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DOLE v PAMAO-NFL - Ayesha January 13, 2003 DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs.


Facts: February 22, 1996: new five-year Collective Bargaining Agreement for the period starting February 1996 up to February 2001, was executed by petitioner Dole Philippines, Inc., and private respondent Pawis Ng Makabayang Obrero-NFL (PAMAO-NFL). Disputed section on meal allowance of new CBA under Section 3 of Article XVIII on Bonuses and Allowances: Section 3. MEAL ALLOWANCE. The COMPANY agrees to grant a MEAL ALLOWANCE of TEN PESOS (P10.00) to all employees who render at least TWO (2) hours or more of actual overtime work on a workday, and FREE MEALS, as presently practiced, not exceeding TWENTY FIVE PESOS (P25.00) after THREE (3) hours of actual overtime work. some departments of Dole reverted to previous practice of granting free meals after exactly three hours of actual overtime work; other departments only after more than three hours of overtime work private respondent filed complaint before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board alleging that petitioner Dole refused to comply with 1996-2001 CBA because it granted free meals only to those who rendered overtime work for more than three hours and not to those who rendered exactly three hours overtime work parties agreed to submit dispute to voluntary arbitration voluntary arbitrator: in favor of respondent; ordered DOLE to extend the "free meal" benefit to those who did overtime work even for exactly three hours only Dole sought for recon, denied CA recon also, denied present petition for review filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

Issues: 1. WoN the phrase "after three hours of actual overtime work" should be interpreted to mean after more than three hours of actual overtime work (NO -- should be after exactly 3hrs.) 2. WoN there is impairment of rights of DOLE as employer who supposed to have management prerogative (NO -- management prerogative has limits: eg CBA)

Ratio: 1. The "meal allowance" provision in the 1996-2001 CBA is not new. It was also in the 1985-1988 CBA and the 1990-1995 CBA. The 1990-1995 CBA provision on meal allowance was amended by the parties in the 1993-1995 CBA Supplement. The clear changes in each CBA provision on meal allowance were in the amount of the meal allowance and free meals, and the use of the words "after" and "after more than" to qualify the amount of overtime work to be performed by an employee to entitle him to the free meal. review of past CBAs o (the provisions on free meals of past CBAs are in the case, all the same except amount and the use of after more than; after more than used only in amended CBA, a supplement to the 1990-1995 CBA after renegotiation; present one has no such phrase)

on petitioner's contention that more than is mere surplusage as it had always been the policy to give the meal allowance only after more than 3 hours of overtime work (even during past CBAs, absent such phrase this has been the practice daw) o if this were true, why was it included only in the 1993-1995 CBA Supplement and the parties had to negotiate its deletion in the 1996-2001 CBA? o clearly, reversion to the wording of previous CBAs can only mean that parties intended that free meals be given to employees after exactly, or no less than, three hours of actual overtime work. The disputed provision of the CBA is clear and unambiguous; not susceptible to any other interpretation. Literal meaning of "free meals after three (3) hours of overtime work" shall prevail. 2. The exercise of management prerogative is not unlimited; subject to the limitations found in law, a collective bargaining agreement or the general principles of fair play and justice. This situation constitutes one of the limitations. The CBA is the norm of conduct between petitioner and private respondent and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law. Dole cannot assail voluntary arbitrators interpretation for the supposed impairment of its management prerogatives just because the same interpretation is contrary to its own. Held: PETITION DENIED. Ocean Builders v Sps Cubacub- Ayesha April 13, 2011 OCEAN BUILDERS CONSTRUCTION CORP., and/or DENNIS HAO, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ANTONIO and ANICIA CUBACUB, Respondents. Carpio Morales, J.

Facts: Bladimir Cubacub (Bladimir) was employed as maintenance man by petitioner company Ocean Builders Construction Corp. at its office in Caloocan City April 9, 1995: Bladimir afflicted with chicken pox; advised by petitioner Dennis Hao (Hao), the companys general manager, to rest for 3 days which he did at the companys "barracks" where he lives free of charge April 12, 1995: Bladimir went about usual chores of manning the gate and even cleaned company vehicles. o afternoon, he asked co-worker Ignacio Silangga (Silangga), to accompany him to his house in Capas, Tarlac so he could rest. o Hao gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga to instead bring Bladimir to nearest hospital. o Along with co-workers Narding and Tito Vergado, Silangga brought Bladimir to Caybiga Community Hospital (Caybiga Hospital), a primary-care hospital around 1km away from office o hospital confined Bladimir, with Narding keeping watch over him April 13, 1995: doctor informed Narding they needed to talk to Bladimirs parents; on Silanggas request, co-workers June Matias & Joel Edrene fetched Bladimirs parents from Tarlac o At about 8pm: Bladimirs parents-respondent spouses Cubacub, with friend Dr. Hermes Frias (Dr. Frias), arrived at the Caybiga Hospital and transferred Bladimir to the Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH) where he was placed in the intensive care unit and died the following day, April 14, 1995 death certificate issued by the QCGH: Bladimirs immediate cause of death - cardio-respiratory arrest, antecedent cause as pneumonia o death certificate by Dr. Frias: causes of death as cardiac arrest, multiple organ system failure, septicemia and chicken pox

