G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B.

BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitionerappellant, vs. AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor. FACTS: Appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla.The petition was opposed by the appellees because: (3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and (2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills. CFI: It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the holographic will is lost, a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of the original. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that 'in the matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the material proof of authenticity of said wills. ISSUE: May the Court allow the probate of the will? Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy. HELD: YES! Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994 FACTS: Annie Sand died and left a holographic will naming as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children. Petitioners instituted a special proceeding for allowance of decedents holographic will. Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner. Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. On appeal, trial courts decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was dismissed for failure to comply Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether the holographic will in question should be admitted to probate. HELD: YES. Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases: (a) If not executed and attested as required by law; (b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution; (c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats; (d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit; (e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto. In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads: Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases; (1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with; (2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution; (3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats; (4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person; (5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud; (6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should (7) be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus: A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator. A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court held: Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an identical commentary when he said "la omission de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1985." Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. Matters which are taken up in Probate Proceedings SOFIA NEPOMUCENO V. COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, ET AL FACTS: Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a a notarial will duly executed as to its form. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and

his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner, leaving nothing for his wife Rufina. Rufina and Martins children thereby opposed the probate of the will on the grounds that (1) the Will was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; (2) that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters testamentary should not be issued to her. Court of First Instance: Denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident. Court of Appeals: Declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 (donations) in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Aggrieved, the petitioner (Nepomuceno) submitted that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor cannot be passed upon and decided in the probate proceedings but in some other proceedings because the only purpose of the probate of a Will is to establish conclusively as against everyone that a Will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator has the mental capacity to execute the same. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner. HELD: No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will. Invoking "practical considerations", we see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions. Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.

invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him. Issue: whether or not the will is valid? If yes, what law shall govern? Held: valid and shall be governed by Pennsylvania law. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide: Art. 16 par. (2). xxx xxx xxx However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled: It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones. Note: Hermogenes died during the proceedings, thus in his will he appointed Polly Cayetano as executrix which is also being questioned by his children. Hence, Polly was substituted as petitioner. Not important but just to quench your curiosity who is Petitioner Polly Cayetano. Molo v. Molo Digest Molo vs. Molo G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951 Bautista Angelo, J. (Ponente) Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation Facts: 1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces. 2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution. 3. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.

POLLY CAYETANO vs. HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS Facts: Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos. Eleven months after, Nenita C. Paguia (sister) filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix. Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A. An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are

Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent disallowed 1939 will RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent will,containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void. There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason. Heirs of the Late Jesus Fran v. Judge Salas, Concepcion Mejia Espina and Maria Mejia Gandiongco G.R. No. L-53546 June 25, 1992

acceptance of the copy or duplicate thereof. In Salazar v. Court of First Instance of Laguna, the Supreme Court upheld the prevailing practice in some courts to permit attachment of a mere copy of the will to the application, without prejudice to producing the original thereof at the hearing or when the court so requires. Since a copy of the original will was attached to the petition, the requirements of the law and the rules are complied with. TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA, JUAN CABALLERO, AUREA CABALLERO, OSCAR LAROSA, HELEN CABALLERO, SANTOS CABALLERO, PABLO CABALLERO, VICTOR RAGA, MAURICIA RAGA, QUIRICA RAGA, RUPERTO ABAPO, represented herein by his Attorney-in-Fact, ARMSTICIA * ABAPO VELANO, and CONSESO CANEDA, represented herein by his heirs, JESUS CANEDA, NATIVIDAD CANEDA and ARTURO CANEDA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents. FACTS: An examination of the last will and testament of Mateo Caballero shows that it is comprised of three sheets all of which have been numbered correlatively, with the left margin of each page thereof bearing the respective signatures of the testator and the three attesting witnesses. The part of the will containing the testamentary dispositions is expressed in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect and is signed at the foot thereof by the testator. The attestation clause in question, on the other hand, is recited in the English language and is likewise signed at the end thereof by the three attesting witnesses hereto. 3 0 Since it is the proverbial bone of contention, we reproduce it again for facility of reference: We, the undersigned attesting Witnesses, whose Residences and postal addresses appear on the Opposite of our respective names, we do hereby certify that the Testament was read by him and the testator, MATEO CABALLERO; has published unto us the foregoing Will consisting of THREE PAGES, including the Acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively in the letters on the upper part of each page, as his Last Will and Testament and he has the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin, in the presence of the said testator and in the presence of each and all of us. What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the attestation clause herein assailed is the fact that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The phrase "and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin," obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the words "as his Last Will and Testament." On the other hand, although the words "in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each and all of us" may, at first blush, appear to likewise signify and refer to the witnesses, it must, however, be interpreted as referring only to the testator signing in the presence of the witnesses since said phrase immediately follows the words "he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for hissignature and on the left hand margin." What is then clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis , is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. ISSUE: May the Court allow the probate of the will? HELD: NO. It is our considered view that the absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the aforestated defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the language used

