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Policies as to employee classification/status G.R. No. 103586 July 21, 1994 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, petitioner, vs.

. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and FRANKLIN BAKER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES (DAVAO PLANT), respondents. Facts:

Government issued Wage Orders Nos. 3,4,5 and 6. Wage increase causes wage distortion in Franklin Baker Company of the Philippines (Davao Plant). When wage order no. 5 was implemented, regular and non-regular (casual) employees wages were the same. As a result, the company regularized the casual employees. The NFL wanted that the difference between the wage of the new regularized employees and the old regular employees must be based on seniority. The company contends that there is already a difference of wage but based on the CBA. Whether the company has the right to classify its employees based on the exercise of its management prerogative. Yes. A new or additional scheme of classification of employees for compensation purposes should be established by the Company (and the legitimacy or viability of the bases of distinction there embodied) is properly a matter for management judgment and discretion, and ultimately, perhaps, a subject matter for bargaining negotiations between employer and employees. It is assuredly something that falls outside the concept of "wage distortion." The Wage Orders and Article 124 as amended do not require the establishment of new classifications or sub-classifications by the employer. The NLRC is not authorized unilaterally to impose, directly or indirectly, under the guise of rectifying a "wage distortion," upon an employer a new scheme of classification of employees where none has been established either by management decision or by collective bargaining.

Issue:

Held:

G.R. No. 110854 February 13, 1995 PIER 8 ARRASTRE & STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. MA. NIEVES ROLDAN-CONFESOR, in her capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and GENERAL MARITIME & STEVEDORES UNION (GMSU), respondents. Facts: The negotiation between the company and the union collapsed. The union filed a notice of strike. The NCMB failed to resolve the issue.

The Sec. of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the issue. It ordered not to exclude the four (4) foremen, a legal secretary, a timekeeper and an assistant timekeeper from the bargaining unit composed of rank-and-file employees. The company contends that these positions should be excluded from the bargaining unit because of the nature of their work. Issue: Whether the Sec. of Labor acted with grave abused of discretion in not excluding the other positions in the CBA. Held: Yes. Public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in not excluding the four foremen and legal secretary from the bargaining unit composed of rank-and-file employees. Foremen are chief and often especially trained workmen who work with and commonly are in charge of a group of employees in an industrial plant or in construction work. They are the persons designated by the employer-management to direct the work of employees and to superintend and oversee them. They are representatives of the employer-management with authority over particular groups of workers, processes, operations, or sections of a plant or an entire organization. In the modern industrial plant, they are at once a link in the chain of command and the bridge between the management and labor. In the performance their work, foremen definitely use their independent judgment and are empowered to make recommendations for managerial action with respect to those employees under their control. Foremen fall squarely under the category of supervisory employees, and cannot be part of rankand-file unions. Upon the other hand, legal secretaries are neither managers nor supervisors. Their work is basically routinary and clerical. However, they should be differentiated from rank-and-file employees because they, are tasked with, among others, the typing of legal documents, memoranda and correspondence, the keeping of records and files, the giving of and receiving notices and such other duties as required by the legal personnel of the corporation. Legal secretaries therefore fall under the category of confidential employees. Thus, to them applies our holding in the case of Philips Industrial Development, Inv., v. NLRC, 210 SCRA 339 (1992), that: o . . . By the very functions, they assist confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons to, exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations. As such, the rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist or join a labor union equally applies to them.

