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Attorneys General
Take Action:
Real Leadership in
Fighting Foreclosures
ACORN Survey and Scorecard
June 2008
All told, there were six attorneys general who particularly stood out for their aggressive and creative
leadership in solving this crisis: Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, Massachusetts Attorney
General Martha Coakley, New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo, Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan,
Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller, and Minnesota Attorney General Lori Swanson, who all earned an
“A+” grade. These attorneys general are actively seeking real data from mortgage servicing companies,
pursuing cutting-edge cases against the industry’s bad actors, speaking out on matters of state and federal
importance, putting their offices to work for distressed borrowers, cracking down on vulturine rescue
scams, and pushing the industry to perform better for their constituents.
Many other attorneys general are doing great work and are paying increasing attention to the crisis, devoting
additional resources to the issue, and collaborating together more often than in the past. Still other attorneys
general, either because of their state avoiding the worst of the crisis so far or ideological barriers, have not
yet tuned in and turned the attention of their offices to meeting the challenges faced. ACORN is pleased to
see so much progress, and looks forward to working with attorneys general in continuing to pursue justice
and protect the American dream of homeownership.
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INTRODUCTION _____________________________________________________________________________________
American families are being squeezed on all sides – at the gas pump, the grocery store, through healthcare
costs, and especially in housing costs, long the most substantial piece of the American household’s budget.
With resetting interest rates, negatively amortizing loans, plummeting home values, and an illiquid market
that severely restricts refinancing availability, the national mortgage delinquency rate has topped 6% of all
loans, and 30% of subprime loans. More Americans lost their homes to foreclosure in 2007 than at any
time in recent history, and the crisis is only expected to deepen in 2008 and 2009. Currently, 2.5% of all
mortgages are in foreclosure, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association. One in 10 borrowers is
underwater, owing more money to their lender than their home is worth, and increasingly homeowners are
walking away from their homes and sending their keys to their lender in the mail, giving rise to the post-
subprime phenomenon of “Jingle Mail.”
There is an unlimited supply of blame to go around for the genesis of this crisis, from regulators who were
asleep at the switch, predatory brokers that swindled borrowers into bad loans in exchange for higher
commissions, lenders who abandoned any semblance of underwriting standards, insurance and ratings
agencies that did no due diligence, investors seeking to game the system, and a federal government that
approached the crisis with the fortitude of an ostrich. These failures were then compounded by the nearly
universal inadequacy of mortgage servicing companies to handle the sheer volume of delinquent mortgages,
and some saber-rattling from moneyed investors that slowed down appropriate loss mitigation and other
foreclosure avoidance workouts.
While Congress and some governors have grabbed headlines for some of their modest reactions to the
foreclosure crisis, there is another critical and largely untold story of the innovative and impactful leadership
that many states’ attorneys general have demonstrated in their diverse responses to the crises in their states.
This report, the first effort of its kind, seeks to catalogue the work that all 51 attorneys general have done,
highlight and recommend the best practices and cutting-edge strategies they have employed, and compare
their efforts and willingness to engage in solving this crisis and preventing the next one with those of their
colleagues around the nation.
ACORN appreciates the willingness of the vast majority of the state attorneys general and their staffs to
engage with us on this project and tackle the issue. The reactions that attorneys general have had to the
current crisis range from total inaction to all-out efforts using the full complement of available resources to
protect borrowers and reform the current system to prevent another crisis in the future. A questionnaire
from ACORN distributed to all 51 offices focused on nine issue areas in which some attorneys general have
acted to protect borrowers and enact reforms, from simple constituent service like establishing a 1-800 line
for distressed borrowers, to legal strategies like seeking preliminary injunctions against foreclosures sought
by companies that engaged in widespread predatory lending and advocacy roles like using the bully pulpit to
advance legislative protections at the state and federal level. The questionnaire further sought a summary
of any and all actions that the office had taken outside of the scope of the nine questions, which resulted in
a few inches-thick binders of information from some of the field’s leaders.
The coming pages include the 51-state scorecard, a discussion of findings including highlights of some best
practices from the front lines, a fuller explanation of methodology, and an appendix with the full questions.
