r

Armor in the Furtoen Forrest, 14 Sep

44. ?+e'7 49.

1t

Armored

School, student research rer

This Document
IS A HOLDING OF THE

ARCHIVES SECTION
LIBRARY SERVICES FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

DOCUMENT NO. N-2146 .72

COPY NO.1

ARkM

IN. THE HURTGEN FOREST

-g?0 l(-7

A .RESEARCH

REPORT PREPARED

BY
C O1MMITT,'EE 7 ,

OFF ICERS ADVANCED

COURSE

THE. ARMORED SCHOOL

f '

1948 -1949 LIETUTEN&NT COLONEL CAREY A. ClIARK NAJOR JOHIN M. GAUS TAD, Cha irinian MAJOR JOHN F. SHEFFEY YJOR WILLIAM B. JAC1yJBS

CAPTAIN

ADRIAN

ST.

6HEN

CAPTAIN ROBERT

D. V'iAN

CAPTAIN

GERALD V. IB 'RY

~
# ,

'"~i

L1~

-T (

FORT KNOX, KENTUO Y MAY 1949

1 rC
o

ic

PREFACE The purpose of this study is (1) to assemble all available

data on the use of armor in the HURTGEN FOREST between 14 September and 15 December 1944., (2) to evaluate. the contribution of arm, and (3)

or to the First United States Army offensive in this area, to interpret our findings in trine of armored employment# In approaching this study all plored. The principal sources

the light of past and present doc-

sources available were exafter acNot all

include unit histories,

tion reports,

combat interviews, and personal interviews.

of these sources were accessible for each unit considered and as a result there is up the report. a certain lack of balance in the chapters making For- example, while an abundance of material was Tank Battalion,

available on the 5th Armored Divisi&j, and the

707th

combat interviews with personnel of the 709th Tank Battalion could not be. obtained. Certain data regarding the other units listed in However, within these limits

the report were also unobtainable.

the committee has attempted to do justice to each armored unit involved. In

view

of the purpose of the report the infantry picture This was done knowingly, not through

will seem somewhat slighted.

any desire to overlook the gallant actions of the many infantry units involved, but because time and space did not permit a full account of these actions. The few conflicting reports of action have been checked and evaluated to arrive at what is believed to be the most prob-

able conclusions.-

The interpretations and conclusions reflect the

the committee wishes to acknow-

opinion or the committee; however, ledge its

'indebtedness

to the following officers who made them-

selves
time in

available for interview and on several occasions lent their order to review and comment upon the early drafts of the V'.A. Hamberg, 10th Tank Battal745th Tank

aotions of their units: Lt. Col

ion, 5th Armored Division; Lt. Cal,. Vallace J. Nichols, Battalion; Lt. William K. Sanders,

745th Tank Battalion; Lt. Col.

Icbert S. Garner,

707th Tank Battalion; 1kajor Lewis C. Taynton, 70th Tank Bat-

70th Tank Battalion; Captain James D. IcLanachan, talion.

The committee further wishes to thank the Research and Evaluation Division and other departments of The Armored School whos-e personnel have been helpful in the reproduction of maps, and photographs, the procurement of source materials, and other tasks

necessary to the preparation of this report.

iii

TABLE OTF, CONTENTS

Chapter PREFACE. I. INTRODV'CTION ,.

the
t

Page

..
Offensive.

1
6

Beginning
I I.

New

THE 746T.1 TK',N~ B&TTALION IN STJPPORT OF T'--E 9TH . ~ INIA ;TRY DIVISION The 47th ROT Captures and Holds SCE-EVL NUTTE . . .0 The 39th RCT Near LNERDR. ." The 60th RCT Near I-O SCJAU The ihttack on G-EP aTER and VOSSENACK.......
Employpet of Tas.
...........................

12
.
..

15 16 18 19
20

Surmiary........................ III. THE 707TH TA.1, BA~TTALIO~N INv SUPPORT OF THE 28TH I "F ]\TRY DIVISIO...............
Action at VOSSEN'ACK.
..............................

33
35
37

jERSCHNEIDT and SCI IDT......... Action at KOkH Logistical Considerations.............

..

49 60

Conclusions.........................62
IV.
:Th TTLION IN SUPPORT OF THE 1ST THE 745TH TA.-N ............ Iilv'ITiY D TTIS I ON........ G omba t Operations, .............................. ......................................... Coniclus ions.

67
68

81.

V.

THE

TTALION IN SUPPORT OF THlE 4TH 70Th1 TAN 1'1BA. .......... 1FAhYDIVISION......... Nov),............87 16 (1 to A~ttack Plan ning the InitialI Penetration by -che 8th Ragiraerit (15 to Nov)........................................89 At-taok of GFCSSHAU by the 22d Inf entry..........92 ............. The Germa n Counter-Attack.....
S anma ry.................. .........

85

19
98
100

VI.

14.TT.J.'IGH IN SUPPORT OF TIDE 8TH T 7E 709 T .1 N .......... I NFAN')P'f DIVIS ON, ........ .......... tissault to HTRTG-EN (21 to 28 HLURTGEN to the Corps Objective (29 Nov to 5 .Doc) . ......... ...... C onclu's ions........ ............. Summary.............

N'ov).

104
107

115
120
121

VII.

THlE 53TH Ar-daORED DIVISION -iYD THE HURPTGEN PATTL-6 r The 5th a-rmored as a Maobile Reser,,e. . . . (19 to 23 Nov) STEIN Plan hU-BERG HiURTGENu-KLEIU

.
r

125
126
.,127

Chapter
Thle HUMRTGhN operation (23 KiLE Iv HiU Operation (28 to BRA.NLEBERG OpEration (30 BERGSTBINv Operation (4 to GRGSSLhI.U to- SCHAFBERG (29 Push to the ROER (9 to 15 Logistics........................179 Sumnmary. ...........................
VIII,
*'..

Page to 25 Nov) .130 30 Nov)............187 Nov. to 4 Dec) .... ~ 146 8 Dec)...........156 Nov 'to 5 Dec). 171 Deo) *.......... 175 83
.. . . . . .

CONCLUSIONS.
Tactics.
.

...
..

*..

194 196

BIBLIOGR PRY......................203

APPENDICES.......................
I II III Terrain Study.... States Order of Battle German Order of Battle. . ..
. .. . .
......
,

I
.

United

ix

......

~xi
. . . . . . . . . . x v i

IV leap References.....................xiv V M aps,. 4 . . . . . . VI Arti llery....................xx

ChAPTER

INTRkODICTION Cf the campaigns and battles which led to "Victory in

Europe," one of the most bitter and bloody was the battle of the FhURTGEN FOREST.

Although

this battle was predominantly an infan-

try action, a separate tank battalion supported each infantry division and the 5th lrmored Division played a decisive role. objective of this study is units were employed The

to examine the manner in which armored

and to evaluate, their contribution to the Before bringing these units

Allied effort in' the 'HURTGEN FORiEST.

under close scrutiny it is first desirable to discuss the background of the operation. The HURTGEN

'OREST

covers an area of approximately fifty

square miles of-GEM,,t&NYP near the BELGITAN border and within the triangle formed by ti'e cities of and M0NICHAOU sevenity-five kCAIMN (K840430), DUPEN (F1204,60),

(1940185).

"Tall, closely packed fir trees rise

to one hundred feet above the damps rugged floor of

the forest allowing little sunlight to filter through even on the brightest days." 1 The forest is dotted with hills and cut by deep The weather which

draws which are effective natural obstacles. the --

Americans

encountered during the battle was unusually severe

rain turned the ground into a sea of mud; mist hindered visi"Not in

bility; and. snow and bitter cold followed.

years

had

European weather been so unfavorable for grand scale military operations.1 2

lVhy was it necessary ftr':the Allies to fight' over this formidable terrain? The battle for the EURTGEN was primarily a battle for the The ROE. RIVER was controlled by a series of headROER dams, water dams in the hills -east 'of EUT EN K798272 and in AACHEN the Americans had captured Vuery complete engineering studies showing just what could be done with them.3 In the event that the Allied forces north of the HURTGEN FOREST area succeeded in crossing the PQER it the Germans, choosing their time, would be a simple matter for

to produce a flood which could

effectively cut off these forces. During the planning stages of the Allied offensive to be launched in the direction of the COLOGNE FL&IN, Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, to General George C. Marshall, General Dwight D,

Allied Expeditionary Force, wrote Chief of Staff, United States Army:

He (the enemy) is assisted in that area...by the flooded condition of the HOER RIVER and the capability he has of producing a sudden rush of water by blowing the dams near SCHMIDT Bradley has about come to the conclusion that we _F063298 . must take that area by a very difficult attack from the west and southwest.4 And again, in writing after the war, General Eisenhower stated:

use first attempted destruction of the dams by air. The bombing against them was accurate and direct hits were secured; however, the concrete structures were so massive that damage was negligible ard there was no recourse except to take them by ground attack.5 General

Marshall

in his Second Biennial Report states: "The

seiz-

ure of the ROER RIVER dams in

the vicinity of SCTHNIDT was a nece-

ssary prelude to clearing the enemy from the west bank of the RHINE and a full scale drive into the heart of GERMANY," 6 Two major penetrations of the SIEGFRIED LINE had been made

in the vicinity of AACHEN and U.S. droops,' in large numbers were east of CHEN. By the end of September 1944, although AACHEN

itself was still under assault, troops of the First U.S. Army, spearheaded by the 9th Infantry Division, pushed east and southeast of that city and occupied a salient within six miles *f the ROER dams.

This did not mean that no more fortifications were to

be met for another band of defense lines ran through the HURTGEN and I.ONSCHAU FORESTS, taking full advantage of the terrain.This

band was as much as nine to twelve miles deep and included many heavily fortified villages which served as key strongpoints. In spite of the terrain, the fortifications, of bad winter weather, Commander, and the threat

General Omar Bradley, Twelfth Army Group

felt (and SHtEF agreed) that both the HURTGEN FOREST This -mission fell

area and the ROER RIVER dams must be secured. to the First United States army.

On 21 October Twelfth army Group ordered a general attack to the east which directed First Army to reach the RHINE in the vicinity of BONN (F547375) bridgehead, and COLOGNE (F450600), and to seize a a front of

First Army at this time had assigned to it

approximately sixty miles and had under its command three corps: VII Corps on the north, V Corps in the south; in the the cnter, and. VIII Corps in

The majority of the HURTGEN FOREST fighting occurred of V and VII Corps, then commanded by Major General respectively.

zones

Leonard T. Gerow and Major General J. Lawton Collins,

As a preliminary to its attack First army had to replace the 9th Infantry Division in the line. This division had suffered

4I

i.i

PL11E VIII

AFTER

I DECE1.i l-h 1944,

LULKE

ON .TE 1ST DIKION F

14T

AS LITTLE ,',ORE

PIAN

PATROL AC . VI T^

numerous casualties after six weeks of fighting in

the HIRTGEW and

ROTGEN FO BESTS and was badly in need of a period in which to refit and recuperate... Its relief was effected on 28 October

by the 28th

Infantry Division and with this change the First Army order of battle was as, showninFigure '_1. F'acing the

First

Army at this time from north to south

were the LXXI, LXXIV, LXVI, and This alignment included all

LIXX

German Corps (Appendix III).

of the Seventh German Army with the 12 SS Panzer. Elements of

exception of its northernmost corps, this corps, however, paign.

were used later in *the HURTGEN FOREST camall of these German units

In addition to holding sectors,

were attempting to refit across FRANCE.

and reorganize following the withdrawal

The First Army attack order provided for V Corps to secure the area VOSSENiCK (F03827)-SCIDAIDT-STRHiJCH (F011262), which dominated the ROER RIVER crossings and provided access to the ROER RIVER dams. Seizure of this area was to be followed by a co-ordi-

nated attack by VII Corps through the northern HURTGEN FOREST defenses to reach the RHINE

in the

vicinity of COLOGNE.

The prelim-

inary

(V Corps) phase proved to be harder than had been expected fought for its

and VII Corps was committed while V-Corps still objective.

fighting on their own soil and The Germans were hbwI close to their sources of supply; their reconstituted Seventh and First Armies were in sufficient strengths and were handled, Allied officers felt, more skillfully than they had been in NOJidaDY....The Germans appeared to have strong local reserves available as they had not in NORNYANDY, and they used them expertly and economically, thrusting in short, sharp counterattacks against dangerous illied penetrations, then promptly withdrawing.

4,
First 7
,-L1
XXII

IiI
xx
N~

LmII
xx xx

Yxx
1
*2:J

7 2K

9(-.47 RCT)

xx

.1[

Ii i'

xx

xx

Figure 1. Order of~ Battle, First

United

States Army 28 October 1944

Because the hilly terrain

and the dense forest linited ob-

servation, supporting artillery was unable to render continuous or effective assistance to the advance and the hmerican soldier was forced to fight without the close support to which he was accustomed. Except for a few days bad weather prevented planes from Finally, the weathw-

giving close support to the attacking troops.

or and the terrain combined to reduce the effectiveness of armor,

Beginning the New Offensive On 2 iNovember the 28th Infantry Division attacked
gone to secure

in its

the V Corps objective, Simultaneously in

the VOSSE.iMK-SCHMLIDTthe VII Corps zone the 1st

STRACUH triangle.

Infantry Division made a strong demonstration employing mortars, artillery, and large patrols, but did not change its front line positions. The 28th took VOSSENAOK with relative ease and reached

SCIRhJIDT with elements of one battalion on 3 November but was unable

to hold it in the face of severe counter-attacks which began the next day.

By 8 November troops of the 28th had been driven back

Greatly reduced in spite of murwas

almost to their original line of departure.

combat effectiveness the division held VOSSEPaCK in

derous artillery fire and frequent counter-attacks until it relieved on 20 November by the 8th Infantry Division.

After the collapse of the 28th Division attack, First hrmy again re-organized its troops, bolstered by the addition of the In the VII Corps area the lst

99th and 104th Infantry Divisions.

Infantry Division zone was narrowed when the 104th took over a portion of the front east of AiACIMN on 8-9 November. VII Corps

was further strengthened by the assignmrent of the 4th Infantry Division which was placed on the southern flank of the corps zone. The 99th Division was made available to V Corps and went into corps reserve (Figure 2). VKith the new alignment in -effect, First hrmy ordered a continuation of its attack, VII Corps was to make the main effort 9th

with its 1st Infantry Division passing through the 47th RCT, Division, in

the direction of I.ANGEIFWEHiE (F030475) to seize crossThe 1st Division was to be

ings of the, ROER RIVER north of DUREN.

assisted where possible by the 3rd Armored Division on its left (north) flank. The initial objective for the 1st Division was and the HAMICH

designated as the town of GRESSENICH (K987426) (F002437)-NOTHBERG (K936487) RIDGE.

The 4th Infantry Division on the

the right (south) flank was to seize crossings of the ROER in vicinity of DUEEN 'or south of DUREN and to assist in vance of the 1st Division to COLOGNE.

the later ad-

The VII Corps, attacking at 161245 November after air and artillery preparation, began a hard, slow, stubborn fight with the

yard by yard advances marked by great numbers of casualties in 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions.

The terrain was as much an enemy defensively, who

as the German, who had thoroughly organized it

held every inch of ground until the last minute, and who followed each loss with an immediate counterpattack. However, slowly but

surely gains were made and by 1 December VII Corps held a line which ran through INDEN (1'028522), WIr'EHE,

IA1NERSDORF (F027509), LhiNGER-

and just west of GEY (F072399) in the 4th Division Zone..

