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Common Provisions Section 6 ARUELO VERSUS COURT OF APPEALS Doctrine: A motion to dismiss and a motion for a bill of particulars may be filed in an election protest pending before the regular courts, since the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are not applicable to the regular courts because of the exclusive rule-making power of the Supreme Court. (Aruelo vs. CA, 227 SCRA 311) Section 7 CUA VERSUS COMELEC Article IX-A, Section 7 Cua v. Commission on Elections (& Priv. Respondent Puzon) (1987) Facts: 1. The first division of Comelec rendered a 2-1 decision favoring the petitioner but nevertheless suspended his proclamation as winner in the lone congressional district of Quirino due to the lack of the unanimous vote required by the procedural rules in Comelec Resolution No. 1669. Section 5 of the said resolution states that, A case being heard by it shall be decided with the unanimous concurrence of all three Comissioners and its decision shall be considered a decision of the Comission. If this required number is not obtained, as when there is a dissenting opinion, the case may be appealed to the Commission En Banc, in which case the vote of the majority thereof shall be the decision of the Commission. Petitioner contends that the 2-1 decision of the first division was a valid decision despite the resolution stated above because of Art. IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution. He argues thatthis applies to the votings of the Comelec both in division and En Banc. Respondent, on the other hand, insists that no decision was reached by the first division because the required unanimous vote was not obtained. It was also argued that no validdecision was reached by the Comelec En Banc because only three votes were cast infavor of the petitioner and these did not constitute the majority of the body.

the basis of the two aforecited decisions was a valid act that entitles him to assume his seat in the House of Representatives.

ACENA VERSUS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution of the Civil Service Commission which set aside the order of the Merit Systems Protection Board declaring the herein petitioner as the legitimate Administrative Officer of Rizal Technological Colleges. Acena was assigned as Admin. Officer by then President of Rizal Technological Colleges and was subsequently promoted as Associate Professor on temporary status pending his compliance to obtain a Masters Degree while assuming the position of Acting Admin Officer at the same time. The Board of Trustees designated Ricardo Salvador as Acting Admin Officer and pursuant to the same, the new College President Dr. Estolas revoked the designation of the petitioner as acting Admin Officer. Petitioner sent a letter to the CSC stating his desire to keep his appointment as Admin Officer instead of Associate Professor. Thus the latters appointment was withdrawn. He also filed a complaint for injunction of damages to Dr. Estolas assailing the validity of his dismissal from his position as violation of security of tenure. He filed another complaint for illegal termination against Dr. Estolas before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The CSC opined that Acena is still the Admin Officer since his appointment as Asso. Prof. was withdrawn. Dr. Estolas filed petition for review to the Office of the President. The Presidential Staff Director referred the complaint back to the CSC. In the dispositive portion of its resolution, the CSC finds the action of Dr. Estolas valid and set aside the previous opinion made by the CSC and the order of the MSPB. The petitioner files a petition for certiorari against the CSC decision on jurisdictional issue. Issue: whether or not the appeals from decisions of Merit System and Protection Board (MSPB) is cognizable by the Civil Service Commission Held: Yes. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1409 dated June 8, 1978, provides that: Sec. 8. Relationship with the Civil Service Commission. Decision of the Board involving the removal of officers and employees from the service shall be subject to automatic review by the Commission. The Commission shall likewise hear and decide appeals from other decisions of the Board, provided that the decisions of the Commission shall be subject to review only by the Courts.




Issue: W/N the 2-1 decision of the first division was valid. Held: The 2-1 decision by the first division was a valid decision under Art. IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution. Ratio: The three members who voted to affirm the first division constituted a majority of the five members who voted and deliberated thereon (Note: This is the part of the decision which Fr. B criticized in the Reviewer. See second column.) En Banc and their decision are also valid under the aforecited constitutional provision. Hence, the proclamation of Cua on

Implementing the above provisions, Section 7 of CSC Resolution No. 81-1329 dated November 23, 1981 likewise provides that: Sec. 7. Cases appealable to the Commission. Decision of the merits Systems Board on contested appointments and other non-disciplinary cases are appealable to the Commission by the party adversely affected within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof. (Emphasis supplied). Based on the above provisions of law, the decision of the MSPB is appealable to the Civil Service Commission within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the copy thereof. Perfection of the appeal within the prescribed period is jurisdictional so that the failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. Moreover, the right to appeal is a statutory right and the party who seeks to avail himself of the same must comply with the requirements of the law. Failure to do so, the right to appeal is lost. Civil Service Commission has the jurisdiction to review the decision of the MSPB. However, said authority to review can only be exercised if the party adversely affected by the decision of the MSPB has filed an appeal with the Commission within the reglementary period.