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State Attorney General Party 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total Grade
Alabama Troy King R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 F
Alaska Talis Colberg R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 F
Arizona Terry Goddard D 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 6 21 A
Arkansas Dustin McDaniel D 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 5 20 A-
California Jerry Brown D 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 6 22 A
Colorado John Suthers R 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 1 1 2 10 C-
Connecticut Richard Blumenthal D 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 7 25 A+
Delaware Beau Biden D – – – – – – – – – – – Inc.
Florida Bill McCollum R – – 0 2 2 0 2 – 2 3 15* B-
Georgia Thurbert Baker D 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 20 A
Hawaii Mark Bennett R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 F
Idaho Lawrence Wasden R 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 5 11 C
Illinois Lisa Madigan D 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 7 25 A+
Indiana Steve Carter R 2 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 1 4 16 B
Iowa Tom Miller D 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 7 25 A+
Kansas Stephen Six D – – – – – – – – – – – Inc.
Kentucky Jack Conway D 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 5 20 A-
Louisiana Buddy Caldwell D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 F
Maine Steven Rowe D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 F
Maryland Doug Gansler D 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 22 A
Massachusetts Martha Coakley D 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 7 25 A+
Michigan Mike Cox R 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 4 10 C-
Minnesota Lori Swanson D 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 7 25 A+
Mississippi Jim Hood D 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 21 A
Missouri Jay Nixon D 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 2 4 18 B
Montana Mike McGrath D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 F
Nebraska Jon Bruning R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 F
Nevada Catherine Cortez Masto D 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 2 2 3 12 C
New Hampshire Kelly Ayotte R – – – – – – – – – – – Inc.
New Jersey Anne Milgram D 2 1 0 2 1 0 2 0 2 5 15 B-
New Mexico Gary King D 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 22 A
New York Andrew Cuomo D 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 7 25 A+
North Carolina Roy Cooper D 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 2 6 21 A
North Dakota Wayne Stenehjem R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 F
Ohio Vacant/Interim – – – – – – – – – – – Inc.
Oklahoma Drew Edmondson D – – – – – – – – – – – Inc.
Oregon Hardy Myers D 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 5 22 A
Pennsylvania Tom Corbett R 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 F
Rhode Island Patrick Lynch D 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 2 4 10 C-
South Carolina Henry McMaster R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 F
South Dakota Larry Long R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 F
Tennessee Robert Cooper D 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 0 2 4 16 B
Texas Greg Abbott R 2 1 0 2 1 0 2 2 1 3 14 C+
Utah Mark Shurtleff R 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 5 21 A
Vermont William Sorrell D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 F
Virginia Bob McDonnell R 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 5 D
Washington Rob McKenna R 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 4 20 A-
Washington, DC Linda Singer D 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 5 11 C
West Virginia Darrell McGraw D 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 15 B-
Wisconsin J.B. Van Hollen R 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 10 C-
Wyoming Bruce Salzburg D – – – – – – – – – – – Inc.
SCORING KEY: Partial Credit - 1 point Full Credit - 2 points Extra Credit - 0 to 7 points (See Methodology section for full explanation)
Notes: Florida score based on proportion to score quantities. See Methodology section for full explanation.
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20
Total 18
Democrat
16 Republican
15
Total 12
10
Total 8 8
Total 6
5 5
4 Total 1 4
3
2 2
0 1
Grade A B C D F
Note: Chart does not include the six offices that received an “Incomplete” grade.
GRADE A B C D F
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FINDINGS ______________________________________________________________________________________________
While the responses of attorneys general to the current foreclosure crisis range widely, it is clear that the
interest and attention paid to the topic has grown rapidly in the recent past, and that the best practices of
some attorneys general are increasingly being replicated. The vast majority of attorneys general are aware
of the crisis and engaged in some sort of response, though too few have been willing to stake out aggressive
leadership and advocacy roles. This report’s findings on the questionnaire’s topics and responses are
organized into four categories below: interstate cooperation and mortgage servicing data, constituent
services, advocacy roles, and legal strategies. Within all of these arenas, there are attorneys general doing
stellar work, and many opportunities to continue to grow and evolve new strategies for solving different
parts of the current crisis.
