1

TORTS AND DAMAGES Definition: Whoever by a ct or omission ca uses damage to a nother, there being fault or negligence, i s obliged to pay for the damage done, Such fa ult or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is ca lled a quasi-delict a nd i s governed by the provi s i ons of thi s Cha pter. (Art. 2176, New Civil Code) El ements: 1. Acts or omi ssion ca used by fa ult or negligence. 2. Da mages results from the act or omission 3. Ca us al connection between the acts or omission a nd the damages; a nd 4. No pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. Negligence It cons ists i n the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the ci rcums tances of the persons, of the ti me a nd of th e place. The fa ult or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obl igation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the ti me and of the pl a ce. When negl i gence s hows bad faith, the provi s i ons of Arti cl es 1171 a nd 2201, pa ra gra ph 2, s ha l l a ppl y. (Art. 1173, New Civil Code) The wa nt of ca re requi red by the ci rcums ta nces . (Umali vs. Bacani, et. al., 69 SCRA 263)

Umali vs. Bacani (C.R. No. L-40570 Jamuary 30, 1976) Facts: A s torm wi th strong rain hit the Al cala Pa ngasinan, from 2:00 o'clock i n the a fternoon and lasted up to a bout mi dni ght of the s a me day. During the storm, the banana plants standi ng on a n el eva ted ground a l ong the roa d of s a i d muni ci pa l i ty a nd nea r the tra ns mission line of the Al cala Electric Pl ant were blown down and fell on the electric wire. As a result, the l ive electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post a nd the other fell to the ground under the fa l l en ba na na pl a nts . On the fol l owi ng morni ng, a t about 9:00 o'cl ock barri o captain Luciano Bueno of San Pedro Iii who was passing by saw the broken electric wi re a nd s o he wa rned the people i n the place not to go near the wire for they mi ght get hurt. He also saw Ci priano Bal domero, a laborer of the Al ca l a El ectri c Plant near the place and notified him ri ght then a nd there of the broken l ine and asked him to fi x it, but the latte r told the ba rri o ca pta i n tha t he coul d not do i t but tha t he wa s goi ng to l ook for the l i nema n to fi x i t. Sometime after the barrio ca ptain and Ci priano Baldomero had l eft the place, a s mall boy of 3 yea rs a nd 8 months ol d by the na me of Ma nuel P. Sa ynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the broken li ne wi re wa s a nd got i n contact with i t. The boy was electrocuted a nd he s ubsequently died. It was only a fter the electrocution of Ma nuel Sayn es tha t the broken wi re wa s fi xed a t a bout 10:00 o'cl ock on the s a me morni ng by the l i nema n of the el ectri c pl a nt. Issue: Whether or not the El ectri c Compa ny ca n be hel d l i a bl e for tort? Held:

Al ca l a El ectri c i s LIABLE under tort. Fi rs t, by the very evidence of the defendant, there were big and tall banana plants a t the place of the i ncident s ta ndi ng on a n el evated ground which were a bout 30 feet high and which were higher than the electric post s upporting the el ectri c l i ne, a nd yet the employees of the defendant who, with ordinary foresight, could have easily s een that even i n case of modera te wi nds the el ectric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down, di d not even ta ke the neces s a ry preca uti on to el i mi na te tha t s ource of da nger to the el ectri c l i ne. Second, even after the employees of the Alcala El ectric Plant were already a ware of the possible damage the s torm of Ma y 14, 1972, coul d have ca used their electric l ines, thus becoming a possible threat to l ife a nd property, they did not cut off from the pl a nt the flow of electricity a long the lines, a n a ct they could have easily done pending inspection of th e wires to see i f they had been cut. Thi rd, employee Ci priano Baldomero was negligent on the morning of the i ncident because even if he was already made awa re of the l ive cut wire, he did not have the foresight to realize that the same pos ed a da nger to l i fe a nd property, a nd tha t he s hould have taken the necessary precaution to prevent anybody from approaching the live wire; i ns tea d Ba l domero l eft the premi ses because what was foremost in his mind was the repair of the line, obviously forgetti ng tha t i f l e ft una ttended to i t coul d enda nger l i fe a nd property. On defendants' argument that the proximate ca use of the vi ctim's death coul d be a ttri buted to the pa rents ' negl i gence i n a l lowing a child of tender a ge to go out of the house alone, We could readily s ee that because of the aforementioned s eri es of negligence on the part of defendants' employees resulting i n a live wire l ying on the premises without a ny vi sible warning of i ts

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l ethal character, a nybody, even a responsible grown up or not necessarily a n innocent child, could have met the same fate tha t befell the vi ctim. It may be true, as the l ower Court found out, that the contributory negligence of the vi cti m's pa rents i n not properly ta king ca re of the child, which enabled him to leave the house alone on the morning of the i ncident and go to a nearby pl a ce cut wire was very near the house (where vi ctim was l iving) where the fatal fallen wire electrocuted hi m, mi ght mi ti ga te res pondent's liability, but we ca nnot agree with petitioner's theory that the pare nts ' negl i gence cons ti tuted the proxi ma te ca us e of the victim's death because the real proximate ca use was the fallen live wire which posed a threat to life a nd property on tha t morning due to the series of negligence adverted to a bove committed by defendants' employees and which could ha ve ki l led any other person who might by a ccident get i nto contact wi th it. Stated otherwise, even if the child was a llowed to l e a ve the house unattended due to the parents' negligence, he would not have died that morning wh ere it not for the cut live wire he a cci denta l l y touched. Art. 2179 of the Ci vi l Code provi des tha t i f the negl i gence of the pl a i nti ff (pa rents of the vi cti m i n thi s ca s e) wa s onl y contri butory, the i mmediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants' lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover da mages, but the courts s hall mitigate the damages to be a warded. This law may be a vailed of by the peti ti oner but does not exempt him from liability. Peti tioner's liability for i njury ca used by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Arti cl e 2180 of the Ci vi l Code. The owner a nd manager of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their empl oyees i n the s ervi ce of the bra nches i n whi ch the l a tter a re em pl oyed or on ti l e occa s i on of thei r functi ons . The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the empl oyer beca us e the empl oyer i s s uppos ed to exerci se supervision over the work of the employees. This liability of the employer is primary a nd directs (Standard Va cuum Oi l Co. vs . Ta n a nd Court of Appeals, 107 Phi l. 109). In fact the proper defense for the empl oyer to ra i s e s o tha t he ma y es ca pe l i ability is to prove that he exercised, the diligence of the good fa ther of the family to prevent damage not only i n the sel ecti on of hi s employees but also in adequately s upervising them over their work. This defense was not a dequately proven as found by the tri a l Court, a nd We do not fi nd a ny s uffi ci ent rea s on to devi a te from i ts fi ndi ng.

Test for Determining Negligence: Di d the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable ca re a nd ca ution which a n ordinari l y prudent pers on woul d ha ve us ed i n the s a me s i tua ti on ? (Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil 809)

Picart vs. Smith (March 15, 19818 37 Phil. 809) Facts: Ama ndo Pi cart s eeks to recover from the defendant Frank Smith the sum of Php 31,100 a s damages alleged to have been ca used by a n a utomobi l e dri ven by Smi th. The i nci dent ha ppened on Dec 12, 1912, a t the Ca rl a tan Bridge, San Fernando, La Union. Pi cart was riding on his pony a ver the s aid bridge. Before he had gotten half wa y a cros s , Smi th a pproached from the opposite direction driving his vehicle a t 10 to 12 mi les per hour. Smith blew his horn to give warning a s he observed tha t the man was not observing rules of the road. Smith continued his course a nd ma de two more bl a s ts . Pi ca rt wa s perturbed by the ra pi dity of the a pproach that he pulled his pony to the ri ght s i de of the ra i l i ng. As the a utomobi l e a pproa ched, Smi th gui ded the a utomobile to i ts l eft, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. Smi th noti ced tha t the pony wa s not fri ghtene d s o he conti nued wi thout di mi nuti on of s peed. When he l earned that there was no possibility for the pony to go on the other s ide, Smi th drove hi s ca r to the ri ght to a voi d hi tti ng the pony, but i n so doing the vehicle passed i n a close proximity to the horse that i t became fri ghtened a nd turned i ts belly a cros s the bri dge with its head towards the ra iling. The horse was s truck on th e hock of the left hind l eg by the fl a nge of the ca r a nd the l i mb wa s broken. The horse fell a nd i ts rider was thrown off with some vi olence. It showed that the free s pace where the pony s too d between the a utomobile a nd the ra iling was probably less than o ne half meters. The horse di ed a nd Pi ca rt recei ved contus i ons whi ch ca us ed tempora ry uncons ci ous nes s a nd requi red medi ca l a ttenti on for s evera l da ys . Issue: Whether or not Smith was guilty of negligence that gives ri se to a ci vil obligation to repair the damage done to Picart a nd his pony? Held: Yes , the court ruled that Smith that he is liable to pay Pi cart the a mount of P200. The sum is computed to i nclude the va l ue of the hors e, medi ca l expens es of the pl a i nti ff, the l os s or da ma ge occa s i oned to a rti cl es of hi s a ppa rel . In the nature of things, this change i n situation occurred while the automobile was s till some distance away. From this momen t i t wa s no l onger pos s i bl e for Pi ca rt to es ca pe bei ng run down by goi ng to a pl a ce for grea ter s a fety.