xxxx

xxx

xxX

x X

xx

Xx

xx

xx
4

xx
~~~~(-Res0an) xx ," 14*

xx
.9

xx

X
t9(-47 PCT) jj '8

S47 ROT

* Although

these units were attached to the Corps indicated, they oc wstituted the enly divisions available for First

Army

reserve,
10 Nov--

Figure 2.

Order of Battle, ember 1944.

First United States Army,

The optimistic objectives of First Army had not been reached and the 1st and 4th Divisions were relieved in place by the 9th Infantry.Division from V Corps and the 83rd Division, which had moved north from VIII Corps. Meanwhile, in the V Corps area the 8th Division had relieved the 28th and after hard fighting ,;occupied the town of

HURTGEN (F041356) on 28 November.

jective, BERGSTEIT

The cSpture of the V Corps ob(F064343)-

the high ground KLEINHAU (053370)-BRAiU\]DNBERG (F076377),

was completed on 5 December by the Reserve

Command, 5th Armored Division, which had been attached to the 8th Division for, this mission. By 15 December the entire First army

front was on or near the banks of the ROER but did riot threaten the strategic dams. This marked the end of offensive operations in for First Army until one month later. the area

On the next day the Germans

launched their ARDEN1ES counter-offensive, which placed the Allied troops on the defensive. February 1945. The price paid in lives and equipment for the First Army The ROER dams were not secured until

offensive in the HJRTGEN FOREST has never been accurately reckoned; however, battle casualty totals compiled by First Army for the

three divisions most heavily engaged were 12,707 for 99 days of fighting. 8 The First Army offensive gained fifty square miles of ground including the. HURTGfEN FOREST and the approaches to the ROER dams. The Nazis suffered great casualties, both as a result of

the hand to hand fighting and because of the Allied air and artillery, which was superior to that of the Germans in the terrain and wather. Although plans for the spite of counter-

.IRENIES

offensive were not then known to the

illies, there is

no doubt

that the determined attack of the Utiirst Army interfered greatly with the German plans for re-organization of units in preparation for this large scale asault. The enemy was forced to use units

which had beon earmarked for the ARDENNES; some of these were decimated and others badly mauled, This is the story of the HURTGEN FOREST in brief. It will

serve as a background to the following chapters in which the role played by armored units will be examined. What was the contribuWere tanks employed Present doctrine? The answers to

tion of armor to the HI URTGEN FOREST campaign? in accordance with their contemporary doctrine? Should more or less armor have been employed?

these and other questions will form the basis for evaluation of the proper employment of armor under extreme conditions of terrain and weather.

NOTES FOR Cif PTER I Report of Operations, First United States Army, 1944 to 22 February 1945, pp.,165-168..
2 1

1 August

The Reports of General George C. Marshall, General Mlarshall's Third Report, New York, Lippincott,. 1946, p. 195.
3Walter

War

Millis,. The Last Phase,

Boston,

Houghton Mifflin

Co..,

1946,

pp. 71-74.

4 fop.

cit., Gen~eral karshall's Third deport, p. 195. Dwight b. E~isenhower; Crusade in Europe (Garden Doubleday and Co., 194$), p. 329.

5 Gerxeral

City, Ni. Y.,

George C. I,.arshal1, Biennial Leport of the Chief of staff of the United atates Army, July" 4l1~ o June 30 195 ote6~rtr of War washngton, Inf'antry. Jourrna1 Press, 1946), p. 80.
7 Millis,

6 General

o. cit.,
i'irst

pp. 71-74. p. 167.

sop. cit.,,

UJnited States Army,

CHAPTER II TM, 746TH TANS. BTTLION LiT SUPPORT OF TIih; 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION The first american unit involved in the HURTGEN FOREST the morning of

fighting was the 9th Infantry Division.

Early in

14 September 1944. elements of the division,

supported by the started

746th Tank Battalion under Lt. Col. Clarence G. Hupfer,

across the Belgian-German border at ROTGEN (4915285)

and MONSCHAIJ

with the mission of penetrating the defenses of the German WEST WiLL"nnd seizing the road centers in the vicinity of DUREN.

With-

in three days the 47th Infantry compltely penetrated the VVEST

WALL at SCYEVENHUTTE (F006422),

through the first

while the 39th Regiment was

line of defenses at

LaM1ERSDORF

(K968267)

and

the 60th Regiment was through the first 4Vell

line near HOFEN (K950165),

organized German resistance halted the division with the cap-

ture of these objectives; thus ended the long march through FRANCE and BELGIT;i; the tough fighting for limited objectives, the HURTGEN FOREST, began. character-

istic of combat in

Probing attacks all along the division's front failed to achieve substantial gains despite heavy losses; the forces were spread too thinly for effective action against the organized G.er man positions. So,

-on 4

October,

the 4th Cavalry Group relieved

DiU

the 39th and 60th Regiments in the IAYIvlERSDORF and MONSC

areas,

and the two regiments assembled northwest of GEPLETER (F026334) for an attack on that town and on the road south and west of there. This attack was successful, but its continuation toward VOSSEACK

was halted by a German counter-attack from the north, which threatened to isolate the 39th Infantry on 12 October. Thereafter

the seriously depleted forces of the 9th Division held their gains until the 39th and 60th Regiments were relieved on 28 October by the 28th Infantry Division. regrouping of the This relief was ,made possible by the of,

First

US Airmy forces following the fall

1-AICBHN

on 21 October.

It rnarked the opening of a new phase of op-

erations --

the co-ordinated First army attack to seize the ROER

RIVER dams and crossings of the ROER RIVER. The 746th Tank Battalion was first attached to the 9th Infantry Division 12 June after entering combat six days earlier with the 4th Infantry Division in amphibious landings in NORM1iNDY.

Most of the battalion's practical tank-infantry training was in preparation for these landings. Previously trained in doctrine the tankers soon learned that

that called for use of tanks in mass,

infantry support meant fighting in small teams with the infantry. Seldom were they used in greater mass than a platoon. The 9th Division attached the three medium tank companies to the three regimental combat teams: Company lz to the 47th Infantry Regiment; Company B to the 60th Infantry Regiment; Company C to the 39th Infantry Regiment. The medium tank companies were further broken down to give each infantry battalion one tank platoon. Most often this platoon The company

was allotted to the assault company of the battalion.

headquarters normally -operated near the infantry regiment command post.

Company D, the light tank company,

was attached to the 9th

Reconnaissance Troop and had one platoon constantly at the Division

CP on guard duty.

The other two platoons were used at various (2) to re-inforce road blocks es-

times (1) in division reserve;

tablished by engineer combat battalions attached to the division; .and (3) to protect the- flanks of the infantry regiments. The assault

guns

of the battalion were organized into

three twpo-gun sections to co-operate with the cannon companies of the infantry regiments. This re-organization, which took place

late in September, was an improvement over the prior employment, which had seen the assault guns used as .tanks . The tables of or-

ganization and equipment called for an Assault Gun Platoon of three guns in Headquarters Company and one assault gun in each medium tank v ompany. The Iortar Platoon of Headquarters Company was used throughout the period to re-inforce the road blocks set up by the attached engineers. The Battalion headquarters and Headquarters Company and

Service Company operated generally in the vicinity of the Division headquarters. The following brief description summarizes the actions of the 9th Infantry Division in the battle of the HURTGEN FOREST without specifically mentioning the supporting tanks of the 746th Tank Battalion, Which were organized for combat as indicated above. The method of tank employment will be discussed in detail following the narrative of e'vtents.

The 47th RCT Captures and Holds SOHEVENIITTE To accompl ish

'the

mission of breaching the

V'EST

,-,.LL de-

fenses and. capturing, road centers near DIRN, the 9th Division commander ordered the 47th Infantry Regiment to proceed northeast from ROTGEN along the edge of the HURTGEN FOREST. The regimental

commander used his 3rd Battalion to protect the right flank by proceeding through the forest mass, while the bulk of his command followed thxe edge of the forest (hppendix VI,

Map

1).

German resistas indicated by

ance to the advance was sporadic and disorganized, the following combat interview:

The third battalion executive officer, Major VV.-N. Tanner, stated that, from the time they had left ROTGEN until reaching SCEVENHUTTE, they did not receive a single round of artillery or mortar fire, due in a large measure to the fact that the Further evidence enemy did not know exactly where they were. that every night some part of the enemy of this was the fact uncompletely area, the battalion blunder into forces would aware of the presence of our troops. The most serious threat during this three-day advance was a meeting engagement at 150400 September, when a battalion of German infantry marched into the bivouac area of the 3rd Battalion just south-east of ZVEIIALL (K956367). up within five hours, The situation was cleared

and the third battalion continued to a posifor the night. On 16 September the

tion east of VICHT (K962394)

3rd Battalion proceeded to SCIIVENhTITTE in approach march formation and prepared a co-ordinated attack on. GRESSETNICH for the next day. This attack was called off when the Germans counter-attacked north, and east. The Germans continued almost

from the northwest,

daily counter-attacks through.22 September when their final effort

made by two companies was repulsed.

They continued to harrass

SChIEV-NHtTTE with artillery and mortar fire for many weeks. iVVhile the 3rd ,Battalion proceeded on the right, the 1st

and 2d Battalions advazicd through ZWEIFALL and VICHT to 1VaUSBiCH (K971409) and KREWINKEL (K981410). Here again, opposition was

sporadic until the final positions were reached on 16 September. The 2d Battalion cleared MIUSBiCH and KREWINL on that date but was withdrawn south out of KRE'VINKEL on the following day. 1st battalion occupied The

aiUSB&CH on 16 September and was moved to a

position in the edge of the forest south of GRESSENICH to attack the town in conjunction with the 3rd Battalion on the following day the attack which was called off. In these positions, troops of the 47th withstood counterattacks and artillery and mortar fire for rany weeks.- They were not relieved when other elements of the 9th Division retired from the HURTGEN FOREST on 28 October, but stayed in position under the command of other divisions.

The 39th ROT Near Li1AERSDORF The 1st Battalion led the 39th Infantry through ROTGEN and L i RSDORP on 14 September with the intention of clearing the main road through GEIMETEl and HURTGEN to DUREN. However, when opthe bulk of

position just north of LAGvIMERSDORF proved persistent,

the battalion moved across country to F'INI&NBUR (K949301) and then doubled back down the road to clean it up north of L.MERSDORF..

The 2d Battalion, which had followed the 3d Battalion, 47th Infan-

try, east from RCTGIN, turned south to establish a road block

1,000 yards southwest of JAGERHHAUS (K984310).

to man the road block,

Leaving Company G

the rest of the battalion attacked southBattalion to clear the area north

west in conjunction with the lst of IAIviERSDORF.

These operations were completed -by 17 September

and meanwhile the 3d Battalion had taken over the mission of pro" coeding from LAMIERSLiF to ROLESBROICH (K995267) northeast to DUREN4 The 3d Battalion managed to reach the eastern edge of IL&Y MERSLORFY before determined opposition developed on 14 September. The following morning each of the three rifle companies was ordered to probe for weak spots in the enemy, defenses
--

and thence

Company I on

the road which by-passed ROLLESBROICH to the west; Company K through ROLLESBROICH and then northeast; and Company L south through PAUSTENBAGH (K972255) BROICH. and then northeast through ROLLESgetting through PAUSTENBACH The

Only Company L made progress,

and conducting an ineffectual attack on HTLL 554 (K976254), hill

was to consume the efforts of the battalion for the next two was stoutly defended and commanded the terrain over After two days of little

weeks since it

which the battalion was ordered to pass.

progress, the battalion planned a co-ordinated attack on HILL 554 for 18 September with Companies I and K attacking from the north and Company L from the west. until 29 September, This was unsuccessful and it was not

when Company K and the battalion's tank pla-

toon swept around to attack from the east and southeast, that the hill was finally taken.

On 18 September,

meanwhile,

the 2d Battalion opened an atTwo

tack to seize the high ground north and west of ROLLESBPOICII.

companies attacked east out of LAYIMRSDORt and after five bitter days of

fighting

managed to get the westernmost end of the ridge.

Company G, which had been manning the road block near JAGERHAUIS, captured that little community on 23 September and -four days later Companies F and

moved south to attack the east end of the ridge.

G then co-operated to clear the ridge on 28 September but were so reduced in strength that they were pushed off two days later, The ]Ist Battalion had gone to a position southwest of Z~yEIhALL on 18 September to probe southeast toward GERMIETER. After reaching the road junction just west of HURTGEN on the VVETSER VEH CREEK, howeyer, they were recalled to MAUSBACH on 22 September to help repel a counter-attack against the 47th Infantry. On 26 September the )st was committed near JAGERHIJUS on the left of the 2d Battalion but moved only a short distance before being sent back to an assembly area west of LAINNERSDORF. On 4 October,

all troops of the 39th Regiment were relieved in position by elements of the 4th Cavalry Group and moved to an assembly area southeast of ZWEIFALL for an attack on GERIJETER and VOSSENACK in conjunction with the 60th

Regiment.

The 60th RCT Near MQNSCHAU On the right flank of the 9th Division the 60th Infantry moved southeast out of EIPEN to MIONSCHAD on 14 September. Force Buchanan, Task

with the 1st Battalion of the 60th as a nucleus,

moved south out of EMiEN, turned right through S OURBRODT (K870097) 18

and CAMP ELSENBORN (K902085),

and then proceeded north to MONSCHAU.

The two forces tied in on 17 September and then attempted to clean up the high ground to the southeast, including HOFEN and ALZEN (K958151). They continued on this mission until relieved by after which thy moved north for

troops of the 4th Cavalry Group, ETER. the attack on GERIM

The Attack on GEELMITER and VOSSENACK The final effort of the 9th Division in the HURTGEN FOREST was the co-ordinated attack of the 39th and 60th Regiments on GERMETER and the road to the southwest of that town. The plan was to

have the 39th take GER IETER and continue to VOSSENACK while the 60th concentrated on seizing the road and high ground southwest of GERIETER. The attack opened 6 October*' after being delayed a day The 39th used the 3d Battalion on the left and

by bad weather.

1st Battalion on the right., with the 2d Battalion following the 3d and protecting the north flank of the regiment, The 60th used the

st Battalion on the left and the 2d Battalion on the right with its third Battalion following the 2d. After four days of stubborn opposition, the Americans succeeded in cutting the road both north and south of GERMliETER on 9
October,

The 3d Battalion, .39th Infantry, was astride the road at

'WITTSCHEIDT (F028340) north of town, while the 1st Battalion, 60th Regiment, held RICHELSKAUL (F019324) just south of town. Battalion, 39th, cleared GERIVMTER the next day. V); The 1st

(Map 1, Appendix

VOS ENACK was the next objective for the 39th Infantry, so the

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3d Battalion moved to the edge of the woods north of VOSSENACK by early morning of l3 October, but the 1st Battalion had little success " moving out of GEMViETER toward the west end of VOSSENaCK on the same day.

co-ordinated attack by the two battalions planned

for the next day was halted by a German counter-attack from the north which penetrated the 2d Battalion positions. The 3d Battal-

ion was called back to clear up this attack by KG WdIREGLEIN, a force approximately a battalion in strength. Thereafter, the 39th

was ordered to hold its position in GERNIVETER and vicinity until relieved on 28 October. The 60th continued tough fighting until it objectives along the road southwest of GIREIETER. captured its On 11 October,

the 1st Battalion proceeded southwest of RICHELSKAUL to capture another road junction about a mile down the road. The 2d Battal-

ion fought until 16 October to capture its final objective and clear the road from ROTGEN east through GEFd\M1TER. Five weeks of unrelieved fighting had taken their .toll these two regiments, it of

and with the fall of AACHEN First Army found The

possible to relieve them with troops of the 28th Division.

bare description above does not fully describe the difficulties whicn beset the infantrymen FOREST battle. of the 9th Division in their HURTGEN

But the main interest of this study is to determine

what support armored units gave these infantrymen.

loyment of Tanks Emp Advance to Contact was generally made with tanks leading and infantry mounted thereon. However, 20 no set formation was used

throughout the division.

The 1st Platoon, Company C, 746th Tank on 14 September

Battalion, led the 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, from ROTGEh towards LAkIvIERSDORF.

platoon of infantry rode the

tanks until they were fired upon by an anti-tank gun just outside of LAiV~vRSDORP. Thereafter the infantry flanked the tanks on

either side of the road. The 1st Battalion, 47th Infantry, moving through ROTGEN

toward the north on the same day, mounted Company B on five tanks and four tank destroyers. The 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry, crowd-

ed two companies on the same number of vehicles while moving through the KONZENER VVALD south of ROTGEN. Organization for Combat has already been indicated in each infantry battalion normally had a platoon of five tanks. Usually, the terrain dictated that the tanks be used by section rather than by platoon. Rarely that

were

they used singly except for

special purposes such as pillbox reduction. Captain James R. Shields, who commanded Company C, 746th

Tank Battalion, stated that although only one tank could fire at a time in attacking through woods, give the first protection. a second tank always followed to

In practically all situations infantry

accompanied tanks and Capt. Shields emphasized that in the woods flank protection by the infantry was more essential than elsewhere because of the extremely limited observation. The First Well-OrganizedDefenses met by the 9th Division were dragon's teeth covered by'numerous. pillIboxes and other enemy emplacements. Capt. Shields indicates that the 1st Platoon of his

company,

accompanied by dismounted infantry of the 3d Battalion,

39th Regiment, attacked in column through the dragbn's teeth on the main

'road

southeast

of LMAERSD OR.P on 17 September.

crater

in the road at the dragon's teeth gap proved no obstacle; the tanks proceeded right through it. However, 100 yards beyond the

crater the lead tank was knocked out by long range anti-tank Lire from the east.
When

the third tank was also disabled the remainCn 18 'eptember the

ing tanks retired and the attack bogged down.

tanks tried to pass through a gap in the dragon's teeth farther to the south. mined it The engineers had blown this gap, but the Germans

persistently despite the efforts of both infantry and The right suspension system was blown

engineers to keep it clear. off the first

tank to enter the gap, and blocked the gap for the

rest of the day. Three tanks got through this gap on 19 September, but in attacking HILL 554, the first was hit by bazooka fire and another by anti-tank fire. The third returned to LkADERSDOEF. Captain

Shields menticned that although infantry were in the vicinity, they were not alongside the tanks. Reconstituted to a three-tank strength, the platoon again

passed through the dragon's teeth on 20 September to aid the infantry to reach the top of HILL 554. Lt-Col, R. H. Stumpf, the 3d

Battalion commander, noted that despite the loss of one tank to anti-tank fire the other two continued to shoot up the enemy in the trenches. Pillbox Reduction was the next problem faced by the

infantrymen and attached tankers.

Each tank company found its own

solution, although tank-infantry co-operation was almost invariably the rule, ing team. Company A, with the 47th Infantry, fired armor-piercing ammunition on the doors of the pillboxes and caused the enemy to surrender hastily. In one instance, infantrymen fired small arms Normally, only one tank was included, in the assault-

on the apertures while the tank approached within 20 yards of the door. Three rounds from the tank gun caused fifteen Germans to In a second instance, the tank fire was effective at The occupants surrendered after four rounds hit the

surrender. 600 yards.. door.

Company B, with the 60th Infantry, used its tanks in conjunction with the infantry to fire on apertures. Then infantry

and engineers flanked the pillbox and blew in the door with high explosive charges. Troops of the 2d Battalion met pillbox resistTwo tanks first

ance in clearing the road from MONSCHAU to HOFEN.

assisted by driving enemy from surrounding houses into the pillboxes and then by helping to kill driving off 100 others.. fifty enemy re-inforcements and

Under cover of tank and infantry fire, on the pillboxes and tankers fired on

infantrymen poured gasoline

them to ignite the pillboxes; twenty occupants surrendered. Company C, with the 39th Infantry, found that the most successful pillbox attacks were those employing smoke and fire and maneuver. The smoke was employed in for casualty effect.. two ways: (1) to screen move-

ment and (2)

The tactics used by the 39th

23

Regiment are described in

the followingCor;bat interview:

In reducing the pillbox at (96287), Company 39th Infantry, used a TD and a tank to fir'e at the openings, a squad of infantry, a half squad of engineers using poling charges, a squad of flame throwers and white 'phosphorous smoke. The TD closed the embrasures by firing from a distance of about 400 yards, and.trhe infantry followed behind the vehicle protecting it from enemy infantry. 60-mm. mortars were used to run the enemy from his emplacements into the pillbox, while the tank moved up to a range of 200 yards and then finally 50 yards, The direct firing and the pole charge seemed to be ineffective. Finally, one of the infantry saw a crack in the door of the pillbox, and in there he threw a white phosphorous grenade, The enemy came piling out. 2 Using much the same tactics, Company i reported taking nine pillboxes in one hour and ten minutes on 17 September. Be-

E,

cause of the terrain, tanks could not always support the attacks, and the, infantry experienced more difficulty in pillboxes. capturing the

The unsupported infantry attacks lacked shock effect.

Rarely did tanks venture forth without infantry support, but in the final attack on HILL 554 on 29 September, Company A, the 1st Platoon,

746th Tank Battalion, outdistanced its supporting inin five or, six pillboxes. continually limited

fantry and recuced the resistance

Obstacles,

both natural and man-made,

the effective employment of tanks in the i3TRTGEN F0YIBST area.

Usually, the enemy supplemented the natural obstacles with every

means at his disposal ready been discussed. 'wring the advance to contact, several unprotected road blocks held up the advancing tanks. suming, nuisances. On 14 September, Tnese were usually time-conCompany C tanks with the 3d
--

the effect of the dragon's teeth has al-

Battalion, 39th Infantry, were held'up about an hour at a railroad

crossing by an iron gate protected only by mines.

day they met a more common type of road block -across the road.

Later in the
trees felled

These trees did not happen to be mined or coverThe tankers solved their

ed by fire as was usually the case.

problem by looping cables around the trees and pulling them out.

tank dozer

was

used to fill

in craters in the road. to remove commanding was on

Engineers were not always readily available mines at these road blocks. Company A, 39th Infantry, Captain Ralph G, Edgar,

cited two instances.

The first

14 September when moving through LkI1iAiAWERSDORF where the tanks were held up most of the day awaiting removal of mines at a crossroads. Again on 9 October, tanks supporting his company in the attack on

GRF M,,TTR were held up from 0830 until 1400 before the engineers arrived to clear mines. German defenders blocked and mincd the fire lanes through the rough, heavily wooded forest. Capt.

Shields statg-d that some-

timeis it was possible to take paths through the woods, but usually tanks found it through tria best to avoid the fire lanes and go directly

woods. on the efficiency

Tank obstacles had a very definite effec t of the tank-infantry team.

Neither element of this team operated In some in-

as efficiently alone as when the two fought together.

stances the whole attack was held up when obstacles stopped the tanks. In other instances, as when the 2d Battalion, 60th Infan-

try, was attacking in

the area southwest of GEIRMITEF. on 9 October,

the tanks progressed just far enough to break the enemy resistance

and allow the infantry to go forward 1,000 yards. occasion the 1st Battalion, 60th Regiment,

However,

on one

advanced from GERMETER

to a road junction 1,000 yards to the southwest without armored support.. They accomplished the. mission quickly on 10 October by

following rolling barrages of the 4.2-inch and 81-mm. mortars. The armored support was held up by a mined road block and arrived at the road junction two hours after the infantry had secured it. Tank-Infantry Attacks were seldom deliberately planned and even when they were plann-d they were not always successful. On

11 October, tanks of the 1st Platoon, Company C, led Company A, 39th Infantry, in the attack from GE. METER to VSSERACK at 0830.

The platoon had four tanks which proceeded in column along the road with the infantry following in vancing 500 or 600 yards, fire.

column of platoons.

After ad-

the lead tank was destroyed by anti-tank An artillery At

The other tanks retirad as did the infantry.

concentration was brought down on the enemy anti-tank guns. 1100 the three remai nin. tack down the road.

tanks again led the infantry into the at-

Just before reaching the knocked-out tank, The was hit

the second of the three was disabled by anti-tank gun fire. lead tank, trapped on the road between two disabled tanks, while maneuvering to withdraw.

One tank remained and upon its

withdrawal the attack on VOSSENACK came to an end. The combined arms attacks of armor and infantry were generally more successful than this, however, While clearing the Company A,

road. from FIMIKENJR to LAI3ERSDORF on 15 September, 39th Infantry,

without tank support, was held up trying to secure

an important road junction.

The arrival of two tanks to support

the infantry caused the enemy to withdraw without further fighting. Two days latgr Company I of the 39th, attacking east from LkAMERS-

DCRF with -tank support, reported that the enemy broke and ran the same enemy which had held up the infantry attack the previous day. Northwest of GEHITER on 9 October used two companies

.the

2d Battalion, 39th

Infantry,

of infantry and two medium tanks to

clean out a strong enemy patrol which had succeeded in disabling a light tank on

the

north flane of the regiment's position.

The

following day the 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, with tank support. resistance

captured GERETE'R

Capt. Edgar attributed the lightness of the Capture of GEIvETER en-

to the presenrce of the tanks.

abled the tanks to proceed northeast on the road and assist the 3d Battalion in recapturin.g v'WLITTSCiEIDT which the unsupported infan-

try had lost on the previous day. An outstanding example of successful tank-infantry attack took place on 9 Octob:-r

when

the 1st Battalion,

60th Infantry,

took

the road junction at RICHELSKkUL with its tank platoon giving good support. 0800. A 10-minute artillery preparation preceded the attack at

Then tanks and infantry worked their way to the edge of the The tanks broke out of line of skirmish-

woods 200 yards east of the road junction. the woods abreastU of. the infantry, ers on both sides and to the rear.

which was in

Both tanks and infantry fired

every weapon,

x German lieutenant raised up out of the bushes,

which penetrated the turret of the lead tank The tank; returned the

fired his bazooka,

and slightly wounded the tank commander.

the fire with a 75-mm. shell which cut the German officer in

half.

This so demoralized the rest of the defenders that they broke and ran from their well dug-in positions, and the tanky-infantry team killed fifty and captured twenty-five of the enemy. Prisoners

stated that after the officer was killed they were afraid to use the other twelve bazookas in Capt. the company.

Shields considered the psychological effect of

the

tanks on the enemy as the prime consideration in using armor in difficult terrain Ie stated:

Within woods, the chances of hitting the enemy are relatively slight. But the shock and psychological effect is great. The enemy would generally give up when the tanks got to a position where they could fire at close range, even though they Cthe enemy l could not be hit. 3 Tanks captured our troops.

by

the Enemy were sometimes turned against the Germans put two of the tanks dis-

For example,,

abled near VOSSNACK in position to fire one our troops in GER1iVjTMiR, although they did not actually keep them manned. vent their use by the Germans, To pre-

an infantry patrol protected a tyank the tanks to destroy

crewman who set off incendiary grenades in them.

Tank Road Blocks were occasionally established for short periods in a moving situation. The 2d Battalion, 39th. Infantry,

used tanks with infantry support as road blocks southwest of. JAGE2RRHA.S in th& early stages of the HIRTGEN

FOREST

battle and

north of GE'1&'_TLR on 9 October.

The 3d Battalion used them simiThese were all one-day used its tanks with

larly

in LUJiLMMRSDORF on

14

September.

stands.

The 2d Battalion,

60th Infantry,

infantry in

stable road block position for almost a week between In SCEiLVLN-

19 and 25 September at the south edge of MONSCMFU. HUTTE, the 3d Platoon,

Company A, 746th Tanlc Battalion, covered ?or the

all routes of approach from positions within the town, first

few days no foot troops were in position to give close sup-

port to the tanks, Defensive eimployment of Tanks was usually accomplished by using tank platoons as a mobile reserve for the infantry battalions to which they were attached, During the first weEk in SCEEV-

ENHUTTE the tanks were used as road blocks,

enemy made its final attempt to recapture the tanks and tank destroyers were used

but by the time the

-the town on 22 Septembor a mobile striking force.

as

They moved up and down the main street firing machine guns and 76mn, shells

at

any enemy who presented himself as a target.

Defense

Against

Airborne Attack was the mission given to 746th Tank Battalion on 19 October. the vicinity of FLEUTH

the 2d Platoon, Company A,

The platoon was used on the hign ground. in (K973404) landings.

with the mission of guarding against possible glider

Weather added to the difficulties faced by the tankers during October. "fair to good." cold Only seven days during the month were listed as iost of the rest were cither cold and rainy or i'og frequently held up attacks planned for early thze attack on GEDEETE.R on 10 October was

and

cloudy.

morning --

for instance,

scheduled for 0830 but was held upuuntil 1400 because tanks supporting the 39th Infantry could not advance because of the fog.

Withdrawal of Tanks from the perimeter of the infantry de-

fenses

at night was a source of friction between tark and infantry Lt. Col. Hupfer, commanding the

conmanders in the 60th Regiment.

746th, pointed out that the inability to pull tanks back had two principal defects:

(1) green

replacements had to be placed in

tanks by taking therm to the vehicles at the front without orientation to crew or veh:cles; and (2) proper maintenance and service

of vehicles could not be accomplished.

possibly the more serious pvoblem.

This latter defect was

The tanks of Company B were Lt. Col. Hupfer

continuously on the, line from 1 to 24 October:indiated

that

many tanks became inoperative because auxiliary the re-

motors to charge the 'batteries could not be operated --

sultant noise brough ; down mortar concentrations which caused many casualties among the*._nfartrymen near the tanks. Frequently the

infantry units regroujed behind the protection of the tanks, but the tanks "were never given tie opportunity to drop back to perform necessary maintenance. The solution finally reached by agreement

on 24 October was that the tanks would normally drop back to a position near the infantry battalion conmand posts where they could' get proper care and still be on call of the an emergency.

battalion

commander in

This policy was pursued by the other two regiments.

Corrmunicatioivl) between the tanks and the infantry were im-

proved during the period by three methods: (I) SCR-300 radios were
installed in tions; (2) seven tanks per company for tank-infantry communica-

telephon,3 linked with the tank interphone systems were

installed on the rea:^ of all medium tanks to facilitate ground to

(

~j
30
4

4-

tank communication; (3) SCR 509-510 radios were established at the infantry battalion command post for an additional channel of communication. Enemy Tactics were best described as tenacious. The enemy

defended his positions effectively by making the most of fortifications well suited to the terrain. don and used concentrations Ho employed mines with abanHe

of heavy mortars and artillery.

prepared field fortifications

outside his pillboxes and fought

from these until driven inside. Anti-tank weapons used were: (1) the .anzerfaust, (2) a hand-

carried anti-tank weapon for. close-in fighting;

the self-pro-

pelled gun which was used to support his counter-attacks; and (3) an anti-tank rocket launcher mounted on wheels with a very low silhouette. Anti-tank guns were not plentiful because of the lim-

ited fields of fire and the enemy elected not to use his tanks in this terrain during this period. Morale activities for personnel of.the 746th Tank Battalion during September and October were very limited, but some of the men were sent on pass to VERAIERS, BELGIUM. Laundry was. accomp-

lished fairly regularly through quartermaster facilitiesb Casualty figures are available only for the month of October. Lisregarding those "injured in action" (who were hurt when a

truck overturned) the personnel losses indicate that about three men were lost each time a tank was permanently disabled. 3). (Figure

PERS ONNEL GASLIALT I~S PE RS offAL N Ca E sua lty Killed in Action Died of Wounds MVissing in Aition Seriously Wounded in Action Lightly W'ounded in Aiction
Lightly

I Off icer

Tota i

'Injured

in action
TOTALS TANK CASUJALTIE~S Tank Type Medium Tank M 4 Medium Tank Mi4A3E2 Lighat Tank Mi5A1 TOTAL Los se s Breakdown of Losses AT Gun Fire AT Rockets Mines Artillery

Figure 3*

Personnel, and Tank Casualties, .746th Tank Battalion October, 1944.

Summary The material aid of the 746th

Tank

Battalion to the ad-

vance of the 9th Infantry Division in the HURTGEN FOREST was limited principally by the terrain; but tree use of tanks in spite of,

physical difficulties benefitted the division because of the psychological effect of tanks -terrified the enemy. was possible, they encouraged our own infantry and

In almost every instance where tank support

the infantry was enabled to _advnoe more readily. infantry cormmanders had

Tank support miight have been better if

realized the importance of the employment of tank-infantry-enginrer ~:tams to help keep the tanks moving. Engineers with the in-

fantry division had little training with tank units, and this fact, coupled with the rugged. terrain of the HTRTGEN FOREST, meant that the infantry often failed to get the tank support to which it entitled. The 9th Division's efforts to penetrate the IIHRTGEN FOREST ended with the relief of the 39th and 60th Regiments by elements of the 28th Infantry Division on 28 October, was

All of the action of

the 9thi was proliminary to the First U.S. Army's deliberate plan to clear the forest on its way to the ROER RIVER dams and ROER R,VER crossings. On the front originally approached by the 9th
--

Division in September, the army was to employ two corps

and VII --

the V

before the HOER RIVER was to be crossed in February.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER II 1enetration of the SIEOFRIED LINE by the 47th Infantry Regiment, Combat Iterview 56, prepared by First leutenant Harry L tCondron, 2nd Information) and; Historical Service, Headquarters, First U.S. Armay, p. 6.
2 9th Infantry*Division;, 39th Infantry Regiment, 2d BattalN ion, 15 Septembler to 26 tobe:r 1944, Cambat Interview 56, prepared by Second Lieutenant F. L. Hadsel, 2nd Informiatioh and Historical Service, Headquarters, First U.S. Armyo

39t

IfanryDivision,

"C" Company,

746th Tank .Battalion,

SIEGFRIED LINE, 15 Septemrber to 16 October 1944, 56, prepared by First Lieutenant Fred L. Hadsel, and Historical Service, VIIL Corps Team, p, 6.

Combat Interview 2d Information,

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CHAPTER III
THE 707TH TAM~ BATTAILION IN~ SUPPORT OF
The 29th Infantry

TIME

28TH I1P1AITRY DIVI SION~

Divi sion,

suppor ted by the 707th

Tank Battalion, relieved the depleted 9th Infantr'y Division in the vicinity of GMMM on 28 October and prepared to continue the assault to the ROAR RIVE fall of .rMiT
on 21 October,

DA4v2S.

Previous to the

the bulk of General Hodge&'

First Arrnay forces were enCgu e1 in the reduction of that city. After that date ho was able to regroup his divisions for the attack to seize crossings of the ROT, RIVElR. VII Corps was while

to ma.ke the rain effort to cross the ROER near DMM

as

a necessary prolirninary to this crossing, V Corps was to

seize the darns in the vicinity of SCHNiIDT. The objoctivo assigned

to

the 29th Division by V Corps SCHMIDT was rn in-

was the areca VOSS!7iACI1-STIATJCH-SCHI IDT.

portant conrunications center located astride an east--west road which First Armay wanted for' .^n TiSR. and in addition on a ridg~e overlooking the SCHWAZU TA the vit,-l ROMl dare.

was

(F O59273),

one of

East of the division and in the center atop a'n east-west

of its sector lay the townm of VOSSEAOC

ridge surrounded by. woods.

B3cTD t3:RG--3

To the north lay the HUJRTGM~'-

G STEIT ridge

which

doinated the. VQS2TAOXK the towns of SCHI-IIT a~nd

ridge

as

did the ridgec on which

lay

XO4-;RSCIMIDT (1 057309).; (See Appendix I.)

The division plan of attack~ provided for the 109th

Regiment to be cerruitteci on the north flank in the direction of the town of

HUJRTG2T;

tho 110th Regiment on the south the 112th Rogime.nt in the

toward $11401 SKAL (F023300), and.

center to tn'ko in turn, the towns of. VOSS bTACC, KIMESCHEIDT, andl SCHMITT

The 707th Tank Battalion comanded by Lt Col

This battalion had

Richard Ripple was to support the attack. joined tho 29th on 6 'Octobor

nd u~p to the t iimo of the

combat. In this opera-

HtJTGM- operaion had soon very little

tion~ the 707th fought mostly in support of the center regiment. In front of the division on both north and south were dense forests cut by dleep draws and hiding numerous defenses such as pillboxes, nnti-tank oxid anti--personnel mines, other typos of man-made obstacles. In the center

and
the open

was

ridge on which lay the tovn of V0SSTA0C. VOSS2TAC and separating it

Southeast of

from SCM-iIDT was the MCIL RIVER

This river wa~s

rtmning through a steep wooded gorge.

crossed only by

a smalwJJ

ood~s

trail which connected VOSSENACK become. the MSR for the

and. K01,2PMRS01i-2IDT andc which forces south of the KALL~.

was to

Before the attack the the immdiate f ,ont the enemy to the north

division had

G-2 estimated that to

approxinatcly 3350 meon,

19)40, and

to the south 1850, all fighting as in--

fmaitry, under dontrol of the 89th Infantry; Division.

Re-

servos capable of

rapid intervention wore estimated at 2000

not comr-ittocl

and 3000 fron less active fronts.

The attack, which was schedluled to junp off on October, was delayedl dily because of bad weather

31,

Pc-cl was

f in,?1y macic on 2 NTvembor.

but it

Adverse ;weather cont inuedl.

wras decided the attack could xro longer be delayed..

,ection

at V0SSENAOK
the town of V0SSMYAO1K 'lay

As previously mentioned, astride The

road which ran qlon- the top of an open ridge. about a city block wide and two thousand yarcls N~ear the center of 1tSMA the church f ormeda

town was

in length,

proninent lanclhmark and overlooked the cleep draws fron the surroundng woods which reached up to the town on the north, east,.

outskirts

of the

and

south.

At

020900 Novembor, af ter an hour'Is artillery prcpara jumped off fron the lioving clown

tion, the 2nd battalion, 112th Regiment,

vicinity of C-:BTflR in the attack on VOSSMTACK.

the ridge Compa ny G was on the left, Gompany F on the right, with Corpany E followint" in reserve.
at tack was 'Corany 0,

In support of this
The 1st platoon

707th Tank Battalion.

under Second Lieutenant Willia n S. (Zaarrie~plus two t^anks from the second platoon, attacked with Company G. Thc, three

rc~alning tanks of the second platoon with First Liou'3oxiamt

James

J.

Lening in co::mands attacked with Corrpany F.

Second

Licutenant Joseph Hovakl s 3rc' platoon with Cotnpany

'-;jwas to

assist in rmopping up the ob ject ive or to come to the Aidt of the other

trnk

platoons if

1 . required

The attack pro- essot on the objoctive shortly

satisfactorily and' the afteor 1000.

infantry was

Tho tanks, however,

hacL trouble fron the start,

The

first platoon sergeant s tank had moving through

track blown off while

gap in an Amierican laid protective rinefield.

N~ext

Lt. Quarrie Is tank became mired in the soft ground.

Captain George S. "Jst,

connanding the tank comrpany, saw the

anO. placed the Lieutenant in his The last t^ank of the second'! was iknockod., otit by bazooka

difficulty, came forward,

tank, and. the platoon moved. on. platoon wont too far south fire.

and

The platoon comm1ancler, Lt Loming, who was having trouble