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The Working Group has released two reports that show with data what housing counselors have known
anecdotally for some time, in particular that the servicers’ loss mitigation efforts are woefully inadequate,
with seven out of ten distressed borrowers that should be on a loss mitigation track not receiving the
assistance they need. These cases represent the “low-hanging fruit” of foreclosure prevention, in that routine
modifications would allow the borrowers to save their homes and simultaneously reduce the loss in profits
to the investors who own the loans, as foreclosures usually result in a significant profit loss, especially in
a weak market. Without a clear picture of what the mortgage servicers are doing with loss mitigation, it is
difficult to diagnose the weak links in their systems and start making desperately needed improvements, be
they voluntary or imposed by new regulations.
The Hope Now Alliance, the organization founded by the industry last year in response to the crisis, has
trumpeted what it considers to be the success of the servicing industry in avoiding foreclosures, claiming
in April, for example, to have provided “more than one million workouts” to prevent foreclosure. This is a
rather incomplete picture though, as only 278,000 of those workouts actually involved a modification to the
terms of the loan that had already become delinquent, and it is unknown how many of those modifications
were merely capitalizing arrears instead of actually reducing the interest rate or principal to arrive at a more
affordable monthly payment. The balance was mostly repayment plans, which actually increase the monthly
payment of the distressed borrower by tacking on a portion of the arrears to the already unaffordable terms,
and are not particularly likely to avoid foreclosure in the end.
The Working Group’s efforts at getting real data on loss mitigation activities are critical to providing public
accountability to improve servicing practices. Question One of the survey asked about willingness to work
with other Attorneys General in getting just such data, and to make it as useful as possible by differentiating
it by company and making it publicly available. There was broad support for continuing and expanding the
role of the Working Group in this essential service they have provided.
CONSTITUENT SERVICES
Attorney general’s office can play an important role in the direct services that they provide to constituents,
even though they may have budgets of varying sizes. These services can take many different forms, and
aside from being smart politics, can actually succeed at reducing unnecessary foreclosures.
Among the simplest services employed by some attorneys general is the creation of 1-800 numbers for
distressed borrowers, as a centralized source of information for those seeking advice and assistance. Many
offices also publish brochures or use their websites as a means for distributing information. Question
Four asked the attorneys general about whether they have an information portal like a 1-800 number or
published material on their website, and many offices have created portals for distressed borrowers, often
in conjunction with their governor or state banking department. Some states, especially smaller states with
smaller budgets, indicated that they lacked the staffing to provide direct assistance and relied instead on the
Hope Now hotline to refer borrowers.
Another constituent service many offices provide is to arrange large-scale town hall meetings or forums,
whose purpose can range from the purely informational to the incredibly practical, by including lenders,
servicers, and housing counselors and actually getting some workouts done on the spot. Question Seven
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asked the attorneys general about their willingness to hold large meetings like these in collaboration with
community organizations. As with the 1-800 number, this is an easy way to inform the public, and attorneys
general demonstrated widespread willingness to do more public events to inform struggling borrowers
about their options and encourage them to avoid “foreclosure consultant” scam artists that have been
preying on desperate homeowners.
A natural byproduct of having an attorney general’s office interact with so
many individual constituents in need of help is figuring out systematic ways
to provide that help. The state of Massachusetts, in a show of interagency
cooperation, has achieved nearly universal participation from servicers to
voluntarily suspend foreclosure proceedings against any borrower that
enters the state’s distressed borrower pipeline for sixty days. This provides
ample time to collect the necessary financial documents that should inform
any loss mitigation decisions, and word of the servicers’ participation helped
encourage borrowers who had previously been out of contact with their
servicer get back in touch through the state. Even the Hope Now Alliance has
announced that most major lenders will provide a 30-day stay for previously
no-contact borrowers that are facing foreclosure and make contact.