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The control of the situation had then passed entirely to Smith, a nd i t was hi s duty to bri ng hi s ca r to a n i mmedi a te s top or s eeing no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far a way from the hors e to a voi d col l i s i o n. There wa s a n a ppreci a bl e ri s k tha t a hors e not a cqua i nted wi th vehi cl es woul d rea ct tha t wa y. The Test to Determine the Exi stence of Negligence i n a particular ca se ma y be stated a s follows: Di d the defendant i n doing t he a l leged negligent a ct use that reasonable ca re and caution which an ordina ri l y prudent pers on woul d ha ve us ed the s a me s i tua ti on? If not then he i s gui l ty of negl i gence. The l aw in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the i maginary conduct of the di s creet pa terfa mi l i a s of the Roma n La w. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the s ituation before him. The l aw cons i ders wha t woul d be reckl es s , bl a meworthy or negl i gent i n the ma n of ordi na ry i ntel l i gence a nd prudence a nd determi nes l i a bi l i ty by tha t. A prudent man, placed i n the position of Smith in the Courts opinion would ha ve recogni zed tha t the cours e whi ch he wa s purs uing wa s fra ught wi th ri s k a nd woul d therefore ha ve fores een ha rm to the hors e a nd the ri de r a s a rea s ona bl e cons equence of tha t cours e. (DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE)

Lilius et. al. vs. The Manila Railroad COmpan (G.R. No. L-39587 59 Phil. 758) Facts: Li l ius with his wife and daughter was on a sight-seeing tri p for Pagsanjan via Dayap. It was the first ti me that he made s a i d tri p a l though he had already been to many places, driving hi s own ca r, i n a nd outs i de the Phi l i ppi nes . Where the roa d wa s cl ea r a n d unobstructed, the plaintiff drove a t the ra te of from 19 to 25 mi les a n hour. Pri or thereto, he had made the tri p a s fa r a s Ca l a ua n, but never from Ca lauan to Pa gsanjan, vi a Dayap. He was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the roa d a t s a i d poi nts a nd h a d no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing a t Daya p. Before reaching the crossing i n question, there wa s nothi ng to i ndi ca te i ts exi s tence and i nasmuch as there were many houses, s hrubs a nd trees along the road, it was i mpos s i bl e to s ee a n a pproa chi ng tr a i n. At a bout s even or eight meters from the crossing, coming from Ca lauan, the plaintiff saw a n a utotruck parked on the left side of the roa d. Several people, who s eemed to have alighted from the s aid truck, were walking on the opposite side. He slowed down to about 12 mi l es an hour a nd s ounded his horn for the people to get out of the way. Wi th his attention thus occupied, he did not s ee the crossing but he heard two short whistles. Immediately a fterwards, he s a w a huge bl a ck ma s s fl i ng i ts el f upon hi m, whi ch turned out to be l ocomotive No. 713 of the defendant company's tra in coming eastward from Bay to Dayap station. The l ocomotive struck the pl a i nti ff's ca r ri ght i n the center. After dragging the said ca r a distance of about ten meters, the locomotive threw it upon a siding. T he force of the i mpact was s o great that the plaintiff's wife and daughter were thrown from the car a nd were picked up from the ground uncons ci ous a nd s eriously hurt. In spite of the efforts of engineer Andres Basilio, he was unable to s top the l ocomotive until a fter i t h a d gone a bout s eventy meters from the cros s i ng. Issue: Whether or not Ma ni l a Roa d Compa ny i s gui l ty of negl i gence a nd ci vi l l y l i a bl e? Held: The court i s of the opinion that the a ccident was due to negligence on the part of the defenda nt-a ppel l a nt compa ny, for not ha vi ng had on that occasion a ny s emaphore at the crossing a t Dayap, to s erve as a warning to pa s s ers -by of i ts exi s tence i n order tha t they might ta ke the necessary precautions before crossing the railroad; and, on the pa rt of i ts empl oyees the fl a gman a nd switchman, for not havi ng remained a t his post a t the crossing i n question to warn passers-by of the approachi ng tra i n; the s tationmaster, for failure to s end the said flagman and switchman to hi s pos t on ti me; a nd the engi neer, for not ha vi ng ta ken the necessary precautions to avoid an accident, i n vi ew of the a bs ence of s a i d fl a gma n a nd s wi tchma n, by s l a ckeni ng hi s s peed a nd conti nuous l y ri ngi ng the bel l a nd bl owi ng the whi s tl e before a rri vi ng a t the cros s i ng. Al though it is probable that the defendant-appellant entity e mployed the diligence of a good father of a family i n s el ecti ng i ts a foresaid employees, however, i t did not employ s uch diligence i n supervising their work a nd the di s cha rge of thei r duti es beca use, otherwise, it would have had a semaphore or sign at the crossing and, on previous occasions as well as on the night in question, the flagman and s wi tchma n woul d ha ve a l wa ys been a t hi s pos t a t the cros s i ng upon the a rri va l of a tra i n. The di ligence of a good father of a family, which the law requires in order to a void damage, is not confined to the ca reful a nd prudent s election of subordinates or employees but i ncludes i nspection of their work a nd supervision of the discharge of thei r duti es . Umali vs. Bacani (C.R. No. L-40570 Jamuary 30, 1976) Facts: A s torm wi th strong rain hit the Al cala Pa ngasinan, from 2:00 o'clock i n the a fternoon and lasted up to a bout mi dni ght of the s a me day. During the storm, the banana plants standi ng on a n el eva ted ground a l ong the roa d of s a i d muni ci pa l i ty a nd nea r the tra ns mission line of the Al cala Electric Pl ant were blown down and fell on the electric wire. As a result, the l ive electric wire was cut, one

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end of which was left hanging on the electric post a nd the other fell to the ground under the fa l l en ba na na pl a nts . On the fol l owi ng morni ng, a t about 9:00 o'cl ock barri o captain Luciano Bueno of San Pedro Iii who was passing by saw the broken electric wi re a nd s o he wa rned the people i n the place not to go near the wire for they mi ght get hurt. He also saw Ci priano Baldomero , a laborer of the Al ca l a El ectri c Plant near the place and notified him ri ght then a nd there of the broken l ine and asked him to fi x it, but the latte r told the ba rri o ca pta i n tha t he coul d not do i t but tha t he wa s goi ng to l ook for the l i nema n to fi x i t . Sometime after the barrio ca ptain and Ci priano Baldomero had l eft the place, a s mall boy of 3 yea rs a nd 8 months ol d by the na me of Ma nuel P. Sa ynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the broken li ne wi re wa s a nd got i n contact with i t. The boy was electrocuted a nd he s ubsequently died. It was only a fter the electrocution of Ma nuel Sayn es tha t the broken wi re wa s fi xed a t a bout 10:00 o'cl ock on the s a me morni ng by the l i nema n of the el ectri c pl a nt. Issue: Whether or not the El ectri c Compa ny ca n be hel d l i a bl e for tort? Held:

Al ca l a El ectri c i s LIABLE under tort. Fi rs t, by the very evidence of the defendant, there were big and tall banana plants a t the place of the i ncident s ta ndi ng on a n el evated ground which were a bout 30 feet high and which were higher than the electric post s upporting the el ectri c l i ne, a nd yet the employees of the defendant who, with ordinary foresight, could have easily s een that even i n case of modera te wi nds the el ectric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down, di d not even ta ke the neces s a ry preca uti on to el i mi na te tha t s ource of da nger to the el ectri c l i ne. Second, even after the employees of the Alcala El ectric Plant were already a ware of the possible damage the s torm of Ma y 14, 1972, coul d have ca used their electric l ines, thus becoming a possible threat to l ife a nd property, they did not cut off from the pl a nt the flow of electricity a long the lines, a n a ct they could have easily done pending inspection of the wires to see i f they had been cut. Thi rd, employee Ci priano Baldomero was negligent on the morning of the i ncident because even if he was already made awa re of the l ive cut wire, he did not have the foresight to realize that the same pos ed a da nger to l i fe a nd property, a nd tha t he s hould have taken the necessary precaution to prevent anybody from approaching the live wire; i ns tea d Ba l domero l eft the premi ses because what was foremost in his mind was the repair of the line, obviously forgetti ng tha t i f l eft una t tended to i t coul d enda nger l i fe a nd property. On defendants' argument that the proximate ca use of the vi ctim's death coul d be a ttri buted to the pa rents ' negl i gence i n a l lowing a child of tender a ge to go out of the house alone, We could readily s ee that b ecause of the aforementioned s eri es of negligence on the part of defendants' employees resulting i n a live wire l ying on the premises without a ny vi sible warning of i ts l ethal character, a nybody, even a responsible grown up or not necessarily a n innocent child, could have met the same fate tha t befell the vi ctim. It may be true, as the l ower Court found out, that the contributory negligence of the vi cti m's pa rents i n not properly ta king ca re of the child, which enabled him to leave the house alone on the mo rning of the i ncident and go to a nearby pl a ce cut wire was very near the house (where vi ctim was l iving) where the fatal fallen wire electrocuted hi m, mi ght mi ti ga te res pondent's liability, but we ca nnot agree with petitioner's theory that the parents ' ne gl i gence cons ti tuted the proxi ma te ca us e of the victim's death because the real proximate ca use was the fallen live wire which posed a threat to life a nd property on tha t morning due to the series of negligence adverted to a bove committed by defendants' em ployees and which could ha ve ki l led any other person who might by a ccident get i nto contact wi th it. Stated otherwise, even if the child was a llowed to l e a ve the house unattended due to the parents' negligence, he would not have died that morning where it not for the cut live wire he a cci denta l l y touched. Art. 2179 of the Ci vi l Code provi des tha t i f the negl i gence of the pl a i nti ff (pa rents of the vi cti m i n thi s ca s e) wa s onl y contri butory, the i mmediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants' lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover da mages, but the courts s hall mitigate the damages to be a warded. This law may be a vailed of by the peti ti oner but does not exempt him from liability. Peti tioner's liability for i njury ca used by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Arti cl e 2180 of the Ci vi l Code. The owner a nd manager of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their empl oyees i n the s ervi ce of the bra nches i n whi ch the l a tter a re empl oyed or on ti l e occa s i on of thei r functi ons . The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the empl oyer beca us e the empl oyer i s s uppos ed to exerci se supervision over the work of the employees. This liability of the employer is primary a nd d irects (Standard Va cuum Oi l Co. vs . Ta n a nd Court of Appeals, 107 Phi l. 109). In fact the proper defense for the empl oyer to ra i s e s o tha t he ma y es ca pe l i ability is to prove that he exercised, the diligence of the good fa ther of the family to prevent dama ge not only i n the sel ecti on of hi s employees but also in adequately s upervising them over their work. This defense was not a dequately proven as found by the tri a l Court, a nd We do not fi nd a ny s uffi ci ent rea s on to devi a te from i ts fi ndi ng.