As for the timekeeper and assistant timekeeper it is clear from petitioner's own pleadings that they are, neither managerial nor supervisory employees. They are merely tasked to report those who commit infractions against company rules and regulations. This reportorial function is routinary and clerical. They do not determine the fate of those who violate company policy rules and regulations function. It follows that they cannot be excluded from the subject bargaining unit.

they are not absolute prerogatives but are subject to legal limits, collective bargaining agreements and the general principles of fair play and justice Regular vs. Casual Employees G.R. No. 166705 July 28, 2009

Doctrine of equal pay for equal work G.R. No. 149758 August 25, 2005 PHILEX GOLD PHILIPPINES, INC., GERARDO H. BRIMO, LEONARD P. JOSEF, and JOSE B. ANIEVAS, Petitioners, vs. PHILEX BULAWAN SUPERVISORS UNION, represented by its President, JOSE D. PAMPLIEGA, Respondent. Facts: Philex Gold and Philex Bulawan Supervisors Union (Mining site in Negros Occidental) entered into a CBA. PG assigned its Padcal, Benguet employees as Supervisors in its mining site in Negros Occidental. It was discovered that Padcal Supervisors has a higher salaries and benefits than that of the Bulawan Supervisors. Issue: Whether the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" should not remove management prerogative to institute difference in salary within the same supervisory level. Held: No, because petitioners failed to adduce evidence to show that an ex-Padcal supervisor and a locally hired supervisor of the same rank are initially paid the same basic salary for doing the same kind of work. They failed to differentiate this basic salary from any kind of salary increase or additional benefit that may have been given to the ex-Padcal supervisors due to their seniority, experience and other factors. It is noteworthy to state that an employer is free to manage and regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all phases of employment, which includes hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and the discipline, dismissal and recall of work. While the law recognizes and safeguards this right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives, such right should not be abused and used as a tool of oppression against labor. The companys prerogative must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor. A priori,

MANTLE TRADING SERVICES, INCORPORATED AND/OR BOBBY DEL ROSARIO, Petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PABLO S. MADRIAGA, Respondents. Facts:

Issue:

Madriaga was hired by MTS as batilyo or fish hauler and eventually he became taga-puno (someone who filled up tub with fish). It was reported that Madriaga is doing some illicit favor to some of MTS customers. Allegedly, Madriaga was barred from coming to work. On the other hand, company alleged that Madriaga abandoned his work. Madriaga filed a case for illegal dismissal. Whether Madriaga is a regular employee. Yes. Madriagas work as tagapuno may be likened to the work of a cargador that is directly related, necessary and vital to the operations of the employers business. The distribution of the days catch to the tubs of different fish traders has a reasonable connection to the fishing business of petitioners company.

Held:

Contra: G.R. No. 147816 May 9, 2003

EFREN P. PAGUIO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, METROMEDIA TIMES CORPORATION, ROBINA Y. GOKONGWEI, LIBERATO GOMEZ, JR., YOLANDA E. ARAGON, FREDERICK D. GO and ALDA IGLESIA, respondents. Facts: Metromedia Times Corporation entered, for the fifth time, into an agreement with Efren P. Paguio, appointing the latter to be an account executive of the firm. Paguio was to solicit advertisements for "The Manila Times," a newspaper of general circulation, published by respondent company. Contract provisions provide that Paguio is not an employee of the company and that either party may terminate such contract any time by giving written notice to the other, thirty (30) days prior to effectivity of termination. After 2months from the execution of the contract, Paguio received a letter terminating him.

Paguio filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Whether the contract is for regular employment. Yes. That petitioner performed activities that were necessary and desirable to the business of the employer, and that the same went on for more than a year, could hardly be denied. Petitioner was an account executive in soliciting advertisements, clearly necessary and desirable, for the survival and continued operation of the business of Respondent Corporation. Robina Gokongwei, its President, herself admitted that the income generated from paid advertisements was the lifeblood of the newspaper's existence. Implicitly, Respondent Corporation recognized petitioner's invaluable contribution to the business when it renewed, not just once but five times, its contract with petitioner. A "regular employment," whether it is one or not, is aptly gauged from the concurrence, or the nonconcurrence, of the following factors: o The manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee. o The mode of payment of wages. o The presence or absence of the power of dismissal. o The presence or absence of the power to control the conduct of the putative employee or the power to control the employee with respect to the means or methods by which his work is to be accomplished. The "control test" assumes primacy in the overall consideration. Under this test, an employment relation obtains where work is performed or services are rendered under the control and supervision of the party contracting for the service, not only as to the result of the work but also as to the manner and details of the performance desired. An indicum of regular employment, rightly taken into account by the labor arbiter, was the reservation by respondent Metromedia Times Corporation not only of the right to control the results to be achieved but likewise the manner and the means used in reaching that end.10 Metromedia Times Corporation exercised such control by requiring petitioner, among other things, to submit a daily sales activity report and also a monthly sales report as well. Various solicitation letters would indeed show that Robina Gokongwei, company president, Alda Iglesia, the advertising manager, and Frederick Go, the advertising director, directed and monitored the sales activities of petitioner. Regular employee is one who is engaged to perform activities that are necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer as against those which are undertaken for a specific project or are seasonal.