Facts: Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo executed a last will and testament bequeathing her properties to her collateral relatives and designating Rosario Tan, or upon her death, Jesus Fran, as executor. Remedios died with neither descendants nor ascendants. Fran, with conformity of Rosario, filed a petition for the probate the will. Attached to the petition are a copy of the original will and an English translation thereof. The probate court issued an order setting the petition for hearing. Meanwhile, the court appointed Fran as special administrator. The petition became uncontested when private respondents in this case did not file any opposition and instead filed a manifestation wherein they expressly manifested that they have no objection to the allowance of the subject will. Subsequently, the probate court rendered a decision admitting to probate the will of Remedios and appointing Fran as executor thereof. Later, a Project of Partition based on the dispositions made in the will and signed by all the devisees and legatees, with the exception of some including respondent Concepcion Mejia Espina, was submitted by the executor for the courts approval. The legatees and devisees submitted certifications stating that they have no objection to the approval of the Partition Project. The Partition Project was approved by the court. Six years thereafter, however, private respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration asking the court to declare the proceedings still open and admit their opposition to the allowance. The motion was granted and the court ultimately ruled in favor of respondents on the ground of forgery among others. Hence, Fran filed with the Supreme Court a Supplemental Petition to restrain Judge Salas from reopening the case contending that the order approving the Project of Partition and terminating the proceedings had long become final and had in fact been executed. Private respondents in turn alleged, for the first time, that the probate court never acquired jurisdiction over the case since Fran failed to submit to the court the original of the will. Issue: (1) Whether the testate proceeding was properly reopened by the motion for reconsideration? (2) Whether in a petition for allowance of a will, the original will must be attached? Held: (1) No, the testate proceeding was not properly reopened by the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration. The non-distribution of the estate is not a ground for the re-opening of the testate proceedings. A seasonable motion for execution should have been filed. In a case, the Supreme Court ruled that if the executor or administrator has possession of the share to be delivered, the probate court would have jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding to order him to transfer that possession to the person entitled thereto. This is authorized under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. However, if no motion for execution is filed within the reglementary period, a separate action for the recovery of the shares would be in order. (2) No, the annexing of the original will to the petition is not necessary as it is not a jurisdictional requirement. This is clearly evident in Section 1, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which allows the filing of a petition for probate by the person named therein regardless of whether or not he is in possession of the will, or the same is lost or destroyed. Aside from the Rules of Court, jurisprudence dictates that it is not necessary that the original of the will be attached to the petition. For instance, in Santos v. Castillo, the Supreme Court ruled that the original of the will must be presented or sufficient reasons given to justify the non-presentation of said original and the

therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance rule. It may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omissions which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself. 6 7 ERLINDA A. AGAPAY vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ G.R. No. 116668 July 28, 1997 FACTS: Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage in 1949 with private respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol. Miguel and Carlina had a child, Herminia Palang. The trial court found evidence that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii, where he worked. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with private respondents. In 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his second marriage with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. Two months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan. A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise purchased, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang. HELD: (1) YES. The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. However, their marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective contributions. It is required that there be an actual contribution. If actual contribution is not proved, there will be no coownership and no presumption of equal shares. Erlinda failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed money to but the subjected riceland. Considering her youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed the P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased and Carlina. It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of Herminia. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was not specifically for separation of property and should not be so inferred. With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property revealed the falsehood of Erlindas claim that she bought such property for P20,000 when she was 22 years old. The lawyer testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase price and directed Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee. The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of the law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code, expressly provides that the prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union

Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. Two years later, Miguel died. Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein private respondents, instituted the case at bar, an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. Private respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot both located at Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while the riceland is registered in their names (Miguel and Erlinda), she had already given her half of the property to their son Kristopher Palang. She added that the house and lot is her sole property, having bought the same with her own money. Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded from claiming aforesaid properties since the latter had already donated their conjugal estate to Herminia. Trial court: dismissed the complaint after declaring that there was little evidence to prove that the subject properties pertained to the conjugal property of Carlina and Miguel Palang. The lower court went on to provide for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of Kristopher Palang, Miguels illegitimate son. Court of Appeals: reversed the trial courts decision; ordering defendantappellee to vacate and deliver the properties in question to herein plaintiffsappellants. Hence, this petition. (1)MAIN ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay. (2) SUBJECT-RELATED ISSUE: Whether the trial court correctly made pronouncements regarding Kristophers heirship and filiation and successional rights.

(2) NO. The second issue concerning Kristopher Palangs status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir to Miguels estate is here resolved in favor of respondent courts correct assessment that the trial court erred in making pronouncements regarding Kristophers heirship and filiation inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession. The trial court erred gravely. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was, therefore, not a party to the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in the case at bar. Petitioner adds that there is no need for Kristopher to file another action to prove that he is the illegitimate son of Miguel, in order to avoid multiplicity of suits. Petitioners grave error has been discussed in the preceeding paragraph where the need for probate proceedings to resolve the settlement of Miguels estate and Kristophers successional rights has been pointed out.

The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition for the probate of the will of the late Torcuato Reyes. Perforce, the only issues to be settled in the said proceeding were: (1) whether or not the testator had animus testandi; (2) whether or not vices of consent attended the execution of the will; and (3) whether or not the formalities of the will had been complied with. Thus, the lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the testator that Asuncion Oning Reyes was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the wills intrinsic validity and which need not be inquired upon by the probate court. The lower court erroneously invoked the ruling in Nepomuceno vs. CA in the instant case. In the case aforesaid, the testator himself, acknowledged his illicit relationship with the devisee. This case is different. Testator Torcuato Reyes merely stated in his will that he was bequeathing some of his personal and real properties to his wife, Asuncion Oning Reyes. There was never an open admission of any illicit relationship. We agree with the CA that the trial court relied on uncorroborated testimonial evidence that Asuncion Reyes was still married to another during the time she cohabited with the testator. Said declarations are not sufficient to destroy the presumption of marriage. Nor is it enough to overcome the very declaration of the testator that Asuncion Reyes is his wife. G.R. No. 108947 September 29, 1997 ROLANDO SANCHEZ, FLORIDA MIERLY SANCHEZ, ALFREDO T. SANCHEZ and MYRNA T. SANCHEZ,petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ROSALIA S. LUGOD, ARTURO S. LUGOD, EVELYN LUGOD-RANISES and ROBERTO S. LUGOD, respondents. Facts: Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod are the legitimate children of Rosalia. On the other hand, Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez. Following the death of Rosalias mother, Rosalia filed a petition for letters of administration over the estate of her mother and the estate of her father, Juan C. Sanchez, who was at the time in state of senility. Before the administration proceedings could formally be terminated and closed, Rosalia's father, died. The illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez, filed a petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez, which petition was opposed by Rosalia. Rosalia and the illegitimate children of her father assisted by their respective counsels executed a compromise agreement wherein they agreed to divide the properties enumerated of the late Juan C. Sanchez. Rosalia was appointed by the trial court, and took her oath as the administratrix of her father's intestate estate. The illegitimate children of Rosalias father filed a Motion to require Rosalia, to deliver deficiency of 24 hectares and or to set aside compromise agreement. Rosalia and the illegitimate children entered into and executed a mernorandurn of agreement which modified the compromise agreement. Nine years later, the illegitimate children filed a motion to defer the approval of the compromise agreement in which they prayed for the annulment of the compromise agreement on the ground of fraud. The illegitimate children contend that, because the compromise agreement was executed during the pendency of the probate proceedings, judicial approval is necessary to shroud it with validity. They stress that the probate court had jurisdiction over the properties covered by said agreement, Trial court: A compromise agreement or partition, executed by the parties was void and unenforceable, the same not having been approved by the intestate court and that the same having been seasonably repudiated by the illegitimate children on the ground of fraud. Court of Appeals: rendered its assailed Decision granting the petition, setting aside the trial court's decision and declaring the modified compromise agreement valid and binding. Issue: Whether a compromise agreement partitioning on the inherited properties is valid even without the approval of the trial court hearing the intestate estate of the deceased owner? Held: The compromise agreement is valid. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as "a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already

