Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 121

BJC/OR-1112

Facility
Hazard Categorization/
Classification
and Hazard Analysis
Application Guide












INTERNAL USE ONLY

CAUTION

This document has not been reviewed for patent
and information control matters and should
therefore be considered as an internal use only
document. No external distribution is to be
made with out prior approval of the appropriate
Classification and Information Control Office.


BJC/OR-1112

Facility
Hazard Categorization/
Classification
and Hazard Analysis
Application Guide






Date IssuedApril 2002





Prepared by
Westinghouse Safety Management Solutions LLC
Aiken, South Carolina
under subcontract #23900-BA-ES029F




Prepared for the
U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Environmental Management

BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY LLC
managing
Environmental Management Activities at the
East Tennessee Technology Park
Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
under Contract DE-AC05-98OR22700
for the
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY




APPROVALS


Facility
Hazard Categorization/
Classification
and Hazard Analysis
Application Guide




This document is a new document. It applies to all BJC facilities when preparing
EMHSs and EMHAs.





BJC/OR-1112

April 2002







Dennis O. Myers Date
Nuclear Safety Supervisor
Nuclear Facility Safety Organization
Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC





Bruce A. Wilson Date
Manager
Nuclear Facility Safety Organization
Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC



ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This document is the result of a team effort by the Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC (BJC) and Westinghouse
Safety Management Solutions Mid-America (WSMS). The primary authors of this document were Mr. Kurt R.
B. Menger and Ms. Michele L. Baker.
Mr. Menger has over thirty-two years of experience in operation of nuclear facilities and safety analysis. He has
been recognized for his contributions in such areas as technical support, design and construction oversight,
operational readiness coordination, facility startup functions, operating procedure development and
implementation, training program development and presentation, and safety documentation development and
interpretation. For the last six years, Mr. Menger has been heavily involved in hazard/accident analysis
activities for the Savannah River Site and for other customers in the DOE Complex. He has taken the lead on
several hazard analysis tasks and has played a key role in innovative approaches to hazard analysis. With a
proven record in Plutonium processing facility operations, procedure development, and safety documentation
development, Mr. Menger has been frequently sought as a consultant during the development of a number of
facility Authorization Basis documents. Mr. Menger was appointed as the Manager of the Hazards Analysis
Group at the WSMS Aiken, SC office in April 2001.
Ms. Baker has been a member of the WSMS Hazard Analysis Group for multiple years and in that time has
authored various Safety Analysis documents. She has prepared Emergency Management Hazards Assessment
reports for Oak Ridge facilities, as well as Hazard Analyses, Hazards Assessment Documents, and
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statements for the Savannah River Site.
In addition to Mr. Menger and Ms. Baker, the following individuals provided significant input to the
development of this guide:
Dennis O. Myers (BJC)
Mike Taylor (BJC)
Joe Little (BJC)
Alvin Gwathney (BJC)
Karen Balo (BJC)
Mike Hitchler (WSMS)
Doug Heal (WSMS)
Jim McCormick (WSMS)




iii
CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 PURPOSE ........................................................................................................................................ 1
1.2 INITIAL HAZARD CATEGORIZATION/CLASSIFICATION..................................................... 1
1.3 HAZARD ANALYSIS..................................................................................................................... 2
1.4 FINAL HAZARD CATEGORIZATION......................................................................................... 2
1.5 DOCUMENT OVERVIEW............................................................................................................. 2
2. INITIAL HAZARD CATEGORIZATION/CLASSIFICATION.............................................................. 4
2.1 OVERVIEW..................................................................................................................................... 4
2.2 BASIC CONSIDERATIONS........................................................................................................... 4
2.3 OVERALL APPROACH................................................................................................................. 6
2.4 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION......................................................................................................... 6
2.4.1 Facility Identification........................................................................................................... 7
2.4.2 Facility Description.............................................................................................................. 7
2.5 HAZARDS ....................................................................................................................................... 7
2.5.1 Preliminary Hazard Screening ............................................................................................. 8
2.5.2 Additional Considerations For Hazard Screening................................................................ 9
2.6 FACILITY CATEGORIZATION/CLASSIFICATION................................................................. 10
2.6.1 Facility Categorization for Radiological Hazards .............................................................. 11
2.6.2 Facility Classification for Non-Radiological Hazards........................................................ 16
2.7 DETERMINATION OF CONSEQUENCES................................................................................. 19
2.7.1 Types of calculations ......................................................................................................... 20
2.7.2 Modification of consequence-based classification............................................................. 21
2.8 DOCUMENTATION..................................................................................................................... 24
3. HAZARD ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................................... 25
3.1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION....................................................................................................... 26
3.1.1 Division of the Facility ...................................................................................................... 26
3.1.2 Facility Walkdowns ........................................................................................................... 26
3.1.3 Screening of Standard Industrial Hazards.......................................................................... 28
3.1.4 Results of Hazard Identification......................................................................................... 28
3.2 HAZARD EVALUATION............................................................................................................. 28
3.2.1 Initial Conditions ............................................................................................................... 29
3.2.2 Unmitigated Hazard Evaluation......................................................................................... 32
3.2.3 Mitigated Hazard Evaluation ............................................................................................. 36
3.2.4 Hazard Evaluation Output ................................................................................................. 38
4. FINAL HAZARD CATEGORIZATION................................................................................................ 39
4.1 INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................... 39
4.2 PROCESS....................................................................................................................................... 39
4.3 DOCUMENTATION..................................................................................................................... 40
5. REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................... 41
APPENDIX A ANALYSIS REFERENCES FOR HAZARD
CATEGORIZATION/CLASSIFICATION................................................................. A-1

iv
APPENDIX B TABLES FOR HAZARD ANALYSIS ............................................................................ B-1
APPENDIX C HAZARDS SCREENING CRITERIA............................................................................. C-1
APPENDIX D INTEGRATED WORK PROCESS ................................................................................. D-1

1

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 PURPOSE
Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC (BJC) has developed an integrated approach to the development of Safety
Basis (SB) documentation. This approach is documented in application guides, which detail the development
of major elements of the SB process. This integrated approach is designed to:
Improve the overall quality of SB documentation by ensuring more uniformity of process and consistency
of input parameters.
Reduce the cost and time necessary for development of SB documents by standardizing the techniques
used by the analysts, providing generic templates, and providing site specific information, as appropriate,
thereby eliminating the need to reinvent the wheel for each document.
Reducing the time necessary to update the documents by standardizing the process and ensure consistent
flow of information throughout the process.
Reduce the time necessary for review of the documents by Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC (BJC)
management and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) by getting concurrence on methodology prior to
development of SB documentation.
Increase the involvement of operations in the development of SB documentation. This is considered a key
in effectively implementing SB documents.
A flowchart summarizing the overall process is included as Figure D-1.
Specifically, this application guide presents the structure behind the development of the Initial Hazard
Categorization and Classification, Hazard Analysis, and Final Hazard Categorization. The Initial Hazard
Categorization and Classification provides a valuable measure of the hazards associated with a facility and is
useful in developing a graded approach for the safety analysis required for the facility. The Hazard Analysis is
a detailed evaluation of the hazards within a facility and identifies possible event scenarios along with the
frequency, consequence and risk bin of the event. This information is the chief input into the control selection
process. Final Hazard Categorization is performed based on the Unmitigated Hazard Evaluation (a portion of
the Hazard Analysis) to re-examine the safety documentation needed for the facility.
1.2 INITIAL HAZARD CATEGORIZATION/CLASSIFICATION
The Facility Hazard Categorization/Classification section of the document presents a method for
identifying hazards and categorizing/classifying facilities for safety analysis in accordance with 10 Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) 830 and subpart B and DOE Order 5480.23 (DOE 1992). Hazard identification is
the process that selects hazards for consideration in facility categorization/classification. Facility
categorization/classification reflects the relative magnitude of hazards in a facility, and is used in implementing
a graded approach to facility safety analysis. The graded approach proportions the thoroughness and level of
detail of safety analysis so it is appropriate to the magnitude of the hazard. The term facility is used

2
throughout this document to include physical facilities, operational activities, processes, or experiments
grouped together for safety analysis and documentation.
Each facility is defined and described in the Facility Description Document (FDD), which includes a detailed
description of the facility and a maximum inventory of hazardous material. If the facility is identified as having
only occupational hazards, it should be classified as Other Industrial and requires no further evaluation. However,
if there are unique hazards identified, then a complete initial hazard categorization/classification must be
performed in accordance with this application guide. This guidance document is based on DOE-STD-1027-92,
Change Notice (CN) 1 (DOE 1997), DOE-EM-STD-5502-94 (DOE 1994a) and DOE-STD-1120-98 (DOE
1998), which augment requirements of the DOE Orders mentioned above.
1.3 HAZARD ANALYSIS
This portion of the document presents a method for conducting a Hazard Analysis (HA) consistent with
guidance provided in Chapter 3 of DOE-STD-3009, CN 1 (DOE 2000). The HA provides a comprehensive
assessment of facility hazards and/or accident scenarios that could produce undesirable consequences for BJC
workers and public. The HA methodology includes hazard identification, screening for Standard Industrial
Hazards (SIH), postulating release events, and risk binning of events based on frequency and consequence
levels. The HA provides the core data from which potential follow-on activities, such as accident analysis,
control selection, and emergency preparedness efforts are based.
An HA must be performed for a facility initially categorized as Category 3 or higher, or classified as
Moderate or higher using the methodology described for initial hazard categorization/classification included in
this application guide. If the facility was categorized/classified below these levels (i.e., Radiological, Low or
Other Industrial), other less detailed forms of safety documentation are more appropriate [e.g., Auditable
Safety Analysis (ASA), Health and Safety Plan (HASP)], and an HA is not required to be performed.
1.4 FINAL HAZARD CATEGORIZATION
Once the unmitigated HA is complete, the initial hazard categorization is re-evaluated. The consequences
of the most bounding event are compared to dose thresholds given in DOE-STD-1027-92 to determine the final
hazard categorization. If the facility remains categorized as a Category 3 facility or higher it will require
accident analysis, control selection, and a mitigated HA (in addition to other required safety documentation). If
the final hazard categorization determines that the facility can be downgraded to Radiological, Low, or Other
Industrial, a Hazards Assessment Document (HAD) will be developed and submitted to DOE for approval. It is
important to note that the final hazard categorization is for radiological hazards only; there is no final hazard
classification for non-radiological hazards. Therefore, if a facility was initially classified as Moderate or higher,
it will require accident analysis, control selection, etc., regardless of the outcome of the unmitigated HA.
1.5 DOCUMENT OVERVIEW
The purpose of this document is to provide the approach to be used for facility categorization for
radiological hazards and facility classification for non-radiological hazards including energy sources; and to
identify criteria, requirements, and instructions for implementing the basic considerations for hazard
categorization and classification as well as hazard analysis. A description of allowable modifications for release
fractions, segmentation, and special considerations, and guidance for making qualitative estimate to classify a

3
facility for energy releases is also provided. References used for determining inventory-based categorization
and classification are included in Appendix A.
In addition, this guide provides the recommended format and content for documenting hazard
categorization/classification and for hazard analysis, and discusses the results of unmitigated hazard evaluation
used in conducting final hazard categorization.
The entire SB document process (development and/or revision/periodic updates) is depicted in diagram
form in Appendix D. By reviewing the process, inputs for each item can be determined as well as where the
outputs are used. Figures D-2 and D-3 highlight the inputs necessary to perform the portions of the integrated
work process addressed in this application guide (hazard categorization and/or classification and hazard
analysis) as well as where the outputs from the hazard analysis are used.

4
2. INITIAL HAZARD CATEGORIZATION/CLASSIFICATION
2.1 OVERVIEW
This portion of the document describes the method for performing an Initial Hazard
Categorization/Classification. The categorization/classification process is broken down into two sections:
hazard identification and facility classification.
In selecting hazards for facility categorization/classification, the hazard identification process separates
occupational and unique hazards using screening criteria. If there are only occupational hazards, a facility is
classified as an Other Industrial facility and no further safety analysis is required. Other Industrial facilities
have only occupational hazards that are adequately controlled using established, standard industrial hygiene
and safety management programs. These occupational hazards are not a factor in the facility
categorization/classification method described in this document. Facility hazard categorization/classification is
restricted to human safety issues. Environmental issues are controlled by other existing programs that utilize
requirements, studies, permits, reviews, etc., which are separate from facility safety analysis. Unique hazards are
evaluated by facility safety analysis to determine requirements for structures, systems, components, activities,
or conditions that prevent accidents or mitigate consequences of accidents that could impact facility workers,
other on-site persons, or the public.
Facility categorization is accomplished using an inventory-based method for the evaluation of radiological
materials, and facility classification is accomplished using both inventory-based and consequence-based
methods for the evaluation of non-radiological materials. In addition, qualitative considerations of the level of
the hazard associated with energy sources will be made. Facility categorization and classification is done
separately for radiological and non-radiological hazards, respectively. Facilities are categorized as Category 1,
Category 2, Category 3, or Radiological for hazards characterized by ionizing radiation in accordance with
DOE Order 5480.23, and the DOE Standards mentioned before (DOE 1992, DOE 1994a and DOE 1997).
Facilities are also classified as High, Moderate, or Low for non-radiological hazards in accordance with
DOE Order 5481.1B and DOE-EM-STD-5502-94
1
. It should be noted that designation as a High hazard
facility can be assigned only by DOE. Facilities not categorized/classified at any of these levels are classified as
Other Industrial facilities.
2.2 BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
All facilities should be reviewed to separate occupational and unique hazards. Occupational hazards are
those commonly encountered throughout industry, or are hazards present in quantities that are below the
threshold quantities (TQs) prescribed in DOE guidance or reportable quantities (RQs) determined in the Code
of Federal Regulations (CFR). Occupational hazards are adequately controlled by standard industrial safety
provisions, which include training, procedures, warning signs and labels, protective clothing and equipment,
workplace surveillance, and employee health monitoring programs. Facilities having only occupational hazards
are classified as Other Industrial facilities.

1
Although these references have been cancelled, replacement guides have not been generated. These documents specify standard
current practices across the DOE complex, and; therefore, will be referenced in this guidance document.

5
Unique hazards are of interest in facility safety analysis. The hazard identification process identifies the
unique hazards that require further hazard evaluation and possibly accident analysis. Detailed hazard and
accident analysis, which considers accident initiation, scenario progression, and system and human response to
accident events, is beyond the scope of hazard identification and facility categorization/classification. These are
the subjects of facility safety analysis.
Facility categorization/classification involves an inventory-based approach for radiological materials, and
an inventory-based approach combined with a consequence-based evaluation for non-radiological materials.
The facility hazard categorization/classification is a measure of the potential severity of impacts of releasing
identified hazardous materials. To determine facility categorization the inventory of each identified radiological
material is compared to categorization criteria established by the DOE. This inventory-based method of facility
categorization does not require quantitative determination of release rates and dispersion of airborne hazardous
materials, nor does it require quantitative determination of the probability of events that could release
hazardous material. The inventory-based method does not take credit for accident prevention or mitigating
actions; however, adjustments to selected categorization criteria are allowed to apply realistic release fractions
when different from those used as the basis for the criteria. Also, it is permissible to take credit for facility
segmentation. According to DOE-STD-1027-92, The concept of independent facility segments should be
applied where facility features preclude bringing material together or causing harmful interaction from a
common severe phenomenon. For facility classification, the inventory of each non-radiological material is
first compared to classification criteria established by the DOE. If the inventory exceeds the criteria, the non-
radiological material must be evaluated further using a consequence-based analysis.
Unique hazards included in hazard identification and facility categorization/classification are:
1. Radiological hazards associated with ionizing radiation. These include naturally radioactive materials,
man-made radioisotopes, radioactive surface contamination, radioactive waste, and ionizing radiation
from fission reactions or inadvertent nuclear criticality.
2. Non-radiological hazards associated with dangerous properties of materials. These include materials that are
toxic by human contact, ingestion, or inhalation; carcinogens; and biohazards. Also included are materials
that are gases, or which become gases at ambient conditions, which could pose a threat of asphyxiation by
displacement of breathing air. Materials characterized by flammability, self-reaction, or explosive
tendencies are included. Incompatible materials normally separated, which produce reaction products with
the hazardous characteristics just described, should be included in this category unless segmentation
precludes mixing. Also, combustion products from accidental fires should be included in this category.
3. Non-radiological hazards associated with energy sources. Energy sources should be included if they could
significantly adversely impact persons within the facility or beyond facility boundaries. Energy sources
include electrical energy, kinetic energy, pressurized containers and equipment, potential energy, and
devices that can produce either ionizing or non-ionizing radiation by on-off modes (lasers, particle
accelerators, and X-ray machines). Qualitative considerations are used in facility classification for energy
releases. It is necessary to estimate the severity of energy releases considering the location of potentially
impacted persons. The locations of interest are the facility where the hazard is located, on-site locations
beyond the facility boundary, and off-site locations.
Hazard identification and facility classification should be documented in a standardized format. All
hazards in some facilities might be determined by the hazard screening to be occupational hazards. In these
cases the facility is classified as an Other Industrial facility. Hazard identification documentation should be
prepared for Other Industrial facilities to provide a record of the hazards considered in hazard screening and to
record the outcome of hazard screening. Those facilities that have unique hazards should be

6
categorized/classified as previously described, and documentation should record the
categorization/classification and the basis for the results.
2.3 OVERALL APPROACH
Hazard identification and facility categorization/classification should typically be accomplished by
performing the following tasks in the order listed. Details are provided in later sections.
Review the FDD and other documents that describe the facility and associated processes. Consult
operations and engineering personnel to determine the processes and functions performed in the facility.
Determine the systems and subsystems to be evaluated in organizing the information about hazards and
facility classification.
Visit (walk-down) the facility and interview appropriate operations and engineering personnel to
determine which hazards are present. Use the screening criteria discussed in the Hazard Screening
section to separate occupational and unique hazards. Record information about the facility and hazards.
Information should identify the facility and the amount and form of the hazards.
If the facility contains only occupational hazards, classify the facility as an Other Industrial facility and
document the result and basis for the determination.
For facilities with unique hazards, use information about the hazards as described in the following three
steps to categorize/classify the facility. Categorize/classify the facility for both radiological and non-
radiological hazards, respectively. Appendix A provides convenient reference sources that may be used to
perform these tasks.
Compare the maximum allowable amount of each radionuclide with its RQ and TQ to determine the
inventory-based categorization of the facility for radiological hazards. If appropriate, adjust only the TQ for
Category 2 categorization by applying alternative release fractions. Alternative release fractions are not to
be used to adjust Category 3 TQs. Segmentation and special considerations may also be used in facility
categorization for radiological hazards. Adjustments, segmentation, the treatment of mixtures and/or
multiple radioisotopes, and special considerations are described in subsequent sections.
Perform consequence-based evaluation for the hazardous chemicals that exceed their respective RQs.
Segmentation, the treatment of mixtures and/or multiple chemicals, and special considerations are
described in subsequent sections.
Identify unique hazards associated with energy sources and classify the facility based on judgment and
qualitative estimates of the health and safety consequences if the energy is released.
Prepare documentation of the hazard identification and facility classification activities according to
requirements given in this guidance document.
2.4 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Hazard identification is a structured process for identifying radioactive materials, hazardous chemicals,
and sources of energy that are to be used in facility hazard classification. The process involves (a) identifying
the facility or activity of interest; (b) dividing the facility or activity into systems, subsystems, or phases; (c)

7
recognizing hazards, (d) separating occupational and unique hazards, and (e) recording data about the unique
hazards for use in facility hazard classification.
The key objective of hazard identification is the separation of occupational hazards and unique hazards.
This is accomplished by first reviewing materials, energy sources, and operating conditions associated with the
facility to determine hazards that are present. These hazards are then compared with screening criteria to
determine if the hazards are occupational hazards or unique hazards. If there are only occupational hazards in a
facility, the facility is classified as an Other Industrial facility. No further safety analysis is necessary, and
appropriate documentation is prepared to record that this decision has been taken. Information is recorded
about unique hazards for use in facility classification.
2.4.1 Facility Identification
The hazard identification process should clearly define the project, facility, or activity for which the
hazards are examined. The location, functions, boundaries, and interfaces should be described so there is no
uncertainty about the identity of the facility for which hazards are reviewed. This information should be
documented in the FDD.
2.4.2 Facility Description
Information necessary to describe a facility may be obtained from the FDD. If additional information is
needed, it can be obtained by (a) visiting the facility of interest; (b) discussions with persons who will be
operating the facility; (c) discussions with designers, safety personnel, and others familiar with the functional
requirements of the facility; and (d) review of applicable design documents, procurement specifications,
operating and maintenance procedures.
The facility of interest should be divided into structures, systems, subsystems, and phases appropriate for the
organized presentation of data about hazards. The organization should be designed to assist a person unfamiliar with
the facility or activity in searching, retrieving, or using the data for activities related to facility safety analysis.
As an example, an enriched uranium facility which converts UF
6
to UF
4
could be divided into the following
systems: feed autoclave, sampling autoclave, fluorine supply, hydrogen supply, reactor, cold baths/chemical traps,
and the potassium hydroxide supply. Avoid dividing a facility to the component level of detail (e.g., tanks,
pumps, piping, etc.) because unnecessary complexity may compromise the usefulness of information.
It may be desirable to divide a large facility into segments and evaluate the hazards in each segment
independently. This can be an efficient way to evaluate a large facility containing independent processes with
different hazards. Caution is advised to ensure the segments are actually independent before evaluating
segments independently. To be independent, failures in one segment must not propagate into another segment
and accumulative release of hazards must not occur from multiple segments due to a common event (e.g., a fire
that starts in one segment cannot propagate to another segment).
2.5 HAZARDS
Materials, energy sources, and operating conditions should be considered as hazards if they satisfy any of
the criteria listed below. Hazards to be considered include:
Any element, compound, or hazardous waste appearing in Table 302.4 of 40 CFR 302.

8
Any material listed in 29 CFR 1910.119, Appendix A, List of Highly Hazardous Chemicals, Toxics, and
Reactives.
Any material listed in 40 CFR 355, Emergency Planning and Notification.
Any radioactive substance.
Any known carcinogen: Go to http://hmweb.ctd.ornl.gov/complete_carcinogen.html.
Any gas that is denser than air and could cause asphyxiation.
Any other material that experience or knowledge indicates to have hazardous characteristics such as
toxicity, flammability, explosiveness, reactivity, or corrosiveness. Reaction products not normally present in the
facility, but which could result from inadvertent mixing of incompatible materials should be included.
Intermediate substances that are produced and subsequently consumed in processes in the facility should
be included. Hazardous characteristics of combustion products should be considered.
Energy sources, if loss of control might impact facility workers, other on-site persons, or the public. The
types of energy included are electrical, kinetic (e.g., flywheels), pressurized containers and equipment,
and potential energy associated with elevated mass. Lasers, particle accelerators, and X-ray equipment
should be included as hazards.
2.5.1 Preliminary Hazard Screening
The first step of the hazard identification activity is Preliminary Hazard Screening (PHS), a straightforward
sorting process used to determine if more detailed hazard screening analysis is needed. Only those facilities or
processes that are either Other Industrial in nature or obviously benign are screened out during the PHS
process. If there is any unresolved question as to the magnitude of the hazards, the facility or process is passed
on to the more detailed facility classification step. The PHS step may be bypassed if it is extremely likely that
the hazard level will be at least Low, if an inappropriate effort would be required to conduct the PHS
evaluation, or it is apparent that a more detailed analysis is needed.
A recommended PHS worksheet is presented in Attachment G of BJC-NS-1002. The Action Basis
column should include information regarding the maximum anticipated inventory of a material and the form
(e.g., liquid, gas, solid) of the material. It is important to indicate the physical form of a hazardous material. For
example, massive shapes of uranium are not easily combusted because of the small surface to mass ratio, but
fine machine turnings of uranium (with large surface to mass ratio) self-ignite in air. If a hazardous substance is
in a solution (or mixture), its fraction, or percentage, in the solution (or mixture) should be specified.
Hazard screening criteria are based on: 1) whether the inventory of a material is (a) less than the TQs in
DOE-STD-1027-92 or the RQ in Appendix B of 40 CFR 302 for radiological materials, or (b) less than the
RQ in Table 302.4 from 40 CFR 302 for toxic materials; 2) whether industry standards are satisfied; or
3) whether knowledge or experience indicates the materials are hazardous. Values of various chemical and
physical properties for a material can be found in handbooks or manuals [e.g., National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 1994, Perry, R.H. and Chilton, C.H. 1973, and Sax, N.I. and
R.J. Lewis 1992] or in Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS). National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
Standard 49 (NFPA 1991) is useful in separating occupational and unique hazards. In addition, chemicals
should be screened against the RQs and Threshold Planning Quantities (TPQs) of 40 CRF 355, the TQs of 29
CFR 1910.119, and the TQs of 40 CFR 68. If the inventory of the facility is above any of these screening
quantities, develop programs in accordance with the CFR(s) in which the screening quantities were exceeded.