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Corliss et. al. vs. The Manila Railrod Company (G.R. No. L-21291 - March 28, 1969 37 SCRA 674) Facts: On the evening of Feb 21, 1957, a t the railroad crossing i n Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga, in front of the Cl ark Air Force Base , the l a te Ralph W. Corliss, the jeep he was drivi ng collided wi th a l ocomotive of defendant-appellee Ma nila Railroad Company. On December 1956, pl a intiff, 19 yea rs of a ge, ma rried Ralph W. Corl iss Jr., 21 yea rs of a ge, that Corliss Jr. was a n air police of the Cl a rk Ai r Force Ba s e; tha t a t the time of the a ccident, he was driving the fatal jeep; that he was then returning i n said jeep, together with a P.C. s oldi er, to the Ba s e; a nd that Corliss Jr. died of s erious burns a t the Base Hospital the next day, while the soldier s ustained serious physical injuri es a nd burns . Pl a i nti ff-a ppel l a nt, Preci ol i ta , the wi fe of the decea s ed, fi l ed for a cti on for da ma ges . However, the negligence i mputed to defendant-appellee wa s thus rul ed out by the l ower court, s a ti s fa ctory proof to tha t effect, i n i ts opinion, being lacking. Hence this a ppeal direct to the SC, the amount sought in the concept of damages reaching the s um of P282, 065.40. Issue: Whether or not the l ower court committed an a buse of discretion in not a warding damages in favor of the Corliss ? Held:

The Lower Court i s correct i n not a wa rdi ng the da ma ges . Negl igence is defined as "The failure to observe for the protecti on of the i nteres ts of a nother pers on tha t degree of ca re, preca uti on a nd vi gi l a nce whi ch the ci rcums ta nce jus tl y dema nds w hereby s uch other pers on s uffers i njury." (Col ey) Jus ti ce Ca rdozo a nnounced would emphasized what was set forth earlier that each and every, ca se on questions of negl i gence i s to be decided in accordance with the peculiar ci rcumstances that present themselves. There ca n be no ha rd a nd fa s t rul e. There must be that observa nce of that degree of ca re, precaution, and vi gilance which the situation demands. Thus defenda nt a ppel l ee a cted. It i s undeni a bl e then tha t no negl i gence ca n ri ghtful l y be i mputed to i t. In the ca se at bar, there were two witnesses that testified that the jeep driven by the deceased did not s top even though there wa s a s ound from a tooting horn from the locomotive. Also, there was a credible testimony that before the locomoti ve, whi ch ha d been previously i nspected and found to be i n good condition a pproached, the crossing, that is, about 300 meters a wa y, he bl ew the siren a nd repeated it i n compliance wi th the regulations until he saw the jeep suddenly s purt a nd tha t a l though the l ocomotive was running between 20 a nd 25 kilometers an hour a nd although he had applied the brakes, the jeep was caught i n the mi ddl e of the tra cks . The weight of authorities is to the effect that a ra ilroad tra ck is i n i tself a warning or a signal of danger to those who go upon i t, a nd that those who, for reasons of their own, i gnore s uch warning, do so at their own risk and respons i bi l i ty. Corl i s s Jr., w ho undoubtedly had crossed the checkpoint frequently, i f not daily, must have known that locomotive engines a nd tra i ns us ua l l y pa s s a t tha t pa rti cul a r cros s i ng where the a cci dent ha d ta ken pl a ce.

Culion Ice, Fish and Electronic Co.. Inc. vs. Philippine Motors Corp. (November 3, 1930 55 Phil. 129) Facts: Cra ns ton was the representative of the plaintiff i n Ma ni l a a nd pl a i nti ff wa s the regi s tered owner of the motor s chooner Gwendoline . Cra ns ton decided to have the engine on the Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner. He ha d a conference with Quest, Phil. Motors manager, who a greed to do the job, with the understanding tha t pa yment s houl d be ma de upon compl etion of the work. The work was begun and conducted under the supervision of Quest, chi efl y by a mecha ni c whom Ques t too k wi th him to the boat. Quest had the assistance of the members of th e crew of the Gwendoline , who ha d been di rected by Cra ns ton to pl a ce thems el ves under Ques t's di recti ons . Upon preliminary i nspection of the engine, Quest concluded that a new carburetor was needed a nd thus i ns ta l l ed a Zeni th ca rburetor. The engine was tried with gasoline and the result was s atisfactory. The next problem was to i ntroduce into the carburetor the ba s er fuel, consisting of a low grade of oil mixed with distillate. A temporary ta nk to contain the mixture was placed on dec k above and at a s hort distance from the compartment covering the engine. This ta nk was connected with the carburetor by a piece of tubing, which was a pparently not well fitted a t the point where i t was connected with the tank. The fuel mixture l eaked from the ta nk a nd dri pp ed s own i nto the engine compartment. The new fuel line a nd that already i n use between the gasoline ta nk and carburetor were s o fi xed tha t i t wa s possible to change from the gasoline fuel to the mixed fuel. This arrangement enables the operator to s tart the engi ne on ga s ol i ne a nd then, a fter the engi ne ha d been opera ti ng for a few moments , to s wi tch to the new fuel s uppl y. It wa s observed that the carburetor was flooding, a nd that the gasoline, or other fuel, was tri ckling freely from the lower p art to the ca rburetor to the fl oor. This fact was called to Quest's a ttention, but he said that, when the engine had gotten to runni ng we l l , the fl ooding would disappear. The boat was taken out i nto the bay for a trial run. The engine s topped a few ti mes during the fi rst pa rt of the cours e, owing to the use of a n i mproper mi xture of fuel. In the course of the tri al, Quest remained outside of the engi ne com pa rtment a nd occupied himself with making distillate, with a view to ascertaining what proportion of the two elements would give bes t res ul ts i n

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the engine. As the boat was coming in from this run, the engine stopped, a nd connection again had to be made with the gasoline l i ne to get a new start. After this had been done the mechanic, or engineer, switched to the tube connecting with the new mi xture. A moment l a ter a back fi re occurred in the cylinder chamber. This ca used a flame to s hoot back into the ca rburetor, a nd i nstantly the ca rburetor and a dja cent parts were covered with a mass of flames, which the members of the crew were unable to subdue. The s alva ge from, the wreck, when s old, brought onl y the s um of P150. The va l ue of the boa t, before the a cci dent occurred, a s the court found, wa s P10,000. CFI ga ve judgment i n favor of the plaintiff to recover of the defendant the s um of P9,850, wi th i nteres t a t 6 per centum per a nnum from the da te of the fi l i ng of the compl a i nt, unti l s a ti s fa cti on of the judgment, wi th cos ts . Issue: Whether or not rhe l os s of the boa t i s cha rgea bl e to the negl i g ence a nd l a ck of s ki l l of Que s t? Held:

Yes. When a person holds himself out as being competent to do thi ngs requi ri ng profes s i ona l s ki l l , he wi l l be hel d l i a bl e for negligence i f he fails to exhibit the ca re and skill of one ordi na ri l y s ki l l ed i n the pa rti cul a r work whi ch he a ttempts to do. The temporary ta nk in which the mixture was prepared was a pparently a t too great a n elevation from the ca rburetor, s o tha t when the fuel line was opened, the hydrostatic pressure i n the ca rburetor was greater than the delicate parts of the ca rburet or coul d sustain. This was the ca use of the fl ooding of the carburetor; a nd the result was that; when the ba ck fi re occurred, th e external parts of the carburetor, a lready s aturated with gasoline, burst into flames, whence the fire was quickly communica te d to the hi ghly i nflammable material near-by. The leak along the pipe l i ne a nd the fl oodi ng of the ca rburetor ha d crea ted a da ngerous situation, which a prudent mechanic, versed i n repairs of this nature, would have ta ken preca uti ons to a voi d. The ba ck fi re ma y ha ve been due ei ther to the fa ct tha t the s pa rk wa s too a dva nced or the fuel i mproperl y mi xed. Proof s hows that Quest had had ample experience i n fixing the engines of a utomobiles and tra ctors, but i t does not a ppear tha t he wa s experienced in the doing of s imilar work on boats. Possibly the dripping of the mixture form the ta nk on deck a nd the fl ooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire. Quest did not use the s ki l l tha t would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert i n repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was here, on the pa rt of Ques t, a blameworthy a ntecedent i na dvertence to pos s i bl e ha rm, a nd thi s cons ti tutes negl i gence. The burni ng of the Gwendoline ma y be said to have resulted from a ccident, but this accident was in no sense a n unavoidable accident. It would not ha ve occured but for Quest's carelessness or l ack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was a ccidental in a sense, but whether Ques t wa s free from bl a me. The tri al judge s eems to have proceeded on the i dea tha t, i na s much a s Ques t ha d control of the Gwendoline duri ng the experimental run, the defendant corporation was in the position of a bailee a nd that, as a consequence, the burden of proof wa s on the defendant to exculpate itself from responsibility by provi ng that the accident was not due to the fa ult of Quest. As a rul e workmen who make repairs on a s hip in its owner's ya rd, or a mechanic who repairs a coach without ta king it to hi s s hop, a re not bailees, a nd their ri ghts and liabilities are determined by the general rules of law, under their contract. The true ba i l ee a cquires possession and what is usually s poken of a s special property i n the chattel bailed. As a consequence of such possess ion a nd s pecial property, the bailee is given a lien for his compensation. These i deas s eem to be i ncompa ti bl e wi th the s i tua ti on now under cons i dera ti on. Thi s action was i nstituted a bout two years after the a ccident had occured, a nd a fter Quest had ceased to be manage r a nd ha d gone back to the US. Upon these facts, the defendant bases the contention that the a ction s houl d be cons i dered s ta l e. It i s s ufficient reply to s ay that the a ction was brought within the period limited by the statute of limitations and the situat ion i s not one where the defens e of l a ches ca n be properl y i nvoked. Judgment a ppea l ed from a ffi rmed. Cangco vs. The Manila Railroad Company (October 14, 1918 39 Phil 768)

Facts: Jos e Ca ngco, was employed by Ma nila Railroad Company a s cl erk. He l ived i n San Ma teo, Ri za l , l oca ted upon the l i ne of the defendant railroad company; a nd i n coming daily by tra in to the company's office i n the ci ty of Ma nila where he worked. He us ed a pa s s , s upplied by the company, which entitled him to ri de upon the compa ny's tra i ns free of cha rge. Ja nua ry 20, 1915, the pl a i nti ff wa s returni ng home by rail from his daily l abors; and as the tra in drew up to the station i n Sa n Ma teo the pl a i nti ff whi l e ma ki ng hi s exi t through the door, took hi s pos i ti on upon the s teps of the coa ch. On the s ide of the tra in where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there i s a cement platform which begins to ri se with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office a nd extends along i n front of said offi ce for a di s ta nce s u ffi ci ent to cover the l ength of s everal coaches. As the tra in slowed down another pa s s enger, Emi l i o Zuni ga , a l s o a n empl oyee of the ra i l r oa d compa ny, got off the same car, a lighting safely at the point where the platform begins to ri se from the l evel of th e ground. When Jos e Ca ngco s tepped off, one or both of his feet ca me i n contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet s l i pped from under hi m a nd he fell violently on the platform. His body a t once rolled from the platform a nd was drawn u nder the movi ng car, where his ri ght a rm wa s badly crus hed a nd lacerated. After the plaintiff alighted from the train the ca r moved forward possibly six meters be fore it ca me

