Chief Marshal Roper and Marshal Harley on

setting the record straight in NG12-0435

From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 11/23/12 4:09 PM
To: roperj@reno.gov (roperj@reno.gov); harleyj@reno.gov
(harleyj@reno.gov); je@eloreno.com (je@eloreno.com);
skent@skentlaw.com (skent@skentlaw.com); cvellis@bhfs.com
(cvellis@bhfs.com); eifert.nta@att.net (eifert.nta@att.net);
nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net (nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net);
patrickk@nvbar.org (patrickk@nvbar.org); christensend@reno.gov
(christensend@reno.gov); mike@tahoelawyer.com
(mike@tahoelawyer.com); davidc@nvbar.org (davidc@nvbar.org);
fflaherty@dlpfd.com (fflaherty@dlpfd.com);
fflaherty@dyerlawrence.com (fflaherty@dyerlawrence.com);
stuttle@washoecounty.us (stuttle@washoecounty.us); wongd@reno.gov
(wongd@reno.gov); ormaasa@reno.gov (ormaasa@reno.gov);
mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us (mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us);
zyoung@da.washoecounty.us (zyoung@da.washoecounty.us);
bdogan@washoecounty.us (bdogan@washoecounty.us);
jleslie@washoecounty.us (jleslie@washoecounty.us);
holmesd@reno.gov (holmesd@reno.gov)
Dear Panel, Judge Nash Holmes, Chief Roper, Marshal Harley, Bar Counsel,
et al,
I apologize for using email to communicate here, but my current indigency
and time constraints so require it. Further, I in no way wish to violate any
Orders by any of the RMC Judges respecting emailing or contacting the RMC
in connection with specific cases, and submit this limited correspondence in
the hopes that my interpretation of any such Orders is in line with reality and
will forgive at least this limited use of email outside of any attempt to file
anything in any of the matters in which I am a party before the RMC. The
exigency involved here relates primarily to the enormous deference that will
be given to the Panel's decision in the SBN v. Coughlin disciplinary matter,
and my desire to have the Panel afforded every opportunity to have all
essential information necessary to arrive at a just decision at its disposal.
What follows is in part a request and in part a recognition of the extent to
which Judge Nash Holmes's action during the 2/27/12 Trial in 11 TR 26800
may likely have been the best thing to have had done, owing to her vast
experience in these and a great deal many other matters, and, hopefully, will
have an upbeat result stemming therefrom.
At the Double R Blvd. Northern Office of the State Bar of Nevada, RMC
Judge Nash Holmes, on 11/14/12, testified under oath and indicated
something along the lines of the following:
During the 11 TR 26800 "simple traffic citation Trial" on 2/27/12, starting at
about 3 pm, Judge Holmes interrogated Coughlin as various points
throughout the Trial as to whether he was recording the proceedings (without
permission), and or whether he had a "recording device" (whether every laptop
anyone brings to Court would be considered a "recording device" to Judge
Holmes is not exactly clear).
Judge Holmes then testified that after an initial round of interrogation of
Coughlin as to whether he was recording the proceedings and or had a
"recording device" that Coughlin got "all sneakity" and said he was not, but
then "quote, 'took the Fifth' then immediately asked to be allowed to use the
restroom...and I ordered Marshal Joel Harley to accompany him there...and it
was reported to me that while in the restroom Coughlin disassembled a
recording device and hid some part of it in the restroom..." (Coughlin
recounts this testimony from memory, and admittedly, it is far from
verbatim).
It is categorically false (though not necessarily maliciously so)
for Judge Nash Holmes to assert, in the audio record on
3/12/12 the order of events and when she asked Coughlin her
questions about recording, considering when a restroom break
took place and exactly what it is she asked Coughlin and when,
and what his responses were, and when some allegations by
"the Marshal" were made, what they consisted of, etc.. on
3/12/12 in 11 tr 26800 the audio transcript reads 7 minutes into
the audio record the RMC provided the SBN:
Judge Nash Holmes (Nash): It appears to me in this case that the
defendant is suffering from some extreme form of mental
illness. during the trial I asked the defendant attorney
repeatedly if he was recording the proceedings he denied that
vehemently a few times and then he quote took the fifth a few
other times and then he requested to be excused to go to the
bathroom and the Marshal later reported to me that while the
gentleman was in the bathroom he disassembled a recording
device in his pocket and took the memory out of it and it was
later found in that, uh, by the Marshal no one else had gone into
the bathroom and that was retrieved and it was put into his
possession at the Sheriff's office and when they booked him
into jail for the contempt charge that was booked into evidence
and I asked the Sheriff's office to hold that into evidence. I
believe he has violated Supreme Court Rule 229(2)(B) which was
amended by ADKT 440, August 1st, 2011...."
One Coughlin did not do anything of the sort indicated by Judge Nash Holmes (by way of
unattributed hearsay, like her car sleeping allegations in her 3/14/12 letter re Coughlin to the SBN)
above.
Perhaps NRS 178.405 in the context of NRS 5.073 should have some baring on anything said or
done or Ordered by Judge Nash Holmes following her statement at the 7 minute mark that "It
appears to me in this case that the defendant is suffering from some extreme form of mental
illness." To the extent any question of Coughlin's competency was communicated to or brought to
Judge Nash Holmes attention prior to the 2/27/12 3:00pm start of the Trial in 11 TR 26800, that
proceeding should have been stayed or suspended, especially if the WCPD's Office made such
communnications in close temporal proximity to the 1:31 pm 2/27/12 Order for Competency
Evaluation by Judge Clifton in RCR2011-065630. And arguably, given the same office (in a broad
sense) in which DDA Z. Young and DDA Kandaras work, it is arguably a basis for conflicting out the
WCDA's Office from any one of the three prosecutions is has maintained against Coughlin this year
(especially considering the issues related to whether the WCSO's timely effected the lockout of
11/1/11 in the eviction from Coughlin's former home law office, which, given the recent admissions
by the locksmith there that day, and the Reno Carson Messenger receipt from the day prior, and
Casey Baker, Esq's testimony related to his interactions with the WCSO on October 28th, 2012
during his sworn testimony at the criminal trespass trial before RMC Judge Garder on 6/18/12, and
the RJC's failure to even move to Quash Coughlin's subpoenaing records related to the fax logs and
confrimation of transmission or receipt incident to the RJC's "usual custom and practice" of faxing
eviction Orders to the WCSO for service (like those in the Richard Hill/Casey Baker Summary
Eviction "Trial" involving Coughlin's former home law office, and the "within 24 hours of receipt"
language found within NRS 40.253 (the Order is void or invalid after that point, in which case, it
would mean Hill and or Baker were the trespassers, not Coughlin, regardless, its inappropriate for
RMC court appointed defender Loomis to categorically refuse to assert any claim of right defense
that such a criminal trespass defendant may wish to assert for, say, Richard Hill admits to charging
the same rent under a "storage of personal property" that was previously charged for "full use and
occupancy". Nonetheless, posting an Eviction Order that does not contain stay away language
(much less the fact that is does not have the required "within 24 hours" language called for by the
statute) is not tantamount to posting a no trespassing sign, further, Hazlett-Stevens making
arguments in his closing as to matters not in evidence (allegations of living in the residence) is
reversible error, and for Judge Gardner to do as Judge Howard did, an prevent the City Attorney
from even having to Oppose Coughlin's Motion for New Trial, is further indication of the extent to
which Coughlin's reactions during the 2/27/12 Trial, however offputting, are not totally unfounded.