position to which he was promoted in 1977 after serving as Medical Specialist I of the same hospital for six (6) years (since 1971). On February 4, 1988 Dr. de la Fuente received notice from the Department of Health that he would be re-appointed "Medical Specialist II." Considering this to be a demotion by no less than two ranks from his post as Chief of Clinics,Dr. de la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization Board. When his protest was ignored, he brought his case to the Civil Service Commission where it was docketed as CSC Case No. 4. In the meantime "the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the position of Chief of Clinics were turned over to and were allowed to be exercised by Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr." Petitioner further argues that the Court of Appeals denied her due process by refusing to admit her answer, considering that: (a) she personally attended each and every hearing of the mandamus case; (b) in its decision of 9 June1989, the Court of Appeals explicitly declared that it was not the proper forum for the claim for damages, at which point then the necessity of an answer had become moot; (c) it was only on 27 September 1989 that the Court of Appeals reconsidered its decision of 9 June 1989 thereby upholding its jurisdiction to hear the claims for damages; (d) but then, consistent with her stand that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the claims for damages, she assailed such ruling before this Court, hence she could not have been expected to file an answer; (e) nonetheless, upon receipt of the adverse decision of this Court of 4 August 1992 in G.R. No. 101428, she immediately filed her answer with a corresponding motion for its admission; and (f) while her motion for admission of the answer had been pending since18 October 1992, the Court of Appeals did not act on it until it was already her turn to present her evidence on the claim for damages.

VITAL-GOZON VERSUS COURT OF APPEALS DOCTRINE: Under Article 27, in relation to Articles 2219 and 2217 of the Civil Code, a public officer, like petitioner herein, may be liable for moraldamages for as long as the moral damages suffered by private respondentwere the proximate result of petitioner's wrongful act or omission, i.e., refusalto perform an official duty or neglect in the performance thereof.

ISSUE/S: 1) whether petitioner was denied due process when her answer to the petition was not admitted; and 2) whether the awards of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees were proper.

HELD: 1) No. The record of CA-G.R. SP No. 16438 shows that in the resolution NATURE: Petition seeks to reverse the CA Resolution of 29 December 1998, the Court of Appeals gave due course to private respondent's petition and required herein petitioner and the other respondents to answer the petition within 10 days from notice of their solution. Clearly, therefore, petitioner's failure to file the answer to the petition was due to her fault or negligence. She was, by formal resolutions of the Court of Appeals, required to file answers to both the original petition and the supplemental/Amended Petition; yet, she failed to heed both resolutions.

FACTS: In the early months of 1987 and pursuant to Executive Order No. 119 issued on January 30, 1987 by president Corazon C. Aquino reorganization of the various offices of the Ministry of Health commenced; existing offices were abolished, transfers of personnel effected. At the time of the reorganization, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was the Chief of Clinics of the National Children's Hospital, having been appointed to that position on December 20, 1978. Prior thereto, he occupied the post of Medical Specialist II, a

2) It is thus evident that under Article 27, in relation to Articles 2219 and2217 of the Civil Code, a public officer, like petitioner herein, may be liable for moral damages for as long as the moral damages suffered by private respondent were the proximate result of petitioner's wrongful act or omission, i.e., refusal to perform an official duty or neglect in the performance thereof. There can be no question that private respondent was entitled to be restored to his position as Chief of Clinics by virtue of the final and executory decision of the Civil Service Commission. Petitioner, as head or chief of the National Children's Hospital, then had the duty to see to it that the decision be obeyed and implemented. This she failed to do and private respondent's two official demands for compliance with the Civil Service Commission's decision were merely referred by petitioner to the Legal Department of the Department of Health; and as further noted by this Court in its decision in G.R. No. 101428,"she did not answer [private respondent's] letters not even to inform him of the referral thereof to the Assistant Secretary [for Legal Affairs]. She chooses imply to await 'legal guidance from the DOH Legal Department.'"