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to a ful l stop. The accident occurred on a dark night, a nd the tra in station was lit dimly by a s i ngl e l i ght l oca ted s ome di s ta nce a wa y, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to discern, especially to a pers on emergi ng from a l i ghted ca r. The s a ck of melons on the platform is because it was the customary s eason for harvesting these melons a nd a large lot had been brought to the s tation for shipment to the market. This row of sacks was s o placed that there was a space of only a bout two feet between the s a cks of mel ons a nd the edge of the platform; a nd i t is cl ear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot ali ghted upon one of thes e melons a t the moment he s tepped upon the platform. His statement that he failed to s ee these objects in the darkness i s readily to be credi ted. The pl aintiff was drawn from under the car i n a n unconscious condition, and with s erious injuries. He was i mmediately brought to a hos pital where a n examination was made and his a rm was a mputated. The plaintiff was then ca rried to a nother hos pi ta l whe re a s econd operation was performed a nd the member was again a mputated higher up nea r the s houl der. Expens es rea ched the s um of P790.25 i n the form of medi ca l a nd s urgi ca l fees a nd for other expens es i n connecti on wi th the proces s of hi s cura ti on. Augus t 31, 1915, he i nstituted this proceeding in the CFI Ma nilato recover damages of the defenda nt compa ny, foundi ng hi s a cti on upon the negligence of the serva nts and employees of the defendant in placing the s a cks of mel ons upon the pl a tform a n d i n l eavi ng them s o placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's tra ins. At the hearing i n the CFI, the tri a l judge, found the facts substantially as a bove stated, a nd a lthough negligence was a ttributable to the defendant by reason of the fact tha t the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to a nd from the ca rs, nevertheless, the pl a i nti ff hi ms el f ha d fa i led to use due ca ution in a lighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering. Judgment was a ccordingly e ntered i n fa vor of the defenda nt compa ny, a nd the pl a i nti ff a ppea l ed. Issue: Whether or not there wa s contri butory negl i gence on the pa rt of the pl a i nti ff? Held:

No. In determining the question of contributory negligence i n performing such act - that i s to s a y, whether the pa s s enger a cted prudently or recklessly - the age, sex, a nd physical condition of the passenger a re ci rcumstances necessarily a ffecting the safety of the pa s s enger, a nd s houl d be cons i dered. The employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these s acks on the platform. Their presence ca us ed the pl aintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; a nd that they constituted a n effective l egal ca use of the i njuries s us ta i ned by the pl aintiff. It follows that the defendant company is l iable for the damage unles s recovery i s ba rred by the pl a i nti ff's own contri butory ne gl i gence. The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of ca rri a ge, a nd tha t the obl i ga ti on to res pond for th e da mage which plaintiff has suffered a rises from the breach of that contract by reason of the fail ure of defenda nt to exerci s e due ca re i n i ts performa nce. Its l iability i s direct and immediate, i mposed by a rticle 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due ca re i n their selection and supervision. Arti cle 1903 of the Ci vil Code is not a pplicable to obligati ons a ri s i ng ex contr a ctu, but onl y to extra -contra ctua l obl i ga ti ons In commenting upon article 1093, Ma nresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa , s ubs ta nti ve a nd i ndependent, whi ch of itself constitutes the s ource of a n obligation between persons not formerl y connected by a ny l ega l ti e" a nd cul pa cons i dered a s a n "a cci dent i n the performa nce of a n ob l i ga ti on a l rea dy exi s ti ng" In the Rakes vs . Atl antic, Gulf and Pacific Co. the court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that a rti cl e 1903 i s not a ppl i ca bl e to a cts of negl i gence whi ch cons ti tute the brea ch of a contra ct. Under the Spanish law, in ca ses i mposed upon employers with respect to damages due to the negligence of their employees to pers ons to whom they a re not bound by contract, such is not based upon the principle of respondent s uperi or - but upon the pri nciple a nnounced in article 1902 which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or negligence, do i njury to a nother, the obl i ga ti on of ma ki ng good the da ma ge ca us ed. The l iability a rising from extra-contractual culpa i s always based upon a vol untary a ct or omission which, without willful i ntent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to a nother. A master who exercises all possible ca re in the selection of hi s s ervant, taking i nto consideration the qualifications they s hould possess for the dis cha rge of the duti es whi ch i t i s hi s purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to thi rd pers ons to whom he i s bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no l iability whatever i f, by reason of the negligence of his serva nts, even withi n the s cope of their employment, such third persons suffer damage. Article 1903 pres umes negl i gence, but tha t pres umpti on i s refuta bl e. In Ba hia vs . Litonjua and Leynes, a n action is brought upon the theory of the extra-contra ctua l l i a bi l i ty of the defenda nt to res pond for the damage caused by the ca relessness of his employee whil e a cti ng wi thi n the s cope of hi s empl oyment The Court, a fter ci ting the last paragraph of a rticle 1903 of the Ci vil Code, said: (1) That when an injury i s caused by the negl i gence of a s ervant or employe e there instantly a rises a presumption of law that there was negl i gence on the pa rt of the ma s ter or empl oyer either i n the s election of the servant or employee, or i n supervision over him a fter the selection, or both; a nd (2) that pres umption is juris ta ntum a nd not juris et de jure, and consequentl y, ma y be rebutted. It fol l ows neces s a ri l y tha t i f the

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empl oyer s hows to the satisfaction of the court that in s election a nd s upervision he has exercised the ca re a nd di l i gence of a good fa ther of a fa mi l y, the pres umpti on i s overcome a nd he i s rel i eved from l i a bi l i ty. Every l egal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra -contractual obligation ha s i ts s ource i n the brea ch or omission of those mutual duties which civil i zed s oci ety i m pos es upon i ts members , or whi ch a ri s e from thes e rel a tions, other than contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally embra ced i n the concept of s ta tus . The l egal ri ghts of each member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding l egal duties, which the exi s tence of thos e ri ghts imposes upon all other members of society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful i ntent or to mere i na ttention, if productive of injury, gives rise to an obligation to i ndemni fy the i n jured pa rty. The funda menta l di s ti ncti on between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contra ctua l obl igation it i s the wrongful or negligent a ct or omission i tself which creates the vi nculum juris, whereas i n contractual relations the vi nculum exists independentl y of the brea ch of the vol unta ry duty a s s umed by the pa rti es when enteri ng i nto the contra ctua l rel a ti on. The ra ilroad company's defense i nvolves the assumption that even gra nting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing a n obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of a pproaching and lea vi ng i ts tra ins, the direct and proximate cause of the i njury s uffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait unti l the tra in had come to a complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence a nnounced i n the Ra kes ca se, if the accident was ca used by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is i mpos ed upon defenda nt, wherea s i f the a cci dent was ca used by defendant's negligence a nd plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages s houl d be a pporti oned. It i s , therefore, i mporta nt to a s certa i n i f defenda nt wa s i n fa ct gui l ty of negl i gence. The Court i s of the opi ni on tha t the correct doctri ne rel a ti ng to thi s s ubject i s tha t expres s ed i n Thomps on's work on Negl igence:"The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence i n attempting to alight from a movi ng railway train is that of ordinary or reasonable ca re. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent pers on, of the a ge, s ex and condition of the passenger, would have a cted as the passenger a cted under the ci rcums ta nces di s cl o s ed by the evi dence. This ca re has been defined to be, not the ca re which ma y or s hould be used by the prudent ma n genera l l y, but the ca re whi ch a ma n of ordi na ry prudence woul d us e under s i mi l a r ci rcums ta nces , to a voi d i njury." In considering the probability of contributory negligence on the part of the pl a i nti ff the fol l owi ng ci rcums ta nces a re to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a l evel higher than that of the roadbed a nd the s urrounding ground. The di s tance from the s teps of the car to the s pot where the alighting passenger would pl a ce hi s feet on the pl a tform wa s thus reduced, thereby decreasing the ri sk i ncident to s tepping off. The cement platform also assured to the passenger a s ta bl e a nd even s urface on which to alight. The plaintiff was possessed of the vigor a nd agility of young manhood, and it was by no mea ns s o ri sky for him to get off while the tra in was yet moving as the same act would have been i n a n a ged or feebl e pers on. The pl a ce was perfectly fa miliar to the plaintiff, a s it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at this station. There coul d be no uncertainty i n his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was requi red to ta ke or the cha ra cter of the pl a tform where he was alighting. It is the Courts conclusion that the conduct of the plaintiff i n undertaking to alight whi l e the tra i n was yet slightly under way was not characterized by i mprudence a nd tha t therefore he wa s not gui l ty of contri butory negl i gence. The decision of the lower court is reversed, and judgment i s hereby rendered pla i nti ff for the s um of P3, 290.25, a nd for the cos ts of both i ns ta nces .

Dissenting Opinion: MALCOLM: Wi th one sentence i n the majority decision, we are of full a ccord, namely, "It may be a dmitted that had pl a i nti ff wa i ted unti l the tra i n had come to a full stop before alighting, the particula r i njury s uffered by hi m coul d not ha ve occurred." Wi th the general rule relative to a passenger's contributory negligence, we are likewise in full accord, namely, "An a ttempt to alight from a movi ng train is negligence per se." Adding these two points together, we have the l ogi ca l res ul t - the Ma ni l a Ra i l roa d Co. s houl d be a bs ol ved from the compl a i nt, a nd judgment a ffi rmed.

Vergara vs. C.A. (G.R. No. 77679 - September 30, 1987) Facts: On, 5 Augus t 1979 i n Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Ma rtin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck belonging to Verga ra , ra mmed "hea d on" the s tore-residence of the Amadeo Azarcon, causing damages thereto which were i nventoried a nd assessed a t P53, 024.22. Verga ra fi l ed a third party complaint a gainst Travellers Insurance a nd Surety Corporation, a lleging that s aid cargo truck i nvolved i n the vehi cul a r a cci dent, belonging to the petitioner, was i nsured by the third party defendant insurance company a nd a sking that he paid paid whatever the court woul d order hi m to pa y to Aza rcon. The tri al court and the court of a ppeals ordered Vergara jointly a nd severally wi th Travellers Insurance and Surety Corpora ti on to pa y to Aza rcon (a) P53,024.22 a s a ctual damages; (b) P10,000.00 a s moral damages; (c) P10,000.00 a s exemplary da mages; a nd (d) the s um of P5,000.00 for a ttorney's fees and the costs. On the third party complaint, the insurance compa ny wa s s entenced to pa y to the

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peti tioner the following: (a ) P50, 000.00 for thi rd pa rty l iability under i ts comprehensive accident insurance pol i cy; a nd (b) P3,000.00 for a nd a s a ttorney's fees . Issue: Whether or not Verga ra i s l i a bl e to pa y da ma ges ? Held:

Yes, he i s l i a bl e. The requisites (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by a ct or omission, of which defendant, or s ome pers on for whos e a cts he must respond, was guilty; a nd (3) the connection of ca use a nd effect between s uch negl i gence a nd the da ma ges . The a cts which ca used the damages to Aza rcon can be a ttributed to Vergara. The fact that the vehicular accident occurred wa s wel l established by the police report describing the same. The contention of Verga ra tha t the a cci dent occurred beca us e of mecha nical failure of the brakes ca nnot be considered fortuitous a nd coul d ha ve been prevented. Al s o, Verga ra fa i l ed to a dduce evi dence to di s pute the pres umpti on of negl i gence i n the s el ecti on of hi s dri ver.