9
Screening criteria for hazardous energy sources are also included in the PHS worksheet. These criteria are
based on quantitative levels, satisfaction of industry standards, qualitative evaluations, experience, and
judgment. These criteria are intended to screen out from consideration those energy sources that could not
benefit significantly from facility safety analysis. Routine energy sources that are adequately controlled by
industrial safety programs are eliminated from further evaluation.
2.5.2 Additional Considerations For Hazard Screening
The RQs were selected as screening criteria to establish the boundary between Low hazard and Other Industrial
facilities. If an RQ is not available for a known toxic chemical or combustion product [e.g., a material for
which the NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards lists as Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health
(IDLH)], the analyst may choose to proceed with the consequence-based evaluation or determine a substitute
RQ. The methodology for determining a substitute RQ is provided in Attachment 4 to Appendix A.
Consistent with the guidance in DOE-STD-5502-94 and DOE-STD-1027-92 for considering the
simultaneous release of multiple radionuclides, the combined effects associated with the simultaneous release
of multiple hazardous materials (e.g., mixtures) should also be considered. During the initial hazard screening,
credit should not be taken for facility segmentation unless it is obviously appropriate.
2.5.2.1 Nature of process
Consideration for the screening of material for categorization/classification purposes due to nature of
process is allowed. If hazardous material cannot be released in an unmitigated event based on its form,
location, dispersability, and interaction with other materials, it can be excluded from the inventory evaluated
for hazard categorization/classification. For facilities with inventories containing fissile material, credit may be
taken if nature of process precludes the potential for criticality. In this case the standard TQs from DOE-STD-
1027 should be used as opposed to the criticality mass limits. It should be noted, though, that this material
should be listed in the inventory included in the FDD, regardless of availability for release.
2.5.2.2 Treatment of mixtures/multiple chemicals
When two or more toxic substances are present and could be released simultaneously as a result of a
credible accident, their combined effect should be considered. It should be noted that for some facilities with
hazardous materials that are distributed in small quantities in separate areas of the facility, or in dilute
concentrations throughout the facility, a simultaneous release of the total inventory is not feasible. Examples of
such facilities may be burial sites or storage facilities. If release of the total inventory is not assumed, the
documentation must indicate the maximum expected amount of hazardous material that could be released in
one event and the rationale for considering less than the total inventory.
When considering the release of multiple materials, without information to the contrary, the effects of the
different materials should be considered as additive. That is, if the sum of the following fractions,
M
1
/RQ
1
+M
2
/RQ
2
+ . . . +M
n
/RQ
n
exceeds 1.0, then the limit of the mixture should be considered as being
exceeded. M indicates the mass of the toxic material being evaluated, and RQ, the corresponding limit. It may
be unreasonable to determine ratios and use the sum-of-ratios approach for facilities with a large number of
hazardous chemicals. Facilities that may have dozens or hundreds of chemicals include storage facilities and waste
facilities. Hazardous chemicals present in amounts nominally less than approximately 10% of their RQ values
may be excluded from the summation in such facilities. Exceptions to this approach may be taken when there is
good reason to believe that the chief effects of the different harmful substances are not in fact additive, but
independent, as when purely local effects on different organs of the body are produced by the various components
of the mixture. Consideration of synergistic action would normally be considered outside the scope of hazard

10
screening. However, if a mixture of hazardous chemicals has known synergistic chemicals that can be identified
and characterized by inspection by an industrial hygiene staff member, synergism should be considered.
2.5.2.3 Facility segmentation/consideration of simultaneous releases of multiple hazards
When considering the simultaneous release of multiple hazardous materials, an evaluation may indicate
that facility segmentation is appropriate and that the simultaneous release of all the hazards is not credible. If
facility segmentation is appropriate, an evaluation of the sum of the RQ fractions should only consider those
materials present in the same facility segment. A consideration of credible accidents is normally required to
determine whether multiple hazards can be released from a credible accident. This scenario development and
analysis is beyond the scope of the PHS. Therefore, unless it is obviously inappropriate, the PHS should
normally consider the simultaneous release of all hazardous materials present in a facility or facility segment.
2.5.2.4 Use of release fractions
The RQs from Table 302.4 of 40 CFR 302 are based on the standard physical characteristics of materials
at ambient conditions. If a material is present in an unusual form (e.g., a material that is normally considered to
be a liquid is absorbed in a powder), it is appropriate to compare the material at risk (MAR) to the RQ by
considering the release fraction.
The release fraction should be used to determine the magnitude of the MAR by multiplying the total
inventory of a toxic material by the ratio of the release fraction of the material in its actual form to the release
fraction appropriate for the typical form (e.g.; gas or liquid) for the material. The MAR should then be
compared with the RQ for each material.
For example, if a gas is present in an aqueous semivolatile solution, it may be reasonable to assume the
release fraction of the gas is 0.5 instead of the more typical 1.0 release fraction for a gas. The 0.5 and 1.0
release fractions are based on the release fraction information provided in Attachment 1 of DOE-STD-1027-92.
Therefore, the MAR to be compared with the RQ would be (0.5)/(1.0)(MAR).
2.5.2.5 Exposure duration
A 24-hr maximum exposure duration is assumed in DOE-STD-1027-92. Therefore, the MAR should be
based on the maximum amount of material released over 24 hrs. To determine the amount released, use the
total amount of MAR if the release duration is less than 24 hrs, but if the release occurs over a longer time,
estimate the amount released in a 24-hr period.
An example of a facility where this may be an important consideration is an in situ vitrification process. In
situ vitrification typically occurs slowly over a period of days, and the release of toxic substances would be
gradual. The MAR to be compared with RQ values should be obtained by estimating the maximum amount to
be released in a 24-hr period.
2.6 FACILITY CATEGORIZATION/CLASSIFICATION
Facility categorization/classification considers radiological and non-radiological hazards separately. In
decreasing order of importance to facility safety, facilities are categorized for radiological hazards as
Category 1, Category 2, Category 3, or Radiological. Similarly, facilities are classified for non-radiological
hazards as High, Moderate, or Low. If a facility does not qualify for one of these categorizations or
classifications it is classified as Other Industrial.

11
Facility radiological hazard categorization consists of determining the inventory-based categorization for
each radioactive material identified using the process. Non-radiological hazards (e.g., toxic materials, energy
sources, reactive materials) that were not screened out during the hazard screening process are further analyzed
using a consequence-based evaluation to determine the facility classification. Within restrictions described
later, the categorization/classification may then be modified as necessary to take credit for segmentation or to
reflect release fractions that are different from the release fraction upon which criteria are based. An example
of the resulting facility categorization/classification might be Category 2 for radiological hazards and Low for
non-radiological hazards. If the example had only occupational non-radiological hazards, the example facility
categorization/classification would be Category 2 for radiological hazards with negligible non-radiological
hazards. The term Other Industrial Facility should only be used when both radiological and non-radiological
type hazards in the facility are determined to be occupational hazards using criteria in this document.
2.6.1 Facility Categorization for Radiological Hazards
2.6.1.1 Process
The first step of facility categorization for radiological hazards is to compare the inventory of
radionuclides to the RQs given in Appendix B of 40 CFR 302 and the TQs in Table A.1 of
DOE-STD-1027-92. The method for determining inventory amounts is explained in earlier sections addressing
hazard identification. The inventory-based categorization is determined based on the comparison of inventory,
RQ and TQ values and using the criteria described in Sect. 2.6.1.2.
The inventory-based categorization should next be compared with results of previous hazard
categorization activities for similar facilities. Determine if the inventory-based categorization is consistent with
experience in categorizing other facilities. Determine, based on technical expertise, if the results are consistent
with what is expected. For those facilities with questionable inventory-based categorization, use techniques
described in Sect. 2.6.1.3 in order to modify the inventory-based classification.
Select either the inventory-based categorization or the modified inventory-based categorization for each
radiological hazard.
Hazard identification and facility categorization documentation should record the basis for the facility
categorization for radiological hazards.
2.6.1.2 Criteria
The radionuclide inventory is compared to criteria listed below to categorize a facility for radiological
hazards. Inventory refers to the maximum amount of a radionuclide expected to be present in a facility at any
time. Figure D-2 in Appendix D provides a flowchart for the inventory-based categorization of radiological
hazards.
A facility is Category 1 if it is a Category A nuclear reactor with steady-state power level greater that 20 MW(t),
or it is designated Category 1 by the Cognizant Secretarial Officer or the designated representative.
If the inventory is equal to or greater than the Category 2 TQ in Table A.1 from Attachment 1, DOE-
STD-1027-92, then the facility is Category 2 unless it is Category 1.
If the inventory is equal to or greater that the Category 3 TQ in Table A.1 from Attachment 1, DOE-STD-
1027-92, but less than the Category 2 TQ, then the facility is Category 3.

12
If the inventory is equal to or greater than the RQ in 40 CFR 302.4, but less than the Category 3 TQ, then
the facility is Radiological.
In addition to the above criteria, facilities are Category 2 (or greater) if the inventory of fissionable
radionuclides
233
U,
235
U, or
239
Pu is equal to or greater than 500, 700, or 450 g, respectively, unless
segmentation or the nature of the process precludes the potential for a criticality. For combinations of
233
U,
235
U, and
239
Pu, the threshold for Category 2 is 450 g. The site Nuclear Criticality Safety organization should be
consulted for guidance on other fissionable materials (e.g.,
243
Cm). If there is no potential for criticality due to
segmentation or the nature of the process, the basis for this conclusion should be included in the documented
basis for facility categorization (HAD, see Section 4.3).
The combined hazard associated with n different radionuclides (whether elements or isotopes) is
determined by evaluating the sum of the ratios of the individual radionuclide inventories and their RQs. Based
on the radiological material inventory, a facility is an Other Industrial facility if the following condition is true:
M
1
/RQ
1
+ M
2
/RQ
2
+ M
3
/RQ
3
+ ...M
n
/RQ
n
< 1.0,(1)
M
n
is the inventory of radionuclide n and RQ
n
is the reportable quantity of radionuclide n from
40 CFR 302.4. The inventory is the maximum amount of material that could be present at the location of
interest. It is not the amount that could be released.
For a mixture of radionuclides, or more than one isotope of the same element, in which equation (1) gives a
value greater than one, the ratios of inventory to appropriate TQ should be combined to determine the category
of the mixture. With Cat3TQ being the Category 3 TQ, the combination in equation (2) below is evaluated:
M
1
/Cat3TQ
1
+ M
2
/Cat3TQ
2
+ M
3
/Cat3TQ
3
+ ...M
n
/Cat3TQ
n
< 1.0 (2)
If the sum in equation (2) is less than one, the facility should be categorized a Radiological facility, given
that the combination in equation (1) is equal to or greater than one. If the combination is equal to or greater
than one, the following equation should be evaluated:
M
1
/Cat2TQ
1
+ M
2
/Cat2TQ
2
+ M
3
/Cat2TQ
3
+ ...M
n
/Cat2TQ
n
< 1.0 (3)
If the sum in equation (3) is less than one, the facility should be classified as Category 3 given that
equation (2) is equal to or greater than one. If the sum in equation 3 is equal to or greater than one, the facility
should be classified as Category 2, unless there is reason to classify it as Category 1. Additional considerations
regarding the summation of radionuclides for Category 2 facilities can be found in DOE-STD-1027-92. These
considerations are that (1) it is necessary to consult the individual threshold values only if an isotope is being
isolated and collected for some purpose and (2) facilities are considered category 2 if the potential for criticality
exists in the storage arrays and processing means used. See the standard for a more detailed discussion on these
considerations.
2.6.1.3 Modification of inventory-based categorization
There are two basic ways to modify the inventory-based categorization: (1) adjust the TQ for a different
release fraction, and (2) take credit for segmentation. Each of these is described below. Categorization is based
on an unmitigated release of available radionuclides. This means categorization may consider material quantity,
form, location, dispersibility, and interaction with available energy sources. However, categorization may not
take credit for safety devices whose function is to prevent or mitigate consequences of accidents.

13
Adjustment of Category 2 threshold quantities for alternative release fractions
The TQs given in DOE-STD-1027-92 are intended to be generally conservative for a broad range of possible
situations and may be used directly for determination as to whether a facility exceeds Category 2. In addition,
adjustments of Category 2 TQs are explicitly described in DOE-STD-1027-92 for situations where the credible
release fractions can be shown to be significantly different than these values based on physical and chemical form and
available dispersive energy. The basis for using alternate release fractions, and therefore, alternate TQs, must be
provided in the hazard categorization documentation and further supported in the Hazards Analysis. Table 1
lists the release fractions assumed by DOE as a simplified means of providing conservative estimates of the
amount of material released in establishing Category 2 TQ values in DOE-STD-1027-92.
Table 1. Release fractions assumed by DOE for Category 2 threshold quantities
(from page A-9, Attachment 1, DOE-STD-1027-92)
Material Release Fraction
Gases
(tritium, krypton, xenon, argon, radon, chlorine)
1.0
Highly Volatile or Combustible
(phosphorus, sulfur, potassium, iodine, sodium, bromine)
0.5
Semi Volatile
(selenium, mercury, cesium, polonium, tellurium, ruthenium, carbon)
10
-2

Solid, Powder, or Liquid
(all materials not listed above)
10
-3


For example, DOE based the TQ for solid uranium on a release fraction f
i
= 10
-3
. If the physical and chemical
characteristics of the release phenomena can be shown to involve an alternative release fraction, f
a
= 10
-4
, then
it is permissible to adjust the TQ in Table A.1 from Attachment 1, DOE-STD-1027-92 as follows:
Cat2TQ
adjusted
= Cat2TQ
STD-1027-92
f
i
/f
a
(4)
Cat2TQ
adjusted
= Cat2TQ
STD-1027-92
10 (5)
Alternative release fractions may be determined by methods described in Airborne Release Fractions/Rates
and Respirable Fractions for Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities, (DOE 1994b). It is noted that release fractions
listed in Table 1 are not to be used for any other purpose than to adjust Category 2 TQs listed in Table A.1
from Attachment 1, DOE-STD-1027-92. It should also be noted that if the default release fractions are known
to be non-conservative for a particular scenario (e.g., burning uranium with water present), more conservative
release fractions should be applied.
Segmentation
Within a given facility there may be a wide variety of independent, co-located operations. The concept of
segmentation is used in facility hazard classification to avoid placing inappropriate or excessive requirements
on simple co-located operations. For segments to be independent, a single initiating event, such as an
earthquake, must not result in a release of inventory from two or more segments. It is not necessary to include
the total inventory of radioactive and special nuclear materials in determining a facilitys inventory when
segments can be shown to be independent. The concept of independent segments should be applied where
facility features (not safety features) preclude bringing material together or causing harmful interaction from a
common severe phenomenon. When segmentation is used to modify the inventory-based categorization,
justification of the independence of the segments should be included in the documentation of hazard

14
identification and facility categorization. The concept of segmentation may be applied to facilities that might be
initially categorized as Category 2 or 3 without segmentation. That is, an initial facility categorization of
Category 2 might become Category 3 or Radiological, or an initial categorization of Category 3 might become
Radiological by applying segmentation.
Segmentation may be applied to categorize facilities for criticality hazards. To accomplish this, the
inventory, location, and distribution of fissionable materials must be known. If it can be shown that facility
features preclude bringing sufficient material together for criticality, segmentation may be used to determine
facility categorization. For segmentation to be applied, it is also necessary to show that a common severe
phenomenon (e.g., a seismically induced building fire) will not cause interaction of fissionable materials in a
manner that could result in criticality.
2.6.1.4 Special considerations for radiological hazards
It is recognized that broad application of general criteria might result in unrealistic categorization of some
facilities. There may be unique situations that require special considerations for meaningful hazard evaluation
and facility categorization. The following sections discuss special considerations where it is difficult or
inappropriate to apply inventory-based criteria.
Effect of physical and chemical conditions on criticality
The facility is Category 2 (unless otherwise designated Category 1) if 500 g of
233
U, 700 g of
235
U,
450 g of
239
Pu, or 450 g of any combination of these isotopes are present and there is potential for criticality,
and the record should indicate this is the basis. If other fissionable nuclides (e.g.,
243
Cm) are present, consult
the site Nuclear Criticality Safety office for information about critical mass, and categorize the facility as
Category 2 whenever there is potential for criticality. When physical/chemical conditions, segmentation, or
unique features of the process indicate that criticality is not physically possible or credible, even though these
amounts are exceeded, then it is necessary to record the basis for determining that there is no potential for
criticality.
Criticality may be incredible because of the nature of the process, or because of the combination of natural
nuclear properties and the physical/chemical form of fissionable materials. For example, a storage facility might
contain a large quantity of depleted uranium billets. A small fraction of depleted uranium is
235
U, and the total
amount of
235
U might exceed the 700 g that require that the facility be Category 2. However, nuclear properties
and the physical condition of the uranium make criticality physically impossible. In this case, DOE-STD-1027-92
has allowed categorization to be based on TQs of 1.9 10
6
g and 1.1 10
8
g of
235
U for Category 3 and 2,
respectively. It should be noted that the other isotopes (e.g.,
238
U and
232
U) must also be considered in
establishing the hazard categorization.
Sealed sources
Some facilities contain sealed sources that are used for checking, testing, or calibrating instruments or to
provide radiation fields for specific, non-process purposes. DOE-STD-1027-92 states, Sealed radioactive
sources that are engineered to pass the special form testing specified by the U.S. Department of Transportation
(DOT) in 49 CFR 173.469 or testing specified by American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N43.6,
Sealed Radioactive Sources, Categorization, may be excluded from summation of a facilitys radioactive
inventory. DOE-STD-1027-92 also requires that such facilities ...must have in place a source control policy
that complies with DOE Notice 5400.9, Sealed Source Control Policy, and the source control policy specified
in Article 431 of the DOE Radiological Control Manual. This is interpreted to mean that facilities need not be
categorized as Category 3 or higher if sealed sources meet these conditions, or are properly stored.

15
Facilities with sealed sources, in quantities that exceed the RQs, which satisfy the above-mentioned DOT
or ANSI and DOE testing requirements should be categorized as Radiological facilities. If sealed sources do
not meet these requirements, Radiological categorization may be requested (based on available data, use, leak
testing, etc.) in writing to the site Facility Safety organization. In either case, source control policy meeting
DOE N-5400.9 and the Radiological Control Manual is essential to the Radiological categorization. Otherwise,
the source radionuclide inventory is compared with RQ and TQ values to determine the inventory-based
facility categorization.
It is important to note that even though the inventory of the sources does not need to be explicitly
considered in the facility categorization, the material may still be a hazard. More specifically, if the source
contains a fissile radionuclide, it must still be considered for Nuclear Criticality Safety purposes.
Surface contamination
DOE Order 5480.11 and 10 CFR 835 establish requirements for protection of workers from ionizing
radiation in occupational settings. These standards establish controls and set exposure limits for direct radiation,
ingestion and inhalation of radioactive substances, and contact with surface radioactive contamination.
Radiological Areas are required where work surface contamination exceeds the established levels. Appendix A
contains discussion about these levels, taken from Surface Radioactivity Guides from Attachment 2 of
DOE Order 5480.11.
The measured amount of surface contamination should be compared with the levels of fixed, removable,
or both fixed and removable surface contamination in the Surface Radioactivity Guides. If surface radioactivity
measurements are greater than those values, the facility should be categorized as Radiological. Facilities with
measured radioactivity equal to or less than values in the Surface Radioactivity Guides may be considered
Other Industrial facilities unless the non-radiological hazards require a higher classification.
Radioactive waste
Radioactive waste is found in waste storage or disposal areas, burial sites, tanks containing liquid or
sludge, residual non-fixed contamination, or in areas undergoing active remediation. For such waste facilities,
determine the inventory or administrative limits for radionuclides. If the inventory or limit is known with
reasonable accuracy, determine the category by applying the inventory-based categorization criteria. If this
results in an unreasonably high categorization, modification can be made as described in the next paragraph. If
the inventory is not known and cannot in a practical sense be known with reasonable accuracy or if the
inventory is currently not limited administratively, consult Facility Safety for assistance in determining the
facility categorization. When categorizing waste facilities, thoroughly document the analysis and assumptions
upon which the categorization is based.
Waste facilities often consist of radionuclides at low levels of concentration distributed non-uniformly
throughout a large volume. If the maximum radioactivity in a facility is known with reasonable accuracy and is
less than 0.002 Ci/g of waste, the facility may be classified as an Other Industrial facility, provided there are no
other non-radiological hazards that require a higher classification. Facilities with greater than 0.002 Ci/g
might be categorized unrealistically high using inventory-based criteria simply because of the large total waste
volume. In such cases, the radioactive waste facility inventory-based categorization may be modified using
adjustments to the release fraction or segmentation. Inactive underground waste burial sites and underground
contamination sites may be categorized as Radiological facilities when all of the following criteria are met and
documented.
a. The soil covering or backfill is maintained to the initial condition by site inspection and maintenance programs.

16
b. Natural phenomena will not (1) suddenly remove the soil or backfill covering the site or (2) suddenly
transport the contaminants through the intact soil or backfill to a location above ground.
c. The sites are clearly marked and controlled in a manner consistent with the contamination levels.
d. The sites are controlled by site procedures for excavation and penetration work, and are not near areas in
which excavation and penetration are allowed. Future excavation and penetration work must evaluated
per these criteria.
e. Based on best available information, the underground site does not contain explosives, reactives, or other
energy sources, which if uncontrolled, could propel contamination from the ground.
f. The site either contains less than 700 g
235
U fissionable equivalent mass or criticality accidents are
precluded by segmentation or nature of process.
Material in qualified shipping containers
DOE-STD-1027-92 indicates that material contained in DOT Type B shipping containers (with or without
overpack) should not be considered part of a facilitys inventory for categorization as Category 3 or higher (see
page A-2 of the standard). It should be noted that DOT containers must be used within their design limits and
the certificates of compliance must be current. If the total facility inventory of radioactive material is inside
qualified containers, the facility may be classified as an Other Industrial facility, provided there are no non-
radiological hazards that require a higher classification.
2.6.2 Facility Classification for Non-Radiological Hazards
2.6.2.1 Process
Each of the non-radiological hazards (e.g., toxic materials, energy sources, reactive materials) that were
not screened out during the hazard screening will be analyzed further to determine the facility classification for
non-radiological hazards. A consequence-based evaluation will be used to determine the facility classification
for toxic materials. The consequence-based evaluation determines the potential health effects to both on-site
and off-site populations due to a release of toxic material. The consequence-based classification is determined
based on a comparison of the health effects to the criteria identified in the tables below. Classification of other
non-radiological hazards (e.g., energy sources) is discussed later.
The results of the facility classification should next be compared with results of previous facility
classifications for similar facilities to determine if it is reasonable and consistent with experience. For a
consequence-based evaluation, the analyst should consider the impact of the key assumptions used in the
analysis. The appropriateness of the classification should also consider whether or not the hazards need further
analysis to adequately understand the nature of the hazard or to define the need for special controls for safety
and the results should be documented as described in this application guide.
2.6.2.2 Criteria for classification of hazardous materials
DOE Order 5481.1B indicates that consideration should be given to classifying non-radiological hazards
as Low, Moderate, and High. DOE has issued guidance such as DOE-EM-STD-5502-94 that provides
additional information useful in determining the hazard classification of non-radiological hazards.
DOE-EM-STD-5502-94 classifies facilities into four categories: (1) Nuclear, (2) Non-nuclear,

17
(3) Radiological, and (4) Other Industrial. The DOE-EM-STD-5502-94 Other Industrial classification
corresponds to hazards below the Radiological and Low Hazard thresholds.
The general non-radiological hazard screening health effects guidelines shown in Table 2 are based on the
information provided in DOE Order 5481.1B and in standard DOE-EM-STD-5502-94. Table 3 presents the
criteria for the evaluation of toxic materials. Figure D-2 in Appendix D provides a flowchart for the
consequence-based method of facility classification.
Table 2. DOE non-radiological hazard screening guidelines
Hazard Class Guideline
High Those with the potential for on-site or off-site impacts to large numbers of persons or for major
impacts to the environment.
Moderate Those that present considerable potential on-site impacts to people or to the environment, but at
most, only minor off-site impacts.
Low Those that present minor on-site and negligible off-site impacts to people or to the environment.
Other Industrial Defined in DOE-STD-5502 as those that are below the Radiological and Low hazard thresholds.


18
Table 3. Non-radiological hazard screening health effects criteria
Hazard Class On-site Off-site
HIGH Designated by DOE
MODERATE Irreversible effects to any individual not
present in the immediate operating area of
the accident.
Irreversible effect to any person.
OR
Reversible effect to a large number of people.
LOW Irreversible effects to a few individuals
present in the immediate operating area of
the accident.
OR
Reversible effect to a large or very large
number of people.
Reversible effect to a few people.
OTHER INDUSTRIAL Consequences less than that defined for Low. Consequences less than that defined for Low.
Irreversible effect is defined as a significant effect on a persons quality of life, e.g., serious injury.
Reversible effect is defined as no significant effect on a persons quality of life, e.g., minor injury.
The terms used to describe the number of people affected are defined as follows: few - less than tens; large - tens; very
large - hundreds.

The guidance provided in Table 4 can be used to determine whether a chemical exposure should be
considered irreversible, reversible, or negligible.
In addition to the criteria provided in Table 4, Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs)
developed by the American Industrial Hygiene Association may be used to predict the severity of health effect
associated with chemical exposures:
1. Concentrations less than ERPG-1 can be considered as having negligible health effects,
2. Concentrations between ERPG-1 and ERPG-2 can be considered as resulting in reversible health effects, and
3. Concentrations above ERPG-2 can be considered as resulting in irreversible health effects.
It should be noted that ERPGs only currently exist for a limited number of chemicals. Therefore, ERPG
alternatives must be used for many chemicals. The DOE-Headquarters (HQ) Office of Emergency Planning
and Operations Subcommittee on Consequence Assessment and Protective Actions has developed a hierarchy
of alternative criteria, which is included in Attachment 2 of Appendix A.

