You are on page 1of 6

1. Casupanan vs Laroya G.R. No. 145391.

August 26, 2002 FACTS: The parties in this case were involved in a vehicular accident. As a result, Casupanan filed a civil case against Laroya for Quasi-delict and Laroya filed a criminal case against the former for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was already in its Preliminary investigation stage. Laroya filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of forum shopping considering the own going criminal case, which was granted. Casupanan filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently from the criminal case. ISSUE: Whether or nor an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case? HELD: Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action. Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or guardians. Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a separate civil action . This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.

Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law. Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous. 2. Hambon vs CA G.R. No. 122150 March 17, 2003 FACTS:

Herein respondent filed a complaint for damages against respondent for the injuries and expenses he sustained when the latters truck bumped him that night of December 9, 1985.

However, the criminal case (Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence) filed previously against the respondent was dismissed by the court for petitioners lack of interest.

Respondent alleges that the dismissal of criminal case includes that of the civil action.

Trial Court rendered decision in favor of petitioner,

Court of Appeals reversed the decision, on the grounds that the Hambon failed to file the civil case. Hence, it is impliedly instituted with the Criminal case. The dismissal of the criminal case also includes the dismissal of the civil case.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A CIVIL CASE FOR DAMAGES BASED ON AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION FALLING UNDER ARTICLE 32, 33, 34 AND 2176 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE BE DULY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION TO FILE A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE FILED ARISING FROM THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION OF THE ACCUSED PURSUANT TO RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT, THE FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION BEING DUE TO

THE FACT THAT THE CRIMINAL CASE WAS DISMISSED BEFORE THE PROSECUTION STARTED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE FOR FAILURE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO APPEAR DESPITE NOTICE

Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute the civil action for damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. Having failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damages subsequently filed by him without prior reservation should be dismissed. With the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2049, whatever civil action for the recovery of civil liability that was impliedly instituted therein

HELD:

was likewise dismissed.chan robles virtual law library WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1995, is AFFIRMED in toto

1quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will de deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case.... In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will de deemed instituted with the criminal action. Contrary to private respondent's contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of procedure. The requirement is merely procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any person criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended party the right to bring a separate civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before it may be brought separately. While the Abellana case ruled that a reservation is not necessary, the 1988 amendment of the rule explicitly requires reservation of the civil action. x x x Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil actions can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or simultaneous with the criminal action. . . . Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caos v. Peralta": . . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.

3 . D R E A M W OR K C O N S T R U C T I ON , IN C . , v s .J a n i o l a G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009 Facts: This case is a petition for the reversal of the decision on the suspension of the criminal proceeding filedby the petitioner in the MTC for the ground that there is a presence of prejudicial question withrespect to the civil case belatedly filed by the respondent. The petitioner appealed to RTC but deniedDreamwork, through its President, and Vice-President, filed a Complaint Affidavit againstJaniola forviolation of BP 22 at theOffice of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City. Correspondingly, the former alsofiled a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC, entitledPeople of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.On September 20, 2006, Janiola, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner for the rescission of analleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. Thereafter respondentfiled a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the Criminal Case for the ground that private respondentclaimthat the civil case posed a prejudicial question against the criminal case.Petitioner opposed theRespondents Motion to Suspend criminal proceeding based on juridical question for the followinggrounds; (1) there is no prejudicial question in thiscase as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncingchecks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question isthat the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issueraised in the subsequent criminal action; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal casehaving preceded the civil case. T h e M T C g r a n t e d t h e R e sp o n d e n t sM o t i o n t o S u sp e n d P r o ce e d i n g s. Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC but denied the petition.Hence, this petition raised. ISSUE Whether or not the MTC or RTC Court erred in its discretion to suspendproceedings in Criminal Case onthe basis of Prejudicial Question , with respect to the Civil Case belatedly filed.