RCPI vs. C.A. (G.R. No. 79578 March 13, 1991) Facts: Spouses Timan through RCPI s ent a telegram, i n order to express their condolences for the death of the mother-in-la w of thei r cous ins Mr. a nd Mrs . Mi doranda. The telegram, however, was written i n a Happy Bi rthda y ca rd a nd i ns erted i n a Chri s tma s gra m envelope. The spouses Timan, filed an action against RCPI in order to cl aim damages for the ridicule, contempt and humili a ti on tha t the l a tter ca us ed to the pri va te res pondents . RCPI i n i ts defense alleges that the "error" in the social form used does not come wi thin the ambit of fraud, malice or ba d f a i th a s unders tood/defi ned under the l a w. Court rendered a deci s i on i n fa vor of Spous es Ti ma n. Issue: Whether or not RCPI s houl d be hel d l i a bl e? Held:

Yes. We ful ly a gree with the appellate court's endorsement of the tri a l court's concl us i on tha t RCPI, a c orpora ti on dea l i ng i n tel ecommunications and offering its s ervices to the public, is engaged i n a business a ffected with public interes t. As s uch, i t i s bound to exerci s e tha t degree of di l i gence expected of i t i n the performa nce of i ts obl i ga ti on. In the present case, it is s elf-evident that a telegram of condolence i s intended a nd meant to convey a message of s orrow a nd s ympa thy. Precisely, i t is denominated "telegram of condolence" because i t tenders sympathy a nd offers to s ha re a nother's gri ef. It seems out of this world, therefore, to place that message of condolence in a birthday ca rd a nd del i ver the s a me i n a Chri s tmas envelope for such a cts of ca relessness and incompetence not only render vi olence to good ta ste and common sense, they depict a bizarre presentation of the sender's feelings. They ri dicule the deceased's l oved ones and destroy the atmosphere of gri ef a nd res pect for the depa rted.

Pantranco vs. Baesa (G.R. Nos. 79050-5 - November 14, 1989) Facts: The s pouses Baesa, their four children, the Ico spouses, the latters son and 7 other people boarded a passenger jeep to go to a pi cnic i n Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding anniversary of the Baesa s pouses. The jeep was dri ven by Da vi d Ico. Upon rea c hi ng the hi ghway, the jeep turned ri ght a nd proceeded to Ma lala m Ri ver a t a s peed of a bout 20 kph. Whi l e they were proceedi ng towa rds Ma l alam River, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Apa rri , on i ts regul a r route to Ma ni l a , encroa ched on the jeepneys l a ne whi l e negoti a ti ng a curve, a nd col l i ded wi th i t. As a res ult, the entire Baesa family, except for one daughter, a s well a s Davi d Ico, di ed, a nd the res t s uffered from i njuri e s . Ma ri ca r Ba es a , the s urvi vi ng da ughter, through her gua rdi a n fi l ed s epa ra te a cti ons for da ma ges a ri s i ng from qua s i -del i ct a ga i ns t PANTRANCO.

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PANTRANCO, a s ide from pointing to the late David Icos (the driver)alleged negligence as a proxi ma te ca us e of the a cci dent, i nvoked the defense of due diligence i n the s election and supervision of i ts driver. The RTC ruled i n favor of Baes a, which wa s uphel d by the CA. The petitioner now contends that the CA erred i n not applyi ng the doctrine of the last cl ear chance against the jee pney dri ver. Peti ti oner contends that under the circumstances, i t was the driver of the jeep who had the last cl ear chance to a void the col l i s i on a nd wa s therefore negligent i n failing to utilize with reasonable ca re a nd competence hi s then exi s ti ng opportuni ty to a voi d the ha rm. Issue: Whether or not the l a s t cl ea r cha nce doctri ne wi l l a ppl y? Held:

No. The doctri ne applies only i n a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of a prior or a ntecedent negl i gence but the defenda nt, who ha d the l ast fair chance to avoid the impendi ng ha rm a nd fa i l ed to do s o, i s ma de l i a bl e for a l l the cons equences . Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of ma king a defendant l iable to a plaintiff who was guil ty of pri or or a ntecedent negl i gence, a l though i t ma y a l s o be ra i s ed a s a defens e to defea t cl a i m for da ma ges . It i s the petitioners position that even assuming a rguendo that the bus encroached into the lane of the jeepney, the dri ver of the l a tter could have s werved the jeepney towards the s pacious dirt shoulder on hi s ri ght wi thout da nger to hi ms el f or hi s pa s s engers . Thi s i s untena bl e. For the l ast cl ear chance doctrine to a pply, i t is necessary to s how that the person who all egedl y ha s the l a s t opportuni ty to a vert the a ccident was a ware of the existence of the peril, or s hould, with exercis e of due ca re, ha ve been a wa re of i t. One ca nnot be expected to a void an a ccident or i njury i f he does not know or coul d not ha ve known the exi s tence of the peri l . In thi s case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney dri ver Da vi d Ico knew of the i mpendi ng da nger. When he s a w a t a di s tance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not i mmediately s werve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on hi s ri ght since he must have assumed that the bus dri ver wi l l return the bus to i ts own l a ne upon s eei ng the jeepney a pproa chi ng form the oppos i te di recti on. Even a ssuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the a ctual collision, he had no opportunity to a voi d it. The Court has held that the last cl ear cha nce doctrine can never a ppl y where the pa rty cha rged i s requi red to a ct i ns tantaneously, a nd i f the injury ca nnot be avoided by the application of a ll means a t hand a fter the peri l i s or s houl d ha ve been di s covered.

Proof of Negligence A pers on cl aiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of p[roving the existence of such faul t or negl i gence ca us a ti ve thereof. (PLDT vs. C.A., 278 SCRA 94) PLDT vs. CA (G.R. No. L-57079 - September 29, 1989) Facts: A jeep driven by pri vate respondent Es teba n fel l i nto a n open trench, the exca va ti on wa s due to the i ns ta l l a ti on of a n underground conduit sys tem by PLDT, the said open trench was without cover and any warning signs. As a result the private res pondent a nd hi s wi fe s us ta i ned i njuri es , a nd thei r vehi cl e wa s a l s o da ma ged. PLDT i n i ts defense, i mputes the i njuries to the private respondents own negligence. Also, it alleges that L.R. Ba rte and company a cti ng as an i ndependent contractor should be responsible for the excavation was performed by them. As for Ba rte, they a l l ege d tha t they ha ve complied with the due s tandards i n performing their work, and that it was not a ware of the accident i nvol vi ng the Es teba ns . Court of Appeals held that respondent Es teban spouses were negligent a nd consequently a bs ol ved peti ti oner PLDT from the cl a im for damages. Upon respondents s econd motion to reconsideration, CA reversed i ts decision, following he deci s i on of Tri a l Court a nd hel d PLDT l i a bl e for da ma ges . Issue: Whether or not PLDT i s l i a bl e? Held: No. We fi nd no error i n the findings of the res pondent court i n i ts ori gi na l deci s i on tha t the a cci dent whi ch befel l pri va te res pondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban a nd was not i mputable to negligent omi s s i on on the pa rt of peti ti oner PLDT. The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the a ccident; the only purpose of said signs was to i nform a nd warn the public of the presence of exca vations on the site. The private respondents already knew of the pres ence of s a i d exca va tions. It was not the lack of knowledge of these excava ti ons whi ch ca us ed the jeep of res pondents to fa l l i nto the

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exca va tion but the unexplained sudden s wervi ng of the jeep from the inside lane towards the a cci dent mound. As opi ned i n s ome quarters, the omission to perform a duty, s uch as the placing of wa rning signs on the site of the exca va ti on, cons ti tutes the proxi mate ca use only when the doing of the said omitted a ct woul d ha ve prevented the i njury. It i s ba s i c tha t pri va te res pondents ca nnot charge PLDT for their i njuries where their own failure to exercise due and reasonable ca re wa s the ca us e thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of ca ution for his own protect ion. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Es teban had the last cl ear chance or opportunity to a void the a ccident, notwithstandi ng the negligence he i mputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on tha t s treet a l mos t everyda y a nd ha d knowledge of the presence a nd l ocation of the excavations there. It wa s hi s negl i gence tha t expos ed hi m a nd hi s wi fe to da nger, hence he i s s ol el y res pons i bl e for the cons equences of hi s i mprudence. A pers on cl aiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of provi ng the existence of s uch fa ul t or negl i gence ca us ative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be a ffirmatively established by competent evi dence. Whos oever rel i es on negligence for his ca use of a ction has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if con tested, otherwi s e hi s a cti on mus t fa i l .