19
Table 4. Chemical health effect exposure levels
1

IRREVERSIBLE CONCENTRATION > 1.0 IDLH
REVERSIBLE 0.1 * IDLH CONCENTRATION 1.0 IDLH
NEGLIGIBLE CONCENTRATION < 0.1 IDLH
1
Exposure levels shown are only to be used for facility classification.
Chemical concentrations should be the highest five-min time-weighted-average (TWA).
If IDLH values are not available, use the following as equivalent. They are listed in decreasing order of preference.
0.1 * LC
50

1.0 * LC
LO

0.01 * LD
50

0.1 * LD
LO

500 * TLV
IDLH = Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health, a maximum concentration from which, in the event of respirator failure, a healthy
male could escape within 30 min without experiencing any escape impairing or irreversible health effects.
LC
50
= The concentration (ppm or mg/m
3
) of a substance in air expected to cause death of one-half of the exposed population.
LC
LO
= The lowest concentration (ppm or mg/m
3
) of a substance in air expected to cause death to some of the exposed population.
LD
50
= The dose of a substance (mg substance/kg subject body weight or mgmin/m
3
) expected to cause death of one-half of the
exposed population.
LD
LO
= The lowest dose of a substance (mg substance/kg subject body weight) expected to cause death to some of the exposed
population.
TLV = threshold limit value, the TWA concentration for a normal 8-hr work day and a 40-hr work week, to which nearly all workers
may be repeatedly exposed, day after day, without adverse effects.
2.7 DETERMINATION OF CONSEQUENCES
The objectives of this step are to determine the potential health effects from an accidental release of a
hazardous material and to determine the approximate number of people affected both on-site and off-site.
Using the criteria presented in Table 2, the facility is assigned a hazard classification. Calculations are to be
performed at an appropriate level of detail considering the physical characteristics of the hazard, release
mechanism, demographics, and the ability of the operators and on-site personnel to avoid the hazard and
evacuate the area. In general, the analysis should be based on conservative assumptions. However, as described
below, credit may be taken for some types of administrative controls. The estimate of potential health effects is
in terms of negligible, reversible, and irreversible effects on a persons quality of life.
Each of the hazardous materials (e.g., toxic materials, combustion products) that were identified in the
hazard identification and determined to require further analysis must be considered. The chemical and physical
properties of the hazardous materials should be taken into account when determining the possible results of
accidents. For example, the analysis should not assume that a block of metal is vaporized and transported to a
receptor if there is no energy source to vaporize the solid metal. The actual configuration of the specific
facilities should be taken into account when calculating consequences of accidents in those facilities.
To take credit for on-site evacuation, the on-site people must be able to detect the release of the hazard,
and avoid it. Generally, only operating personnel in the immediate release area are considered candidates for
evacuation. Credit is not taken for evacuation of off-site people. Credit is also not taken for active or passive
mitigation except for DOT containers used within their design limits. If the operation of a component or system
makes the consequences worse, then the calculations should assume that component or system is operating. For
example, if a ventilation systems operation would make the off-site consequences of a release worse, then the
off-site calculations should assume the ventilation system is operating. For the same hazard, if operation of the

20
ventilation system would make the on-site consequences better, then the on-site calculations should assume the
ventilation system is not operating.
Credit may be taken in calculating the consequences of accidents for administrative controls that limit the
amount and kinds of materials that can be taken into a facility and the handling of material in the facility.
However, no credit is allowed during hazard screening for other administrative controls, active safety systems,
passive safety systems, or safety class items that could either prevent an accident or mitigate the consequences
of an accident. Procedures that do not allow material to be removed from a shipping container within a facility
would be an example of an administrative control for which credit can be taken. Allowing credit for
administrative controls appears to produce meaningful results. A vault in which radioactive materials are stored
in DOT-approved containers that are procedurally forbidden from being opened within the vault may receive a
lower hazard classification than a facility that processes or handles such radioactive materials outside of DOT-
approved containers. The safety documentation requirements should be greater for the facility that handles the
radioactive material outside of the DOT-approved containers.
The hazard screening consequence determination may be an iterative process. As in many engineering
calculations, the analyst will first employ relatively simple, but conservative methods to estimate the bounding
consequences of the hazards. Sometimes in this type approach the conservatism in different steps of the
calculations are additive; the results of such calculations may be overly conservative. Thus, it is always
appropriate for the analyst to determine if the results are reasonable and consistent with the nature of the
hazard. If, in the opinion of the analyst, the initial bounding calculations yield results that do not appear
reasonable and consistent with the nature of the hazard, the analyst should contact a more experienced analyst
for guidance. Additional, more detailed and/or complex calculations may be appropriate.
When a value is calculated for an exposure to a hazardous material, it does not imply that the exposure is
expected to occur, or if it did, that it would be acceptable. The calculation only gives an indication of the
relative magnitude of consequences associated with the various hazards. It allows facilities to be prioritized
according to this relative magnitude of consequences so that a higher proportion of resources may be allocated
to the facilities with the higher potential hazards.
2.7.1 Types of calculations
Most of the scenarios will involve the accidental release of some toxic substance, the atmospheric
transport of this substance to a receptor, and the consequences of that receptor inhaling or being exposed to this
substance. The substance may be either radioactive, chemically toxic, or both. For analysis of these scenarios
the key questions are:
What is the material?
What are the characteristics of the material?
What is the release mechanism?
How much is released?
Where is the release with respect to the receptors?
What is the working volume into which the material is released?
What are the transport characteristics?

21
Additional scenarios may involve the release and transport of a substance in which the consequences arise
from other than simple release-transport-exposure considerations. An example would be the release of an
explosive gas. The consequences arise from the force of the explosion. For analysis of these scenarios the key
questions are:
What is the material?
What is the energy involved?
What is the release or exposure mechanism?
How much is released?
Where is the release with respect to the receptors?
A methodology for performing consequence calculations is provided in Attachment 1 to Appendix A.
When addressing other types of scenarios not identified in the referenced documents, or for complex or
unusual scenarios of the types mentioned above, an analyst with specialized experience should be contacted for
guidance.
Once the number of people and severity of their health effects have been determined, the criteria and
additional qualitative and special considerations (described below) are used to determine the hazard
classification for the toxic material.
The chemical concentration used in Table 4 is found by taking the highest 5-min time-weighted average
(TWA) concentration to which the accident receptors may be exposed. If the concentration to produce a
specific health effect can be specified as a function of exposure time, an alternative approach, as described in
Attachment 1 to Appendix A, may be used. The use of the IDLH (or one of the other values defined in Table
4) or the ERPG is appropriate for hazard classification when no other measure of health effects is readily
available. If actual information is available on the boundary between irreversible and reversible health effects,
and the boundary between reversible and negligible health effects, this information should be used instead of
the IDLH values. For evaluations other than hazard classification such as safety analysis reports, an industrial
hygienist or toxicologist should be consulted and the IDLH (or its equivalent) should be used only if
recommended by them.
2.7.2 Modification of consequence-based classification
The following subsections describe two allowable ways for modifying the consequence-based facility
classification for non-radiological hazards. Segmentation of the facility can be handled as was allowed for
modifying the categorization for radiological hazards. In addition, a reasonableness test based on experience
may be used to modify the classification as explained below.
2.7.2.1 Segmentation
The concept of segmentation described for radiological hazards applies to hazardous chemicals and
unique hazardous energy sources. Credit can be taken for the separation of inventory amounts of hazardous
materials or separation of energy sources when facility features preclude cumulative effects of releases,
interactions, or reactions to common severe phenomena. When segmentation is used to modify the
classification, justification of the independence of the facility segments should be documented.
2.7.2.2 Applying the reasonableness test
Implementation of the methods and criteria described in this document are expected to provide reasonable
facility classifications in most cases. However, there may be exceptions in which the method results in

22
unrealistic or inappropriate classification of facilities. The facility classification should be compared with
results of more sophisticated and thorough analysis previously completed for similar facilities and hazards to
see if it is consistent. If the result of an existing analysis is the basis for modifying the classification,
justification must be provided for similarity of the hazard, location, inventory, form, and conditions. Also,
consideration must be given to what action might be required if the previous analysis is superseded or revised.
In this exercise, the analyst should also consider whether or not the hazards need further analysis to
adequately understand the nature of the hazard or to define the need for special controls for safety. Because
hazard classification is used to determine the appropriate safety documentation level, unusual occurrence
reporting requirements, the appropriate natural phenomena performance criteria, configuration management
requirements, etc., obtaining the appropriate hazard classification is important. If the results obtained using the
approach described in this document seem unreasonable or inappropriate, the Nuclear/Safety Technical Lead
should be contacted for further guidance.
2.7.2.3 Special Considerations for Non-radiological Hazards
Carcinogens
Chemicals that are considered carcinogens are listed at http://hmweb.ctd.ornl.gov/complete_carcinogen.html.
A facility would be classified as Low if the quantities of carcinogens exceed the RQ values. If there is no RQ
listed in Table 302.4, 40 CFR 302, then specialists in industrial hygiene should be consulted for assistance in
determining the facility classification. Currently, there are no criteria for a higher classification due to the
carcinogenic hazard. If a material is carcinogenic solely due to radioactivity, treat material as radioactive hazard,
and note assumptions.
Biohazards
Biohazards are biological agents or conditions, such as infectious organisms, that constitute a hazard to
man. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) does not consider biohazards when establishing RQs.
There are no known criteria for making a determination as to whether this hazard is occupational or unique.
Specialists in industrial hygiene and the Installation Facility Safety Manager should be consulted for guidance
in facility classification when a biohazard is present.
Asphyxiant hazard
Asphyxiation is generally a concern for the release of a gas that is heavier than air. The gas, if released,
could displace breathing air. TQs for asphyxiant gases have not been established because the hazard is
characterized by buoyancy of the gas in air, configuration of the volume into which the release occurs, and air
movement. The effects of the potential release of asphyxiant gases are generally limited to areas within the
facility boundary. If an asphyxiant gas is released in a facility where the gas could be trapped in volumes at a
low elevation, and if unsuspecting persons could be present, it may be necessary to classify the facility as Low.
No criteria are apparent for classifying a facility as Moderate due to the asphyxiant hazard.
A simple calculation is recommended using the amount of gas released and the available entrapment
volume. If results indicate the oxygen level could be reduced from the normal 21% to 18% or less of breathing
air due to increased asphyxiant gas concentration, consideration should be given to classifying the facility as
Low for this hazard. It is necessary to use judgment in classifying a facility for the asphyxiant hazard. In
addition to knowledge and experience with the situation being evaluated, judgment should be based on the
consideration that occupational hazards are controlled by standard industrial safety provisions, but unique
hazards require facility safety analysis to determine the need for structures, systems, components, activities, or

23
conditions for facility safety. Facilities with occupational asphyxiant hazards are considered to be Other Industrial
facilities.
Incompatible chemical reaction products and combustion products
A list of incompatible chemicals is provided in Attachment 3 to Appendix A. It is necessary to determine
the quantity of reaction products that could be formed if sufficient quantities (i.e., > 1 kg) of incompatible
chemicals are present in the same area, and the potential reaction products are toxic. The quantity of reaction
products can be estimated based on the chemical reaction equation and the quantities of materials that are
present. The limiting inventory of one of the reactants will determine the maximum amount of reaction
product(s) produced. The analysis of the reaction products would then proceed similarly to the analysis of other
hazardous materials (i.e., postulate release scenario and determine consequences).
Industrial plating shops are an example of operations where incompatible chemicals that could produce a
hazardous reaction product are found. Two process liquids that are used separately are nitric acid and a solution
of copper cyanide in sodium cyanide. All three chemicals are listed in Table 302.4, 40 CFR 302.4, and
therefore, are identified as unique hazards by criteria used in hazard identification. A spill of any of these
chemicals raises safety concerns because MSDSs indicate skin contact and inhalation of vapors are important
health hazards. Neither chemical is flammable or very volatile and hazards would appear to be limited to
persons near spills. However, if the two liquids are not kept separate, they react to produce hydrogen cyanide
(HCN). HCN is a highly toxic, highly flammable gas at room temperature. It could be dispersed to adjacent
areas and seriously impact persons beyond the facility boundary. Although not normally present in the copper
plating process, HCN should be identified as a hazard because it is an incompatible chemical reaction product.
A similar situation exists for combustion products. Combustion, or decomposition upon heating to
elevated temperatures without combustion of some chemicals, produces hazardous (toxic) products. The
amount of burning (or decomposing) material should be used to determine the stoichiometric amount of
product that should be treated like any other hazardous material in facility classification. A Fire Hazards
Analysis or a survey by Fire Protection Engineering should, if available, be consulted to identify the expected
combustion products.
Energy sources
Energy sources can be a hazard to facility workers, other on-site persons, or the public from electrical
shock, moving objects, blast pressure, radiant heat, or beams of energy or particles which originate in devices such
as lasers, accelerators, or X-ray machines. The types of energy sources are identified in the FDD.
In facility classification, the analyst should consider the maximum energy that could be released, the
distance and direction of persons from the energy source, and the presence of barriers such as passive
structures and shielding. A facility should be classified as an Other Industrial facility if it contains only
occupational energy hazards that are controlled by standard industrial safety provisions. To classify a facility as
Low or Moderate for unique stored energy hazards, thought should be given to the benefit or usefulness of
facility safety analysis. Such classifications should only be made if facility safety analysis might determine the
need for structures, systems, components, activities, or conditions for protection of persons at locations of
interest. If impacts are limited to persons within the facility, consider classifying the facility as Low. If impacts
could extend to persons beyond the facility boundary, consider classifying the facility as Moderate.

24
2.8 DOCUMENTATION
Documentation should be sufficiently comprehensive and clearly organized to be understandable to a
reviewer who is not familiar with the facility. It is important that all facilities have a record showing that
hazards have been identified and screened to separate the occupational hazards and the unique hazards. Each
new or modified facility should be classified either as an Other Industrial facility or categorized/classified for
radiological and non-radiological hazards using criteria established in this document.
Hazard identification and facility classification documentation should include the following information:
(a) facility identification, (b) facility classification for both radiological and non-radiological hazards, (c) date
the document was prepared, (d) persons involved in preparing and approving the document, and (e) the basis
for the facility categorization. An effort should be made within the documentation to minimize references to
other SB documents.
The cover page identifies the facility, the results of the hazard identification and facility classification
activity, persons involved in preparing the document, and the date the work was performed. A brief description
of the facility is desired to describe the primary functions and purpose of the facility and the scope of the
hazard identification and facility classification task. An explanation should be provided if materials are
excluded from hazard identification using the hazard screening criteria.
If only occupational hazards are identified, the cover page indicates the facility is categorized as an Other
Industrial facility and the hazard screening results are recorded on the PHS worksheet. This is sufficient
documentation for Other Industrial facilities.
For unique hazards, the basis for facility categorization may involve a simple comparison of inventory and
TQs. In this case, the documentation might only include the cover page and a table showing the inventory, the
TQs, and the results of the comparison. The basis for facility classification may include a consequence
calculation. The consequence-based evaluation should be included in the hazard classification document. If the
initial categorization/classification is modified by taking credit for segmentation, or by adjusting TQs for release
fractions, the justification and basis should be provided. If special considerations are used, these should be
described.

25
3. HAZARD ANALYSIS
The HA methodology provides a comprehensive assessment of facility hazards and/or accident scenarios
that could produce undesirable consequences for BJC workers and the public. This includes hazard
identification, screening for SIHs, and risk binning of events based on frequency and consequence levels. The
HA provides the basic hazard and/or release event information used in Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs)
and to derive Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs). The HA is a key input to accident analysis and control
selection. It is also intended to give sufficient up-front information to determine whether simple inventory
controls or more complicated and costly systems or system modifications are needed to prevent or mitigate
certain hazards in the DSA.
The initial step in performing a Hazard Analysis is to assemble the team that will be conducting the
analysis. The full HA team consists of the HA team leader, the core HA members, and additional
functional representatives/experts with limited participation. The number of HA team members will vary
depending on the complexity of facility operations and hazards associated with the facility. A typical team has
a core group with the following functions represented: safety documentation projects, nuclear safety (usually
assigned as HA team leader), facility operations/engineering, and facility regulatory programs. The full HA
team includes, on an as-required basis, representatives from the following disciplines accident analysis,
frequency analysis, fire protection, criticality safety, radiation control, structural mechanics, emergency
management, and control selection and TSR development. The core group performs the majority of the work
while the secondary group provides consultation and assistance in specific areas of knowledge and experience.
The HA methodology presented in this procedure is a hybrid of the What-If/Checklist and the Preliminary
Hazard Analysis methods as presented in Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures (CCPS 1992). The
example flowchart in Figure 5.3 of this reference provides a method for selecting a specific Hazard Evaluation
technique. Using this flowchart, the technique is selected with the following criteria:
The Hazard Evaluation study is for regulatory purposes
No specific Hazard Evaluation method is required
This is not a recurrent review (for new developments, once an acceptable Hazard Evaluation is performed,
recurrent reviews to update the Hazard Evaluation may be acceptable)
Expected results are a list of specific accident situations plus safety improvement alternatives
The results will not be part of a Quantitative Risk Assessment
At this point in the decision process, the methods common to the applicable parts of the decision tree are
the What-If, What-If/Checklist, and Preliminary Hazard Analysis methods. The hybrid combination of the
methods is to strengthen the analysis results and provide more consistent development and demonstration of
completion for DSAs.
The HA procedure is divided into two main parts: hazard identification and hazard evaluation. Hazard
Evaluation covers the Unmitigated Hazard Evaluation and the Mitigated Hazard Evaluation.

26
3.1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Hazard Identification is a comprehensive, systematic process by which all known facility hazards
(hazardous materials and energy) are identified, recorded, and screened. Screening is performed to eliminate
material/energy types and quantities that are considered SIHs that are not initiators and/or contributors to
undesired events that may cause radiological or chemical releases.
The hazard identification process should clearly define the project, facility, or activity for which the
hazards are examined. The location, functions, boundaries, and interfaces should be described so there is no
uncertainty about the identity of the facility for which hazards are reviewed.
The Hazard Identification done for the HA differs greatly from the Hazard Identification completed for
the Initial Hazard Categorization/Classification. In the Initial Hazard Categorization, the key objective of
hazard identification was the separation of occupational hazards and unique hazards. This was accomplished
by first reviewing materials, energy sources, and operating conditions associated with the facility to determine
hazards that are present. These hazards were then compared with screening criteria to determine if the hazards
are occupational hazards or unique hazards. If there are only occupational hazards in a facility, the facility is
classified as an Other Industrial facility, and no further safety analysis is necessary. However, if unique hazards
exist within the facility, and additional safety analysis is required, a more vigorous hazard identification
process may be performed for use in the HA. The Hazard Identification for the HA includes a much more
extensive list of hazards that can possibly be identified and recognizes any hazard that has the potential to
become an event initiator. Information gathered during the Initial Hazard Categorization should be used at least
as the starting point for the HA hazard identification.
Hazard Identification is divided into three steps: 1) a division of the facility into facility areas, 2) facility
walkdowns, and 3) screening for SIHs.
3.1.1 Division of the Facility
The HA team should divide the facility into areas to facilitate hazard identification and evaluation.
These areas may be individual unit operations, individual or grouped facility systems, specific function(s),
and/or physical boundaries inside the facility. The term facility area is used in the HA process to distinguish
from facility segments that may have been previously defined during the Initial Hazard
Categorization/Classification. However, this distinction does not preclude the use of facility segments as
facility areas.
The facility of interest should be divided into structures, systems, subsystems, and phases appropriate for the
organized presentation of data about hazards. The organization should be designed to assist a person unfamiliar with
the facility or activity in searching, retrieving, or using the data for activities related to facility safety analysis.
As an example, an enriched uranium facility which converts UF
6
to UF
4
could be divided into the following
systems: feed autoclave, sampling autoclave, fluorine supply, hydrogen supply, reactor, cold baths/chemical traps,
and the potassium hydroxide supply. Avoid dividing a facility to the component level of detail (e.g., tanks,
pumps, piping, etc.) because unnecessary complexity may compromise the usefulness of information.
3.1.2 Facility Walkdowns
Facility walkdowns include both physical walkdowns and information walkdowns. Physical walkdowns
permit the team to familiarize themselves, first-hand, with actual facility systems, processes, practices,
equipment, and inventory. Information walkdowns is the process of HA team-members reviewing existing
safety documentation, design/system drawings, or procedures in the context of Hazard Identification. The team

27
should perform physical and/or information walkdowns to identify hazardous materials and energy sources for
each facility area.
An inventory and screening task, which should be completed as part of the FDD and/or Initial Hazard
Categorization/Classification, produces a listing of all known radiological and chemical hazards, including
material that may be excluded from the DOE-STD-1027-92 Hazard Categorization (e.g., sealed sources or
material in Type B containers). The inventory should include the material, quantity, location, form, and other
pertinent information regarding the material (e.g., concentration). Chemical inventories of hazardous chemicals
as defined in 29 CFR 1910.119, 40 CFR 302.4, and 40 CFR 355 should be obtained. Additional hazards may
be identified, which, due to the potential chemical interactions, should be evaluated, as necessary, as part of
Hazard Evaluation.
The information walkdown should include a review of the following:
Facility Description Document, which includes the facility description and hazardous material
inventory.
Existing safety documentation (SARs, Bases for Interim Operation, TSRs, Project Design Documents,
Fire Hazards Analysis, etc.)
Facility or Operational Safety Plans and/or Integration Work Sheets,
Consultations with facility system and/or process experts, operations staff, ES&H Team, and workers
HAs, for neighboring facilities, to determine if an event at that facility could initiate an event for the
subject facility
Hazard Identification Tables, used to document the results of Hazard Identification, are a useful
checklist when performing physical or paper walkdowns. Table B-1 in Appendix B provides an example of a
Hazard Identification Table. Use of this table is recommended, but not required. The table has five columns,
described as follows:
ItemA specific number provided for each facility hazard.
Hazard Energy Source or Material This is a checklist of potential hazards that may be in the facility.
A large general list is provided to allow the table to be used for a variety of facilities.
ExistsThis is used to document whether the hazard exists in the particular facility area. Each item in
the list requires either a Yes or a No response.
DescriptionThis column is used to characterize the hazard in sufficient detail to allow the HA Team
and reviewers to understand the hazard. Location of the hazard (in sufficient detail to locate the hazard
within the facility area), quantities, and any clarifying information are useful to include in the
description.
DispositionThis column is for documenting the final disposition of the hazard and is not used during
Hazard Identification. When the Hazard Evaluation process is complete, each identified hazard must be
properly dispositioned to aid in demonstrating completeness. Use of this column is further discussed later
in this chapter.
Using a separate table for each facility area, the HA team members performing facility walkdowns should
fill in the third column, Exists, for all hazards in the table and the fourth column, Description, for the
hazardous material and/or energy sources noted during the walkdown. After the walkdown, the team should

28
meet to discuss the results and develop a single, master hazards checklist for each facility area. During the
development of the master checklist, care should be taken to identify additional hazards or hazardous
materials that are a byproduct of the process (e.g., hydrogen generated by the dissolution of metal by acids
during a recovery process).
NOTE: The hazards listed in the Hazard Identification Table in Appendix B are not intended to be an
exhaustive list of the potential hazards. Therefore, this table may need to be modified to support the analysis of
the respective facility.
3.1.3 Screening of Standard Industrial Hazards
The third step in the Hazard Identification process is the screening of SIHs. These are defined as materials
or energy sources that are routinely encountered in general industry and construction, and for which national
consensus codes and/or standards (e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Administration [OSHA] and DOT)
exist to govern handling and use and are implemented at the facility. In accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94,
CN 1 (DOE 2000), common hazards are not typically evaluated and are evaluated only to the extent that they
could act as initiators and contributors to events that result in a radiological or chemical release. The HA team
screens each identified hazard for each facility area based on material and/or energy types and quantities using
the guidance and screening criteria provided in Appendix C.
If the identified hazard meets the appropriate screening criteria, then the hazard is screened as a SIH. No
further consideration is given to this hazard except as a potential initiator or contributor to an event that
releases radiological or hazardous material. If the identified hazard does not meet the appropriate screening
criteria for identification as a SIH, then the hazard is carried forward to the Hazard Evaluation phase.
For completeness, the hazard sources screened as SIHs are documented in this table stating the
appropriate screening criteria in the disposition column. Note: The screening documentation in the Hazard
Identification table should also include any screened chemical and/or radiological hazardous materials. This
table can also provide useful input to the Unreviewed Safety Question Determination process by providing a
complete list of hazards, including screened hazards, that can be used for comparison to see if new hazards
have been added or if the hazard no longer meets the screening criteria.
3.1.4 Results of Hazard Identification
Hazard Identification Tables index all identified hazards and corresponding locations for each facility area, as
well as documents the hazard screening. The recommended format of the Hazard Identification Table is given
in Appendix B.
3.2 HAZARD EVALUATION
Hazard Evaluation begins following the comprehensive identification of all known hazardous material and
energy sources. As described in this guide, the Hazard Evaluation is performed to meet the requirements of
DOE-STD-3009-94, CN1. The hazard evaluation may also be used for all safe harbor methods, including
DOE-STD-3011-94 (DOE 1994c), but the author should use a graded approach depending upon the hazards.
The purpose of the Hazard Evaluation is to ensure a comprehensive assessment of facility hazards and focus
attention on those events that pose the greatest risk to the public and the workers.
At a minimum, all core members of the HA Team (such as nuclear safety, and facility
operations/engineering representative) should be involved with all aspects of the Hazard Evaluation. Secondary

29
team members with other special disciplines (such as frequency analysis, fire protection, emergency
management or criticality safety) provide support, as needed.
The scope of the Hazard Evaluation includes:
All aspects of facility process and operation including design, construction, mission-oriented operations,
deactivation, transition surveillance and maintenance, and decontamination and decommissioning, as well
as any planned operations described in the FDD.
Natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes, tornadoes, straight-winds), external events (e.g., aircraft and
vehicular impact), and nuclear criticality (where applicable).
Consideration of the entire spectrum of possible events for a given hazard in terms of both frequency and
consequence levels (e.g., from a small localized fire to a large propagated or facility-wide fire).
Hazards addressed by other programs and regulations (e.g., Process Safety Management, OSHA, Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, DOT, Environmental Protection Agency) only if loss of control of the
hazard will result in a release.
The scope of the Hazard Evaluation does not include:
Hazards screened as SIHs
Willful acts, such as sabotage
Detailed information regarding hazardous material and energy sources in the context of facility area and/or
whole facility operations is the basis for specific release events. Event categorization, identification of event
cause(s), assignment of initiating event frequency and unmitigated consequence level, initial risk binning,
identification of potential mitigative and preventive features, and mitigated frequency and consequence level
determination are tasks performed during Hazard Evaluation.
This information should be collected and organized in Hazard Evaluation Tables. These tables are a useful
guide for performing the evaluation and provide an effective format for documenting the results, and are used
to document both Unmitigated and Mitigated Hazard Evaluation results. A sample format is provided in
Table 5, and detailed discussion of each piece of information contained within the Hazard Evaluation Table is
presented later in this chapter. An example of a typical Hazard Evaluation Table using the sample format is
shown in Appendix B. The format and content of the table may be modified to suit the needs of the analysis.
The team should produce a separate Hazard Evaluation Table for each facility area, and should also define a
single general hazard facility-area that includes hazards that could involve more than one facility-area (e.g.,
facility fire and earthquake).
The Hazard Evaluation process may be divided into three steps: Identification of Initial Conditions,
Unmitigated Hazard Evaluation, and Mitigated Hazard Evaluation.
3.2.1 Initial Conditions
Prior to beginning the evaluation, the Initial Conditions (ICs) for the facility are determined and
documented. As early as possible in the process it is desired to document inventory limits or any proposed
changes to expedite HA. ICs are specific conditions that are a part of facility operations. ICs may include
assumptions, inventory information, specific passive features (i.e., no mechanical or human involvement) such

30
as the facility construction and location. Any ICs thus identified must have the specific information for which
the IC is valid before it can be credited in the Unmitigated Hazard Evaluation. Examples of ICs are:
Building/Facility construction is capable of withstanding a surface vehicle impact without adverse
affects on facility operations (Note: This does not cover vehicle impacts on support or process
equipment located outside the main facility)
Facility and process inventories are limited to those identified. (Note: The inventory should give
specifics such as design information relating to tank volumes and concentrations, location within the
facility, etc.)
Building construction is Performance Category-3 (PC-3). Frequencies for Tornado/High Wind and Seismic
events impacting the building structure are as identified DOE-STD-1020-94 (DOE 1996).
Workers ability to react to obvious hazardous conditions and to evacuate. This, of course, invokes the
assumptions that the workers are physically able to evacuate, and that an evacuation route is available
during or immediately following the hazardous condition.
These ICs are part of the input to the control selection process and may require protection as TSRs.
Therefore, care must be taken regarding the selection of ICs and in determining the impact the ICs will have on
the Hazard Evaluation. ICs, other than those that are part of the facility design basis (e.g., PC-3 construction)
or that will obviously prevent an event (e.g., structure able to withstand vehicle impact), are discouraged from
being used since they may skew the unmitigated risk levels and result in unanalyzed or inadequately controlled
hazards. For example, a fire door may be credited as an IC for preventing fire propagation. This control may
fail (e.g., door is blocked open) so it does not completely prevent the event, but only reduces the frequency. If
the frequency reduction moves the event risk to a level that does not require further analysis, then the
adequacy of the control is not evaluated and the safety functions of the door may not be properly determined.
Additionally, this may lead to a larger control set since controls identified for other fire events (e.g.,
combustible material control, fire suppression) may be adequate to protect against this event.
ICs should be uniquely numbered for reference in the Hazard Evaluation Tables using IC as the leading
designation. This is to support identification of specific conditions or features that require TSR protection and
to provide the basis for the requirement.


