Pre-Interview Meeting for

Andrew Card, White House Chief of St

Friday, March 26, 2

Topics of Interest
• Any knowledge Card has of the USG's authorization for the departure from the
U.S. in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 of an aircraft carrying members of Bin
Laden's family and other prominent Saudis. Our interest includes the possible
involvement of any member of the White House staff or executive branch. In
other words, our interest is not just limited to Card himself, but also to his
subordinates. It also extends to knowledge he might have of the direct
involvement of the president or vice president (including the vice president's
staff) in the authorization, the role of Saudi officials including Prince Bandar, the
role of the FBI in vetting the departure, the role of other White House staff.

• Discussions Card had during the transition or in the early weeks/months of the
Bush administration on the Clinton administration's al Qaeda policy. Specific
early discussions of Bush administration officials to change policy.

• What briefings on al Qaeda and UBL did Card participate in during the transition?

Knowledge Card has of any such briefings the president received.

The extent of Card's participation in DC's on UBL/al Qaeda and related regional
issues. Card's participation in the September 4 PC. Card's participation in other
discussions of UBL and al Qaeda, including informal discussions with the
president, vice president, APNSA, DAPNSA, and national coordinator for CT.

Does Card have contemporaneous notes on the PC or the DCs?

Card's knowledge of the threat level during the "summer of threat." What did he
know about the threat? What key meetings did he participate in responding to it.
How did he arrange the government to respond to it? How did he loop in the
domestic agencies (FAA, Coast Guard, FEMA, etc.)? What does he know of
steps Rice took to do the same?

The president's awareness of the summer of threat, and involvement in

responding to it.
 The origins of the PDB on August 6 regarding al Qaeda. The president's response
to that PDB or to other PDBs discussing al Qaeda or terrorist threats.

Card's knowledge of the policy review on Afghanistan and the drafting process of
the NSPD on al Qaeda.

• Discussions about covert action authorities.

• Discussions about the Taliban. Discussions about the changes in terrorism over
the 1990s and the relative importance of state sponsors.

• Discussions about the possible use offeree in a CT context.

• We intend to cover Card's participation in key meetings from 9/11 to 9/20—

specifically, the NSC meetings of September 12, September 13, the Camp David
meetings, and the September 17 NSC meeting, as well as other NSC meetings.
Prominence of discussions of attacking Iraq in any of these meetings.

Questions re Clarke's allegations

• What Card knows about Clarke's claim that the President on September 12
pressed Clarke to develop information on Iraq's links to al Qaeda.

• (Was Clarke "ir e lootj^-on couBterterronsm;

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• How urgent a priority was CT for the Bush administration? Which indicia would
he cite to support his view?

Any interactions with Clarke, including discussions about what role he might play
in the Bush administration.