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August 17, 1995: herein respondents filed before tarlac RTC in Capas a complaint for damages against petitioners, alleging that Hao was guilty of negligence which resulted in the deterioration of Bladimirs condition leading to his death Tarlac RTC, April 14, 1997: dismissed the complaint; Hao was not under any obligation to bring Bladimir to better tertiary hospitals and cause of death (some complications due to lack of adequate facilities at the hospital) cant be attributed to Hao CA, on respondents appeal, June 22, 2001: reversed RTC, by Haos failure to bring Bladimir to a better-equipped hospital, he violated Article 161 of the Labor Code; Hao should have foreseen that Bladimir, an adult, could suffer complications from chicken pox and, had he been brought to hospitals like St. Lukes, Capitol Medical Center, Philippine General Hospital and the like, Bladimir could have been saved; solidary liability to pay: P50,000.00 for the life of Bladimir Cubacub; P584,630.00 for loss of Bladimirs earning capacity; P4,834.60 as reimbursement of expenses incurred at QCGH P18,107.75 as reimbursement of expenses for the 5-day wake P30,000.00 as funeral expenses at Prudential Funeral Homes P6,700.00 for acquisition of memorial lot at Sto. Rosario Memorial Park P50,000.00 as moral damages; P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; P15,000.00 as attorneys fees and Cost of suit. motion for recon also denied; hence present appeal

Issue: WoN petitioner company and co-petitioner manager Dennis Hao liable for damages (NO)

Ratio: case is for damages based on torts, employer-employee relationship being incidental To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts, three elements: i. duty ii. breach iii. injury and proximate causation assailed decision held it was duty of petitioners to provide adequate medical assistance to the employees under Art. 161 of the Labor Code, failing which a breach is committed ART. 161. Assistance of employer. It shall be the duty of any employer to provide all the necessary assistance to ensure the adequate and immediate medical and dental attendance and treatment to an injured or sick employee in case of emergency determination of what phrase "adequate and immediate" medical attendance means in relation to an "emergency" is left to the employer, except when a full-time registered nurse or physician are available on-site as required under Labor Code, Art. 157 Article 157. Emergency Medical and Dental Services. It shall be the duty of every employer to furnish his employees in any locality with free medical and dental attendance and facilities consisting of: (a) The services of a full-time registered nurse when the number of employees exceeds fifty (50) but not more than two hundred (200) except when the employer does not maintain hazardous workplaces, in which case, the services of a graduate first-aider shall be provided for the protection of workers, where no registered nurse is available. The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall provide by appropriate regulations, the services that shall be required where the number of employees does not exceed fifty (50) and shall determine by appropriate order, hazardous workplaces for purposes of this Article; (b) The services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time physician and dentist, and an emergency clinic, when the number of employees exceeds two hundred (200) but not more than three hundred (300); and

(c) The services of a full-time physician, dentist and a full-time registered nurse as well as a dental clinic and an infirmary or emergency hospital with one bed capacity for every one hundred (100) employees when the number of employees exceeds three hundred (300). o in this case, no allegation that the company premises are hazardous; neither on number of employees (Haos testimony - 7 regular employees & 20 contractual employees still short of minimum 50 workers for it to be required to have a full-time registered nurse on "adequate and immediate medical" attendance mandated by Art 161 -> satisfied, by: o Haos advice for Bladimir to rest and later have him brought to the nearest hospital on necessary assistance o Hao does not appear to have medical background; should not be expected to have known that Bladimir needed to be brought to a hospital with better facilities alleged negligence NOT proximate cause o Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the result would not have occurred. o An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission (FACTUAL ISSUES) dissent finds that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from co-worker and Hao was negligent in not bringing that co-worker to the nearest physician o finding not borne by records; nowhere in appellate or even trial courts decision is there any such definite finding o only allusion to this: when Hao testified that he knew it to heal within three days as was the case of another worker, without reference, however, as to when it happened on which of two death certificates is more credible o no conflict in the two death certificates on the immedia te cause of Bladimirs death since both cite cardio-respiratory arrest due to complications from pneumonia per QCGH, septicemia and chicken pox per Dr. Frias. In fact, Dr. Frias admitted that the causes of death in both certificates were the same. o Dr. Frias could not be considered as Bladimirs attending physician, he merely ordered Bladimirs transfer to the QCGH after seeing him at the Caybiga Hospital; left Bladimir to care of QCGH, returned to Capas, Tarlac at 4 the following morning or 8 hours after seeing Bladimir; he himself testified he did not personally attend to Bladimir anymore once the latter was brought to the ICU at QCGH o Dr. Frias was not around at the time of death IN FINE, petitioner company and its co-petitioner manager Dennis Hao are not guilty of negligence.

Held: petition granted, CA decision reversed and complaint dismissed

DISSENT, Bersamin, J:

L.G. Foods -Ayesha September 26, 2006 L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR, Vice-President and General Manager, petitioners, vs. HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, and SPS. FLORENTINO and THERESA VALLEJERA, respondents.

Garcia, J.

Facts: February 26, 1996: Charles Vallereja, 7-year old son of the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the accident. :( Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the driver before MTCC Bacolod City before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver committed suicide MTCC, order of September 30, 1998, dismissed the criminal case June 23, 1999: spouses Vallejera filed before RTC Tarlac a complaint for damages against the petitioners as employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that as such employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees o Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim: petitioners as defendants denied liability for the death; they had exercised the required due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, including the deceased driver; thus prayed for dismissal for lack of cause of action on the part of the Vallejera couple o pre-trial: defendant petitioners insisted their dismissal prayer be resolved; court required them to file within ten days a memorandum of authorities supportive of their position o Instead, however, of the required memorandum of authorities, defendant petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, principally arguing that the complaint is basically a "claim for subsidiary liability against an employer" under the provision of Article 103 of the RPC contend that there must first be a judgment of conviction against their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable since the driver died during the pendency of the criminal action, the sine qua non condition for their subsidiary liability was not fulfilled, hence lack of cause of action also argued that since plaintiffs did not make a reservation to institute separate action for damages when the criminal case was filed, damage suit in question is thereby deemed instituted with the criminal action, which was already dismissed. o RTC, September 4, 2001: denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and set the case for pre-trial; motion for recon also denied o CA: denied petition; motion for recon also denied

Issue: WoN spouses Vallejeras' cause of action is founded on RPC 103, as maintained by the petitioners (NO, derived from NCC 2180! as ruled by lower courts)

Ratio: Nothing in the allegations suggests, even remotely, that the herein petitioners are being made to account for their subsidiary liability under RPC 103 o complaint did not even aver the basic elements for the subsidiary liability of an employer under RPC 103, such as the prior conviction of the driver in the criminal case filed against him nor his insolvency o from the allegations of the complaint, quasi-delict was their choice of remedy against the petitioners plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault and negligence on the part of the driver and the failure of the petitioners, as employers, to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees o spouses further alleged that the petitioners are civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of their driver since they failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employees,

which diligence, if exercised, could have prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to the death of their 7-year old son Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of action: "act or omission by which a party violates the right of another." Such act or omission gives rise to an obligation which may come from law, contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts. An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender: 1) civil liability ex delicto; and 2) independent civil liabilities, such as: those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony ( e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law; the intentional torts; and culpa aquiliana); or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action. Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender. in other words: [DOCTRINE!!!] victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code on relevant NCC provisions [not verbatim but what it says] NCC 1161: civil obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by penal laws subject to the provision of Article 2177 and of the pertinent provision of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages NCC 2177: provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff may choose from in case the obligation has the possibility of arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly from quasi-delict/tort. choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in his initiatory pleading or complaint and not with the defendant NCC 2180: liability of the employer is direct or immediate; not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee

in this case! allegations by complainant are sufficient! (those already mentioned above) Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on RPC 103 o they would have alleged that: guilt of the driver had been proven beyond reasonable doubt; such accused driver is insolvent; it is the subsidiary liability of the defendant petitioners as employers to pay for the damage done by their employee (driver) based on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable since there was no conviction in the criminal case against the driver, precisely because death intervened prior to the termination of the criminal proceedings, the spouses' recourse was, therefore, to sue the petitioners for their direct and primary liability based on quasi-delict. Besides, in petitioners Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim: repeatedly made mention of NCC 2180 and anchored their defense on their allegation that "they had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of [their] employees." -> admission that petitioners acknowledged private respondents' cause of action as one for quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

IN SUM: case is a negligence suit brought under NCC 2176 to recover damages primarily from the petitioners as employers responsible for their negligent driver pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for damages caused by his employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former is not engaged in any business or industry.

Held: petition DENIED