3
1

Table 5. Sample Hazard Evaluation Table for (Facility Area)

Unmitigated Mitigated
Event
No.
Event
Cat.
Event
Description Causes
Freq.
Level
Consequence
Level
Risk
Rank
Method
of
Detection
Preventive
Features Mitigative Features
Freq.
Level
Consequence
Level
Risk
Rank



32
3.2.2 Unmitigated Hazard Evaluation
The Unmitigated Hazard Evaluation is performed to determine the risks (frequencies and consequences)
involved with the facility and its associated operations without regard for any safety controls or programs.
Unmitigated refers to the determination of the frequency and consequences without credit given for preventive
or mitigative features other than the specified ICs. This is essential to avoid taking credit for any type of active
or passive barriers or controls, which must then be designated as a Safety Class Structures, Systems, and
Components (SSC) or Safety Significant SSC depending upon which receptor (Offsite Public, Co-located
Workers, or Facility Workers) risk was reduced. During the Unmitigated Hazard Evaluation, the Material at
Risk will equal the available hazardous inventory that can be acted upon during the postulated event. No credit
will be taken for any controls. However, the laws of physics will be obeyed. Information that can be captured
in the Hazard Evaluation Table during the Unmitigated Hazard Evaluation includes the following:
Event Number
Event Category
Postulated Event Description
Causes
Unmitigated Frequency Level
Unmitigated Consequence Level
Unmitigated Risk Bin
Method of Detection
Additional detail and pertinent methodology information for each of the Hazard Evaluation Table
categories is provided in the following sections.
3.2.2.1 Event number
Events are numbered to provide each with a sequential reference. The numbering system may be chosen
such that facility area is identified mnemonically. For example, consider a facility area identified as Pump
House. The mnemonic PH may be chosen to represent this facility area, and events would be numbered PH-01,
PH-02, etc.
3.2.2.2 Event category
Events are categorized according to the nature of the event, with the exception of events initiated by
external or Natural Phenomena Hazards. A standard list of event categories expected at DOE sites is listed
below, along with a general description of the general consequence source. The first five categories are for
internally initiated events, which are typically process-related events. The final two categories are externally
initiated events.
E-1 Fire Consequences typically due to inhalation/ingestion of released hazardous material.
E-2 Explosion Consequences typically due to inhalation/ingestion of released hazardous material.


33
E-3 Loss of Containment/Confinement Consequences typically due to inhalation/ingestion of released
hazardous material.
E-4 Direct Radiological/Chemical Exposure Consequences typically due to direct exposure (contact
chemical exposure, radionuclide shine).
E-5 Nuclear Criticality Consequences typically due to direct exposure and release of fission products
E-6 External Hazards Consequences typically due to inhalation/ingestion of released hazardous material.
Depending on specific event, direct exposure consequences may also be applicable.
E-7 Natural Phenomena Consequences typically due to inhalation/ingestion of released hazardous material.
Depending on specific event, direct exposure consequences may also be applicable.
3.2.2.3 Postulated event description
A brief description of a postulated event, which clearly defines the nature of the event, is given in this
column. The event description should include event progression information, location, the release mechanism
(e.g., fire, pressurized release, spill, etc.) or other consequence mechanism (e.g., direct exposure), and the
affected hazardous material, including the MAR that may be impacted by the event.
Using the Hazard Identification Tables as a basis, the HA team develops event scenarios for each facility
area where a potential exists for a release of hazardous energy and/or material, and establishes a link between
the hazard groups identified with the potential events caused by the hazards. Table B-2 of Appendix B
provides an aid for identifying potential events but is not intended to be comprehensive or to limit the scenario
development. The full character of the hazard must be considered when developing potential scenarios. For
example, electrical hazards are identified in the table as potential contributors for fires, explosions, and worker
injuries. However, if an electrical insult to a chemical may produce an unwanted reaction (e.g., cause the
chemical to break down into toxic components), then that event must be identified as well.
Scenarios should cover the entire spectrum of possible events for a given hazard, from small consequence
events, for which procedures or equipment is acknowledged to provide adequate protection, to reasonable
worst-case conditions. Unlike worst-case, reasonable worst-case does not necessarily consider every
parameter in its most unfavorable state. For example, if a toxic material is normally handled as a liquid at room
temperature during processing, a reasonable worst-case release does not necessarily have to consider a spill
with the liquid at 130F. Follow-on events, such as a fire following a seismic event, should be identified and
evaluated to ensure that the entire spectrum of possible events is addressed.
3.2.2.4 Causes
The causes of the postulated event are listed. A cause specifically states the failure, error, operational,
and/or environmental condition that initiated the release event. Causes are synonymous with initiating events,
and therefore, need to be clearly identified to support frequency evaluation. The Hazard Identification Tables
are used as a guide in developing specific causes for release events also provides guidance on potential causes
for various events. When a hazard is identified as a potential cause for an event, the specific event number is
identified in the Hazard Identification Table Disposition column. Multiple event numbers may exist for each
hazard identified.


34
3.2.2.5 Unmitigated frequency level
Event frequency evaluation is a qualitative or semi-quantitative process that involves assigning a
frequency level to each event in the Hazard Evaluation Tables. Frequency levels and descriptions are
summarized in the Frequency Evaluation Levels shown in Appendix B, Table B-3, which are based on DOE-
STD-3009-94, CN1. The HA team determines which frequency level is appropriate for a particular event based
on the events cause(s). Frequencies can be qualitatively estimated based on the judgment of the analysts who
may utilize the following:
Existing safety documentation
Engineering calculations
Equipment failure rate data
Data regarding human error
Facility expert opinion
Historical accident data
HA team evaluation
The frequency level is recorded in the Hazard Evaluation Tables according to the Table B-3 lettering
scheme, along with a footnote number indicating the source of the frequency used. These references should be
summarized at the end of the Hazard Evaluation Tables.
Erring in the conservative direction from best-estimate values accommodates uncertainties in frequency
levels. This practice is particularly important when an event frequency is just below the next highest frequency
level. For example, 9.7 x 10
-3
/year is at the high end of the Unlikely level. The HA team, considering the
sources, methods, and uncertainty associated with this value, might collectively decide to call this event
frequency Anticipated rather than Unlikely.
When evaluating event frequency, credit may be taken for items identified as ICs. Any IC credited during
the frequency determination must be identified below the frequency using the unique IC number.
3.2.2.6 Unmitigated consequence level
Event consequences are documented by specifying the impact on the receptors (described below). For HA
purposes, unmitigated consequences are defined as the dose or exposure at specified receptor locations that
have been determined without taking credit for barriers or controls that could reduce the consequences, as per
DOE-STD-3009-94, CN1. Consequences are a function of the type and characteristics of the hazard, the
quantity released, the release mechanism, relative location of the release, and any relevant transport
characteristics. Consequences can be qualitatively estimated based on the judgment of the analysts who may
utilize the following:
Simple source term estimates
Existing safety documentation
Qualitative assessment by the HA Team
The HA team utilizes its discretion, expertise, and knowledge of facility hazards to select one or more of the
above methods appropriate for consequence determination. When evaluating consequence levels, direct


35
radiation exposure or chemical contact consequences to the worker are addressed in Event Category E-4
Events, while E-6 and E-7 Events are events where the exposure to the hazardous material could be significant
(e.g., earthquake damages shielding, allowing direct radiation exposure).
Unlike frequency levels that cover two orders of magnitude, consequence levels sometimes span less than
one order of magnitude. Thus, a more refined effort may be required by the HA team to determine the
appropriate consequence level for a given event and receptor. Much like frequency evaluation, the HA team is
encouraged to err in the conservative direction, especially for those events with consequences at the high end
of a given level.
Consequence evaluation is the process of determining which of the consequence levels (shown in
Appendix B, Tables B-4 and Table B-5) are relevant to the three receptors for a particular release event. These
tables give the radiological and chemical consequence levels that can be used for risk binning process.
Receptors are as follows:
Facility Workers: Individuals immediately adjacent to, or in, the occupied area of the hazard
Co-located Workers: Individuals outside the occupied area of the hazard but within the site boundary
Offsite Public: All individuals outside the DOE site boundary
NOTE: The HA is concerned with the maximally exposed individual at each of the receptor locations.
When evaluating event consequences, credit may be taken for items identified as IC. Any IC credited
during the consequence determination must be identified below the consequences in the Hazard Evaluation
Table using the unique IC number.
The Hazard Evaluation Tables should provide the impact of the event on the three receptors for each of
the postulated release events under the Consequence Level heading of the Hazard Evaluation Tables.
Terminology for receptors and consequences is taken from Appendix B Tables B-4 and Table B-5. If the event
may result in radiological and chemical consequences, the cause of the consequences should be identified (e.g.,
a heading for radiological, with the radiological consequences listed below, then a heading for chemical, with
the chemical consequences listed below.) This is especially important in the case of the offsite public since
there are no DOE Safety Class control requirements for chemical hazards (CCPS 1992). Additionally,
information on consequences, other than chemical or radiological exposure to individuals, should be presented
in this column. This information should include the physical consequences to the worker (e.g., an explosion
could result in a worker fatality) or safety impacts in other areas of the facility (e.g., a lightning strike knocks
out facility power, which in turn disables the nitrogen/purge system).
3.2.2.7 Unmitigated risk bin
The objective of risk binning is to focus attention on those events that pose the greatest risk to the Offsite
Public, the Co-located Worker, and the Facility Worker. Higher risk events might be candidates for additional
analysis and/or control selection evaluation. Using event frequency and consequence levels, the HA team
bins events in frequency-consequence space to assess relative risk.
Tables B-6, Table B-7, and Table B-8 present the risk binning matrices for the three receptor locations
considered in the HA (i.e., Facility Worker, and Co-located Worker, and Offsite Public). In each of these
tables, bins are defined by a rectangular matrix in frequency-consequence space. Each bin is lettered for
identification purposes.


36
Table B-6 and Table B-7 are the risk-binning matrices for the workers, both the Facility Worker inside the
facility and the Co-located Worker. Region A represents risk that exceeds the worker risk-binning criteria and
requires further evaluation per methodology in the Control Selection Document (CSD). The desired result is
that the mitigated combination of consequence and frequency is moved well into the C region, possibly the D
region. Region C represents risk that challenges the worker risk-binning criteria. Unmitigated events with risk
falling in or challenging Region C may needadditional consideration in Control selection to move the mitigated
risk well toward, and possibly into, the D region. Unmitigated events with risk falling in Region D generally
have negligible risk and no further action is required..
Table B-8 is the risk-binning matrix for Offsite Public. Region A represents risk that exceeds or
challenges the Offsite radiological Evaluation Guideline and/or chemical risk-binning criteria. Events falling
into these bins typically require further evaluation per methodology in the CSD. In DOE-STD-3009-94, CN1
terminology, these events are considered unique, or situations of major concern, with sufficiently high risk
that individual examination is needed by accident analysis. The desired result in applying these controls is that
the mitigated combination of consequence and frequency is moved well into the C region, and possibly the D
region.
Region A1 represents consequences that exceed the radiological Evaluation Guideline per DOE-STD-
3009-94, CN1. There is no predetermined frequency cutoff value, such as 10
-6
per year, for excluding low
frequency operational accidents (i.e. internally initiated),. . .the determination of need is solely driven by the
bounding consequence potential. Operational accident events, which fall into (or challenge) this bin due to
radiological consequences, require further evaluation as specified in the CSD. For further information, natural
phenomenon events are defined in terms of the frequency of the initiating events and external events are
defined with a cutoff frequency of 10
-6
(conservatively calculated); these events will most likely be captured
within another risk bin.
Unmitigated events with risk falling in or challenging Region B in Table B-8 due to radiological release
require further evaluation as specified in the CSD. Unmitigated events with risk falling in Region B due to
chemical release may additional consideration within control selection. Again, the desired result is that the
mitigated risk is moved well into the C region and possibly the D region. Also in Table B-8, unmitigated
events with risk falling in or challenging Region C may need additional consideration in control selection to
move the mitigated risk well toward, and possibly into, the D region. Unmitigated events with risk falling in
Region D generally have negligible risk and no further action is required.
3.2.2.8 Method of detection
Method of detection includes features designed to detect initiating events or subsequent event progression.
These include alarms, monitors, indicators, and an operators ability to recognize the events by visual
observation or sound. Inclusion of this column in the Hazard Evaluation Table is optional, since the SSCs
identified are also captured in the Preventive and Mitigative Features columns.
3.2.3 Mitigated Hazard Evaluation
Mitigated Hazard Evaluation is performed to demonstrate that adequate prevention and mitigation features
are selected to reduce the unmitigated event risk below the risk-binning criteria for the Co-located Worker and
the Worker. This evaluation is applied only to those events that exceed the risk-binning criteria for Workers
and Co-located Workers and have not been evaluated in the accident analysis.
For events where the unmitigated risk exceed the risk-binning criteria for the Co-located Worker and the
Facility Worker (i.e., events falling into Region A in Table B-6 and B-7), additional qualitative analyses for the


37
Co-located Worker and the Facility Worker may be conducted and documented in the Mitigated Hazard
Evaluation. Events that exceed or challenge the Offsite Evaluation Guideline (i.e., events falling into Regions
A and A1 in Table B-8) may also be included in this additional analysis.
If an event exceeds the risk-binning criteria for the Co-located Worker and the Facility Worker, controls
that have been identified as potentially SC or SS during the accident analysis and control selection can be
credited first and then, the event is reevaluated. If the event still exceeds the risk-binning criteria, appropriate
members of the HA Team identify additional controls to be credited in an iterative manner until the risk no
longer challenges the risk-binning criteria for the Co-located Worker and the Facility Worker. The controls
credited during this evaluation must be documented along with the credit given (i.e., the reduction in the event
frequency or consequences due to the particular control) in either an appendix to the HA or in a separate Safety
Basis Calculation. After the accident analysis, the mitigated hazard evaluation may be modified to reflect the
risk rank.
The results of the Mitigated Hazard Evaluation are also documented in the Hazard Evaluation Tables to
demonstrate that adequate control(s) has (have) been identified for the events that exceed the risk-binning
criteria for the Co-located Worker or the Facility Worker during the Unmitigated Hazard Evaluation. Changes
in event frequency, consequences, and risk bin are documented in the appropriate columns in the Hazard
Evaluation Table as discussed below.
3.2.3.1 Preventive features
Identification of preventive features should start during the Hazard Identification phase and carry through
the end of the analysis. Preventive features are features expected to reduce the frequency of a hazardous event.
The identification of such features is made without regard to any possible pedigree of the feature, such as
procurement level or current classification. These might include engineered features (e.g., SSCs, etc.),
administrative controls (e.g., procedures, policies, programs, etc.), natural phenomena (e.g., ambient
conditions, buoyancy, gravity, etc.), or inherent features (e.g., physical or chemical properties, location,
elevation, etc.) operating individually or in combination. Preventive features are listed in the Hazard Evaluation
Tables such that a distinction is made between administrative and design features. Planned improvements (e.g.,
modification of the process, addition of equipment) may also be documented in this column, as long as they are
designated as such.
Preventive features constitute a significant portion of Defense in Depth (DID) and Worker Safety
(required for Chapter 3 of the DSA) and they provide essential input to the control selection task. Therefore, it
is important that the identification effort capture essentially all of the possible features that could be counted on
to prevent a hazardous event.
Preventive features that were credited for reducing the frequency during the Mitigated Hazard Evaluation
are underlined.
3.2.3.2 Mitigative features
Identification of mitigative features should start during the Hazard Identification phase and carry through
the end of the analysis. Mitigative features are any features expected to reduce the consequences of a hazardous
event. The identification of such features is made without regard to any possible pedigree of the feature, such
as procurement level or current classification. Mitigative features must be capable of withstanding the
environment of the event. These might include engineered features (e.g., SSCs, etc.), administrative controls
(e.g., procedures, policies, programs, etc.), natural phenomena (e.g., ambient conditions, buoyancy, gravity,
etc.), or inherent features (e.g., physical or chemical properties, location, elevation, etc.) operating individually


38
or in combination. Mitigative features are listed in the Hazard Evaluation Tables such that a distinction is made
between administrative and design features.
Mitigative features constitute a significant portion of DID and Worker Safety (required for Chapter 3 of
the DSA) and they provide essential input to the control selection task. Therefore, it is important that the
identification effort capture essentially all of the possible features that could be counted on to reduce the
consequences of a hazardous event. Planned improvements (e.g., modification of the process or addition of
equipment) may also be documented in this column as long as they are designated as such.
Mitigative features that were credited for reducing the consequences during the Mitigated Hazard
Evaluation are underlined.
3.2.3.3 Mitigated frequency level
The events initiating frequency level (from the unmitigated column of the Hazard Evaluation Tables) is
modified with the reductions due to credited preventive features. The amount of frequency reduction is
dependent on the control(s) and may be defined during the accident analysis. If the frequency reduction is not
identified, then the HA Team may make a qualitative evaluation of the reduction based on the failure rate of
the control and engineering judgement. An acronym representing the results of frequency evaluation is
assigned according to the Table B-3 lettering scheme. As with the initiating frequency level, a reference is
added to indicate the source of the frequency and the frequency. Depending upon the complexity of the
systems/accident scenarios addressed in the HAs, simplified logic trees, such as event trees or fault trees, may
be constructed in order to estimate the mitigated frequency.
3.2.3.4 Mitigated consequence level
The unmitigated consequence levels for each event are modified with the reductions identified during the
Mitigated Hazard Evaluation. The credited feature is evaluated to determine what factors affect the
consequences when the feature is applied.
3.2.3.5 Mitigated risk bin
Based on the Mitigated Frequency and Consequence Levels, the events are binned in the same manner as
during the Unmitigated Evaluation. The final risk bin determined in this manner is used to demonstrate that the
prevention and mitigation features reduce the event risk below the established guidelines.
3.2.4 Hazard Evaluation Output
The Hazard Evaluation Tables are the primary output of the Hazard Evaluation effort. An example of a
typical Hazard Evaluation Table in a suggested format is shown as Table B-9 in Appendix B. The format and
content of this table may be modified to support the needs of the analysis. These tables constitute a portion of
the overall results of the HA.


39
4. FINAL HAZARD CATEGORIZATION
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Following the unmitigated HA, the final facility hazard category is established. The unmitigated HA
considers material quantity, form, location, dispersability, and interaction with available energy sources, but
does not consider safety features (e.g. ventilation system, fire suppression system, etc.) which prevent or
mitigate the event. The unmitigated HA identifies all hazardous events to be evaluated, and screens those
events that are controlled by industry codes and standards or site programs (i.e., common industrial hazards).
As such, the unmitigated HA establishes the full set of hazardous events to be analyzed in the AB process.
The results of the unmitigated HA will also be used to identify the final facility hazard category. From the
unmitigated HA it may be shown that it is more reasonable for the facility to be categorized lower than its
initial categorization. If this is the case, a final hazard categorization is documented to reduce unnecessary
safety analysis.
It is important to note that the final hazard categorization is for radiological hazards only; there is no final
hazard classification for non-radiological hazards. Therefore, if a facility was initially classified as a Low
facility or a higher classification, it will require the full detailed facility safety analysis regardless of the
outcome of the unmitigated HA.
4.2 PROCESS
In order to determine the final hazard categorization of a facility, the bounding event considered in the
unmitigated HA is further evaluated. In choosing the bounding event, the analyst should consider the event that
has the most impact to all receptors. This event will typically be a hazard effecting the entire facility such as the
full facility fire.
Once the bounding event is identified, the consequences are compared to the dose thresholds taken from
DOE-STD-1027-92. If the consequence dose of the bounding event is at or above 1 rem at 100 meters, then the
facility is a Hazard Category 2 facility. If the consequence dose of the bounding event is at or above 10 rem at
30 m, then the facility is a Hazard Category 3 facility. If the consequence dose of the bounding event is below
10 rem at 30 m, then the facility is categorized as a Radiological facility.
This final hazard categorization determines the further safety analysis that is required for the facility. If the
facilitys final hazard categorization is Category 3 or higher, it will require accident analysis, control selection,
and a mitigated HA (see Figure 1 in Appendix D). If the facilitys final hazard categorization is reduced to a
Radiological or lower, then less detailed forms of safety analysis documents will be required (such as a ASA or
HASP).


40
4.3 DOCUMENTATION
The recommended standard documentation of the Final Hazard Categorization is the Hazards Assessment
Document (HAD). A HAD provides the bases and records the hazard categorization of Nuclear Category 3 and
Radiological facilities. In addition, the HAD defines certain administrative controls to preserve elements of the
categorization process. The hazard categorization for a Category 2 facility may be included within the SB
document instead of a separate classification document. A HAD can also be used to document the Initial
Hazard Categorization/Classification for Category 3 and Radiological facilities.
The format of a HAD should include the following:
Standard cover page with hazard categorization and classification
Brief facility description including a description of current operations
Inventory of radiological and hazardous materials
Discussion of inventory techniques and confidence in the accuracy
Preliminary Hazard Screening
Initial hazard categorization based on inventory
Basis of the unmitigated hazards analysis
Discussion of administrative controls to be used to ensure any initial conditions or assumptions used in the
unmitigated hazards analysis are maintained under current operating conditions.
Final hazard categorization
Discussion of inventory control methods to ensure the classification remains valid considering current
operating or facility conditions



41
5. REFERENCES
CCPS (Center for Chemical Process Safety) 1992. Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, Second
Edition; ISBN 0-8169-0491-X.
DOE (U.S. Department of Energy) 1986. Safety Analysis and Review System, DOE O 5481.1B, November.
DOE 1992. Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, Order 5480.23, April 30.
DOE 1994a. Hazard Baseline Documentation, DOE-EM-STD-5502-94, August.
DOE 1994b. Recommended Values and Technical Bases for Airborne Release Fractions, Airborne Release
Rates, and Respirable Fractions for Materials from Accidents in DOE Fuel Cycle, Ex-Reactor Facilities,
by Jofu Mishima, DOE-HDBK-3010-94.
DOE 1994c. Guidance for Preparation of DOE 5480.22 (TSR) and DOE 5480.23 (SAR) Implementation
Plans, DOE-STD-3011-94, November.
DOE 1996. Natural Phenomena Hazards Design and Evaluation Criteria for Department of Energy
Facilities, DOE-STD-1020-94, Change Notice #1, January.
DOE 1997. Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order
5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, DOE-STD-1027-92, Change Notice 1, September.
DOE 1998. Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities,
DOE-STD-1120-98, May.
DOE 2000. Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis,
DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 1, January.
EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency), FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency), and DOT
(U.S. Department of Transportation) 19987. Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis, Emergency
Planning for Extremely Hazardous Substances, December.
NFPA 1991. Hazardous Chemical Data, National Fire Protection Association, Standard 49.
NIOSH 1994. NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, National Institute of Occupational Safety and
Health, June.
Perry, R.H. and C.H. Chilton 1973. Chemical Engineers Handbook, 7
th
Ed., or later.
SAX, N.I., and R.J. Lewis 1992. Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials, 8th ed., or later.



APPENDIX A
ANALYSIS REFERENCES FOR HAZARD
CATEGORIZATION/CLASSIFICATION


A-3
INTRODUCTION
This Appendix contains analysis reference documents that support the Hazard Categorization/Classification
methodology presented in this Application Guide. This guide presents a method for identifying hazards and
categorizing/classifying facilities for safety analysis in accordance with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
Orders 5480.23 and 5481.1B
1
. Hazard identification is the process that selects hazards for consideration in
facility categorization/classification. Facility categorization/classification reflects the relative magnitude of
hazards in a facility, and it is used in implementing a graded approach to facility safety analysis.
The references identified in this guide will be used primarily for hazard identification and facility
categorization. The references are grouped by subject matter for Radiological and Non-radiological subject
matter. Some references are not reproduced in this appendix due to their length, but a listing of each reference,
including a brief description of the reference, is provided below.

RADIOLOGICAL
Reportable Quantities for Classification as Radiological Facility Appendix B, 40 Code of Regulations
(CFR) 302 (not attached)
Provides reportable quantities of radionuclides; if quantities of radionuclides exceed the reportable
quantities (RQs), but are less than the Category 3 threshold quantities (TQs) in DOE-STD-1027-92, the
facility is categorized as a Radiological facility by inventory. If quantities of radionuclides are less than the
RQs, the facility is categorized as an Industrial facility (assuming that there are no significant
non-radiological hazards in the facility).
Threshold Quantities for Classification for Category 2 or Category 3 Table A.1 from Attachment 1,
DOE-STD-1027-92 (not attached)
Provides TQs for determining if a facility is either Category 2 or Category 3 based on the inventory of
radionuclides in a facility.
Surface Radioactivity Guides from Attachment 2 of DOE Order 5480.11, 12-21-88 (not attached)
Provides hazard screening criteria for fixed and/or removable radioactive surface contamination.

NON-RADIOLOGICAL
List of Hazardous Substances and Reportable Quantities Table 302.4, 40 CFR 302 (not attached)
Provides hazard screening criteria for toxic chemicals, combustion products, and carcinogens. If the
quantity of hazardous material exceeds the RQ, a consequence-based evaluation will be required to

1
Although these references have been cancelled, replacement guides have not been generated. These documents specify standard
current practices across the DOE complex, and; therefore, will be referenced in this guidance document.