with his tank gunp,

radioed the third platoon f~or assistance.

One section came forward the town.

and

was, sent tdwarci the east end of

After totting-his Lun in action, teeming moved

forward, only to have his tank- immobilized by a Meaniwhile,

Gorrmin

nine,

Capt. Weost. left his own tank to Lt. Qurrie

and commandeered a third platoon tankc vich struck a mine

in

VOSSEM~AOX shortly afterward and. was put out of action.

Heo

then moumltod a battalion headqcuarters tank which was in the townm .poz'f ornmn gi platoon.
6.1.

forward observat ion for the battal.ion assault d7ifficulties of comman!11C under the cols :.aons
be. appreciated.
H~is platoons were

which

faced

Clpt., West can

in

support of three different infantrycompanies; he could only

act as an expeiter and to clo this ho required both

transpor-

tation mnd conrruLication.

A tank retriever which came into the town to evacuate Lt. Lcnin's tank was hit

and

imobilized by German artillery.

Thus by 1300 five t.nks and one retriover were out of action which recluced the effective strong-th of tho conr-my one-third.

by

roughly

Iost of those tanks were rcvorrable, but they wore value to the infantry wrhichi thcy were supporting.

of no immediate

At 1600 the company returned to an area within 400 yardes of GMMTI call from and soent the night in that location, remaining on

the

infntry.

About 0500 the next cay, the t,-nk cor.zany moved forward, occupiedl supporting; positions on the north

andeast

edges of

VOSSi 1tACI, a~nd rerlained in these positions encoutering no enomy activity until

heavy

artillery beg an to lanzd about 1200.

All

tanks excopt three were ordered back into G-IMIZT-T. romaining, were these of the 1st and

The three

2nd platoon leaders

cnd

tkie battalion he adquarters tank ordered to stay in communi catLion purposes. The command

the town for

tank

of the first

platoon

was still irmobilized but could be used in this capacit

About 1230 hostile artillery fire hit the batt,-lion henclquartors tank, knocking it VOSSL"TA7C out nd at

1530

the only operative tank in

was er Lo:-cc

back.

NNo further tank action occurrcl until the following orning when the 2nd pla tbon was used in fire support role for one of tho battalions of the 110th Rogriont to the south. nission was comzpleted bay 0705 and the platoon returned to company control. At 1030, on the request of te infantry comThe

mandcer

in VOSS AOI , the four tnks of the fir

It platoon

went. forward t-o neutralize snall arms coming from the fired fire,

r~nc ni achine gun fire

The tanks moved in and

woods

north of town.

IM, at
and

ranges of 15 0-200 yards, neutralized R at 1100.

the

enemy

returned to G-rRL'T

Againl at the request

of the infantry,

one section of the 2nd7 tank platoon plus his tank wont back into VOSS1TACK, was still holding

the company conmandcr in

where the 2nd battalion, 112th Regiment, at considerable cost.

The eastern end of the tonm and the

eastern slope of the ridge where the infantry had clug-in was subjected to continuous battering artillery which took its toll of casualties anc undlermined the morale of the deThe western end of the town was relatively quiet to KOIZ SGHIfJIDT.

Lenders.

except for troops passing through enroute

Medical and other vehicles continued to use the route through V0SSITACK to the south.
11hile the three tans

(See iap 2, Appendix

V,)

were engg.,eod in

counteracting

snall armas fire at the direction of the infantry, Capt. tank backed into a c:.later and broke a drive shaf t.

West's

He ordered

the other tarikrs back and stayed with his own until he

was

towed back by company maintenance

about niniht.

At 1915 Lt. Quarriie with three tanaks of the first platoon moed to the position occupied' by Copany F. spotted tracer fire coming frozn He

a draw east of the town

and radioed the position to the battalion assault guns, which fired into this draw until the divisional artillery took over the mission.

A PW later stated that this fire broke up

the draw, ind-icating

a counter-attach which was forming in

the advant sge of having an assault gun platoon organic to the tank 'battalion.

Lt.

Quarrie remained with Company F all night were in

while the balance of the tans

MMM-TR.

Capt. West, moved at 0700, 5 November, with Lt.

Leming' s three tnks, to positions from which they could fire into the iloodis north of VOSSM-1CK on mortar and enemy small arms locations. hit which killed Here one ta..t T received a, direct HE

the driver and destroyed the 75-r a gun. BER TER about 1000. At 1400

The other tanks returned to

Lt. Leming went forward with his platoon in a reported counter-attack.

order to =repel

Capt. West, accompanied this

Lt. guarriets

platoon which moved up to support Companiy G. platoon continuecl to suiport Conpany E.

The entire eastern

end of the ridge came under intense heavy ar tillery fire, and by 1500 both platoons were receivin withdrew to GMIME . heavy fire and Capt.

apparently without orders.

11est, in his tanks, remained in turret defilade behind Con-

pimny G,

At 1730 Lt... qurrie again reported to Company F He rethe

with an extra tank borrowed from the 2nd. platoon. mained with thon all night, next morning. After Lt.

returning to GERITER3 crly

Qjuarrie reported back, Lt. Col. Ripple re-

ceived orders to get all available armor into VOSSITACK to stop am enemy counter-attack; Battalion, platoon, were committed. Companies B and C, 707th Tank Company B initially sent its 1st

undor First Lieutenant Carl A, -Anderson, into town.

This platoon was soon followed by Capt. C-eorge S* Granger, the company commander , and the 3rd. platoon co-mmanded by Second Con,

Liutenant Danforth Sherman. camEe last.

,mny

C,with its

eight tanks,

The

situation was described by the tankers as one TIalny of the infantry were running to none of the t ankers know where the

of corrplete confusion,

the rear out of the town. front locate

lines

wore, or where the counter-attacking enemy was platoon of Company C occupied a position

The first

northeast of V0SSLTXOK and fired to the north until about 0900 when it 3, pulled back to GDR;:; :TER. ieanhile, in Company

Lt. .derson evacuated the crew of a datmaged Cnpany C

tank by placing one

man

from the crew in

each of his tanks Although he

and returning; with his entire platoon to the LD.

asled. for and received. permission from Capt. Granger to this evacuation,
all

make

there seems to be no sound reason for taking

of those tanks out of

action

at a time

rhen

presumably

they were. badly however,

needec.

He soon returned 2nd platoon, entorod

to. VOSSMIAiCK,

and rplieved

the

Company C, by 0930.
VOSS ICK they knew As a

When the Company 3 tankers first

nothing

about tho ground and loss about the sitw*tvio4..

result they fired first infantry and caused

into buildings occupied by the friendly

come casual~ties.

They

also. fired perilously

close to the third platoon of Corrppany C and some tank destroyers which were in the town. During all of this time Cn.pt. Granger

was trying to locate the infantry battalion co~ander to get an intelligent picture of what was haponing. Vhether or not -there was a

German

counter-attack is

uncertain from the avilable accounts. 3rd platoon approachin is credited

Ltt. -Tovk1~ s Company C,. infantry The one fact

with stopping some Gerr.-ia

the t

own

from the east and southeast.

that can definitely be reconstructed. is that the American infantry defenders, having been subject ed to unceasing artillery and mortar fire for five clays, had reached the limit of their

encurance.

When the first

shouts of counter-attack went up,

.Manic spread like wildfire and the men 1Efft their hales afd ran to the rear. battalion present,

When

Capt. Grenger located

the infantry

OP

he found that the battalion comnder, though

was a coba t fatigue casualty and that a captain

on his staff was in actual comma nd.. In the initial., action of Co_-ppany 3 in V0SSTUQK it is

of. interest to note that requests a-nd. orders to Company B came

Capt. 'est of Company battalion conmander.

C rather than from the tank or infantry

Capt. *est was in town at the time Com-

pany B was committed, but the accounts indicate that even he did not know the infantry situation. Capt. ::hest was killed

about 0900 by an enemy shell which landed in the turret of his tank. Capt. Granger took command of the tanks of both

companies and kept his lst and

'rd

platoons in the vicinity

of VOSSENACK the remainder of the day.

Artillery fire knocked

out three tanks and the only direct action against the enemy was the destruction of a small infantry counter-attack. At

0900, Lt, Quarrie of Company C, came forward and relieved the tanks of Company B for the night. This day's action at VOSSENACK is a graphic illustration of the dangers attending such vague orders as those sending tanks into the towfn. The comunication and coordin-

ation

necessary betwreen the tanks and infantry had completely

Nhen Capt. Wnest was killed the remaining tanks

broken down.

were under the oomrmnnd of Capt. Granger who was not familiar with the terrain and who was also occupied in trying to establish contact with the local infantry defenders.

By this time the foot troops in VOSSENACK consisted

largely of engineers of the 1171th Engineer Combat Group (twro battalions) supporting the 28th Division. During the night,

Brig. Gen. George A. Davis, assistant division commander,

visited the town and ordered the engineers to retake the

eastern end which had been abandoned by the infantry and re-

occupied by Germans in undetermined strength. About 0300 on the following day, Lt. Quarrie's tank

was

disabled by a direct hit on the turret while another tank

of his platoon was hit in the engine compartment.

Lt. Quarrie

was not injured, however,and at 0500 he was called to the engineer CP for his recommendations as to the employment of

tanks in the engineer counter-attack to take place that morning. He explained that he was to be relieved by Lt.

Johnson of Company B, but recomnended that tanks not be used on the left (north) flank of the town because of its vulnerability from the high ground at TURTGEN and BRANDEN13ERG. (See

Appendix I.)
and Capt.

At 0730 Lt. Johnson, accompanied by Lt. Anderson Lt.

;uandarson

Granger arrived.

led Quarrie's platoon Granger after

back to GERMI TER, a.d. Quarrie followed with Capt. orienting Johnson on the engineer plan.

At this time the en ineers held a north-south line through VOSSEINTACK at about the center of the town. Lt. John-

son's platoon was to move up the right (south) flank of the town immediately after the artillery bar rage which heralded the engineer attack. One company of engineers was to attack from with Lt. Johnson's

house to house up the main road of the tow

tank firing two rounds into each house befdre the assault. This plan succeeded and the engineers were able to retake the entire town. Despite

direct

nd

indirect artillary and bombing and

strafinc from friendly planes, largely from other causes.

casualties to the tanks -witere

One was immobilized by a mine,

another beame bogged in a shell hole, while a third became inoperative because of a broken gas line. An incident occurred here which emphasizes the necessity for dependable corrnunications. A garbled radio message caused

the engineers to w ithdrawv from the eastern end of the town under the impression that they were ordered to hold north-south line th"rough the church. They did this without notifying the tanks

and then called don

end of the town.

artillery and mortar fire on the eastern

This fire fell around Lt. Johnson and his moved farther east. The

tanks until he succeeded in getting it

vac:nt part of the town wtiaas again occupied by friendly troops

and
Lt.

the tank platoon reaminad in Position until relieved by Aderson

and

his platoon at 1800.

This platoon imediately

received diroct artillery fire from its right front and Lt. Ainderson ordered his tanks to move back, intending only that they back out of the line of fire. At this point his radio the rest of his pla-

failed and because of the loss of. contact, toon returned all the way to GEPJVETEI. his platoon, but enroute he met Lt.

He started back after

Col. Henbest, commanding

the 2nd battalion, 109th Regiment, which had been ordered to

relieve the Engineers of the defense of V0TOSSENACK.

told: him that he and Capt. in GERETB7

The colonel

Granger had decided to keep the tanks

since they could move up easily when desired, and

their presence only drewN unwv~elcoe artillery fire. About 0500, on the morning of 8 November, Lt. Col. with

fBenbest called for tanks, and at 0600 Lt. Anderson,

four tanks, moved into VOSSENaCK and occupied positions at the western end of the town. His platoon moved in and around the

town for the rest of the day except between 1200 and 1400 when he returned for resupply. He was relieved at 1200 by Lt. Novak

of Company C, who remained in the town after Anderson's platoal returned.. Anderson's main action during the day consisted of

firing his tanks and adjusting artillery fire on moving targets and gun flashes. He also called and received an air strike on After dark both pla-

some enemgy tan.s which had been sighted.

toons returned to GERN7,TEPM; Lt Novak cane back on foot ahead of h-isplatoon suffering from severe shoulder and leg wounds. 8 November marked the last of the action for Company C in VOSSENACK. During the fighting here it had tried to keep This

on" platoon in town

-,.ith
in

the infantry at all times.

efrort wuas not usuali

response to definite reouests for

armor for specific missions, continuous armored support, At 0630 on

but was rather an attempt to give

,9 November,

the 2nd platoon oef Company B, By now it was

numbering three tanks, moved into VOSSENACK. snowing

and

visibility was nil,

At 0900 one of the sergeant

tank commnanders asked permission of Lt Johnson to return to GERIE.TER. His gunner was almost hysterical from battle exhaus-

tion and naeded a rest. were left in the town.

Permission was granted, and two tanks Later in the morning an officer (unidi-

tified)

from the artillery, walked over They did so,

and

asked the tanks to

leave town.

apparently without questioning the This concluded active although it

authority of the order. Company B, 707th,

participation

of

in VOSSENACTEK,

remained on alert

status in CGEPIETER during 9 and 10 November. The action of the 707th Tank Battalion at VOSSENACK is a perfect example of the unnecessary loss of lives and material occasioned by (i) lack of mutual understandin-g between the armor and infantry arms; (2) lack of efficient communication between

these two arms or a failure to use such means; (3) lack of exchange of tactical information between the arms on the lower levels. It was vital to the 28th Infantry Division to hold VOSSENACK since the division ISR, to SCI town.

1IDT

passed through this

If the tanks had been used as a mobile reserve and given clear and concise orders when coimitted, the losses

complete,

both to the armor and the infantry would have been less. The role of the overlooked. ties did little
engineers

in this action should not be

Their mine reconnaissance and mine clearing activito prevent the loss of tanks from mine damage.

At a minimum, routes of counter-attack should have been cleared

early

in. the action in order for the infantry to receive maximum

benefit from the armor in the mobile reserve capacity.

-Action

at KO.T,.fl7RSCHEIDT and SCHMIDT

Concurrently with the action at VOSSENACK troops of the 112th Regiment became involved in

fighting at KOiVi''17RSCHEIDT and SCHMIDT.

These two towns are accessible from VOSSENACK only by a tortuous, twisted .trail which passes through the forest and dips into the valley of the KALL RIVER (Figure 4.)., This trail was a distinct

-obstacle for tanks, tank destroyers, and supply and medical vehicles. It was narrow, unpaved, barely the width of a tank,

and was characterized by sharp angled turns and rock abutments which hindered the passage of vehicles. These conditions were early November.

aggravated by the frequent rainfall occurring in SCHMIDT, it will be remembered,

was the objective of the 112th the attack which began on 2

Regiment and of the 28th Division in November. Its importance was its dominated the

control of a good road net

and the fact that it RIVER.

SCH

AMMANAUEL DAM on the ROER

Since VOSSENACK had been taken with comparative ease on

the first day, it was decided to pass the 1st and 3rd battalions through the 2nd in VOSSEFACK to attack KOAMMERSCHEIDT and SCHMIDT respectively, This was a slight change in the original plan ivhich However, after an

contemplated the attack through RICHELSKAUL.

abortive attempt in this direction on 2 November, the plan was changed as indicated. fall The new plan

was

successful and by night virtually

the 3rd battalion was in SCHMIDT, having taken it

unopposed, while the 1st battalion was in also occupied with very little trouble.

and around KO4MM1ERSCHEIDT However, the attackers

who had been so successful soon became the defenders of their

I*

'Pr

nC

71Fr

V~'ifer74~

4,

IO'IOCKEP

vur

TAts c'iN MSR

swircN BAKS d11 P"SI~E/47

4,

Figure

4.

MSR between VOSSENACK and

A(

JFf)
;HIDT

showing

hwn

kokdottns
knocked

out

tanks.

respective towns

without

American armor

forwrard

to support them,

Company A, 707th Tank Battalion, was the'.'unit which was committed to the support of these troops and

was

reinforced by Company The

C, 893d Tank Destroyer Battalion (equipped with M 10's).

difficulties which beset the tanks and:TDs are brought out in the following account. 2 November found Company A, 707th Tank Battalion, located in GERMETER in a reserve role, Its mission was (l) to support

by fire the attack of Company C rithh the infantry on VOSSENACK, (2) to guard against a possible counter-attack from HURTGEN and the north east, and (3) to be prepared to support the 1st and 3rd battalions, 112th Regiment, i their attack on SCHMIIDT. After an inactive day, Capt. Bruce M6 Hostrup, the company commander, was called to the regimental CP at 1800. He was told that

his company was to support the attack of the 3rd battalion .rhich had the mission of securing KQIMAVERSCIEIDT and of driving on to seize, consolidate, and establish roadblocks in SCHIIDT. Next

he met Lt, Col, Flood, C. 0, of the 3rd battalion, td discuss plans for the attack. The tanks were to be employed as foll-;s: 2nd and 3rd

tank platocns support L and K companies respectively as they attacked KOpriMMRSC11IDT abreast, starting from the church at V9SSENACK; the 1st tank platoon follow at about four hundred yards, The tanks with the leading companies Twere initially to lead the infantry and assist in cleaning out any Germans who might occupy the nose of the ridge. Next, they planned to fire into the woods

while the infantry moved forward.

and finally, pull back to

high grcund from which they could fire directly into KO:IERSCHEIDT until the infantry reached the hill ton,

immediately north of that

Although the assaulting infantry companies intended to the 4 cease fire' to the tanks was

lay wire as they advanced,

to depend on visual means only. The attack Jumped off at 0700 3 November and wont almost as planned. Platoon leader, Lt. John J. Clark lost his

tank to a German mine. the high ground,

The rest of the tanks pulled back to

commend~d firing into KO0IVIRSCHEItDT as out-

lined, and lifted their fire when they were able to see the infantry moving in good formation up the high ground on the The tanks then took advantage

other side of the KALL RIVER. of

whct

dcfilade; was available and waited for word from the

engineers that the trail between VOSSET\ CP "and KO~j."IERSCHEIDT

was passable.

About 1700 wod came from Lt.

Ccl. Ripple that the e~ngHostrup in one of

ineers had reported the road clear,~ Capt.

his tanks reconnoi, ered the road and found that it impassable for tarsks. who relayed it

was still

After reporting this to Col. Ripple, the captain as sub-

to division headquarters,

.sequently ordered to relrain in place until morning.

He was

told that engineers would work on th,: road to KCN XJERSOHEIDT all night. The tanks remained in this position the rest of

the night during which time artillery and mortar fire hit several but caused no material damage. Three tanks were inoperative

by this time, however,

from other causes.

Lt. Clark's had hit

a mine, a second had thrown a track, and a third had bellied up on a sharp rocky ridge:. The fire received during thc night pre-

vented retrievers from coming to their aid,

At
EIDT.

daylight Company A again tried the tail

to KO'MVI EI RSCH-

Lt. Raymond E. Fleig leading the first platoon started

to move through the draw, but as he reached the entrance his tank hit a mine and threw a track. This was 24 hours after Lt. Fleig

the engineers had reported the road clear of mines.

reported to Capt. Hostrup 1ho told him to got his tank clear of the road

--

the company had to go

through.

Lt. Fleig then

began a battle with the terrain which resulted in a number of disabled tanks and denied tank support to the infantry in KODRfVERSCI-IEDT and SCHIIBvDT, tank around the first it In attempting to move his second slipped off the left side of the road At this point his platoon

and became mired in-the soft ground.

sergeant using the command tank as an anchor winched the remaining three tanks of the platoon past the command tank and removed the stuck tank. As soon as the lead tank wras clear Lt. Pleig took it tow~ard the river, being forced at intervals to back and turn the tank in order to negotiate th6 turns in the trail (Figure 4.)

At

the three switchbacks he

was

forced to direct the tank on

foot.

After crossing the stone bridge at the KM.AL he led his

tank on foot nearly to the top of the hill north of K0M4A4ERS",1:IDT. He made a brief visual recennaissaace of his route, mounted his

tank, and rode into to an,

arriving about 0730.

There he rep-

orted to the CO of the 1st battalion, 112th Regiment, stating that he expected the rest of his company up by noon. The colonel

told him that a German counterattack had driven part of the 3rd battalion out of SCHMIDT and asked him to take a position from ~rhi.ch he could support a further

withdrawal,

Lt. Fleig

was joined about 0930 by his platoon sergeant with two tanks.
All three tanks were placed

'in

prtial

defilade covering SCHIMIDT.

The Germans apparently no longer considered the defense at SCHMIDT effective and at 1100 counterattacked K0.D/iERSCHEILDr

with

infantry and tanks.

Lt. Fleig destroyed two M1ark IVs Fleig then

and the other two tanks accounted for a third.

moved to his left where the defenders were giving way and engaged and knocked out a Mark V, after

which

he returned to the

other American tanks and continued to fight with them until the attack was finally repelled at 1300. The tanks spent the remainder

of the afternoon firing at two pillboxes ws:st of SCHMIDT which the enemy was trying to reoccupy. Lt. Fleig had been instructed 112th Regiment,

not to fire into SCHMVIIDT as part of M Company, was still there,

about, 1500 these troops pulled out and Lt.

Fleig was ordered by the regimental CO to reain,where he was. The colonel promised him infantry ground support adding that he expected another counterattack and stat d that he felt if the tanks moved out of position, even for resupply, the infantry on the position would leave also, did not materialize, area.. The expected night attack

but artillery and mortar fire rained on the

During the time that Lt1. Fleig

was

engaged in KO4M. ER-

SC'IETT Capt. Hostrup was desperatley trying to reach the town with the remainder of Corpany A. to assist the ast of Lt. ?Ieig's He had walked down the trail pA"Atoun -in crossing the XLL.

The last tarnk of the platoon threw a track and became mired at the bottom of the draw. toon sergeant s tank led about this time Lt. Clark in his pla-

his

platoon forward.

Not knowing the

method which had boen used to

winch

the 1st platoon around the

dead tank at the trail entrance, Lt, Clark lost his tank off the road to the left when it tried to pass. Lt. Clark and the

sergeant dismounted to survey the situation when artillery fire killed the sergeant and wounded Lt. Clark. The next two tanks

using the two immobilized tanks as buffers went straight through on the road. Upon reaching the first bad curve the tank in

the lead slipped off the road to the left and threw a track. The next tank, about 150 yards behind, also slipped off the left of the road thrcwing both tracks. Thus there were three tanks chance of get-

blocking the YbSR to KOiMPERSCHEIDT with little ting maintenance vehicles near them.

Capt. Hostrup, later joined b;y personnel from his company maintenance section, worked on the vehicles and on the MR. The center tank of the three was of most concern to the workers. its tracks were replaced time after time only to have it ,roll a few yards and lose its tracks again. The tankers in the draw

also assisted the engineers in trying to dig bypasses out of the high right bank of the road to re-obpen it for traffic.

These banks were largely stone, however, and even blasting failed to produce satisfactory results. During the day and

night the work of the tankers and the engineers was continually interrupted by interdictory mortar and artillery fire and once the workers were delayed by the stream of infantry pouring back from SCHMIDT. Capt. Hostrup kept Col.. Ripple abreast of

the situation ard received the promise of additional engineers. By mid-night the tank battalion S-4* was on the road waiting to take a supply train through to KOP;,WXRSCHEIDT. Finally, acting

on orders from tank battalion headquarters and with daylight approaching, Capt. Hostrup and his men rolled the blocking-tanks imto t1h draw, paeritting the supply trains to go through. At 0430 Capt. Hostrup walked back up the road to his 3rd platoon position and stayed there until 0600 at which time he returned to the MSR. He learned that the engineers had

been able to get bulldozers in and that the road was passable. Returning to the 3rd platoon, he attached to the platoon the remaining two tanks of the 2nd platoon and followed this group toward the road entrance.. Lt. Payne, commanding the third platoon, halted to allow nine destroyers from the 893rd Tank

Destroyer Battalion to move through ahead of him.

Iittle dif-*

ficulty was experienced with the road, and IA. Payne had his platoon on the hill north of KOP DAERSCHEIDT by 0900. Capt.

Hostrup's tank developed engine trouble south of the KiLL and he radioed Lt. Fleig to take command of all tanks in the area pending his arrival..

Lt., Fleig with his three tanks helped the infantry

beat off a small tank-infantry counter-attack, which faltered after a German Mark VI had received seven direct hits from the

American tanks.

About 0900 the Germans counterattacked again, The-tank destroyers arrived in town Lt. Payne's

this time without tanks.

during the second attack which was also beaten off.

platoon then joined the defenders and the enemy counter-attacked regularly at about four-hour intervals during the day; none of the attacks were successful. At dark the tank destroyers went

to the rear to resupply, but the tanks again were ordered to remain in the-town. Capt. Hostrup's tank, again operative,,

was at the regimental C? where the regimental CO wanted it for communication purposes. The division commander's orders to

the regiment that night were to hold KOP,1iERSCHEIDT at all costs. At about 0330 a German counterattack cut the lightly defended MSR and the enemy roamed it practically at will, Part

of the tank battalion 5-4 section was cut off in KOfv1JvESCHEIJDr. The infantry regimental CP moved south into the town and joined the lst battalion C, At 0900 the Company

A tanks

protecting

the south. and southeast flanks of the town spotted another counterattack which wms effectively broken up by artillery, tanks, and TDs. The tanks remained on a forward slope all day

with the dug-in infantry but were forced to move continually in the face of direct fire and artillery from the excellent German positions near SCHMIDT, ~RSCHEIDT, (F070306) and

BERGSTEIN, consuming more of their now precious gasoline.

Then

night fell the tanks pulled in near the buildings of the town, Two of Lt. Fleig's tanks were sent to the rear, having received direct hits which jammed their turrets. Meanwhile, an unusual event was taking place. The tank

battalion commander was appointed commander of a task force to be, known as Task Force Ripple consisting of: (1) The 3rd bat-

talion, 110th Infantry Regiment (already weakened by fighting in the south of the division sector), (2) Company A, '707th Tank Battalion (already in KOIAdE SCHIDIY) (3) Company D (light tanks)

of the 707th, and (4) Company C, -93rd Tank Destroyer Battalion (also in KOlVliMRSCHEIDT but weakeed

by

3 or 4 destroyers),

plus one platoon of Company B, 893rd.

Company D 707th was on

a screening mission to the south and actually never joined the task force,, nor did the extra platoon

of

tank destroyers.

At 0245 on the morning of November the battered infantry battalion of Task Force Ripple crossed its line of departure GERM TER R.0-HURTGEN). Its mission was to pass through the emRSCHiEILDT, pick up the remainder

batted ._ defenders of XO1i

of the task force, and recapture SCihvrDT.

At daylight the weather, already cold,

disagreeable by rain.

was made more

The 3rd battalion 110th Regiment, under

Lt. Col. Ripple, TF comander, arrived at the woodlina north of K0MIVHSCHEIDT in time to witness a German counterattack on the town following a 30 minute artillery preparation., The size

of the enemy force was estimated as from one to two battalions supported by tanks, Estimates of the number of hostile tanks

vary from 6 to 30 (probably L-15), but the observers in many cases were bordering on hysteria. in about the town had had The American infantry dug

fire

poured into their foxholes from The enemy tanks ,ere Three One ser-

dominating positions for several days.

engaged by American tanks, Tns and infantry bazookas., TDs and two of the defending.'tanks were knocked out.

geant tank commander, Whose tank was shot out from under him, took over the crew of a TD thich had lost its commander and fought until that too was knocked out.. The defending armor

began a withdrawal to the north, losing two more tanks with thrown tracks. The infantry, battered and depleted by being Finally

under constant Lire for five days, was also leaving.

one tank and two TDs remained and supported Company C of the

112th Regiment, holding the woodsline north of KOMICIRSCHEIDT,

where the infantry battalion of TF Ripple was also.located. The one remaining tank was Lt. F18eig'., After dark Lt. Payne took a patrol forward and carried back ammunition from his own immobilized tank to be used by Lt. Fleig. The defenders of the

woodsline were required to beat off another counterattack during the night, This ragged force held the 7-oodsline during the following morning even though many of the troops had gone to the rear during the night. There was little activity on this day

but the recapture of SCHMIDT

was

out of the question,

About

1700 the force was ordered to withdraw north of the KILL and to destroy the remaining tanks and TDs. This terminated the

action of Company A of the 707th a a.fighting force in the HURTGEN

FOREST. The remaining men of :the company were led back

to

GER-

METER by Capt. Hostrup, Lt. Fleig and other officers. A had lost 15 off its 16 tanks and 32 men were missing

Company

The key to the failure of the forces at KOMMEASCHKIDT and SCHIDT port.

was

the failure

of

adequate and timely armored sup-

Because of the terrain and road net the armored support

depended in turn on engineer support.

7e

have seen that the

bulk of the engineer group attached to the 28th Infantry Division was engaged in fighting in VOSSENACK. Even those

who were assigned to make the 1M/SR passable for tanks

were

re-

quired to provide their owvn security rhich reduced the number of men available to work on the road. The lesson learnod here must

is that if armor is to-support the infantry operation it

be made certain prior to the operation the armor can move to the vital area when needed. The loss of SCHMIDT

was

a bitter blow to the Allied

cause, and .it-was not r oaaptured until ealw1y 145,. Logistical,Consideratio s In spite of the inadequate road net resupply of the 707th Tank Battalion became serious only in rc.7ard to Company A in KOMIESCBEIDT. Companies B and S withdrew their platoons

regularly from VOSSENACK and were able to effect resupply with relative ease. During the action aA KQ11IVERCHEIDT the battalion supply trains reached Company A twice: onoe on the night of 4-5 Novsn4br

and again on the follouwing night.

The trains c-onsisted largely and even

of 'weasels' which had been borrowed from the infantry,

these versatile vehicles had difficulties with the MSR since they were pulling trailers. The trailers had to be unhitched Two

and man-handled around the difficult turns of the MSR.

way traffic was out of the question even though this road was the only route of medical evacuation for the troops south of the KALL.. On both nights the troops of the tank battalion in

KOMIIERSHEIDT received gasoline, ammunition, rations, water,. and mail. On the second night part of the supply section in-.

oud ng the 5-4 'and Headquarters Company commander who had accompanied him were cut off

when

the Germans moved onto the

MSR.

They subsequently took part in the withdrawal described in

the account of Company A. It is interesting to note from a logistics as well as tactical point of vier that Company B fired sustained indirect fire missions for a period of four days under the direction of the 28th Division Artillery. fire at a time rationed. Evacuation of vehicles* presented an unusual problem in that all of them had to be moved or repaired under fire. Under They were able to keep up their

when

artillery ammunition to the division was

normal conditions the fighting has moved on when the maintenance crews conduct battlefield evacuation, but in the HUJRTGEN main-

tenance vehicles were vulnerable to the same enemy action that

took

toll of the tanks.

The situation which developed on the

MSR between VOSSENACK and KOMiVRRSCHEIDT demanded the presence of maintenance vehicles, but the condition of the road as well as hostile artillery made it almost impossible for these vehicles to be used. No mention is made in the combat interviews of the battalion medical detachment; therefore, it is assumed that evacThere

uation of the wounded was through infantry installations..

is an occasional reference to tanks evacuating their own mounded, and Lt, Col. Ripple admits that in the

withdrawal

from KOQDER-

SCEEIDT many -wounded were left behind because there was no way to get them out. Some were evacuated on improvised litters of their combat

carried by soldiers who stripped themselves, equipment to perform this -task.

Company A listed 32 men missing

in this withdrawal and the infantry battalion listed about 150. The experience in KOIVIERSCHEIDT is a grim commentary on the importance of clearing, maintaining, and strongly securing a main route of supply and evacuation. Although the ground

distance to division rear installations was relatively short, the defenders at SCHMIDT and KOVIERSHETDT were, in effect, divorced logistically from the division. The terrain in a large

measure was responsible for this, although the action of the enemy certainly played its part. Thus ancther bitter lesson

was learned on the battleground of the EURTGEN FOREST. C niusi on s The 707th Tank Battalion permanently lost 31 medium tanks in the WURTGEN FOREST; 15 from Company A, 7 from Company

B, and 9 from Company C. Most of these were due to mines or enemy shell fire. On the night of 8-9 November the battalion

reached its lowest ebb with-only nine effective medium tanks remaining. Company D, the Might tank company, was not committed.

In view of the vehicular losses the personnel casualties among the tankers seem rather light. The missing men Qf Company A

doubtless included some dead and wounded, however, aside from these only three men

were

known to be definitely killed, and Exact figures for company B

one officer and six men wounded.

are not available but after action reports indicate that they were rather jight. commanding officer), Cqmpany C had twro killed (including the one man missing in action, and one officer

and eleven men wounded. Fr'om the standpoint of combat, effectiveness the above figures of tank casualties are important as is the fact that during the action many tanks were immobilized by thrown tracks or soft ground. Since under the prevailing conditions there was

no gay of rapidly returning these tanks to action. they were just as ineffective as if they had been completely demolished.

At no time during the action at VOSSENACK,. at KOMMERSCHEIDT,. and particularly at SCHRJIDT did the infantry have the tank support to which it

wias

entitled.

The 707th Tank Battalion was employed entirely in support of infantry, either offensively or defensively, but never in a separate armored. action. Neither the battalion nor its

companies were at any time employed in mass against a given

objective.

Admittedly, this was precluded by the terrain to a

large degree rather than by.tactical decision. In the light of prk:sent doctrine and with the advantage of hind-sight, it appears that the tanks in support of the VOSSENACK defense could have been better employed as a counterattacking force and used only when it was necessary to repel a German attack. As they were actually used, they merely drew fire which

they could not accurately return and were of no material value to the infantry, except possibly for morale considerations. Again 1:ith the advantage of hindsight it appears that early efforts to clear the road betvieen VOSSENACK and KOMMERSHEIDT of mines, to improve it ongly

with

engineer iwork,

and to hold it

str-

,,ould have
It

paid immeasurable dividends to the 28th Infantry

Division. is apparent that the job of the tank battalion commander Although

attached to an infantry division is especially difficult,

he can recommend the employment of his tanks, his recommendations frequently may be rejected. He usually finds his companies and

platoons widely separated and can no longer effectively command his units. He must content himself with keeping contact with

them and with higher headquarters, trying to see that his companies are supported logistically, and trying always to be in the position where he is needed most. In many instances he is reduced

to acting as a relay station between his units and the supported

infantry or as a mere dispatcher,

In the European war many separate tank battalions made a distinction between whether they were attached to infantry units or in dirc et support, feeling that the latter allowed them more independence.

1hatever justification may exist for this

feeling, the only practical effect at company level is to weaken coordination. The new organization which finds the tank company

organic to the regiment and the tank battalion organic to the infantry division.should eliminate this problem. The conclusions drawn are based on fighting in an area characterized by thick woods, deep ravines, and poor roads and complicated by rain, mist, and snow. in VOSSENACK was not in the forest, Although the tank fighting the presence of the surroundThe forest limited

ing woods determined the nature of the action. visibility and maneuver, and found the tanks in vantage.

provided cover for the enemy AT weapons,

exposed positions to their great disad-

In the action at KOAMERSCHEIDT affected by the difficwoods and terrain decidedly influenced

ulties in clearing the IMSR, the outcome.

To say that tanks should not have been employed at all in the operations of the 28th Division would be an improper conclusion for time and again their work was effective against the enemy and assisted the supported infantry. concluded: (1) Rather, it is to be

Tanks should not occupy defensive positions in (2) Adequate routes for

clear view from dominating terrain.

movement, supply, and evacuation must be provided for tanks, (3) The inclusion of tanks in the infantry division and regiment

is mandatory for effective command and communication,

(4)

Armor

support was of material value to the":28th Infantry Division. The 28th Infantry Division succeeded in getting elements south of the KILL RIVER to KOMMERSCHEIDT and SCHMIDT ini its attemit
to seize the HOER RIVER DAMS. Because the

707th

Tank Battalion

could not get sufficient armored support forward over the inadequate route from VOSSENOCK TO KOMIRSCIGMIDT, the forces south

of the KLIL RIVER could not hold their gains, and were driven back across the river. On 11+ November,, the 8th Infantry Div-

ision in

VIII

C orps f zone to the south began a mtual ex..

change of zones with the 28th Division, -hich 19 November. VI).

wvas completed on

(For action of 8th Infantry Division see Chapter however, the VII Corps opened its major offen.

Meanwhile,

sive to break out of the ncrthern edge of the HURTGEN FOREST and seize crossings of the ROER in the vicinity of DUREN.

CHAPTER IV THE 745TH TANK BATTALION IN SUPPORT OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION 9th Infantry Division and First

Despite the failure of bbth the

the 28th Infantry Division to seize the ROER RIVER DAMS, Army directed that VII Corps continue its

plans for the major in the vicinity

745

offensive to seize crossings of the ROER RIVER DUREN. The 1st Infantry Division,

d'f

supported by the

th Tank zone

Battalion, was directed to make the main effort in

the corps

by breaking out of the northern corner of the HURTGEN FOREST and seizing crossings north of DUTREN. At the beginning of the month of November Tank Battalion was disposed in of AACEN repairing the for the capture of that ter 1944, the 745th

positions around the southern edge the violent fighting

damage incurred in city,

and hoping for a period of quiet afOn 8 Novem-

months of action with the 1st Infantry Division.

ber came the cheerless news that the 1st Division was to relieve immediately, the 9th Infantry Division on the western edge of the By

HURTGEN FOREST, and, as usual, the 745th was to support it. 10 November the Ist Division had closed in and as in assembly areas

stretchof

ing from VICHT to NAUSBACH,

past months, in the

elements

the 745th were teamed up with old friends The battalion headquarters, 16th Infantry Regiment.

1st Division.

companies A and D, were with the the 18th Regi16th, each battalion

Company B accompanied In the

ment and Company C the 26th Regiment.

had a light tank pla t oon and a medium tank platoon, and through-

out the 18th and 26th Regiments each battalion had one medium tank platoon only. attached to it, In addition, the 1st Division had

the 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion, which was

disposed throughout the division in generally the same manner as the tank battalion.1 To further augment the division, the