Note on Seafarers G.R. No. 110524 July 29, 2002

Issue:

Held:

DOUGLAS MILLARES and ROGELIO LAGDA, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TRANS-GLOBAL MARITIME AGENCY, INC. and ESSO INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CO., LTD. respondents. Facts: Esso International hired petitioners through its manning agency here in the Philippines. Petitioners decided to take a leave and plan to avail the optional retirement plan under the Consecutive Enlistment Incentive Plan (CEIP) considering that they had already rendered more than twenty (20) years of continuous service. But their request was denied for the reason that their employment was on contractual basis. Issue: Whether the petitioners employment was on contractual basis. Held: Seafarers are considered contractual employees. They cannot be considered as regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code. Their employment is governed by the contracts they sign everytime they are rehired and their employment is terminated when the contract expires. Their employment is contractually fixed for a certain period of time. They fall under the exception of Article 280 whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

G.R. No. 162419

July 10, 2007

PAUL V. SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., respondent. Facts:

Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc. (respondent) for about five (5) years. He signed another contract for 9 months and the contract was approved by the POEA. He would be deployed in MSV Seaspread, which will be leaving in the port of Manila to Canada. Days before departure, the Captain of Seaspread received a letter, stating that Santiago will jump ship in Canada just like what his brother did. Due to this information, Santiago was replaced and informed that he will not be going to Canada but he was reassured that he might be considered for deployment at some future date. Santiago filed a case for illegal dismissal, damages

and assailed that he is a regular employee. Issue:

Whether petitioner is a regular employee. No. He still cannot be considered a regular employee, regardless of his previous contracts of employment with respondent. In Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court ruled that seafarers are considered contractual employees and cannot be considered as regular employees under the Labor Code. Their employment is governed by the contracts they sign every time they are rehired and their employment is terminated when the contract expires. The exigencies of their work necessitates that they be employed on a contractual basis.

Held:

G.R. No. 172038

April 14, 2008

DANTE DELA CRUZ, petitioner vs. MAERSK CREWING, INC. and ELITE SHIPPING, A.S., respondent Facts:

Issue:

Elite shipping hired Dela Cruz as 3rd engineer through Maersk Crewing. After a few months Dela Cruz was informed that he would be terminated under Art 1(7) of the CBA of Shipping and its employees. Art 1(7) of the CBA provides that the first 60 days of service is considered as a probationary period and the ship owner or ship captain may terminate the contract after giving a 14-day notice. Dela Cruz was terminated under this provision and that he was informed that his performance did not meet the required qualification by the ship captain. Petitioner was made to disembarked and repatriated to Manila Petitioner filed a case for illegal termination and that he is already a regular employee when he was terminated. But the respondent assailed that he is on probationary status only, which merits them to terminate him. Whether the petitioner is a regular employee. It is well to remind both parties that, as early as Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, we already held that seafarers are not covered by the term regular employment, as defined under Article 280 of the Labor Code. This was reiterated in Coyoca v. National Labor Relations Commission.20 Instead, they are considered contractual employees whose rights and obligations are governed primarily by the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Filipino Seamen (POEA Standard Employment Contract), the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment, and, more importantly, by Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as The

Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Even the POEA Standard Employment Contract itself mandates that in no case shall a contract of employment concerning seamen exceed 12 months. It is an accepted maritime industry practice that the employment of seafarers is for a fixed period only. The Court acknowledges this to be for the mutual interest of both the seafarer and the employer. Seafarers cannot stay for a long and indefinite period of time at sea as limited access to shore activity during their employment has been shown to adversely affect them. Furthermore, the diversity in nationality, culture and language among the crew necessitates the limitation of the period of employment. In Millares v. NLRC, this Court had occasion to rule on the use of the terms "permanent and probationary masters and employees" vis--vis contracts of enlistment of seafarers. In that case, petitioners made much of the fact that they were continually re-hired for 20 years by private respondent Esso International. By such circumstances, they claimed to have acquired regular status with all the rights and benefits appurtenant thereto. The Court quoted with favor the NLRC's explanation that the reference to permanent and probationary masters and employees was a misnomer. It did not change the fact that the contract for employment was for a definite period of time. In using the terms "probationary" and "permanent" vis--vis seafarers, what was really meant was "eligible for re-hire." Probationary Employees G.R. No. L-44360 March 31, 1977 REGINA S. BIBOSO, NENITA B. BISO, FE CUBIN, MAGELENDE H. DEMEGILLDO, EMERITA O. PANALIGAN, NILDA P. TAYO, NELDA TORMON, ARDE M. VALENCIANO, MA. LINDA E. VILLA and the VICMICO SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (VICSEA), petitioners, vs. VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC. and the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Facts: G.R. No. 74246 January 26, 1989 MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC., and ANGEL T. DAZO, petitioners, vs. HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister of Ministry of Labor and Employment judgment, and JOAQUIN A. DEQUILA, respondents. Facts:

Held:

Joaquin A. Dequila was hired on probation by petitioner Mariwasa Manufacturing, Inc. as a general utility worker. Upon the expiration of the probationary period of six months, Dequila was informed by his employer that his work had proved unsatisfactory and had failed to meet the required standards. To give him a chance to improve his performance and qualify for regular employment, instead of dispensing with his service then and there, with his written consent Mariwasa extended his probation period for another three months. His performance, however, did not improve and on that account Mariwasa terminated his employment at the end of the extended period. Dequila filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and contending that he becomes a regular employee. Whether or not, Article 282 of the Labor Code notwithstanding, probationary employment may validly be extended beyond the prescribed sixmonth period by agreement of the employer and the employee.

Issue:

services of private respondent Bernadette Galang as a probationary cultural orientation teacher. After 3 months, private respondent was informed, orally and in writing, that her services were being terminated for her failure to meet the prescribed standards of petitioner as reflected in the performance evaluation of her supervisors during the teacher evaluation program. She was given the proportionate amount of her 13th month pay and the equivalent of her twoweek pay. She filled a complaint for illegal dismissal. Issue: Whether or not an employee who was terminated during the probationary period of her employment is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her six-month probationary employment. Held:

G.R. No. 164532

July 24, 2007

Held: Yes. For aught that appears of record, the extension of Dequila's probation was ex gratia, an act of liberality on the part of his employer affording him a second chance to make good after having initially failed to prove his worth as an employee. Such an act cannot now unjustly be turned against said employer's account to compel it to keep on its payroll one who could not perform according to its work standards. The law, surely, was never meant to produce such an inequitable result. By voluntarily agreeing to an extension of the probationary period, Dequila in effect waived any benefit attaching to the completion of said period if he still failed to make the grade during the period of extension. The Court finds nothing in the law that by any fair interpretation prohibits such a waiver. And no public policy protecting the employee and the security of his tenure is served by prescribing voluntary agreements that, by reasonably extending the period of probation, actually improve and further a probationary employee's prospects of demonstrating his fitness for regular employment.