A-4
determine the facility classification for non-radiological materials. If the quantity of hazardous material is
less than RQ, the facility is classified as an Other Industrial facility (assuming that there are no
radiological hazards that would result in a higher categorization).
Consequence Calculation Methodology (Attachment 1)
Provides methodology for performing a consequence-based evaluation to support classification of
non-radiological hazards.
Use of Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (Attachment 2)
Provides a hierarchy of alternative criteria developed by the DOE-Headquarters (HQ) Office of
Emergency Planning and Operations Subcommittee on Consequence Assessment and Protective Actions for
estimating alternate Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG) values for chemicals in which no
ERPGS have been developed.
Reactive Materials and Incompatible Chemicals (Attachment 3)
Provides information from Environmental Protection Procedure EPM-12.0, which can be used in
completing the hazard identification and screening regarding reactive materials and incompatible
chemicals.
Method for Determining Substitute Reportable Quantities (Attachment 4)
Provides a method for determining substitute RQs for those chemicals that are not listed in 40 CFR 302.



ATTACHMENT 1
CONSEQUENCE CALCULATION METHODOLOGY




3
PREFACE
In the earlier versions of CSET-2, the dispersion coefficients for atmospheric dispersion were based on
values recommended by Briggs for the following assumptions: continuous release, level ground, and open-
country conditions. These values are smaller (more conservative) than Briggs' values for urban conditions.
Recommended values for the horizontal dispersion coefficients for instantaneous releases were half the values
for a continuous release. However, the instantaneous values are much more uncertain than the continuous
values, and the accuracy of any dispersion model is generally poorer than a factor of two so that any correction
for release time is probably not warranted. Also, the close-in model, presented in this revision, blends smoothly
into the long-distance model if the continuous values are used. Therefore, Revision 2 recommends that the
horizontal dispersion coefficients for an instantaneous release be equal to the values of the horizontal
dispersion coefficients for a continuous release.
In addition, the previous versions of CSET-2 recommended that the worst-case (i.e., results in highest
downwind concentration) stability class (e.g., F stability for ground-level releases) should be used to establish
the facility classification. Based on recent guidance from DOE (e.g., DOE-STD-1027-92),the use of more
typical meteorology (e.g., D stability with wind speed of 4.5 m/s) is recommended in this guidance.
Documents reproduced in part in this Appendix:
1. Sanford G. Bloom, Atmospheric Transport Analysis to be Used in Hazard Classification, October 1995.
(pages E-1 through E-13)
2. R. A. Just, Guidance for Analyzing the Effects of Postulated Toxic Releases, Internal Correspondence to
all SSE Personnel, October 4, 1990. (pages E-14 through E-19)

4
ATMOSPHERIC TRANSPORT
ANALYSIS TO BE USED IN HAZARD
CLASSIFICATION
SCOPE
This methodology provides some of the techniques that may be used in a first pass analysis of the
consequences resulting from accidental releases of hazardous substances. It is assumed that the analyst has
already been introduced to methods for identifying potential hazards and for postulating accident scenarios.
First pass analyses are used to indicate a preliminary hazard classification by employing relatively simple,
but conservative, methods to estimate the consequences of the hazards. Second, or higher-order, passes may
be required if (a) the results are not low or negligible, (b) the results are inconsistent or just don't seem
right, or (c) management wants a more realistic assessment.
Most of the scenarios that will be considered in hazard classification involve the accidental release of
some toxic substance, the atmospheric transport of this substance to a receptor, and the consequences of that
receptor inhaling this substance. The substance may be either radioactive, chemically toxic, or both.
Additional scenarios may involve the release and transport of a substance in which the consequences
arise from other than simple release-transport-exposure considerations. An example would be the release of
an explosive gas. The consequences arise from the force of the explosion but such estimates are beyond the
scope of this course.
Finally, there are scenarios whose principal consequences do not involve exposure to a toxic substance
and these are also not considered in this course. Examples are criticality events, exposure to direct radiation
(e.g., nuclear radiation, microwaves), and accidents due to personnel contact with electrical, thermal, or
mechanical equipment. Such accidents either require very specialized training or are considered standard
industrial hazards, which are not analyzed in facility safety documentation.
All analyses of releases of toxic substances involve three basic elements: (1) determining the amount of
material released and available for transport (this is called the source term); (2) determining how much
(usually expressed as a concentration) of the released material reaches humans (this is called transport
calculations and, since the material usually moves through the air assisted by the wind, it is usually called
atmospheric transport); and (3) estimating the physiological effects humans would experience from breathing
or being immersed in the cloud of toxic substance (this is called dose-consequence analysis). This
methodology concentrates on the first two elements and provides guidance regarding sources of data for
making dose-consequence determinations. The purpose of the analysis is to (a) predict the health effects on
humans of the released toxic material or (b) show that the concentration levels or exposures are below
allowable levels established by DOE or other national agencies such as the National Institute of Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH).
ACCIDENTAL RELEASE SOURCE TERM
Two types of accidental releases are considered in this course: (1) an instantaneous release of some
fraction of the amount of material at risk and (2) a constant, steady release rate over a period of time. The
objective is to estimate the amount of material that becomes airborne and is thus available to be inhaled. For
first pass analyses, the fractions listed in Table 1 may be used for estimating the amount airborne for various
conditions. These fractions are based on engineering judgement and experience using procedures given by
Ayer, et al. (1988). These latter procedures should be used for a more detailed analysis.

5

For instantaneous releases, the amount airborne is simply the product of the appropriate fraction from
Table 1, and the amount of material at risk. The amount of material at risk is estimated from the circumstances
of the scenario. If there is no valid basis to assume a smaller amount, the entire inventory of the material in the
facility should be considered as the amount of material at risk. The expression for the amount airborne is
Table 1. Fractions for First Pass Estimates of Amount Airborne
Type of release Fraction
Gas 1.0
Simple powder spill 0.001
Simple liquid spill 0.0001
Pressurized powder release 0.01
Pressurized liquid release 0.05
Burning of contaminated combustible solid 0.0005
Burning of contaminated combustible liquid
non-volatile contaminant 0.01
volatile contaminant 1.0

fM Q (1)
Q is the amount of material airborne, g
f is the appropriate fraction from Table 1
M is the amount of material at risk, g.

Similarly for continuous releases, the amount airborne is simply the product of the appropriate fraction
from Table 1, and the rate at which the material is released. The rate at which the material is released and
the duration of the release have to be specified. The expression for the rate airborne is

dt
dM
f
dt
dQ
, for 0 < t < = 0, for t > (2)
dQ/dt is the rate at which the material becomes airborne, g/s
t is the time since the release began, s.
dM/dt is the rate at which the material is released, g/s
r is the duration of the release, s.

6

There are methods for estimating release rates when they are not specified, but they are beyond the
scope of this course and are only mentioned here. If you encounter a situation in which a release rate must
be estimated, consult either S. G. Bloom (4-6638) or R. A. Just (4-6497) for guidance. Liquid release rates
may be estimated using expressions for gravity-flow or forced convection. Gases emerging from pressurized
containers can usually be estimated using expressions for choked flow. Gases from evaporating liquids can
be estimated using expressions for heat transfer and/or mass transfer.

Uranium Fires
Uranium is a pyrophoric metal and the possibility of uranium fires must be considered in many accident
scenarios at the Y-12 and gaseous diffusion plants. The most likely fires involve small pieces (chips) that are
the byproduct of machining operations. These can ignite spontaneously and will burn quickly. Large pieces and
parts (chunks) can also burn but are more difficult to ignite and will burn slower. The following factors and
rates should be used for uranium fires rather than the factors in Table 1.
The amount of uranium that becomes airborne from burning uranium chips is estimated on the basis of
experiments conducted by Napier (1984). These tests indicated that the amount airborne for drained chips
was about 0.0033%. Drained chips have about 15 to 30 wt % water adhering to the chips. The amount
airborne was much higher (0.3 to 0.9% of the amount burned) when the chips were ignited in contact with a
pool of water. It is believed that the smaller value for drained chips is due to the absence of a gaseous
combustion product and minimal water vapor to carry away the UO, solid combustion product from the
burning surface. With the larger amount of water, there is sufficient water vapor to entrain UO
2
particles and
thereby increases the amount of material airborne. However, if there is sufficient water to quench the fire,
the total amount of UO
2
airborne will be smaller due to less uranium being burned. Thus, the worst case
would be an attempt to fight a uranium fire with a liquid but the amount is insufficient to quench the fire.
The time to completely bum 30 to 40 kg of chips was about 2 to 4 minutes.
If burning chips are in contact with water or other liquid, but the amount of liquid is insufficient to quench
the fire, a value of 1.04 is recommended for the fraction airborne. This is an upper bound to Napier's results. If
burning chips are dry or have less than 15 wt % water adhering to the chips, a value of 0.0033 % is
recommended. If the burning chips are near (but not in) a hydrocarbon fire, which may supply a significant gas
flow, some intermediate value is appropriate. Eased on engineering judgment, the recommended value is 0.033
% (a factor of 10 greater than the dry value). Since the chips bum rapidly, an instantaneous release can be
assumed. Alternatively, the rate corresponding to burning 40 kg in 2 minutes (about 300 g/s times the
corresponding fraction airborne) can be assumed for a 2-minute duration. In either case, no quenching should
be assumed unless it can be justified.
The amount airborne from burning uranium chunks is based on a release factor for Burning Radioactive
Pyrophoric Metal presented by Ayer et al. (1988, Table 4.2, p. 4.9). The value is 8.9 x 10
1
percent/s and is
assumed to apply to large chunks of dry, burning metal with no significant gas flow to carry away UO
Z

particles. If the burning uranium part is in contact with a liquid, but the amount of liquid is insufficient to
quench the fire, the above rate should be increased by the ratio of wet to dry chips from Napier's experiments
(0.0093 - 0.0000333 = 279 or 1000 to be conservative) to give a value of about 0.0089 percent/s. If the burning
metal is near, but not in, a hydrocarbon fire, a value of 8.9 10
-1
percent/s is assumed (a factor of 10 greater
than the Ayer et al. value). Since these rates are relatively slow, the fire is assumed to continue for 30 min
which is an estimate of the response time for the fire department to arrive and extinguish the fire. This is
equivalent to a steady, continuous release over 30 minutes.
Evaporation from Spilled Liquids

7
There is an upper limit to the air concentration of a gas coming from an evaporating liquid and this
expression is given here. It assumes (1) the liquid covers a large surface area(tens of square meters) and there is
a large enough quantity of liquid to keep the surface covered during the time of interest, (2) the region of
interest is enclosed and isolated from mixing with the surrounding environment, and (3) the air within the
region itself is well mixed. With these assumptions, the maximum (equilibrium) concentration in air can be
estimated by

RT
p
M C
W E
(3)
C
E
is the equilibrium air concentration of the gas, g/m'
p is the partial pressure of the material, mmHg
M., is the molecular weight of the material, g/mole
R is the gas constant, 0.062363 m' mmHg/(K mole)
T is the absolute temperature, K.

8
ATMOSPHERIC TRANSPORT OF AIRBORNE MATERIALS
Atmospheric transport analysis provides estimates of the time-weighted, average concentration and the
concentration-time integral of airborne materials at receptor (people) locations. These quantities are used to
assess the health-related consequences of the release on people and are related by

TF
TB
i
dt t C I ) ( (4)

M
t TB TF + (5)

A
t
I
C , if t
M
t
A


M
t
I
C , if t
M
> t
A
(6)
I is the concentration time integral, g sec/m
3
C
i
is the air concentration of the material as a function of time, g/m
3

TB is the time the exposure begins, sec
TF is the time the exposure ends, sec
t
M
is the duration of the exposure, sec
C is the time-weighted, average concentration of the material, g/m
3

t
A
is the averaging time interval, sec.

The time the
-
exposure begins is usually selected to maximize the concentration-time integral if this
time is within the bounds of the scenario.
At distances close to the release (within about 10 meters), the transport is strongly influenced by the
geometry of the release and the local air currents. At distances far from the release (greater than about 50
meters), these factors have a diminished effect while larger-scale wind and the atmospheric stability become
dominant.
Close-in Estimates For Small Enclosures
If the release takes place within a relatively small enclosure (less than about 1000 ms), the airborne
material is assumed to mix instantaneously and homogeneously with the volume of air within this enclosure.
It is assumed that initially, people within the enclosure would be aware of the release and would not be
immediately incapacitated by the accident. Therefore, they would be exposed only during the time it takes
them to leave the enclosure. These assumptions avoid considering many of the local effects.

9
The concentration-time integral for an instantaneous release is given by

M
t
VF
Q
I (7)
VF is the volume of air within the enclosure, m
3
.
For a constant-rate release, the maximum value of the concentration-time integral occurs if the exposure
begins after all the material is released (r 5 TB). This is equivalent to Equation 7 with the product of dQldt and
r replacing Q. In general, the concentration-time integral for a constant-rate release is given by
( ) TB TF
dt
dQ
t
VF
I
M
+

,
_

,
_

5 . 0
, for TF
( )
2 2
2
5 . 0
TB TF
dt
dQ
VF
I
,
_

,
_

, for TB < < TF



M
t
dt
dQ
VF
I

,
_

,
_

, for TB (8)
Section A.5-11.1 of the Life Safety Code (NFPA, 1988, Page G-7) implies that a person can evacuate an
area at a rate of 5 to 7.5 ft/sec (1.5 to 2.3 m/sec). A reasonably conservative estimate of exposure time would
be the distance to the nearest exit, divided by the smaller escape rate (1.5 m/sec.).
Close-in Estimates For Large Enclosures and Outdoors
If the release takes place within a large enclosure, instantaneous mixing cannot be assumed. A model
based on a turbulent diffusion mechanism is recommended and is described by Bloom (1993). The model
assumes simple gas dispersion (no chemical reactions, neutral buoyancy) with no effects of nearby structures
(wakes or downwash). The model is also applicable to small particles (less than 10 microns). The source is
either a point or a semi-circle that lies in the Y-Z plane and diffusion is assumed to be restricted by solid
boundaries (vertical at X=0 and horizontal at Z=0) to the upper-right quadrant (X Z0, -oe < Y < oo, Z z0). The
semicircular source encompasses the area given by Yz+Z
2
5 r
2
. X is the horizontal coordinate in the downwind
direction, Y is the horizontal coordinate in the crosswind direction, and Z is the vertical coordinate. This model
and models for explosive releases and particle deposition have been combined into a QuickBASIC program
(INEXPLC.BAS) and its PC executable form (INEXPLC.EXE). The report and these programs (on a disk
which includes sample input and output files) are available from S.G. Bloom (Ext 4-6638). Figure I is the
sample input and output files for the INEXPLC code.
People in the large enclosure would probably not be immediately aware that an accident occurred nor
would they know that they were in the path of a toxic cloud. Consequently, they could be exposed to the entire
cloud resulting from an instantaneous release and this conservative assumption (tw -+ m) is usually used. For a
constant-rate release, the exposure time is the time required to alert/evacuate people, which may range from a
few minutes up to an hour.
For distances greater than 2 meters from the source, the turbulent diffusion model is

10

( )
1
]
1

,
_

+

F
A
F
s
r
Ur
Q
I
1
exp 1
2
2

(9)

( ) ( )

1
1
]
1

,
_

1
0
1
exp
1
1
j
j j
j
j j z y
P
s
H
s s A UA
Q
I

(10)

z y
A
A A
r
r
2
,
2

,
_

y
A
A
X
X ,
A
A
F
X
r
s + 1 (11)
( )
2
2
2
4
Z y
j
A
jZH H Z
A
Y
H
+
+

,
_

,
A
j
j
X
H
s + 1 (12)
I
F
is the infinite-time, concentration-time integral close to a finite-area source, g sec/m
3

I
P
is the infinite-time, concentration-time integral close to a point source, g sec/m
3

Q is the amount of material released to the air, g
r is the effective radius of the finite-area source (area is 0.5r
2
), m
U is the velocity of the air carrying material from the source in the X direction, m/sec
X is the downwind distance of the receptor from the release (positive values only), m
Y is the horizontal distance of the receptor measured from the X-axis (all values), m
Z is the vertical distance of the receptor measured from the X-axis (positive values only), m
A
y
, A
z
are dispersion parameters in the Y and Z directions, respectively, m
H is the vertical position (positive values) of the point source measured from the X-axis, m
j is a counting variable with values 0 and 1
The dispersion model for the finite-area source applies only along the X-axis (the line Y=Z=O). Values on
this line are the maximums at specific downwind locations for the finite-area diffusion model. The model for a
point source applies at any location within the upper-right quadrant except right at the source where the value
becomes infinite. For a constant rate release over a finite duration, Q is replaced by the smaller of ( dQ/dt) or
(t
M
dQ/dt).
Unless there is a forced ventilation system in operation, it is often difficult to assign an air velocity (U) for
dispersion within a large enclosure. Air currents are usually present even in enclosures with no apparent
airflow. In general, air speeds less than I m/sec are not noticeable and it is recommended that a tenth of this
value (0.1 m/sec) be used for U if no other value is available. The direction of U should be such to maximize
the potential consequences. For outdoors applications, U is usually the wind speed; however, if the outdoor
release is in a sheltered area a mirunal value of 1 m/sec may be more appropriate.

11
For H=0 (ground-level source), the value of I, along the line through the source (the X-axis) will always
be larger than the corresponding I
F
value at a specific downwind (X) location but the difference between the
two values decreases with increasing X. However, the value of I, off the X-axis (the line Y o 0 and/or Z > 0)
may be smaller than the corresponding I
F
value. For H > 0 (elevated source), the value of I, may be smaller
than the corresponding I
F
value even along the line through the source (Y=0, Z=H) except very close to the
source. Since the finite-area model is only applicable along the X-axis, the recommended value to use for I for
a-receptor and/or a source off this line is the smaller of I
F
and I
p
.
Large Distance Estimates
When the ratio of source radius to downwind distance is small enough, the finite-area source becomes
indistinguishable from the point source and Equation 10 be should be used for this region. Equation 10 is
applicable for r 5 0.04 (see Equation 11) and the maximum value of I, occurs for Y=Z=0 and s; = l. The value
of s; approaches 1 for large downwind distances {large X) and, for s
i
=1, Equation 10 is equivalent to
expressions given in Slade (1968, p 403 to 404). Therefore, Equation 10 provides a smooth link between close-
in and large-distance estimates.
Recommended Dispersion Parameters
The recommended dispersion parameters are given by Bloom, (1992) and can be expressed as
X A A
z y
175 . 0 , , for small X for all Stability classes

( )
n
z y
bX
aX
A A
+

0 . 1
, , n=0, , 1 for large X
a, b, n are empirical coefficients in the expressions recommended by Briggs for constant-rate releases, level
ground, and open-country conditions (see Table 2).
Values for A
Y
and A
z
should be computed using both of the above expressions and the larger of the two
values should be used.
For releases with receptors at the same elevation as the release, F stability will always yield the highest
concentrations and concentration-time integrals. For all stability classes, these values decrease with increasing
distance from the release. For releases with receptors at an elevation different from the release, these values
will increase with distance close to the release, reach maximum values at some distance (depending on the
difference in elevations and the stability class), and then decrease with increasing distance. Based on recent
guidance from DOE (e.g., DOE-STD-1027-92), the use of F stability is considered to be too conservative, and
inconsistent with the meteorology typically used for chemical dispersion. In DOE-STD-1027-92, DOE used a
more typical chemical dispersion meteorology such as D stability at 4.5 mlsec, a value used for comparison by
NRC and used as the basis for dispersion by the Department of Transportation for assigning evacuation zones
around chemical spills. For facility classification, the analyst should use D stability with a wind speed of
approximately 3.0 mlsec.
Examination of suggested values of dispersion coefficients for instantaneous releases (Slade, 1968, pp
173-175) indicates that a rough approximation for the instantaneous vertical dispersion coefficient is to set it
equal to the corresponding continuous value. It also implies that the instantaneous values for the crosswind,
horizontal coefficients are about equal to half the horizontal continuous value. However, the accuracy of any
dispersion model is generally poorer than a factor of two so that any correction for release time is not
warranted.

12
Other Methods
There are other more sophisticated and complicated methods, which may provide better estimates of
atmospheric transport but they are beyond the scope of this course. Wind tunnel tests, using a scaled physical
model of a facility, have been used extensively to estimate close-in transport and the effects of nearby buildings
and other obstacles. The above models do not include effects of buoyancy, phase changes, or chemical
reactions, which may significantly impact the results. A model, which approximately incorporates these effects,
is available if needed (Bloom, et al, 1989). If detailed data are available on the wind field that is likely to occur
during an accident, a puff model (e.g., AFTOX) may be appropriate since such a model allows the gas to more
closely follow a trajectory dictated by the wind field. If you have any doubts about the applicability of the
simple, first pass models, consult either S.G. Bloom or R.A. Just.
Table 2. Formulas for Estimating Dispersion Coefficients

Stability Category A
y

A (0.22 X) (1.0 + 0.0001 X)'
7
(0.20 X)
B (0.16 X) (1.0 + 0.0001 X)'n (0.12 X)
C (0.11 X) (1.0 + 0.0001 X)'n (0.08 X) (1.0 + 0.0002 X7
112
D (0.08 X) (1.0 + 0.0001 X)'n (0.06 X) (1.0 + 0.0015 X72
E (0.06 X) (1.0 + 0.0001 X)'
n
(0.03 X) (1.0 + 0.0003 Xr
F (0.04 X) (1.0 + 0.0001 X)
-

n
(0.016 )) (1.0 + 0.0003 X7

Notes: Reference is Hanna et. al., 1982, Table 4.5, p 30.
A,, and A
x
are cross-wind horizontal and vertical dispersion coefficients, respectively, m. Values are for continuous
releases, level ground, and open-country conditions.
X is the downwind distance, m.

13
Figure 1. LISTING OF SAMPLE INPUT AND OUTPUT FOR THE INEXPLC CODE
Input
BEOC.OUT
for a Circular Source
1,10,.5,1000,1.0,0
1,4,100
10,.005,0
100,.1,0
100,10000
1.0,0.,0.
5.,1.0,1.0
10.,1.0,2.0
50.,2.0,10.
100.,5.0,10.
500.,5.0,10.
1000.,5.0,10.
0.,0.,0.
for a Circular Source
1,0,.5,100,1.0,0
-1,4,100
0,1.0
1.0,0.,0.
5.,1.0,1.0
10.,1.0,2.0
50.,2.0,10.
100.,5.0,10.
500.,5.0,10.
1000.,5.0,10.
0.,0,0

14
Output
DISPERSION ESTIMATES for a Circular Source
QT(g org/s) = 1000, V(m/s)= 1 , ISTAB = 1, H(m) = 10
R(m) =.5 ,
PSI(mic) = 10 ,
PSI(mic) = 100 ,
NPCL =1,
VD(m/s) =.005 ,
VD(m/s) =.1 ,
S =4 ,


PSIG(mic) = 100
FR =.0483604
FR =.4516395




TNT(g) = 100 , DIRT(g) =10000 , DURT(s) = 0
X (m) Y (m) Z (m) C(mg/m3) DS (mg s/m3) PSI(mic)
1.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 1.000E+01
1.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 1.000E+02
1.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 1.000E+05
5.000E+00 1.000E+00 1.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 1.000E+01
5.000E+00 1.000E+00 1.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 1.000E+02
5.000E+00 1.000E+00 1.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 1.000E+05
1.000E+01 1.000E+00 2.000E+00 3.546E-40 1.064E-37 1.000E+01
1.000E+01 1.000E+00 2.000E+00 3.666E-39 1.100E-36 1.000E+02
1.000E+01 1.000E+00 2.000E+00 7.332E-39 2.200E-36 1.000E+05
5.000E+01 2.000E+00 1.000E+01 8.701E-01 2.610E+02 1.000E+01
5.000E+01 2.000E+00 1.000E+01 8.995E+00 2.699E+03 1.000E+02
5.000E+01 2.000E+00 1.000E+01 1.799E+01 5.397E+03 1.000E+05
1.000E+02 5.000E+00 1.000E+01 2.315E-01 6.944E+01 1.000E+01
1.000E+02 5.000E+00 1.000E+01 2.393E+00 7.179E+02 1.000E+02
1.000E+02 5.000E+00 1.000E+01 4.786E+00 1.436E+03 1.000E+05
5.000E+02 5.000E+00 1.000E+01 2.492E-02 7.475E+00 1.000E+01
5.000E+02 5.000E+00 1.000E+01 1.508E-01 4.525E+01 1.000E+02
5.000E+02 5.000E+00 1.000E+01 2.902E-01 8.707E+01 1.000E+05
1.000E+03 5.000E+00 1.000E+01 8.187E-03 2.456E+00 1.000E+01
1.000E+03 5.000E+00 1.000E+01 1.265E-02 3.796E+00 1.000E+02
1.000E+03 5.000E+00 1.000E+01 1.760E-02 5.279E+00 1.000E+05

DISPERSION ESTIMATES for a Circular Source
QT(g or g/s) = 100, V(m/s) =1 , ISTAB= 1 , H(m)= 0
R(m) =.5 , NPCL=1 , S =4 , PSIG(mic)= 100
TNT(g) = 0 , DIRT(g) = 1 , DURT(s) = 0
X (m) Y (m) Z (m) C(mg/m3) DS(mg s/m3) PSI(mic)
1.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 8.318E+02 2.495E+05 0.000E+00
5.000E+00 1.000E+00 1.000E+00 1.081E+00 3.243E+02 0.000E+00
1.000E+01 1.000E+00 2.000E+00 1.051E-01 3.154E+01 0.000E+00
5.000E+01 2.000E+00 1.000E+01 3.651E-13 1.095E-10 0.000E+00
1.000E+02 5.000E+00 1.000E+01 6.768E-07 2.030E-04 0.000E+00
5.000E+02 5.000E+00 1.000E+01 2.687E-01 8.061E+01 0.000E+00
1.000E+03 5.000E+00 1.000E+01 1.610E-01 4.830E+01 0.000E+00


15
CONSEQUENCES TO THE RECEPTOR
There are several measures that can be used to assess the consequences of an accident involving the
release of a toxic material. Many organizations involved in industrial health (e.g., NIOSH, 1985; ACGIH,
1989), publish values of air concentrations that are considered to cause no significant health effects.
However, most of these published values apply to long-term, chronic exposures and would not be applicable
to accident situations.
For screening purposes, it is acceptable to use the IDLH concentration (NIOSH, 1985) as the boundary
between irreversible and reversible health effects. A tenth of this value may be used as the boundary
between reversible and negligible health effects. For release durations less than five minutes, the averaging
time is taken to be five minutes for computing a time-averaged concentration for comparison with the IDLH
value. A time period is selected to give the highest 5-minute average. The time-averaged concentration is
computed using Equation (5), (10), (12), or (14).
If the concentration to produce a specific health effect can be specified as a function of exposure time,
an alternative approach should be used. For example, ten Berge et al. (1986) determined that the lethal
concentration (LC
50
) is proportional to TM' where n is generally greater than 1.0. Their results for n (mean
value and 95 percent confidence limits) are summarized in Table 3 for 11 irritant and 9 systemically acting
gases and vapors. Table 3 also includes the IDLH values, if available, for these gases and vapors. The
recommended approach is to set t = t
M
in Equation (5), (10), (12), or (14) and compare the resulting
average concentration with the IDLH concentration scaled by ti'. Concentrations equivalent to the IDLH
were calculated in this manner, using the mean value of n, for exposure times of 2, 5, 10, and 15 minutes.
The IDLH is defined as being applicable to a 30-minute exposure. Consequently, the IDLH equivalent for a
2-minute exposure period is the IDLH multiplied by (2130). The results of these calculations are also given
in Table 3. Using the mean value of n is reasonable for facility classification but, for a Safety Analysis
Report (SAR), it is more appropriate (and conservative) to use the 95% confidence limit that yields the
lower concentration (i.e., the high limit of n for exposures less than 30 minutes and the low limit for
exposures greater than 30 minutes).
If actual information is available on the boundary between irreversible and reversible health effects,
and the boundary between reversible and negligible health effects, this information should be used instead
of the IDLH values. For example, Just and Emler (1984) report air concentrations of soluble uranium, as
functions of exposure time, that result in health effects due to chemical toxicity. These values may be
conservatively applied to insoluble uranium. For exposures less than 30 minutes, no health effects occur at
concentration time integrals less than 650 mg min/M
3
(39 g sec/n
-
?), possible mild (reversible) health effects
occur at concentration time integrals between 650 mg minim' and 1,250 mg minim' (75 g sec/d), renal injury
occurs at concentration-time integrals greater than 1,250 mg minim', and the value for 50 percent lethality is
35,000 mg min/m
3
(2,100 g sec/m3).
The use of the IDLH (or an equivalent value) is appropriate for HSM when no other measure of health
effects is readily available. For SAR applications, an Industrial Hygienist or Toxicologist should be
consulted and the IDLH (or its equivalent) should be used only if that was their reconunendation. J. T.
Jankovic of Central Safety & Health Organization should be contacted for information on specific toxic
materials.