Issue: 1. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an order of the COMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising from its invitation to bid; and 2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under the premises against the COMELEC and Acme to enjoin them from complying with their contract. Held: 1. Yes, the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the suit involving the award of contract of COMELEC. 2. No, Filipinas has no cause of action against the COMELEC and Acme to enjoin them from complying with their contract. Ratio: The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts. The COMELEC's Invitation to Bid No. 127, dated September 16, 1969, expressly stipulates THE COMMISSION ONELECTIONS RESERVES THE RIGHT TO REJECT ANY OR ALL BIDS; TO WAIVE ANY INFORMATION THEREIN; OR TOACCEPT SUCH BID AS MAY IN ITS DISCRETION BE CONSIDERED MOST REASONABLE AND ADVANTAGEOUS14. THIS CALL FORBIDS IS NO MORE THAN AN INVITATION TO MAKE PROPOSALS AND THE COMMISSION ONELECTIONS IS NOT BOUND TO ACCEPT ANY BID, NOR SHALL THIS CALL FOR BIDS BY ITSELF CONFER A RIGHT TO ANYBIDDER TO ACTION FOR DAMAGES OR UNREALIZED OR EXPECTED PROFITS UNLESS THE BID IS DULY ACCEPTED BYTHERE SOLUTION OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS. Pursuant to COMELEC's Invitation to Bid No. 127, a bidder may have the right to demand damages, or unrealized or expected profits, only when his bid was accepted byresolution of the COMELEC. Filipinas' bid, although recommended for award of contract by the biddingcommittee, was not the winning bid. No resolution to that effect appeared to have been issued by theCOMELEC. Decidedly then, Filipinas has no cause of action.

FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP VERSUS FERRER Facts: In preparation for the national elections, the Commissioners of the COMELEC issued an INVITATION TO BIDCALL No. 127 calling for the submission of sealed proposals for the manufacture and delivery of 11,000 units of voting booths with specifications and descriptions. Among the seventeen bidders who submitted proposals in response to the said INVITATION were the petitioner, Filipinos Engineering and Machine Shop, (Filipinas for short) and the private respondent, Acme Steel Manufacturing Company, (Acme for short). The respondent COMELEC Bidding Committee Chairman and Members submitted their Memorandum on the proceedings taken pursuant to the said Invitation to Bid which stated that Acme's bid had to be rejected because the sample it submitted was "made of black iron sheets, painted, and therefore not rust proof or rust resistant," and that, "it is also heavy51 kilos in weight. The Committee instead recommended that Filipinas be awarded the contract to manufacture and supply the voting booths, but that an "ocular inspection be made by all members of the Commission of all the samples before the final award be made." Ocular inspection of all the samples submitted was conducted by the COMELEC Commissioners, and after that, the Commissioners noted that Acme submitted the lowest bid, the COMELEC issued a Resolution awarding the contract to Acme. Filipinas filed an Injunction suit with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, and also applied for a writ of preliminary injunction. After hearing petitioner's said application, the respondent Judge in an order denied the writ prayed for. Public respondents filed a motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the nature of suit, and that the complaint states no cause of action. The Judge dismissed the case and denied motion for reconsideration of Filipinas.

MATEO, et. al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al

FACTS: Petitioners, all Board Members of MOWAD, conducted an investigation on private respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then General Manager. When placed under preventive suspension, Maximo San Diego was designated in his place as acting General Manager. He was later dismissed from service. Private respondent then filed a Special Civil Action before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 78, challenging his dismissal by petitioners.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the case on two grounds: 1. The court had no jurisdiction over the case; and 2. Quo warranto was not the proper remedy. Respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration as well. ISSUE: Whether or not the regional trial court has jurisdiction over the special civil case involving dismissal of an employee of Quasi-public Corporation. RULING: The Supreme Court held that it has no jurisdiction. MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, and as such its officers and employees are covered by the Civil Service Law. Indeed the established rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of government-owned and controlled corporations are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Laws and Rules and Regulations. Petition is hereby granted. REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 1-95 May 16, 1995 (REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 1-91) TO: COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, ALL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION SERVICE, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES. SUBJECT: Rules Governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from Judgment or Final Orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies. 1. SCOPE. These rules shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Office of the President, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, and Construction Industry Arbitration Commission. 2. CASES NOT COVERED. These rules shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines. 3. WHERE TO APPEAL. An appeal under these rules may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the

manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. 4. PERIOD OF APPEAL. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full a mount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed another period of fifteen (15) days. 5. HOW APPEAL TAKEN. Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the court or agency aquo. The original copy of the petition intended for the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner. Upon filing the petition for review, the petitioner shall pay to the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted by the Court of Appeals upon verified motion setting forth the grounds relied upon. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from notice of the denial. 6. CONTENTS OF THE PETITION. The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the courts or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) state all the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the reglementary period provided herein; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as required in Revised Circular No. 28-91. 7. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS. The failure of the petitioner to comply with the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient grounds for the dismissal thereof. 8. ACTION ON THE PETITION. The Court of Appeals may require the respondent to file a comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. The