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC., Petitioner, vs. LEON M. MAGTIBAY, JR. and PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER EMPLOYEES UNION (PDIEU), Respondents. Facts:

G.R. No. 72222 January 30, 1989 INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BERNADETTE GALANG, respondents. Facts:

Magtibay was first hired by PDI as a casual employee to assist its telephone operator. Before the expiration of Magtibays contractual employment, he and PDI agreed to a fifteen-day contract extension. After the expiration of Magtibays contractual employment, as extended, PDI announced the creation and availability of a new position for a second telephone operator who would undergo probationary employment. Magtibay was employed under said position and status. Before the expiration of the probationary period he was terminated by PDI. Magtibay anchored his case principally on the postulate that he had become a regular employee by operation of law, considering that he had been employed by and had worked for PDI for a total period of ten months. He also claimed that he was not apprised at the beginning of his employment of the performance standards of the company, hence, there was no basis for his dismissal. Whether he was not apprised at the beginning of his employment of the performance standards of the company. Within the limited legal six-month probationary period, probationary employees are still entitled to security of tenure. It is expressly provided in the afore-quoted Article 281 that a probationary employee may be terminated only on two

Issue:

Held: International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), a non-profit organization dedicated to refugee service at the Philippine Refugee Processing Center in Morong, Bataan engaged the

grounds: (a) for just cause, or (b) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. The court do not agree with the appellate court when it cleared the NLRC of commission of grave abuse of discretion despite the latters disregard of clear and convincing evidence that there were reasonable standards made known by PDI to Magtibay during his probationary employment. It is on record that Magtibay committed obstinate infractions of company rules and regulations, which in turn constitute sufficient manifestations of his inadequacy to meet reasonable employment norms. The suggestion that Magtibay ought to have been made to understand during his briefing and orientation that he is expected to obey and comply with company rules and regulations strains credulity for acceptance. The CAs observation that "nowhere can it be found in the list of Basic Responsibility and Specific Duties and Responsibilities of respondent Magtibay that he has to abide by the duties, rules and regulations that he has allegedly violated" is a strained rationalization of an unacceptable conduct of an employee. Common industry practice and ordinary human experience do not support the CAs posture. All employees, be they regular or probationary, are expected to comply with company-imposed rules and regulations, else why establish them in the first place. Probationary employees unwilling to abide by such rules have no right to expect, much less demand, permanent employment. The court, therefore find sufficient factual and legal basis, duly established by substantial evidence, for PDI to legally terminate Magtibays probationary employment effective upon the end of the 6-month probationary period. G.R. No. L-63316 July 31, 1984 ILUMINADA VER BUISER, MA. CECILIA RILLOACUA and MA. MERCEDES P. INTENGAN, petitioners, vs. HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Labor & Employment, and GENERAL TELEPHONE DIRECTORY, CO., respondents. Facts: Iluminada Ver Buiser, Ma. Cecilia Rillo-Acuna and Ma. Mercedes P. Intengan entered into an "Employment Contract (on Probationary Status)" with private respondent, a corporation engaged in the business of publication and circulation of the directory of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company. Company hereby employs the employee as telephone representative on a probationary status for a period of eighteen (18) months.

The Employee recognizes the fact that the nature of the telephone sales representative's job is such that the company would be able to determine his true character, conduct and selling capabilities only after the publication of the directory, and that it takes about eighteen (18) months before his worth as a telephone saw representative can be fully evaluated inasmuch as the advertisement solicited by him for a particular year are published in the directory only the following year. The private respondent prescribed sales quotas to be accomplished or met by the petitioners. Failing to meet their respective sales quotas, the petitioners were dismissed from the service by the private respondent. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissals. Issue: Whether probationary period is limited only to 6 months. Held: General rule: The probationary period of employment is limited to six (6) months. Exception: When the parties to an employment contract may agree otherwise, such as when the same is established by company policy or when the same is required by the nature of work to be performed by the employee. In the latter case, there is recognition of the exercise of managerial prerogatives in requiring a longer period of probationary employment, such as in the present case where the probationary period was set for eighteen (18) months, especially where the employee must learn a particular kind of work such as selling, or when the job requires certain qualifications, skills, experience or training. In the case at bar, it is shown that private respondent Company needs at least eighteen (18) months to determine the character and selling capabilities of the petitioners as sales representatives. The Company is engaged in advertisement and publication in the Yellow Pages of the PLDT Telephone Directories. Publication of solicited ads are only made a year after the sale has been made and only then win the company be able to evaluate the efficiency, conduct, and selling ability of its sales representatives, the evaluation being based on the published ads.