REYES vs. CA G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997 TORRES, JR., J .: FACTS: Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament giving and bequeathing, among others, to his wife Asuncion all his shares of their personal properties consisting among others of jewelry, coins, antiques, statues, tablewares, furnitures, fixtures and the building and all his shares consisting of 50% of all the real estates he owns in common with his brother Jose. After Reyes died, private respondent Julio Vivares filed a petition for probate of the will before the RTC. The recognized natural children of Torcuato Reyes with Estebana Galolo, and the deceaseds natural children with Celsa Agape, filed an opposition with the following allegations: a) that the last will and testament of Reyes was not executed and attested in accordance with the formalities of law; and b) that Asuncion Reyes Ebarle exerted undue and improper influence upon the testator at the time of the execution of the will. The opposition further averred that Reyes was never married to and could never marry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he claimed to be his wife in the will, because the latter was already married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then alive and their marriage was never annulled. Thus Asuncion cannot be a compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with Reyes was violative of public morals. RTC: Declared that the will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It, however, ruled that Asuncion Reyes, based on the testimonies of the witnesses, was never married to the deceased Reyes, and, therefore, their relationship was an adulterous one. The will of Reyes was admitted to probate except for the paragraphs relating to Asuncion, which was declared null and void for being contrary to law and morals. CA: Affirmed the trial courts decision admitting the will for probate but the paragraphs relating to Asuncion were declared valid. ISSUE: Whether or not the paragraphs relating to Asuncion are valid. HELD: YES. As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court merely inquires on its due execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of the wills provisions. The intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved and allowed. There are, however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because practical considerations demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions are doubtful legality. Where the parties agree that the intrinsic validity be first determined, the probate court may also do so. Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will.

commenced." Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties. Judicial approval is not required for its perfection. And from that moment not only does it become binding upon the parties, it also has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata. Although it is denominated as a compromise agreement, the document in this case is essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Article 1082 of the Civil Code which provides that "every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction." For a partition to be valid, Section 1. Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of the following conditions: (I) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds. All the foregoing requisites are present in this case. The court therefore affirm the validity of the parties' compromise agreement/partition in this case. The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it rendered its decision in disregard of the parties' compromise agreement. Such disregard, on the ground that the compromise agreement "was not approved by the court," is tantamount to "an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation and within the bounds of law."

properties will pass to the donee only because of the donors death, then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament. But if the donation takes effect during the donors lifetime or independently of the donors death, meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties passes to the donee during the donors lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of the deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos. The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the validity or revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is inter vivos, it must be executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 and 749 of the Civil Code, except when it is onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation must be in the form of a will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise it is void and cannot transfer ownership. The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following: 1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; 2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; 3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that any right, title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina. The phrase to become effective upon the death of the DONOR admits of no other interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime. One of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. Also, the deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation as mortis causa: SIGNED by the above-named donor, Celestina Ganuelas, at the foot of this deed of donation mortis causa, consisting of two (2) pages and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the joint presence of all of us who at her request and in her presence and that of each other have in like manner subscribed our names as witnesses. As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will under Article 728 of the Civil Code should have been complied with, failing which the donation is void and produces no effect. Also, the attesting witnesses failed to acknowledge the deed before the notary public, thus violating Article 806 of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