47th RCT of the 9th Infantry Division remained in its sector when the 9th was relieved and continued to fight under 1st Division command.2 Since the days of NORlMANDY the 745th Tank Battalion had been constantly attached to the 1st Infantry Division. Its vet-

erans had seen almost every type of fighting that men and machines were called upon to face in Europe-. hedgerow fighting, pursuit across open country, attacks upon fortified positions, and the Sometimes their

tedious mopping up operations of city fighting.

arrored punch seemed to be the spark that kept the 1st Division rolling, and at other times it seemed that the tanks served block

only to draw fire upon their protecting infantrymen, their roads, and rip up their telephone lines.

The brief per-

iod 16 November to 7 December 1944,

saw examples of all the

above types of fighting compressed into the narrow space of a few miles of village spotted forest on the western edge of GERMANY.

Combat Operations With knowledge gained from unhappy experience in previous

assaults in the HURTGEN FOREST, the First United States Army laid careful plans for a new assault that would sweep to the ROER RIVER. Artillery was massed in support from every unit under

First Army control;.plans were laid for a formidable bombing along the whole front by more than 2500 bombers from United States and British air forces 1 and ground forces were carefully briefed until all was in recadiness, D-Day was set for 15 Yovember, and for six

cold, miserable days the tankers and It finally came, wet,

infantrymen

sat and waited,

cold, and overcast, It

but at 1100 the weather

cleared and the bombing began. 3

was one of the largest pre-

attack bombardments yet employed in front of an arry, and the part

of it which fell in the lst Division zone seemed enough to churn the forest and hills into rnbble;The towns of

H.AKICH and

GBESSEYICH were saturated, and the woods on all sides were splintered and smoking when H-hour cone at 1245. covered in dix V.) As the smoke of the bombing cleared away, the 16th Regi(For the actions see Map 3, Appen-

the followiing pages of this chapter,

ment

moved out of SCHVENHUT1I'E toward FrAICH with its

attached

tanks following.

Due to terrain obstacles andl the limited fields

of fire the tanks of Company A, 745th, struggled forward with their assigned infantry battalions without firing.4 At the sane

time the 47th RCT jumped off from the woods south of GRSSEICH with that town as their objective,. 'lith them were the attached

tanks of Company A, 746th Tank Battalion, which accompanied the leading elements of the infantry in this pore suitable terrain. The third element of the attack was the 26th infantry Regiment which attacked northeast through the woods from SCHYMECtTT with

the mission of seizing the high ridge about one thousand yards

away.

Company C 745th Tank Battalion was unable to be of much

assistance to them in this steep, wooded terrain, but did accompany them, breaking their own trails as they advanced. The rest

of the 1st Division remained in positions east of VICHT awaiting developments. Each of the assncI ting regimentst tank des-

troyer companies from the 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion remained in its attack position.
5

High above the towns of GRESE1ITICH and H.1ICH, commanding observation into these objectives and all the approaches to them,
was enemy-held HILL

232 (K996446) which allowed the Germans to

In addition,

rake the whole valley with accurate artillory fire. in spite of the massive bombing,

in the tons of GRESSENICH and

IUICH

the enemy soldiers came out of the cellars and foxholes

and quickly manned the defenses ;and the attacking troops were met with heavy fire as soon as they approached their objectives. Company A, 746th, attacking HAIViICH, lost two of its tanks under

the heavy artillery and direct fire which came in on them as soon as the attack jumped off, One of these tanks was the pla-

toon leader's, and of its crew he was the only man left unwounded. 6 Under this shelling the infantry attack slowed and In

finally stopped after reaching the near edge of the town.

GRESSENICH, almost the same, thing happened to the 47th Infantry, and the 26th Regiment with its supporting tank company made only a short advance toward its objective.

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The following day,

17 November,

the Air Force again

bombed in frrnt of the First Army with tremendous formations, and the lst Division concentrated seventeen battalions of artillery on HILL 232 (K996446) before the attack was resumed. This time Company A 745th accompanied the leading elements of the 16th Regiment on the right side of the SCHVEHTTE.HAMICH Road while a platoon from the 634th TD Battalion advanced along the road, Inside HaMICH the Tfs and the accoml-snying

infantry took one side of the street"*file and their infantry took the other. center of town before it

J -the Oofpany-A

tars

The

attack reached the

was halted by a ceterdined enemy In

counterattack launched from the northeast end of the town. this first counterattack one tank knocked out an enemy selfpropelled gun at the ed of the townis main street, but a German Mark V moved from behind a house not sixty yards away and shot through the frontal armor fore it could fire again.

of

the Company A tank be-

The infantry worked up close enough

to hit the Mark V and it withdrew, apparently undamaged. After darkness fell the Germans c'unterattacked again with five tanks and about two hundred infantrymen, firing flares The artillery and their men

and supported by heavy artillery concentrations, set fire to one of the Company A tanks and one TD flames lit the whole areai7

The 16th Regiment ordered its

under cover and called in artillery,

time fire frem Its own supporting

but this only slowed up the fighting,

and

made the

tank action of both forces more important, groping its

One of the Mark Vs by the blazing

way in the darkness only dinly lit

American tanks, drove within eight yards without seeing it,

of

a Company A tank

The gunner soundlessly swung his turret

and fired at the Mark V at this point blank range destroying it.8 Four separate counterattacks were launched within RAMICH

during the night, and in the mixed up fighting the Gernan and American losses were about equal, One of the Panther tanks

fell in a bomb crater during the darkness, gving the Air Force credit for another kill were safely in their bunks in althr~ugh by this time the pilots ngland.. The bazooka ter.ms of

the 16th Regiment also managed to

destroy one tank, while one

Company A lost two more M--4s to enemy bazooka teams an

of the TDs was set on fire either by mortar fire or hand grenades.9 Despite the stubborn resistance

at

every house,

and

the numerous counterattacks, at daylight the next, 19 Novem: ber, the 16th Infantry Regiment held most of MAMICH anid was

preparing to move to the northeast and finish clearing the t own, In GRESSNICH the

47th RCT and its

supporting tanks

from the 746th Tank Battalion were engaged in a sir.ilar action, but with less success, At daylight on the Lth they held

only half the town while enemy artillery fire directed from HILL 232 poured in on them, Company 0, 745th, with the 26th Regiment continued to

have more difficulty with the terrain than with the enemy and

was unalb.e to give much support',

The infantrymen advanced through

the woods le ving what roads and trails thore were for the use of the tanks, but- the enemy had expected. were well defended just that and the roads

A roadblock and1 wire, covered by mortar

and. machine gun fire stopped the advance of the tanks on 17 November and there was no way to byr-pass in the narrow, wooded Val, ley and the tanks could only wait until the 26th infantrymen advanced beyond. it, The first two days of the First Armiy assault showed there would be no easy ad-

that despite the hope~s and plans,

vances to the ROER, but instead, a continuation of the slow, costly struggle, In the 1st Division zone the advance continued,

but even the attacking units had so little room for maneuver that it is understandable that a whole regiment and of the 7)45th Tank Battalion were not employed day1,ss On I9 November the Company A tanks which had not entered a portion

in the first

the town opened fire from the woods southeast of HAMICH, using
fuze delay the town.

75 m HE on the houses in the enemy hold part of

After fifteen minutes of this firing the white flags
was in the hands

began to appear and. soon the rest of HAMICH of the 16th Regiment. disseminated, town, Then,

as soon as plans could be made and

the attack on HIL, 232 jumped off from the edge of

In the words of Lt.

Willian

K. Sanders,

an officer of

the 745th:

,,..It was the sweetest example of infantry-tank cooperation that I have ever seen. A medium tank platoon of the 745th, a light tank platoon of the same battalions and a destroyer platoon from the 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion moved out from HAMICH, carrying as many infantrymen from the second battalion of the 16th Infantry as possible on their decks. They advanced up the gradual slopes of HILL 232, firing at the ridge line and likely German positions and observation posts as they moved. There was but not enough low underbrush on this part of the hill, up the halfway About tank movement. with to interfere the infantry dismounted and pushed ahead on foot hill while the tanks continued their fire at the dug in German An enemy selfpositions and the ridge line in general. kept the tanks (016446) of vicinity in the gun propelled in the same tank an enemy and time of the most fire under However, tanks. A the Company one of out knocked vicinity the infantry advanced to the crest of the hill without a

loss.
At this instant the German artillery opened up on the American -tanks, firing high explosives and some large caliber jellied gasoline shells. -These shells made intense fires wherever they struck, and to avoid tank losses and to avoid more of this fire on the infantry, the tanks moved about twvo hundred yards to positions back down the hill give out of German observation but where they could still direct fire support to the infantry on the ridge line. On top of the hill the 2nd battalion infantrymen were separated from the Germans by a low embankment about twenty Here both feet wide behind which the Germans were dug in. sides tossed hand grenades at each other, but the tankers could see every German who showed himself to toss a grenade 75's at single Germans, scorinT direct and often fired t'eir hits a few yards in front of their own infantry. 1 0 About this time, late afternoon of 18 November, a heavy

concentration from our own 3rd Armored Division Artillery fell astride the lines on top of the hill. Fortunately, it caused

no casualties among our o~n men, but the damage to their morale can be easily imagined.ll At the same time the Germans launched

a strong counter-attack with about two battalions of infantry

supported by tanks.

The German tanks remained in place about

eight hundred yrds to the east and fired direct support for
the counterattn cking infantry who were partially successful and managed to drive the 2nd battalion rrom the top of the hill and halfway down the western slope. The hillton>changed

hands several times during the next two days, but the tan'ks played no great part in the fighting. After a lull in the fighting on 19 November, Division assault began anw on 20 November. the 1st

The 16th Infantry

attacked the high ground east of THAVITCH with six tanks of Company A, carrying troops and leading the advance. They

crossed the open ground on the outskirts of the town, firing their guns at the houses and the ridge line to their front as they went until they reached cover where the infantry dismounted and pushed ahead on foot. A few hundred yards farther east a

German tank attempted to change position in order to fire on the American tanks; a P-47 pilot caught the movement from above and set it burning with rockets.

In several cases we were unable to destroy the enemy tanks firingat us from long range but were able to cause them to move. Wnhen they s'-howed themselves by movement, Wkhenever the Corps P-47s got therawith rockets. our weather was good there were P-47s in the air over us, but much of the work they did was out of our observation, and we learned of it only when we overran tanks and SP guns that they had ianocked out. 12

Air

While
lth,

the -16th .iegiment fought east from HMICH, the 745th,

moved

supported by Company B,

in to attack . ENAU

(F015445)'; in the woods to the east the 26th regiment attacked SC'TLOSS LAUiFENBERG (P029445), with its Company C tanks still hampered by limited fields of fire and narrow muddy trails. One

element of this last group moving down the road which branched
west toward the objective of the 18th, TVENAU, lost two tanks to the Panzerfaust fire of unseen Germans. the Still further west

47th

RCT,

9th Division,

continued the struggle to clear

GRES SEN IT.1

Between 20 and 27 November the 16th Infantry and its

accompanying tanks advancod painfully through the woods and

the muddy fields until itz advance was stopped by the fire from German troops of the 3rd Parachute Division holed up in GUT 1E4RB.ERICH (F020475).
1n

nteresting use of the tanks took place

when a battalion of Gerrfin Irifantry held out in ROSSLERSHOF

CASTLE (P015473)
and it

ivas

planned to use tanks to shioot or The Germans could

smash down the gates through the castle walls.

not fire effectively fromn the castle walls except with machine guns and small arms, so six tanks of Corrpany the

attacked across

muddy,

brush covered fields with accompanying infantry, but In spite of the Sullivan, jumped from

the tanks bogged down almost immediately. hostile fire the platoon leader, his t-ank and aided in Lt J. 7.

placing logs, towing one tank with another,

and guiding drivers until the tanks finally reached the castle

where in

traditional. cavalry style they, stormed through the

gates with the remaining infantry firing in all directions and

forcing the defenders to surrender. 1 3 In front of the 18th reg-ment and its B Company tanks

SCHOEITHAL (F023459) fell, but a strong German counter-attack from L1,NGE RETJE recaptured the high ground to the north, HILL 203, (F022468) and defended it strongly. Further to the east

cxdepleted regiment of the German 47th Volksgrenadier Division held out against the attack of the 26th regiment and its C Company tanks until the night of 24 November,
-withdrew,

when it

finally

suffering f;xw losses,

and

at long last the enemy was

driven out of GRESSEWLCH 'bythe 47th RCT which went on to take SCHLOSS PIRENZFJIWERG (0l8490) by 27 November.

The Germans atsparently attached considerable importance to HILL 203 ini the zone of the 18th infantry regiment, but it

had to be taken before an attack could be launched against LYNGERIWEHE so on 27 November the 18th attacked. The enemy had

sited anti -tank gns

and machine guns in the heavy stone-walled

and

houses that covered the southern aoprocches to the hill,

they took their toll rtf the advancing tanks shooting three of them

as

they moved wi -h the infantry on the narrow road.1 4

wiihen the defenders saw.the attack launched on HILL 203 they suan'oncd a counter-attack by troops of the 2nd German Parachute Division from LANGERIA3HB, but it moved in behind the hill just

as the full fury of thie 1Sth's supporting artillery fire fell and was almost destroyed. The defenses of the hill broke, and

close behind the retreating Germans the infantrymen of the 18th and-their tanks rolled into LANGEREHE. the east on the SarC day, 27 November, Farther to

the 26th regiment

attacked a town, JU.NTGERSDORF (F040467) which finally allowed

the supporting t
ankjs

of Company C to give them worthwhile support. and their direct

At last their fields of fire for the tanks,

fire added to the heavy,artillory preparation helped the 26th to drive the 3rd battal-cn, the town. 3rd German Parachute Division from

However not all of Company C fared so well --

almost

at the sane time that the attack on JU'NGERSDORF was succeeding, the platoon wtith the -2ad battalion of the 26th, approaching Major.

19MODE (F048452) was hiving what the, battalioon executive, Howell H. Heard, oalle;j "the M1ERODE was approachbl-; by

sorriest experience of the war". type of vehicle from the German from the American controlled the JT7hen the attack was

any

side but by only one narrox, side. Nevertheless it

soggy trail

had to be taken, for it

main road net in that sector of the forest.

launched, the C Comptaty platoon was to advance down the narrow forest trail the woods. and the

'nfantry

battalion was to attack through

In advancing down the muddy, tree-lined trail the

third tank in the plh,toon colurm! overturned, complrtely blocking the trail, cutting o-,f the two tanks be!hind it. Thus the tank

attack consisted of two tanks.

WNhen

they reached the town one

of them received a mortar round on its rear deck which set fire

-1 tuba

At
NAr_ TNEAURLY IMvPASSMBLE QU: i
FCRPFkS T S,,CA'DS

i [IcE

to the bedding rolls and the tarpaulin there.

The crew

decided to go back into the woods to put out the fire and when they withdrew, the other tank pulled out also, and when
2 5

the infantrymen reached the town they had no tank support

At

this instant the 2nd Battalion, 3rd German Parachute

Division counter--attached and cut off the two infantry companies in NMRODE. With their MiSR blocked, no tank support, and no

hope o.f reinforcement, following day.

they were forced to surrender the

There was some feeling that

the

tankers had

friled them in turning back without thle little

orders~ but considering

strength of the German counter-attack, this probably made difference. The stubborn resistance of the enemy had cost the 1st

Division heavily, but it cost the defenders even more.

First

Army reports that by the end of November the 1st Division and
its supporting troops had destroyed the fighting effectiveness of, the 104th rerman Regiment, the 47th Volksgrenadier Division,
and the German 12th Infantry Division.

It is

not claimed that but they had

these were full strength,

first

line divisions,

been determined, effective fighting forces. 1 6 On 1 December the 1st Division line paralleled the ROER RIVER,, running from LUTGER',1EHE through JUJNGERSDORF to
NRODE,

with no major terrain obstacles in

front of them.

The Germans held o-lat in

RODE, successfully blocking the roads

to the northeast.

Supporting the defenders of ITTR.ODE was the

artillery of the 3rd Parachute Division and the 47th Volksgrenadier Division, altogether a formidable array when combined with the

terrain obstacles on the 1st Division side which limited the attack to foot troops, supported only by what could be hnndIn the face of these obstacles the

carried through the woods.

26th regiment made no further attempt to take the town and the 1st Division shifted its attack to the north, In front of the 16th regiment and its tanks from Company A the enemy had w ithdrin from, GUT iVRIBERICH when LANGERhE fell, for and had retreated into LUHEvIM (F037490). In preparAtion

the attack on this town the 16th lined up a.ll of its tanks TD company, A, 634th. The attack

both light ^nd medium, and its

jumped off wthout artillery preparation, and the tanks reached the edge of town almost before the Germans knew what was happening,
Wlhen they did,

the inevitable counter-attack came from ECHTZ,

(F070484),
it before it

but the 1st Division artillery, poised waiting, destroyed had crossed the open ground between ECHTZ and LUCHEM, German activity in the 1st Divimore than

'Vith the loss of LUCHE,

sion Tzone alost patrol their sion.was in

cea ed,

and bohth the -foices did little

fronts

from then until

December when the

lst

Divi-

relieved by the 9th Division and withdrew to a rest area taking with it the 745th Tank Battalion and the 634th

BELGIUM,

Tank Destroyer Battalion.

F
ii t
A4f

JU
'l~~iTE VIII AFTER 1 DECEI."'ER 1944,
ON
ZHE

TI'-{KVEF WAS LITTLE ;TORE T'AN PATROL

,r,! T

~ I

1ST

DM01011

F-

Conclusions The 745th Tank Battalion had behind it months of intiThe

mate association with the men of the 1st Infantry Division. same platoons had accompanied the same after day across Europe, hardly have been better,

infantry .battalions day

and their state of training could

At

the opening

of the battle in the

HTJRTGEJN FOREST they stood at one hundred percent strength in men and equipment. True there was a sprinkling of green rethe tank crews, but not enough there could

placements here and there in

to affect the status of the battalion.

Altogether

hardly have been a better unit selected for a test

of tanks

in support of infantry in the difficult terrain of the HiURTGEN FOREST. The assistance given by the

745th

Tank Battalion to

the operations of the lst Division was not great when measured in terms of strong points taken or considered in ncemy destroyed, but when that they had

the light of the nullifying effect

upo,n enemy tanks,

and the encouragement that their presence

gave the division foot soldier their value was far out of proportion to the destruction they wrought. It is plain that the tanks were used whenever there was

the

slightest chance that they could be of any value, to the The noise

extent that at times they were a definite hindrance. they miade and the blocking of the trail

at IRODE certainly conbut else-

tributed to the failure of the assault on that town,

PER~SONNEL LOSSES
Killed in
ct

..........

on {.
.

. .

3 79

Wlounded in Aiction.........

T1LNK LOSSESS
Cause

Total3
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. ... .

Mdines..

Direct F1ire Weapons (A~T guns, tanks, panzerfausts, bazookas),..........,...........................

Artillery or
M~ortars... ............ ",..

. O1lO*

Terrain

(Mvud

or obstacles).....
*

...

Mechanical Failure...,......... SAll but two recovered.

**Varied

i.w

..

from day to day; average number

four

tanks.

I'igure .5.

Losses of 745th Tank Battalion during the period of fighting in the HUXRTGEN FOREST 16 November- 6 Decem-

ber' 1944.o

17

where in

terrain equally as difficult their assist^.nce ranged

from slight to considerable. Nichols,

In the words of Lt Col Wallace J.

"in spite of the

the 745th Tank Battalion coirn der, woods,

hilly terrain,

limited road net,, and mud, the tanks were

employed successfully." The use of tanks in small units preceded by infantry or closely surrounded by them was unquestionably the only practical way in which they could have been employed. Their mobility and

armor protection meant nothing on the forest trails, but their machine guns and the fire of their cannon as

assault

guns were

encouragement to the infantry that sometimes carried the attack

throughe

It

is

true that durinr the battle the 745th could count

more tanks out of action due to terrain difficulties than due to enemy action. The rem aining ones proved that regardless of how little advantage may be

difficult the terrain may seem, and hom

taken of the tank's basic m.orits, we must have them there first and in greater numiibers than the enemy.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

1

After Action Report F290, 745th Tank Battalion, November, TF4, p. 10. in Danger Forward,

2I H. Peterman, Hurtgen Forest as I Saw It Albert Love Enterprises, 1947. p. 176,

3

Ibid, p. 177.

4 Lt.

Col. "Nallace J. Nichols, Battalion.

Comnmanding Officer,

745th Tank

5 AftcrAction

Report 464, 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion,

p.

November,
6 Lt

1944.

23.

Col Wallace J. Nichols. 2nd

7 Combat

Interview - 5 23 May, 1945, Maj. Kenneth Hechler, Information and ,Historical Section. p. 1. p. 2

8 Thid,

9 mmi,

p.2.
K. Sanders, ptn. ldr., Co. A, 745th Tank Bn.

1OLt. ffillia.
1 10p.
12

Cit.,

Co- bat Interview /$5. K. Sanders. Combat Interview #,5.

Lt 0p.

William

13

Cit.,

14Lt Col Wallace J. Nichols..

1 5 Ibid.

(Conflicting statemeont is Combat Interview

#5Lwhich

states that tanks turned bacic at woods edge without reaching town.)

16Op. Cit., Danger Forward, p. 181.

1 7 After

Action {Zeports 273 and 290, and December, 1944.

745th Tank Bn.,. November

CHAPTER V THE 70TH TA17K BATTAL1 O7 Iii SUPPORT OF TtE 4TH IITFYRY DIVISIO1

Supporting the major effort of the 1st Infantry Division in the VII Corps zone was the 4th Infantry Division,

d FOREST to protect the south which fought through the HURTGM, flank of the Corps and to seize crossings of the RODR at DUT and south thereof. and its

The presence of the 4th Division

attached 70th Tank Battalion

was

a well-guarded

secret since they were to fight through a portion of the forest where no

American

troops had attempted an offensive, reached SCHBVETHUTyE ti~o months

since the 47th Regiment previously.

The immediate objective assigned the division by VII Corps was to seize the main IFJRTGET-DU3 T ROAD, would facilitate the capture of the crossing of the ROER RIVER. which

ROER dams and a

Early in

-November

General

Eisenhower had told all commanders in "This is

the 4th Division,

the big push of the war to break the German's back.

It

is entirely conceivable that the ra~r this attack is successful."'

will

be over by

Christmas if

On 16 November 1944 the 70th Tank Battalion, attached to the 4;th Infantry Division, pushed off into what w,,as to prove its most gruelling battle in Europe. To under-

stand vrhat kind of unit the 70th was, see wrrhat experience it

it

is

necessary to

had prior to JIMBTGT. Africa as a

The 70th Tank Battalion had fought in light tank battalion. In November
19

43

it

was transferred. and. From

to Thgland., redesignated as a medium tank battalion, attached to the 4th Division for amphibious training. Englanl the battalion went to Normandy on D-Day, and finally to the HURTGCz FOREST still Division. The unit entered the HRTGT

across France,

accorpanying the 4th FOREST a tough,

battle-seasoned corps.

outfit with high morale and. good esprit de

The experience of the 4th Division in

the EURTGET

FOREST

Operation was characterized by severe fighting and The troops of the

extreme weather conditions. that all routes,

4th

found

fire breaks and trains were heavily mined Added to the

and covered. by automatic weapons fire. casualties suffered in

combat wore large numbers of troops Companies which were brought

made helpless by trench foot.

up to strength by replacements would. be found two days later

with less than 50

strength remaining.

Objectives were
25 or

sometimes taken by companies consisting of 20, In addition to combat in the forest' it the division to construct its zone,

45

men.

was necessary for -a road net within

and

maintain

hampered by mud and unceasing artillery fire.

F" yt ii3A iff

~ ~umm~
"-r

'i

-j

7L
S ~ ~ -.'-~ ~--. ~ -I ~.-

C~i

.i."

,L

"

'-

-i~

-"

if7
.-

~qA.

....

alo,

-ft

--

40 ,r0A

moba

PL C T

FIX

IT IVA T SETQO NE CE 2S D SAYE FO R

TH E 4TH ' IN '_;,N TRY DIV IS ION TO CCN ST

" '1'CP

Planning the Attack (1-S 6ov) Dispositions of the 4th Division at this time are shown in Map 3, Appendix

V.

The plan of attack celled for the 22nd

the 8th Regiment to be committed on the left, Regiment to to

.e tho center, and the 12th Regiment the right

flank.

The 8th w,,ras given the mission of assisting the

advance of the 1st Infantry Division on the north and of keeping contact with that division; the 12th had orders to attack north and northeast and envelop hIRTGM'T and then close in on the 22nd Regiment and continue the attack to the 22nd occupied a three-mile gap between

the northeast;

the south boundary of the 8th Regiment end the front line of the 12th. Because of the rugged terrain and the strength

of the enemy defenses it iwTas impossible for one regiment to attack on this broad front, so the 22nd was to penetrate sector, seize GPLOSSRAU,

on a narrow front in the center of its then turn northeast to GY. in

As planned this would result

the 8th and 22nd Regiments converging on the ROM? near while the 12th covered the right rear. The German front line crossed the division north bound-

DTRM

ary 1000 yards east of SCHT

MWTE and ran due south to the

salient occu7pied by the 12th Regiment north of GMPLP TER.

The Germans had been fortifying their position for two months

rand

had built a rigid line of barbed wire ad Obstacles,

extenbunkers,

sive minefields across the entire front.

A
7

All

"A

-.

..

I.

21r

*'-

Ut'.

VA',

-;

,-

--

j -' "kj

v"~
A

,.

, -

' !rt

.,,

a'4r} [ c

-J
.A'---------~4 --

I-

., 101'1-

-,>-T'r"

r'

,J 'T)

Srr

-m-'

and

entrenchments had been built up in the south to a depth

of one mile Kid- in the north portion to a depth of two miles. Initially facing the 8th and. 22nd Regiments w..ere about eight German battalions of the 275th Inf entry Division reinforcd., A number of reserves were available to the enemy,

and the bulk of twrro other divisions and elements of still others were encountered. cluring the course of the battle. Nearly all of those were of poor to mediocre quality. During the planning phase the Anaerican front line in
the sector of the 4th Division was held on the north by elements of the

47th

RCT of the 9th Infantry Division and on There was

the south by the 299th Engineer Combat Battalion.

no action along the front except for harassing artillery

fire.
ember,

Field Order C5j3,

4th Infm-ntry Division, dated 7 Nov-

announced that the division would pass. through these

units on the line and attack with the 1st Infantry Division on its left

to secure crossings of the BOER at DUPLT and

south thereof. Everything

was

in

readiness by 10 ioverrber but the Every

attack was dependent

on favorable flying weather.

effort
attack;

was made to preserve the secrecy of the impending therefore, lines of departure for the regiments were Six long days were spent started.

1000 yards w,,est of the enemy lines. in waiting for the weather

to clear before the attack

Despite this long wait there was no air action on the enemy defenses in front of the division as occurred in front of the 1st Division. woods It w,,ras

felt

that

an

air attack in such dense

as

fLaced the 4th would be impractic ble.

Initial Penetration by the 8th Regient (15-19 Novomber) On Wednesday 15 Novomber, final plans for the attack were completed by the 70th Tank Battalion which had been ordered to make the following attachments: Company

and two

platoons of Co~any D were attached to the 8th Regiment; Ccmpany C and one p1 ^toon of Compr.ny D wore attached to the 22nd Regiment ; and Comp,-a-iy B was attached to the 12th Regiment axA the assault gun platoon was attached to the 29th Field Artillery Battalion. D-DnT and cold. battalion
2

was

lb Jovemlber 1914.

The weather

was

clear

At 0115 a ceded message

received at the tank The lst

OP

indicated that H-hour would be 12?45.

platoon of Corplany D moved out to join the 2nd Batt ?lion of the 8th Infantry Regiment, This regiment was attacking in

colunn of battalions, 2nd battalion loading without artillery preparation.

1,1R

The point selected for penetration of the enemy

was just south of the east-west road which formed the

The avenues of approach

south boundary of the ist Division. were fire breaks

which

were filled with concertina wire In front

eight to ten feet high and heavily booby-trapped. of the wire the ground was sprinkleod

with

Schu mines and

covered "by machine g'un and Mortar fire.

The attack started with infantry leading, and

tanks of the first canalized platoon followed

the

as support but wore

to the firc broak,

When the infantry was hold up fired.

by the concertina wire the tank platoon moved up and on the enemy covering positions. track, and

One of the tanks threw a

in trying to mak e repairs the crew suffered three Other crewmen of the were wounded

casualties from hostile mortar fire.

tak platoon attempted to evacuate these men and them selves by the murderous fire.

The inf antry wras forced to

Thus, the first

dig-in and the tanks withdrew to resupply. platoon of Corpafny D had the first

of mvany casualties to the HTLRTGM'T FO EST.

be suffered by the 70th Tank Battalion in

During the morning other tank platoons moved out in support of their resective infantry bttalions. first day of battle the assault During this

gun

platoon fired as a battery by FOs of

471 rounds of 105-nm; the targets bei ng designated the 29th Field Artillery Battalion.

The 903rd Tank Destroyer

Battalion, which. had been attached to the division on November, was relatively inactive.

Because of the poor roads

and heavy woods the destroyers were unable to get close enough to the front lines to give any support. On the second clay the 1st platoon Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, moved out

at

0930 to support the advanc

of the 2nd.

Battalion,

9Sth

Infantry Reginnt,

in continuation of its attack.

The infantry was still held up by triple concertina wire covered by heavy fire in addition to anti-personnel mines and booby traps. The medium tanks of this platoon made little better

progress than had, the light tanks of Coirpany D en the previous day; they wore stopped cold by heavy enemy fire. However, the

TDs of the 903rd were able to render some support to the infnntry. On the third day, the 1st platoon of Conpany A iwas still in support of the sarme infantry battalion 76 -m I and fired

into the tangle of wire holding up the infantry and

then pushed on across it with the infantry following in the tank tracks. Considerable progress was made. An unexpected

ally appeared when a P-47 passing overhead joinod in the

battle.

The tanks had their panels on display and the plane This caused some

seeing the situation strafed the enemy lines.

demoralization among the enemy and enabled the tanks and infantry to advance several hundred yards to breach the defensive 115R.

penetration of almost 1000 yards had been the advance could

made on the third day of the battle; however,

not be pressed further until the penetration had been broadened, With this in mind, the 8th Regiment decided to hold up and reorganize its positions. Two battalions were placed in the

line wi try one held back in reserve. The next several days the 70th Tank Battalion spent

in

slugging at tho enemy.

Small

vances wrere maide

daily in

most

of the sectors assigned the infantry regiments, but it The tanks and. Ds continued to

was tough going all tho way.

give the infantry all possible sup-?ort commensurate with the poor read net and small number of passable trails. Supply and resupply was period the only means F lugnntic task. During one

of

getting gasoline and ammunition to An interesting rnd ef-

Cornrany C was by the use of a weasol.

fective wray of getting fresh water tc. the tank companies was the use of three large 250 gallon water tanks captured from the Ycnzis. They -ere mounted on one

~2~ ton truck which mde

The

a &daly run to each corpany with the ration truck.

-'~

corrnany kitchens wrere kept forward with the conpnnies during

the entire oper,tion.3

Personnel casualties were evacuated gere

throuh the infantry battalions with which the tanks working at the time.

Attack of GROSSIRZU by the 22nd Infantry

On D-Day the 22nd Infantry Regiment in been assigned the task of capturing GROSSHAiU, many days of hard slew fighting, the center had (F052591) After

on 23 Noverber the

rogiment

reached the edge of the woods facing the town and here con.solidated their positions. On 24 November replacements were

received bgring_in; the regim:-ent up to strength, and it was de-

cided to attack the town of -ROSST{AU

on the following clay.

The

regimental cornder desired surprise in his attack ordered the 3rd Battalion of th@

and, therefore,

egimnent

to; envelope from the north w ithout artillery preparation.

The 1st battalion
rwas

to cover the left rear west of GROSSHAU,

while the 2nd iwas to make a secondary attack to the edge of the -goods southwest of the towzi. Company C, 70th Tank Battalion, was to support the 3rd Battalion in its attack, 22nd since 16 November, This company had been working with the On Saturday morning, 25 November, Captain

Lewis Taynton in command of Company C, moved his tanks into positions to support the attack. The Germans greeted their of

movement into the attack position with heavy concentrations artillery and mortar fire which caused many casulties among the infantry.

At 1000 the 2nd tank platoon had to find a new

attack position to the northwest since the infantry company

-which had been with them was reduced to four men.

At 1115

the 13 remaining tanks and the 3rd platoon of Company C, 803rd TD Battalibn jumped off in the attackoa GROSSEAU. sciheduled to be a coordinated attack, This was

but because of the

terrific vol-ume of artillery fire very few of the infantry were able to clear the edge of the woods. The tank company

commander reported. seing only six men and one infantry officer 4 The terrain botween the woods and the town was open,rolling ground and almost immrn.ediately the tanks and TDs (employed as tanks) were fired upon by well placed anti-tank guns. Six of

the tanks and two destroyers were knocked out by direct hits. The remarning destroyers and tanks withdrew to the edge of the forest, but there the rearward movement w^s stopped by fallen trees

which

artillery and anti-tank guns had knocked dowvn. in front, end sometimes in rear

Trees fell across the top, of the tanks.

In the opinion of the company commander every

tank was eventually hit either by direct or indirect fire of some kind. All the armor was forced to stay in the edge

of the woods until nightfall when the trees were cleared away. One more tenk was lost during the night by a hit from a large caliber artillery shell.
M'reanwhile Company C of the 709th tank battalion

(which

had arrived from V Corps the day before) sunmorted the limited objective attack of the :,nd Battalion southwest of GROSSHAI. The battalion secured its objective late in the afternoon.

Since th-:ere was no longer nny c'rance of a surprise attack on GROSSFATI, the village was shelled. cided to wait until the 12th Regiment and sion (V
r'orps)

The regiment dethe 5th Arored Divi-

came abreast.

The regimental commander ordered

tanks and destroyers to withdraw e.nd assemble further back because as long as the tanks remained in the front lines they drew artillery, mortar, and anti-tank fire.

The day following the ill-fated attack on 0-ROSSHAU, a task force was formed from Company C, 70th Tank Battalion, Company C, 709th Tank Battalion, and company C, 803rd 9T Battalion.

This force was attachied -to the 70th under the nominal command of the battalion executive officer, and it the 2nd battalion of the 22nd woods southmest of the town. was sent to support

egiment facing GROSSHAU in the During the day the group Jas moved

into position to support the infantry.

on enemy positions

The tanks and TDs fired they

in the town of GROSSH.AU and KLEINHAU;

were subjected to enemy artillery fire all day but held their positions. For the next two days the task force poured fire on

enemy positions in

and around the town, from the sector of the

2nd battalion, which extended from the east-west road leading into GROSSHAU south about 1000 yards. One German self-propelled

AT gun was knocked out when one of the sharp-eyed tank commanders of the 70th noticed me ement in area between and AP mines, the woods south of town. The

fte woods ,and the town was heavily mined with AT but beQause of the artillery and small arms fire

coverin! these mines it was impossible for engineers to move foward to clear them, The dominting ridge in this locality The

ran through i YLE INF .AU and east of CROSSHAU toward GEY,

possession of this high ground enabled the enemy to cover GR0SSHAU and its western approaches, and to keep the 22nd

Regiment under devastat-ng direct fire.

While

waiting for V Corps troops

to come abreast,

the

regimental co=ander of the 22nd decided on a plan to by-pass

GROSSHAU to the north in the direction of GEY.

This move together

with the advance of V Corps through KLETNHAUJ would encircle GROSSHAU. operation. On *..ednosday, 29 November, the plan was put in

The 2nd Battalion continued to hold

west

and

southwest of GROSSHAU vehile the 1st and 3rd advanced northeast toward GEY. Just before noon the division commander

disapproved the plan and ordered that GROSSHAU be taken that day. The only battliIon in position to make an immediate

attack on the town

kias

the 2nd.

The hastily formed plan called for the infantry to advance followed by the tanks and destroyers of the task force. At 1500 the attack was- launched, but almost immedia +ely the of enemy

infantry was pinned down by heavy concentrations fire.

The tanks and tank destroyers then attempted to push The 1st platoon of Company 3,

out ahead of the infcantry.

70th Tank Battalion, which was leading attempted to breach the minefield. knocked out. Two of the tanks struck mines and were

The remaining three tcannks pushed out following two and successfully broke

closely the tracks of the first through the mines.

The comprany comander was following closely

in his command tank and the four tanks arrived in the torn almost at the same time

as

three TDs.

The infantry of the 2nd

battalion followed rapidly and eliminated the snipers in the cellars of the town. Durinr the attack destroyers of Company C, 803rd TD Bttalion, neutralized two pill boxes and two machine gun nests

by direct fire. 45 prisoners

jijho

They killed about 50 of the enemy and took were passed over to the infantry on arrival.

The third platoon of this company gave direct fire sup port to the attack by firing HE, .AP, and caliber .50 from their original positions. By 1900 GROSSHATU

was

completely in American hands,

and the armor began to -,fithdraaw for refueling and resupply. This -as accomplished by sendinc a few back at a time. the last tank cleared the mine field on its way back the enemy detonated a large portion of the field by remote control, but no one was hurt. CP for the night in ially standing, The 2nd Battalion set up its GROSSHAU even partAs

the only building in

using the basement which had been converted The tanks and TDs returned

into a bomb shelter by the Germans. to the townim as they

jere

refueled and went into a defensive

position outposting the town for the ni ht. After the f all of GP.OSSHAT the next objective of the

22nd Regiment was the wooded area between CTROSSHAI

and GEY.

The armored task force formed by the three C Companies supported the infantry in the attack to the northeast and succ3eded in either taking or controlling. all of the open (For action of 5th Armored

ground north and east of the town.

Division in this area, see Chapter VJI.)

The Gorman Counter-attack On Saturday, 2 December, just before dawn, the 1st

battalion, 9 6 3rd German Infantry Regiment infiltrated through

the front lines between the 2nd 22nd R4egient. Their objective,

and

3rd battalions of the

as later ascertained by G-2,

was to recapture GROSSEA.U.

Initially their tactics were success-

ful and they penetrated the front lines to a depth of about 500 yards. The armored task force was called forward immed's the

iately to assist in the American counter-attack. tanks and destroyers advanced, but did not realize it them.

they encountered the enemy

until bazooka teams began to attack

Confusion reigned for sever ,I minutes while one tank anaged by bazooka fire.

was knocked out and burned and another Another tank was set bailed out.

afire,

and except for one man the crew put out the fire and drove

The remaining crcwnir

back to GRQSSNU, ward the fight.

loaded another crew,

and

started back to-

Meanwhile

the inf ant ry organi zed and to ;ether

with the tanks systematically set out to destroy the enemy, By 1400 hours all the

attackers

hrld boon destroyed or captured.

The front was reestablished anad the armor moved back to, a position southwest of GROSSHAU where they were resupplied. During this action several infantrymen including two corpany commanders were catured taen to by the Germans and were

farmhouse approximately 500 yards in front of the Vhile the lines were being re org~anized, a

Aerican lines.

platoon of infantry moved out to the farmhouse,

crptured

the

German

guards, and released the Americans without a fight. Throughout the remainder of tho day, the front

lines of the 4th Division took a pounding from artillery and mortar fire. One s:all enemy counter--ttack in the sector

of the 12th Regiment was turned back;

the entire front held

and remained alorted for possible enemy action during the night. On the next cly the armored task force moved to an

assembly area on the high ground northeast of GROSSITAU where it could act as
nbile o

reserve to repel any hostile action Io counter-attack occurred but the

in the reginental sector.

tanks were subjected to sporadic artillery fire all day. The task force held its position until 1900 when the 22nd.

Regiment was relieved in place bur the 330th Infantry Regient of the

93rd Infantry Division.

Crews from the 744th Tank

Battnalion (attached

to the 93rd Division) took ever three in position on a)n cxchnge ba-sis. to woods

tanks of Corpany C, 70th, These taks

wre considered to be better adapted

fighting9 having reinforced aror 75-nn Guns.

and mounting short barreled

These were 171432 medium= tanks and with their without

shorter barrels 360 degree traverse could be obtained the guns striking trees. After

drawing
,d.

back from the front,

Corpany C, 709th

Tank Battalion,

Company C, 903rd TD Batta-lion, were re-

lieved from attachment and. reverted to their own battalion control, On Tuesday, 5 December, Company C of the 70th was orderec to move to IWDOPLF, LU=1,MOVRG, and. Comparny C, The other com..attached to defensive

903rd also moved to ' IAOIMORF on this date. panies. of the tank and.TD battalion wore still

their respective regiments which had. established positions all along the division front.

artillery fire was

the only .ction to be found long the front of the 4th Division, The entire division w.s relieved by 12 December by

the 93rcl.

Ifantry

Division,

ad

noved to LUM1'OiJR.

Summary During the period from 16 ilove:bor to 12 Deceber 1944, the 70th Tank Battalion foW:ht in twenty-four active yards of tanltks were

engag-).,enmnt s.

They wore on or writhin a few hu ndred

the front at all times.

Throug hCout the fighting,

c.nalized to trails <.nd. fire-brenks w-hich were heavily mined and covered by fire. Many times wire and anti-personnel mines and the tanks provided the only means

held up the infantry,

of neutralizing these obstacles.

They tore up the wire by

firing into it or moved ahead of the infantry neutralizing

AP

mines and ennbling the infantry to follow.

The capture of GROSSLZJJ had proved a Y-lost difficult

and costly engagement for the tanks.

In the initial attack

100

*~#e

*.

.4
4

XE

'

1%p
"

%
"

~t~

1!

-SATE

'A

OB

.T1

ri

moo

PLATH XI

IF THIS RUIYGED TERRAIN

IXT .CT1.TION OF

six tanks of CoMpany C of the 70th weTre iestroyed and two destroyers from the 903rd were lost. as tanks during this action. successful, force.
The

Tfls

wore employed

In the later attack, which was

the destroyers and tanks wore formed into a task

At this time only six tanls and seven TDs remained of

the two companies which had entered the HURTGI' at 100510 strength, and in the attack two more wore lost.

On 2 December the enemy hurled a countr--attack against the line northeast of GROSSI&iAJ. The tanks which wore in

assembly 300 yards from the front sped forward to intercept the attackers. Before the tanks wore aware that they wore and

not amon, friendly infantry, one tank was destroyed another damaged by bazooka fire,.

The

next thirty minutes

were a, wild melee in which crwmen shot

many

of the enemy

with carbines fnd pistols and drove then away from the tanks. veiontually the counter-attack

was

halted and the tanks the complete destruction of

assisted the friendly infantry in the attacking force.

The battalion connnder of the 903rc,

Lt Col Charles the

W. Goodwin had this to say about the employment of TDs in IIURTT . nolicy of attaching destroyers to infantry "The comanders has again proven very unsatisfactory. ower infantry commanders have no knowledge of the In one action during proper use of tank destroyers. this period our destroyers were ordered to charge a town abreast with tanks, resulting in two destroyers arrs drastic This, in my opinion, being; destroyedl. is a Sacrifice misuse of valuable men and equipr:ont.

101.

poor substitute for leadcrship. It is my reconendttion that tnak destroyers b- left under control of the trained and e-rperienced tank destroyer officers. The job in the past and in the future is better dione under these conditions." The 70th Tank Battalion losses in equipment were high

and

included 24 tanks lost as a rsult of enemy action.

Of

these, twelve which did net burn were later retrieved and either repaired or cannibalized for parts.

Personnel casualties included one officer killed. and eleven woundec while 11 enlisted nn Thuzing this period various causes, The action of the 70th in cated that it is the HtURTGTR1 FORST has indithere were

were

killed and

67 wounded.

46

non-battle casualties from

a terrific oempnse from the standpoint of Materwooded areas. This is due to the

iel for tanks to fight in

restricted manouvor space available a.nd the vulnerability to

concealed

anti-tank

weapons.

However,

many times the tanks

offered the only means of enabling the infantry to advance. From a morale standpoint it is desirable to have a limited num-

ber of tanks supporting infantry as they advance through wooded areas. The psychological effect on ground. troops as well as

material assistance given makos up for all the hand.icaps tanks suffer in woods. If at all possible9 and if a few trails and they should attacks

open spaces are available for movement of tank:s, in

the future be utilized in platoon size units in

through h. woods.

102

ITO TE S FOR CHAP ER V

l oersoml interview with Knox,

Major

Michael C. Vnrhol, Fort

KentuckyT.

2 eftor Aiction Report, 70th Tank 3attalion, IVoverlber 19)4 .

3 Personal interview with Captain John M.. 3ushcy, Fort

Knox, Kontucky. l ersonna1 interview with M jor Liewis Knox# Kentucky.

C.

Taynton, Fort

103

Chapter VI THE 709TH TANK BATTALION IN SUPPORT OF THE 8TH INFANTRY DIVISIONS

"The failure of the 28th Infantry Division to take SCHIIDT made it necessary for the First Army and V Corps to

secure another road which would serve as a supply route in the push to the

ROER

1 RIVER;" and to effect the seizure of

the vital dams that influenced all operations to the north. "An alternate route was found in KLEINHAI. the road through HIJRTGEN to

Not only were there several approaches to the road

but possession of the positions around HURTGEN on the KLEINHAUBERGSTEIN RIDGE would give the American forces observation while

denying

.2 to - the e'emy,"
On 14 November 1944 the battered 28 Infantry Division

was relieved from the HURTG EN front and began a mutual interchange of positions located in

with

the 8th Infantry Division which was

the relatively quiet VIII Corps sector to the south, which had been

and on 19 November the 709th Tank Battalion,

attached to the 8th infantry Division throughout the European campaign, relieved in place the 707th Tank Battalion, the arm-

ored support of the 28th Infantry

Division.

Oral orders from the commanding general of V Corps were received by the 8th Infantry Division early on the evening of 10' November necessitating a hurried move of the 121st Infantry Regiment which was still in LUXEMOURG. A letter of instructions

104

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I
REG?1IX T ADVXPCES XIIOtG THE GENYE''TER.-'.TPG7T- ROA_'D

PUNT? XII

THE 121ST

17FkNW''

followred which directed the attachment of COR, 5th Armored Division, to the 8th Infantry Division for an attack to seize the HURTGEN-KLEINHATJ-BERGSTEIN Chapter VII). "In order to carry out the corps directive it was planned to divide the action into two phases. I the 121st Infantry Regiment, During Phase RIDGE on 21 November (see

reinforced, was to pass through

the 12th Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, and commencing at 210900 November was to seize as its first objective the northern and eastern edges of the forest south and west of HURTGE." This would provide a line of departure for OCR,
3

5th armored

Division, to initiate Phase II by its advance under cover of darkness from the west to seize HURTGEN and KLEINHAUJ and the ridge on which these towns were located. The 121st Regiment

was then to relieve OCR, occupy HURTGEN, KLEINHAU, HILL (F058377),

401

and defend the ridge from counterattacks from the

northeast and southeast while OCR continued the attack to BERGSTEIN. VII, The 121st Regiment had attached i. l12th angi
ar:,ABn. ,

The account of Phase II can be found in Chapter

to clear the road to HURTGE\I which was heavily mined and obstructed by fallen trees. No serious threat from German

armor was expected during the attack through the forest but there --as a strong possibility of counterattacks -hen the edge of the forest was reached. Company A, 644th TD Battalion, To counter this possi -ilitv
iras

attached to the regiment.

105

.1~-* -

C-

*r'~- ,~-'-.

* *

*--. *

-~

-. *

.2*~jA
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- 4- lob

q'I-., ~

-I

L.7117 8Th T? LN~

VT r

rO

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T,r'T

TN TH

9HUBTGT:N FOFFB

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The other regiments were to have little part in the attack on HURTGEN. The 28th Regiment was to remain in position

in VOSSEACK and the 13th was to occupy defensive positions just north of the KALL RIVER. The portion of the forest through on the toiwn of HURTG1

Which

the attack

had to pass lay generally along and The Germans had correctly

west of the HURTGEN-GERMKETER ROAD.

evaluated the defensive capabilities of the heavily wooded, boggy, irregular terrain which was cut by numerous gullies and steep cliffs. They had prepared elaborate positions of

-wire entanglements, minefields, log bunkers, pillboxes and prepared fires, "Maps of the forest used by the Germans had each section marked; Twhen the observers in the log bunkers heard a noise in any section they called for fire on that point." 4 The mud, rain, and sleet of early winter added to the formidable nature of the obstacles opposing the American forces. The German troops opposing the attack of the 8th Infantry Division were not of the best quality. Their forces con-

sisted of many provisional units which were formed of exceptionally old or young men many of Thom had never been in

combat and stragglers from units that had been disorganized in FRANCE. Some of the enemy units identified were, Combat

Team "EINEN consisting of about 400 men, elements of the 8h Division and other non-divisional units. defenders was generally low1 The morale of the

and for that reason certain of the

106

SS troops were stationed wrest of the ROER to discourage any notion of surrender, A scarcity of officers was indicated

with all platoons and most companies being commanded by ncncomm--issioned officers. battalions. In several cases 2nd Lts commanded however,

The poor quality of the defenders,

was more than offset by the elaborateness of the defense. All approaches to the clearing in which the town of HURTGEN was located passed through dense woods with the two roads approaching from the west having sharp bends which provided ideal sites for strongpoints. The Germans took full advantage of

these positions as outposts. The frustrating obstacles of mud, mines, and limited mobility in the tangled masses of trees forced the 709th Tank

Battalion to be employed largely by platoons throughout the HURTGEN operation. Even in this strength the available ground

so limi.ted that tank operations frequently for raneuver w,7,as came to a standstill when a single tank immobilized by mines or mud blocked the path of the canalized column. played a minor role in ths initial The tanks

attack toward HURTGEN, never rose

and except during the attack on the tow:-n itself

above a supporting role during the entire operation.

Assault to HUR.TGN 12-28 November 144 The 121st Infantry Regiment attackod

with

three bat-

talions abreast at 210900 November toward the forest clearing southwest of MURTG7ENt, as launched through the The attack Y,

107

positions of the 12th Regiment,

4th Infantry DiVision,

located

generally north and west of VWITTSCIEIDT,

but bogged down

almost immediately because of the heavy concentrations of mortar fire and the dense anti-persnbrnel mine fields encountered. Company I, on the right flank of the regiment, was the only the edge of the forest south-

company to reach its objective, west of the town of HUTGEN.

On the following morning the regiment resumed its attack with the 1st battalion in the center making the main effort.

The 3rd battalion on the right strengthened its positions. on the edge of the forest but made little in forward progress

spite of the repeated attacks and the support of the Corps The 2nd battalion meanwhile advanced about 200 yards

artillery.

and reached the edge of a fire lane short of the objective. The lack of success was due principally to mortar fire, woods, mine fields, and heavy artillery fire. By evening dense

it was apparent that much greater progress must be made on the next day if a line of departure for CCR of the 5th Armored

Division was to be secured, On 23 December the regiment again attacked with three battalions abreast without appreciable gains. The 2nd platoon

of Company D, 709th was attached to the 1st battalion 121st Regiment, and the 3rd platoon Company D was attached to the 3rd battalion. 2nd platoon in It wqs first planned to use the tanks of the infantry battalion,

the firebreaks ahead of its

but four of the five tanks bogged down before reaching their

108

but four of the five t<;,nks bogged dorvn positions.

before reaching their 3rd platoon of Com-

It was then planned to use the

pany D in front of the 3rd battalion against a strong point which had been holding up both battalions. The tanks bogged

dcn en route to the 3rd battalion, andwhen they finally arrived at 1645 the lead tank became mired again and blocked the advance of the others. At 1700 the enemy counter att cked repulsed after a

along the entire regimental front but ws 30 minute engagement,

By nightfall the line of departur j for

the attack of OCR of the 5th ;armored Division Which was to initiate Phase II still had not been secured and the

attack

of OCR scheduled for the 24th

was

delayed.

On 24 November the remainder of the 709th (less ecrqpanyCC) was attached to the 121st Regiment for employm-ient on the following day and attack on MIRTGE.P1

-ias held ready to folcw OCR in its

Company C of the 709th

was

attached to the

2nd battalion 22nd infantry Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division. lst The 121st Regiment cont .Hued its attack with the

Battalion, made no gain; the 2nd Battalion on the left HURTG N fro the west, and the

gained 500 yards to fa

3a

Battalion on the right advanced about 200 yards east cf the Germeter still

HtJRTGEN

Road.

The 3rd platoon of Company D, 709th

attached to the 3rd battalion was given the mission of

wiping out a machine gun that was holding up the infantry. At 0900 the 3rd battalion bogan a coordinated attack on both sides of the road with the attached light tanks in support.

109

The lead tank was disabled by a mine although the road had been cleared the night bef ore, it Either the Germans had mined the mines,

again

or the engineers had failed to clepar all

The platoon leader disrmounted to check for mines and steppon on an anti-personnel mine self-propelled

which

bleuw off, hi s. legs..

A German three

8rmm gun further disabled the tank

with

direct hits, killing one member cf the crew and wound~i g anot=e' g The other four tanks turned back since they could not pass the first tank, w.hich, together with a large crater beside it, At 2150 a tank recovery vehicle from Com-

blocked the road.

pany A, 709th, went forward to pull the tank off the road. Some 200 yards short of its off a track. goal it hit a mine 7hich knocked

Men of the 12th Engineer Battalion -.ent up during crder to clear the rcad, but

the night and blew up the tank in discovered two cth -r, Meanwhl_e,

large orators blocking the road beyond. the 2nd platoon of Co -

to the northv-est,

pany D with the 2nd battalion

rf

the 121st Regiment had the an advance to i;he forest

mission of supporting the infantry in edge. Mines and

obstacles

halted the advance and the tank

attack was called off. The situation as seen at the close of 24 NovTember by Division Headquarters was as follows: the advance of the

4th

Division on the ncrth seemed to insure that an attack by the 121st Regiment against the I-LYJRTGPINT-GROSSaHU (;052381) RIDGE

could be supported from that flank; progress had been slow7 in the 121st regimental zone; co0,mbined attacks by light tanks,

110

tank destroyers, and the bulk of the 3rd battalion made slight prcgress on the south flank, In general, vas still ision, the situation in the 121st Regimental zone

not conducive for an attack by CCR, 5th Armored Divon 25 November. the NU'TGLk However, the arrival of German reinf-

orcements in

area and the expected arrival

of

more

reinforcements indicated the necessity cf an attack by CCR ,ithout delay. The

8th

Infantry Division plan contemplated that

the 121st Regiment,

reinforced by the 709th Tank Battalion (-) follow CCR and mop

and Company A cf the 644th TD Battali .on, up and occupy HUKTG N, KLEEINIHd,

and HILL 401 v ith c.ne reincf the

forced battalion on each.

The 22nd and 12th Regiments

4th Division twere to support the attack from positions west o:f HURTGEN and KLEINHAU, be made available to

rhi le Company C of the 709th wias to

OCR'.: at KLEINHILU

At 250730A November the

121st

Regiment renewed its

at-

tack toward the edge of tho forest. Left made the only ap:>reciabl

The 2nd battalion on tho The

gain, a bout 700 yards.

2nd platoon of CcmTany D, 709th, attached tc; his battalion had been instrurprtal in its advance to the edge of the forest.

"To get to the edge of the focrest, Co E, 121st Regiment, pulled out first It had 'Itaihmant cf engi.noers from the 12th Brineer Battalion end the 2n1 platoon from Company G won-t t, the ccrnPpany D, 709th Tank Battalion. left of the, minefield and then across country to a hairpin turn in the rcad to the eaejt, ThLiey took rut a machine gun iwThich w ;s in a set of road blocks along the rcad ne r this turn. 'Then a team -, s organized it wTent down the road, The infantry led, then the enginers, end finally the tanks. Te infantry pr tcted the e }i.a:neor s ,hile cthey rermvRe d some 100 anti-tank mines and 4 road blocks. Tanks helped

111

knock out bunkers. Apprcximately 38 prisoners were taken. There was wonderful tiam -:;crk bet,7een the infantry, engineers, and tanks. None cf the tanks were destroyed." 5

"-E

Company

iwas

,alking around the tanks and about

4
*

men
*

=ere riding the tanks.

7e met 'jerries'

in log bunkers

Each bunker had at least one The tanks exchanged

'automatic weapon
6

and small arms. in log bunkers

few shots with 'jerries'

and easily persuaded them to give up." The :push of the 2nd Battalion improved the regiment's

position which weas nrw on or around the crest side; of HURTGEN.

Meanwhile COCR had launched an attack at 0730 and

again

at 1630

through the 3rd Battalion of the 121st up the GERN;ETER-hTJRTGE ROAD but made no advances. (See Choapter VII) The plan fcr the

taking of HURTGN by CCR of the 5th lrmored was abandoned the mission fell to the infantrymen of the 121st Regiment.

and

Operations for 26 November came

as

s'-e-iwhat of a 'breather'

with

only limited objective attacks being made to straighten out the regimental front line by eliminating small pockets of resistance. Reducing this resistance, the 1.21st consolidated along the edge of the forest on the southest, west and northw-est sides of the HEJTGU clearing.
Co. F

advan.cod

to

within
A

300 yards of HUJRTGEN cocrdinated attack was planned in

but withdrew in

the face of heavy- fiire.

on HURTGENT by the regiment with its

attachments

conjunction 7ith the 1st Battalion, 13th Regiment, on the north. The employment cf the tank battalion was not contemplated until the fall of HURTGEN in order that the restricted road net -lould

not be blocked for the regiment.

tank destroyers and necessary light vehicles cf

112

'4.
a

4t
3

1"' _,

%~ ik

2
.

.tqr

00 W. .1

On the following day the 1st battalion, 13th Regiment,

made an advance of approximately 1500 yards to the east on the

north side of HUJRTGEN and cut the !F-JRTGEN-KLEINAI.U road. The

1st battalion of the 121st Regiment advanced toward HURTGEN but made little gain because of reduced strength and the heavy fire encountered. The 2nd battalion also attacked toward the

town but was stopped cold by small arms fire from the outlying houses and by mortar fire. The 1st and 2nd platoons of Company A

were in support of the 2nd battalion, but were of no major assistance. The 3rd battalion on the south continued to attack east On the night of 27 November patrols from the

through the forest.

2nd battalion and from the 1st battalion of the 13th Regiment erroneously reported HURTGEN unoccupied; the town was nearly encircled by the iimericans. Neit morning to enter the 2nd battalion of the 121st attempted

HURTGEN

from the southwest but was surprised to meet

resistance.

The 1st battalion attacked. From the woods to the

south of THUR.TGEN but was stopped by machine gun fire coming from the town. The regimental attack bogged down but by noon was

reorganized into a combined infantry-armor assault which advanced into HURTGEN despite heavy artillery and mortar fire. The 1st platoon Company A.. 709th, led the attack,

followed by

infantrymen from Company E and a squad of the 12th Engineers with minesweepers mounted the tanks of the leading wave. panies F and G advanced on foot, Com-

As the combined arms team

113

approached the town one tank was hit by artillery fire which wounded all of the infantrymen aboard. Small arms fire was

received and the troops of F and G companies dropped behind. Then the tanks reached the outlying buildings of the town the infantry and engineers dismounted and took shelter on both sides of the street. No mines were encountered in the town

so the engineers fought as infantry.

The foot troops advanced

house by house on both sides of the street while the tanks moved ahead firing into each building with their 75's after which the infantry cleared it top to bottom. Ninety-five

percent of the prisoners were taken from reinforced concrete "The Germans were terrified by the tank fire more 7 than anything else." As the lead tank neared the church in the center of HURTGEN it +w;as hit by a bazooka and set on cellars.

fire.

A few minutes later a tank destroyer was knocked out the same vicinity, however, by 1730 the town Officers of

by a bazooka in

was secured after all houses had been cleared.

the 709th Tank Battalion felt that the infantry should have advanced at least three houses ahead of the tanks in the town fighting to prevent tank losses from enemy bazooka fire. Company C, 13th Regiment advanced into HURTGEN from the ist Battalion positions on the northeast of the town, where, The

during the day, it had repulsed several counter-attacks. remainder of the ist Battalion seized HILL 401, south of KLEINHAU. The ist

Battalion of the 121st Regiment joined the mopping up. CCR, 114 5th Armored Division was

2nd Battalion in

alerted and ordered to jump

Cf

at daylight 29 November to

capture KINHkU and the high ground to the northeast.

___'GEN

to the Corns Objective

N(29 Nov-5 Dec

KLEINHiU-

'T ith the fall

of HURTGEN a foothold on the HTJRTG-

BRI.NDENBRG ridge was seized wrhich gave CCR, 5th Armored, room to maneuver. KLEINU Accordingly, OCR attacked at daylight and captured and HILL 401 to the northeast. Here it was relieved

by the 1st Bettalion, 13th Regiment, in order that it could regroup and push south to BRRNDENBERG. The 1st and 2nd Battalions,

121st Regiment, consolidated positions in the vicinity of

while the 3rd Battalion continued its

HURTGEN

attack east through the

Elements of the

forest and gained 1000 yards south of the tocwn.

28th Regiment in VOSSENACK to the south pushed eastward and occupied HILL 50 (F049343). The 709th Tank Battalion was still

attached to the 121st Regiment but remained in regimental reserve helping to consolidate and to organize defensive positions around HURTGEN. On the next day new orders were given to the 709th Tank Battalion, The assault gun

platoon was

attached to the 56th

Field Artillery Battalion.

Company A -rus attached to a task clearing remaining enemy

force with the mission of assisting in

resistance wirest of the KLEINN'iU-BRLIdDENBFRG plus one platoon of Company B Lt.-Col, Streiter which

ROAD.

Company D

was

attached to the garrison under ith two rifle

as being organized

companies and a platoon of TD's for the defense of KLEINH0lJ. En route to KLEINHLXU a light tank from Company D turned over

115

killing an officer and an enlisted man. platoon)

vas

Company B (less one

ordered to

dutpost and defend HURTGEN, and lost

one tankvduring the day

when

it

ran over a mines

The drive for the dams gained headway again once the bottleneck of HURTGEN was removed: The picture on the 8th

Infantry Division front for this day includes the building up of defenses along the line HURTG N-KLEINU to ward off any attack from the northeast; the push of elements of the 121st Regiment just south of H{URTGEN toward the KLEINHAU--BR .:NDENBERG ridge; and the breakout of the VOSSENAsCK 'thumb' by the 28th Regiment in the direction of the KLEI [UU-BR:"NDENBERG ROD.

All

the while CCR,

5th Armored Division,

was

pushing dawn this Though

road in

the direction of BlNDENBERG and BERGSTEIN,

bloody fighting continued the stalemate was crumbling. Company Ai, 709th Tank Battalion, on 1 December in continued to operate

the reduction of enemy resistance west of the ROAD. The 1st platoon was ordered to

KLTNHIiU-BRONDENBERG

attack with the 2nd Battalion, 121st Infantry Regiment against the enemy to the southeast of HURTGEN. The 2nd Platoon also

joined the attack with the mission of giving supporting fire: The attack was successful and the 2nd Battalion crossed the KLEINHOU-BRNDENBERG launched its jumped off ROA',D by evening. The 3rd Battalion Just before the attack Major Hogan,

attack in the same area.

4 American tanks appeared on the scene.

the Battalion Cormander,

talked with the tank platoon leader

Tho informed him that his mission 116

was

to support the

2n3

Battalion.

Major Hogan requested that they support him instead.

Shortly afterwards when the 3rd Battalion was held up by pillboxes the tank platoon commander requested and received permission to assist them. An infantry sergeant was placed in

the lead tank and coordinated the tank fire with that of the infantry on the strongpoints which were holding up the attack. The Germans placed fire on the tanks but failed to destroy them. After assisting the infantry to gain 70-100 yards in

the entire days fighting the tanks returned to HURTGEN for the night. To the northeast the 3rd Platoon of Company A attacked with the 1st Battalicn of the 13th Regiment. The attack

started at KLEINHLU and the platoon progressed some 1500 yards to the south, losing but one tank which struck a mine. The attack south of HURTGI continued on 2 December against

the remaining enemy pockets west of the KLEINHLU-BR ANDENBERG ROAD with the 2nd Platoon of Company A in support. Lt. Bush

and Sgt. Harper of the Infantry were placed in

one of the tanks

with an SCR 300 radio and coordinated tank fires with those of the infantry. One pillbox was knocked out by a tank firing An advance

at it from pointblank range with its 75-mm. cannon.

of 150 yards against stiff resistance was made and 55 prisoners were taken. Sergeant Carlton R. Brown, Operations Sergeant of

the 3rd Battalion, 121st Regiment, stated in a combat interview regarding this action, "Tanks .7ere not of much value except that psychologically they scared the enemy and encouraged

7
us. "

117

The 2nd Battalion, 121st, to the east of the KLEINHiUBR5NDENBERG ROAD reported that an Imerican tank fired on them killing two men and wounding tw-o others before it stopped. could be

They also reported that later one of the tanks in

the same group ran over a pile of 20 mines which destroyed the tank, killed the crew, and injured some of the nearby infantrymen. (After Action Reports of the 709th Tank Battalion

do not mention this incident.) The 1st and 2nd Platoons of Company

attacked

with

the 3rd Battalion cleared out the pocket west of the KLEINHA.UBRsANDE BERG ROAD and crossed into the woods on the east by evening of 3 December. ed its The 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment press-

attack east of the road supported by the 3rd Platoon,

Company A, 709th, gaining 300 yards before they consolidated their gains for the night.. On.this date CCR seized BRNDENBERG. While the 121st Regiment was clearing out the resistance on both the east and west sides of the road, the 28th Regiment to the south had been pushing east and southeast from VOSSENACK attemrpting to straighten out the line from VOSSENZaCK to BRNI1ENBERG. On this date the 2nd Platoon, Company:709th moved to iId

VOSSENW.OK to suppcrt one of the attacks

of that regiment.

and woods interfered w4vith the coordination of tanks and infantry and the tank platoon

withdrew to GERIlVETER.

The 1st and 2nd Platoons of Company A cf the tank battalion on 4 December assisted the 121st Regiment in a final attack to secure its objectives on the KEINPIYU-BRANDENBERG ridge.

118

Lt. Bush of the 3rd Battalion was again placed in one of the lead tanks as the attack moved ferward. countered, but it
Mortar fire

was

en-

bounced off the tanks without damaging them.

The infantry complained of the reluctance of the tanks to leave the firelanes and enter the foods. Uhen they did so, however,.

the tanks knocked out two machine gun nests before bogging don. ras on the Corps objective (theThe 3rd Battalion --

'WIiii1U-

BRhNDENB ERG ridge) by nightfall. Meanw,?hile the lst Platoon cf Company B supported the 2nd Battalion 28th Regiment in an attack to the southeast of VOSSENACK. The attack jumped off after . heavy artillery

preparation but met no success and lost all of the tanks of the platoon, presumably to enemy tank fire. the tank crews returned to GERIMETER. On 5 December Company C returned to the control of the 709th after seeing considerable fighting wiith the 4th Infantry Division. The remnants of

A description

of its action is included in

the capter on armored support of the 4th Division. ( See Chap. V ) The phase of the action that ended on 5 December saw the 121st Regiment in possession of the high ground which included HIJRTGEN, KLEINIH U, and

BRWNDENBBRG with

control of sup-

ply routes necessary to continue vital dams on the ROER.

the attack southeast to the

The 28th Regiment had pushed elements The action

east as far as B NDEJBERG and BERGSTEIN.

of

the

709th

Tank Battalion in the area near HURTGM,,T was concluded

and the weight oif armored support was shifted to the 28th Regiment.

11.9

Conclusions Supply was no great problem to the company commanders of the 709th Tank Battalion. The Battalion S-4 brought the Light tanks were

supplies to the company area each night.

used at times to carry supplies forward and also to evacuate the wounded. In the operation the tank companies kept on hand

2 days reserve rations, one and a half days oil and gas, and one day of fire in ammunition.

During the battle of HURTGEN FOREST the 709th Tank Battalion discovered that some infantry officers were not acquainted with the capabilities and limitations of armor. On one occasion the infantry requested that tanks attack at night over unreconnoitered terrain. in In the town fighting infantry preceded

HURTGEN the tankers felt that had the

the tanks by 3 or 4 houses the infantry would have been well supported and tanks would not have ben lost to enemy banokes. The abundance of German artillery made it expeditious for the noise of movement of armor to be covered by artillery fire in front of the area. German artillery fire also hampered

the movement of infantry commanders while directing the attack. One infantry battalion comimander found that by using a light tank as a mobile command post he could more effectively control his companies in the attack.

The winter conditions adversely affected the normal

Ioperation of equipment.

Tank turrets had to be worked constthe cold weather. Tank

antly to prevent them from freezing in

120

tracks

would

freeze to the ground

qnd break

if the t nk8s were

not moved frequently.A ,great deal of difficulty enced withi sights and :per-scopes freezing over.

as

experi-

Frost on

the drive rs vision slot was. particularly troublesome' as it blin&-d the driver; when Tt4 ttoned up- and made

him- entirely

dependent Tfor,directions ;oni the tank: ci,0-ander.

Prior~ to 'the EHURTdlEN action, 19A AN/Vc-3 (tank 'SR300)

radios were :installed in tanks of the 709th.

cessfully

They here used suc-

ini. 06patiori

7ith the infantry'.

Radios, f requ ently

went

out,

during the operatiopn but quick rbpair by .skilled corn-,

municutions personnel minimized the problem.

The acetion of thei 8th Thfantry Division in the HUBRTGEN

operation.

centered largely .around

the 121st

Regiment which

at-

tempted to secure for the C0,R, 5th Armored Division, of departure for an then to the south,

aline

attack

on the fJRTG -o;LETNHAU area and

Light tanks of the 709th Tank Battalion

were employed ii4thout success along the frebreaks in front. of the infantry battalions
nd, upn thie G RiTERf- iRTGE

ROAD.

The failure of armor at this time cen be attributed largely to the fact, that' mud mired the t4nks .and mines d isabnled the n Because of the slow -progress of the 121st Regiment OCR

tried

to atta(-k through them on 25 N'ovember

without

success,

It ?7as apparent that armor could not be employed in mass until the clearing ,,hich surrounded WUJRTG' could be reached. It is

121

interesting to note that on 25 November when CCR could not break through, a tank-infantry-engineer team employed farther west where advances had

previously

been halted was able to

reach the edge of the forest..

The theory of combined arms

seems sound when the members of the team play their respective roles; the infantry protects the engineers while they clear a path for the tanks. It is to be emphasized that mere group-

ing of the several arms does not in itself provide a team; teamwork and close coordination arc essential. noted that, after this success, It is further

the attack bogged down for

about three days until at noon on 28

November

another team,

consisting of elements of Company A, 709th, 2nd battalion 121st Regiment, and part of the 12th Engineer Battalion, was formed and immediately moved in and effective results of the captured HUgUTGBU. The

,ork of this team indicate that it

would be advantageous for combined arms teams to have the opportun.ity of working and training together prior to actual combat. The fall of HURTG N permitted OCR to pass through the infantry, seize KLEIN IMU and continue its attack to the south,

Also 'rith the fall of HURTGTIN the 28th Regiment in VOSS E ACK
began moving east in cenjuction with the 121st. During the

move of the 121st to the Corps objective tanks were used in platoon and section size units in support of the battalions in the forest.

122

As

the Corps objective

was

approached

the main effort

of the 8th Division began to shift to the gcne of the 28th Regiment and the tanks ere gradually shifted to that area..

The role of the 709th Tank Battalion in the HUFHGEN FOREST battle is not one to be used as an illustration of and violent

armored principles of mass action, maneuverability, attack.

Rather,

its main contribution was close support of

infantry by individual tanks in slow, plodding advances that were measured in yards rather than miles. It is felt that the

main lesson to be learned is the necessity for complete understanding, for coordination and cooperation between platoon size tank and infantry units which operate or expect to operate together. The actions of the 709th Tank Battalion are ve y similar to those of the other separate tank battalions which were attached to infantry divisions in the Battle of the hIURTGEEN FOREST. All

five of the battalions normally fought individual tank platoons in support of infantry battalions. In

one

or two instances tanks were But always,

massed in company formations -- never larger..

the

tanks of these battalions supported the infantry to which they were attached., and their actions w4-ere ordinarily dictated by infantry commanders. is ion --

An

examination of the actions of the 5th Armored Div-

tne only large armored unit wh--ich fought in th;.e HIJRTGEN

its problems differed essentially

FOREWST -T nay disclose whether

from those of the tank battalions which have been discussed thus far.. 123

NOTES FOR CHAPTER

_vj

1 fato. Sumr Corps Interviewers. 2 Ibido

atefrHrg-

oetZ

After Action Report, 8th Infantry Dhv-i si on, 2Q0 Novembr_ _194.4~ 4 Combat Interview, Major Luther INillen, S-3, 121st Inf Reg t. Combat Intervie v, Lt O~olonel Henry B Kurizi g: 00, 2nd Bn,
Combat Interview, S/Sgt

Anthony

Rizzo,

2nd Plat,

G, 12Tht
Cop

Inf Regt. 7
Combvat

121st

Inter view S
If Reit

rd i.

Adams,

3rd1

1~t

124

CHAPTER VII THE 5TH AR AORED DIVISION AND THE itRTGN__ L

Tho 5th. Ami ored Division w7as a, participnt in the Bat-tle of the HURTG FOREST from the first ;peek fI October unti. it

,,

ithdrawn from positions near the ROER RIVMR~

22 Decembor

as a result of the German ART.EN ES

Offensive.

During this

period the division

Sias

employed

in mrissions ihich included (2) having combat comimands

(1) holding a defensive soctor,

att ached simultaneously t'o V and VII Corps as reserves, (3) autackino, key positions :Tithin the forest, and (4)

at-

tempting to

exploit oast -lard when infantry elements reached

the eastern edge of the of the 5th it

ras the

more

thickly

-'ooded

area.

The action

Armored

is Important to this study net only because

only armored

division

employed in the HURTGEM FOREST

mass but primarily because the division secured th--ip objective, t~,z~e~ h
S th

Thfa-try Division.

To better understand tha, action of this division in the HIRTGEIC,. let us briefly revio T its historyr prier to Oct's
obor 1944.

'In February
where

1944

thr. "V'ictory were

Division"

arrived

in &igland

ttmarriedt formaitions

adopted for for oombcat,

last
These

minute training and the final

preprtrations

formations ,ore

to be ,.:sed writh only minor variations thru h"Finally on 23 July 1944 theo men of

otrt the ETTOPFAN campaign.

the divisi on embarked for FR' NCE and the job for

which they

had

bcen preparing nearly three years.

On the continent the 5th was attached to XV Corps and spearheadcd the corps' advance in FRNCE as it the Third Army dash across --the army it wras

pursued the German SemthA

to oppose in the iRTGM4 FOREST.

Teamed w7ith the 28th Infthe division capt-

antry Division and fighting under V Corns, ured the city

of

LUX-11BOURG and pushed to the German border b.come the first division to

where

on 11 September 1924;1+ it

fight inside the Third Reich.

The Fifth as a Mobile Resorve

In the first -as relieved in

l Oct to

19

Nov

week of October the 5th 1rmored Division by the 8th Infantry Division and
S

' LUXENOUl

moved north to the vicinity of IMON of the critical

CHAIU,

just south and Test

hNJRTG

'N FORES1'ST

area.

During the following month the division did not opeorate as a unit against tth.e enii, were engaged. although eleents of the ?fit ,ere even

Control of divisional comuonents

more decentralized than in

tho previous month: elements

were

employed in

both. the V and VII Corps simultaneols ly individu l battal ens, and companies were wcek of Nove;,mber the

cumbat commands, attache

61 to

infantrv units.

In the firs,;

division headouarters

and Combat Command B remained

at

MODERSCHED (905990) as the Vr Corgs mobile reserve; COB had an additional defensive IR'E,,RG (925146). NEUDORF (550312) in

mis

ion in

a aector near K I LTER-

At this time Combat Command h assembl. d at order (1) to repel any enemy counterattack

through the 28th Inf'-ntry Division which wras making the corps

126

,f

,t

1*
/r -4. r

:'

t
h' 1

?';

~;

qr'q
1* Il

so,.

I
-i.
-

-.

o*-

r_

.. T2

XVI1I

SCF: Fr3

:'ifF 1JITh:I .

7927.1LHTG

main effort or (2) when it STBAUCHO

to attack -through the 28th on Corps order the vicinity of SCHMIDT and

secured the high ground in

As discussed in Chapter III the 28th attack was unand CCA was not committed, On 8 November CCB in the

successful

defensive sector was placed under army control; division headquarters jcined CCA at EUDORF and became V Corps reserve with restrictions, however, placed by Army on its committment, In the

meantime the reserve command had been attached to VII Corps for employment with the 4th Infantry Division also attacking through the HURTGEN FOREST. On 17 November CCB rejoined the division

having been relieved of its defensive responsibilities by the 99th Infantry Division. The division less CCR remained in V Corps performing On 19 Nov-

reserve and engaged in minor security missions and in routine training and imaintenance until 29

November.

ember OCR was relieved from the VII Corps and on the same day was attached to the 8th Infantry Division which had relieved the 28th, EURTGEN-KELITi\ilhU-BERGSTh IN Plan (19--23 Nov) OCR was attached to the 8th Division, but it should

be emphasized that V Corps assigned i.+ the specific mission of seizing the dominating open ground surrounding HURTGEN, KELIIMIU, BPA NDENBERG, and BIERGSTEIN, first, This attack was to the edge of the woods

be carried out in three phases:

one mile south of HURTGEN would be secured by the 8th Infantry Division attacking from the southwest and the 4th Infantry Division attacking from the west (See Map 3, Appendix V)

127

second, the armor using this edge of the departure would attack to take HURTGEN and

oods as a line of

KLEiNRI.J

where tre7,T

would he relieved by an infantry battalion of the 8th; third,

COR would swing southeast to seize BNDENBBRG and BERGSTEIN as elements of

the

8th threatened . t

these towns by pushing throvugh this high ground in pos-

the wl od "*to thE>W*&b ,*

' Titll

session of V Corps troops, the ROER and the ROER DIMS could be taken thereby completing the first part of V Corps!

mission, to protect the south flank of the attacking VII Corps. V Corps ;ould then be in a position to secure a crossing over advance to the east.
was controlled by the ene-

the ROER RI'V MR end to continue its Since the dominating grene

my and since there was no point ,hich offered geod obso;rv-ation,

physical reconnaissance by unit ccmmanders wTas limited.

was partially offset, howrevr, by four factors: BELSTEtN

This

(1) Tere

1Jas an OP from w-Thich r- rt viewed; (2)

of thE

ridge could ba liaison

many reconnaissance flights in

aircraft

were condu-icted;

(3) there eras su fficient tim.e to make a t" horinformation of thc enemy ,vas avai

cugh map stud r; anJ (4) largely

able
-

as

a result of patrolling -to B 'ANM D TBERG and BER&F'

STEIN by the

2d Ranger Battalion.

The area was defended bu"

eleents of the Germn 27th forced initia~lly by uh,,

and 89th :nf?.:nt-vry Divisions reinDivisioni as a maobile

116th Panzer

reserve; hoever, this latter division the time OCR was committed.

,,was

being

77 i.thdraw?n

at

The

elements of the two

infantry

128

divisions

included the 253c and the 600th Engineer Battalions,

the 275thFusFlie~ttali on, tho 2d Battalion, tl icn .60th

the

31st--M

nine 'Gu2 RttalionL

10325th Reinent. and the lst and 2d Batien all of which were

-'anzer Grnader

supp7orted by the -,ivisional artillery of the twl o divisions engaged. This actually show.-Ts eleven battalions defending the

area, but intolige nce at the tine correctly estimated thzat all batt _lions ;ere Ian...n to at Ii ast one-third strength. This m,, ant that opposing !SCR there '~s the equivalent of one
NL

rcgiment with good fire sup-port from the 31st

chine Gun

Bat t^li

cr

artilery, and rmiort .rs (at lea st tw-o l-.ght and one

medium artillery brttalins and a minmlum of twielve mortar batteries, 81mm, weas ; el

and

120m-m).

The enemy in the area,

howev:r,

organized

and

was controlled by twio K riegsgruppen-Of still more importance was the

KG Trier .nd KG Wegelein.

fact th_at the relatively st blel situation over a nerJ od of weeks had been used to advantag_ by the two engineer battalions to

lay

large numbers of mines.

AT and AP mines were int-

ersperse - throughout althou; gh Schu mines were predomin the on

,nt

in

woods and the

y eolz mines 'sero prvedominar,,nt

:long the roads and

shoulders. The open terrain ereund the objectives ;-as lirdited

and surround1ed on all sides

by

woods and weeded drawo that at

facilitated tank stalking by the e ny concealment to his

night

and gave

AT

g ''-s by day.

In ad-dition, the grolund

129

had been cultivated plowTed

-in

tJhe previcus growaing season,

and

this

ground

softened bit heavy rains made yank :movement difthird-rate roads. An exception

ficult eXcept on the narrowv,

to

this

T7as

the GERMdETER-KLEIN1HAU main road, but movement

here soon bc-came aTwward due to the stresses of tank ba:ttle,

The k ey

terrain

featu Lr s cf j:t- e <<rea

ere a hi.ll

northeast

of KLEINIIAUt,

a hill northea.st of I-TJRTG ET, a hill just east This

of DERGSTEIN, and a ridge connecting these last twvo. gave the enemy observatioin ov,-r the entire area. a voed bdrar betwA een VOSS
VOSS NAC.K and BBLHIDENBERG,

Further,

.LOK

and

HURTGENv,
woods

another betve ;n

and heavy

east of KLETNHIJJ-

and north of BRA,.NDE RV*RG -were good obost acles easily defended

by

a minimum of trcops. At this tir.Je the -ceserwe command and attached elemec.nts

a ere locate;d. and

at

T' ThLO.I

(,7lO321)p BP LGi'UM , where formations

grcupings :rere rnpdle

as

shown ivr 1F

gre1.53

Immedi ately the 95th Arm-

upon attachm:ent

tc

the 8th Infantry

Division

ored Field Artillery fires of

Battalion was

directed to. reinforce the

tho

56th

Field

Artilkory B-ttalicn (Sth Divisio~n

A}rtilleryi), but

it

w-as to rovtrt to CCR control upon its

con mitt~ent 1

The

RjRTGL1T n3rrtion

(2

o5

jTC')
Rcse .e

The or-igirlal plan -ins to

move

Command leass

its

trains

fro~m MILEOVT to an

assembly

area at ROTGEI' -on 23 Mov-

em.ber and morning.

to

launch an attack against H 1RTGE!4

the:

follow7ing

A: s discussed in Chapters V and VI the infantry part

130

y___

CD:
I
47 4 (p}

()
C/387

95
AAAW BN

A/10 & A/47 AIB C/io & G47 AIB /f1oTK BN 1/C/628 TD BN 1/0/22 AEB

B/47 & B/10 TK BN 2/0/22 AEB 0/628 TD BN (-) 1 M16 C/387 AAAWT BNT 1 Flail Tank (British)

1
wjHQ i ... (-)

cf

,685
SV /10,47,95 BNS
C/75 AM BN
Det C/12 7 AOM BN

Figure 6.

Task OrganizatiLor, ofOC

of the corps plan called for (1) irnent, 3th Division

the 121st Infantry Reg-

to

secure a line of departure along the

edge of the woods just south of

HURTGEN;

(2) the 28th and

13th Regiments of the same Division to hold the woods from HIJRTGEN south to include VOSSEIACK; and (3) the 4th Infantry Division to continue mopping up the I UR4EN, and to push its

woods

northeast of In addition all

attack on G1ZOSSHLJ.

available artillery would lay on the towT-qn of HURTGNT

Dreporation to includo smoke

just prior tc jump-off.

The 47th
the

Arlmocred Infantry Batt~ion moving tc an a ttack position in

night was to attack HURTGEN at 0730 and hold until relieved by elements cf

the

13th lnf._ ntry Rogirmnt; the 10th Tank

Battalion following the

/47th across the LD wias to seize the

high ground southeast of HTJRTGLN to protc:ct the comr-emnd's right flank and conxtinu;e the; a ttack to KLEINTNU on reserve command order;- engineers and reconnaissance elements -ere directed to rnark the routes to the attack position an! support the attack once launched. delayod twraenty-f cur The attaack, h~-7ever,

to
Tas

hours as neither the 4+th ncr the 8th

Infantry Divisions made the progress initialler contemrplated. On the reported that it removing mines vening of the 24th,

the 8th

Infr.ritry Divisicn

had s( curdA the lino of lep~rturo and ;s..n < .di ridng a crater in the road north of

GERLi1 TER (Chapte:r vI)

Cayin Frank 15A. Pool, commelnding

ras sent

Convfny B, 10th Tank Battalicn,

to

a forvuard b,-t-

tallion CP to got the latest reports on infantry progress,

132

particularly that which applied to the condition of the GERTIEER--HURTGEN road over which his company wiould attack, learned there that, contrary to reports, the infantry had not physically reached the edge of the woods designated as the LD; but he He

-as informed that this would be accomplished

prior to jump-off time as two infantry companies were to attack forward to that line at 0500. CP, Capt. Later,

at

the 121st Infantry

Pool met the 8th Infantry Division .Engineer and the road to the line of departure and (2)

was reassured that (1)

would definitely be cleared of mines, would be bridged

or

the crater 1 a path would be cleared around it. -lit

0725 this was confirmed by a radio message from the 8th Infantry Division. At 242100 November the infantry of the 47th proceeded in half-tracks to a point from which they -ere to move to the

LD dismounted. infantry on

The tanks started. later and were to meet the

the LD prepared to attack at 250730 Nvovember,

Major Hogan com anding the 3rd Battalion 121st Infantry Reg-ment gave the arm ior ed infant~ry locations of his troops and ninefields

and

furnished guides to lead thon forwvaJrd through It had rained all night and continued to rain_

the
all

minefield. morning.

Abcut fifty yards from the meeting point the of the armored infantry

ff'stlpatoon

walked

into a minewho began

field and the mine explosions alerted the Gcrmans,

pouring in intanse and accurate artillery and mortar fire. Three minutes later and right on schedule the artillery began its preparation anc' laid the smoke screen on the southern out.

skirts

of

HURTGEN.

133

At

the se-me time the lead tank of =the tank column

which was about three hundred yards south of the LD reached the crater in the road at

026437.

A lthough the crater

was

neither bridged nor by-passed, it looked as. if it would hold a tank so the load medium tried to cross and immediately bogged down. Artillery and mortar fire was coming in, and as

the tank hit the crater the column began receiving small arms fire from the right and left. An AT gun located southwest each round missed

of HiR.TGEN opened fire on the tank; however, and passed in the same place.

Evidently, the gun had been

laid to fire directly down the road and was not being reaimed at the tank, edge of the road,

which was By

laying on its

side' on the left

combining manipulat ons of the elevatthe tank gunner was able to the column ere

ing and traversing handohee.13, dostroy this AT gun. 3 hit by

Several other tanks .in

artillery

and, although not disabled, lost crew members, the

i;oods

Americans and Germans in

were so intermeshed that

the enemy small arms fire could not be neutralized without endangering the friendly troops. The infantry commander stated

that

he could not withdraw his men because of the mines. 4 A brid:ge truck of thy: 12th Engineer Combat Battalion,

8th Infontry Division, was standing by, so it span the crater, However, there

was

decided to

was

an additional delay as

the engineers did not have sufficient troadway to complete the span and had to go

to

the rear to obtain some,

during which

134

time the

infantry suffered very heavy casualties. the engineers

von Then

material was available,

were

very reluctant to

erect the treadv ay under the heavy fire until the spirit of the crane driver, who volunteered and mcved forward, spurred

the

others on,

The crater With

was

finally spanned after ccnsidtank immobilized the next

erable difficulty, tank in

the

first

the column crossed the span at 1030 anrI the attack

was resumed--only to stop fifty feet from the crater ,Then this tank hit a mine, ag'Sin the road was blocked. crew could A1T gun. Before the

get

out this tank received a direct hit from another

Since the artillery sm& e screen had dissipated by

this time, two tanks were edged into a firing position just off the road and placed HE and. smoke

on

the south border of HURTGEN

while a third tank moved forard to tow7, the disabled tank from the road. The third tank was hit by a bazooka round as it The road

reached the kniv cked-nut tank.

,,as near

completely

blocked for the tanks; therefcro, a request for more infantry

was made.

In the meantiem

ad:diticnal spoke wvas requested,

but the supply had been exhau.sted= . tack

At this time an air atand the air claimed one

was

made cn IIRTG ?N and KLEI LUJ

enemy tank,

but this g:rve only temporary re liwf from the con-

stant rain of fire. CCR began regrouping at once to give the 4+7th Armored Infantry

Battalion

its

can A, B,

and C companies in already attached.

addition The

to Company B,

10th Tank Battalica,

135

attack

was

resumed at 1630 when Comnanv C vas comi tted to At first'$ progress

the left of Company B of the infantry. was good, which it

but then the company encountered a minefield in lost seven men in ton minutes, Ccmpany C ten

swung right to move up the highway, six machine guns and an A T gun in During all

but w, as pinned down by

the south edge of HUTG7,T.

of this time the: mortar and artillery fire had Company B of the infantry had

been falling without let-up.

eighty men loft out of tw,:ro huncrd tw!enty-five and Company C suffered fifty casualties in t;enty minutes. "n attempt

was made to evacuate the disabled tanks but wVas unsuccessful due primarily to the artillery fire, had been lost, The element of surprise

the infantry continued to suffer heavy losses and

without making any headway,

-the 10th Tank Battalion was

ne:ver able to get clear of the woods to make its thrust; therefore, Colonel C.H. nderson, th ; Reserve Command commander,

directed that- the troops .rrithdraeI to R0TGE1 under cover of darkness to reorganize, vehicles baccin ftor cons ii erable

difficulty
the

with

stuck during the with its

-ra:l,

47th
<-rea at

Armored Infantry Bttalion close l in

assemly

ROTGENT just prior to daybreak cr 26 Yove mber, Thus, fifty in after a day's fighting and at a co:st cf one hundred the command succeeded? attack on HJ~R!CE GPU1.

actual casualties and three tanks, r-achin-' its line cf departure for

the

The action can be

summarized b v saying that enemy mines and

16

and

so;7

ground

madle

mc.,vornent

rf

tanks

almost impvossible-,

while artillery acd mortar fire and numierous anti-personnel mines made dismounted advance very costly. Following this unsuccessful that HURTGEN could not be taken

attack

it wnse decided

froml

this direction and

would

have to be captured by infantry forces frcrm- the w st :an(! northhest.

Even :hen elearents of the 121st Infantry

Regiment

were

entering the north,- estern outskirtus of HUR"TGrI to them oan 28 Novomb<:r as brouight out still

(the tc~n fell

in

Chapter VI) it was

imposible, fox'r other forcos to : ebouch from the

woods

along the road from the southwest..

All ,uring, the period tha ^t the 121st was reducing the
German defenses at r1'RTG FNh, the 10th Tank Battalion wa-3s parked' phiceh was a ono.-,way, narrcx, forest on secondary

along the arm~orerI divisio~n's MISR, circuitous route

roa cds

from ROTGEN through the

to

ROTT (K 22326) en77'ALL.

TOur t

parking

on

this

road must have:

interfere;' seriously -'ith suporly, but there,

was no place to clear at any moment

---

and

besid'es we~t rare

expectingz

to attack

for abcut three drayrs "5

MLEINHI1U

0r'"--rati

2to __, '~O.No

When on 28 N\ovembor the 121st Inf entry Regiment too:.k HIJRTGEN,3 CCR wass dire cta

to continue the attack to KI 5T, :

H1k.U

and on to BERG;STEIN as orig.inaFlly planned,

The onemy Aefn_

ding- KLEINH/L. consisted of three infantry companies

of

sev-

enty men each, three self-propelled guns, .an~i several gun~

137

sections from the 31st Miachine Gun Battalion(towed 75 mm.) The friendly order of battle remained the same except that one platoon of Company C, 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and the attached flail tank were transferred from the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion to the 10th Tank Battalion while the multiple AAA D16 reverted to its parent batteryo The general plan called for the 121st Infantry Regiment 6 to clear north to the road junction at 052366 and for the 4th Infantry Division to push its attack on GR0SSHAJ* The

10th Tank Battalion established liaison with elements of the 22nd Infantry Regiment and Company C, 70th Tank Battalion, both of the 4th Infantry Division, which mere just west and north of KLEINH.. These elements were not to fire on KLEINHUJ unless fired on by high velocity weapons. The tank-infantry

teams of the 10th were to move through GEiMETER with the head of the column to reach the draw north of IURTGEN at first on 29 November, attack through KL IIIAU to seize HILL 401 light

northeast of the town, and hold until relieved by the 1st battalion, 13th Infantry Regiment, which was to follow the armored elements, The 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion; in dirits fires north of KI.EINIHiU to

oct support, would concentrate

prevent retreat but would be prepared to shift to targets called for by forward elements, while the 47th Armored Infantry

Battalion would stand by in reserve southeast of GERMTERa

138

Betueen 25 and 28 November, guns were emplaced on a hill

two self-propelled 155mm.

about 5,000 yards west of KLEIN-

HAU and proceeded to destroy the tow ,n by direct fire starting at the south end and working north up the main street. in

addition, artillery fires had been placed on KLEINHAU all the previous week by the 8th Division and supporting artillery, but as a variation it was decided not to shell the town the night before the attack. How;;ever, preparatory fires

from sixteen to eighteen battalions were fired immediately preceding the jump-off. the towin in the path of it Although there

;-Vas

a trench around

the

attack which reconnaissance had

reported occupied, of the attack it

ws only lightly manned

at

thetime

was felt that this ,vas because the Germans

the night before

remained in town during the artillery lull

and were caught there in the morning by the intense preparetion. 7 This perhaps facilitated the entrance to the town

but at the same time left more Germans to be rooted from the cellars;

hether it

is

more boneficial to defeat the enemy

infantry in

the relative open outside of town or to have to towvn is certainly debatable. that the

combat them house to house in

The reason the 10th preferred the second method is tankers did not want to

assault

the fixed, dug-in positions;

they all had developed a high respect for the panzerfaustA8 Returning to the assault, the 10th Tank Battalion task Haamberg began moving but again

force under the command of Lt Col W.A, forwvard in

the early morning hours of 29 November,

139

there was trouble reaching the line of departure. of the column with the

The head

"married"

C companies leading finally

passed through HURTGEN at 0756 after having trouble by-passing the same crater that caused trouble in and still the HURTGEN action At

further difficulties with mines on the raod.

0860 the attack begen as forward elements opened from positons just south of KLEINH:IU.

direct fire

The infantry had been

dismounted early to breach a minefield that had been reported south of the town. The dismounted infantry was hit heavily but they although

by artillery and mortar fire and became pinned dow.n, did determine that there was no specific minefield,

the shoulders of the road were littered with AT and AP mines. From this time on it was extremely difficult to keep the dis-

mounted infantry up with the tanks. This early dismounting of the infantry and the resulting casualties was considered by Lt. Col. Hamberg to be one of the biggest mistakes he made during the war, 9 although it certainly seems justified in view of the information then

on hand.

The original report of the minefield was received

from the infantry and it was verified several times by prisoners of war. In addition, the report was "clinched" the day

before the attack when, after a light snow, a regular pattern of partially melted rings could be seen just where the mines were supposedly located; these rings were later found to have been caused by cow dung1 The incident is of value to show how

a series of small circumstances can lead to a wrong tactical

140

decision even by an experienced leader9

It

was decided that

from this time on the armored infantry would not be dismounted in a tank-infantry attack until forced to do so; this rule spite of the

was

followed at both BS'NDWBERG and B"'RGSTEIN in mines,

and

the attacks progressed much more rapidly and were

0

less costly to the infantry.l

The artillery preparation lifted at 0858.

The second

tank platoon of Company C moved into the torn from the south; the first platoon attempted to flank the torn from the west left the road; the third

but began bogging down as soon as it

platoon acted as a base of fire from the jump-off point at the crossroads on the southern edge of the tcwn. Azt 09C8

the second platoon reported that it had entered the tuvn but that its infantry had fallen behind due to accurate artillery

time fire.

About this time information Infantry Division -7as not would commence its

was

received that the 4th as planned but

trtacking GR0 7SHAU

attack at 1100.

Since the tanks were drapermission was received

ing heavy direct fire from GIROSSF1'JJ1, to place 'rtillery duced this fire. By 1101 the 10th Tank in twn

ccncntrations there which considerably

re-

Battalion

had

two tank platoons

but the infantry .as still the town near first

about ten minutes behind. outskrirts was destroyed at In

Mark IV tank in

the

very close range after it

disabled one CCR tank.

141

addition, per; it

several AT guns were found unmansred in

KLEINHAU pro-

w-as not determined

whether

thoy had been abandoned or At

whether the crews

had

been knocked out by the artillery.

1012 the armored jnfantry arrived and began clearing the buildings, and by 1058 the "married" A companies moved up and sent one platoon of infantry into tclwn to assist in the mopping

up while the remainder of the tanks and infantry fought ':est of KLEINLU to flank the t on and and to strike it from the north

-rest

(Figure

i_).

This maneuver was likewise extremely

subjected to devast-

difficult for the infantry as the force ,as ating artillery and mortar fire.

While

this w,. s

occurring,

the 47th Armored infantry Battalion task force moved forward from ROTGEN to its reserve position lest of GZRKeTER. rd ^nd_ th

A message was recejivzed at 1100 that t)--e Panzer attack.

Regiments

were, moving south toward GROSS!-AU in

a counter-

All units -ere alerted- and nines and tank destroyers but nothing came cf the attack except that

were rushed forward,

Company C reported hearing sounds of enemy tanks moving into 11 G IOSSI-MU at 1118. By 1245 the attack -was progressing wrell although movement cf the dismounted infc.ntry was still crstlyT because of the s

continuing

high traj; otory fire,

At this tide Com;pany A

on the north

edge

of town while Ccmpany C vas

crking thrugh

the town from the south Germans fron the oellars,

ith the infantry who were flushirg primarily by th; use of white p? os-

phorous and fragmentation gronddes,

About

1327 the Tiveath_r

142

~-

cr
K

(~A

0 ~>
~QY

(L

30
AI

(d ,D
Q 1

I" KIF

C"3

55

GO

2
-'

?~
10

"

Figure 7'.

10th Tank Battalion

cleared and friendly aircraft appeared overhead, wihich brought about a noticeable decrease in enemy artillery thereby enabling house to house

the infantry to proceed more effectively writh its clearing.

In general, the enemy had evacuated the town before hcwover, this did note preclude bitter house some sections. Com-

the tanks errve:;

to house fighting in

The tocwn wr as securely in nmerican hands by 1730. pany A, 10th Tank, Battalion,

,ward

established road blocks just for" 12 of the high ground northeast of KLEINIEU and secured

the north half of the toen, while the other half. was secured by Company C, 10th Tank Battalion. tank destroyers moved into th;; ton The twc platoons of attached but the 47th Armored Infantry
Duri.ng the night

Battalion remained wost

November, ibility elements

of GIiiETER,

of 29-30

of the 13th Infantry Regiment assumed respons-

for the defense of KLEINHJVU althcugh they occupied the

town only and did not occupy the rcad blocks or any positions on the hill north ; ast of to;n. The infntry stated that they The road

did not have sufficient strength to go out that far.

blocks were ria inta~inc d by the 10th Tank Battalion until 300$00 November when they lore -Aithdra,,vn by request cf the infantry since they "drew fire." The CCR plan ha semble in calid for the 10th battalion to

as-

ROTGEF upon completion cf its

mission, but V Corps

ncw directed that the elements assemble and remain in the open
field just est of KLEINW U. On the 30th the Germans brought

?p eight self-propelled

gunA to the edge cf the Twoods just east

144

of GROSSHOiU

and placed direct fire on this assembly area. but refused because the.enemy

!ir

,..,,as requested

was

in

the 4th In-

fantry Division zone; hcwever artillery fire from the 95th armored Field Artillery Battalion caused the guns to - ithdrw

with

a prebable loss of three.

The

10th

Tank Battalion had one

tank disabled by a mine when it

moved to engage these guns and

lost one half-track -hich burned after being hit by a high explosive round. That evening Lt.-Col. Hamberg moved his battalion about seven or eight hundred yards ,est received into the

woods

and as a result

uch

less artillery fire, which had been continuous This mcve was Even though

since he assembled in the open field as ordered. made writhout ordere, but it the ,roods

7as

later approved.

w-ere rather thick, the standing was good enough to

.fter the area ;aT cleared cf "Bouncing

permit maintenonce 13 Bettys." The a cti cn

of the Ger -aans in the HURTGEN-KLERINiJ

area

,as characterized by stubbornness rather than by aggressiveness. Bt no time ;T as there any inidicat on of a general withdraral. The enemy refuse 9, except oy d i_.r: ct pressure, to give ground obstacles

which

he held by full

1use

f natural and man-made

ith very heavy artillery and mcrtar support; yet contrary to his usual custom, he did nct counterattack. This

may

be partially

explained by the fact that a field order of the lstPnchine GunBattl-io4AasKLINH&U at all fouT4 w;,rich show-,Ted its costs."
In addition.

mission to be "to hold the

directi on of the

145

attack

on KLEINHAJ

,as

soewrhat of a surprise

arecorring

to PIV

reports, north.

as
This

the Germans expected the attack to come from the

is

substantiated by -the Minefield and trench

system

bet--een KLEIhHATJ and GROSSHLLU Figure TI) .

In the battle for iYLE~sh1HAU, OCR

captured fifty-five

prisoners and lost sixty men,

one tank destroyer, thi.rteen. halfand eight tanks (two

,ere lter tracks (some w

fire~ and six

recovered),

to

!T

to mines).
BT{It',DBITB YIRG O~erat cn 3 i cv_ t o-_ _e ,

Follu-ing the

seizu're

of K-LEIN Y.1,

plon. s ere clcmplet d

focr the attack on B T&'NDE TBEG. Division

Elements of the 8th Infarttrv,

were to

approach F iND DiB]31 G through

the

-roodrs from

\TOSSENICK and to secure

fcr thet armored

line cf

Ilo-Parture

north of the town

the

attack

from 'KLEIA THAU.

However,

infantry

had considerable difficulty advancing thn'cugh the '-:oodis so that OCR? ,,as directed to lay---nch its att -ck on 2 December rather than
"wait

any longer (Figure The ,assign~ent

8). of
troops -rithin the ccmIniand remrained

te same as at troops. On

KLBIHLJ
encroy

except for miner changes in. supportring RPiU1s w,-)s -'efenoed by elements

the

side,

of

the : 055th and 1056th

oiiments, the 2d and 3d Companiesmcof

rimar^ilu

the 189th BnEineer

Battalion (used

as

infantryr),

the

189th Anti-Tank Battalion ('towed 75-mm. guns only t;vo of" -hicn were actuallyr in Br ANDE;JtBURG), the 21 Com on983 T;innt

and one battalion of dual purpose anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns. These enemy units -:ere roc.Aving

direct

suppo-rt from the

1.46

189th Artillerv Regiment and from at least two batteries of

120-mm. mortars. BRNDENBERG is southea st from LJJEI situated on a narrow. ridge which runs t BERG S'STIN
cn

The ridge

had

open, rollon

ing,

cultivated fields

the crest and was heavily wocded

the slopes.

A paved road running along the crest ,-as in

ex-

trernely poor repair and craters. dcrinated

-as

pockmarked by numerous artillery are

The approaches to bcth BPANDFNBERG and BERGTSTEIN by HILL 402 (F087338) six hundred meters east of

BEIGSTEIN and

dtcu

other just east of the

ROER RIVER and north-

,est of
KO

NIDEGGEN (F115332)

and they could be observed from the

D.iDJERSCHEIDT

-SCHMh4TDT area (Appendix 1),

The reserve coEand plan -,as to attack southeast along the ridge with the 10th Tank fantry front lines (Figure .) Battalion passing through the inat 020730 Deco-muber to seize BI-AN-

DENBERG and to be prepared to continue the attack to seize and hold BFRGSTEIN. The

47th

iArmcred Infantry Battalion was to take prepard to

a position astride the road southw,,,est of GiJ1YUA',fiTE move through HUIRTGEN and K~I IRFUJto defense of BI'iNDEB &G or .

attack or to assist in the Di-

EBRGSTEIN within thirty minutes.

rect artillery support

-ould be furnishoced by the 05th Jlrrnc'red

Field Artillery Battalion reinforced by the 56th Field Artillory Battalion and a 155-mm. be available
:if

Howitzer battalion.

ir

suoport

could

the -reather pr mitted.

Cwmpany D, 10th Tank

Battalion was to cover both flanks of the attack.

14

I (~D(>j
c2~y. 6A
YvrI 94-1
lb

(9

G31(
8Q

a
BPY Qr S Prf?

Figure

e.

CRP oe

Aoins f)3 Dee mer 1944.

The attack did not cornmence at 0730 sinc - the 10th Tank Battalion said "it

-,Tas too dark to shoot," but elements did move

''hen the attack finally jumped

forw:ard to the line of departure. off, vory little

progress

as made during the morning

as

tho

road was well covered by camouflaged SP guns in Bd' INDENBBRG, and other positions.

KOM i"ESGRHIDT,

One of these guns was later

located 7ithin friendly lines.

When the tanks attempted to de-

ploy they found they wre confined to the roaad because the shoulders w:,er e deep -mud. and the fields inae mined. field ras covered by automatic This mine-

one panzerfausts from the aanedpns

draws and by small arms and in-achirne gun fire from the -:-ods to. the east, in addition to the self-propelled guns referred to above.

Two flights

cf

ai..rcraft repcrted at 0835 and 091+2 respectthe ex-

ively to the forwa-rad air controller who was riding in ecutive officer's tank. strafing targets in woods;

These --ore employed in bombing and BE}ISFEGi, the surrounding

BRLNDEI"IBERG,

but their effectiveness -wras limited by the very poor and at 1020 the -eatl-er eliminated further air support.

visibility,

The only apparent apprcach to BRBA.NDENBERG was straight do.n the road. Fighting occurr 7I on both flankcs since the in-

fantry had not secured the east side cf the road ncr had they eliminated a pocket on the tank of the first est just southeast of ITIr:GS iNr

platoon of Company 1 hit

mine on the right

side of the road and care under (75 or 88 mm.); ithdrawal

direct

fire from KO: QR!BEIDT

when the platoon leader got cut to direct the the tanks, he and several men who had fallen to

of

149

the grounda tc avoid artillery bursts mCnved abruptly. In th.e meantime,

;sere

run over

vwhen

the tanks

th:o more tanks hit mines on

7.nd direct FIE fire

the ,:-Vest side of the road.

Axccurate artillery

ccntinued to pour onto the ridge.

By 1245 the situation had become static.

lost four tanks to minas ber

Compa1ny A. had

or

direct fire and had had a large numappeared necessary to be made. Per-

of

radio ant;n nae

shot off; also, it

remove the mines before any further advance could mission -,as received from the present gains in

rth

Infantry Division to consolidate

crder tc remcve the mines u.-nder cover of darkCompany D, 10th

ness and to resume the attack on 3 December. Tank Battalion,

suppcrted by infantry, tcok over the front n113 C returneAl est

positions while Companies A

of

KLETINTLHU to

reorganize fcr the attack the follc-Thg day. The line -;T s hoPeU1_. by Ccijnpany during the night talion,

D,

10th Tank Battalion,

hile Ccmpany C, 22d Armored Engineer Bat-

cleared a path through the minefield west

of the

roLcd

by removing two hundred fifty Holz mines.

The minefield i..tself

was situated on the friendly slope of a rise that d-minatesd

BR'NWDENBERZG. The crigiri- 1 plan as to clear five lane: t, peronly one

mit the tanks to advance in line across the crest, but sector wvas cleared; not make full use h ol,.ver,

th.e Germans fcr some recs cin dir -hen t'le attaci:

:f

this toctical adcvantage

was made.
f::.prisoners were .ere sent for-,ard tken diring the night as patrols These patrols

ntc the surrounding !ods.

150

reported that enemy in large numbers as well as panzerfaust teams were active throughout the night, led by Lt. One of these patrols

Miersma,

commanding officer of Company C-, 47th

Armored Infantry Battalion, got through the minefield and ran upon eigtt Germans in dug-in positions; these eight followed Apparently some

the patrol back to our lines to surrender.

of the Germans liked this type of fighting no more than did the Americans; Heavy artillery fire was placed on BADNBaBERG all night with a ten minute preparation in the attack~ the morning just before

This was followed by bombing and strafing as

the tanks moved forward at 0308O0 December to the minefield which was the designated line of departure. "married" C companies were in the lead, This time the

followed by the A

companies which were to establish a base of fire at the top of the crest. Lt.

Moving to the line of departure the tank of

T.A. Maguire, commander of Company C, was disabled by a

mine before he could get into position; he changed to another tank and continued to lead the column down the road even though they received terrific artillery fire from all directions O P,41iIERSCHETDT, NIDEGEN east of the ROER, and from

OBERMMJBACH (F088361)

due east, as well as direct fire from An enemy smoke screen slow, ed

positons near BRANDEBER.T.

progress somewhat initially, but by 09.12 with the air still attacking, the C companies were ready to enter the town.

The base of fire companies

were
151

receiving some artillery

C-

, .

t~r ~.J.

!f>
i ~7

to

'p to
POR

-W / **
i

+I,

.14

I,

d
PL,

f C XIX

ASSN' TLT GU S CF~ T,-

47P~ T'

('7

IN FIN RY R' TTT,IOU STTnPpO'

A.

MTC K

71

VP7*

fire.'hut mostly small arms fire from a drawiT west of the road which had not-yet been eliminated by the infantry. Another flight of aircraft controlled by the forward air controller riding in the Company C column began attacking at

0958.

BERG, As the air strafed and bombed BR NDET!

the tank column pushed down the road with the first platoon going straight into to-n and the third platoon swinging left to hit the southeast edge of the towan.

When

guns from

BERGSTETN opened up on the third platoon, geants got burned up a'-out it and ,ent

' one of the ser-

down to BERGSTEIN

where he destroyed the AT gun that had fired at him and knocked the sight off another. BERflSTETN,
1 4

A second tank moved dowvn to of tanks in .BIRGSTE TN

but this premature movement

caused the 28th Infentry fire on the tow:n.

Regiment to call for corps artillery

This fire

was

cleared by Lt.

Col. Hamberg

because at the time he had not been informed of the two tanks advancing to BERGSTEIN; iwhen he hf-ard

they

were his tanks,

he had them withdraw;-.-n immediately

15

No casualties

were

suffer-,,d in this particul :r encounter; and although the tanks were withdrawn, mined. Lt. Col. Hamberg felt and had recorimended during the it

was learnedr the road to BLRGSTEIN was not

planning the night before that the battalion could and should have pushed right into BERGSTEIN, contention,

16

The biggest bone of

hocever, seemed to be the fear of higher head-

quarters that the second town could not be held and that the

counterattack thus incurred might not only cause the loss of BERGSTEIN but of BR NDENBERG as well, primarily because of the heavy
goods

around the town and

the non-availability of

infantry to assist in cposed .fllanlo

the defense of the towns and the e744

The remainder of the tanks and infantry continued cleaning up BRPNDEIBERG and established security. One of these

tanks -wThich had been set out as an outpost on the main road
at the south edge of tarmn w as hit by a panzerfaust; the concussion blew off an open hatch, killed the tank commander, blew open a closed hatch, tank.

and

blew two crewmen out of the

By 1115 the seizure of BRANDEBERG was complete and taken. (Some of these

two hundred seventy-six prisoners .ere

wvere taken by the 121st and were turned over to the 10th). Howrever, elements of the 8th Infantry Division had

not taken their planned obiectives, so OCR was directed to assist the 28th and 121st Infantry Regimnts. 10th Tank Battalion, supported the 121st in hill Company D,

seizing a small

northwest of BIRANDIBERG from wihich one hundred forty

prisoners were taken, and the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion

was

attached to the 28th Infantry Regiment at 031200 Decembe r zone.

to assist in its

At
planes,

1430 the 10th Tank Battalion as attacked by enemy

and two planes were shot dwn ,pith no damage to the These planes, houever, gave BFRGSTPIN "one hell of

battalion.

153

over and the Gemans captured there by us the next 17 1 day were still pleenty bitter about it. ' The units were now,

working

disposed to prepare for the attack on BERGSTEIN and to defend BRANDENBFERG; tank destroyers and infantry -ere in hile tanks and infantry were in south of town. the towvn

positions near the road junction

The tanks of Company D were used to patrol the to BRDENBEPRG. Enemy artillery BPASNDENBE'G,

MSR, the road from KLEINH!

and mortar shells continued to fall on the troops in

chile our own artillery interdicted the road to BF:BGSTEIN throughout the night. Two platoons of Troop C, 85th Reconnaissance Elements

Squadron, w7ere sent to BAUhDENBERG to act as infantry,

of these platoons formed tw-:o night patrols to enter BERGSTEIN from the north

and

es t,

respectively.

These patrols reported the

the

town occupied and verified the absence of mines in

approaches. In the meantime, the 4.7th Armored Infantry Battali.on

(supposedly the CGR Reserve) was given a mission by the 8th Division of clearing a lrge rubbl..e pile

and

fire trench at

the east edge of v OSSENTACK .

This mission w-as assigned to the B companies, who launched the

second platoons of the "married" attack at 03]430 December,

A second team cf married platoons

w.7ould follow the attac: and push southeast through the objective
to contact infantry elements at the woods line

hile mortars The

from Headquarters Company smoked the KOt iV, SRS hEIDT ridge. rubble pile; w7raS

crescent-shared _-nd surrounded by an elaborate addition to the already existing

system of nines and fox holes in

154

fire trench and draw nearby (Figure

13)

Just as the attack jumped off, the area -as strafed and bombed by a group of .tw.nty to thirty that attacked BER ):a ,-

!vE-lO09s (the same planes

One ship w.as reportedly knocked down

by fire of the infantry or tank units.

As

the attack again got

under Vaar9 orders '-ere received to send tanks immediately to repel a hostile counter-attack northeast of VOSSENAr.K, but this turned out to be only about t-.renty-five Germans who advanced a short w.ay out of the 'Moods and then retired. By 1530 the attack

had progressed to within approximately seventy-five yards of the objective .,Then the load tank hit a mine end was knocked out. Although the infantry attempted to continue the advance, was drivn off by small then ithdrew and tried it

arms
to

and artillery fire.

The

infantry

attack

the objective from the. north

supported by by automatic,

direct

tank fire, but they again were driven off Each time the infan-

artillery, and mortar fire the enemy in

try approached,

the southern fire trenches fired

a green flare wvirhi ch brought dow-nn heavy artillery and mortar barrages from the K0&:RSr -HEDT area. During the same period

the tank-infantry team tried to move around to the south ,-:-.yd east to reach the w.oodline, but hit minefields which stopLd

the tanks and high velocity fire that prevented the infantry from earing the field or from moving through it. A third

unsuccessful attempt wias

made

to seize the rubble pile after

Jahich the 2 th Infantry Regiment directed the forcs to wiTthdraw, reorganize, and make an attack that night.

At 4O2-T9

155

December the forces, wbi ch had been reinforced by the "scorpion" tank, jumped off. The "scorpion"

worked

excellently at first

but hit a nest of five mines w~hich blewi off the chains; the tank, still moving, hit another, mine and lost a track. Nevertheless,

by 1200 the pile was cleared of enemy after tw,1o more tanks were lost -Goldman, one to artillry fire

and

the other to a mine.

Lt.

corriranding the force,

was commended by the CO of the

20th Infantry Regiment side for more than a

as

this position had been a thorn in their

-eek.

The 47th was then directed to attack southeast from VOSSENACK, plan reinforced by Company C,

28th

Infantry Regiment.

The 10th

was

to divide the eight remaining tanks of Company B,

Tank Battalion, of Company B,

into t-7o groups, one to mount the remaining men

47th Armored Infantry Battalion, and the other to the attack had to be

mount Company C, 28th Infantry; ho7ever,

postponed since the men of the latter unit could not be rallied 19 and reorganized in timo. This latter plan Resorve

was

abandoned as the 47th reverted to and was directed to conjunc-

Command control at 041600 December,

reorganize in G R!.-Ti t prepared to attack BERGSTTN in tion with the 10th Tank Battalion. BERGG STEIN Oncration.(f On. 4 December COR STEIN. to 8 Dec

was

directed to prepare to attack BERG(2)

Colonel Anderson strongly requested (1) air support,

the use of both his battalions, end

(3) that the attack: not be

launched until the infantry had successfully cleared the' flanks,.

156

The first request dependod on the s1eather; the second -7as granted; and in regard to the third, it 'as agreed that the infantry

should clear the enemy from the draw southeast of HURTGEN and should occupy the woods south cf BRNDEID1PEP. before the attack -. ould be launched.
showin in Figure 9.

Res-.rve Command formed its task forces as

The Germans defending BERGSTEIN consisted of the 2d Battalion, 980th Re irmient, (approximately four hundred men) the remaining elements of the 189th Anti-Tank Battalion, five self-

propelled guns, all supported by the same artillery that backed up the defenses of BPiNDENBBERG. Later the same day, CCR -as directed to be repered to

attack on order of the 8th Infratry Division after 050800 December. The 10th Tank Balttalion was to seize and hold north and
the situation permitted,"

northeast BERGS TEIN and HILL 402 "if

and to utilize the light tank company to secure the MWSR and to maintain contact ;;ith

elements
The

of the 121st Infantrr

Regiment

Armored Infantry Bttalion, 20 w7ith eleven tanks and sixty-four fighting men, -1as to move; on order to an assembly area south of KLEINHAU and attack on 'rder behind and wpest of the 10th Tank Battalion to seize the southwrest and south portions of BELrGSTETN. was to prepare

of the northeast flank.

47th

and

hzld

This batt ;.Jiou

T defenses can all roads entering from the south

and -pest and to contact the 28th Infantry Regiment on the *est.

'eather

peritting, air support

,ould

be made available.

The

95th Armored Field Irtillcry Battalion was to furnish

diirect

157

947((/
-/io & A/A7 AIB c/io & c/47 AIB D/1O TK BNT
2 AEB B/47 & B/10 TK BNT

IFc
i,B,C

j95

1/0628 TD BNT

C/387 AAUA BN~t

1/95

AFA

BN

c/as RCN BIT (-.)

>

IHQ

22-

1085

Figure 9.

Task Orgarization of CCR

artillery support4 The attack was postponed until 051400 December because of bad weather. However, when the weather cleared, the air The

flights arrived for the attack and gave excellent suppott6 flights were controlled by a forward air controller who rode in the executive officer's tank.

Air-ground coordination between

the armor and the planes worked perfectly, although some confusion was caused by an air controller with the 8th Infantry Division who directed the planes to bomb BERGSTEIN after the tanks had entered the town; this was countermanded in time by the tank air

controller, who was with the battalion commander on a small rise where he could see the entire operation. Between attack missions

the planes remained overhead thus reducing considerably the volume of enemy artillery fire. The assault guns of the 10th Tank Battalion, prior to the dump-off, were to take up defiladed positions just north of BERGSTEIN to cover the northeast portion of the town. The "mar-

ried" C Companies swinging west behind the assault guns would attack the eastern portion of the town. A Companies "married",

which now had but seven tanks, would follow C and move directly into town. The married B Companies under the 47th Armored

Infantry Battalion were to swing west of A and hit the town from the southwest (Figure 10) 21 The plan was a good one and worked almost perfectly; the one delaying factor was that the assault gun platoon failed

159

C>'

C'
'(7/ U

I
A
& WQ

'V

*bug

*u~ t
S

Kr>

7)
l

vJV

C Klii5~J> (43 (III) S&4DcoD 99cc~U~'<'~ cQ &

C,
~

JO(*)

Gd $t

ng

-~

(2Q9(
p

K
(4;

cy~jI~
' 3'
in t

WI

4Th

KY
(9
Kay

7)

'9
d

fiejs /17/K)
I(
'-'

{3
F

p
it'
(<C)
~2'

1'-

wi

aym
V

J.

Oxi

J3

(~A

(2

fl
K,)

KLo ,~,/9

A~

3
K'
(C~

(~>
~~(1

~~0>

4
,,,<1

I,

Li
CA

K>

--

A j

cm
C .'

('7
~INv
-I

(~> C'. f )

KY
7
"

(~C

(4

U
C
,1'

'LI,
7)
K>
c-N')

,,1~-*

,v1Fgure

'Ij

CC R attack on'

to turn off east as soon as they should have and ran into an unreported minefield; The rear assault gun was knocked out by ithdrawal of the others, the platoon

amine and blocked the

leader was killed by artillery ";hen ho dismounted to direct the withdrawal. The two remaining assault guns fired from this a minefield and under heavy artillery fire.

position although in

Company C moved east of the assault guns as soon as the first AG stopped. and burned. In doing so, one tank was hit by an L-mm. shell

All this ground was under observation from a ridge

at NIDEGGEN across the river, and the operation wras constantly subjected to heavy artillery fire. reported he mop up. The conurander of Company C

was

in

the tcwn at 1444 and by 1500 had begun to

At the same. time

companies ,sere moving in

and the

47th task force

was

entering the western portion of

BERGST1EIN.

All this action tock place tnder unremitting however, this time the armored infantry

artillery fire; mounted in half-

was

tracks following the tanks (after the lesson learned at KLEINH/J). "Infantry dismounted couldn't have live>d through that

inferno of fire, but as it was 77e had only one casualty going 22 into town." Then the infantry of the 47th task force dismounted and deployed to the the tow7n. By 1720 the mission accomplished, but the town est in a skirmish line at the tip of

of
was

taking BERGSTEIN wras reported bigger than had been thought and Two reconnaissance

an urgent call for more infantry was made.

platoons

wraere set out as outposts,

and the two engineer platcons

161

Thich had been kept in reserve were brought forward to act as infantry. In addition, Com-pany D came up to assist in the defense. For'!lard observers

with

all

three tank-infantry teams

,were casualties and trained observers w7ere requested from the

8th

Infantry Division.

Radios had to be removed from disabled

tanks to furnish them with the communications necessary. Since the 121st Infantry Regiment failed to secure its objective during the attack, it flank with artillery fire. by the infantry, and one TD so was planned to cover the north

Nor was the gap on the "-jest cleared

OR was reinforced by one infantry company to

-acoi pan3

assist

in

defending that flank. six tanks,

In this attack COC

lost four assault guns,

and

one

M-10

tank destroyer.

in fact, all units -- ere seriously Figure ILL, Some

understrength in men and vehiclcs as shon in

of the vehicles listed in Figure l1-were tanks that had been disabled in evacuated, the battles for HURTGEN and KLEINkU and had been repaired, and returned,

Intermittent artillery aind mortar fire throughout the night further demolished BERGSTEIN. came from the onemy area all lso, considerable noise

night which seemed to indicate ttack. Finally at

the Germpans ;ere preparing an

0640

an

artillery preparation began and lasted about fifteen minutes. This consisted mostly of high-velocity fire from three sides -SCHMIDT, and -rest. KOLk;,ERC SEIDT, ND GEN, actually it and the woods to the south

came from four sides as part of the

24
friendly artill,,ry was falling on CCR's southwestern troops."

.62

Unit 10th Tank Battalion Co A Co B Co C 47th Armored Infantry Battalion Cc A Co B Co C Company C, 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion Company C. 22nd Armored Engineer Battalion

Officers

EM

Vehicles

5 Tanks 8 Tanks 8 Tanks

9 Half-tracks

Approximately two platoons.

23 Figure 11. Strength of CCR after taking

ERGSTEIN.

163

At

060710 December the first

of three counteratt:.acks -.705 launch-

ed1 into the sector of the 4+7th

Armored

Infantry Batt- lion from

the-

oods to the southeast.

.men of

This attack was ,ide by about five

Re iment

hundre'

the 1st Bttalione 0:1 0th

(PV s

later

stated they hal moved from the S'-HM!WDT arean during the night

of the

3-4 December),

supported by about ton POanther tanks and. as-

sault guns.

The catt acking forces r.ere brought under fire by 4Ath

10th Tank Battalion

everything

it

hat; but the battalion :.hich 25

now h,,d less than one 76-a1M. rer compoany -An: the rest,

were 75-mm.
in

just bouncd off

the ene!-,y tanks."

av .lable

The troops

the 47th sector

a'-c. fired. all

=1 s c alled

-epons. Division.

and cor-(s =artillery

c)d "began l andi.ng in about This

thirty minutes Thich was as soon as coi..'i be expected."

tim. e

interval

was
,

spe ?ifically statedb

Lt- Goda; howver

Lt.-Col.

flarber
"That

who

comman1 rdedl thie 10th Tank Battalion in i4th that ststemont:

BEF GSTBIN,
artillery

had this to say -hen conf r,'nted sure is a surprise to :)e!

plan

-ith

77e had'' an elaborate

numberd

could call therm!_do-rn. The conccntratil on overlay had been i ssued to leaders c,n to and inclm Ong tank ccmmcqners. The Corps Artillery Officer tel 1 tr tchat w- fired morL than 4 C,OCO rcun <s of -r-till ry in the fe - days we wet're n BLRGSTE_,IN T-'his (stat .,.eri-t Lt. Go-ldn is grossly unfair to our artiller.y,_ since a lack strengths an - the soctocr inv or i. should,. p-rove tha1:t a.rt illat rc-ur acl z bore: the def ense., view.,. of artillery rrIn support and coordination in pre-

concentrations andl anyonen

of

vious attacks, is

it

seemrs likely teat Lt.

-Col.

Ha.brg s pi cture

closer to t' e actual facts. Ait this tiMe it woe-Istill ark

3ndAmrican

forces we16re

164

i '1

E1:

ROCKETS

FIRE

ON ThT

E TEIY COTTTFI

having considerable difficulty finding targets although the

Germans did not seem to be having the same trouble. The German

tanks had moved to the flank and were firing point-blank range, while tho infantry came through in groups --

'they t ould have

28

made good targets if we could have seen them!"

There

rwere 'two

TD's near the edge of the town, but one received a direct hit before

it

could do any good.

The other waited for a German out;

I

tank to come up within seventy-five yards and knocked it the enemy must have -oickd up its gun flash,

as

it

'7as

hit

a felw

seconds later.

1s daw7n came, the Company B

moved to

command tank (the only 76-mm, the south edge of town. an open field; the 76-rrm.

Twith the 47th's forces)

Dayligt disclosed a Mark V moving in destroyde it with one shot and quickIn

ly traversed left to got a second Panther in ttwo rounds. the course

of

about an hour this tank knocked out five enemy "lye ere in the open between t7To houses

tanks and an SP gun. of rubble

and

don't know why they failed to destroy us" as

German tanks were in

goor defilade firing positions and the 29 shells burst all around the tank. " ,ll during this t me there were two 90-mm. TD's sitting in the roead to the rear of the tank, but the turrets

ere facing -the wrong way and. the crewrs yoibre in cellrs
would not come out to fire as they said the eney 30 up the gun flashes.

a~nd

ould pick

Fr' endly elem ents had initially w7ithdrawrn about seven houses for more secure positions, but by 0900 the attack was

repulsed and the position was restored with cn estima-ted two hundred enemy killed, sixty captured, five anti-tank guns destroyed. but ten men in and six tanks and

PTJ' later reported that all At 1130 and

one company were casualties,

2420 further attacks were launched (the latter by the R: laement Battflion)

1_9th

but these wmere quickly broken up,

primarily by defensive artillery fires. The importance the Germans placed on repelling this attack by OCR exemplified in von Gersdorff,

and

the sincerity of their counterattacks is

the folloiiing statement Chief of Staff of the

by

General-Major German sir=:

Seventh

The attack of an Americ-n armored group in the iirecticn of BRhKNDE ?G and B_ RGSTEIN in early December was of critical importance. This thrust threatened a deep penetration 7ith a consequent externsion of our thinly spread forces. Every offort weas, therefcre, made to repel this lunge by counterattacks. Having no other reserves available, Seventh ArmvLw:7ith the concurrence of Army Group, decided to commit the 272d VG It wa s an unDivision assisted by assault gun units. ,relcome 'decision for Toth 1 Army and Army Group. The division was scheduled to participate in the RDEZNES offensive and it as recognized that heavy casualties in this engagement would seriously hamper its effectivness. The projection, however, of the American attack on through Di 'BRGSTEIN to the ROER RIVER -woeuld jeoplardize the execution of the YiRD'TNES operation.... Repeated counterattacks against ff1LBDENPERG, BERGSTEIN, and HILL 402 enjoyed no success.

-.

Enemy continued firin

ccnstant artillery and mortar

fires on EERGSTEIN and BRINDIENBE G, and casualties of men and equipment rapidly mounted. By afternoon the

47th

task

force had a fighting strength of but thirty-four men, and the 10th Tink Battalion was compar:Itively as weak. "Couldn't

afford to evacuate combat fatigue cases although some of

166

the men were Out of their minds.

32

In answer tc the request

for reinforcement for the -,vn, word was received that the 2d Ranger Battalion w7ould move into the towrn to reinforce the reserve command and to soize HILL 402 to the east the armor to capture.

which the "situation had not permitted"

Tho hhchine Gun Platccn, 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, was dispatched forward from BRNDNBERG, but the platoon

leader was wcunded as they assembled and a half-track was hit and the platoon sergeant killed when they started dcwn the road. By evening there

--. ere

only ten or twelve men

effective in this platoon.

Then the third reconnaissance

platoon (about forty men) from Troop C, 85th Reconnaissance Squadron, was dismc.qunta _nd started to the south. The artbut fif-

illery gauntlet en route to BEPGSTEIN eliminated all teen;

a German counterattack just after their arrival left the platocn. Next sixty men just

only eight effective in

cut

of the hospitl

wsere sent into BEPGSTEIN as replacements, in poor health and lacked essential It was necessary to pick up weapons

but these men were still individual equipment.33

for them w7herever they cculd be found on

or

near the dead,

arld although they had no blankets there were none available for issue in R

"RGSTEIN.

Rain trwTas pouring dcwn as it

had

been almost constantly fcr several days; all

the men were

soaked and were already suffering from bad colds. However, the

weather suddenly began clearing at about

It attacked

1500, and by 1600 friendly air appeared overhead.

167

the enemy to the south but received heavy anti-aircraft fire and requested artillery to counter this. This request was a position

immediately

acted upon.
3 5

"So seldom were we ever in

to help them,0

and it was later learned that this counterforce which was

battery actually broke up a counterattackinassembling to the southeast.

About 062400 December, the 2d Ranger Battalion began

to move into BIRGSTEIN. B, Lt. R.S. Lewis, said: -uoi.imsnding Company

47th Armored Infantry Battalion,

About midnight a guy came down the road, then two They others, each one five yards behind the other. They asked for enemy were three Ranger lieutenants. positions and the road to take; said they were ready We talked the situation over with the officers. to wo. Let is go, men." We heard They stepped out and said, the tommy guns click and without a word th~6 Rangers moved oast. Our morale went up in a hurry, In the early morning of 7 December the 2d Ranger Battalion seized its east of BERGSTEIN, ob;ective the high round immediately

and later the same day the 121st Tnf.

antry Regiment took its

5 December objective.

Although any action involving HILL 4+02 would be closely allied with BERGSTEIN, no official relationship was

established betwen the 2d Ranger Battalion and elements of CCR in the town. In fact, the entire command relationship in CCR maintained its CP on a rise west of

this operaticn was unusual.

168

KLEINH1 U from which it

had good radio communication to its The 47th and 10th battalions

battalions and to division.

were on an equal hasis and cc-ordination would normally come from COR, but COR was so far from the actual scene of operaticns that nearly all arrangements were made on a basis of mutual unl'erstanding between Lt. Col. Boyer, commanding -the

47th Armored Infantry Battalion, and Lt. Col. HaImberg although

Colonel Anderson' did come forward frequently to check on the situatien. In fact, troops such as engineers, tank destroyers,

and reconnaissance platoons were used in the 47th sector although actually attached to the 10th Tank Battalion. The

relationship ,ith the 2d Ranger Battalion was conducted on the same basis and cooperation was excellent. The ranger bat-

talion

commander said ho would consider himself attached to

the 10th Tank B-ttalion since he felt close coordination was necessary an, since his organization was weak in radios and evacuation facilities; therefore, tanks were given to the rangers for communication and their casualties were evacuated through 10th Tank Brttalion channels.. "ith a maximum of

cooperation and a minimum of confusion the r~anger battalion

lined up along the ,astern signal all edge of B RGSTEN, and at a given rec-

men rose and dashed to the tcp of HILL 402,

eiving only three or four casualties in the few seccnds it took to be on the objective. However, they found the hill

barren and rocky and the enemy artillery began to cause losses. A requ.st was relayed through Lt. Ccl. Hamberg for permiseion 169

to defend forward of the hill, -- the hill told this,

but the request was denied T7hen

must be "occupied and held at. all costs.W'

the Ranger Battalion commander answered that he "every hour on the hour" but could not

would seize the hill occupy it.

This was apparently acceptable as no further

message was received from the

8th

Infantry Division. 37

On 7 December CCR continued to defend in BERGSTEIN. All during the day artillery

continued

to cause casualties.

During the night of 7-8 December,

OCR was relieved by elements

of the 121st Infantry Regiment and of the 644th TD Battalion and was directed to move to TALHORN, ation. BEIGIUPJ, for reorganiz-

It was impossible to evacuate any of the disabled

vehicles at this time, and the command was followed up the road to BDRUANDENB ERG by
Od

artillery

fire.

Then

OCR

was reliev-

Iit

had seventy infantrymen left out of seven hundred

fifty, eight out of fifty-eight tanks, and one tank destroyer out of a company. both because of evacuation. The losses in tanks were particularly high

of enemy action and because of the difficulty Also, losses

were

disproportionately high

among key personnel because the type of fighting placed specidemands on leac1ers; in t addition, many tank comma'nders were During the period of re-

lost as a res~

of time fire.

organization that followed, CCR remained attached to V Corps and had no mission other than being the reserve of that corps,

170

GROSSHIIMJ to SCHABERG L9 Nov to

-5 De)
less

As' stated previously, the 5th Armored Division, COR, was attached to VII Corps on 29 November. troops and COB rerained near NEUDORF, reserve, it

Thile

division

BELIUM, as VII Corps

CCA was attached to the 4th Infantry Division since any breakthrough.

was to be the load combat command in

The 46th Armored Infantry Battalion of COQ1 w7as further attached to the 22d Regimental Combat Team then operating just west of GROSSH:IU. The 46th was given the mission of attack-

ing on the right flank of the 22d to secure the road from KLEIN1HiIU northeast to SCH -FBEPL SCHFB'RG, (074383). The capture of

situated at the eastern edge of the forest, would

provide a point of debouchment for CCAt to attack the following day, the remainder of COA, in the meantime, had moved

to T7EIF=A1L to bo prepared to fellowy the 46th, to break out of the

woods,

and to push the attack rapidly to the ROER The line of departure

RIVER about four th-usand yards east.

fcr the armored infcantry battalion was to be HILLJ 401 just northeast of KL INIT' to be in U; the hill (It andl the town were reported will be remembr rAd from the owing CCR occupied

friendly hands.

}UEINIHlU acc(e1,.:at that the inf antry fo'l rrily the tow:. and 7art the hill)

The lack of time for preparation was a serious handicap as CC. ail atta ;he-a troops had ber. expecting to be erop-

toyed fn the V Corp; zone .here

they ;cre fu..17J abreast of

the situation and torr4n; but now they becamie attached to

171

an infantry division in another corps zone on one day, and the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion was used in an attack on the morning of the next. was that the 22d Information given to the 46th Combat Team was opposed by the and by three rifle

Regimental

7th Company, 985th Infantry Regiment,

companies and a heavy weapons company of the 253dFusilier Battalion,

At
Figure l2

this time CCx consisted of the troops indicated in For the attack, the 46th Armored Infantry Battalicn

was to use its organic companies dismounted with the 44th

Field Artillery Battalion, 4th Infantry Division, in support role. pany a direct

The formation was Company C on the left, Coin-

on the right, and Company B in a reserve echeloned to The Machine Gun Platoon of Headquarters

the right rear, C cmpany

was

attached to Comany _ , while the &'Lmm. mortars

and assault guns genral support, AllO area in

were

retained under battalion control in

No-v_' : ber the battalion moved from its

irnich

assembly

an approach

fcrmaticn;

but as the leading com-

panics emerged frm and1 continuous nrll'c

the T ocds at 045375 they came under heavy ry and mortar fire, and as they, advanc-

ed they -receivecnmall arms and alutomat._c fire from. HILL 01, Although the 22d RCT still insisted this must be friendly fire,

the batt.lion oomnian.er directed an assrult of HILL 401 by Chrlie. The assault, althcugh against 'fieii1<' ?nd reaulted in fire,

wvas

costly biat s, ccl,sful

the capture of fifty*

172

Ki~'
11

;cD46

~o~I 95

I
Al JED2'2

--

1). AL... ...

85

7K

9crc~

I Q ~)

L~Y

Figure 12..

Task Organization of CCA

prisoners

and

six machine gins.

The attack , as continued and

by nightfall the battalion had established a,line approximately one thousand yards short of the ob jective. dug in for the night. The devastating artillery fire created an acute supply and evacuation problem and as a result al4 supplies and evacuation of wounded 1ras carried on during the hours of dark38

iero the battalion

ness.

Casualties for the operation sc far were four officers

and one hundred thirteen enlisted men. This position w-ras held throughout the night with considerable patrol action on bcth sides, and the battalion jumped off at 010900 December Yith the same formation to continue to SCH'L 'BERtG.

Although contact

:ath

the enemy ,gas made im-

mediately, the loading companies had made a costly advance of

i-jie hundred yards by 1100.

Visibility eras limited

to
39

a max-

imum of five yards due to the density of the trees.

Ho-!evver,
bttalicn

the 22d RCT directed at this time that the o position hel(. the night before in 22d ROT, order

wvrithJr='wr

to establish contact wt..th the 2d Battalion,

hich was

about six hundred yards back and eight hundred yards loft. This rithdra -= "'ar successfully acccrpIt shed

-wpith difficulty

hec u.se cf th. ,,uLmr cf -ounded

w;hc

had

to be carried back.

'Thile organizi ng this position a counterattack by a company of the Re.18t U.w4mz: That r -ere issue; th; ;hti te was dispersed, primarlly by artillery fire.
ACA

46th reverted J;c:

trc

and crders

Ooman: y B, 34th Tank Bottalion, would support

174

the battalion in

its

attack east the follcing morning (2 Dec-

ember), but by 021100 December the tanks still had nct arrived

at the battalion.

Then the attack was postponed because of a

German counterattack from GEY and because artillery, fired in

probably

conjunction waiith this attack, had reduced the bat-

talion to below 30 rer cent effectives so that it was withdrawn ,est of KLEINHUX.

All of the effectives except a skeleton com-

pany acting as a. covering force were used to carry the wounded, and during the ithdra,,tal the one remaining battalion staff

officer and the ranking company commander were put out of action. The wuithdra-val ras completed on 022000 December. In the three

days the battalion had suffere-d ten officers ard two hundred t,7enty-seven enliste d casualties. From 2 to 5 December elements of the combat command remained at this location an'. on 5 December assembled in to reorganize and remained there until 9 Decembor. although the 46th -Irmorore Infantry Battalion of IMG1 had advanced to
-writhir^

ZrEIF.LL

about five hundred yards of the eastern adge it was , directed to -rithdraw

of the HURTGal FOIJJST on 1 Dece-Eber,

by the 22d Regimental Combat Team and C0.1 maneuver reor. to commit its

was

not able to gain

forces at this time.

Push to the RORI 9 to 15 Dec During the period that OCR wr as attacking w ith the 8th Infantry Division, the Division Headquarters and COB

were

as-

sembled prepared to take advantage of any success by CGL in breaking out of the woods. On 10 December the Fifth -as ,tis-

175

Dosed w7ith its

headquarters at Z-TFA LLA OCA at IiT, and CCB assembled in

(K915357)

OCR at t LHORN reorganizing, The

KLEITNHM,

8?3d Infantry Division had relieved the 4th Division and

the two exits from the HURTGEN

gas attacking ,GEY and SCHFB~RG,

FOREST.

The Fifth was ordered to attack through

83d Division
tw To armored

elements at 110730 December and planned to columns --

do

so in

CCL~ on the north passing through GEY and

COB

on the

south through SOCHL FB'RG , with the 4th Cavalry Group screening the southern flank of the division. division reserve; howuever, and re-equipping and -iould it OCR nwas to act as the

wiould emphasize reorganization an emergency. it

be called upon only in

Although CCB passed through the

83d

at SCHA1FBERTG,

wvas stoppeJ about twc hunrdr4ed yards to the southeast by enemy resistance; CA was directed to halt for the night in the vicin-

ity of GR0SSH'U

as the capture of GEY was not yet complete.

COB

was having considerable trouble as the only supply line as impssable to heeled cr supplies

was under constant shelling and

semi-track

vehicles; light tanks w,.ere used to bring in The continuance

and to evacuate casualties.

,hich

cf the attack to the 13th

had been

planned

for the 12th was postponer Aiithoe.?gh CQL was still

and then to

the 14th.

unable to move

through GEY, no clear reason has been found for not ^ttempting to continue the attack of the scutharn column. overall On the 14+th the

attack

rw,!s resumred

{nd 0CA r eached

the outskirts of

KUFFFJRATH (103399) after HORM (086396).

breaching

an extensive minefield near

In the south COB met very heavy enemy resistance

176

and initially could advance but one kilometer; however, the 15th CCB split into tom columns,

on

one seizing L^,N.TGE'ROICH CCA also

(098388) and the other the wocds to the south.

split into two columns on this date and secured KIFFERLTH and the hills southeast.. in The followd ing day CCA remained

these locations while VCB consolidated at LiJiNGENBROICH

and pushed south to capture the

town

of BILSTEI

(102378). committed

At the time the 5th Armored Division

was

to attack through the 83d Infantry Division, the 4th Cavalry Group which was to cover the 5ths south flank already had a light tank battalion screening from the 83d's forward infantry elements southwest to KLMNH1U.
'e.d

The Group, which was attach-

to the division for this mission, was further attached COB on this southern flank. At this time the 4.th Cavalry

to

Group consisted of the troops show-n in Figure

VL3,

The majrity

of the troops including the light tank and TDp battAlions employed dismounted. w7as already in

-ere
:d;

As mentioned

abovo, the tank battalion

position south of the KLEIN? IU-SCH FB ~ G r

the 85th Cavalry Squadron (minu.s Troops C an :l D) with Conpany C, 635th TD Battali.on, attache'

was

to followJ COB and .push n. The

south to extenlld the screen of ths li ht tankottalic organic squadrons

were

not used in

either of these missions

because the 4th was still

screening a

gap

between the 9th the 24th

Infantry Division and the 83d Division, while

was
Those

committed between two regiments of the latter division. two squadrons w ere not relieved until the 13th and 18th,

177

,/-21
,-9

G85

7~9(Lt)
SI

1635(Towed)
Cavalry

297C

Figs re 13.

Task Organization of 4th:

Grouip

respectively,

when the 4th Squadron was directed to take over

the mission of the

85th Squadron and assembled just north of

On 16 Decemfber

GROSSRUI on 15 December,

two

troops of the ccntact

4th Squadron extendod the screen east to with the for;',ard elements of 0JB.

lt:ihtain

The magnitud e of the German attack in on 16

the ARDLNNES and the 5th

December was not iirediatelyr recognized,

Airmored was assigned a:-diticnal missions to cleer the west bank of the ROBI. Finally, on 22 December, both the 5th

iArmored Division and the 4th Cavalry Group wore directed to assemble in prepartion for operotiocns in the sruth. CCA

was relieved by the

83d

Infantry Division and CCB

as rel-

ieved partly by elemients of the 831: of the 121st Regiment of the

and partly by elements

8th

Infantry

Divisicn

which also

relieved the 4ath Cavalry Group. Loisti cs Discussion of logistics will be broken dowiksn into the same three periods used for the discussion of tactical emp-

loyment--W()

a mobile reserve period; (2) a period during the fore t an(:. (3) to assist the infantry the armored attack to

Which elements were used in in achieving its

penetration;

the banks of the ROER RIVER, First Phase 4 in In the first period, the division was not hich held a defe-

contact except for one combat commr and

nsive sector on an inactive front.

This period was very wisely

used to resupply after the trek across France and to perform

179

maintenance and to prepare for f'utu--e operations, particularly in obtaining

the

necessary items, such as "cduck bills",

over-

shoes, and sleeping bags for the coming winter. assembly area in the vicinity

The divisicn

of TVIONSCHhU

was close to the securing sup--

army dumps so that no problem was involv&.' in plies; however, distribution

ras somewhat complicated by the

Combat commands

splitting up of divisional organic units. were periodically detached anO7!

moved to other corps areas; (Comp any D, 10th Tank

tank battalicns and even companies

Battalicn was attached to the 2d -anger Battalion) were attached to infantry units.

lNeve'thedsm,,
actively

as it

turned cut,

none of these elements ,wlere

engaged so that supply

requirements remained at a niimum. In preparation for future operations a system of d ccnducting protecto convoys wa s instituted. This entailed

establishment anal operation of a "Division Service A1rea" into which units -ould !ispatch suply vehicles guarded by

armed escort from the un-it an,' from w.7hich the division could

?ispatch convoys to suply points

-ith

ivision protecti r.
40

The reverse procedure operated in the forward flow of sup.-lies

This general system -ias utilized throughout the although armed escorts were seldom necessary The dirvisicn set up Class I and Class III dumps by employing transportatiocn of the attached-1 Quartermaster Truck companies anoi by using personnel frolm these companies to {U:tRGEN aotion,

180

supplement a detachment cf service trocps provided by V Corps. Scheduled convoys were operated betwe n army and division dumps. the trucks of the

During the months cf October and November,

to .Quartermaster Truck companies averaged 739 miles per truck per month. Second Phase. December,
infantry

Frcm the last w,,eek of November to 8

while elements in

of'

the divisi'on were assisting the

penetrating the forest, resupply became a definite

problem. but C0M its

The d'ivision headquarters and COB were together;

.as

attached tr' the

4th

Infantry Division with one of

batrtralicns operating under

the

control of the 22d Reg-

iment Combat Team and, at the same time OCR ,.-as not cly attached to the 8th Infantry Division but zone.

--as

in

another corps

To increase further the burden, both OCR and the

46th

Armored Infantry Battalirn were suffering men and materiel.

heavy losses in

Losses in personal equipment, individual

arms, and crew served dition,

weapons were

extremely heavy; in ad-

heavy replacements

ere reeuire', for tires, radiost

bursts in the fc-rest of those

and raliatcrs shalttered. byr artillery tr'-e action.. An abnormal delay existed in

the replacement

and most major items because rf theD confusirn caused 1 ,ythe detachment of rrganic ccmonnts, the resultant time lag of

reports,, and the circuitious tVISR's* Duringg

this

period individual units took steps to

reduce the materiel losses and to obtain equipment that wTas slow in being replaced or that was not available at depots.

181

A truck was kept at the aid station and items of individual equipment, particularly arms and overshoes, were removed from

the wounded and loaded into this truck.

Because overshoes

were a critical item and the incident gate of trench foot cly to the rear to was rising, trucks were sent periodic canvass hospitals for overshoes and ather items of equipment Although this was out of channels, the expedient kept the trench foot rate low. Those units engaged found that all supplies had to be brought forward at night and then in often, in tanks and armored trailers, all half-tracks or, more

In the action of the supplies had to be hand-

46th Battalion east of GROSSHAU, carried by teams of drivers, The S-4 of the 46th found it

cooks, and maintenance personnel. necessary to direct most of his

attention to distribution which required far more personal supervision to reload supplies, and to comimand these groups in to organize carrying teams, the operation.

Long evacuation routes to the Ordnance Battalion for vehicle evacuation were further complicated by the lack of hard standing and by poor roads. ers could not negotiate the roads, to the rear by retrievers, tanks, Because tank transportdisabled tanks were dragged and M-25 tractors. tanks or in

Personnel casualties were evacuated in armored trailers towed by tanks.

In the action of the 46th

Armored Infantry Battalion even this method was impractical, Administrative personnel and the supply carrying-teams handcarried the wounded under cover of darkness sometimes as far 182

as two kilometers.

Since evacuation was so difficult,

aid

stations were kept well for-Trrd, assault companies, Final Phse,

frequently right with the

During the third period,

supply was not Resupply and ev-

quite so difficult as in the second period.

acuation for frontline elements was accomplished for the most

part by light tanks and armored trailers --

only full-track

ve:;hicles could negotiate the roads and high-angle fire continued to harrass the supply routes. installations were located on the In addition, supply

est of the forest while

units

were attackingr

on the east edge with long, narro,

unimproved,

winding routes bet- een the tw!o. can be found to the difficult

Few specific solutions supply situation in seems to

this type of operation; the only answer initiative, endurance, and ingenuity

be

longer hours,

on the part of service personnel. Surmary First Phase. ision and its The employment of the 5th Armored Dvin general,

elements in

the reserve role conforms, is

to present doctrine except that it

.ill not normally be

felt that combat ccmmands

attached to infantry divisicns. Argun as necessary for logistical reasons

rne ns that attachment

are inconsistent since the combat commands were supplied by the armored division any'-ay. armored division while it not considered normal, Additicnal missions given the the reserve role, although

was in

were dictated by the circumstances and

did not detract materially from the primary mission since the 183

majority of the division remained ready for immediate employment and since plans were made for quick release of elements otheravise utilized. Second Phase. Colonel Anderson was particularly

critical of the use of his Reserve command the

while

attached to

8th Infantry Division,41 but it

is

certainly doubtful

that dismounted infantry could have seized the objectives nithout suffering even gr.ater losses. There was evidence

of a lack of co-operation between the armor and the infantry division based on (1) receiving erroneous reports from the infantry,

And

(2) the ffilure of the infantry to take its joint attacks. However, the latter may be

objectives in

jus-

tified since some of the infantry companies were dovin in

strength to a dozen men (Chapter VI).

erroneous reports,

As for the

commanders must learn that reports must be

whenever

verified by personal reconnaissance

time permits.

The officer establishing contact must not stop at division or regiment; but must go to the company or platoon that is sically on the ground. phy-

A different picture of the operation is presented by

Lt. Col. Hamberg,

who

commanded the 10th Tank Battalion, in

the following statements I have never seen an operation in which more personal initiative and bravery was shown, The reason that individual initiative and courage showed up was due to the way the attack s conceived and planned. Ample -time was given to study the job. There were excellent maps and photos. Each job studied in complete detail. Houses and terrain features -ere identified, Squads

7a

,as

184

and tanks were assigned to particular missions, After the first operation, however, COR ls forces were depleted to the point that there were no reserves; all troops were committed, Artillery preparation was planned in the same detail as other acti ons 4 . This commitment of COR to assist the infantry in penetr-tion by limited objective its

attacks

at decisive points where

the infantry lacked the strength and .drive to be successful is fully in accordance with present-day doctrine. It is felt that and

CCR's success ?-here three infantry divisions (the 9th, 8th) had bogged dow~n vindicates its losses. This is employment in

28th,

spite of heavy

not indended to indicate that OCR accomplished

what three divisions could not; the divisions had attacked singly and were low in strength and spirit by the time they had reached this point. In addition, the 8th InfRntry Division captured

HURTGEN, which unhinged the defense of the area and served as a wedge into the German positions, of COR's losses Further, the greater percentage

were

received in .two actions, the unsuccessful

attack on HT2TGEN on 25 Novemgber and the holding of BERGS TEIN against repeated counteratta.cks between 5 and 8 December, first The

was directly occasioned by erroneous information from the

infantry and the failure of OCR to verify these raports on the ground. In the second instance, infantry elements, to conform In the s,- cond instance, infantry elements, to

wvith ground. conform

with

doctrine, should have taken over the defense of the night. This was called for in the original

objective plan,

the first

although

the depleted strength and other commitments of the Nevertheless, the

8th Infantry Division may have precluded this. action did prove something.

Tankers normally are very reluctant 185

to be * placed on the defensive; although positpn defense is

not the

most profitable use of mo-lil

forces,

this action demonstrates

thr!t tanks can set up a strong defense infantry when required to do so. Thus, the use cf armor in speed up the penetration when it high cost to the inf-antry is and present tc3ctics; in Armorod in fact,

with

a small force of

a limiited objective attack to is progressing slo.wly and at a

certainly within the scope of past the rete ntion of all of the 5th

a reserve role when it

could hasten such a costly In such a commitment (1)

penetration could not have been justified.

of armor there aru tw7o principles t1U.t should be applied:

that the objective assigned be .;ithin the capability of armor (i.e., ground sufficiently open to givi-: maneuver room to the

attacking armor even

if

surrocnded by wods),
in

and (2) that suf-

ficient force be retaineci success so gained. Final Phase.

reserve to take advantage of any

In the last period, two armored columns

attacked thrcugh the inf:ntry on the f'.r edge of the forest to push to the ROER before the Germa;ns could reorganize their defense. The attack did not proceed rapidly because of numerous mines, but 1.t was successful and was marker the 5th Armored Division and the General Conclusions. the general picture. ored Division were by close cQ ^eration between

3d Infantry Division.

Two possible criticisms exist ill

At various times elements of the 5th Arm# out to infantry units during the

parcelled

186

first

period.

This does not refer to the attachment of CCR to

the 8th Infantry Division, as this was tactically sound and necessary, is That sufficient emergency existed in other CC attachments

not apparent now,

but full consideration should always be given like the organic

to the fact that combat and reserve commands, battalions, division.

are not designed to operate detached from the armored While CCA was attached to the 4th Infantry Division

from 29 November to 9 December, its armored infantry battalion was used in the line with the 22nd Regimental Combat Team; this was a completely dismounted action and was very costly in officers and

other trained personnel; although the battalion was well ahead of other battalions of the 22nd ROT, it was ordered to retire to
a

straighten the line,

and its contribution to the overall situation Armored infantry contains

did not justify the losses sustained,

too many specialists in proportion to the number of riflemen to attack profitably with regular infantry. By the same token, the that it became

4th Cavalry Group was given so many gaps to fill

necessary to committ an attached light tank battalion and a TD battalion dismounted; although reconnaissance battalions are trained to fight mounted or dismounted, tank units should be

committed in dismounted action only as a last resort. The technique and tactics within the division conformed to present day doctrihe except in two matters: (1) the constant

use of the reserve command as a fighting headquarters, and (2) a semi-permanent attachment of battalions bat commands. battalions, .n the reserve and com-

This latter idea was carried down to reinforced consisted of tank and armored

which with few exceptions,

187

infantry copanies "married" to each other.

Both of these points

are contrary to the teachings of the Armored School, but still have many

propronents

in the armore& force.

Those opposed to tho needed

school doctrine arguo that a triangular organization is in combat and is

actually

provided by the third headquarters

(which is

organized the sw e as the

the-rs except for the grade

of the co.mander) and, further,

that units rcesting or being re-

habilitated can operate Frith the trains or as division trcops, Using three fighting

ccrny

an!-1s ene blcs a rotati.on of headquarters co:.andi~ng the reserve better able

and leaves the headquarters

to be committed as a reserve, In regard to the "m ried" f rmations CR, for example, SOP's

used a system of set foriratic'ns vhich vera included in and designated in crders by "A", "B",

or "C"

It

VLeas found that

those formations covered just about every situation encountered, and if they did! not, it

was still
They,

possible to alter them as the

circumstances demanded.

of

course, had the advantage of

simplifying comrrunications built a pride in there ,as

rela tionships and also and comim:_,ndl but had the disavantage that

the various teams, tc use one

a tendency

of clreso formantins out of. habit

rath r than crgenize acccrding to One might say that there is no the task organizati the plan.

the terrain andk the missicn,

a trend tcc:7rard making the plan fit

rather than organizing the troops to fit

In addition, this system

led

to a fixed

forma.tion

vithin z CR -

,herebi

the armored infantry battalion consisted habit-

ually of but one "married" team of

tanks

and infantry and

small

188

proportion cf supporting trocops, thereby -1.asting rbpttalion qua,rtrrs and; giving thei lad rupee'te Jly to

head-

the

ta'- ' batlon. the employment of

Some cons ideration. shculd be given

bAtaliocns and companies in
madec CCR.

to

The only cri ti cism that can be

of

this a

llorganized operation is in the plans for the the

utiliz.Ition of the reserve, arhi ch considered its use o>nly if

attncking battanlion

got

in

trouble
=also

rather

th-.an

its

use

to exploit

a successa.

The reserve

_'vas

kept

;1e1 to the rear and wvas example,9Then

not moved frTrdas the

ttack Prgese.Fr
BRIDI",BLRFG

the 10th Tank Battalion las ott= eking

Infantry Batt alion, the and 7o

the 47t1i~

rmorredl

reserve,
(ver

.,<s

still locat.,
congested rC'

-ost c f G:
;}s

RE.LT -

bhve

ha::"

to

move

poor,

throiush

KLEtSN:11U. it

Had the

been ereserve ' Toll freard, atleast

to KiLBINHAUj

could have nushe::

through t,-- BEBGSTETN :=en Company

tanks

entered that tr-.-. The

on 5 Decem~ber. battalion in

tank

its

o.ttf oke on KLINFAU, FBPJIDENBERG,

EGT~ 'n various arms.

sdt

full

ad1v nta-ge the c apc'lZ li tiies of1 its

In general, the tanks andl infantry attacked a taw~n ith s.yome 4-inary protction cu~t off theI the infa.ntry, rcads in

~cintly; tanks

and niut of the tc:ernahl

eas itili

:ssisted byr s coe tank s,

to clear the tc ;rn.

in the ,Atack

Cn

KLE11T-INHU thei
n,'ted,v :;nd

inf-antry _-as dismounte-d

too soion,

as :~e

have

already

this er.ror

-Tas

corrected in subsequ~ent alctions.