16
Table 3. Exponent for Variation with Exposure Time
Gas or vapor.
IDLH
(ppm)
n
95%
Confidence
limits on n
IDLH, Equivalent for Different
Exposure Times
Local Irritants 2 min 5 min 10 min 15 min
Ammonia 500 2 1.6 to 2.4 1936 1225 866 707
Hydrogen Chloride 100 1 0.7 to 1.3 1500 600 300 200
Chlorine Pentafluoride 2 1.4 to 2.6
Nitrogen Dioxide 50 3.5 2.7 to 4.3 108 83 68 61
Chlorine 30 3.5 2.5 to 4.4 65 50 41 37
Perfluoro-isobutylene 1.2 1.1 to 1.4 -
Crotonaldehyde 400 1.2 1.1 to 1.3 382 713
Hydrogen Fluoride 30 2 1.2 to 2.8 116 73
Ethylene-imine 1.1 0.8 to 1.3 52 42
Bromine 10 2.2 2.0 to 2.4 34 23
Dibutylhexa-
methylenediamene
1 0.6 to 1.4 16 14
Systemic Action
Hydrogen Cyanide 50 2.7 1.8 to 3.7 136 97 75- 65
Hydrogen Sulfide 300 2.2 1.6 to 2.7 1027 677 494 411
Methyl t-Butyl Ether 2 1.0 to 2.9
Chlorobromomethane 5000 1.6 1.4 to 1.8 27166 15322 9935 7711
Ethylene Dibromide 400 1.2 1.1 to 1.2 3821 1780 999 713
Tetrachloroethylene 500 2 1.4 to 2.6 1936 1225 866 707
Trichloroethylene 1000 0.8 0.3 to 1.4 29520 9391 3948 2378
Carbon Tetrachloride 300 2.8 1.9 to 3.7 789 569 444 384
Acrylonitrile 500 1.1 1.0 to 1.2 5863 2549 1357 939


17
The consequences of radionuclide releases are usually expressed in terms of radiation doses (rem or
millirem). Radiation exposures can result from radionuclides existing outside the body (external dose) and
those that have been inhaled, ingested, or absorbed (through the skin) inside the body (internal dose).
External exposure ceases when the person leaves the contaminated area, removes any contaminated
clothing, and/or washes any contamination from his skin. However, internal exposure will continue until the
body can rid itself of the radionuclide. For long-lived radionuclides that cannot be readily cleared from the
body, the exposure can last for the remaining life of the individual. Therefore, a radionuclide release is
likely to lead to higher internal doses than external doses.
For radionuclides released to the air, inhalation is the principal pathway for entering the body. An
expression for calculating the internal radiation dose due to inhalation is
I S BD D
A F s
(15)
D
s
is the 50-year committed effective dose equivalent (C.E.D.E.), rem
B is an inhalation rate, m
3
/s
D
F
is the radiation dose factor, rme/Ci
S
A
is the specific activity of the radionuclide, Ci/g
The C.E.D.E. is a measure of the equivalent radiation dose to the whole body that is incurred over a
50-year period following inhalation of the radionuclide. The dose factors are tabulated in DOE/EH-0071
(1988b). Unless there is specific information to indicate the solubility class of the radionuclide (Class D, W,
or Y), the highest dose factor should be used. The inhalation rate usually assumed is 1.2 m'/h (0.000333
m
3
/s) which may be typical for moderate exertion. For a pure radionuclide, the specific activity can be
calculated from

( )
H W
A
T M
S
5
10 578 . 3
(16)
T
H
is the half-life of the radionuclide, years.
For most accident scenarios at Y-12 and the gaseous diffusion plants, the principal radioactive material
is uranium consisting of varying amounts of 2U, 'U, and 'U. The specific amounts of each radionuclide
depend on whether the uranium is the naturally-occurring material, enriched in
I
U by the gaseous diffusion
process, or the tads of this process which are depleted in =U. Since the half-life of a' U (2.45 10
3
years)
is much shorter than that of IU (7.04 101 years) or z U (4.47 10 years), most of the radioactivity is due
to the
9
''U.

In the gaseous diffusion process, z' U is enriched or depleted along with U which is the key
isotope for the various uses of uranium. An empirical expression relating the specific activity of uranium to
the percent of 'U has been presented by Rich et al. (1989) and is
( )
6 2
10 0034 . 0 38 . 0 4 . 0

+ + E E S
A
(17)
E is the weight percent of U-235

18
Naturally-occurring uranium contains 99.2745 weight percent U, 0.72 percent U-235, and 0.0055
percent zU. Depleted uranium contains about 0.20 percent' U. Enriched uranium occurs with different
percentages of
I
U at the plants and the percent of U must be specified to use Equation (17).
Since the radiation dose factors for the above three isotopes of uranium are similar (1.3 10` rem/Ci
for zU and 1.2 10 rem/Ci for U and s U), the value for' U can be conservatively used with
Equations (15) and (17) to estimate internal radiation doses involving uranium releases. In the future,
uranium enriched by the AVLIS process may be prevalent. The AVLIS process is more specific in enriching
I
U and Equation (17) may no longer apply.
There are also dose factors to estimate the external dose rate from beta- and gamma-emitting
radionuclides to a person in the vicinity of an infinite, contaminated plane and submerged in an infinite,
contaminated cloud. These external dose rate factors are tabulated in DOE/EH-0070 (1988a). The
immersion dose depends on the air concentration but the plane dose requires an estimate of the surface
concentration (Ci/m
z
) on the ground, which may be difficult to estimate. However, for most situations
involving uranium, the radiation is due to alpha particles, which contribute a negligible external dose. The
main radiation concern with uranium is the potential inhalation and/or ingestion and the resulting internal
dose, which can be calculated using Equations (15) and (17). If a situation arises requiring an external dose
calculation, consult with S. G. Bloom.

19
REFERENCES
1. ACGIH, 1989, Threshold Limit Values and Biological Exposure Indices for 1989-1990, American
Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists.
2. J. E. Ayer, A. T. Clark, P. Loysen, M. Y. Ballinger, J. Mishima, P. C. Owczarski, W. S. Gregory, and
B. D. Nichols, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facility Accident Analysis Handbook, NUREG-1320, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Washington, D.C, 1988.
3. S. G. Bloom, R. A. Just, and W. R. Williams, A Computer Program for Simulating the Atmospheric
Dispersion of UF6 and Other Reactive Gases Having Positive, Neutral, or Negative Buoyangy, K/D-
5694, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, 1989.
4. Bloom, S.G., Atmospheric Transport Analysis used in Hazard Screening Methodology, paper (92-
WA/SAE 5) presented at the session on Safety Engineering and Risk Assessment (SERAD) at the
Winter Annual Meeting of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (November 8-13, 1992) in
Anaheim, California.
5. Bloom, S. G. Models for Close In Atmospheric Dispersion, Explosive Releases, and Particle
Deposition, ORNLITM-12452, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
Oak Ridge, TN., 1993.
6. U.S. Department of Energy, External Dose Rate Conversion Factors for Calculation of Dose to the
Public, DOE/EH-0070, U.S. Department of Energy, Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and
Health, Washington, D.C, 1988
7. U.S. Department of Energy, Internal Dose Conversion Factors for Calculation of Dose to the Public,
DOE/EH-0071, U.S. Department of Energy, Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health,
Washington, D. C, 1988.
8. S. R. Hanna, G. A. Briggs, and R. P. Hosker, Jr., Handbook on Atmospheric Division, DOE/TIC11223,
U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Research, Washington, D.C., 1982
9. R. A. Just and V. S. Emler, Generic Report on Health Elects for the U.S Gaseous Diffusion Plants, K/D
5050, Section VIII, Part 1, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant,
Oak Ridge, TN., 1984.
10. J. M. Napier, Release of Uranium to Air During Oxidation of Uranium Chips, internal correspondence
to I. Darling, July 9, 1984, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, TN.
11. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), 101-1988 Life Safety Code, 1988.
12. NIOSHIOSH.4 Guide to Chemical Hazards, National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health/Occupational Safety and Health Administration, NIOSH, 1985.
13. B. L. Rich, S. L. Hinnefeld, C. R. Lagerquist, W. G. Mansfield, L. H. Munson, E. R. Wagner, and E. J.
Vallario, Health Physics Manual of Good Practices for Uranium Facilities, EGG-2530, EG&G Idaho,
Inc., Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Idaho Falls, ID, 1988.
14. D. H. Slade, Meteorology and Atomic Energy, TIC-24190, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Office of
Information Services, Washington, D.C., 1968.
15. W. F. ten Berge, A. Zwart, and L. M. Appelman, Concentration-Time Mortality Response Relationship
of Irritant and Systemically Acting Vapours and Gases. Journal of Hazardous Materials, Vol. 13, pp.
301 to 309, 1986.


ATTACHMENT 2
USE OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING GUIDELINES



3
The American Industrial Hygiene Association has developed Emergency Response Planning
Guidelines (ERPGs) for emergency response applications. The ERPGs are widely accepted endpoints for
evaluating the consequences of accidental chemical exposures. However, ERPGs only currently exist for
approximately 50 chemicals. Therefore, ERPG alternatives must be used for many chemicals. The DOE-
HQ Office of Emergency Planning and Operations Subcommittee on Consequence Assessment and
Protective Actions (SCAPA) has developed the following hierarchy of alternative criteria if ERPGs are not
available
ERPG1 Source
PEL-STEL OSHA
TLV-STEL ACGIH
TLV-TWA x 3 ACGIH

ERPG2 Source
EEGL (60-min) NAS
LOC EPA/FEMA/DOT
PEL-C ACGIH
TLV-C ACGIH
TLV-TWA x 5 ACGIH

ERPG-3 Source
EEGL (30 min) NAS
IDLH NIOSH

The definition of the acronyms used above are provided below.
AGENCIES
ACGIH American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
AIHA American Industrial Hygiene Association
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
NAS National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
USDOT U. S. Department of Transportation

GUIDELINES (Text extracted from memo from Doug Craig, Westinghouse, to the SCAPA chair)
AIHA Terms (developed for emergency response purposes)':
ERPG-1 Emergency Response Planning Guideline 1: The maximum airborne
concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be
exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing other than mild transient adverse
health effects or perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odor.
ERPG-2 Emergency Response Planning Gui del i ne 2: The maximum airborne
concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be
exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or other
serious health effects or symptoms that could impair their abilities to take
protective action.

4
ERPG-3 Emergency Response Planning Guideline 3: The maximum airborne
concentration below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed
for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing life-threatening health
effects.
NAS Terms (developed for military use)
2
:
EEGL Emergency Exposure Guidance Level: A concentration of a substance in air
(as a gas, vapor, or aerosol) that may be judged by DOD to be acceptable for the
performance of specific tasks during rare emergency conditions lasting for
periods of 1-24 h. Exposure at an EEGL might produce reversible effects that do
not impair judgement and do not interfere with proper responses to the
emergency. The EEGL is a ceiling guidance level for a single emergency
exposure, usually lasting from 1 h to 24 h -- an occurrence expected to be
infrequent In the lifetime of a person.
CEGL Continuous Exposure Guidance Level: CEGLs are ceiling concentrations
designed to avoid adverse health effects, either immediate or delayed, of more
prolonged exposures and to avoid degradation in crew performance that might
endanger the objectives of a particular mission as a consequence of continuous
exposure for up to 90 d.
SPEGL Short-Term Public emergency Guidance Level: The SPEGL is defined as a
suitable concentration for unpredicted, single, short-term, emergency exposure of the
general public. In contrast to the EEGL, the SPEGL takes into account the wide
range of susceptibility of the general public. This includes sensitive populations -
such as children, the aged, and persons with serious debilitating diseases.
OSHA Terms (developed for occupational safety)'
:

PEL Permissible Exposure Limit: Although the term PEL is not used in the Final
Rule Limits Columns of Table Z-1-A and Table Z-2 (29 CFR 1910.000, July 1,
1990), it was used in the Transitional Limits. It is also used in the compound-
specific rules for various substances, e.g. #1910.1018 (Inorganic arsenic),
#1910.1028 (Benzene), #1910.1045 (Acrylonitrile), #1910.1047 (Ethylene oxide),
etc.
PEL-TWA Time-Weighted Average: The employee's average airborne exposure in any 8-
hour work shift of a 40-hour workweek, which shall not be exceeded. This is to be
computed from the equation:
( )
8
n n b b a a
T C T C T C
E
+ +

where C is the concentration during any period of time T (in hours) where the
concentration remains constant
PEL-STEL Short-Term Exposure Limit: The employees 15-minute time weighted average
exposure that shall not be exceeded at any time during a work day unless another
time limit is specified.

5
PEL-C Ceiling: The employees exposure which shall not be exceeded during any part of
the work day. If necessary from a monitoring point of view, C may be assessed as
a 15-minute time,weighted average.
EPA Term (developed for emergency planning)
4
LOC Level of Concern: The concentration of an extremely hazardous substance in air
above which there may be serious Irreversible health effects or death as a result of
a single exposure for a relatively short period of time. (Also used by FEMA and
USDOT)
ACGIH Terms (developed for workplace safety)
5

TLV-TWA Threshold Limit Value Time Weighted Average: The time weighted average
concentration for a normal 8-hour workday and a 40-hour workweek, to which
nearly all workers may be repeatedly exposed, day after day, without adverse
effect.
TLV-STEL Threshold Limit ValueShort-Term Exposure Limit: The concentration to
which workers can be exposed continuously for a short period of time without
suffering from 1) irritation, 2) chronic or irreversible tissue damage, or 3) narcosis
of sufficient degree to increase the likelihood of accidental injury, impair self-
rescue, or materially reduce work efficiency, and provided that the daily TLV-
TWA is not exceeded. A TLV-STEL is ... a ... 15-minute TWA exposure which
should not be exceeded at any time during a workday even if the 8-hour TWA is
within the TLV-TWA. Exposures above the TLV-TWA up to the STEL should not
be longer than 15 minutes and should not occur more than four times per day.
There should be at least 60 minutes between successive exposures in this range.
TLV-C Threshold_ Limit Value Ceiling: The concentration that should not be
exceeded during any part of the working exposure. ... if instantaneous
monitoring is not feasible, then the TLV-C can be assessed by sampling over a 15-
minute period except for those substances that may cause immediate irritation
when exposures are short.
NIOSH Term (developed for respirator use)
6
:
IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health: The maximum concentration from
which, in the event of respirator failure, one could escape within 30 minutes
without a respirator and without experiencing any escape-impairing (e.g. severe
eye irritation) or irreversible health effects.

6
REFERENCES
1. ERPGs: Concepts and Procedures for the Development of Emergency Response Planning Guidelines
(ERPGs). American Industrial Hygiene Association ERPG Committee. December 1989. [New data
sets issued as they are developed.)
2. Emergency and Continuous Exposure Guidance Levels for Selected Airborne Contaminants, V 1 -7.
COMMITTEE ON TOXICOLOGY. Board on Toxicology and Environmental Health Standards,
Commission on Life Sciences, National Research Council, National Academy Press, Washington, DC.
(1985).
3. Code of Federal Regulations: Labor: CFR29: PARTS 1900 TO 1910, Revised as of July 1, 1988. #
1900-1000, Subpart Z - Toxic and Hazardous Substances, pp 6 - 33 (1900).
4. Technical Guidance for Hazard Analysis. Emergency Planning for Extremely Hazardous Substances.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency; and U.S.
Department of Transportation, USGPO 1991517-003/47004, December 1987.
5. 1992 -1993 Threshold Limit Values for Chemical Substances and Physical Agents and Biological
Exposure Indices. American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, Cincinnati, OH
(1992).
6. NIOSH POCKET GUIDE TO CHEMICAL HAZARDS. U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control, National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health Washington DC (1990).


ATTACHMENT 3
REACTIVE MATERIALS AND INCOMPATIBLE CHEMICALS



3
This appendix originally included attachments 1 and 2 of Environmental Protection Procedure EPM-12.0.
Due to copy quality, Attachment 1 was omitted from this appendix. Information on reactive materials is found
in the bottom left corner of Attachment 1. Information on incompatible chemicals is found in Attachment 2,
which is included in this appendix.
Hazardous Chemical Reactions
Acetic acid and potassium hydroxide - Potassium hydroxide residue in a catalyst pot reacted violently
when acetic acid was added.
Acetone and chloroform - A mixture of acetone and chloroform in a residue bottle exploded. Since
addition of chloroform to acetone in the presence of a base will result in a highly exothermic reaction, it is
thought that a base must have been in the bottle.
Acetone and sodium hypobromite - An explosion occurred during an attempt to prepare bromoform
from acetone by the haloform reaction.
Acetone and sulfuric acid and potassium dichromate - Acetone ignited when it was accidentally
splashed into a sulfuric acid-dichromate solution.
Acetone and 1.1.1-trichloroethane - A mixture of 1,1,1-trichloroethane and acetone will undergo a
highly exothermic reaction when catalyzed by a base.
Air (liquid) and charcoal - Explosions have occurred when liquid air contacted organic matter. A
cracked tube of activated charcoal immersed in liquid air exploded violently.
Air (liquid)-and hydocarbons - Almost any reducing agent and all hydrocarbons can foam explosive
mixtures with liquid air.
Alcohol& and hydrogen peroxide and sulfuric acid - Mixtures of alcohol with concentrated sulfuric
acid and strong hydrogen peroxide can cause explosions. Mixtures of ethyl alcohol with concentrated
hydrogen peroxide for powerful explosives.
Alcohols and hypochlorous acid - Alkyl hypochlorites are violently explosive. They are readily
obtained by reacting hypochlorous acid and alcohols either in aqueous solutions or in mixed water-carbon
tetrachloride solutions. These materials decompose in the cold and explode on exposure to sunlight or heat.
Alkali metals and boron trifluoride - boron trifluoride reacts incandescently when heated with alkali
metals or alkaline earth metals, except magnesium.
Alkali metals and maleic anhydride - Maleic anhydride decomposes explosively in the presence of
alkali metals.
Aluminum and ammonium nitrate - A mixture of aluminum powder and ammonium nitrate can be
used as an
,
explosive. A number of explosions in which ammonium nitrate and aluminum were mixed
with carbon or hydrocarbons, with or without oxidizing agents, have occurred.
Aluminum and bismuth trioxide - When bismuth trioxide is heated with powdered aluminum, the
reduction occurs with explosive violence.

4
Aluminum and bromates - A combination of finely divided aluminum with finely divided bromates (also
chlorates or iodates) of barium, calcium, magnesium, potassium, sodium, or zinc can be exploded by heat,
percussion, or sometimes light friction.
Aluminum and bromine - Bromine vapor reacts with warm aluminum foil with brilliant incandescence.
The reaction is vigorous, even at 15C.
Aluminum and carbon tetrachloride - A bomb containing powdered aluminum and carbon tetrachloride
exploded violently when heated to 153C. A mixture of powdered aluminum and carbon tetrachloride in a ball
mill exploded. Impact sensitivity tests have shown that mixtures of carbon tetrachloride and aluminum will
detonate.
Aluminum and chlorinated hydrocarbons - When hot vapors contact powdered aluminum, an explosion
results. Contact at room temperature with freshly machined chips results in violent reaction.
Aluminum and chlorine - Aluminum powder burns in chlorine, even at 20C.
Aluminum and chlorofluorohydrocarbons - It has been experimentally determined that mixtures of
powdered aluminum with monofluorotrichloroethane or with trifluorotrichloroethane will flash or spark on
heavy impact.
Aluminum and chloroform - Chloroform, methyl chloride, and carbon tetrachloride and mixtures of these
chemicals explode when in contact with aluminum powder or magnesium powder.
Aluminum and conner oxide - A strong explosion occurred when aluminum was heated with copper
oxide. With lead oxide, the crucible was broken in pieces and the doors of the furnace blown off.
Aluminum and fluorochloro lubricants - An explosive reaction occurs with fluorochloro oils or greases in
contact with fresh aluminum surfaces under high loads. Examples cited: a spinning aluminum rod under
pressure on an aluminum surface; a freshly bored aluminum cylinder under pressure from an aluminum piston;
threading an aluminum rod into a dural tube with fluorochloro oil as a lubricant.
Aluminum and iodine - Aluminum powder and iodine in close contact will ignite spontaneously.
Aluminum and iron -oxide - The reaction of powdered aluminum and iron oxide, usually started by
burning magnesium, proceeds vigorously, with evolution of intense heat. The mixture is known as thermite.
The reaction can be initiated by impact between all aluminum objects and a rusty surface.
Aluminum and lead oxides - The reduction of lead oxide by aluminum is violent.
Aluminum and sodium hydroxide - A 2590 sodium hydroxide solution was filtered into a tank trailer
thought to be made of mild steel. By the time it was discovered that the tank was made of aluminum, copious
volumes of hydrogen were already boiling off.
Aluminum and sulfates - Violent explosions occur when potassium sulfate and sodium sulfate are melted
with aluminum. The reduction of barium sulfate and of calcium sulfate is attended by violent explosions.
Aluminum and trichloroethylene - In the presence of dilute hydrochloric acid (0.1 % to 0.2% ),
aluminum and trichloroethylene formed aluminum chloride which catalyzed polymerization of the
trichloroethylene with a very high release of heat. Under this condition, subsequent oxidation of aluminum
fires caused an explosion.

5
Ammonium nitrate and contaminant - During the flame cutting of a pipeline plugged with impure
ammonium nitrate, the pipe contents exploded violently.
Ammonium nitrate and metals - The reaction of fused ammonium nitrate with powdered metals is often
violent and sometimes explosive. Zinc; cadmium, copper, magnesium, lead, cobalt, nickel, bismuth,
chromium, and antimony are the metals that reacted in this way.
Ammonium nitrate and organic matter - Ammonium nitrate forms explosive mixtures with organic
matter.
Aniline and nitrobenzene and glycerin - In the reaction of these three ingredients to form quinoline,
with ferrous sulfate as catalyst, there was too much sulfuric acid and too little water present. The resultant
excessive temperature initiated a runaway reaction.
Arsenic and bromates - A combination of finely divided arsenic with finely divided bromates (also
chlorates and iodates) of barium, calcium, magnesium, potassium, sodium, or zinc can be exploded by heat,
by percussion, and
-
sometimes by light friction.
Arsenic and chlorine - Arsenic burns spontaneously in gaseous chlorine. With liquid chlorine, arsenic
ignites at 33 C.
Arsenic and potassium nitrate - A mixture of arsenic and potassium nitrate explodes when ignited.
Barium and acids - Barium reacts violently with acids.
Barium and trichlorotrifluoroethane - It has been determined experimentally that mixtures of finely
divided barium metal and a number of halogenated hydrocarbons possess an explosive capability.
Barium and water - Barium rapidly decomposes water. The heat of reaction is sufficient that the
evolved hydrogen may ignite.
Barium alloys and acids - Alloys containing a substantial proportion of barium react violently with
acids.
Barium alloys and water - The reaction is similar to that of barium.
Beryllium and carbon tetrachloride - It has been determined experimentally that a mixture of beryllium
powder with carbon tetrachloride will flash or spark on heavy impact. Trichloroethylene will produce the
same reaction.
Calcium oxide and water - Addition of water to quicklime has generated temperatures as high as
800C. Some reports describe the reaction as violent. Ignition of sulfur, gunpowder, wood, and straw by the
beat of the quicklime reaction has been reported.
Carbon and oils and air - Fatty oils are spontaneously flammable when distributed in activated carbon.
The carbon enormously increases the surface of oil exposed to the air.
Chlorates and acids - All chlorates, when brought into contact with sulfuric acid or certain other strong
acids, may give off chlorine dioxide, an explosive gas. With concentrated sulfuric acid, a violent explosion
is usual.
Chlorine and acetylene - Acetylene can react explosively with chlorine.