Court, however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. 9. CONTENTS OF COMMENT. The comment shall be filed within ten (10) days from notice in seven (7) legible copies and accompanied by clearly legible certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein together with other supporting papers. It shall point out insufficiencies or inaccuracies in petitioner's statement of facts and issues, and state the reasons why the petition should be denied or dismissed. A copy thereof shall be served on the petitioner, and proof of such service shall be filed with the Court of Appeals. 10. DUE COURSE. If upon the filing of the comment or such other pleadings or documents as may be required or allowed by the Court of Appeals or upon the expiration of period for the filing thereof, and on the bases of the petition or the record the Court of Appeals finds prima facie that the court or agencies concerned has committed errors of fact or law that would warrant reversal or modification of the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, it may give due course to the petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the same. The findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals. 11. TRANSMITTAL OF RECORD. Within fifteen (15) days from notice that the petition has been given due course, the Court of Appeals may re-quire the court or agency concerned to transmit the original or a legible certified true copy of the entire record of the proceeding under review. The record to be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceeding. The Court of Appeals may require or permit subsequent correction of or addition to the record. 12. EFFECT OF APPEAL. The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just. 13. SUBMISSION FOR DECISION. If the petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals may set the case for oral argument or require the parties to submit memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice. The case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last pleading or memorandum required by these rules or by the Court itself. 14. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS. All petitions for certiorari against the Civil Service Commission and The Central Board of Assessment Appeals filed and pending in the Supreme Court prior to the effectivity of this Revised Administrative Circular shall be treated as petitions for review hereunder and shall be transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition. Petitions for certiorari against the aforesaid agencies which may be filed after the effectivity hereof and up to June 30, 1995 shall likewise be considered as

petitions for review and shall be referred to the Court of Appeals for the same purpose. In both instances, for purposes of the period of appeal contemplated in Section 4 hereof, the date of receipt by the Court of Appeals of the petitions thus transferred or referred to it shall be considered as the date of the filing thereof as petitions for review, and the Court of Appeals may require the filing of amended or supplemental pleadings and the submission of such further documents or records as it may deem necessary in view of and consequent to the change in the mode of appellate review. 15. REPEALING CLAUSE. Rules 43 and 44 of the Rules of Court are hereby repealed and superseded by this Circular. 16. EFFECTIVITY. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect on June 1, 1995. May 16, 1995. (Sgd.) ANDRES R. NARVASA

B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION Section 2 TUPAS v. NHA Facts: National Housing Corporation is a corpo r a t i o n o r g a n i z e d i n u n d e r Executive Order No. 399 of the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations. Its shares of stock are and have been 100% owned by the government from its incorporation under Act 459, the former corporation law. The government e n t i t i e s t h a t o w n i t s shares of stock are the GSIS, SSS, DBP, the N a t i o n a l Investment and Development Corporation a nd the People's Home site and Housing Corporation. On the other hand, Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC. In 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with DOLE Regional Office in order todeterm ine the exclusive bargainingrepresentati ve of the workers in NHC. It was claime d t h a t i t s m e m b e r s comprised the majority of the employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by the med-arbiter holding that NHC being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective bargainingp u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 1 , R u l e I I, Book V of the Rules and Regulati o n s Implementing the Labor Code. TUPAS appealed to BLR which, in turn, reversed the med-arbiter and ordered a certification election to be c o n d u c t e d . H o w e v e r , t h e s a m e w a s reversed in the MR. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON a certification election may be co n d u c t e d a m o n g t h e N H C employees Held: Y e s . U n d e r the present (1987) C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e c i v i l s e r v i c e n o w covers only government owned or controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. Since the NHC is a GOCC without an original charter, it is not covered by the Civil Service Law but by the Labor Code. Anyway, whether the NHC is covered by Labor Code or the Civil Service Law is beside the point. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental a n d t h e private sectors. The Bill of Rights provides t h a t t h e r i g h t o f t h e people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not beabridged.

This guarantee is reiterated in the second par agraph of Section 3,Article XIII, on Social Justice and Human Rights, which mandates t h a t t h e State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. Specifically with respect to government em p l o y e e s , t h e r i g h t t o unionize is recognized in Paragraph (5), Section 2, Article IX-B which providest h a t t h e r i g h t t o s e l f organization shall not be denied to govern m e n t employees. The rationale for this is that the government for all its sovereign functions also performs mundane tasks such that it is also an employer in the true sense of the term. In fact, it is the biggest employer in the nation.