Ain impcrta it point to be cons _dre:_ is thae need focr

armored

vehicles

to bring up front line supplies and1 to eve:cua te

casualties.

Because of thfe intense high trajectory fire, the 10th

189

Tank Battalion frequently rsed light tanks

missions. in

tc

cc<I1muli sh these

Thc inclusion cf the I-/ 4 full-track per sonnel

carrier
beTeyerp

-resent tables

of crganize.tion sh ouli

solve this

problemi,

since such situations :;ill ba the exception rntla r than the rule;. "fe can conclude that armnr other than that in direct suppert of infantry can be successfullyi emrployed1, macdc themseiilves
whin

not

through

heavy

but

sei to S

L dc~isiv

a Y1as pen re

jithin the.C foCrest Thes- attack s

i;nfantry

elements

have secured the mo,,ods-line.

ucrark bet? een tanks, armored engineers, require ,:rti.cular ly close- tcaY: and ar iored

inf
Su:ch

ee:fre aroe
fighting.

ntryr and es- ecu~llv close cooptr; tion betm:een th~e ni. snat ith uhich they are te u tticsrequire the i ax_ ium armor that
.,

the

open
;ire

-- races

Till hcl..

n.ll a.S closal

c c; drine.t

artillery

fir e. pra-ticcns an:d count erbatt .v~ery

The ta nks

-m st

adlvanlce im-

medliately behind" sumponrtin _ artiller y firms and often un-ear a.rtiller tie fi re t o ge t pIrot-ectca f
.et ild
rm.

remy bazo k!as.

These
and
7) s

.attacks require
ta nk creu's,

planning,

.ently fr cu

domn to squads

:Thich neecstctS

itasaquaite time anl: a~:1+ccura

te

and

airphts

190

NOTES

iOR CHAPTER VII

1
Combat Interview by V Corps on 29 Decembher 1944 with Capt F. M. Pool, C. 0. Company B, 10th Tank Battalion (CI 49-A) 2 Combat Interview by V Corps on 29 December 1944 with Lt. B. S. Lewis, 47th Armored Infantry Battalion (CI 49-A)

3 Interview by Cpat A. St John on 10 January 1949 with Lt Col

T'.

A. Hamberg,

G,, 0. 10th Tank Battalibn

4 Q2Lcit..
5

Interview with Capt F. M* Pool (CI

49-A)

Op Cit., Interview with Lt Col 7. A. Hamberg by Capt St John 6 This part of the plan was specifically stated in the After Action Report of CCR of the 5th Armored Division although it seems rather improbable since this road junction i:s ih- the-.butherni outskirts of KLEINHAU, and if the infantry could clear the road to phase of the mis this point they would have accomplished the first sion by thus securing a foothold in the builtup portion of the town: In addition, this was never accomplished by the infantry. 7 Combat Interview by V Corps on 28 December 1944 with Lt C. 0. 20th Tank Battalion (CI 49-A)

Col

W A

Hamberg,
g.

On Cit.

Interview

with

Lt Col.

A. Hamberg by Capt St John

9 Ibid
10

OD
11

Cit.

Combat Interview with Lt Col .1,

A. Hamberg (CI 49,A)

This was probably the at-tack on GROSSHAU by tanks with the 4th Infantry Division,

12
as it Lt Col Hamberg stated that he did not occupy the hill was "flat as a lbll3iard ball and besides the people at the road block could see over and around it."t He added in an interview on 10 January by Capt St John that the tankers of A/10 Tank Bn. ran all with their tanks,. This became an important point over the hill when .the 46t1 Armored Infantry Battalion made its attack on GROSSHAU. 191

OnCILJ., Interview with Lt Col VJ,.

A.Hamberg

by Capt St John

14 Combat Interview by V Corps on 29 December 1944 with M4ajor 7V.M. Daniel, Ex 0. 10th Tank Battalion (CI 49-A)

15
Op Cit., Interview with Lt Col W. A. Iamberg (CI 49-A) Ibid 17
Op Cityj

Interview with Lt Col TV. A. Hamberg by Capt St John

18
After action, Report,

47th~Tt Amrored

Infantry

Battalion,

Dec

44

Ibid 20 Combat Interview by V Corps on 30 December 1944 with Lt 0. D. Goldman, Company B, 47th Armored Infantry Bn, (CI 49-A) 21 r,Ct.. Intervieca with Lt Cal 17 22
Ci

A. Hamberg (CI 49-A)

Interview wjith Lt 0. D. Goldman (CI 49-A)

23 After ction Report CCR, 5th Armored Division, Dec 44 Combat Interview by V Corps on 30 December 1944 with Lt R. Stutsman, Company 3, 47th Armored Infantry Bn. (CI-49A)

24

A.Hamberg (CI-4 A) This Interview with Lt Col interviewed by V Corps when Goldman Lt by made statement was also on 30 December 1-944.
Qp
;Cit.

25

77o

26
Omi ,s Interview with Lt

D. 0,

Goldman (CI 49-A)

27
OCit

Interview

with

Lt Col W.

A.1Hmberg

by Capt St John

Op Cit., Interview with Lt 0, D. Goldman (CI 49-A)

192

Op Cit.. 30

Interview with Lt' RF, S. Iewis (CI

49-A)

Ibid
Report on the Battle 'ofthe Hurtgen Forest by General-M ajor Frhr. v Gersdorff, C of-5, Seventh Gex~nn Arm translated and prepared by UJS{,m Historical Section.

32
a it. Interview with Lt R. S. Lewis (CI 49-rA)

33 Ibid 34
Ibid

35
Onit

Interview with Major

IN. M. Daniel

(CS 49-A)

36 ~Ci~Interview with Lt R. S. Lewis. CI /9-A) 37

.O1

Cit... Interview with Lt

Col. W. A. Harnberg by Capt St John

After Action. Report,

46th

Ar ored Infantry Bn, Nov 1944.

39
Ibid

40o
After Action Report, 5th Armiored Division, Oct 1944.

41
Combat Interview by V Corps on 27 - Decmber 1944 with Col Go, H.. Anderson, C.- 0. GCR, sth Armored Division.

42

Op Cit., Combat Interview

with

Lt Col T7. A. Hamberg (CI 49-A)

193

CHAPTER

VIII

CONCL SION S The combination of terrain and weather was the more prominent of the two major factors which were common to all of the armored units involved in the HIURTGEN FOREST fighting,

The terrain

restricted maneuver, reduced mobility, limited observation, hindered supply of attacking units, and decidedly favored the determined

German defenders,
conditiona:

The weather was closely allied to the 'terrain

rdin transformed the already formidable terrain into

a morass; fog reduced visibility in some instances to only a

few

yards; snow and cold adversely affected equipment, concealed mines and

booby traps, and added frostbite anditrenchfoot to the other

the forest.

discomforts suffered by troops in

The fact that armored units were fighting in support of infantry and under the operational control of infantry commanders was the second major factor. were modified to fit This means that the tactics of armor

the ir:fantry situations and were dictated by

the infantry and that their objectives were infantry objectives. Furthermore, co-ord'ination was weak; control was ineffective; and

armored units often lacked the necessary tactica1 information.

One of the most pressing problems in the HURTGEN FOREST -a direct result of these two major factors -was the vital need (1)

for close and aggressive engineer support for armored units: terrain and

weather

conditions made excessive demands on the engi-

neers; and (2) engineer units trained to support infantry did not appreciate the magnitude of their role in supporting armor. For

194

instance,

lack of adequate engineer support precluded the use

qf

the 707th Tank Battalion in the 28th Infantry Division's of SCIiIDT and was instrumental in the failure of the 5th Armored Division.. of a route

defense

attaok on HURTGEN by Reserve Commani,

Aggressive and continuous preparation and maintenance for armored

vehicles

would have done much toward avoiding the

losses sustained in these two engagementso Engineers must be included in every tank-infantry team, Their presence assures maximum availability of tank support to the infantry, But their absence delays or denies the in-

fantry this support; for instance, a lack of engineers for mine removal prevented timely tank support for infantry of the 9th Division at both 1AMNRSDORF and GERIvITERO

Russian army

doctrine recommxends the followving small combined arms team for forest fighting: It is advisable to attach ab,.rut one squad of infantry and three or four sappers to each tank, and contact between them must not be broken. Aside from saws and axes, the sappers should be equipped with mine deteotor8 and explosive materials for demolishing trees. 1 All of the difficulties encountered stem from the fact that the engineers with the infantry divisions had too little training in tank support. The tank battalions which had fought

continuously from the NRMFANDY 'beaohes with the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions had less trouble getting adequate engineer support than the tank battalions with other infantry divisionso Inclusion of tanks in the infantry division under the new tables of organization would result in better tank-infantry". engineer training and will do much to solve the problem Qf 195

engineer support. Tactics Attacking infantry must have tanks in close support re-o gardless of difficulties presented by the terraino The psychothe

logical advantages of using tanks in the HUETTGEN FOUST --

shock effect on enemy troons and the-,confidence which tanks gave our oin infantry -far outweighed the disadvantages of limited This premise
-that

mobility and restricted fire power.

scme

tanks must be in im:mediate support of infantry in every tactical situation -- underlies any discussion of the tactical use of armor in forest fighting. It does not follow that the principle

of mass is violated just because the terrain often dictites that tanks must be used individually or by section to give effective support to the infantry; if tanks must be so employed, then the commander is using them in the largest mass possible. Frcm this

it follows that commanders at every echelon must be alert to use their tanks in greater mass if the accidents of terrain offer this opportunity, The infantry battalion commander having a platoon of

tanks at his disposal must look for opportunities to use his tank platoon in massed formation; the regimental commander must be prepared to mass his tank company; the division commander should be ready to use his tanke battalion (or an attached Corps tank battalion) to exploit a favorable situation; and the corps colmander should seek an opportunity to employ his armored division to gain the decision.

196

Presnt d-ctrine for the use of armor in reducing a forest mass contemplates (1) that armor sweeps around the forest mass

in a pincer movement to isolate the area and thus facilitate the advance of infantry through the woods; or (2) when the flanks

are unassailable, that armored elements are massed in a mobile reserve to attack through infantry when the far edge of the woods has been secured as a line of departure,

In addition,

the basic

premise that tanks must be in immediate support of infantry regardless cf the difficulties presented by terrain necessitates a third concept: infantry clearing dense forests must employ small combined arms teams which include tanks, infantry and engineers. The HURTGEN

FOREST

o-v-ration was initially planned in acHowever, it was found necessary to assist in the

cordance with the second method. to

weaken

this reserve by conmitting part of., it

penetration.

The utilization of the armored division in this role,

prepared to attack through the infantry when sufficient penetration has been made to secure maneuver room, follows the normal principle of employing a mobile reserve,

The

reserve must be centrally lo-

cated; the armor must maintain close liaison with infantry elements to be prepared for any contingency; and prior planning and detailed reconnaissance forward are necessary. Great stress must be placed

on liaison and planning in forest fighting as any movement through infantry will require detailed coordination and preparation to avoid congesting the limited road net and the few open patches of

ground.

In the

battle of the HURTGETT FOPE'ST, the means used to

17-

E
-~-

197
,4 '~

4A-

soave this reqtref t'thfr ;sp.c1al cerdinations was to attach to the infantry division concerned the combat command which was to lead the attack, woulda revert to its with the reservation that this combat command parent
unit

as soon as the attack had progressed Such attachment of a combat

sufficiently beyond the infantry.

command to an infantry division is not the best solution, since (1) it further 6ugments the difficulties of coordination by neces-

sitating a change of command at a critical moment, and (2) it ccmpliicates logistical and ad-iinistrative support because the combat command is not an administrative headtgtaurt~ w .

urther

infantry

commanders vivll be tempted to use elements of this intended re-

serve in the line, reducing its capability to make a powerful dritted. ving attack when comm 17ith proper training and a proper

attitude on the part of the infantry and aimored commanders, the

necessary coordination and cooperation can be accomplished without frictiono Mtual understanding and mutual appreciation should be

the keynote rather than technicalities as to command$ whether units are attached, supporting, or cooperating. During the mobile reserve phase it will frequently be expeditious to use components of the reserve in secondary missions such as the defense of an inactive sector or indirect fire roles.

the former may

become necessary as an econcny measure in order to

permit other forces to e crentrated to achieve the breakthrough; and the latt er, as in the

HRT

TGFN,-JJ

011.-T campaign, wall OF

often be Ri ssions e assigned

necessary because of a shortage of arti .ery ammunition. such as these shcuVr" be considered as exr>ed.ets but

nay

198

when circumTsrtanc.s dictate,

provided that (1) they do (2)

not

detract

materially from the primary mission, reserve is

a majority of the mobile and (3) plans

retained ready for immediate employment,

are made for a quick release of units so utilized. A-modification of the concept of employing armor after the infantry has secured the far edge; of the woods is to commit armror-

ed elements from the mobile reserve to assist the infantry in penetrating the forest mass.
Such attacks will

normally

be limit-

ed objective attacks directed at decisive points such as those made by OCR, 5th rmored Division to secure the PLJRTGEN-KL2I TUBE'RGSTEIN area. This employment is of part of the mabile reserve to progressing slowrly and at a high In. this role, particularly if the of

hasten a penetration when it

cost to the infantry-is sound. objective or zone of action is

completely within the boundaries

one

of the attacking infantry divisions,

the armor may- well be at-

tached to that division.

There are two requisites to the elmploy(1) the

ment of the. armored command in this type of operation: area assigned for attack

should

be sufficiently open to allow surrounded by woods, and (2)

,maneuver rooml to the armor even if

sufficient force mrust be retained to'take advantage of any success so gained. Deliberate plannin.g and violent execution are the key; launched.

there can be no hsitation

once the attack is

The, concept of employment within the

attacking

force fol-

lows the same pattern as for any armored attack; close tearrwork between tanks, armored engineers, ancd armored infantry is vital,

and especially imlpcrtant is

close co-operation between the armored

199

troops and the other infantry units in the area. on maneuver necessitate detailed plannirg,
cial miissions dovm_ to squads and tank crews. by all echelons,

The restrictions

often to include speSuch planning readequate time, and

quires good reconnaissance accurate maps and. air

photos,

Likewise,

closely co-ordinated since the talks

artillery support become,)cs

1p-articularly important

must. advance immediate ly behind supporting

fires

and often. under Other

artillery time fire to get protection. against bazookas. principles are normal: engineer

infantry mrust attack with the tanks;

support mrust be well forward and imrediately available, obstacles slowing the adval-ce; the infantry

Trhe engineers re move

protects the tanks and the engineers; The role of tanks in immediate

the tanks protect both, and direct support of

infantry divisioris during the of

UTJikTGEN FOREST fighting was the role

tank battalion. Co-op-

the

medium tank company of the attached

eration between the tank battalions which they supported variod in they had.

and the infantry divisions

proportion to the length of time the

worked togethr

the longer their association,

smooth:D-r their combined action. support td the infantry it

to fight in neers.

To render continuous,

immediate

was necessary for tanks to be prepared

small combined arriLs teams with the infantry and engi-

Porest fighting necessitates dccentralization of commriand,

as was used by the 9th mright be desirable

and some su.ch organizatio

'Infantry
whenever

Divisionh tanks

for the reduction of pillboxes are to be used. It

has

alr ady been stated that

infantry cormanders

at

all

200

levels

must.

be ready tc mess th-C-ir tanks to t k

),dvarntege

of

accidents

of terrain.

These accidents will vsually be clearings

power of the

wit lira the forest ..:ass where tie mobility and fire tajnks can be better utilized. of the 746th Tank batetalion is at tank plattoon level.

Thie attack at RICl;LSKi1UL by tankAs

good example of this employmont

The use of a compa ry of tanks and tank

destroyers near GUR0.SHt.XU where

the 70th Tank Battalion was sup-

porting the 4th Infantry Division

exemplifies

this employment on

the c ompany 1evel.

IL antry c~ormxan.d.ors usually gained a closer appreciation of tank capabilities and limitations the longer they worked with armor. The use of the tanks cf the 707th Tank L :;ttalion as

armored pillboxes at V'BSS

extremely wasteful

FdCK

by the 28th Infantry Division was

material

and was without

w.a frequently

advantage to the infan-

try

--

in fact,

it

to their disadvantage because the

tanks attracted artillery fire to the nearby infantry positions. The situatiion often dictates that tank!:s should be held in mobile reserve, prepared to move to any possible scene of action on short notice at GROSSh-UJ. The new tables of organization- and. equipment a^dopted since
--

as the: y were; emi .loyed

by the 70th Tank Battalion

'lorld

har II will eliminate many of the difficulties enin the Battle

c crpay

countered by armocred comma,,enders

of' the. HURITGEN

ICRGLST.

The inclusion of a tank

organic to the infantry attacking infantry must

regimae-nt recognizes thne principle have: tanks

that

in close support in every situation, and will elimai-

201

nate many difficulties

of training and comand.

The organic tank

battalion gives the infantry- division commander

a powerful

weapon the

to assist in the penetration of enemy defenses and. to use in exploitation once the penetration has been effected.

The corps

commander can use a tank battalion from his armored group to further assist his ii antry divisions before he is fcrced to

coimit a part of his armorcd division in mcbile reserve in a limited objective attack.

202

BIBLIOGRAPHY Daily Situation Reports, 12th Army Group Report of Operations, First U. S. Army, 1 Aug 44- 22 Feb Operations' in the ETO, V Corps,

45

6 Jan 42 - 9

May 45'

After Action Reports of the following units: 5th Armored Division 8th Infantry Division Combat Command A, 5th Armored Division Combat Command B, 5th Armored Division Reserve Command, 5th Armored Division

4th Cavalry Group

46th 47th

Armored Infantry Battalion Armored

Infantry

Battalion

10th Tank Battalion 70th, Tank Battalion 707th Tank Battalion 709th Tank Battalion

745th Tank Battalion

746th Tank Battalion 803rd Tank Destroyer Battalion Combat Interview 49-A, V Corps Team, orical Service, 2nd Information and Hist-

First U. S. Army (5th Armored Division) 2nd Information and Hist-

Combat Interview 56, VII Corps Team, orical Service, First U. S,

Army (8th and 9th Infantry Divs)

Combat Interview 76, V Corps Team, 2nd Information and orical Service, First U. S.

Hist-

Army, (28th Infantry Div).

203

Combat Interview 5, VII Corps Team7 . 2nd Information and Historical Service, First U. S. Army (1st Infantry Div)

Wfar Department General Orders 1945, Daniel NlBurns, Th Infantry

ry,

1946.

Bone gm atisor

of the 121st
Co,,l94?

Baton Roueg La. Arm'y

i e

Nam Pub1shin Garden City, N.

Dwight

DEisenhos~ier, Crsd

Y.,
1,46.

Doubleday

8c

Co. , Inc., 1948

Ralph Ingersoll, T, p Scret,

H,

New

York, Harcourt Brace & Co.,

R.

Knickerbocker, InfortDivision

et al, Daner

lonadt The

Story ofr the First Ga.,

in---------- II,

Atlanta,

Albert

Love

Enterprises, Inc., 1947 Charles B MacDonald, Objecotive

Schmidt

-daft)

Historical Division

Special Staff, U. S.

Army'
of In'nt 2hth~ eent,

Harold Macregor,

Histo

W'ash-

ington, Infantry Journal p're ss,

1947
to June 30, 1945, to the

George C Marshall, Biennial Rport of the Chief of Staff of the

United St tesrmv July 1,

19413

Secretary of W'ar

Walter PNill s, Th

Last Phlase, Boston, Houghton Miff lin

Co.,

1946

Joseph B MVit telman, Eight

Stas toVcov
19.47 XANA

Columbus, 0., F. J.

Hleer
Debs

Printing Co.,
et al,

Myers,

editors,

the GI SarLof

the 1.ar,

New

York, Duell, Sloan and Pierce, 1947

Kenneth

A -Peters,

CCR. 5thlroc

_Dvsn.Oeais

in HurtResearch and Evaluation

gen Forest,

Student Monograph No.

145

Division, The Armored School, Ft Knox, Kentucky..

204

General4'Iajor von Gersdorff, The

Noebe

Battle of the
,iitorical

Huute

Fri

2ecbr91 1945.

Office, USET,

12 December
,COR.

5th Armored Division. in the Iurt en, res

Research Project, Research and Evaluation Division, the Armored School,

____The

Fort Knox, Kentucky,

the 'of,

eort Road,to~emany, _the

5th

amored

Division,

Infomation and Education Division, Special and

Information Service, ETOUSA

205

i.PP

iT

I o, S

TAIML1 Ridge System.

STUDY

The ridge line runs through the forest The main crest lies approxIYTJ-SiTlr TH (IY 995242);

from the southwest to the northeast. imately

4000

yards west of the line p,10;SCf

the highest point being 2150 feet just north of iiWZ TZIGH (Kc 922191) at the southern edge of the forest. Over a distance

of approximately 16 miles, to the northern edge of the forest in the vicinity of i.RODE, the crest graOually falls to an elevation of 600 feet, Moving north and northoast from M0%SCHAU, the ridge splits into three fingers, the first starting at SIivATE at the head of the SI
TIE G

ZAIT
-SC

RVR and ;.uxning along the general line IDT to the RO in the vicinity of

riE -ST-UOHv

The second finger splits off to the east about

southwoest of G-SiCT3R i near the TEMSSE'R V
'.GZ,- -- =.

4000

yards

CRS=,
HTJ-

the crest running along the line GAR i TDR GREOSSEtAU. ?ETSSRL U

71

The third finger runs cue north from the head of the
CS
i

and flattens out just south of GRSS-2IC1.

There are two spurs branching off the center ridge which are of major inportance. Both branch off to the east, one following

2" CKE and the other along the line the line G3Pd,-M=R-VOV

Drainage.

Ml major streams in the

URTGMT, 1O

ST area

flow,,r to the north with one exception,

the ?.S'ER RIVER originating

about

7000 Yards due weest of SIT =i ATH

and on the west side Passing through the

of the maint ri6e flows generally wost.

forest from the west, there are three streams that form definite barriers, not so much from their size, but because of the deep

ravines formed by them.

The first of those is the VICHT CP: T /

which runs along the west edge of the forest from the vicinity of

.RQ.0TGDN'

north to VIORT,

where it

flows out of the forest on stream, and the many short

through STOI, %G (iC935342) . tributaries flowing into it, wooded. This is

This

form deep7 ravines which are heavily the area. The

generally true of all streams in TiH CREW, is

secondl stream, the ;TSS P to the east across the first

about four miles further splitting the main

military crest,

ridge line into two distinct ridges. 4000 yards southwest of u. through SCM- Ti yT and

This

stream begins about

T R and flowus almost cae north where it emerges from the forest this stream flows which have

and flows along the edge,

Like the VIGHT,

through a stoep ravine with many short tributaries, cut

dep

into the hillsides on both banks. is

The course of the and

,MTSSI;R 1l,

about 3000 y ard~s to the west of V0SST0IC.C

The

third stream of importance is

the Y.1iLL RIVR,

which

orig inates just southweost of SI~it northeast until it it turns wst

2H axnd flows generally

reaches a point due west of

VOSSM"Mo,

where

: 1 flows into the R'rR just east of 3:R.GSTr. very swift and it has a number of small tribuflows through

Its current is

taries, and like the other streams in the area it

iii

dep ravine With banklcs which are almost perpefid c~lar

in

places. Routes of Communication. forest is

The

road net throughout roads.

the The

generally

poor, especially the east-west

bettor roads run generlly north and seuth fol lowing the ridge linos, xwith third class reads and trails reads. The valley reads connecting these main
-

generally third class ad. trails

their entire length,

follew the major streams throughout

usually Awayr

not mere than a few feet from the banks of the streams. from the populated areas, through the forest,

apparently no more

trees were cut than absolutely necessary to get the roads through* and as a result side. the forest borders these roads closely on either

The only first

class roac, in

the area passes through

the

southwest section of the forest connecting ISMBTF- ri

forest at

C iTSC -ULT-R0TGMT,-

(Tf 9053345 )-KOIT0,P

. IS2 R TH. This is

ST

(IL 90437S) and leaving the

approximatetypes

a hard-surfaced road,

ly 24 feet wide, relatively of traffic. This road

straight and enters

suitable for all

the forest at an altitude of

aprpoximatelyt 800 feet and

goes up the main ridge to an

alti-

tude of 14)40 feet at the crest about 3000 Yards west of

L"'11-1

RSDOF, ide,

where a second class road, hard-surfaced and about branches off to L"' I'wSi 0WLF. From LAP of the ride RYLSiD0 O to G I'D: T R--

16 feet this

second class road follows the crest EY and is

HtP-XrG-I -I-TAJIi-Gn0xSS roads in the area.

one of the two major ridge

The second ridge read, through SMcAh AUHsc:i-Is:

also second class, passes

IflT and cro sses the

a OER just west of NDZG-GM.S. montionod

Between the two ridge roads

and

generally parallel, there is a secondary valley

IVES u.ntil it

read, running along the north bank of the K.)Z reaches the lY=

where it. crosses the KA:'LL, a-nd follows the

ROM~ to
crosses

connect with the south ridge road just the . OR

before

that road

The ridge roads are cross connected by severa.l third class roAs (12 feet wide and surf aced) and second

trails,

with two

class

roads serving this purpos a. One of these is be-and SU-ZI'ATH, f laked by a third, class road.

tweoni:

IIISOIG :

link next is from SIII'

STThe N-ILLS3IOIC{ to SILB":RSCuiIDT1

,JIZL

(F003257) w-inding down to and across the

the north ridge roadt.
oind

to connect with

The next road east connects VOS$]MACK throu!gh K~i- = SCMIDT. This

SC ,ID T,
and

passing

is

a third is

class road very steep

in the vicinity of the LT -ZL IRIMIR crossing it exceding;ly

.nd

crooked, with

sevor^.l hairpin turns. leaves the north ridge

The

last cross link?,

a second class read,

L--JMTi X,

road on the southern edge of

follows a spur ridge to

3)~2,

R G and 3=1 GS 'Ii,

then dowin the ridge

to

the YATJL

IJW

valley road, across the K.'L to connect with the south ridge road just west of the lOR RIVMI bridge. and 32RG-STEI1 a trail leads down to the the south ridge read'at Between BRIT3MZ2IG AL crosses, a.nd joins

j. ,?SQHEIIT.

This is a very steep

trail

with many hairpin turns and not suitanble for vehicular traffic.

On the T-rest edge of the forest there is a second class ro ad connecting ? TGTOTT-ZtTaI,-AU.AC-T

SS7JiH-

SC-73-=JTP 74 YU.
IV~K

thi s is avalley roa. following the VIOriT

hard.-surfacd

and. about iG foot wide.

There are numerous

trails leading cast into tho HUIG

FOF

ST from this road.; Mioving

how-

ever,

there are only three of any importa nce.

north
app-roxi-

from RIOTGMT, the first of these, athird class road, m tely 12 focot

wide

and hard.-surfa)cocl,

branches off at 1 JZU11-

SHJTT~ (K92934-l3)

a~nd runs southeast to coimocct with the north

ridgo road. just north

f rom PEOTT

of

L.:

~.,RSOE.7L

This

road has branches

-and OTCO717

and, a third connect ing; with the north

ridge road about 5000 yards north of theo first connection. next, a second class road, hard.-surfaccd. and about

The

16

feet wide,

branches off to the Cast at Z?.''I?'IL and connect s w,.ith the north
ri dge

road.

midwav

betwee'Gn I,+l

US

)O 2

anxd

01121Z1

The third

connecting, road of importace is asecond. to third class road which enters the forest at SC:Z1:rTTT, along the
road

run s generally south

rTSSPL of

valley and connects with the north ridrge

at

tho head of the

L llIZ3T2R1.J

I,! SS,,1.

M C?2,

about

4000

yards

southwest

This la~st road servos as a trumlk, with three or focur ro-ads load~irCg off on each sideo. The mor'e isroortan~t of those

side read~s a-rc the ones loatding cast to connect with the G %Tr -U.-'' iSt
i

idge rod.

!Jithout oxceoption, thaese

sideo roads are steep, crooked,

anti narrow. The

UJ1G2M

Tactical2 effocts of the Area.

FOFBST covers

an area of qapproximantely 50 square milos, within the triangle

formed by the three towns of .4ACH ' is

: DC UN',

and. UOI\0TSCH

It

thickly wooded with trees meium to tall nature.

and. largely conito

ferous in

Those trees ire large enough in diiameter

prcsent a scrious obstacle to armored vehicles. tho forest is

The floor of

carpeted with pine neeles and. leaves which offer

excellent opportunities for tho installaion of anti-tank. and anti-persennel mines,

as well as booby t;rFa;s of various kinds.

The terrain is

quite rugoed, with many steep hills and perpondicuas well as the streams

lar ravines bordering many roads and trails in the area, These streanms

are

quite swift, but for the most part

are fordable and

only represent obstacles because of the genThe roads are generaly poor, - steep 'ven

erally steep approaches.

and

winding, and ;rill not support heavy vehicular traffic.

the better ones will not support time,. :lttacking

tank

traffic except for a short

through the forest from wrest to east the terrain An attacker through heavy r

particularly favors the defender in all respects.

would
woods,

be obliged to move across on poor roads.

corridors, up hill

These cen-itios enable the def en observation, and

to mae

the maximum use of mines, pillboxes,

canalizes vchicilar traffic. throe h a solid 10,000 yards, area. Tis

The attacker would have for a

to advance

ass of forest,.

distance of ap-proximately
cleared and populated

before reaching the first

area lies ^'lone the ridE e lino G'

CT .1-HTJ!,)TGIMT-

GROSSITAT

and forms a formidable obstacle. HJLTC-7T, 1=I11TE-I{,

The villag es of

=1KiTi-M1, VOSST.CK,

and GROSSW-U

are oneof

street towns built along the ridge road,

Pnd are capable

vii

'being

strongly fortified with excellent observation and fields

To reach the two

of fire.

upper RLOZ

.cIVDJIL

damns,

two additional nd theSiiFFThe

major obstacles must be crossed, the

XATJL

FIV,

SCEf-IDT ridge which separates the X;.LL and PR0DR IIVDLS. SII.

IT?- SCE-Ci DT ridge, the lest obstacle before reaching the the altitude of SItI 01 being

w OI0I, d:ominates all approaches,

1770 feet and SCHTi IDT 1500 feet.

The villages of Z01"TERSCMnIDT,

SCH iIDT

and

".1, SCHDIDT situated in a cleared area along the crest,

The olevation of the Y--L y D%

form a f'ormidable fortress.

between SCHHIDT and VOSSML,'4K is

vmrinteY 950 feet.

Thmployment of a~rmor in the Caren

is

practically impossible, In wet

due to the thick forest, decep ravines, and poor roads.

weather the groiic! in the fcu cleared areas becomes very soggy, and in goneral.

will

not hold armor.

viii

APPM DIX I
0:1D U..

0OF B "TZ2

S.

'ORCS

IN' NU:1TG!

OPIIICL S

0Of the Corns assi ;nedt to. the first United States 2Army clurin ; opera-ltions in the h, the brunt of' the f igvhting.. G-I I'O=DST the V ex-d VII Corps bore

The VIII Cor-n s and

-. t

one time the

XIX Corps were also part of the First Arxmy, but wore on the south and north flanks respectively of the h G freqiuent chnaos of divisions betwecen the rea. The

Corps

waJrrants the

inclusion of seprrte l ine-ups inecicatinU those cha^nges for the entire poriod undor consideration. The relartive positions of the Corps listedl wore from north to south: the

XIX.,..VII,

V, ra ncVi

Corps,

Ofti 22-23 Qotober

1944-,

XIX Corns p ,ssoJL from First 41rmyr coyntrol to the ITinth A',rmy

on the north, while VIII -Corx~s on the south passed from Thircl to

~~First the Army; first Army rem inei

at

three Corps strength.

27 Sept ember XIX Cores 29th Inf Div 30th I of Div 2ndc 2rmorc'd Div 7th Airmoroc1. Div VII Corps

1944
VT Corps 4th inf Liv 29th Inof Div 5th _:rmored. Div

1st I''if Div 9 th Inf Div 3 !-cl -Irrorod Div

Dycelpt for the 29tah Infantry Divi~sion and the 7th yrmorcd. Division which began te arrive in the First Army area on 2e September the order of battle indlicated above w,.as the same as that with Sep tomb or. ix

hich the

Army

hadc operatec for m ost of the

month

of

11 October
1I6

1 9

4P-i
V Corp s 4th Inf' Div 29th I nf Div 5th Jrmored. Div

Corps

VII Corps
1st

29th Inf Div 30th Inf Div 2nd. .-irror ecl Div

In.fc Div

9 th Inf Div 3rd Armored Div 22 October 1944

VII Corps 1 st Inf Div 9th Inf Div

V Corps
nth Inf Div 2Sth Inf Div

VTII COrpS 2nd Inf Div Irnf Div 83rd. Inf' Div 9th Anrmored. Div

9th
D.v

3rd :xrmored. Div

4 th

C v Gp

5 th Armored 102 Cnv G~p 27 Oct ober 1944

VII Corps 1st In. Div

V Corps

VIII Corps

3rd rmored. Div

47th LOCT

2nd liaf Div 4thi Inf Div 9th if Div(-47 ?.CT) 9th Inf Div
29th Inf Div

83rd

Inf Div.

5th Armored Div

10 Y ovober 1944
VII Cor-fs

9 th Armored. Div

V -Corps

VI II Co r~os

1st Inf Div

4th Inf Div 104th Inf Div
47th

71C T (rtchd
1st Div)

9th Inf Div(-47 yOT) 2nd. Inf Div *8th Inf Div *29th Ilnf Div 93rd Inf Div 99th Inf Div 9 Ar:d Divr 5th Armcl Div (_CC-) 14th (crv C-p 102nd Cav CGp

3rd Armd Div

CC.- 5th , rd 4th Cnv Qp.
*

Div ITovemaber.

Th ese

dlivisiOlls tr d.od.c Corps on 19--20 15 Dccombor 1944

VII

C o r-s

VCorps

VIII Corps

1st Laf Div(ros) 9th Inzf Div 83rd. Inf Div l04th Inqf Div 3rd rrZCl Div(res)

4th Inf Div 2nd In Div 29th Inf Div 9th I f Div 106th Inf Div 79th Inf Div 9th Arzd Div 99th Inf Div (-COB) CC" 5th A'rnd Div(re s) 5th Arnd- Liv(-CCR1. ros)CCB 9th Armd.L Div(res) 4th C x v p 102nd Cay G~p (res)

AP=DI'X
GF

III

OPM.DZh OF BATT2
in whose zone lay the 11uTRTG27T the Seventh German Arrmyr The

The FOI-2ST are,

First
oaS

US Army,

opposed

by

German Army boundaries coincided with those of the Althou,-h the rear uard action which the had put up in 7 tro ops, intact.
-C

First

rmy.

German

ALrmy

had

been haphazard and costly in combat

mrost

of the corns and. divi sion staff s had been kept

Atis the retreatinC: Germans

reached

the West

1'7

ll

these headqeuarters were used to comm which no w

.and

n hidden reserve

ma de

its

aeapearDAnce

in the form of inde-pendent battered

"tfortress battalions ".

These battalions relieve.

elements of the division on the front while the latter' were sent further to the re~ar in order to reform and refit. Later,

many of those fortress battalions were pLermanently incorporated into the dzivisions under whose staffs they, served. The

divisiens so formed were lacding in tr aining: and equipment and were about one-third T'/C strength.

Of tho four corps in the Seventh German Army only

one, the L)Q:IV Corp~s writh 526 Reserve
Divis

len

and 7,47

Infan-

try

Division subordinated,

w^ s def ending tie

HT12

.FO?"-T

sector in Septemb'er and early October. Duii : October and . Tovember the German Seventh

Ar i

strove to reinforce its heavilyT en gaged right flank and to

withdraw from-i the Offensive.

line

those

units

earm,?rked f or the

This shift to the north the 272nd

was

effected by

periodic-

,illy reeuirin.

and

277th Volksgrenadier Divisions

(on the south) to leap-frog their right flank batt?.lions during the nirht to occupy the positions of north. Fror e zamele,

their

neighboor on the

the right boundary of the 272nd VG- Divi-

sion-initially

was

just north of Mi SCviAU -and1 ultimately

as edged up to Z2-~2. The job of withdrmwinj: units for refittin.g prior to the D~iS . Offensive wams given ahigh prio rity by the German

Hi

,h Commcnd -nd necessita tecl freciuent changes in the Seventh

. rmyl s

order of battle.

an open w,,oupcl and wars a very disturbing fa~ctor in the plann--ing for the .UI2TFS Offensive. Because of the continuedy fighting, Seventh. Army was alwrays forced to attempt to bring forward reserve troops for the battle in the ? 2TGT. Those VG Divisions that were in the area we1were forbilden to utilize because they had boon earmark,:e. for the TTS. Panzer ^nd SS u~nits wocre alr ad.y undajr control of the armies th^.t were going to f ijyht in the u2D291T S. Those divisions had to finish their reorg.ni-zation and instructions behind the front or in inactive sectors, the only sectors twe wore permitted to commrit thorn.
13y

r or

the

Seventh .Army

the

i-UJWGT

:area

was always

rnid.-1'ovombor the German order of battle had lined

up as shown

in

'i.;.

13

*The

uIVT Corps wa,,s the corp s

primarily

responsible

f or thie sUBTG Z"' AIA, and the Panzer and

SS units constitued. a countorattacking- reserve,

On 10 December the Seventh Army was relieved by ele-

ments of the Fifteenth "rmy Pa xii

the Fifth Paynzer

;Army.

SEVEINTH

LXX IV 353 VG 344 VG 89 Inf 272 VG 277 VG Div Div Div Div Div

LXVI 246 rInf' Div 47 VG Div

3 Para Div Not in HURTGEN area,

tLXX

In Reserve to the west;

xxXx
FIFT
XXXXX

jPz

S5S Pz

LVIII
xx

K -

SS P . M,_ . ..I~i
xx

L77
xx (~)

I dxx ---XXC

I SS

2 SS

r...._D __.12
Figure 13.

SS
German Order of Battle (30 November 1944)

xiii

i=PT

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F076337
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APPENDIX

-VI

ARTILLERY
TIuch has been said in the accounts of the HURTGEN FOREST fighting of the intensity and yolume of the Gernan artillery fire.
Each infantry unit involved felt that it was more severe than any

it had previously encountered;

tanks was unusually great.

the effect of hostile-artillery on

Certainly the enemy which had been

beaten back through FRANCE stiffened his resistance before the ROER RIVER, and an impressive feature of this resistance was his

artillery fire.

Ch

the 1st of October the number of enemy artillery battalions

in the AACHJN area was estimated to be 25; this total had M Moreover, a definite ** increased to 34 by October 21st
improvement in the tactical employment of enemy artillery of fires as well as the coord was observed * * *Massing Heavier ination of widely separated batteries were noted. caliber -weapons were used and these inc zu.ded both field and railroad artillery. Some counter-battery fires were received and all indications showed that a more "artillery The ability of the conscious" enemy was, defending GEPMANY9

enemy to sitch the bulk of his fires from one critical This was illustarea to another also became apparent.
rated wrhen an attack was madae by V Corps in the general direction of SCHMIDT on 2 November and later on 16th November when t e drive to the ROER RIVER by the VII Corps was resumed. Artillery units of brigade and borps size were encountered about 1 December 9

BY

this time there were estimated to be a

total of 68 'battalions of German artillery along the First Army front. This total

was

part of the buildup fdr the ARE7NNES.

It is significant that this sudden stubborn defense on the part of the enemy artillery units came at a time when the Anericans were seriously short of important calibers of, artillery ammunition.

lcwever despite the shortage the A~meriCans were pouring back twice as, much artillery as the Germans were firing, ammun.ition was rationed we may still superiority. First Arny's84
Thus, although

speak of Allied artillery

artillery battalions and 13 Tank

Destroyer Battalions in addition to the organic divisional arty illery units were more than adequate to accomplish all missions. This is an imposing total of artillery units and the statements of many captured Germans pay respectful tribute to its effect. Acidording to one captured German officer '
* **

when our positions

were smothered, *without warning, by an American artillery concen-

2
tration .*then, not even birds or rabbits could escape." And as the First Army Artillery Section points out, "The frequent shortage of artillery ammunition stands alone as a limiting factor in the

3
artillery support rendered during the operations
*'I

During the period 15 October - 28 October which saw the fall of AACHEN the expenditure of artillery amrmunition in the First Army fell sharply due to the limited amounts of such ammunition in the supply pipeline. Only the most lucrative targets were attacked.

During the period 29 October-Il November the ra tioningcdf ammunition continued to be strict and the major effect of the artillery with the Army was used in repulsing repeated counter-attacks in the HURTGEN-TIOSSENACK-SCi-{MIT area. n the next phase from 12 November

to 25 November First I.rmy launched its coordinated offensive with VIT Corps driving toward the fiROER, later jo.ned by V Corps.

Tn-

creased allocations of artillery were received unexpectedly, and were badly needed in vier of the dogged fighting which character ized this offensive, xxi

ring this period expenditures were held

to

a minimum in the

all Corps zone, reflecting the nature of the action along the
Army front, Between 26 November and 9 December artillery in the

V and VII Corps zones was active in supporting the continued offensive but regrouped toward the end of the period in order to prepare for a new attack on 10 December. This period, 10 December to

15 December brought increased allocations of artillery ammuniti.n with a corresponding increase in the amount of fire laid down. For

the five periods outlined corresponding expenditures for the 105 mm howitzer; 155 mm howitzer; and the 155 gun MI are indicated in

Figure 14.
shortage.

These are the calibers most affected by the ammunition

DIring this time one 105 temporarily with 18

mm

howitzer battalion was reequipped

75.rim

howitzers to take advantage of the plentiThe artillery also improvised by

ful supply in that category.

using 36 German 105 mm gun -howitzoers for which approximately 20,000 rounds were

available, while

captured ammunition was used by the The use of the 4.5 inch rocket launch-

155 mm gun M-12 battalions.

ers by the 18th Field Artillery. Battalion was an expedient forced by the shortage of ammunition, when it but this new :-,eapon worked quite well

was employed on area targets.

xxii

Average No. Guns in Action 28 Oct 522 554 57 5 58 6oo

Average Rounds Per Gun P er Day

Total Rounds

Fo~r
Period

Oct-11
15 Dec

Nov

25 Nov Nov-9 Dec

171,200 189, 247 354,989 322,:868 159,049

Ho'oitzer

28

Oct

O ct-11 Nov 25 Nov Nov--9/ Dec 15 Dec

228 213 258 260 282

31,908 37,563
74,300

86,936 57, 577

1 Gun 2z8 Oct Oct-11 Nov

Dec

84 82 84 84 77

9,054 8,900 27,707 28, 29 14, 491

Figure 14,

Average daily amrr2unition expenditure for 105 and 155 rnilineter howitzers and the 155 milimeter gun. These Were the weapons most affected by the artillery a.nnunition shortage during the fighting in the HURTGEN FOREST,

xxiii

NOTES FOR AFFPENDIX VI

:1
Report

of2 Operations, First U. S. Army, 1 Aug 1944

22 February 1945

xxiv