6
Chlorine and ammonia - Ammonia plus chlorine (with heat) explodes, due to the formation of
extremely sensitive nitrogen trichloride.
Chlorine and benzene - An explosion of benzene vapors and chlorine (inadvertently mixed) was
initiated by light.
Chlorine and brass - Brass burns spontaneously in gaseous chlorine.
Chlorine and carbon (activated) - The mixture ignites spontaneously in the dry state.
Chlorine and hydrocarbons - In a chemical process, chlorine inadvertently contacted hydrocarbon
vapors at about 6 psig. An explosion ruptured the pipeline.
Chlorine and hydrogen - A mixture of hydrogen and chlorine is exploded by almost any form of
energy. Explosive range: 5% to 95%:
Chrmates and hydrazine - Hydrazine is decomposed explosively by chromates and chromic anhydride.
Copper and acetylene - Unstable acetylides form when acetylene is passed over copper that has been
heated to form a tarnish of oxide coating. In the presence of wet acetylene and ammonia, copper and brasses
down to 6090 copper form explosive acetylides.
Copper and bromates - A combination of finely divided copper with finely divided bromates (also
chlorates or iodates) of barium, calcium, magnesium, potassium, sodium, or zinc will explode with heat,
percussion, .and sometimes light friction.
Copper and hydrogen sulfide - If a mixture of air and hydrogen sulfide is passed over powdered copper,
the mixture may heat to redness.
Cyanides and chlorates - Violent explosion occurs if cyanide salt is melted with nitrite salt. The melt
explodes if cyanide plus chlorate or nitrite is heated to 450C.
Ethyl alcohol and hydrogen peroxide - The addition of alcohols to concentrated hydrogen peroxide
forms powerful explosives which can be detonated by shock.
Ferrous oxide and air - Ferrous oxide is spontaneously flammable in air.
Ferrous oxide and nitric acid - When pyrophoric iron oxide is gently warmed with nitric acid, the oxide
becomes incandescent.
Fluorine and acetylene - Acetylene and fluorine will react violently.
Fluorine and alkali oxides - The oxides of the alkalies and alkaline earths are vigorously attacked by
fluorine gas with incandescence.
Fluorine and ammpnig - Fluorine and ammonia burst into flame.
Fluorine and carbon - Graphitic or crystallized carbon tends to react explosively with fluorine after an
intermediate induction period.

7
Fluorine and common materials and oxygen - Spill test of 100% liquid fluorine, 30% liquid fluorine in
oxygen, and 100% oxygen on various common materials demonstrated the following effects of the fluorine
content: asphalt and also crushed limestone (calcium carbonate) burned with sputtering and small flames;
JP-4 fuel produced loud rapid explosions and a large fireball; coke burned with a small flame; charcoal
burned smoothly with a large brilliant fireball; and rich soil burned with a bright flame.
Fluorine and hydrogen - Fluorine and hydrogen combine with extreme violence. The reactions of most
organic compounds with fluorine occur explosively. Even halogenated organic materials burn or explode in
a fluorine atmosphere. The reaction with water is violent even at -210C.
Fluorine and hydrogen sulfide - Fluorine ignites in contact with hydrogen sulfide.
Fluorine and metals - Metals (powdered) are in general attacked by fluorine at ordinary temperatures. If
the temperature is raised, nearly all the metals are vigorously attacked with incandescence. Some average
ignition temperatures (F) of various metals in fluorine are: aluminum - higher than 1220, iron - 672, Monel
- 396, nickel - 1162, 302 stainless steel - 681., and tungsten - 283.
Fluorine and neoprene - When pieces of neoprene are dropped into liquid fluorine, slight
explosions occur and the neoprene burns. Neoprene-covered fiberglass exploded in liquid fluorine.
Fluorine and nitric acid - If fluorine is passed into nitric acid, each bubble of gas is attended by
decomposition of the acid and accompanied by flame.
Fluorine and solid nonmetals and oxygen - Numerous nonmetal materials were tested statically on
gaseous and liquid fluorine-oxygen mixtures with 50 to 100% fluorine. Substances that burned or reacted
violently were: Tygon, nylon, Bakelite, buna N, LS53 and LS63 rubber, Viton A, and polyurethane foam.
Under dynamic conditions, i.e., flow and pressure, materials such as Lucite, Teflon, and CPE products
(chlorinated polyethylenes) also ignited in fluorine-oxygen mixtures.
Hydrazine and air - Hydrazine may ignite spontaneously while absorbed on porous materials such as
earth, asbestos, cloth, or wood unless the heat of the gradual hydrazine-air mixture has a chance to dissipate.
Spontaneous ignition can occur with hydrogen peroxide and nitric acid. Contact with many metallic oxide
surfaces may lead to flaming decomposition.
Hydrogen and air and platinum - Finely divided platinum and some other metals will cause a mixture of
hydrogen and oxygen to explode at ordinary temperatures. If a jet of hydrogen in air impinges on platinum
black, the metal becomes hot enough to ignite the gas.
Hydrogen peroxide and acetic acid - Even dilute hydrogen peroxide added to dilute acetic acid and
heated will initiate an exothermic reaction with production of peracetic acid, which will explode at 110C.
Hydrogen peroxide and organic matter - Under certain circumstances hydrogen peroxide is capable of
developing an explosive power in excess of its weight equivalent of TNT when mixed with organic
compounds; the acetone-hydrogen peroxide system is a good example.
Hydrogen sulfide and nitric acid - Fuming nitric acid reacts incandescently with hydrogen sulfide.
Hydrogen sulfide and soda lime (NAOH and CaO) - The reaction between hydrogen sulfide and soda
lime is attended with incandescence in the presence of air; in oxygen, there is a violent explosion. Mixtures
of barium oxides with mercurous or nickel oxide also react vigorously with hydrogen sulfide in air, and
vivid incandescence or explosions may result.

8
Lead and zirconium - An alloy of 10% to 70% zirconium with lead will ignite when struck with a
hammer.
Lead oxide and perchloric acid and glycerin - Over a period of time, perchloric acid fumes from a
laboratory hood condensed on the cover plate of the exhaust fan, which was sealed with a cement of litharge
and glycerin. When a workman tapped the plate with a chisel, a violent explosion caused two injuries and
one fatality.
Lithium and air - Lithium is spontaneously flammable in air if heated to 180C, if the surface of the
metal is clean.
Lithium and carbon tetrachloride - There was no reaction when a drop or two of carbon tetrachloride
was added to burning lithium. When the quantity was eventually increased to about 25 cc of carbon
tetrachloride, a violent explosion occurred.
Lithium and nitric acid - When 15 ml of nitric acid was poured onto 15 grams of lithium in an attempt
to dissolve the metal, a small fire started in the flask. In less than a minute, the reaction was so vigorous that
burning lithium was thrown upward in the laboratory hood.
Lithium and oxygen - Lithium will burn in air, oxygen, nitrogen, and carbon dioxide. The susceptibility
of molten lithium surfaces to spontaneous ignition is increased by the presence of lithium oxides or nitrides.
These reactions and the reaction with water are extremely violent at higher temperatures. Contact with
halogenated hydrocarbons can produce extremely violent reactions, especially on impact.
Lithium aluminum hydride and air - Lithium aluminum hydride can burn in heated or moist air.
Magnesium and air - Magnesium ribbon or fine shavings can be ignited at air temperatures of about
950F, and very finely divided magnesium powder has been ignited at air temperatures below 900F.
Magnesium and beryllium oxide - Oxides of beryllium, cadmium, mercury, molybdenum, and zinc can
react explosively with magnesium when heated.
Magnesium and chloroform - When chloroform or methyl chloride (or mixtures of both) contacts
magnesium, an explosion occurs.
Magnesium and nitrogen dioxide - Magnesium, phosphorus, or sulfur burns vigorously in nitrogen
dioxide.
Magnesium and vhosnhates - A mixture of the two may cause an explosion.
Magnesium and silver nitrate - A mixture of the two ingredients will burst into flame on moistening.
The water causes electrochemical exchange between the magnesium and the silver ion. The heat of reaction
of this exchange provokes the pyrochemical effect.
Magnesium sulfates - A mixture of the two may cause an explosion.
Magnesium- alloys and air - Magnesium alloy powders containing more than 50% magnesium readily
ignite in air.

9
Manganese and aluminum and air - During a fire in an industrial bag filter, a mixture of aluminum and
manganese dusts was inadvertently released from the hopper below the bag, and a drastic explosion
resulted.
Mercuric nitrate and acetylene - Acetylene forms a sensitive acetylide when passed into an aqueous
solution of mercuric nitrate.
Mercuric nitrate and ethyl alcohol - Alcohols should not be mixed with mercuric nitrate, as explosive
mercury fulminate may be formed.
Mercuric nitrate and unsaturates. aromatics - Mercuric nitrate reacts with unsaturates and aromatics
with violence if given time to generate enough heat.
Mercury and chlorine dioxide - Chlorine dioxide and liquid mercury explode violently.
Nitric acid and ammonia - Ammonia gas burns in an atmosphere of nitric acid.
Nitric acid and anion exchange resins - If hydroxyl-form anion exchange resins are contacted by nitric
acid solutions of excessive strength (e.g., 6 molar) rapid heating and resulting gaseous degradation products
can pressurize and damage the ion exchange vessel.
Nitric acid and anion exchange resins and dichromate - Dichromate loadings as low as 0.05 gram per
cubic centimeter of resin in contact with 7 molar nitric acid can cause a runaway reaction. Ignition
temperature is 92 C and decreases with increasing dichromate loading.
Nitric acid and ethyl alcohol - If a mixture of concentrated nitric acid and ethyl alcohol is stirred, a
reaction starts slowly and accelerates to an explosion.
Nitric acid and nitrobenzene - Mixtures of nitric acid and nitrobenzene are detonable, depending upon
the amount of water present.
Nitric acid and organic matter - Nitric acid ignites spontaneously with some organic compounds, such
as furfuryl alcohol and butyl mercaptan.
Nitric acid and toluene and sulfuric acid - If Conditions are not properly controlled, the reaction of
toluene with nitric acid is extremely violent, especially in the presence of sulfuric acid, which takes up the
water formed. Part of the hazard is from the formation of nitrocresols, which react and decompose violently
on further nitration.
Oxygen and clothing - The normal .2 to 3% oxygen enrichment of air supplied to an air-supplied suit
was upset by failure of the air-oxygen mix value so that the enrichment was 68 to 7696. A worker who had
disconnected supply and exhaust lines removed his helmet and lighted a cigarette. Apparently a spark from
the cigarette lighted his oxygen-saturated underwear.and also the pressure suit.
Oxygen -and ethers - In the presence of oxygen or air, ethers form peroxides which may explode
spontaneously with friction or when heated. Isopropyl ether, which had stood on the shelf a long time,
exploded when the stuck cap on the bottle wax freed.
Oxygen and tirichloroethylene - The explosion of an oxygen pipe under pressure (400 psi) in a
metallurgical factory was apparently due to the remains of trichloroethylene, which was used for the
previous cleaning of the pipes. Tests showed it was possible to make a stoichiometric mixture of
trichloroethylene and oxygen vapors explode.

10
Perchlorates and metals - When perchlorates are mixed with finely divided metals, the mixture may be
explosive.
Perchlorates and organic matter - When perchlorates are mixed with finely divided organic matter they
may be explosive.
Perchlorates and sulfuric acid - A mixture of the two may cause an explosion.
Perchloric acid - Anhydrous perchloric acid can decompose explosively at atmospheric pressure. On
storage, even in the dark, the anhydrous acid becomes discolored owing to decomposition products, e.g.,
chlorine dioxide, and may explode spontaneously.
Perchloric acid and acetic acid - Explosions involving these materials have occurred in electrolytic
polishing baths. The violence in some cases approached that of a true high explosive.
Perchloric acid and alcohols - The contact of hot concentrated perchloric acid with alcohols or cellulose
is particularly dangerous.
Perchloric acid_ and charcoal - A drop of anhydrous perchloric acid on charcoal causes a violent
explosion.
Perchloric acid and organic matter - Perchloric acid can cause fire or explosion in most organic
materials. Example: when bis(2-hydroxyethyl) terephthalate, being refluxed with 5% perchloric acid in ethyl
alcohol, was allowed to go to dryness, there was a violent explosion. A similar mixture; containing also
ethylene glycol, flashed brightly after 18 hours refluxing. See also the other organic entries under perchloric
acid.
Permanganates and acetic acid - Acetic acid or acetic anhydride can explode with permanganates if not
kept cold. .
Permanganates and sulfuric acid and benzene - Explosions can occur when permanganates that have
been treated with sulfuric acid come into contact with benzene, carbon disulfide, diethyl ether, ethyl alcohol,
petroleum, or organic matter.
Silver nitrate and ammonium hydroxide - When a mixture of 2896 ammonium hydroxide and silver
nitrate was treated with a small amount of sodium hydroxide, black material precipitated. On being stirred
the mixture exploded. The cause was formation of the sensitive silver nitride.
Silver nitrate and charcoal - A mixture of charcoal and silver nitrate ignites under impact.
Silver nitrate and ethyl alcohol - Alcohols should not be mixed with silver nitrate; an explosive
fulminate may be formed.
Sodium hydroxide and trichloroethylene - When heated, trichloroethylene and sodium hydroxide or
potassium hydroxide form explosive mixtures of dichloroacetylene. The presence of alkylamines, as a
stabilizer in commercial trichloroethylene, furnishes a catalyst that accelerates this reaction. A pail of
trichloroethylene dumped into a tank of caustic caused a fireball and eruption of the contents.
Sodium hydroxide and water - Sodium hydroxide in contact with water may generate enough heat to
ignite adjacent combustible materials.

11
Sodium hypochlorite and oxalic acid - Weighed quantities of the two chemicals were placed in a
stainless steel beaker in preparation of a bleach solution. Just as water was first added, the mixture
exploded. Sodium hypochlorite, a strong oxidizing agent, can react almost spontaneously with readily
oxidizable materials, such as oxalic acid and cellulose.
Sodium nitrite and ammonium salts - A violent explosion occurs if an ammonium salt is melted with a
nitrite salt.
Sodium nitrite, and cellulose - Sodium nitrite at 460F in contact with the fiber drums in which it is
shipped undergoes a vigorous decomposition reaction producing a propellant-type burning until the carton is
consumed.
Sodium nitrite and sodium thiosulfate - When a sodium nitrite and thiosulfate mixture was heated to
evaporate to dryness, a violent explosive occurred.
Zinc and acids - Zinc powder or dust in contact with acids evolves hydrogen. The heat of solution is
sufficient that the hydrogen may ignite.
Zinc and ammonium nitrate - The two substances were mixed intimately and melted with 3 or 4 drops
of water. After a short time, a violent reaction occurred with evolution of steam and zinc oxide.
Zinc and chlorates - A mixture of powdered zinc and an oxidizing agent such as potassium chlorate can
be exploded by percussion.
Zinc and hydrazine mononitrate - When hydrazine mononitrate is heated in contact with zinc, copper,
and most other metals, as well as oxides, sulfides, nitrides, and carbides, a flaming decomposition occurs at
temperatures a little above its melting point.
Zinc and nitric acid - When concentrated nitric acid is poured on molten zinc, the reaction proceeds
with incandescence.
Zinc and water - Zinc powder or dust in contact with water or damp air evolves hydrogen. The heat of
reaction is such that the hydrogen may ignite.
Zirconium and alkali hydroxides - When a mixture of alkali hydroxide and zirconium is heated, the
liberated oxygen reacts explosively with the zirconium.
Zirconium and alkali metal salts - Chromates dichromates, sulfates, molybdates, and tungstates of
lithium, sodium, potassium, rubidium, and cesium will react violently, even explosively, with an excess of
zirconium powder and yield the impure metal.
Zirconium and borax - A mixture of hydrated borax and zirconium explodes when heated.
Zirconium and carbon tetrachloride - An explosion occurred when zirconium sponge was placed in a
beaker of carbon tetrachloride.
Zirconium and cupric oxide - Zirconium explodes violently with cupric oxide or lead oxide.
Zirconium and potassium nitrate - A mixture of powdered zirconium and potassium nitrate explodes when
heated above the melting temperature.

12
Zirconium-uranium alloy and nitric acid - Contact of etched or cleaned zirconium-uranium alloy with
nitric acid results in a mild explosion.

13
Incompatible Chemicals
The purpose of this section is to point out that in uncontrolled circumstances a violent reaction, fire, and/or
explosion can occur with the combination of chemicals listed. They should be stored in such a manner that
accidental contact is avoided.
Alkali and alkaline earth metals such Carbon dioxide, carbon tetrachloride and other chlorinated
as sodium, potassium, cesium, hydrocarbons (prohibit water, foam, and dry chemical on
lithium, magnesium, calcium, fires involving these metals).
aluminum
Acetic acid Chromic acid, nitric acid, hydroxyl-containing compounds,
ethylene glycol, perchloric acid, peroxides, and
permagnanates.
Acetone Concentrated nitric and sulfuric acid mixtures.
Acetylene Chlorine, bromine, copper, silver, fluorine, and mercury.
Ammonia (anhydrous) Mercury, chlorine, calcium hypochlorite, iodine, bromine,
and hydrogen fluoride.
Ammonium nitrate Acids, metal powders, flammable liquids, chlorates,
nitrites, sulfur, finely divided organics or combustibles.
Aniline Nitric acid, hydrogen peroxide.
Bromine Ammonia, acetylene, butadiene, butane and other
petroleum gases, hydrogen, sodium carbide, turpentine,
benzene, and finely divided metals.
Calcium carbide Water (see also acetylene).
Carbon, activated Calcium hypochlorite.
Copper Acetylene, hydrogen peroxide.
Chlorates Ammonium salts, acids, metal powders, sulfur, finely
divided organics or combustibles.
Chromic acid Acetic acid, naphthalene, camphor, glycerin, turpentine,
alcohol, and other flammable liquids.

14

Chlorine Ammonia, acetylene, butadiene, butane and other
petroleum gases, hydrogen, sodium carbide, turpentine,
benzene, and finely divided metals.
Chlorine dioxide Ammonia, methane, phosphine, and hydrogen sulfide.
Cumene hydroperoxide Acids (organic or mineral).
Hydrocyanic acid Nitric acid, alkalis.
Hydrogen peroxide Copper, chromium, iron, most metals or their salts, any
flammable liquid, combustible materials, aniline, nitro
methane.
Hydrofluoric acid, anhyd. (hydrogen Ammonia, aqueous or anhydrous.
fluoride)
Hydrogen sulfide Fuming nitric acid, oxidizing gases.
Hydrocarbons (benzene, butane, Fluorine, chlorine, bromine, chromic acid, sodium
propane, gasoline, turpentine, etc.) peroxide.
Iodine Acetylene, ammonia (anhyd. or aqueous), hydrogen.
Mercury Acetylene, fulminic acid, ammonia.
Nitric acid (cone.) Acetic acid, aniline, chromic acid, hydrocyanic acid,
hydrogen sulfide, flammable liquids, flammable gases, and
nitratable substances.
Oxygen Oils, grease, hydrogen, flammable liquids, solids, or
gases.
Oxalic acid Silver, mercury.
Perchloric acid Acetic anhydride, bismuth and its alloys, alcohol, paper,
wood.
Phosphorus (white) Air, oxygen.
Potassium chlorate Acids (see also chlorate).
Potassium perchlorate Acids (see also perchlorates).
Potassium permanganate Glycerin, ethylene glycol, benzaldehyde, sulfuric acid.

15

Silver Acetylene, oxalic acid, tartaric acid, fulminic acid,
ammonium compounds
Sodium See alkali metals
Sodium nitrite Ammonium nitrate and other ammonium salts
Sodium peroxide Any oxidizable substance, such as ehtanol, methanol,
glacial acetic acid, acetic anhydride, benzaldehyde, carbon
disulfide, glycerin, ethylene glycol, ehtyl acetate, methyl
acetate, and furfural
Sulfuric acid Chlorates, perchlorates, permanganates
Zirconium Prohibit water, carbon tetrachloride, foam, and dry
chemical on zirconium fires




ATTACHMENT 4
METHOD FOR DETERMINING SUBSTITUTE REPORTABLE
QUANTITIES



3
If an RQ is not available for a known toxic material (e.g., a material for which the NIOSH Pocket
Guide to Chemical Hazards lists an IDLH), the analyst may choose to either proceed with the consequence-
based evaluation or determine a substitute RQ. To promote consistency and efficiency, System Safety
Engineering will be the central point for generation and maintenance of substitute RQ values for those
chemicals not listed in 40 CFR 302, Table 302.4.
EPAs methods and criteria for establishing RQs listed in 40 CFR 302 are used to determine substitute
RQ values for substances not listed in 40 CFR 302, with minor modifications. The method involves separate
consideration of (1) toxicity by ingestion, contact, or inhalation; (2) ignitability; and (3) reactivity. EPA also
considered aquatic toxicity and effects of repeated exposures, which are beyond the scope of hazard
identification and facility classification for facility safety analysis. Application of EPAs method and criteria
requires data about physical and chemical properties of hazardous chemicals as described below. It may be
convenient to list property data in a form shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 can be used for three different
chemicals, which would be identified by listing across the top row. When values of the properties in Figure
1 are known, there can be a comprehensive basis for the degree of hazard for a material.
Mammalian Toxicity by Ingestion RQ
LD
50
< 0.1 mg/kg 1 pound
0.1 mg/kg < LD
50
< 1.0 mg/kg 10
1.0 mg/kg < LD
50
< 10 mg/kg 100
10 mg/kg < LD
50
< 100 mg/kg 1000
100 mg/kg < LD
50
< 500 mg/kg 5000

Mammalian Toxicity by Ingestion RQ
LD
50
< 0.04 mg/kg 1 pound
0.04 mg/kg < LD
50
< 0.4 mg/kg 10
0.4 mg/kg < LD
50
< 4 mg/kg 100
4 mg/kg < LD
50
< 40 mg/kg 1000
40 mg/kg < LD
50
< 200 mg/kg 5000


4
Figure 1. Form to Record Data for Determining Substitute RQs
Chemical
State at 68F
Molecular Weight
Synonyms:
CASRN:
NFPA H, F, R
Carcingoen?
Specific Gravity
Vapor Pressure, mm Hg
Boiling Point, F
Flash Point, F
LEL, %
UEL, %
Pyrophoric?
IDLH, ppm
ERPG-3, ppm
LD
50
, mg/kg, ingestion
LD
50
, mg/kg, dermal
LC
50
, ppm
LC
LO
, ppm
H
R
, kcal/gram
Comments
Substitute RQs

5
Mammilian Toxicity by Inhalation RQ
LC
50
< 0.4 ppm 1 pound
0.4 ppm < LC
50
< 4.0 ppm 10
4.0 ppm < LC
50
< 40 ppm 100
40 ppm < LC
50
< 400 ppm 1000
400 ppm < LC
50
< 2000 ppm 5000

Values of LD
P
and LC
w
may be found in Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials, by N.I. Sax
and R.7. Lewis. These refer to amounts of chemicals that produce 50% mortality results in animal tests.
When evaluating toxicity by ingestion, use LD
50
test results from ref. 10 for chemicals administered orally
or into body muscles or cavities by injection. When evaluating toxicity by contact, use LD
50
from tests that
administered chemicals directly onto the skin or subcutaneously (under the skin). LC
50
vlaues apply to
inhalation exposures.

Ignitability RQ

No 1-pound RQs on the basis of ignitability
Pyrophoric or self ignitable 10 pounds
FP < 100F, BP < 100F 100
FP < 100F, BP> 100F 1000
100F < FP < 140F 5000

Values of FP (flash point) and BP (boiling point) may be found in chemical and physical handbooks
and manuals, or in Material Safety Data Sheets.
Reactivity
EPAs methodology for establishing RQs .(in 40 CFR 302) for reactive substances is subjective and
difficult to apply. The following simplified criteria should be used to determine substitute RQ values for
reactivity. NFPA hazard ratings may be found in Material Safety Data Sheets provided by Energy Systems
and in NFPA Standard 49.
NFPA Reactivity Level RQ

4 1 pound
3 10
2 100
1 5000
0 not applicable

Carcinogenicity
It is assumed that EPA has established RQs for carcinogenetic substances and they are all listed in
40 CFR 302. It is not recommended to attempt to identify unlisted carcinogens.