SALAZAR VS. MATHAY The Civil Service Commission: Appointments Facts: On January 20, 1960, petitioner Melania C. Salazar was appointed by the Auditor General confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor General, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Herappointment was noted by the Commissioner of Civil Service. On March 28, 1962 and on February 12, 1965she was extended another appointment by way of promotion, as confidential agent in the same office. On March 18, 1966, petitioner received a notice from the Auditor General that her services as confidential agent have been terminated as of the close of office hours on March 31, 1966. On March 31, 1966, the Auditor General upon favorable recommendation of Mr. Pedro Encabo, Auditor of the GSIS issued an appointment to petitioner as Junior Examiner in his office which was approved by the Commission of Civil Service. On the same day, petitioner assumed the position. On December 27, 1966, petitioner wrote the Commissioner of Civil Service requesting that she be reinstated to her former position as confidential agent. However, no action was taken on said letter. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court to compel the Auditor General to reinstate her to her former position but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition without prejudice to her filing the proper action to the Court of First Instance. Issue: (1)Whether or not the position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential or not.

(2)Whether or not the services of petitioner as confidential agent was validly terminated on the alleged ground of loss of confidence, and if not, whether or not she could still be reinstated to said position after accepting the position of Junior Examiner in the same office. Held: (1)The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential. There are two instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential: (1)When the President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service (now Civil Service Commission) has declared the position to be primarily confidential; or (2) In the absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functions of the office, there exists close intimacy between the appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. In the case before us, the provision of Executive Order No. 265, declaring ...confidential agents in the several department and offices of the Government, unless otherwise directed by the President, to be primarily confidential brings within the fold of the aforementioned executive order the position of confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are primarily confidential.

to have abandoned former position of confidential agent in the same office.

CORPUS VERSUS CUADERNO FACTS: Marino Corpus, Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank, was administratively charged with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and violation of the internal regulations of the office. He was suspended by the Monetary Board desoie the recommendation of the investigating committee that he be reinstated and there was no basis for actions against Corpus. The Board considered him resigned as of the date of his suspension. Corpus moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed the petition to CFI of Manila which favored him and declared the Resolution of the Board as null and void. He was awarded P5,000 as attorneys fees. Both Petitioner and respondent appealed the judgment. Petitioner was appealing the amount awarded to him contending that it was lower than what he has spent for attorneys fees. While the respondent claimed that an offic er holding highly technical position may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by the appointing power who was Governor Cuaderno. ISSUE: Is the lack of confidence by the appointing power be a ground for removing an employee or a public officer?

(2)Yes. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot complain that the termination of her services as confidential agent is in violation of her security of tenure, primarily confidential positions are excluded from the merit system, and dismissal at pleasure of officers or employees therein is allowed by the Constitution. This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power. It should be noted, however, that when such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not removed or dismissed from office his term merely expires, in much the same way as officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected, is not and cannot be deemed removed or dismissed there from, upon the expiration of said term. The main difference between the former the primarily confidential officer and the latter is that the latter's term is fixed of definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent. When this event takes place, the latter is not removed or dismissed from office his term has merely expired. But even granting for the sake of argument, that petitioner's position was not primarily confidential and that therefore her removal from said position for loss of confidence was in violation of her security of tenure as a civil service employee, yet by her acceptance of the position of Junior Examiner in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS on April 1, 1976, she was deemed

HELD: The Constitution distinguishes the primarily confidential from the highly technical employees, and to the latter the loss of confidence as a ground for removal is not applicable. No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for a cause provided by law. Pertaining to the petitioners claim for damages, the agreement between a client and his lawyer as to attorneys fees cannot bind the other party who was a stranger to the fee contract. While the Civil Code allows a party to recover reasonable counsel fees by way of damages, such fees must lie primarily in the discretion of the trial court. Decision appealed affirmed by the Supreme Court. LUEGO VERSUS CSC DOCTRINE: A permanent appointment is protected by the Constitution. NATURE: Petition to review the resolution of the COMELEC FACTS: Luego was appointed Administrative Officer II in the Office of the City Mayor in Cebu City. The appointment was described as "permanent" but the Civil Service Commission approved it as "temporary," subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by Tuozo and another employee. The Civil Service Commission later found Tuozo bettter qualified than Luego and directed that Tuozo replace Luego as Administrative Officer II. The private respondent was so appointed on June 28, 1984, by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent

appointment, is now before the court to question that order and the private respondent's title. ISSUE/S: Whether the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee? HELD: No. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it temporary. Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. Thus, unlike the Commission on Appointments, the Civil Service Commission is limited only to the non-discretionary authority of determining whether or not the person appointed meets all the required conditions laid down by the law. This political detachment will be impaired if the security of tenure clause in the Constitution is emasculated and appointments in the Civil Service are revoked and changed at will to suit the motivations and even the fancies of whatever party may be in power. PAGCOR v. RILLORAZA SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS Facts: On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal. It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay

and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices. Issue: Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike. Held: The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31]. Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such governmentcontrolled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal. LOPEZ v. CSC UP and TORRES v. CSC NAVARRO v CSC CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION VS DACOYCOY To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. Facts: In 1995, George P. Suan, Citizens Crime Watch VicePresident, Allen Chapter, Northern Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Quezon City, a complaint for

habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism against respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy. After a formal investigation, the CSC promulgated its resolution on January 28, 1997 finding no substantial evidence to support the charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the CSC found Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service.

Clearly, there are four situations covered. In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. It is true that Dacoycoy did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. In fact, it was Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended to DECS Region VIII the appointment of Rito Dacoycoy as driver and appointed Ped Dacoycoy as casual utility worker. However, it was the respondent who recommended Mr. Daclags authority to appoint first level positions. It was also the respondent who certified that funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito and even rated his performance as very satisfactory. Further, Ped, listed him in his job description as his next higher supervisor. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondent's two sons and placed them under respondent's immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Both positions are career positions. Clearly he is guilty of nepotism. Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. In Debulgado, we stressed that The basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one. The Court was unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and comprehensive. If not within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or bated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case what we need now is not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the outstanding civil servants, but also to plug the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing legal procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law. 2. There is no question that respondent Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Civil Service Commission adverse to him. He was the respondent official meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court required the petitioner therein, here respondent Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil Service Commission as public respondent as the government agency tasked with the duty to enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CSCs resolution w as reversed ruling that the respondent did not appoint his two sons; hence, respondent was not guilty of nepotism. The Court further held that it is the person who recommends or appoints who should be sanctioned, as it is he who performs the prohibited act. Issues: 1. Whether or not Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism. 2. Who may take an appeal from an adverse decision of the appellate court in an administrative civil service disciplinary case Held: Yes. The law defines nepotism as all appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited. The word relative and members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity. The following are exempted from the operations of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such appointment shall be made to the Commission. Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: a) appointing authority; b) recommending authority; c) chief of the bureau or office, and d) person exercising immediate appointee.




decision of the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.

Whether or not the respondent judge acted in lack of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion RULING: The court held that any judge has the jurisdiction to quash any writ of execution issued by him especially when it was improvidently issued. There is no abuse of discretion by the judge since the defendant made an opposition and proved that there is subsequent verbal agreement that amended the compromise hence the execution cannot be validly decreed without a hearing. The consequent ability of the defendant to meet his obligations by securing a GSIS loan also justifies the courts refusal to eject him from the premises by an execution. CSC, DE LIMA v. ALFONSO

The Court REVIVES and AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dated January 28, 1998 and September 30, 1998, dismissing respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy from the service. (Civil Service Commission vs. Pedro O. Dacoycoy, G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999) DE LOS SANTOS V YATCO (106 PHIL 745) Article IX (B), Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. (2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination. (3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. (4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. (5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees. (6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection as may be provided by law. Facts: Petitioner files for certiorari to revoke the order of respondent Judge Yatco for cancelling his previous order for execution on the parcel of land owned by the petitioner. The said parcel of land is being occupied by Fernando Mendoez with an agreement to pay in installment the said land to the petitioners and that he shall voluntarily vacate the land and the payments he previously made shall be forfeited in favor of the plaintiff. A civil case was filed by the petitioner against Mendoez for failure to pay as per agreement of both parties. Petitioner later filed a motion for execution to take the land back. Defendant Mendoez moved for postponement to give both parties sufficient time to come to an agreement which was allowed by the respondent judge. It was settled by both parties that Mendoez will secure a GSIS loan however when he was ready to make the payment the petitioner refused to abide with their agreement and now asking for a higher amount of money for payment. Finding no justification on the issuance of the writ of execution, Judge Yatco quashed said order hence this petition for certiorari based on lack of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion. ISSUE: