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CODE:
INTHE FAMILYDIVISION
OFTHESECONDJUDICIALDISTRICTCOURTOFTHESTATEOFNEVADA
IN ANDFORTHECOUNTYOFWASHOE
ASHWINJOSHI,
Plaintiff, CaseNo. DV08-01l68
v.
Dept.No. 14
BHARTIJOSHI,
Defendant.
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ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION
Uponreviewofthepleadingsandpapersfiledherein,theCourtfindsandOrders
asfollows.
Initially,theCourtwouldlike to clarifyithastakenunderdeliberationonlythose
portionsofthemotionwhicharerelevanttotheawardofattorney'sfees. Baseduponthe
'NoticeofSubstitutionofCounsel'filed May14,2009,Ms.Joshihaschosentoretain
WashoeLegalServicestorepresentherfor the remainderofthiscaseintheplaceand
steadofMr.Coughlin,andrequestsafinaldecreeofdivorceenteredassoonaspossible.
(Notice,1:15-21).
Apartymovingfor reconsiderationmustdosowithinten(10)daysofthenoticeof
entryoftheorderatissue. WDCR12(8). If timelyfiled,motionsfor reconsiderationare
onlyappropriatelygrantedwhenthecourthasmisapprehendedor madeamistake
regardingapertinentcasefact or issueoflaw. Haroeq'e Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. MacSween, 96
Nev.215,606P.2d1095(1980). This typeofmotionmaynotbe usedto presentnew
F I L E D
Electronically
05-21-2009:11:27:19 AM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 785777
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information or to reargue a previously litigated issue. In Re Ross, 99 Nev. 657, 688 P.2d
1089 (1983); see also DCR 13(7).
A 'Notice of Entry of Order' was filed April 13, 2009. Pursuant to WDCR 12(8),
Mr. Coughlin should have filed the request for reconsideration by April 27, 2009.
Mr. Coughlin filed a 'Request for Adjustment of Filing Date or Extension of Time' on
April 29, 2009, in which he indicates he II attempted to file a timely Request for
Reconsideration on eFile, however, a technical deficiency regarding the signature line
resulted in a rejection of the filing." (Request,l:17-1:19). This pleading was never
submitted to the Court for a decision and Mr. Coughlin was never granted leave to file his
motion. Mr. Coughlin then proceeded to file a 'Request for Reconsideration; Request for
Extension of Time to Respond' on April 30, 2009.
Despite the procedural deficiencies, the Court finds a review of the substantive
argument presented herein is warranted in consideration of the grave nature of the Court'
holding that Mr. Coughlin is to personally pay opposing counsel's trial fees.
(1) Counsel defended a civil action or proceeding in this Court where such action or
defense was not warranted by existing law, or there was no good faith argument
for a modification of existing law -
Mr. Coughlin urges the Court to reconsider its ruling that he maintained and
defended this action without existing law, or made no good faith argument to change
existing law. Mr. Coughlin contends his position throughout this case was that his client i
entitled to more than $1.00 in alimony per year in exchange for Mr. Joshi taking on over
$20,000.00of consumer debt. (Request, 9:23-9:27). Mr. Coughlin cites to various opinions
submitted by courts across the country to support the proposition that a II debt to a third
party creditor may not be used to properly offset an alimony obligation." (Request, 1:18 -
11:21, 15:11-21:7). The persuasive authority presented herein was never submitted to the
Court prior to this time and thereby cannot be taken into account as it attempts to present
new evidence to support an already litigated issue.
/ / /
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The Court understands from this motion that Mr. Coughlin's position was that his
client was willing to take on community debt so long as she also received an alimony
award. It has become apparent that Mr. Coughlin's underlying intent was to create a
'judgment proof' client in that she would ultimately not be able to pay the community
debt allocated to her, but her alimony payments would remain intact. Mr. Coughlin asks
" [w]hat should or would happen if Ms. Joshi was granted alimony and subsequently
moved to discharge her share of the community debt in bankruptcy or simply just failed to
pay these debts?" (Request, 19:21-19:25). Mr. Coughlin's answer to this question is that"a
support obligation (alimony too, not just child support) should be upheld even where the
supported party has failed to live up to the debt distribution terms of a Court's divorce
decree." (Request, 20:1-20:3). Mr. Coughlin advocated for this position although he knew
third party creditors could, and likely would, ultimately go after Mr. Joshi when his client
failed to pay the community debt allocated to her in the decree of divorce. (Mr. Coughlin
states"creditors of such community debt are unaffected by anything in a divorce decree
from pursuing either of the parties for repayment... [and] it is typically very difficult to
pursue a spouse who is not a cosigner with respect to using that spouses separate property
[to] cover any community debt" and " [s]hould Ms. Joshi have been ordered to pay half of
the community credit card debt (for which her personal property probably could not be
used to satisfy as she was not a cosigner on nearly all of the accounts), any subsequent
failure on her part to do so could likely not be used as a proper basis to set off any alimony
award received." (Request 10:24-10:27; 17:3-17:11).
Mr. Springgate contends Mr. Coughlin's position lacks merit pursuant to
NRS 125.150 and Siragusa v. Siragusa, as it is well established that this Court has
jurisdiction to modify an award of alimony when one party fails to pay their attributed
share of the community debt. 108 Nev. 987, 843 P.2d 807 (1992). Mr. Springgate specifies it
has been Mr. Coughlin's position that Ms. Joshi preferred an equal distribution of debt in
addition to an award of alimony so that she could continue to collect alimony even if she
failed to pay her half of the community debt. Mr. Springgate contends Mr. Coughlin's
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pursuit of this matter was vexatious and frivolous "in that it was not grounded under
existing law, and in fact, was essentially urging a distribution of debts and assets in bad
faith." (Opp.5:11-5:13).
Mr. Coughlin has presented various decisions by courts throughout the United
States in support of his position on alimony and the distribution of community debts.
However, as stated above, the argument and case law presented herein were never
presented to the Court prior to this time. As such, there is no valid argument that the
court has misapprehended or made a mistake regarding a pertinent case fact or issue of
law when Mr. Coughlin is presenting argument and persuasive authority for the first time
in an attempt to re-litigate the issue. Not only did Mr. Coughlin fail to present any of the
argument contained herein at trial, he also failed to present any relevant Nevada law
regarding alimony at trial to sustain the contention that his client was entitled to such
support.
Overall, this portion of Mr. Coughlin's motion lends credence to this Court's
finding that his presentation of the case and arguments in support thereof were
unfounded in fact, unwarranted by existing law, unreasonable, and vexatious (Order,
13:11-13:13). At no point does Mr. Coughlin demonstrate that any of the information
contained herein was presented at trial for the Court to take into consideration. Further,
Mr. Coughlin acknowledges he advocated for a 'judgment proof' client and ultimately
contemplated placing Mr. Joshi in such a position that he would be pursued by third party
creditors should Ms. Joshi have been allocated any of the community debt in the decree of
divorce.
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies reconsideration of the award of attorney's
fees.
(2) The Court's 'Order After Trial' is sufficiently detailed and specific to support an
award personally requiring counsel to pay opposing side's attorney's fees -
Mr. Coughlin argues the Court failed to be sufficiently detailed and specific in its
Order with regard to Mr. Coughlin's sanctionable behavior, and with regard to the
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reasonableness of attorney's fees as the Court did not require an affidavit pursuant to
Willer v. Wilfong. (Request, 11:22 - 21:7; 22:10; 24:16).
The Court would direct Mr. Coughlin to review pages 11-13 of its 'Order After
Trial' for specific instances as to why this Court awarded attorney's fees to Mr. Springgate.
As for the contention that Miller was not satisfied, Mr. Coughlin's assertion of Miller
is unmeritorious under these circumstances. The Supreme Court specified that parties
seeking attorney fees in family law cases must support their fee request with affidavits or
other evidence that meets the factors in Brunzell and Wright. 112 Nev. At 623-624.
The Court witnessed first hand any and all evidence required under Brunzell during the
trial as it observed the qualities of the advocate, the character and difficulty of the work
performed, the actual work performed by the attorney, and the result obtained.
As Mr. Springgate is requesting attorney's fees for only that time spent at trial, there is no
need for any additional evidence to support the reasonableness of Mr. Springgate's fees.
Further, the requirement that the Court take into account the disparity in income pursuant
to Wright is nonsensical as the Court is not requiring the fees to be paid by a litigant.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court denies Mr. Coughlin's request for
reconsideration.
(3) Request for extension of time is denied -
Mr. Coughlin requests he be granted "more time to more fully develop this Motion
for Reconsideration and to access the necessary materials from Washoe Legal Services to
do so, including relevant file, work product, video of trial, and record of correspondences
between opposing counsel and Mr. Coughlin." (Request, 49:24-50:1).
This Court has substantively considered Mr. Coughlin'S 50 page motion despite its
procedural deficiencies. No good cause appears to grant Mr. Coughlin further lenience on
/ / /
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thismatter. Accordingly,Mr. Coughlin'srequestforanextensionoftimeto morefully
develophis requestfor reconsiderationisdenied.
GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May.z]:2009.

Gardner
DistrictCourtJudge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Pursuantto NRCP5(b),IcertifythatIamanemployeeofthe SecondJudicial
DistrictCourt,andthatonthe ~ dayof 2009,Idepositedformailing,first
classpostagepre-paid,atReno,Nevada,atrueandcJrectcopyofthe foregoing
documentaddressedto:
Document: Order Denying Request for Reconsideration
ZachCoughlin,Esq.
945W.12
th
Street
Reno,NV89503
IalsocertifythatonthecJ. 1 dayof 2009,Ielectronicallyfiledthe
foregoingwiththeClerkofthe Courtsystemwhichwillsendanoticeofelectronicfilingto
thefollowing:
JohnP.Springgate,Esq.
Marc Ashley,Esq.
~ e ~
AdministrativeAssistant- Dept.14
7