URSULINA GANUELAS, METODIO GANUELAS and ANTONIO GANUELAS, vs . HON. ROBERT T. CAWED, Judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union (Branch 29), LEOCADIA G. FLORES, FELICITACION G. AGTARAP, CORAZON G. SIPALAY and ESTATE OF ROMANA GANUELAS DE LA ROSA, represented by GREGORIO DELA ROSA, Administrator, respondent . Facts: Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin (Celestina) executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property covering seven parcels of land in favor of her niece Ursulina Ganuelas (Ursulina), one of herein petitioners.The donation states: That, for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE, and of the faithful services the latter has rendered in the past to the former, the said DONOR does by these presents transfer and convey, by way of DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above, described, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect. Celestina executed a Revocation of Donation purporting to set aside the deed of donation. More than a month later, Celestina died without issue and any surviving ascendants and siblings. Years after the execution of the Deed of Donation, Ursulina secured the corresponding tax declarations, in her name, over the donated properties, and since then, she refused to give private respondents any share in the produce of the properties despite repeated demands. Private respondents filed with the RTC against Ursulina. The complaint alleged that the Deed of Donation executed by Celestina in favor of Ursulina was void for lack of acknowledgment by the attesting witnesses thereto before notary public Atty. Henry Valmonte, and the donation was a disposition mortis causa which failed to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, hence, it was void. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering Ursulina to return to them as intestate heirs the possession and ownership of the properties. RTC: Mortis Causa! Issue: Whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa. Held: Mortis Causa! If the donation is made in contemplation of the donors death, meaning that the full or naked ownership of the donated

SICAD vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 125888. August 13, 1998 NARVASA, C.J .: FACTS: Aurora Virto Vda. De Montinola of the City of Iloilo executed a deed entitled DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS on December 11, 1979. It named as donees her grandchildren, namely: Catalino Valderrama, Judy Cristina M. Valderrama and Jesus Antonio Valderrama. The deed also contained the signatures of the donees in acknowledgment of the acceptance of the donation. When the deed of donation prepared by Montinolas lawyer was read and explained by the latter to the parties. Montinola expressed her wish that the donation take effect only after ten (10) years from her death, and that the deed include a prohibition on the sale of the poperty for such period. Accordingly, a new proviso was inserted in the deed reading: however, the donees shall not sell or

encumber the properties herein donated within 10 years after the death of the donor. Upon presentation of the deed, the ROD cancelled the TCT in the name of Montinola and issued a new TCT in the name of the donees. Montinola however retained the owners duplicate copy of the new title, as well as the property itself, until she transferred the same ten (10) years later, on July 10, 1990, to the spouses, Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad. On March 12, 1987, Aurora Montinola drew up a deed of revocation of the donation, and caused it to be annotated as an adverse claim on the new TCT. Then on August 24, 1990, she filed a petition with the RTC for the cancellation of said TCT and the reinstatement of the old one in her name. Her petition was founded on the theory that the donation to her three (3) grandchildren was one mortis causa which thus had to comply with the formalities of a will; and since it had not, the donation was void and could not effectively serve as basis for the cancellation the new TCT. The donees opposed the petition. In their opposition dated August 29, 1990, they averred that the donation in their favor was one inter vivos which, having fully complied with the requirements therefor set out in Article 729 of the Civil Code, was perfectly valid and efficacious. They also expressed doubt about the sincerity of their grandmothers intention to recover the donated property, since she had not pursued the matter of its revocation after having it annotated as an adverse claim. The RTC held that the donation was indeed one inter vivos. Montinola appealed to the CA, and while the case was pending, she died. Ernesto Sicad and Evelyn Bofill-Sicad filed a Manifestation and Motion claiming that they had become the owners of the property in question in virtue of a deed of definite sale dated May 25, 1992. The CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether the donation is mortis causa or inter vivos HELD: Mortis causa. A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds form the donee that right to dispose of the donated property during the donors lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive. In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the deed of donation in question to Montinolas grandchildren, the ostensible donees. They did not get possession of the property donated. They did not acquire the right to the fruits thereof, or any other right of dominion over the property. More importantly, they did not acquire the right to dispose of the property this would accrue to them only after ten (10) years from Montinolas death. Indeed, they never even laid hands on the certificate of title to the same. They were therefore simply paper owners of the donated property. All these circumstances, including, to repeat, the explicit provisions of the deed of donation reserving the exercise of rights of ownership to the donee and prohibiting the sale or encumbrance of the property until ten (10) years after her death ineluctably lead to the conclusion that the donation in question was a donation mortis causa, contemplating a transfer of ownership to the donees only after the donors demise. Finally, it is germane to advert to the legal principle in Article 1378 of the Civil Code to the effect that in the case of doubt relative to a gratuitous contract, the construction must be that entailing the least transmission of rights and interests. The donation in question, though denominated inter vivos, is in truth one mortis causa; it is void because the essential requisites for its validity have not been complied with. G.R. No. 110427 February 24, 1997 The Incompetent, CARMEN CAIZA, represented by her legal guardian, AMPARO EVANGELISTA vs. COURT OF APPEALS NARVASA, C.J.: Facts: On November 20, 1989, being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen Caiza, a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared incompetent by judgment of the Regional Trial Court in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate.