APPENDIX B
TABLES FOR HAZARD ANALYSIS





B-3
Table B-1 Example Hazard Identification Table
(Facility Name) Hazard Identification Table Hazard Energy Sources and Materials
Item
Hazard Energy Source
or Material
Exists
(Y/N) Description Disposition
1.0 Electrical
1.1 Battery banks
1.2 Cable runs
1.3 Diesel generators
1.4 Electrical equipment
1.5 Heaters
1.6 High voltage (> 600V)
1.7 Locomotive, electrical
1.8 Motors
1.9 Power tools
1.10 Pumps
1.11 Service outlets, fittings
1.12 Switchgear
1.13 Transformers
1.14 Transmission lines
1.15 Wiring / underground wiring
1.16 Other
2.0 Thermal
2.1 Boilers
2.2 Bunsen burner / hot plates
2.3 Electrical equipment
2.4 Electrical wiring
2.5 Engine exhaust
2.6 Furnaces
2.7 Heaters
2.8 Lasers
2.9 Steam lines
2.10 Welding surfaces
2.11 Welding torch
2.12 Other
3.0 Pyrophoric Material
3.1 Pu and U metal
3.2 Other
4.0 Spontaneous Combustion
4.1 Cleaning / decon solvents
4.2 Fuels (gasoline, diesel fuel, etc.)
4.3 Grease
4.4 Nitric acid and organics
4.5 Paint solvents
4.6 Other

B-4
Table B-1 Example Hazard Identification Table (Continued)
(Facility Name) Hazard Identification Table Hazard Energy Sources and Materials
Item
Hazard Energy Source
or Material
Exists
(Y/N) Description Disposition
5.0 Open Flame
5.1 Bunsen burners
5.2 Welding / cutting torches
5.3 Other
6.0 Flammables
6.1 Cleaning / decon solvents
6.2 Flammable gases
6.3 Flammable liquids
6.4 Gasoline
6.5 Natural Gas
6.6 Paint / paint solvent
6.7 Propane
6.8 Spray paint
6.9 Other
7.0 Combustibles
7.1 Paper / wood products
7.2 Petroleum based products
7.3 Plastics
7.4 Other
8.0 Chemical Reactions
8.1 Concentration
8.2 Disassociation
8.3 Exothermic
8.4 Incompatible chemical mixing
8.5 Uncontrolled chemical reactions
9.0 Explosive Material
9.1 Caps
9.2 Dusts
9.3 Dynamite
9.4 Electric squibs
9.5 Explosive chemicals
9.6 Explosive gases
9.7 Hydrogen
9.8 Hydrogen (batteries)
9.9 Nitrates
9.10 Peroxides
9.11 Primer cord
9.12 Propane
9.13 Other

B-5
Table B-1 Example Hazard Identification Table (Continued)
(Facility Name) Hazard Identification Table Hazard Energy Sources and Materials
Item
Hazard Energy Source
or Material
Exists
(Y/N) Description Disposition
10.0 Kinetic (Linear and Rotational)
10.1 Acceleration / deceleration
10.2 Bearings
10.3 Belts
10.4 Carts / dollies
10.5 Centrifuges
10.6 Crane loads (in motion)
10.7 Drills
10.8 Fans
10.9 Firearm discharge
10.10 Fork lifts
10.11 Gears
10.12 Grinders
10.13 Motors
10.14 Power tools
10.15 Presses / shears
10.16 Rail cars
10.17 Saws
10.18 Vehicles
10.19 Vibration
10.20 Other
11.0 Potential (Pressure)
11.1 Autoclaves
11.2 Boilers
11.3 Coiled springs
11.4 Furnaces
11.5 Gas bottles
11.6 Gas receivers
11.7 Pressure vessels
11.8 Pressurized system (e.g., air)
11.9 Steam headers and lines
11.10 Stressed members
11.11 Other

B-6
Table B-1 Example Hazard Identification Table (Continued)
(Facility Name) Hazard Identification Table Hazard Energy Sources and Materials
Item
Hazard Energy Source
or Material
Exists
(Y/N) Description Disposition
12.0 Potential (Height / Mass)
12.1 Cranes / hoists
12.2 Elevated doors
12.3 Elevated work surfaces
12.4 Elevators
12.5 Lifts
12.6 Loading docks
12.7 Mezzanines
12.8 Floor pits
12.9 Scaffolds and ladders
12.10 Stacked material
12.11 Stairs
12.12 Other
13.0 Internal Flooding Sources
13.1 Domestic water
13.2 Fire suppression piping
13.3 Process water
13.4 Other
14.0 Physical
14.1 Sharp edges or points
14.2 Pinch points
14.3 Confined space
14.4 Tripping
15.0 Radiological Material
15.1 Radiological material
16.0 Hazardous Material
16.1 Asphyxiants
16.2 Bacteria / viruses
16.3 Beryllium and compounds
16.4 Biologicals
16.5 Carcinogens
16.6 Chlorine and compounds
16.7 Corrosives
16.8 Decontamination solutions
16.9 Dusts and particles
16.10 Fluorides
16.11 Hydrides
16.12 Lead
16.13 Oxidizers
16.14 Poisons (herbicides, insecticides)

B-7
Table B-1 Example Hazard Identification Table (Continued)
(Facility Name) Hazard Identification Table Hazard Energy Sources and Materials
Item
Hazard Energy Source
or Material
Exists
(Y/N) Description Disposition
16.15 Other
17.0 Ionizing Radiation Sources
17.1 Contamination
17.2 Electron beams
17.3 Radioactive material
17.4 Radioactive sources
17.5 Radiography equipment
17.6 X-ray machines
17.7 Other
18.0 Non-Ionizing Radiation
18.1 Lasers
18.2 Other
19.0 Criticality
19.1 Fissile material
20.0 Non-facility Events
20.1 Aircraft crash
20.2 Explosion
20.3 Fire
20.4 Power outage
20.5 Transportation accident
20.6 Other
21.0 Vehicles in Motion
21.1 Airplane
21.2 Crane / hoist
21.3 Forklifts
21.4 Heavy construction equipment
21.5 Helicopter
21.6 Train
21.7 Truck / car
22.0 Natural Phenomena
22.1 Earthquake
22.2 Flood
22.3 Lightning
22.4 Rain / hail
22.5 Snow / freezing weather
22.6 Straight wind
22.7 Tornado

B-8
Table B-2 Hazard Sources and Potential Event Types
Hazard Energy Source
or Material Group
Potential Events by Category
Electrical E-1: Fire In combination with combustible/flammable material
E-2: Explosion In combination with explosive material
E-4: Direct Exposure Worker injury
Thermal E-1: Fire In combination with combustible/flammable material
E-2: Explosion In combination with explosive material
E-4: Direct Exposure Worker injury
E-5: Criticality Increased concentration
Pyrophoric Material E-1: Fire Pyrophoric; may serve as ignition source for larger fires
E-2: Explosion In combination with explosive material
Spontaneous Combustion E-1: Fire May serve as ignition source for larger fires
E-2: Explosion In combination with explosive material
Open Flame E-1: Fire In combination with combustible/flammable material
E-2: Explosion In combination with explosive material
Flammables E-1: Fire In combination with ignition source
Combustibles E-1: Fire In combination with ignition source
Explosive Material E-2: Explosion In combination with ignition source
E-3: Loss of confinement Missiles ( in combination with ignition source)
E-5: Criticality Loss of configuration or spacing
Chemical Reactions E-1: Fire Fire or other thermal effect
E-2: Explosion Explosion or over-pressurization
E-3: Loss of confinement Toxic gas generation
E-5: Criticality Increased concentration, precipitation of material
Kinetic
(Linear and Rotational)
E-3: Loss of confinement Impacts, acceleration/deceleration, missiles
E-4: Direct Exposure Worker injury
E-5: Criticality Loss of configuration or spacing
Potential (Pressure) E-3: Loss of confinement Impacts, missiles
E-4: Direct Exposure Worker injury
E-5: Criticality Loss of configuration or spacing
Potential (Height / Mass) E-3: Loss of confinement Impacts (falling objects), dropping
E-4: Direct Exposure Worker injury
E-5: Criticality Loss of configuration or spacing
Internal Flooding Sources E-3: Loss of confinement Ground/surface water runoff
E-5: Criticality Increased moderation
Physical E-3: Loss of confinement Puncture, dropping
E-4: Direct Exposure Worker injury
Radiological Material All Events Potentially releasable material
Hazardous Material All Events Potentially releasable material
Biological Material All Events Potentially releasable material
Ionizing Radiation Sources E-4: Direct Exposure Direct exposure to worker
Non-Ionizing Radiation E-1: Fire Thermal effects in combination with combustible/flammable material
E-2: Explosion Thermal effects in combination with explosive material
E-4: Direct Exposure Worker injury
Other may interfere with equipment operation
Criticality E-5: Criticality Criticality
Non-facility Events May lead to any event category (E-1 through E-5)
Vehicles in Motion May lead to any event category (E-1 through E-5)
Natural Phenomena May lead to any event category (E-1 through E-5)


B-9
Table B-3 Frequency Evaluation Levels
Frequency Level Acronym Frequency Qualitative Description
Anticipated A f 10
-2
/yr Events that might occur several
times during the lifetime of the
facility
Unlikely U 10
-4
f < 10
-2
/yr Events not anticipated during the
lifetime of the facility
Extremely Unlikely EU 10
-6
f < 10
-4
/yr Events that will probably not
occur during the lifetime of the
facility
Beyond Extremely Unlikely BEU f < 10
-6
/yr All other Events

Table B-4 Radiological Consequence Evaluation Levels for Hazard Receptors
Consequence Level
(Abbreviation)


Offsite Public

Facility Worker
(Inside Facility)


Co-located Worker
(Outside Facility)


High
(H)

C 25.0 rem

prompt worker fatality, acute injury
that is immediately life threatening or
permanently disabling

C 100.0 rem

Moderate
(M)

5.0 C < 25.0 rem

serious injury, no immediate loss of
life, no permanent disabilities,
hospitalization required


25.0 C < 100.0 rem

Low
(L)

0.5 C < 5.0 rem

minor injuries, no hospitalization


5.0 C < 25.0 rem

Negligible
(N)

C < 0.5 rem

C < Low


C < 5.0 rem

B-10
Table B-5 Chemical Consequence Evaluation Levels for Hazard Receptors
Consequence Level
(Abbreviation)


Offsite Public
Facility Worker
(Inside Facility)
Co-located Worker
(Outside Facility)
High
(H)
C ERPG-2
prompt worker fatality, acute injury
that is immediately life threatening or
permanently disabling
C ERPG-3
Moderate
(M)
ERPG-1 C < ERPG-2
serious injury, no immediate loss of
life, no permanent disabilities,
hospitalization required
ERPG-2 C < ERPG-3
Low
(L)
PEL-TWA C < ERPG-1 minor injuries, no hospitalization ERPG-1 C < ERPG-2
Negligible
(N)
C < PEL-TWA C < Low C < ERPG-1
Note: If Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG) does not exist, then the Temporary Emergency Exposure Limit (TEEL)
should be used. (TEEL-3 = ERPG-3, TEEL-2 = ERPG-2, TEEL-1 = ERPG-1). Also, the PEL-TWA value may be substituted with the
TEEL-0 value if PEL-TWA information is not available or if the decision is made by the HA team to use the TEEL-0 value.

B-11
Table B-6 Risk Binning MatrixFacility Worker (inside facility)

Frequency

Consequence


Beyond
Extremely
Unlikely
f < 10
-6
/yr

Extremely
Unlikely

10
-6
f < 10
-4
/yr

Unlikely


10
-4
f < 10
-2
/yr

Anticipated


f 10
-2
/yr
High

Prompt worker fatality, acute injury that
is immediately life threatening or
permanently disabling
D A A A
Moderate

Serious injury, no immediate loss of life,
no permanent disabilities, hospitalization
required
D D C C
Low

Minor injuries, no hospitalization

D D D D
Negligible

C < Low

D D D D
Key:
A Region A

Unmitigated events with risk falling in or challenging Region A require further evaluation as
specified in the Control Selection Document (CSD).
C Region C

Unmitigated events with risk falling in or challenging Region C may need additional consideration
as specified in the CSD.
D Region D

Unmitigated events with risk falling in Region D generally have negligible risk and no further
action is required.


B-12
Table B-7 Risk Binning MatrixCo-located Worker

Frequency

Consequence


Beyond
Extremely
Unlikely
f < 10
-6
/yr

Extremely
Unlikely

10
-6
f < 10
-4
/yr

Unlikely


10
-4
f < 10
-2
/yr

Anticipated


f 10
-2
/yr
High

Radiological: C 100 rem
Chemical: C ERPG-3

D A A A
Moderate

Radiological: 25 C < 100 rem
Chemical: ERPG-2 C < ERPG-3

D D C C
Low

Radiological: 5 C < 25 rem
Chemical: ERPG-1 C < ERPG-2

D D D D
Negligible

Radiological: C < 5 rem
Chemical: C < ERPG-1

D D D D
Key:
A Region A

Unmitigated events with risk falling in or challenging Region A require further evaluation as specified
in the Control Selection Document (CSD).
C Region C

Unmitigated events with risk falling in or challenging Region C may need additional consideration as
specified in the CSD.
D Region D

Unmitigated events with risk falling in Region D generally have negligible risk and no further action is
required.


B-13
Table B-8 Risk Binning MatrixOffsite Public

Frequency

Consequence


Beyond
Extremely
Unlikely
f < 10
-6
/yr

Extremely
Unlikely

10
-6
f < 10
-4
/yr

Unlikely


10
-4
f < 10
-2
/yr

Anticipated


f 10
-2
/yr
High

Radiological: C 25 rem
Chemical: C ERPG-2

A1 A A A
Moderate

Radiological: 5 C < 25 rem
Chemical: ERPG-1 C < ERPG-2

D C B B
Low

Radiological: 0.5 C < 5 rem
Chemical: PEL-TWA C < ERPG-1

D C C B
Negligible

Radiological: C < 0.5 rem
Chemical: C < PEL-TWA

D D D D
Key:
A Region A

Unmitigated events with risk falling in or challenging Region A require further evaluation as specified in the
Control Selection Document (CSD).
A1 Region A1

Unmitigated events with risk falling in or challenging Region A1 due to radiological release require further
evaluation as specified in the CSD, if the event is an operational accident (i.e. internally initiated).
B Region B

Unmitigated events with risk falling in or challenging Region B due to radiological release require further
evaluation as specified in the CSD. Unmitigated events with risk falling in or challenging Region B due to
chemical release may need additional consideration as specified in the CSD.
C Region C

Unmitigated events with risk falling in or challenging Region B may need additional consideration as
specified in the CSD.
D Region D

Unmitigated events with risk falling in Region D generally have negligible risk and no further action is
required.


B
-
1
4

Table B-9 Example of Completed Hazard Evaluation Table
Table Number: Hazard Evaluation Table for (Facility Area)
Unmitigated Mitigated
Event
No.
Event
Cat. Event Description Causes
Freq.
Level
Consequence
Level
Risk
Rank
Method
of
Detection Preventive Features Mitigative Features
Freq.
Level
Consequence
Level
Risk
Rank
BC-1 E-1 Large fire

Location:
Backpulse
Chamber Areas

Release
Mechanism:
Thermal (fire)

Hazard Source:
Combustion
products; toxic
smoke or gases
Combustible/
flammable
material:
Miscellaneous
combustibles
Hydrogen from
Uninterrupted
Power Source
battery
AND
Ignition sources
Electrical short
Thermal energy
from electrical
equipment,
friction from
belts, bearings,
etc.
A
1,2
Chemical
FW: High
Co-located: Mod.
Offsite: Low

Physical
High facility
worker
consequences due
to physical nature
of event
Other Impacts:
Combustion
products may plug
High Efficiency
Particulate Air
filter causing loss
of filtration
C
A
C
B

P
A
Design:
Electrical equipment
design code; NFPA
standards.
Administrative:
Combustible material
control; Trained
personnel; Standard
Operating Procedures
Design:
Fire detection and
suppression system;
Building design;
Building ventilation
system.

Administrative:
Fire Department
response, Emergency
Operating Procedures,
Trained personnel.
A Chemical
FW: Mod.
Co-located: Low
Offsite: Neg.

Physical
Low. Workers are
trained to recognize
obvious hazards
and evacuate
C
C
D
D

P
D
BC-2 E-2 Flammable gas
detonation

Location:
Backpulse
Chamber Areas

Release
Mechanism:
Explosion

Hazard Source:
Filtrate solution
(100 gal)
Explosive material:
Oxygen diffuses
into vapor space
and mixes with
flammable gas
(e.g., benzene)
AND
Ignition sources
Electrical short
Thermal energy
from electrical
equipment,
friction from
belts, bearings,
etc.
U
1

IC3
IC4
Radiological
FW: Low
Co-located: Neg.
Offsite: Neg.

Chemical
FW: Moderate
Co-Located: Neg.
Offsite: Neg.

Physical
High Worker
consequences due
to physical nature
of event
R
D
D
D

C
C
D
D

P
A
Design:
Backpulse chamber
design; nitrogen
supply (positive
pressure on backpulse
chamber); backup
nitrogen system
Administrative:
Limited ignition
sources in room
Design:
Building design; fire
detection and
suppression system;
Building ventilation
system.
Administrative:
Personnel Access
Restrictions; Emergency
Operating Procedures;
Trained personnel.
EU

Radiological
FW: Low
Co-located: Neg.
Offsite: Neg.

Chemical
FW: Moderate
Co-located: Neg.
Offsite: Neg.

Physical
Negligible. Access
Restrictions will
protect worker from
serious injury
R
D
D
D

C
D
D
D

P
D
1. Engineering judgement; 2. Equipment failure rate database (Ref. XX); 3. ICs are identified in the document text


APPENDIX C
HAZARDS SCREENING CRITERIA






C-3
Table C-1 Standard Industrial Hazard Screening Criteria
Hazard Criteria/Measure Guidance
Chemical Hazards

This appendix Reportable Quantity (RQ), Threshold Quantity (TQ),
Threshold Planning Quantity (TPQ) screening values as
discussed in this appendix
Toxic Material

This appendix RQ, TQ, TPQ screening values as discussed in this appendix
X-Ray Equipment

Does not meet American
National Standard Institute
(ANSI) X-Ray standards
Applicable national codes and standards (e.g., American
Nuclear Society (ANS) N537/NBS123)
Flammable Materials

N/A Considered as a contributor/initiator for fire events.
Reactive Material

N/A Screened according to RQ, TQ, TPQ screening values or
SARA #00-26
Chemical
Compatibility

N/A Screened according to RQ, TQ, TPQ screening values or
SARA #00-26
Lasers

Class III non-enclosed beam
Class IV
ANSI Z136.1 Safe Use of Lasers classifies lasers in Classes I
through IV
Electrical

>600 volts or
>600 volts and >24 milli-
Ampere or >50j stored energy
at 600 volts
National Electric Code identifies these as systems requiring
special considerations
Kinetic Energy

Unique or Unusual high
kinetic energy sources (e.g.,
high energy flywheels, large
centrifuges)
Many high kinetic energy systems are capable of causing
personnel injury. Most of these (e.g., cars, trucks, forklifts,
cranes) are standard industrial hazards unless an initiator for
another significant event. Unique systems (e.g., high energy
flywheels, large centrifuges) are not considered standard
industrial hazards.
Pressure

Stored energy >0.1 LB TNT
Pressure > 3000 psig
High hydraulic pressures and pressurized gas bottles are
standard industrial hazards. Large volumes of compressed
gases are not routine.
Temperature

Temperatures which could act
as an initiator
High temperature systems are standard industrial hazards but
an evaluation is required if the temperature could result in an
overpressure, creation of toxic products or cause a fire.
Biohazards

As identified by HP or
Industrial Hygiene

Asphyxiants

Oxygen content less than 18% Asphyxiants do not have Threshold Limit Value (TLV) and
cannot be handled as toxic material. Consider areas that could
entrap asphyxiants and areas storing cylinders of asphyxiants

CHEMICAL SCREENING CRITERIA
The lists of chemicals considered to be hazardous are given in 40 CFR 302, 40 CFR 355, 29 CFR 1910.119,
and 40 CFR 68.130 (Ref. 1, 2, 3, 4).
A chemical is screened if any of the following conditions apply:


C-4
The chemical is on the referenced lists but are less than the RQs (40 CFR 302, 40 CFR 355) (Ref. 1,
2).
The chemical is not on the referenced lists but satisfy one of the following conditions:
Is less than 1 pound of solids or liquids
Is less than 100 pounds of solids or liquids, or 10 pounds of gasses, with National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) Health Hazard ratings of 1 or 2 or TEEL-2 greater than 100
Is in common use by office workers, the public, or others
X-RAY EQUIPMENT AND ACCELERATORS
The intent is to screen out those facilities with X-ray equipment or simple accelerators that are commercially
available, conform to appropriate national codes and standards (e.g., ANS N537/NBS123 for X-ray equipment
or ANS 43.1 for accelerators), and have not been modified with regard to safety-related design and operating
features, such as voltage and shielding. If the X-ray system does not conform to the appropriate national code
standard, or the accelerator is considered complex, then it must be identified for further HAs. (See Section
2.6.2.3.2 of ANS 43.1, Complex Accelerators, for the definition of simple and complex accelerators.)

LASERS
The intent is to screen out Class I and Class II lasers (per ANSI Z136.1) and Class III lasers with enclosed
beams, since these do not represent a significant health threat. If these Class I, II, and III laser systems do not
conform to the appropriate national standard, then they must be identified for further HAs. Class III lasers with
non-enclosed beams and Class IV lasers are to be identified for further analysis. Gas supplies that are an
integral part of an unmodified, sealed purchased system design do not have to be treated separately; however,
gas supplies that are not sealed in the purchased system or systems that have been modified must be considered
separately, as appropriate (i.e., toxic material criteria).
ELECTRICAL
The intent is to screen out standard electrical hazards, but to retain for further analysis those that represent
special safety concerns. Systems to be retained are (1) those with 600 volts or more and 25 milli-Ampere or
more output, and (2) stored energy systems with 50J or more stored energy and terminal-to-terminal voltage of
600 volts or more. The National Electric Code (NEC) 70-1990 identifies these as systems requiring special
consideration.
TEMPERATURE
The intent is to screen out high temperature systems whose only consequence is a contact burn and to keep
systems that could result in a strong overpressure if a coolant or other fluid contacted the high temperature
mass, that could cause toxic products if materials in the area were exposed to the high temperature, or that
could cause a fire that would spread radioactive or toxic materials.


C-5
BIOHAZARDS
The intent is to screen out common sources of biohazards, such as cooling towers, but to retain for further,
analysis facilities containing biohazards of such a nature that special industrial hygiene controls (protective
clothing, breathing apparatus, special warning placards) are required.
ASPHYXIANT
Asphyxiants do not have TLVs and, therefore, cannot be handled as toxic materials. Consider if there are areas
to entrap asphyxiants and unsuspecting personnel or situations that would impact large numbers of people.
Cylinders of compressed asphyxiants should be included in these evaluations. Such situations should be
identified for further analysis. Specifically, those situations in which the oxygen level would be less than 18%,
due to increased asphyxiant gas concentration, should be kept for further analysis.
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
Hazardous materials or operations encountered in general industry, in appropriate applications, that are
adequately controlled by OSHA regulations or one or more national consensus standards (e.g., American
Society of Mechanical Engineers, ANSI, NFPA, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, NEC), where
these standards are adequate to define special safety requirements are considered to be SIHs. SIHs must be
considered as initiators for accidents involving hazards that are not SIHs. For example, flammable materials
may be screened out as a SIH, however, if the flammable materials could potentially cause a fire that releases
toxic or radioactive materials, the flammable materials must be considered as a potential initiator for the
release.
REFERENCES
1. Protection of the Environment, Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 302.4,
Designation, Reportable Quantities, and Notification. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Washington, DC July 1992.
2. Protection of the Environment, Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 355, Emergency
Planning and Notification. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, July
1992.
3. Labor, Title 29 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1910.119(e)(6), Process Safety
Management Of Highly Hazardous Chemicals. U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC,
May 26, 1992.
4. Protection of the Environment, Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 68, Accidental
Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under Clean Air Act. U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, March 1995.





APPENDIX D
INTEGRATED WORK PROCESS






D
-
3

Figure D-1. Integrated Safety Basis Documents Process Flowchart
Facility/
Operation
Description (1)
Hazardous
Material
Inventory
(Bounding) (1)
Initial Hazard
Categorization/
Classification
(2)
<Cat 3 and
Low?
Yes
Unmitigated
Hazard
Analysis
(2)
No
Qty > RAD
limit? (2)
Other Industrial
Facility (7)
No
<Cat 3 ?
Documented
UHA & FHC
(HAD) (2)
Yes
BJC NS
approval?
DOE
approval?
Yes
UHA & FHC to
ASA
(7)
Yes
Accident
Scenario &
Seq. (5)
No
No
No
Source Term
Analysis (5)
Mitigated
Hazard
Analysis
(2)
-----------
Consequence
& Freq.
Analysis
Workers
(2)
Consistency
Review (5)
Final Selection
SC/SS/DID
SSCs & ACs
(6)
Challenges
EGs (5)
TSR
(8)
EMHS
(3)
<Order
151 Limit
Done
Yes
Fire Hazards
Analysis
(4)
Criticality
Analysis
EMHA
(3)
Yes
List of Chem
Haz & SMPs
(7)
BJC NS
approval?
No
Rad Facility
(7)
EM
FP
DSA
(8)
No
FHA
(4)
EM
FP
Yes
EM Accident
Scenario &
Seq.
(3)
Significant
New Fac. or
Unique FH?
(4)
No
Yes FHA
Conclusions
(4)
Rad Facility
HASP
(7)
Initial Controls
Selection
(6)
Transmit to
DOE
Consequence
Analysis &
Frequency
Analysis Public
(5)
No
<Cat 2?
No
HAD
(2)
Yes
BJC NS
approval?
DOE
approval?
Yes
Yes(Cat 3)
No (Cat 2)
Yes
1- Facility Description Guide
2- Hazard Analysis Guide
3- Emergency Management Guide
4- Fire Hazard Guide
5- Accident Analysis Guide
6- Control Selection Guide
7- Simplified Documented Safety Analysis Guide
8- Documented Safety Analysis Guide
No (Cat 2)



D
-
4

Figure D-2. Initial Hazard Categorization/Classification Process Flowchart
Final Determination
Non-Radiological Categorization
Identify
Facility
Segment
Facility
Determine
Hazardous
Material
Inventory
Radiological
Inventory?
Yes
Is Nuclide
Fissionable?
Is Inventory
Above
40CFR302.4
RQ?
Are Critical
Mass Limits
Exceeded?
Is Inventory
Above Cat 3
Quantities?
Is Inventory
Above Cat 2
Quantities?
Is Facility
Class A
Reactor or
Designated
Cat 1?
No No
Yes Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Other
Industrial
Radiological
Facility
Category 3
Category 2
Category 1
No
No
No
No
Yes
Chemical
Inventory?
No Further
Eval. Reqd
No
Yes
No
Determine Onsite and
Offsite Consequences
Are
Consequences
Irreversible?
Are
Consequences
Off-site?
Are
Consequences
in Immediate
Area of Event?
Are
Consequences
Reversible?
Are
Consequences
Off-site?
Do
Consequences
Effect a Large
Number of
People?
Do
Consequences
Effect a Large
Number of
People?
Other
Industrial
Low
Hazard
Moderate
Hazard
Is Facility
Designated as
High Hazard?
High
Hazard
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Preliminary Activities
Radiological Categorization
LEGEND
Above RQ?
Yes
No


D
-
5

Figure D-3. Hazard Analysis Process Flowchart
Assemble
HA
Team
Select
Method
Develop
Work
Plan
Gather
Inputs
Hazardous
Material
Inventory
( Bounding)
System
Design
Description
Facility
Design
Description
Drawings
and
Diagrams
Hazard
Identification
Divide
Areas
Facility into
Walkdown
Facility
Hazard
SIH?
Screen
Hazards
Hazardous
Event
Development
Frequency
Analysis
Consequence
Analysis
Identify Potential
Preventive and
Controls
Mitigative
Risk
Challenges
EGs?
Document
Unmitigated
HC and
HA
No Further
Eval. Reqd
Apply
Controls
Selected
Determine
Mitigated
Frequency
Update HA
To Show
Mitigated
Risk
No
Yes
Yes
No
Hazard ID
Complete
Table
No Further
Eval. Reqd
Risk
Binning
Challenges
EGs?
Offsite Risk
Accident
Analysis
Yes
No
Additional
Selection of
SC/SS/DID
SSCs &ACs
Determine
Mitigated
Consequence
Risk
Binning
Mitigated
Hazard
Evaluation
Non-HA Activities
Preliminary Activities
Unmitigated Hazard Analysis
Mitigated Hazard Analysis
LEGEND
Identify
Initial Conditions
Risk
Challenges
EGs?
No
Yes
Initial Hazard
Categorization
< Cat 3 or
Low?
Hazard
Assessment
Document
Yes
No
Functional
Classification
Control
Selection
Final Version
to Functional
Classification
Functional
Classification
Control Selection for
Initial Conditions
Unmitigated
Hazard
Evaluation