Further, that which Judge Nash Holmes had communicated to her prior to the start of Trial on
2/27/12 in 11 tr 26800 needs to be testified to under oath, rather than have Bar Counsel assert to
half baked "can't ask the judge about her mental processes" loophole, as he has done. But,
actually, a review of the Hardesty/Mirch dynamic may dictate that Coughlin would have been fairly
limited in that regard anyways, nonetheless, Judge Nash Holmes appeared, to her credit, and
answered some questions. The answers revealed an opportunity put forward now to clear some
things up, though the constraints of the Disciplinary Hearing format, some disagreements over
what the SBN communicated to Coughlin with respect to the rules that would be applied to him vis
a vis NRCP 45 subpoenas (whether, he, as a suspended attorney could issues a subpoena
(Coughlin maintains the Bar/Panel/Board did give him such authority) and whether any witness fee
or subpoena decus tecum fee must be paid by Coughlin (Coughlin maintains he was provided
indications upon which he reasonably relied that he would not be so required in additions to the
rules or practicies attached to the service thereof), and other factors severely limited the extent to
which the opportunity created by Judge Nash Holmes testimony was realized to its full potential.
That necessitated this correspondence. Coughlin recalls the first time he saw opposing counsel
allege he was lying in a filing, it was one of the early one's by Richard Hill's former associate
Casey Baker, alleging "outright lies". It was upsetting, especially considering how unfair and
baseless the allegations seemed...and Coughlin nows wishes he would have done and said some
things differently incident to his testimony relative to RPD Sargent Tarter and Judge Nash Holmes's
own testimony, and intends to address the extent to which objectionable conduct by opposing
counsel can often times become a sort of learned characteristic perpetuating a race to, if not the
ethical gutter, at least a preponderance of Rambo litigating. To some extent the incidents with
Marshal Harley and RCA Ormaas may be fallout from that. Important too, however, is to consider
whether the "courthouse sanctuary" doctrine has some application, however confusing it may be,
where the WCSO may be hired by private parties to conduct service, and the Marshals are only
extending intra-governmental courtesies in assisting in the manner in which Marshal Harley did on
2/27/12. Richard Hill gets the "oopsies" a lot. Oppsie, I asked for $20K in attorney's fee incident
to a summary eviction at the trial court level, despite that not being supportable under NRS 69.020,
Hill says. Oopsie, I left the window unit air conditioner in the exposed to the street by the Lakemill
lodge window at your former home law office, which was then robbed, but for which I still managed
to charge you full rental value at full use and occupancy rates, though I had you subject to an
arrest for custodial trespass anyways, Hill and Baker say.
(at the 9 minute 48 second mark of the first audio file attached from 2/27/12)
"Judge: Sir, I would like you to raise your hand to be sworn, because its my experience that people
who represent themselves tend to testify a whole lot when they are asking other people questions,
so let's just start that way and then we won't have to do it later, so swear him in and then we'll get
going
Marshal: Testimony (inaudible)...you are about to (inaudible) understand (inaudible) truth, whole
truth, nothing but truth, solemnly?
Coughlin: Yes, Sir?"
However, from there, throughout the Trial Judge Nash Holmes interrupts Coughlin during his
questioning of Tarter to indicate to Coughlin that he is asking questions and not testifying, or that
he will have an opportunity to make some point when its his turn to testify, if he chooses to testify,
etc., etc, and eventually Judge Nash Holmes asks Coughlin, after the restroom break, if he intends
to testify on his own behalf..."Nor does the trial judge's speculation that Appellant might use his
closing argument to present unsworn testimony." Soto, 139 S.W.3d at 857.
The transcript from the 2/27/12 certified audio recording of the traffic citation Trial
at the 1 hour and 6 minute 18 second mark of the running time (yes the certified audio transcript is
provided in a FTR format that necessitates installing TheRecord Player, but for the ease of the
receipients of this correspondnece, Coughlin convereted the audio therein exactly as it was into a
more workable format, .mp3 files, split into two files for 2/27/12 (before and after the one
restroom break) and one file for the continuation fo the trial on 3/12/12) of file one:
Judge Nash Holmes (Judge): Sir, Mr. Coughln, sit down, I am done with you.
Coughlin: Just to preserve for the record, Your Honor.
Judge: Sit down, sit down, your're done. For the record the defendant is looking in his pockets and
behind his back and turning around and clowning around and showing utter disprespect for this
court and if you say another word or do another little antic like that you are going out of this Court
in handcuffs. Do you have any other witnesses? Prosecutor?
Prosecutor Ormaas: No, Your Honor, the City rests.
Judge: Sir, do you wish to testify?
Coughlin: Can I call Officer Tarter as my own witness?
Judge: you can call anyone you wish to testify.
Coughlin: I am sorry, Your Honor, but I really need to use the restroom.
Judge: You have two minutes. Marshal (Harley), you will escort him to the restroom, don't take
anything with you, Sir...
Coughlin: Can I take my notes with me?
Judge:No, turn them upside down.
Coughlin: Can I take the one page?
Judge: No, turn them upside down.
Coughlin: Really?
Judge: Turn them upside down. Marshal you will go with him to the restroom.
Coughlin: Will I be able to go into the stall alone? Just checking.
Judge: You have two minutes. You have two minutes.
Coughlin: Okay.
(that ends the first audio file attached for 2/27/12, which represents the entirety of the proceeding
prior to the ONLY restroom break during that Trial)
(Start of the second audio file of 2/27/12, which represents the entirety of the proceedings of that
day following the ONLY restroom break of the day).
Coughlin: (re-enters courtroom): Thank you, Your Honor.
Judge: Okay, we are back on the record in 11 TR 26800. Mr. Coughlin, are you recording these
proceedings?
Coughlin: No, Your Honor.
Judge: Do you have any sort of devices in your pocket?
Coughlin: I believe what is in my pocket is private, Your Honor.
Judge: I want to know if you have any sort of recording devices in your pocket!
Coughlin: I believe that is a Fourth Amendment issue, Your Honor.
Judge: I am asking you, are you are recording anything from these proceedings in your pocket
without Court permission?
Coughlin: I believe that is a Fourth Amendment issue.
Judge: Sir?
Coughlin: And, no, I'm not.
Judge: Okay, proceed, do you have any questions for this witness (RPD Sargent John Tarter) that
are different from the area that we gave gone over already.
Coughlin: Well, I would like to ask a follow up on the rolling stop citation..." (thereafter Judge Nash
Holmes does not ask any other questions of Coughlin in any way related to recording or recording
devices, nor did Judge Nash Holmes ask any questions of anyone related to recording or recording
devices besides. Judge Nash Holmes did ask, before the restroom break, of Coughlin, if Coughlin
had any evidence or proof to support his contention that he attempted to provide to either Reno
City Attorney Wong or Ormaas discovery or information related to the statement to Coughlin,
incident to the November 13th, 2011 custodial criminal trespass arrest of Coughlin at his former
law office incident to an impermissible summary eviction of a commercial tenant not based on the
non-payment of rent (ie, a No Cause Eviction Notice was posted and a Landlord's Affidavit alleged
a No Cause basis for proceeding).