Caiza was the owner of a house and lot occupied by Spouses Estrada. Her guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MetroTC) to eject the spouses from said premises. The Complaint pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caiza was the absolute owner of the property in question; that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Caiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment;" that through her guardian, Caiza had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but they had refused to do so. In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had been living in Caiza's house since the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Caiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will by which she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question. MeTC: Estradas were ordered to vacate the premises. RTC: Reversed the decision- the issue of possession should be resolved by accion publiciana. CA: Affirmed RTCs decision. Petitioner alleged that a Xerox copy of an alleged holographic will is not relevant in the resolution of the case. Respondents alleged that they had been occupying the property with the prior consent of the "real owner," Carmen Caiza, which "occupancy can even ripen into full ownership once the holographic will of petitioner Carmen Caiza is admitted to probate." They conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Caiza's legal guardian to oust them from the disputed premises. Duing the pendency of the case, Carmen Caiza died. Issue: Whether Spouses Estrada has right to possess the property by virtue of the Holographic will. Held: The Estradas' possession of the house stemmed from the owner's express permission. That permission was subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as was her right; and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was made through her judicial guardian, the latter being indisputably clothed with authority to do so. Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen Caiza had executed a will bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas; that circumstance did not give them the right to stay in the premises after demand to vacate on the theory that they might in future become owners thereof, that right of ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership being possible unless and until the will is duly probated. Thus, at the time of the institution of the action of desahucio, the Estradas had no legal right to the property, whether as possessors by tolerance or sufferance, or as owners. They could not claim the right of possession by sufferance; that had been legally ended. They could not assert any right of possession flowing from their ownership of the house; their status as owners is dependent on the probate of the holographic will by which the property had allegedly been bequeathed to them an event which still has to take place; in other words, prior to the probate of the will, any assertion of possession by them would be premature and inefficacious. A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838, id.). An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.

JOSEPH CUA V. GLORIA VARGAS G.R. No. 156536; October 31, 2006 FACTS:

A parcel of land(99 sqm) was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. The heirs executed a notarized extrajudicial settlement among themselves, partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question, each of them getting a share of 11 sq meters. Among the heirs, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it. Florentino, Andres, Antonina, and Gloria did not sign the document. The document was published for three consecutive weeks. An extra-j settlement with sale was again executed. Once more, only E,V,J,Z, and R signed and their shares were sold to Joseph Cua. According to Gloria, she came to know of hte settlement only when the original house was being demolished. She also claimed that she was unaware of the first document. She sent a letter to petitioner in order to redeem the property. When Gloria and Jose failed to reach an amicable settlement, the former filed a case for annulment of the EJS and legal redemption of the lot. After trial on the merits, the MTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. The MTC upheld the sale to petitioner because the transaction purportedly occurred after the partition of the property among the co-owner heirs. The RTC affirmed the MTC decision. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts. MR denied. ISSUES: 1. Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless of their failure to participate therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate when the extrajudicial settlement and partition has been duly published; 2. Whether the written notice required to be served by an heir to his co-heirs in connection with the sale of hereditary rights to a stranger before partition under Article 1088 of the Civil Code can be dispensed with when such coheirs have actual knowledge of the sale. RULING: 1. The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned. *This is not to say, though, that respondents' co-heirs cannot validly sell their hereditary rights to third persons even before the partition of the estate. The heirs who actually participated in the execution of the extrajudicial settlements, which included the sale to petitioner of their pro indiviso shares in the subject property, are bound by the same. Nevertheless, respondents are given the right to redeem these shares pursuant to Article 1088 of the Civil Code. The right to redeem was never lost because respondents were never notified in writing of the actual sale by their co-heirs. 2. Written notice is indispensable and mandatory, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. It cannot be counted from the time advance notice is given of an impending or contemplated sale. The law gives the co-heir thirty days from the time written notice of the actual sale within which to make up his or her mind and decide to repurchase or effect the redemption. It should be kept in mind that the obligation to serve written notice devolves upon the vendor co-heirs because the latter are in the best position to know the other co-owners who, under the law, must be notified of the sale. This will remove all uncertainty as to the fact of the sale, its terms and its perfection and validity, and quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. As a result, the party notified need not entertain doubt that the seller may still contest the alienation. Considering, therefore, that respondents' co-heirs failed to comply with this requirement, there is no legal impediment to allowing respondents to redeem the shares sold to petitioner given the former's obvious willingness and capacity to do so.

CRESENCIANA TUBO RODRIGUEZ (now deceased), substituted by SUSANA A. LLAGAS, vs. EVANGELINE RODRIGUEZ, BELEN RODRIGUEZ and BUENAVENTURA RODRIGUEZ, Facts: Juanito Rodriguez owned a five-door apartment and executed a "Huling Habilin at Testamento" giving petitioner Cresenciana Tubo Rodriguez, his live-in partner, apartments D and E, and his children Benjamin Rodriguez (the deceased husband of respondent Evangeline Rodriguez), apartment A, respondent Buenaventura Rodriguez, apartment B, and respondent Belen Rodriguez, apartment C. However, on June 14, 1984, Juanito executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of petitioner. Thus, TCT No. 144865 was cancelled and a new TCT No. 150431 was issued in the name of the petitioner. The case arose when petitioner filed on September 20, 2001 a complaint for unlawful detainer against the respondents, alleging that she is the lawful and registered owner of the property; and that in 1984, she allowed respondents, out of kindness and tolerance, to personally occupy units A, B and D, respectively. However, without her knowledge and consent, respondents separately leased the units to Montano Magpantay, Mel Navarro and Socorro Escota, who despite repeated demands, failed and refused to vacate the premises and to pay the rentals thereof. In their Answer, respondents claimed ownership over the subject property by succession. They alleged that while petitioner is the registered owner of the property, however, she is not the lawful owner thereof because the June 14, 1984 Deed of Absolute Sale was simulated and void. Respondents maintain that petitioner exerted undue influence over their father, who at that time was seriously ill, to agree to the sale of the property for only P20,000.00 after knowing that only two apartments were given to her in the Huling Habilin at Testamento. MTC rendered a judgment in favor of the respondents and held that the deed of sale was simulated. RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MTC.

Issue: Who is the entitled to the possession and ownership of the property? Held: petitioner In the case at bar, petitioners cause of action for unlawful detainer was based on her alleged ownership of land covered by TCT No. 150431 and that she merely tolerated respondents stay thereat. Respondents failed to prove their right of possession, as the Huling Habilin at Testamento and the Partition Agreement have no legal effect since the will has not been probated. Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated. This cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy.18 Article 838 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." As the will was not probated, the Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant thereto can not be given effect. Thus, the fact that petitioner was a party to said agreement becomes immaterial in the determination of the issue of possession. Moreover, at the time the deed of sale was executed in favor of the petitioner, Juanito Rodriguez remained the owner thereof since ownership would only pass to his heirs at the time of his death. Thus, as owner of the property, he had the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. Now, whether or not the disposition was valid is an issue that can be resolved only in Civil Case No. 01-1641, an action instituted by the respondents for that purpose.