G.R. No. 109114 September 14, 1993 HOLIDAY INN MANILA and/or HUBERT LINER and BABY DISQUITADO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division) and ELENA HONASAN, respondents. Facts:

Elena Honasan applied for employment with the Holiday Inn and was on April 15, 1991, accepted for "on-the-job training" as a telephone operator

for a period of three weeks. After completing her training, she was employed on a "probationary basis" for a period of six months. Her employment contract stipulated that the Hotel could terminate her probationary employment at any time prior to the expiration of the six-month period in the event of her failure (a) to learn or progress in her job; (b) to faithfully observe and comply with the hotel rules and the instructions and orders of her superiors; or (c) to perform her duties according to hotel standards. Four days before the expiration of the stipulated deadline, Holiday Inn notified her of her dismissal, on the ground that her performance had not come up to the standards of the Hotel. Honasan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, claiming that she was already a regular employee at the time of her separation and so was entitled to full security of tenure. Issue: Whether Honasan is a regular employee. Held: The petitioner placed Honasan on probation twice. first during her on-the-job training for three weeks, and next during another period of six months, ostensibly in accordance with Article 281. Her probation clearly exceeded the period of six months prescribed by this article. Probation is the period during which the employer may determine if the employee is qualified for possible inclusion in the regular force. In the case at bar, the period was for three weeks, during Honasan's on-the-job training. When her services were continued after this training, the petitioners in effect recognized that she had passed probation and was qualified to be a regular employee. Honasan was certainly under observation during her three-week on-the-job training. If her services proved unsatisfactory then, she could have been dropped as early as during that period. But she was not. On the contrary, her services were continued, presumably because they were acceptable, although she was formally placed this time on probation.

On probationary employment with a term G.R. No. 96779 November 10, 1993 PINE CITY EDUCATIONAL CENTER and EUGENIO BALTAO, petitioners, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) and DANGWA BENTREZ, ROLAND PICART, APOLLO RIBAYA, SR., RUPERTA RIBAYA, VIRGINIA BOADO, CECILIA EMOCLING, JANE BENTREZ, LEILA DOMINGUEZ, ROSE ANN BERMUDEZ and LUCIA CHAN, respondents. Facts:

Private respondents Dangwa Bentrez, Roland Picart, Apollo Ribaya, Sr., Ruperta Ribaya, Virginia

Boado, Cecilia Emocling, Jane Bentrez, Leila Dominguez, Rose Ann Bermudez and Lucia Chan were all employed as teachers on probationary basis by petitioner Pines City Educational Center, represented in this proceedings by its President, Eugenio Baltao. With the exception of Jane Bentrez who was hired as a grade school teacher, the remaining private respondents were hired as college instructors. All the private respondents, except Roland Picart and Lucia Chan, signed contracts of employment with petitioner for a fixed duration. Due to the expiration of private respondents' contracts and their poor performance as teachers, they were notified of petitioners' decision not to renew their contracts anymore. Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter, alleging that their dismissals were without cause and in violation of due process. Except for private respondent Leila Dominguez who worked with petitioners for one semester, all other private respondents were employed for one to two years. They were never informed in writing by petitioner regarding the standards or criteria of evaluation so as to enable them to meet the requirements for appointment as regular employees. They were merely notified in writing by petitioners, through its chancellor, Dra. Nimia R. Concepcion, of the termination of their respective services, on account of their below-par performance as teachers. Issue: Whether private respondents contention is correct. Held: No. Brent case o Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as already observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written and oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to prevent security of tenure. It should have no application to instances where a fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the

employer or employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter. Unless thus limited in its purview, the law would be made to apply to purposes other than those expressly stated by its framers; it thus becomes pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and unintended consequences. With respect to private respondents Roland Picart and Lucia Chan, both of who did not sign any contract fixing the periods of their employment nor to have knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon fixed periods of employment, petitioners had the burden of proving that the termination of their services was legal. As probationary employees, they are likewise protected by the security of tenure provision of the Constitution. G.R. No. 152777 December 9, 2005 LOLITA R. LACUESTA, Petitioner, vs. ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, DR. LEOVINO MA. GARCIA and DR. MARIJO RUIZ, Respondents. Facts:

Ateneo de Manila University hired, on a contractual basis, Lolita R. Lacuesta as a part-time lecturer in its English Department for the second semester. She was re-hired, still on a contractual basis, for the first and second semesters. Petitioner was first appointed as full-time instructor on probation, in the same department. Thereafter, her contract as faculty on probation was renewed. She was again hired for a third year. During these three years she was on probation status. Petitioner was notified that her contract would not be renewed because she did not integrate will in the English Department. Fr. Bernas explained to petitioner that she was not being terminated, but her contract would simply expire. Petitioner was offered to work in the University Press. October 29, 2008

G.R. No. 160240

presented petitioner with a Manifesto Establishing Relevant Issues Concerning the School. Petitioner sent two separate Memoranda to respondents placing them under preventive suspension for a period of thirty days for maligning the school. Petitioner issued respondents their Notice of Termination, informing respondents that they did not qualify as regular employees for their failure to meet the performance standards made known to them at the start of their probationary period. Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Issue: Whether respondents are regular employees. Held: Respondents were not regular or permanent employees; they had not yet completed three (3) years of satisfactory service as academic personnel that would have entitled them to tenure as permanent employees in accordance with the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. A probationary employee is one who, for a given period of time, is being observed and evaluated to determine whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. A probationary appointment affords the employer an opportunity to observe the skill, competence and attitude of a probationer. The word "probationary," as used to describe the period of employment, implies the purpose of the term or period. While the employer observes the fitness, propriety and efficiency of a probationer to ascertain whether he is qualified for permanent employment, the probationer at the same time seeks to prove to the employer that he has the qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for permanent employment. Petitioner failed to substantiate their claim by documentary evidence. Considering that respondents were on probation for three years, and they were subjected to yearly evaluation by the students and by the school administrators (principal and vice-principal), it is safe to assume that the results thereof were definitely documented. As such, petitioner should have presented the evaluation reports and other related documents to support its claim, instead of relying solely on the affidavits of their witnesses. The unavoidable inference, therefore, remains that the respondents dismissal is invalid. G.R. No. 183572 April 13, 2010

WOODRIDGE SCHOOL (now known as WOODRIDGE COLLEGE, INC.), Petitioner, vs. JOANNE C. PE BENITO and RANDY T. BALAGUER, Respondents. Facts: Woodridge School hired Joanne C. Pe Benito and Randy T. Balaguer as probationary high school teachers. Their contracts of employment covered a three (3) year probationary period. Respondents, together with twenty other teachers,

YOLANDA M. MERCADO, CHARITO S. DE LEON, DIANA R. LACHICA, MARGARITO M. ALBA, JR., and FELIX A. TONOG, Petitioners, vs. AMA COMPUTER COLLEGEPARAAQUE CITY, INC., Respondent. Facts:

Petitioners were hired as faculty in AMACC in 1998.

In 2000-2001 AMACC adopted a new faculty screening guidelines. Under the new screening guidelines, teachers were to be hired or maintained based on extensive teaching experience, capability, potential, high academic qualifications and research background. This is also used to determine the present faculty members entitlement to salary increases. The petitioners failed to obtain a passing rating based on the performance standards; hence AMACC did not give them any salary increase. Because of AMACCs action on the salary increases, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime and overload compensation, 13th month pay, and for discriminatory practices. Petitioners individually received a memorandum from AMACC, informing them that with the expiration of their contract to teach, their contract would no longer be renewed. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.