On the second audio file from 2/27/12, at the 5 minute mark, the follow occurs on the record:
"Coughlin: was I there? Do I remember the name of the other officer who was there with him who
went into Richard Hill's law office for twenty minutes with him and hung out?
Judge: If you mention the name Richard Hill again I am going to hold you in contempt because I
have told you repeatedly to stick to the relevant issues about the boulevard stop."
(At the 11:17 minute mark of the second audio from 2/27/12 the following occurs on the record):
Judge: Officer (RPD Sargent Tarter), you are excused. Sir, do you intend to testify?
Coughlin: Yes, Your Honor.
Judge: Then testify, you don't need to take the stand, you can testify right there, you don't have to
ask yourself questions, just give me a short narrative version of what happened, and don't refer to
yourself in the third person, he was sworn in at the beginning of the case, don't refer to yourself in
the third person, just tell me what happened.
Coughlin: Yes, your honor, I reported a bribe to Sargent Tarter, then he retaliated against me.
Judge: Sir! Sir! Keep it relevant!
Reno City Attorney Ormaas: Objection, move to strike!
Judge: Keep it relevant about whether or not the boulevard stop occurred and what happened:
Coughlin: Sargent Tarter perjured his testimony today
Judge: Sir, Sir, answer about the boulevard stop.
Coughlin: Yes, Your Honor, this incident occurred when I went over to Richard Hill's office.
Judge: Sir.
Coughlin: I can't get into that? Okay.
Judge: Sir, boulevard stop.
Coughlin: Sargent Tarter lied today when he...
Judge: All right, Sir!
Coughlin: about the boulevard stop, I am saying...I disagree
Judge: take him into custody, you are in contempt of court, you will spend the next five days in jail,
this court is finished, this matter is continued
Coughlin: Your Honor I move for a stay, I have a trial..and I have clients who need me
Judge: that is your problem, Sir. For the record you are in contempt of court because you have been
insubordinate, you have disregarded all of my requests, directions, orders, cajoling, my efforts to
get you to follow the instructions of the court, to act like a lawyer, or even to act like a defendant
representing himself in this court, you have made faces, belittled, you have argued, you have
played, you have been ridiculous in this courtroom and brought up issues that are irrelevant and
immaterial and to disrupt this proceeding, and there are only five or six people here that you could
disrupt, you have done everything you can to divert from the matter at question and to keep us
from resolving the issue of whether or not you have committed the traffic violation of the boulevard
stop, and you are in utter contempt of this court and have done nothing to deal with the facts of
this case...you are being an obstinate jackass, I am having a hard time believing you are a lawyer,
you obviously missed the class on on evidence, courtroom decorum and on criminal law..."
Coughlin was taken into custody whereupon a search incident to arrest was performed in the
holding area/back room of the RMC by Marshal Joel Harley with Marshal Scott Coppa assisting,
and Marshal Coppa was one of two Marshals transporting Coughlin to the Washoe County
Detention Facility where he served the 5 days in jail Judge Nash Holmes ordered (and the RMC
refused to return the $100 that Coughlin's mother paid into the RMC when counter clerk "Tom"
promised her the Court would issue an Order resulting in Coughlin being released from jail one day
early...however, aside from the WCDC walking Coughlin down in handcuffs from his cell to the
booking desk and back, there was no release from custody and Coughlin's mother was not returned
her $100 payment in exchange for an early release by either the RMC or the WCDC.
While conducting the search incident to arrest, RMC Marshal Harley went through Coughlin's
pockets and took out a simple flip style cell phone, a smart phone, a micro sd card, and an
electronic shaver. Upon taking possession of the micro sd card Marshal Harley immediately began
interrogating Coughlin as to whether it would work with the smartphone, then directed another
Marshal to "go tell the Judge that Coughlin was recording!" without any other support for such an
accusation. None of this occurred in the restroom and Chief Marshal Roper has indicated to
Coughlin that Marshal Harley, in carrying out Judge Nash Holmes Order to escort Coughlin to the
restroom, did not actually go in the restroom, but rather waited outside its door.
I ask that Chief Marshal Roper, Marshal Harley, and Marshal Coppa correct the misrepresentations
made by Judge Nash Holmes (whether or not they were purposeful or where something was lost in
translation and the affidavit requirement of NRS 22.030 for "contempt not in the immediate
presence of the Court" was not followed by Judge Nash Holmes incident to her 2/28/12 Order,
wherein Judge Nash Holmes writes, on page 2 of her 2/28/12 Order Finding the Defendnat in
Contempt of Court and Imposing Sanctions: "The matter was called at apprxoimately 3:00p.m. and
concluded withoua verdict about 4:30 p.m. after the court held the defendnat in criminal contempt
of court for his behavior and activites committed in the direct presence of this court during the
trial. The court finds that defendant's contemptuous conduct conside of his ....deceitful...behavior
during trial, all of which appeard to be done to vex an annoy the court, the witness, and the
opposing party, and to disrupt the trial process. The court finds that the following occurred, and
constitute contempt...."9) defendant's lying to the court in response to direct questions posed by
the court with regard to his recording the proceedings...(page 3)...The court finds that the
defendnat's actions were intentional and done in utter disregard and contempt for the court, an in
the presence of the cour, for purposes of disrupting and delaying the proceedins and dishonoring
the rule of law and this court, and constitute the misdemeanor of criminal contempt, a violation of
NRS 22.010. Good cause appearing therefore, the following sanctions are imposed: IT IS
ORDERED, pursuant to NRS 22.100, that the defendant be incarcerated at the Wahoe County
Regional Detnetion Facility for the term of five (5) days, from the time he was taken into custody
on this court's order on February 27, 2012, and that sentence shall not be reduced for any
reason..." The time stamping on that 2/28/12 Order Finding the Defendant in Contempt of Court
and Imposing Sanctions indicate "3:47". Washoe County Sheriff's Office personnel Deputy Hodge,
Patricia Beckman, RMC
Somehow, in her 2/28/12 Order (and during the Trial) Judge Nash Holmes found it relevant that,
allegedly, the RPD "gave Coughlin a break" over his driver's license being expired (actually,
Coughlin's then valid, current, driver's license was being withheld by Richard G. Hill, Esq., as
Coughlin reported to Sargent Tarter...and it was likely an old DL that the RPD is referring to as
"expired" when mentioning the "break", which, again, was somehow relevant enough to find its
way into the Order, but the withholding of Coughlin's then current, valid DL by Hill was sustained
as irrelevant during the Trial (and in fact seems to have been one of a myriad of vague basis for
issuing a summary criminal contempt Order requiring then licensed attorney with client's
depending upon him, Coughlin, immediately being taken to the WCDC for 5 days in jail...).
Coughlin hereby requests the RMC, WCDA, and WCDC to indicate the extent to which his property
was booked into his personal property at the WCDC, only to have the WCDC and or WCDA release
the property to the City of Reno Marshals the following day, well after any timeframe to conduct a
search incident to arrest (NNDB Member Mary Kandaras was involved in this matter, and in fact,
despite Judge Nash Holmes ordering the property released on 3/30/12, it took until 4/7/12 and
approval by Mary Kandaras before the property was so released. wcso12-1805 c-47951.