Richard Blumenthal
Question Five asked about the willingness of attorneys general to advocate A+ Connecticut
on behalf of individual borrowers to win a reprieve and some breathing room
to hopefully negotiate a mutually agreeable solution to avoid foreclosure. Proposed and fought
There was, generally, less enthusiasm expressed from attorneys general for predatory lending
about providing this level of hands-on service, mostly due to budgetary legislation in Connecticut
restraint, although more than 20 offices indicated their willingness to go to Established a task force
bat for individual borrowers with their servicers. ACORN recommends that on predatory lending and
those offices facing staff or budget shortfalls specifically request funding foreclosure assistance
from the governor and legislature to carry out a program of borrower
assistance. Contributed $10,000 to
help train more than 150
There are many other additional constituent services that the most active attorneys for pro bono work
attorneys general have provided, including a novel approach from Connecticut
Advocated for individual
Attorney Richard Blumenthal, who has trained more than 150 lawyers to provide
borrowers to win stays on
pro bono legal defense for families facing foreclosure. foreclosures
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efforts to improve the industry and save homes from unnecessary foreclosure.
LEGAL STRATEGIES
Obviously, the most important arrow in an attorney general’s quiver is the legal authority to represent the
state in pursuing justice. Though there are significant disparities between the states in terms of existing
predatory lending and foreclosure laws to form a basis for legal actions, most attorneys general do have a
sound basis for pursuing legal strategies to protect homeowners and stop foreclosures and equity theft.
Perhaps the best example of an aggressive legal strategy comes from Massachusetts Attorney General Martha
Coakley, who sought and won a preliminary injunction against all foreclosure filings on “presumptively
unfair” loans made by Fremont Investment and Loan. The order, issued by Judge Ralph D. Gants, prohibits
Fremont from advancing or beginning foreclosure proceedings on any loan that is “presumptively unfair.”
Under the order, a loan is considered presumptively unfair if it:
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METHODOLOGY _____________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys general were asked questions about nine different issue areas (see Appendix for a copy of the
original questionnaire, which is discussed in depth in the Findings section) and actionable strategies to
fight foreclosures. For each of these nine questions, attorneys general could earn up to two points, with
partial credit being awarded for answers that acknowledged the importance of or concern about an issue
area without committing to taking a given action. Finally, the extra credit section awarded up to seven
points based on other actions that attorneys general have taken to place their office on the frontlines of the
battle against foreclosures. For example, the letter signed by 40 attorneys general in support of the Miller-
LaTourette amendment to prevent federal preemption of state foreclosure laws, although drafted and sent
after the questionnaire had been distributed, was factored into the extra credit scores. The questionnaire
was distributed in March and April, and all responses received by this report’s publication were included in
its results.
The grades on the scorecard were based on a simple rubric out of the 25 possible points, with 0-4 points
receiving an F, 5-9 points a D, 10-14 points a C, 15-19 points a B, and 20-25 points an A, with the highest
number of points in each grade range receiving a plus and the lowest number of points in each grade range
receiving a minus (thus a score of 14 points received a “C+”, 15 a “B-”).
Because of varying statutory authorities, some attorneys general were not able to answer this questionnaire.
When an attorney general cited specific statutes curtailing their authority to fight against foreclosures, they
were given a grade of “Incomplete”, though in most cases there is still a role, however limited, they could
play in ameliorating the crisis, perhaps only with the bully pulpit. Florida Attorney General Bill McCollum
was the only respondent who specifically cited a statutory/structural inability to answer exactly three of the
questions, and still addressed the remainder; his score is based on a proportional scoring system with the
three questions he could not answer discounted from the equation. In Ohio, an incomplete was given not
for statutory reasons, but because there was a vacancy in the office during the survey’s response time, and
an interim attorney general has just recently been appointed.
Some attorneys general chose to respond to the questionnaire in writing, and to include supplemental
material. In other cases, attorneys general preferred to answer the questions in a public forum or meeting
with ACORN leaders. There were also some offices that declined to answer the questionnaire whatsoever,
and in those cases ACORN attempted to scour the public record of websites, press releases, and court
filings to give appropriate credit where it was due, though it is impossible to claim a truly exhaustive record.