Held T h i s p e t i t i o n m u s t b e g r a n te d , p u r su a n t to SE C . 7 . El e m e n ts o f p r e j u d i c i a l q u e s ti o n . T h e e l e m e n t s o f a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issuedetermines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law asthat which must precede thecriminal action and which requires a decisionbefore a final judgment can be rendered in the criminala c ti o n .T h e ci v i l a c ti o n m u s t b e i n st i tu t e d p r i o r to th e i n s t i t u t i o n o fth e cr i m i n a l a ct i o n . In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case filedby the State with the RTC. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action. Even if the trial court in the civil case declares thatthe construction agreement between the parties is void forlack of consideration, this would not affect theprosecution of private respondent in the criminal case.The fact of the matter is that private respondent issued checks which were subsequently dishonored forinsufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.Therefore, it isclear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, isabsent. Thus, no prejudicial question exists 4. MANLICLIC v. CALAUNAN FACTS: Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and owner-type jeep owned by respondentModesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza. the two vehicles collided. The front right side of the PhilippineRabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall ona ditch with water resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 metersfrom point of collision.By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitionerManliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries. Subsequently on 2December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI.Counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs)4 of the testimonies of respondentCalaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in asmuch as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case. ISSUE: WON the transcripts may be admitted in evidence. HELD: YES. Petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,18 MarceloMendoza 19 and Fernando Ramos 20 should not be admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply with therequisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.For Section 47, Rule 130 21 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable totestify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subjectas that in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in theformer trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.

Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules for a testimonygiven in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, notbeing a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case.The criminal case was filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLIs employee. The cases dealingwith the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to thecriminal cases instituted against their employees. Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the testimonies of the threewitnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.

It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered inevidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege whichthe party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform to the statute is awaiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible forbeing hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficientto prove the facts therein asserted. Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but,when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance itdeserves. In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trialcourt. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by bothpetitioners.26 Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN containing the testimony of DonatoGaniban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiffs witnesses inthe criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat ittoo. It cannot argue that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal caseshould not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for the accused beadmitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, MarceloMendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would beunfair.

5. PEOPLE VS BAYOTAS Topic: Criminal Procedure, Rule 111 FACTS: In Criminal Case filed before RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died at the National Bilibid

Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution, dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based. Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemiawhich held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered. ISSUE/HELD: WON death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability? AFFIRMATIVE RATIO DICIDENDI: ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; Article 30 of the Civil Code provides: When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter.

In pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30. Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision: Sendaydiegos appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable. In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiegos conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiegos civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiegos civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal. Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. 7. JOSE VS SUAREZ Sps. Suares (respondents) had availed of petitioner Carolina Joses offer to lend money at daily interest of 1% to 2% which the latter increased to 5% and respondents were forced to accept due to their financial distress. They sought to nullify the 5% interest per day fixing claiming that the same were contrary to morals and done under vitiated consent. Thereafter, the petitioners filed cases of violation of BP 22 against respondents where the latter filed motions to suspend hearings based on existence of a prejudicial question. Respondents claimed that if the 5% interest rates are nullified and loans are computed at 1% per month, it would mean that the checks which are objects of BP 22 cases are not only fully paid but in fact overpaid.

Issue: w/n a prejudicial question exists such that the outcome of the validity of the interest is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondents in the criminal case? No

HELD: A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.3It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so

Ruling: No. Prejudicial questions have two elements a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not determinative of the guilt of the respondents in the criminal case. The cause or reason for issuance of a check is immaterial in determining criminal culpability under BP 22. The law punishes the issuance of the bouncing check, which is malum prohibitum and not the purpose it was issued for.

intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. Its two essential elements are:7 (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed

8. MARBELLA-BOBIS v. BOBIS

In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. In the current

PARTIES: Petitioner: IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS Respondent: ISAGANI D. BOBIS

jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second

FACTS: October 21, 1985, first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Not annulled, nullified or terminated January 25, 1996, second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis Third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez February 25, 1998, Imelda Bobis filed bigamy Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage *After petitioner sued for bigamy, its just when the respondent filed a declaration of absolute nullity.

marriage with petitioner.

Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question

*Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy (Landicho v. Relova)

ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy

9. People vs Aragon

FACTS: Herein accused under the name Proceso Rosima contracted a marriage to one Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu while he is still married to Maria Gorrea. Yet again, the accused now under the name of Proceso Aragon contracted another a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol. This was put into possibility because the accused was then a traveling sales man. When Maria Gorrea died, and seeing that the coast was dear in Cebu, Aragon brought Faicol to Cebu from Iloilo, where she became a teacher-nurse. Maria Faicol however, suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment brought to her by Aragon. Due to the injuries she was sent to Iloilo to undergo treatment, in her absence the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang. He then categorically denied in the court his marriage to Maria Faicol but affirmed his marriage to Maglasang. The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the instance of the latter.

ISSUE: Whethe or not accused is guilty of bigamy? HELD: It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage can not prosper. For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendantappellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.