With local attorney Pam Wilmore standing, watching, and or hearing/participating in the
conversations, on or about March 21st, 2012 WCSO's P. Beckman handed Coughlin a note that read
"Per Judges Orders, call Marshal Deighton" and provided a phone number for Coughlin to seek
further explanation as to the admission that the City of Reno Marshals had returned to the jail on
2/28/12 and retrieved items of Coughlin's personal property, including his "flip" phone, his smart
phone, and his micro sd card. Deputy Hodge's admission that, contrary to the indications by WCSO
Cummings and Campbell that the micro sd card was released to Coughlin's agent on 2/29/12, but
rather, was not so release, combined with his statement that the smartphone, micro sd card, etc.
were released to the Marshals because it would be easier for Coughlin to get his property back
through them, reveal that a search not incident to arrest occurred here by the RMC on 2/28/12 and
or the City of Reno Marshals, or, to be fair, at least some sort of "seizure" did (especially
considering that upon the smartphone and micro sd card finally being returned to Coughlin on or
about 4/7/12 by WCSO Deputy Iver, Brandi Berriman, and Patricia Beckman (and only after
"Maddy" got approval from DDA Kandaras, and after Coughlin was threatened with abuse of
process by Deputy Beatson). The RMC's Marilyn Tognoni also made some indications respecting
the smartphone and micro sd card to Coughlin. Perhaps, the allusion to wcso12-1805 c-47951 in
Judge Nash Holmes 3/30/12 Order Releasing Coughlin's property indicates whether a warrant or
some other lawful Order allowed for the Marshals to retrieve those items a day after they were
booked into Coughlin's personal property at the jail...but Coughlin has not been provided any such
Warrant or Order and hereby requests that he be so provided a copy of it now, and that, given
important data was lost to Coughlin upon his discovery the micro sd card and smartphone had been
wiped, that any copies of the data then stored therein be provided to Coughlin (the Diaz case in the
Ninth Circuit seems to provided a great deal of latitude to law enforcement to search digital data
within the reach of one whom is subject to a custodial arrest, and perhaps even copy it...in which
case....is would be appreciate if a copy thereof could be provided to Coughlin, and some
compensation for the extent to which his 32 GB micro sd card was rendered useless upon its
return, as was his HTC G2 cell phone (which never quite worked the same from then on and was
rendered totally inoperative a short time thereafter...the 32 GB micro sd card having an
approximate value of $85 and the HTC G2 smartphone a used value of around $175.00).
I know I write in the third person sometimes (its tough representing yourself, especially when time
requires lots of copying and pasting, etc., etc) and that it can appear awkward.
I would appreciate the parties receiving this correspondence who have any knowledge of the
events detailed herein (especially with respect to the false accusations related to recordings,
disassembling, and hiding component parts of devices in the RMC restroom as detailed on the
record on 3/12/12 in 11 TR 26800 and again in Judge Nash Holmes testimony at the 11/14/12
Disciplinary Hearing for NG12-0434 (and NG12-0204, and NG12-0435) to set the record straight.
For a verbatim or close to it transcription of what Judge Nash Holmes testified to at the Disciplinary
Hearing on 11/14/12 (including those matters she purported to repeat details related to what
variosu RMC Marshals told her regarding Coughlin, on would likely need get the transcript or any
recordings from the CCR assigned to that Hearing, Carol Hummel, and given Coughlin's current
indigency, any requirement that Coughlin pay up front for the transcript would make review
prohibitive, and Coughlin hereby requests of the Panel a fee waiver or deferment of such costs in
that regard):
Linda Shaw, Owner, Sunshine Reporting Services - Reno
1895 Plumas St,
Reno, NV 89509,
(775) 323-3411
Sunshine Reporting Services
Eric Nelson
CCR Longoni
(775) 323-3411
fax (775) 323-2749
151 Country Estates Circle
Reno, Nevada 89511
Carol Hummel
(775) 827-9120/
fax (775) 827-9120
chummel@charter.net
In her 3/12/12 Order in 11 TR 26800, a transmogrification of sorts appears to occur, turning a
"simple traffic citation trial" into a Disciplinary Hearing, albeit one of a summary nature, with an
absent Respondent. That Order read, in relevant part:
"Based upon the total circumstances of this case, the in-court performance of the
defendant, as observed by this court, the written documents faxed to the court for filing by
this defendant, the statements and behavior of this defendant and his overall conduct herein,
this court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that Zachary Barker Coughlin, an attorney
licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada, has committed numerous acts of attorney
misconduct, including, but not limited to, violating the following Rules of Professional
Conduct:
8.4(c}-engaging in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
8.4 (d)-engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
3.3 (a)-lack of candor to the court by knowingly making false statements to a tribunal;
3 .l-defending in a proceeding by asserting or controverting an issue without a basis in
fact and with matters that are known to be frivolous;
3.2-failure to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation. and, in fact, taking
extreme measures to delay litigation;
3.4(c)-being unfair to opposing counsel by continually alluding to matters the lawyer
does not reasonably believe are relevant or supported by admissible evidence;
1.3-failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness; and
1. I-lack of competence in his practice and appearances before this court.
In addition, Zachary Barker Coughlin, likely also violated Nevada Supreme Court Rule
229, section 2(b), as amended by ADKT 449 on August 1, 2011, by surreptitiously recording
the traffic citation trial of February 27,2012 without the advance permission of this court and
then lying to this court when questioned about it and denying that he had done so.
Whether or not there are medical reasons to explain Mr. Coughlin's actions is not for
this court to decide. He has become nothing less than a vexatious litigant to Reno Municipal
Court due to his unorthodox, disruptive, bizarre and irrational methods and practices that go
beyond the pale of anything that is civil, ethical. professional or competent. Good cause
appearing therefore, the court orders as follows:
IT IS ORDERED that this matter is continued, and all proceedings relating thereto are
tolled, until further order of this court, while the matter of attorney Zachary Barker Coughlin
is referred to the State Bar of Nevada;
IT IS ORDERED that no further action shall be taken by the Reno City Attorney's
Office, or the clerks or staff of Reno Municipal Court, in the above-entitled case, pending
further order of this court;
IT IS ORDERED that Zachary Barker Coughlin is barred and forbidden from faxing,
emailing, delivering. having delivered, serving. presenting for filing. personally or otherwise,
any motion or document to Reno Municipal Court, in the above-entitled case, pending further
order of this court."
One, Coughlin is not emailing this correspondence in that "above titled case (11 TR 26800) but in
connection with matters outside that case. Three, it is really not at all clear how Judge Nash
Holmes could make all those rulings, and only after having done that, decide to suspend the
proceedings for a Competency Evaluation, given the import of NRS 178.405:
NRS 178.405 Suspension of trial or pronouncement of judgment when doubt arises as to
competence of defendant; notice of suspension to be provided to other departments.
NRS 178.405 Suspension of trial or pronouncement of judgment when doubt arises as to
competence of defendant; notice of suspension to be provided to other departments.
1. Any time after the arrest of a defendant, including, without limitation, proceedings before trial,
during trial, when upon conviction the defendant is brought up for judgment or when a defendant
who has been placed on probation or whose sentence has been suspended is brought before the
court, if doubt arises as to the competence of the defendant, the court shall suspend the
proceedings, the trial or the pronouncing of the judgment, as the case may be, until the question of
competence is determined.
2. If the proceedings, the trial or the pronouncing of the judgment are suspended, the court must
notify any other departments of the court of the suspension in writing. Upon receiving such notice,
the other departments of the court shall suspend any other proceedings relating to the defendant
until the defendant is determined to be competent.
NRS 189.030 Transmission of transcript, other papers, sound recording and copy of docket to
district court.
1. The justice shall, within 10 days after the notice of appeal is filed, transmit to the clerk of the
district court the transcript of the case, all other papers relating to the case and a certified copy of
the docket.
2. The justice shall give notice to the appellant or the appellants attorney that the transcript and
all other papers relating to the case have been filed with the clerk of the district court.
3. If the district judge so requests, before or after receiving the record, the justice of the peace
shall transmit to the district judge the sound recording of the case.
NRS5.073Conformity of practice and proceedings to those of justice courts; exception;
imposition and collection of fees.
1.The practice and proceedings in the municipal court must conform, as nearly as practicable, to
the practice and proceedings of justice courts in similar cases. An appeal perfected transfers the
action to the district court for trial anew, unless the municipal court is designated as a court of
record as provided in NRS 5.010. The municipal court must be treated and considered as a justice
court whenever the proceedings thereof are called into question.
2.Each municipal judge shall charge and collect such fees prescribed in NRS 4.060 that are
within the jurisdictional limits of the municipal court.
(Added to NRS by 1989, 903; A 1991, 455; 1997, 115)
NRS5.075Form of docket and records.The Court Administrator shall prescribe the form of the
docket and of any other appropriate records to be kept by the municipal court, which form may vary
from court to court according to the number and kind of cases customarily heard and whether the
court is designated as a court of record pursuant to NRS 5.010.
City Attorney Ormaas sure could be made to explain her statements on the record regarding
whether the citation or report in 11 tr 26800 contained any mention of retaliation, given she was
looking right at it and given what she said in court. Also, the whispering with Marshal Harley, and
the bits about Coughlin reporting to Ormaas what RPD OFficer Carter said to Coughlin in 61901,
and Ormaas's responses thereto on 2/27/12, and Dan Wong, ditto at an earlier hearing on that
matter...
Simply put, there was no questioning by Judge Nash Holmes of Coughlin as to whether he was
recording anything or whether he possessed a "recording device" until AFTER the one and only
restroom break Judge Nash Holmes mentions on the audio record. Judge Nash Holmes did ask
Coughlin if he had any proof that City Attorney's Wong and Ormaas failed, in some way, to
received or follow up on some offer by Coughlin to provide materials related to Coughlin's
contentions respecting the statement madAnd that sua sponte interrogation of Couglin occured
IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE RESTROOM BREAK, A BREAK IN WHICH JUDGE NASH HOLMES REFUSED
TO ALLOW COUGHLIN TO TAKE HIS YELLOW LEGAL PAD WITH HIM AND WHICH OCCURED AFTER
COUGHLIN MADE A VERBAL PRESERVATION ON THE RECORD OF THE WHISPERING IN EACH
OTHER'S EARS BY CITY ATTORNEY ALLISON ORMAAS AND MARSHAL HARLEY (WHO SEEMED A BIT
UPSET ABOUT SOME OF THE QUESTIONS COUGHLIN ASKED THEM IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE
TRIAL (DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME WHERE JUDGE NASH HOLME'S ASSISTANT INDICATED, ON
THE RECORD IN ONE OF THE OTHER CASES ON THAT STACKED DOCKET, THAT Judge Nash Holmes
just couldn't be found, and how odd that was...which is odd, considering what was going on in 11
cr 22176, 11 cr 26405 12 cr 00696 and 11 tr 26800, and rcr2012-065630 and rcr2011-063341 at the
time (lots of reasons for and indications that local law enforcement and prosecutors and public
defenders were non too happy with Coughlin...and consider the 2/24/12 email vacating the
2/27/12 status conference between young and dogan that neither YOung nor Dogan wish to testify
about...but which seems to have been held anyways after a written communication of its being
reset was transmitted to Coughlin by Dogan, wherein, during the time Judge Nash Holmes couldn't
be found (maybe she was at one of the group meetings amongst Judges about Coughlin that RMC
Administrative Judge William Gardner referenced on the record in 11 CR 26405? Interesting the
Notice of Appeal in 60302 was filed that same day too, 2/27/12) Dogan got his ORder for
Competency Evaluation of Coughlin in rcr2012-065630 (apparently in retaliation for Coughlin's
filing of 2/21/12, and DDA Zach Young was still smarting from a filing by Coughlin of approximately
11/28/12, which resultd in Young promptly amending his complaint in rcr2011-063341 to add a
charge that was duplicative, even where YOung failure to allege theft or possessing/receiving
"from another' under Staab makes his so charging Coughlin in that iPhone case a RPC 3.8 violation,
which is YOung's specialty, apparently. That, and violating NRs 178.405, which YOung did by filing
in rcr2011-063341 with a stamp of 2:55pm a fugitive document of his own, an Opposition to
Coughlin's or the WCPD Motion to Appear as CoCounsel on 2/27/12...never mind Young tried to
hold a TRIAL on 5/7/12 in that case despite the Order finding Coughlin competent in cr12-0376
didn't even get signed and entered until 5/9/12...ditto the Trial seeting of 5/8/12 in RMC 11 cr
26405, the criminal trespass case. NOt much respect for nrs 178.405 (including within NRs 5.010)
here in Northern nevada..
Coughlin didn't received the 2/28/12 Contempt Order in 11 tr 26800 until July 2012...but did file a
Notice of Appeal 3/7/12...despite "summary criminal contempt" being a final appealable order,
Judge Nash Holmes continues to refuse to follow NRS 189.010-050
It is true that contempt committed in a trial courtroom can under some circumstances be punished
summarily by the trial judge. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 . But adjudication by a
trial judge of a contempt committed in his immediate presence in open court cannot be likened to
the proceedings here. For we held in the Oliver case that a person charged with contempt before a
"one-man grand jury" could not be summarily tried. [349 U.S. 133, 138] The power of a trial judge
to punish for a contempt committed in his immediate presence in open ... In re Oliver, 333 U. S.
257. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Coughlin violated in both 11 cr 22176 and 11 tr 26800,
also orders no sufficiently detailed or capable of being known how to comply with, not sufficient
warning, violat Houston v Eighth Judicial District (Nev.).