Absent the statutory restrictions that led to an “Incomplete”, as discussed above, all attorneys general were
included within the survey and scorecard. 37 of 50 offices (not including Ohio) responded to ACORN’s
request for information about foreclosure activity, a number that exceeded our goal and expectations at the
outset of this project.
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APPENDIX ______________________________________________________________________________________________
Will you work with other attorneys general in asking mortgage servicers to report on a monthly
basis to the states the number and type of modifications granted, repayment plans offered, success
rates of each, and the number of foreclosure filings initiated?
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“presumptively unfair.” Under the order, a loan is considered presumptively unfair if it:
• is an adjustable rate mortgage with an teaser period of three years or less;
• has a “teaser” interest rate that is at least three percent lower than the fully-indexed rate
(the relevant index at time of origination plus the margin specified in the mortgage note);
• creates a debt-to-income ratio exceeding 50% if Fremont had measured by the debt due under the
fully-indexed rate; and
• extended 100% financing or the loan has a substantial prepayment penalty or penalty that lasts
beyond the introductory period.
Under the terms of the injunction, the Attorney General’s office must receive 30 days notice prior to a
foreclosure, and has 45 days to object the proceeding. Fremont may then only proceed with a foreclosure
over the Attorney General’s objection if Fremont files a request with the Court, and the Court reviews the
matter and agrees that a foreclosure is appropriate. In considering whether to allow the matter to proceed,
the court will evaluate whether the loan is unfair and whether Fremont has taken reasonable steps to work
out the loan and avoid foreclosure through loss mitigation techniques. The injunction does not release
borrowers from their monthly mortgage obligations.
See the order here: http://www.mass.gov/Cago/docs/press/2008_02_26_fremont_pi.pdf
Do you support the thrust of the court’s decision, and would you be willing to file a motion seeking
a preliminary injunction against all foreclosure filings from a lender or its servicer(s) that has a
demonstrated pattern and practice of “presumptively unfair” predatory lending in a similar case
given adequate resources?
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Will you create (or do you currently have) a toll-free hotline to assist distressed borrowers in your
state, refer them to HUD-certified counseling agencies and pro bono attorneys, and collect information
about their cases that could lead to consumer protection litigation? Alternatively, if resources are too
scarce in your office to create such a line, will you advertise on your website and through other means
these types of resources for troubled borrowers?
QUESTION 5: Seek voluntary 60-day stay for distressed borrowers in assistance pipeline
Massachusetts has achieved nearly universal agreement from servicers to voluntarily offer a 60-90 day
stay for all distressed borrowers that enter the Commonwealth’s homeowner assistance hotline. Even the
industry nationally, through the Hope Now Alliance, has agreed to a 30-day stay for any borrower seeking
assistance.
Will you seek a voluntary 60-day stay for all homeowners facing foreclosure that call your state’s
hotline number or contact the lender with a HUD-certified counseling agency?
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mortgage industry representatives, its contributions so far to foreclosure avoidance have been limited. Hope
Now’s five-year teaser freeze plan only covers those borrowers that become delinquent because of a rate
reset between January 2008 and July 2010, and offers no assistance to the majority of subprime borrowers
who were delinquent prior to January 2008, those who become delinquent prior to a future rate reset, or who
fall behind for additional reasons beyond a rate reset. Most estimates put the number of borrowers eligible
for assistance under Hope Now between 175,000 and 240,000.
Recently, ACORN announced major reforms it had won from Countrywide, the largest servicer of subprime
loans, that will lead to streamlined modifications for many more classes of borrowers than are assisted by
Hope Now. This “Best Practices for Servicing Subprime Mortgages” agreement is expected to assist hundreds
of thousands of borrowers achieve an affordable monthly payment and avoid foreclosure when they become
delinquent on their subprime first mortgages.
Will you work with community organizations like ACORN to encourage lenders and servicers to sign
“best practices” agreements that move struggling families from the fast-track to foreclosure into
sustainable modifications with affordable monthly payments?
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