Negligence as Proximate Cause The a dequate a nd efficient ca use which i n the natural order of events, and under the particular ci rcumstances surrounding the ca s e, woul d na tura l l y produce the event

Phoenix Construction, Inc. et. al. vs. IAC, et. al. (G.R. No. L-65295 - March 10, 1987 148 SCRA 353) Facts: Ea rl y morni ng of November 15, 1975 a t a bout 1:30a m, Leona rdo Di oni s i o wa s on hi s way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a s hot or two" of l i quor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen ca r and had just crossed the i nters ecti on of Genera l La cuna a nd Genera l S a ntos Streets a t Bangkal, Ma kati, not far from his home, a nd was proceeding down Genera l La cuna Street, when hi s c a r hea dl i ghts (i n hi s a l legation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck l ooming some 2 -1/2 meters a wa y from his ca r. The dump truck, owned by a nd registered i n the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc., was parked on the right ha nd side of General La cuna Street fa cing the oncoming tra ffic. The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street c urb) in s uch a ma nner a s to s ti ck out onto the s treet, pa rtl y bl ocki ng the wa y of oncomi ng tra ff i c. There were neither lights nor a ny s o-called "early warning" reflector devices s et anywhere near the dump truck, front or rea r. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Ca rbonel, i ts regular driver, wi th the per miss i on of hi s employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning, Dionisio cl aimed that he tri ed to a voi d a col l ision by s wervi ng his ca r to the left but i t was too late a nd his car s mashed i nto the dump truck. As a result of the coll i s i on, Di oni s i o s uffered some physical injuries i ncluding s ome permanent facial s cars, a "nervous breakdown" a nd l os s of two gol d bri dge dent ures . Di oni s i o commenced a n a cti on for da ma ges i n the Court of Fi rs t Ins ta nce of Pa mpa nga who decided in his favor. On appeal to IAC, the deci s i on wa s a ffi rmed wi th modi fi ca ti on a s to the a mount of da ma ges a wa rded. Issue: Whether or not Phoenix should be held l iable for the damage incurred by Dionisio notwithstanding the allegation that the latter ha d no curfew pa s s a nd thus drove s peedi l y wi th hi s hea dl i ghts off? Held:

YES . The collision between the dump truck and the Dionisio's ca r would i n all probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning l ights or reflector devices. The i mproper pa rki ng of the dump truck crea ted a n unreasonable risk of i njury for a nyone drivi ng down General La cuna Street a nd for having s o created this ri s k, the truck dri ver mus t be hel d res pons i bl e. Di onisio's negligence was not of an i ndependent and overpowering nature as to cut, as i t were, the chai n of ca us a ti on i n fa ct between the i mproper pa rki ng of the dump truck a nd the a cci dent, nor to s ever the juri s vi ncul um of l i a bi l i ty. We hol d that Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate a nd proximate ca use" of the i njury rema i ned the truck dri ver's "lack of due care" a nd that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are s ubject to mi ti ga ti on by the courts (Art. 2179 Ci vi l Code of th e Phi l i ppi nes ) Peti ti oner Ca rbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer Phoenix in supervising i ts employees properly a nd a dequately. The respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly in our opini on, tha t Phoeni x wa s not a bl e to overcome thi s pres umpti on of negl i gence. Turni ng to the a ward of damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of private respondent Di oni s i o on one ha nd and petitioners Ca rbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, we bel i eve tha t the dema nds of s ubs ta nti a l jus ti ce a re s a tisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ra tio. Thus, 20% of the damages a warded by the respondent a ppel l a te

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court, except the a ward of P10,000.00 a s exemplary da mages a nd P4,500.00 a s attorney's fees a nd cos ts , s ha l l be borne by pri va te respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be pa i d by peti ti oners Ca rbonel a nd Phoeni x who s ha l l be s ol idarity liable therefore to the former. The award of exempl a ry da ma ges a nd a ttorney's fees a nd cos ts s ha l l be borne excl usively by the petitioners. Phoenix i s of course entitled to reimbursement from Ca rbonel. We see no s uffi ci ent rea s on for di s turbi ng the reduced a wa rd of da ma ges ma de by the res pondent a ppel l a te court. Tha t there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner Ca rbonels negli gence on the one ha nd a nd the a cci dent a nd res pondents i njuries on the other hand, is quite cl ear. Put i n a slightly different manner, the col l i s i on of Di oni s i os ca r wi th dump truck wa s a na tura l a nd fores e ea bl e cons equence of the truck dri vers negl i gence.

NAPOCOR vs. C.A. (GR 103442-45 - May 21, 1993) Facts: Thi s is a consolidated case comprising of four separate complaints., filed against NPC a nd a particular Chavez. Pl ainti ffs fi l ed a compl aint against respondent for the lost of lives a nd destruction of properties due to the negligence of the l atter in releasing water from Anga t dam during the typhoon Ka ding Benjamin Chavez, being the supervisor a t that time of a multi -purpose hydroelectric plant in the Anga t Ri ver a t Hi l l top, Norza ga ra y, Bul a ca n, fa i l ed to exerci s e due di l i gence i n moni tori ng the wa ter l evel a t the da m. NPCs a l l ega ti ons were a s fol l ows : 1) the NPC exerci s ed due ca re, di l i gence a nd prudence i n the opera ti on a nd ma i ntena nce of the hydroel ectri c pl a nt; 2) the NPC exercised the diligence of a good fa ther i n the s el ecti on of i ts empl oyees ; 3) wri tten noti ces were s ent to the di fferent muni cipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about the i mpendi ng rel ea s e of a l a rge vol ume of wa ter wi th the ons et of typhoon "Ka di ng" a nd a dvi s e them to ta ke the neces s a ry preca uti ons ; 4) the wa ter released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collaps e of the da m a nd a voi d grea ter da ma ge to peopl e a nd property; 5) i n s pite of the precautions undertaken a nd the diligence exercised, they could still not contain or control the flood tha t res ul ted a nd; 6) the da mages i ncurred by the priva te respondents were caused by a fortui tous event or force ma jeure a nd a re i n the na ture a nd cha ra cter of damnum absque injuria. By wa y of s pecial a ffirmative defense, the defendants a verred that the NPC ca nnot be sued because i t performs a purel y governmenta l functi on. The tri al court dismissed the complaints as against the NPC on the ground that the provision of i ts charter a llowing i t to sue and be s ued does not contemplate actions based on tort. The decision on 30 April 1990 di smissed the complaints "for l a ck of s uffi ci ent a nd credi ble evidence." Court of Appeals reversed the a ppealed decision and a warded damages i n favor of the private respondents. Based on the fi ndings that From the mass of evi dence extant i n the record, We a re convinced, a nd s o hold that the flash flood on October 27, 1978, wa s ca used not by ra in waters (sic), but by s tored waters (sic) s uddenly a nd simultaneously released from the Angat Dam by defendants a ppel l ees , pa rti cul a rl y from mi dni ght of October 26, 1978 up to the morni ng hours of October 27, 1978. Issues: 1. 2. 3. Held: We declared therein that the proximate cause of the loss a nd damage sustained by the plaintiffs therein who were s imi l a rl y s i tuated as the private respondents herein wa s the negl i gence of the peti ti oners , a nd tha t the 24 October 1978 "ea rl y wa rni ng notice" supposedly s ent to the a ffected municipalities, the same notice involved in the case a t ba r, wa s i ns uffi ci ent . The petitioners were guilty of "patent gross a nd evident lack of foresight, i mprudence and negligence i n the mana gement a nd opera tion of Angat Dam," a nd that "the extent of the opening of the spillways , a nd the magnitude of the water released, a re a ll but products of defenda nts -a ppel l ees ' hea dl es s nes s , s l ovenl i nes s , a nd ca rel es s nes s ." To exempt the obligor from l iability under Arti cle 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of a n obligati on due to a n "a ct of Go d," the fol lowing must concur: (a ) the ca use of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it i mpossible for the debtor to ful fil l hi s obligation i n a moral manner; a nd (d) the debtor must be free from any pa rticipation in, or aggravation of the i njury to the credi tor. (Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553; Es tra da v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 423; Aus tria v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527; Republ i c of the Phi l . v. Luzon Stevedori ng Corp., 21 SCRA 279; La s a m v. Smi th , 45 Phi l . 657). Accordi ngly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape liabi l i ty for the l os s or da ma ge s us tained by private respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. The event then wa s not o cca s i oned excl usively by a n act of God or force majeure; a human factor negligence or i mprudence ha d intervened. The effect then Whether or not res pondent i s negl i gent? Whether or not the noti ces of wa rni ng were i ns uffi ci ent? Whether or not the da ma ges s uffered wa s not DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA?

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of the force majeure i n question may be deemed to have, even i f only partly, resulted from the participation of ma n. Thus , the whol e occurrence wa s thereby huma ni zed, a s i t were, a nd removed from the l a ws a ppl i ca bl e to a cts of God.

LBC Air Cargo vs. C.A. (241 SCRA 619) Facts: A certa in Rogelio Monterola was ri ding his motorcycl e along a dusty road when i t collided wi th a ca rgo va n owned by LBC Ai r Ca rgo dri ven by Jaime Tano Jr. coming from an opposite direction. On board the va n was manager of LBC a nd his son. The va n or i gi na l l y ga ve wa y to two almost-racing ca rs which cl ouded the way of Ta no, who then, not waiting for the d ustiness to subside turned sudden a t the s harp curve causing the mishap with the motorcycle, kill i ng Monterol a . Hei rs of the l a tter fi l ed for Homi ci de through rec kl es s i mprudence a nd da ma ges were s ought from LBC, the dri ver a nd the ma na ger. Is s ue: Whether LBC, Ta no a nd the Ma na ger a re l i a bl e for da ma ges ? Held: Yes. But the ma nager is not, there being no employer-employee relationship between him and the driver. The proximate ca use of the i ncident was Tanos negligence of not letting the dustiness subsid e a nd s uddenly turni ng i n the curve. LBC i s l i a bl e a s empl oyer to Ta no. However Monterola contributed to the negligence because he was driving speedily and too cl os el y behi nd the vehi cl e he wa s fol l owi ng hence da ma ges a re reduced by 20%.

Presumption of Negligence: 1. Res Ipta Loquitor The thi ng speaks for i tself. The doctri ne of res i psa l oquitur (the thing s pea ks for i ts el f) s ta tes tha t the ha ppeni ng of a n i njury permi ts a n i nference of negligence where plainti ff produces s ubs ta nti a l evi dence tha t i njury wa s ca us ed by a n a gency or i ns trumentality under exclusive control a nd management of defendant, and that the occurrence was such that i n the ordi na ry cours e of thi ngs woul d not ha ppen i f rea s ona bl e ca re ha d been us ed. (Layugan vs. IAC) El ements : a . The thi ng tha t ca us ed the i njury i s under the excl us i ve control of the defenda nt. b. The i njury does not ha ppen i n the ordi na ry cours e of thi ng; a nd c. The i njury ha ppened a nd no s uffi ci ent expl a na ti on wa s gi ven by the defenda nt. e.g.: Medi ca l Ma l pra cti ce Ca s es : a . expert tes ti mony b. l a yma ns tes ti mony.

Africa vs. Caltex (G.R. No. L-12986 - March 31, 1966 - 16 SCRA 448) Facts: A fi re broke out at the Ca ltex servi ce station i n Ma nila. It s tarted while gasoline wa s bei ng hos ed from a ta nk truck i nto the underground s torage, ri ght a t the opening of the receivi ng truck where the nozzle of the hose was i nserted. The fire then s prea d to a nd burned s everal neighboring houses, i ncluding the personal properties and effects i nside them. The owners of the hous es , a mong them peti ti oners here, s ued Ca l tex (owner of the s ta ti on) a nd Boqui ren (a gent i n cha rge of opera ti on). Tri a l court and CA found that petitioners failed to prove negl i gence a nd tha t res pondents ha d exerci s ed due ca re i n the premi ses a nd with respect to the supervision of their employees. Both courts refus ed to a ppl y the doctri ne of res ipsa loquitur on the grounds that as to its a pplicability xxx i n the Philippines, there seems to be nothing definite, a nd that while the rules do not prohibit i ts a dopti on i n a ppropri a te ca s es , i n the ca s e a t ba r, however, we fi nd no pra cti ca l us e for s uch doctri ne. Issue: Whether or not without proof as to the cause a nd origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur s hould apply as to presume negl i gence on the pa rt of the a ppel l ees ? Hel d:

The doctri ne of res ipsa loquitor a ppl i es . Ca l tex i s Liable.