See, this is why In Re Oliver and Cooke require all elements of "summary criminal contempt" occur
" in the "immediate presence" of the Court. Maybe Marshal Harley and some other Marshal have
misled Judge Nash HOlmes, or maybe something worse is going on here....but what Judge Nash
HOlmes said on the recording is entirely misleading an inaccurate, if not an outright lie (again,
maybe not a lie by Judge Nash Holmes, maybe she is repeating a lie, but regardless her reliance on
unattributed hearsay is distrubing an inappropriate, particulary where she not only purports to
issue a "summary criminal contempt" conviction against an attorney, but also where Judge Nash
Holmes appears to try to transmogrify what she sees as "a simple traffic citation trial" into a full
blown SCR 105 disciplinary hearing where she is both Bar Counsel and the Panel...That Marshal
needs to sign an affidavit, under NRS 22.020 and Judge Nash HOlmes ought to have to put
something on the record, under oath, in response to Coughlin's recent subpoena (and SBN Pat King
wishes to let Judge Nash HOlmes phone in her testimony, and it probably won't even be sworn
testimony, but rather just some musings by Judge Nash Holmes purporting to make "rulings"
finding "by clear and convincing evidence" all sorts of things outside her jurisdiction) on 11/14/12,
on, Partick O. King, SBN Bar Counsel has also filed Motion to Quash the Subpoenas Coughlin
attempted to have served on Marshal Joel Harley, Marshal Deighton, Judge Nash HOlmes, Judge
William Gardner, Judge Gardners Administrative Assistant Lisa Wagner, who can't quite find the
NOtice of Appeal Coughlin faxed to her (allowable under the RMC Rules) on June 28th, 2012 in 11
CR 26405 (the appeal was dismissed under an NRS 189.010 analysis by Judge Elliot, whom also got
Coughlin appeal of the 11 cr 22176 conviction resulting in this Court's 6/7/12 temporary
suspension Order in cr11-2064, which was denied based upon a civil preparation of transcript down
payment rule, in that criminal appeal, where the RMC has a thing in place with this Pam Longoni
that violates Nevada law in that it refused to give Coughlin the audio cd of the trial for some time,
insisting only Longoni would be allowed to transcribe it, and that the transcript's preparation would
absolutely not start until a down payment was made. Plus, even where Coughlin caved to the
payment demands..Longoni repeatedly hung up the phone on him and otherwise ignored his
communications (there may be an issue of the email Longoni holding out to the public issuing a
"bounceback"...but she needs to sign an affidavit as to whether she put Coughlin on a blocked list,
and upon information and belief, Coughlin faxed his request to the number the RMC held out for
her on her behalf too...
In her March 14th, 2012 grievance against Coughlin to the SBN Judge Nash Holmes details some
concerns she has with Coughlin's work as a self representing attorney defending a traffic citation
(now NG12-0434, and perhaps, NG12-0435, depending upon whom you ask and what King means
by "Clerk of Court"...because in King's 3/23/12 email to Coughlin he apparently identifies Ms.
Marilyn Tognoni as "Clerk of Court of Department 3"...whoever, wouldn't it be Second Judicial
District Court Clerk of Court Joey Orduna Hastings that would need to send Family Court Judge
Linda Gardner's April 2009 Order sanctioning Coughlin to the SBN's King for King now apparent
contention that the NG12-0435 "ghost grievance" consisting of Judge L. Gardner's April 2009 Order
was not filed by the RMC Judges?
AS to the application of the "courthouse sanctuary" doctrine to RMC Marshal Harley serving the
Order to Show Cause upon Coughlin at approximately 1:25 pm in one of the conference rooms right
outside the interior of Courtroom B at the RMC:
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ny-district-court/1372465.html
"THE LAW
(COURTHOUSE SANCTUARY)
Despite antagonistic dicta to the contrary; most modern era precedent dealing with the issue of
Courthouse Sanctuary from service of process have held that New York State residents receive no
such immunity protections. Baumgartner v. Baumgartner, 273 A.D. 411, 77 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1st
Dept.1948); Department of Housing Preservation, City of New York v. Koenigsberg, 133 Misc.2d
893, 509 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y. Civ.Ct.1986); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Bobo, N.Y.L.J., 1 Misc.3d 901(A),
2003 WL 22928513 (Dec. 17, 2003, J. Miller, Nassau Co. Dist. Ct.) These cases hold that the
Courthouse Sanctuary is only available to foreign state residents who come into New York's Courts
to contest jurisdiction. This doctrine has been slightly expanded to include New York residents
who enter the jurisdiction of a New York Court of limited territorial jurisdiction to contest
jurisdiction. See Palazzo v. Conforti, 50 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. Civ.Ct.1944); Singer v. Reising, 154
Misc. 239, 276 N.Y.S. 714 (Queens County 1935).
The Baumgartner Appellate Division panel also acknowledges a limited Courthouse Sanctuary
rule for New York residents if such service would constitute a disturbance directly tending to
interrupt the proceedings of the Court or to impair the respect due its authority. This rule
by itself would not be applicable to the instant case as service of process was effected in the
Courtroom but outside the Court's presence and in between calendar calls.
STATE RESIDENCY IMMUNITY DISTINCTION?
The English Common Law made no New York State residency distinction. The doctrine of
immunity from arrest of a litigant attending a trial of an action to which he is a party found early
recognition and dates back to the book of 13 Henry IV, J.B. Sampson v. Graves, 208 A.D. 522, 203
N.Y.S. 729 (1st Dept.1924). This is for the obvious reason that England had no sovereign states.
The privilege is not a creature of statute, but was created and deemed necessary for the due
administration of justice. See Matthews v. Tufts, 87 N.Y. 568 (1882); citing to Van Lien v. Johnson
(N.Y. Ct. Appeals, unreported 1871).
The logical question now arises, exactly when did New York's Appellate Court's recognize a
residency distinction for application of the Courthouse Sanctuary? The answer is that the Court
of Appeals never established such a rule. In contra point of fact, the Court of Appeals has opined
that:
It is the policy of the law to protect suitors and witnesses from arrests upon civil process
while coming to and attending the court and while returning home. Upon principle as well
as upon authority their immunity from the service of process for the commencement of civil
actions against them is absolute eundo, morando et redeundo. Person v. Grier, 66 N.Y. 124
(1876). Emphasis Added.
In this unanimous opinion, the Court of Appeals expressly addressed the New York State resident
immunity distinction and established in its dicta that whether any distinction should or does in
fact exist, is at least doubtful. This immunity is one of the necessities of the Administration of
Justice, and Court's would often be embarrassed if suitors or witnesses, while attending Court,
could be molested with process. It is noted that Person involved a foreign state resident. In
establishing the sanctuary doctrine, the Court stated that this rule is especially applicable in all
its foreign suitors . By direct implication, the Court of Appeals is also applying the protective
rule to New York residents.
The basis of the Courthouse Sanctuary rule is that parties should be allowed to contest
jurisdiction without submitting to it. Allowing Re-service makes a mockery of the traverse
hearing and essentially allows the plaintiff to use a defective default judgment as a weapon to
compel the defendant to submit to the service of process. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Bobo; cite
supra. The location of an individual's residence does little to legitimize such a mockery. Absent
the compulsion of clear controlling precedent; this Court will not condone such a situation..."
NRS 266.595 Appeals. Appeals to the district court may be taken from any final judgment of the
municipal court in accordance with the provisions of NRS 5.073.
NRS5.073Conformity of practice and proceedings to those of justice courts; exception;
imposition and collection of fees.
1.The practice and proceedings in the municipal court must conform, as nearly as practicable, to
the practice and proceedings of justice courts in similar cases. An appeal perfected transfers the
action to the district court for trial anew, unless the municipal court is designated as a court of
record as provided in NRS 5.010. The municipal court must be treated and considered as a justice
court whenever the proceedings thereof are called into question.
2.Each municipal judge shall charge and collect such fees prescribed in NRS 4.060 that are
within the jurisdictional limits of the municipal court.
(Added to NRS by 1989, 903; A 1991, 455; 1997, 115)
NRS5.075Form of docket and records.The Court Administrator shall prescribe the form of the
docket and of any other appropriate records to be kept by the municipal court, which form may vary
from court to court according to the number and kind of cases customarily heard and whether the
court is designated as a court of record pursuant to NRS 5.010.
NRS5.010General requirements for court; designation as court of record.There must be in
each city a municipal court presided over by a municipal judge. The municipal court:
1.Must be held at such place in the city within which it is established as the governing body of
that city may by ordinance direct.
2.May by ordinance be designated as a court of record.
The personal service by Marshal Harley of the Order to Show Cause in the appeal of the summary
eviction matter from Coughlin's former home law office at 121 River Rock St, with Richard G. Hill,
Esq. as opposing counsel in CV11-03628, occurred while Coughlin was speaking to RCA Ormaas in
attempts to resolve the matter (11 TR 26800 a traffic citation matter wherein RPD Sargent Tarter
and other officers responded to Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s office on 11/15/12 (its possible both Hill and
Coughlin called the police and or 911...can't remember) when Coughlin appeared there after being
released from 3 days in jail incident to the 11/13/12 criminal trespass arrest (now a conviction and
discussed in that attached materials, some of which appear on the Nevada Supreme Court's site
under case 61901, the conviction stemming from 11 CR 26405 before RMC Administrative Judge W.
Gardner, the brother of District Court Judge Linda Gardner whose April 2009 Order sanctioning
Coughlin was cited by Washoe Legal Services at the cause for his firing, and led to 60302, now on
appeal...
I would really just like to move on from all of this, but this is a time of exigent circumstances, and if
the RMC and the City of Reno Marshals do not take affirmative steps to disavow the unsworn
hearsay Judge Nash Holmes attributed in her supposedly sworn testimony at Coughlin's 11/14/12
Disciplinary Hearing, it may be that a negligent hiring, training, or supervision cause of action may
acrue against various Marshals, even personally (and its not so clear Mr. Christensen and the City
of Reno would extend any purported representation to such personal liability, for, say, slander or
libel).
NRS 22.010 Acts or omissions constituting contempts. The following acts or omissions shall be deemed contempts:
1. Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while the judge is holding court, or engaged in
judicial duties at chambers, or toward masters or arbitrators while sitting on a reference or arbitration, or other judicial
proceeding.
2. A breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance in the presence of the court, or in its immediate
vicinity, tending to interrupt the due course of the trial or other judicial proceeding.
3. Disobedience or resistance to any lawful writ, order, rule or process issued by the court or judge at chambers.
4. Disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refusing to be sworn or answer as a witness.
5. Rescuing any person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of such court or judge
at chambers.
6. Disobedience of the order or direction of the court made pending the trial of an action, in speaking to or in the
presence of a juror concerning an action in which the juror has been impaneled to determine, or in any manner
approaching or interfering with such juror with the intent to influence the verdict.
7. Abusing the process or proceedings of the court or falsely pretending to act under the authority of an order or
process of the court.
[1911 CPA 452; RL 5394; NCL 8941](NRS A 1983, 843)

NRS 22.030 Summary punishment of contempt committed in immediate view and presence of court; affidavit or
statement to be filed when contempt committed outside immediate view and presence of court; disqualification of judge.
1. If a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court or judge at chambers, the contempt may
be punished summarily. If the court or judge summarily punishes a person for a contempt pursuant to this subsection,
the court or judge shall enter an order that:
(a) Recites the facts constituting the contempt in the immediate view and presence of the court or judge;
(b) Finds the person guilty of the contempt; and
(c) Prescribes the punishment for the contempt.
2. If a contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the court or judge at chambers, an affidavit
must be presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt, or a statement of the facts by the masters
or arbitrators.
3. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, if a contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence
of the court, the judge of the court in whose contempt the person is alleged to be shall not preside at the trial of the
contempt over the objection of the person. The provisions of this subsection do not apply in:
(a) Any case where a final judgment or decree of the court is drawn in question and such judgment or decree was
entered in such court by a predecessor judge thereof 10 years or more preceding the bringing of contempt proceedings
for the violation of the judgment or decree.
(b) Any proceeding described in subsection 1 of NRS 3.223, whether or not a family court has been established in the
judicial district.
NRS 22.100 Penalty for contempt.
1. Upon the answer and evi dence taken, the court or judge or jury, as the case may be, shal l determi ne whether the
person proceeded agai nst i s gui l ty of the contempt charged.
2. Except as otherwi se provi ded i n NRS 22.110, i f a person i s found gui l ty of contempt, a fi ne may be i mposed on
the person not exceedi ng $500 or the person may be i mpri soned not exceedi ng 25 days, or both.
3. In addi ti on to the penal ti es provi ded i n subsecti on 2, i f a person i s found gui l ty of contempt pursuant to
subsecti on 3 of NRS 22.010, the court may requi re the person to pay to the party seeki ng to enforce the wri t, order,
rul e or process the reasonabl e expenses, i ncl udi ng, wi thout l i mi tati on, attorneys fees, i ncurred by the party as a
resul t of the contempt.
NRS 199.340 Criminal contempt. Every person who shall commit a contempt of court of any one of the following kinds
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor:
1. Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior committed during the sitting of the court, in its immediate view and
presence, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due to its authority;
2. Behavior of like character in the presence of a referee, while actually engaged in a trial or hearing pursuant to an
order of court, or in the presence of a jury while actually sitting in the trial of a cause or upon an inquest or other
proceeding authorized by law;
3. Breach of the peace, noise or other disturbance directly tending to interrupt the proceedings of a court, jury or
referee;
4. Willful disobedience to the lawful process or mandate of a court;
5. Resistance, willfully offered, to its lawful process or mandate;
6. Contumacious and unlawful refusal to be sworn as a witness or, after being sworn, to answer any legal and proper
interrogatory;
7. Publication of a false or grossly inaccurate report of its proceedings; or
8. Assuming to be an attorney or officer of a court or acting as such without authority.
ARTICLE IV - Judicial Department
Sec.4.010Municipal Court.The Municipal Court must include one department and may include
additional departments in the discretion of the City Council. If the City Council determines to create
additional departments, it shall do so by resolution and may appoint additional municipal judges to
serve until the next election.
(Ch. 662, Stats. 1971 p. 1976; ACh. 553, Stats. 1973 p. 881; Ch. 373, Stats. 1979 p. 645; Ch. 208,
Stats. 1985 p. 675; Ch. 9, Stats. 1993 p. 21)
Sec.4.020Municipal Court: Qualifications of Municipal Judge; salary.
1.A Municipal Judge must be:
(a)An attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada.
(b)A qualified elector within the City.
2.A Municipal Judge shall not engage in the private practice of law.
3.The salary of a Municipal Judge must be:
(a)Fixed by resolution of the City Council.
(b)Uniform for all judges in the Municipal Court.
(Ch. 662, Stats. 1971 p. 1976; ACh. 343, Stats. 1973 p. 422; Ch. 553, Stats. 1973 p. 881; Ch. 98,
Stats. 1977 p. 211; Ch. 561, Stats. 1977 p. 1395; Ch. 208, Stats. 1985 p. 675; Ch. 599, Stats. 1993 p.
2501; Ch. 327, Stats. 1999 p. 1369)
Sec.4.030Disposition of fines.All fines and forfeitures for the violation of ordinances shall be
paid to the City Clerk in the manner to be prescribed by ordinance.
(Ch. 662, Stats. 1971 p. 1977)
Sec.4.040Procedure, additional judges.The practice and proceedings in the Court must
conform as nearly as practicable to that of justices courts in similar cases. Upon the written
request of the City Manager an additional temporary Municipal Judge may be provided for so long
as the City Council authorizes additional compensation for such a Judge. Whenever a person is
sentenced to pay a fine, the Court may adjudge and enter upon the docket a supplemental order
that the offender may, if he or she desires, work on the streets or public works of the City at the
rate of $25 for each day. The money so earned must be applied against the fine until it is satisfied.
CONTEMPT
Acts or omissions constituting, generally, 22.010
Affidavit of facts constituting, 22.030
Affidavits presented in bad faith, NRCP 56(g), JCRCP 56(g)
Appearance, failure of defendant to make, 22.130
Arrest
Bond, 22.070
Excuses for not bringing arrested person before court, 22.140
Illness of defendant, effect, 22.140
Attorneys at law
Bar examination, early release of results, SCR 68
Discharged, failure to deliver certain materials to client, 7.055
Bail
Violation of conditions deemed contempt, 178.484
Commercial premises, violations of writ of restitution, 118C.210
Commission in presence of court or judge, 22.030
Compelling performance, imprisonment, 22.110
Court order, violation, 1.250, 22.010
Court reporters, 656.240
Criminal, 193.110, 193.300, 199.340
Custodial parent, failure to comply with visitation orders, 125C.030, 125C.040
Discharge from arrest, 22.070
Disqualification of judge or justice, making of charge not punished as contempt, 1.225, 1.230
Documents, refusal to permit inspection, NRCP 37(b)(2), JCRCP 37(b)(2)
Failure to perform specific acts directed by judgment, 22.010, NRCP 70, JCRCP 70
Imprisonment, 22.100, 22.110
Indictment for contemptuous conduct, 22.120
Justice courts, civil proceedings, 74.040
Material witness granted immunity, failure to testify, 178.576
Misconduct by defendant during criminal trial, 175.387
Municipal court may punish for, 266.570
Punishment, 22.030, 22.100, 22.120
Reentry on real property after ejectment, 22.020
Refusal to answer or be sworn, 22.010, 50.195, NRCP 37(b)(1), JCRCP 37(b)(1)
Sheriffs duties, 22.060, 50.205
Subpoenas, failure to obey
Deemed contempt, 22.010, 174.385
Witnesses, forfeitures and damages, 50.195
Summary punishment, 22.030
Trials for contempt
By court or jury, 22.100
Disqualification of judge, 22.030
Investigating charge, 22.090
The RSIC Victoria Oldenburg wants to talk to the Panel about how the RSIC
and Wal-Mart are in a long term business partnership where the 2nd St. Wal-
Mart is on tribal land rented out by the RSIC and patrolled by its tribal
officers, who admit to routinely making misdemeanor petty theft/shoplifting
custodial arrest (Officer Kameron Crawford and Donnie Braunworth have
been trained in all the neato "he didn't give me all the information necessary to
issue a citation" explanations (including Crawfords lying under oath that
Coughlin didn't provide his driver's license to him on September 9th, 2011,
especially where Wal-Mart's Frontino admits he did not make a citizen's
arrest, nor did any Wal-Mart employee) even where such misdemeanor arrests
by tribal officers are forbidden under NRS 171.1255.. Reno City Attorney too
would like a chance to explain how she prosecutes cases based upon arrests
by tribal officers for misdemeanor where Nevada law expressly prevents
misdemeanor arrests by tribal officers under NRS 171.1255.
I was forced to cross examine/interact with a represented party at the
11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing, and the SBN and Panel's violations of SCR
105 contributed greatly to my failure to alert Mr. Garin prior to that. I think
out of fairness I and Mr. Garin/Ms. Nordstrom should be provided transcripts
from the 11/14/12 Hearing.
NRS 171.1255Arrest by officer or agent of Bureau of Indian Affairs or
police officer employed by Indian tribe.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, an officer or agent of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs or a person employed as a police officer by an Indian
tribe may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered to him or her, or
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) For a public offense committed or attempted in the officer or agents
presence.
(b) When a person arrested has committed a felony or gross misdemeanor,
although not in the officer or agents presence.
(c) When a felony or gross misdemeanor has in fact been committed, and the
officer or agent has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have
committed it.
(d) On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony
or gross misdemeanor by the person arrested.
(e) When a warrant has in fact been issued in this State for the arrest of a
named or described person for a public offense, and the officer or agent has
reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested is the person so named or
described.
(f) When the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed a battery upon that persons spouse and the peace
officer finds evidence of bodily harm to the spouse.
2. Such an officer or agent may make an arrest pursuant to subsection 1 only:
(a) Within the boundaries of an Indian reservation or Indian colony for an
offense committed on that reservation or colony; or
(b) Outside the boundaries of an Indian reservation or Indian colony if the
officer or agent is in fresh pursuit of a person who is reasonably believed by
the officer or agent to have committed a felony within the boundaries of the
reservation or colony or has committed, or attempted to commit, any criminal
offense within those boundaries in the presence of the officer or agent.
For the purposes of this subsection, fresh pursuit has the meaning
ascribed to it in NRS 171.156.
Please see the photograph in the attached materials of the RSIC Officer taking
Coughlin's driver's license from him, thereby vitiating his assertion that an
arrest was an available option due to Couglin not providing his driver's
license to the Officers.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Zach has 9 files to share with you on SkyDrive. To view them, click the links below.
11 22 12 final collection for Chief Marshal Roper's review 0204 26800 part 1 of 2.pdf
11 22 12 final collection for Chief Marshal Roper's review 0204 26800 part 2 of 2.pdf
11TR26800 031412 RMC continuation of trial Nash Ormaas Hill traffic citation 031412_20120312-
1033_01cd003b8f0851d0.mp3
11TR26800 RMC 022712 part 2 of 2 from 2 27 12 031412_20120227-1621_01ccf56bce224540.mp3
11TR26800 RMC 022712 part 1 of 2 from 2 27 12 031412_20120227-1507_01ccf5618f76c460 (2).mp3
CV11-03628 ENTIRE EFLEX COMBINED FOR APPENDIX IN 60331 AND 61383 COUGHLIN V MERLISS
26406 1708 26800 NG12-0204.pdf
CR12-1262 appeal.pdf
11 2 12 file stamped complete notice of errata and revised supplemental 26405 1708 0204.pdf
11 15 11 rpd tarter redacted 0204 0434 26800 police report ormaas retaliation.pdf
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