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Res ipsa Loquitur i s a rule to the effect that where the thing which caused the i njury complained of is s hown to be under the ma nagement of defendant or his servants a nd the accident i s such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen i f thos e who ha ve i ts management or control use proper care, it a ffords reasonable evidence, in a bsence of explanation of defenda nt, tha t the i nci dent ha ppened beca us e of wa nt of ca re . The a foresaid principle enunciated in Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co. i s a pplicable in this ca se. The ga s ol i ne s ta tion, with all i ts a ppliances, equipment a nd employees, was under the control of a ppel l ees . A fi re occurred therei n a nd s pread to mand burned the neighboring houses. The person who knew or coul d ha ve known how the fi re s ta rted were the a ppellees a nd their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is fair a nd reasona bl e i nference tha t the i nci dent ha ppened beca us e of wa nt of ca re. The report by the police officer regarding the fire, a s well as the statement of the driver of the gasoli ne ta nk wa gon who wa s tra ns ferring the contents thereof i nto the underground s tora ge when the fi re broke out, s trengthen the pres umpti on of negligence. Verily, (1) the s tation is in a very busy district and pedestrians often pass through or mill a round the premi s es ; (2) the a rea is used as a ca r barn for a round 10 ta xi cabs owned by Boquiren; (3) a s tore where people hang out a nd possibly s moke ci ga rettes is l ocated one meter from the hole of the underground ta nk; a nd (4) the concrete walls adjoining the nei ghborhood a re onl y 2 . meters hi gh a t mos t a nd ca nnot prevent the fl a mes from l ea pi ng over i t i n ca s e of fi re. Deci s i on REVERSED. Ca l tex l i a bl e.

F.F. Cruz vs. C.A. (G.R. No. L-52732 - August 29, 1988 258 SCRA 334) Facts: The furniture manufacturing shop of F.F. Cruz i n Ca loocan Ci ty was s ituated adjacent to the residence of the Mables. Sometime i n Augus t 1971, pri va te respondent Gregorio Ma ble first a pproached Eri c Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to request that a firewall be constructed between the s hop and Mables residence. The request was repeated several ti mes but they fel l on dea f ea rs . In the ea rl y morni ng of September 6, 1974, fi re broke out i n Cruzs s hop. Cruzs employees, who slept in the shop premises , tri ed to put out the fi re, but thei r efforts proved futi l e. The fi re s prea d to the Ma bl es hous e. Both the s hop a nd the hous e were ra zed to the ground. The Ma bles collected P35,000.00 on the i nsurance on their house a nd the contents thereof. The Ma bl es fi l ed a n a cti on for da ma ges a ga i ns t the Cruzs . The TC rul ed i n fa vor of the Ma bl es . CA a ffi rmed but reduced the a wa rd of da ma ges . Issue: Whether or not the doctri ne of res ipsa loquitor i s a ppl i ca bl e to the ca s e? Held:

Yes. The doctri ne of res i psa l oquitor is a pplicable to the case. The CA, therefore, had basis to find Cruz l iable for the l oss s us ta i ned by the Ma bl es . Where the thing which caused the i njury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his serva nts a nd the a ccident i s such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen i f those who have i ts management or control us e proper ca re, it a ffords reasonable evidence, i n the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the a ccident a rose from wa nt of ca re. [Afri ca v. Ca l tex (Phi l .),Inc., G.R. No. L-12986, Ma rch 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448.] The fa cts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine, considering tha t in the normal cours e of opera ti ons of a furni ture manufacturing s hop, combustible material such as wood chips, sawdust, paint, va rni s h a nd fuel a nd l ubri ca nts for ma chi nery ma y be found thereon. It mus t a lso be noted that negligence or wa nt of care on th e part of petitioner or i ts empl oyees wa s not merel y pres umed. Cruz fa i led to construct a fi rewa l l between i ts s hop a nd the res i dence of the Ma bl es a s requi red by a ci ty ordi na nce . Tha t the fi re coul d ha ve been ca us ed by a hea ted motor or a l i t ci ga rette . tha t ga soline a nd a l cohol were us ed a nd s tored i n the s hop; a nd tha t workers s ometi mes s moked i ns i de the s hop . Even wi thout applyi ng the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, Cruz's failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordi na nces woul d s uffi ce to s upport a fi ndi ng of negl i gence. Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were i t not for a nother negligent omission on the pa rt of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the fl a mes from l ea pi ng over i t. Defendant's negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses. In the i nstant case, with more reason s hould petitioner be found guilty of negligence since it had failed to cons truct a fi rewa l l between i ts property a nd private respondents' residence which s ufficiently complies with the perti nent ci ty ordi na nces . The fa i lure to comply wi th a n ordinance providing for safety regulations had been ruled by the Court as a n act of negligence [Teague v. Ferna ndez, G.R. No. L- 29745, June 4, 1973, 51 SCRA 181.]

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Batiquin vs. C.A. (G.R. No. 118231- July 5, 1996| 258 SCRA 334) Facts: On Sept 1988, Peti tioner Dr. Batiquin performed a simple ca esarean section on Respondent Mrs . Villegas when the l a tter ga ve bi rth. Soon after l eaving the hospital, respondent began to suffer a bdominal pains a nd complai ned of bei ng feveri s h. The a bdomi na l pa i ns and fever kept on recurring and this prompted respondent to consult with a nother doctor, Dr. Kho (not Ha yden). When Dr. Kho opened the a bdomen of respondent to check her out respondents i nfection, s he di s covered tha t a pi ece of rubber ma teri a l , whi ch l ooked like a piece of rubber glove and was deemed a foreign body, was the ca use of the respondents i nfection. Respondent then s ued peti ti oner for da ma ges . RTC hel d i n fa vor of peti ti oner. CA revers ed, rul i ng for the res pondent. Issue: Whether or not peti ti oner i s l i a bl e to res pondent? Held:

YES . Under the res i ps a l oqi utor. Dr. Ba ti qui n i s LIABLE. Res ipsa loquitur. The thi ng speaks for i tself. Rebuttable presumption or i nference that defendant was negligent, whi ch a ri s es upon proof that the instrumentality ca using i njury wa s in defendant's exclusive control, and that the a cci dent wa s one whi ch ordi nary does not happen i n a bsence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur i s a rule of evidence whereby negli gence of the a l l eged wrongdoer may be i nferred from the mere fa ct tha t the a cci dent ha ppened provi ded the cha ra cter o f the a cci dent a nd ci rcums tances attending i t lead reasonably to belief that in the a bsence of negligence it would not have occurred a nd that thing whi ch ca us ed i njury i s s hown to ha ve been under the ma na gement a nd control of the a l l eged wrongdoer. Under this doctrine the happening of an injury permits a n i nference of negligence where plaintiff produces s ubstantial evidence tha t the i njury was ca used by a n a gency or i nstrumentality under the exclusive control and management of defendant, a nd that the occurrence wa s s uch tha t i n the ordi na ry cours e of thi ngs woul d not ha ppen i f rea s ona bl e ca re ha d been us ed. The doctri ne of res ipsa loquitur a s a rule of evidence is peculiar to the l a w of negl i gence whi ch recogni zes tha t prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for s pecific proof of negligence. The doctri ne i s not a rul e of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when a ppli ca bl e to the fa cts a nd ci rcumstances of a particular ca se, is not i ntended to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines a nd regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facili ta tes the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the ci rcums ta nces i nvol ved, di rect evi dence i s a bs ent a nd not rea di l y a va i l a bl e. In the i nstant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. First, the enti re proceedi ngs of the ca es a rea n s ecti on were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence a s to the a ctual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding i ts w ay i nto pri va te res pondent Vi l l ega s 's body, whi ch, needless to say, does not occur unless through the intersection of negligence. Second, since a side from the ca esarea n s ecti on, pri va te respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could have ca used the offending piece of rubber to a ppea r i n her uterus, it s tands to reason that s uch could only have been a by-product of the caesarean s ection performed by Dr. Ba tiquin. The petitioners, i n this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence a rising from resort to the doctri ne of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Ba ti quin is therefore liable for negligently l ea vi ng behi nd a pi ece of rubber i n pri va te res pondent Vi l l ega s 's a bdomen a nd for a l l the a dvers e effects thereof. Res pondent Superi or Pres umpti on of negl i gence a ga i ns t the empl oyer for the negl i gence of the empl oyees . Empl oyers s hall be liable for damages ca used by their employees a nd household helpers a cting withi n the s cope of thei r a s signed tasks, even though the former a re not enga ged i n a ny bus i nes s or i ndus try. (Art. 2180 par 5, New Civil Code) When the i njury ca used by the negligence of the employee, there i nstantly arises a pres umpti on of l a w tha t there wa s negligence on the part of the employer either in the s election of the employee or i n th e supervi s i on over hi m a fter s uch s election. The presumption, however, ma y be rebutted by a cl ea r s howi ng on the pa rt of the empl oyer tha t i s ha s exerci sed the ca re and diligence of a good father of a family i n the selecti on a nd s upervi s i on of hi s empl oyee s . (China Airlines vs. C.A., G.R. No. 45985, May 18, 1990) Peti ti oner Ca rbonels proven negligence creates a presumption of negl i gence on the pa rt of hi s empl oyer Phoeni x i n s upervi s i ng i ts empl oyees properl y a nd a dequa tel y. (Phoeni x Cons tructi on, Inc. et. a l . vs . IAC, 148SCRA353)

2.

China Airlines vs. C.A. (G.R. No. 45985 - May 18, 1990 - 185 SCRA 449) Facts: Pa nga niban was Vice President a nd General Manager of Rentokil Inc., a l oca insecti ci de compa ny. He ha d a meeti ng wi th a certa i n Peng Siong Li m, President of the Union Taiwan Chemical Corporation, scheduled a t 9:00 a .m. on June 11, 1988. He bought a China Ari l ines ti cket to Ta pei through his tra vel agent. His tra vel agent coursed the tra nsaction to the Philippine Airlines Office in Ma ni l a Hotel

16
whi ch was the ticket sales a gent of China Airlines, here in the Philippines. The officer who aided in the s ale wa s Mr. Es pi ri tu. The ti cket s ta ted that the flight was to l eave at 5:20pm of June 10. Pa nganiban arri ved a t airport a n hour ea rl i er tha n the ti me of the fl i ght. The a ttendant, however, informed him that the flight had left a t 10:20 AM. Phi lippine Airlines arra nged that he be in the next fl i ght to Ta pei on the fol l owi ng da y. Unknown to the Philippine Ai rlines officer i n Ma nila Hotel, all flights of China Airlines to Tapei were cha nged from 5:20 PM to 10L20 AM s ta rting April 1988. PAL ha d not changed their protocol even i f Chi na Ai rl i ne ha d s ent them pri nted copi es of cha nge i n protocol. Pa nganiban filed a complaint a gainst China Airlines for damages because he allegedly experienced humi l i a ti on, bes mi rched reputa tion, embarrassment, mental anguish, wounded feelings and sleepless nights, inasmuch as when he went to the a i rport, he wa s a ccompa ni ed by hi s bus i nes s a s s oci a tes , cl os e fri ends a nd rel a ti ves . The Court found Chi na Ai rl i nes l i a bl e for da ma ges . Issue: Whether or not the Court was correct i n holding China Ai rli nes l i a bl e for the da ma ge ca us ed by Mr. Es pi ri tu who wa s a n empl oyee of Phi l i ppi ne Ai rl i nes ? Petitioner: Mr. Es pi ritu was liable for the injury i n misinforming the tra vel a gent of Pa nganiban. He is a n employee of Philippine Ai rl i nes . Thi s Ai rl i ne (Chi na Ai r) noti fi ed PAL of the cha nges i n s chedul es ea rl y or. Therefore they ca nnot be hel d s ol i da ri l y l i a bl e. Respondent: It i s a n admitted fa ct that PAL i s a n a uthorized agent of CAL. In this relationship, the responsibility of defenda nt PAL for the torti ous a ct of i ts a gent or repres enta ti ve i s i nes ca pa bl e. Held:

Chi na Ai rl i nes i s Not Liable for the negl i gence of the empl oyee of i ts ti cketi ng a gent ( a nother a i rl i ne). Onl y Phi l i ppi ne Ai rl i ne i s Li a bl e There is i ndeed no basis whatsoever to hold China Airlines liable on a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The court a quo a bs ol ved Chi na Airlines of a ny l iability for fa ult or negligence. China Ai rlines did not contribute to the negligence commi tted Phi l i ppi ne Ai rl i nes a nd Roberto Es pi ri tu. Chi na Airlines was not the employer of Philippine Airlines or Espiritu. It has been established i n juri s prudence tha t there i s a need to ascertain the existence of a n employer-employee relationship before a n empl oyer ma y be vi ca ri ous l y l i a bl e under Arti cl e 2180 of the Ci vi l Code. PAL i s l iable for negligence of i ts employees even i f PAL was a cting as ticketing a gents of China Ai rli nes . There i s no ques ti on tha t the contractual relation between both airlines is one of agency. In an a cti on premi s ed on the empl oyee's negl i gence, whereby Pa gsibigan s eeks recovery for the resulting damages from both PAL a nd Espiritu without qualification, what i s s ought to be i mpos ed i s the di rect a nd pri ma ry l i a bi l i ty of PAL a s a n empl oyer under s a i d Arti cl e 2180.

Phoenix Construction, Inc. et. al. vs. IAC, et. al. (G.R. No. L-65295 - March 10, 1987 148 SCRA 353) Facts: Ea rl y morning of November 15, 1975 a t a bout 1:30a m, Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cockta i l s -a nd-di nner meeting with his boss. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Di oni s i o wa s dri vi ng hi s Vol kswagen ca r a nd had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Ma kati , not fa r from hi s home, a nd was proceeding down General La cuna Street, when his car headlights (in his al l ega ti on) s uddenl y fa i l ed. He s wi tched hi s hea dl i ghts on "bri ght" a nd thereupon he s a w a Ford dump truck l oomi ng s ome 2-1/2 meters a wa y from hi s ca r. The dump truck, owned by a nd registered i n the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc., was pa rked on the ri ght ha nd s i de of General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming tra ffic. The dump truck was parked askew (not parall el to the s treet curb) i n s uch a ma nner as to s tick out onto the s treet, partly bl ocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were nei ther l i ghts nor a ny s o -ca l l ed "ea rl y wa rni ng" reflector devices s et anywhere near the dump truck, front or re ar. The dump truck had earlier that evening been dri ven home by peti tioner Armando U. Ca rbonel, i ts regular driver, wi th the permission of his empl oyer Phoeni x, i n vi ew of work s chedul ed to be ca rri ed out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tri ed to avoid a collision by s werving his ca r to the l eft but it was too late a nd his car s mashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio s uffered some physical i njuries including some perma nent fa ci al scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gol bridge dentures. Dionisio commenced a n a ction for damages i n the Court of Fi rs t Ins tance of Pa mpanga which rendered judgment i n his favor. On a ppeal to IAC, the decision was a ffi rmed wi th modi fi ca ti on a s t o the a mount of da ma ges a wa rded.

Issue: Whether or not Phoenix should be held l iable for the damage incurred by Dionisio notwithstanding the allegation that the latter ha d no curfew pa s s a nd thus drove s peedi l y wi th hi s hea dl i ghts off? Held:

17
YES. The col lision between the dump truck a nd the Dionisio's car would in a ll probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning l ights or reflector devices. The i mproper pa rki ng of the dump truck crea ted a n unreasonable risk of i njury for a nyone drivi ng down General La cuna Street a nd for having s o created this ri s k, the truck dri ver mus t be hel d res pons i bl e. Di onisio's negligence was not of an i ndependent and overpowering nature as to cut, as i t were, the chai n of ca us a ti on i n fa ct between the i mproper pa rki ng of the dump truck a nd the a cci dent, nor to s ever the juri s vi ncul um of l i a bi l i ty. We hol d that Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate a nd proximate ca use" of the i njury rema i ned the truck dri ver's "lack of due care" a nd that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are s ubject to mi ti ga ti on by the courts (Art. 2179 Ci vi l Code of the Phi l i ppi nes ) Peti ti oner Ca rbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer Phoenix in supervising i ts employees properly a nd a dequately. The respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly in our opini on, tha t Phoeni x wa s not a bl e to overcome thi s pres umpti on of negl i gence. Turni ng to the a ward of damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of private respondent Di oni s i o on one ha nd and petitioners Ca rbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, we bel i eve tha t the dema nds of s ubs ta nti a l jus ti ce a re s a tisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ra tio. Thus, 20% of the damages a warded by the respondent a ppel l a te court, except the a ward of P10, 000.00 a s exemplary damages and P4,500.00 a s attorney's fees a nd cos ts , s ha l l be borne by pri va te respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be pa i d by p eti ti oners Ca rbonel a nd Phoeni x who s ha l l be s ol idarity liable therefore to the former. The award of exempl a ry da ma ges a nd a ttorney's fees a nd cos ts s ha l l be borne excl usively by the petitioners. Phoenix i s of course entitled to reimbursement from Ca rbonel . We see no s uffi ci ent rea s on for di s turbi ng the reduced a wa rd of da ma ges ma de by the res pondent a ppel l a te court. Bonifacio vs. BLTB ((34 SCRA 618) Facts: Jovi to Bonifacio Sr, together wi th his wife a nd Agustio Angeles(february 27, 1964), us ed to bathe i n Pans ol Hot Spri ng twi ce a week. They used their 1962 Mercedes Benz driven by Al bert Concepcion s ince 1946. They went to Pa ns ol one da y, a t a bout 4:30 A M. Jovi to s eated beside the driver while the two is i n the backseat. The road is slippery a nd dazzling when they a re runni ng a t 30 mi l es per hour. After goi ng down a n overpass a nd negotiating to curve i n the bridge of Landayes San Pedro Tunasan La guna , they s a w a truck pa rked on the l eft portion of the concrete highway without parking l ights a round 5:20 AM. 15 meters from the truck is the LTB passenger bus a bout 200 meters a wa y from them runni ng 185 meter per hour behi nd the truck dri ven by Sergi o Luna a s the dri ver. Concepcion continued to drive a t 30 meter per hour since they a re on the ri ght lane, w hen the Mercedes i s passi ng a l ongs i de the truck, 70 cm. on the other door, the oncoming bus s uddenly swerved to its l eft towards the ri ght l a ne of the Benz, 10 met ers wa y from the truck. The bus has 40 passengers a nd the impact killed Jovi to who was thrown out of the ca r due to the i mpa ct whi l e others l os t cons ci ous nes s a nd rega i ned i t i t i n Ma ni l a Sa ni ta ri um i n Pa s a y. Issue: Whether or not the bus dri ver i s l i a bl e? Held: 3. The negl i gence of the bus dri ver i s the proxi ma te ca us ed. The duty of the dri ver to be wa tchful wi th others who us ed the s a me roa d. The dri ver ma y a s s ume tha t the other dri ver wei l l return to i ts ori gi na l l a ne. The di ligence of the s upervisor will not apply where the supervisor was negligent i n supervision a nd maintenance of the vehicle. The i s s ue on i nteres t i s di s creti ona ry to court. Vi ol a ti on of Tra ffi c Rul es In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner i s solidarily liable with his driver, i f the former, who wa s i n the vehi cl e, coul d ha ve, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It i s disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, i f he had been found guilty or reckless driving or vi olating traffic regulations at l east twice within the next precedi ng two months . If the owner was not in the mi rror vehi cl e, the provi s i ons of Art. 2180 a re a ppl i ca bl e. (Art 2184, New Civil Code) Unl ess there is proof to the contrary, i t i s presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent i f a t the ti me of the mi s ha p, he wa s vi ol a ti ng a ny tra ffi c regul a ti on. (Art 2185, New Civil Code)

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Manuel vs. C.A. (G.R. No. 96781 - October 1, 1993 - 227 SCRA 29) Facts: Pri va te respondents were passengers of a n International Harvester Scout Car (Scout Ca r) owned by respondent Ra mos , whi ch l eft Ma nila for Ca marines Norte in the morning of December 27, 1977 wi th respondent Fernando Abcede, Sr. a s the driver of the vehicl e. There was a drizzle at a bout 4:10 P.M. when the Scout ca r, whi ch wa s then negoti a ti ng the zi gza g roa d of Bo. Pa ra i s o, Sta . El ena , Ca ma rines Norte, was hit on i ts l eft side by a bus. The bus was owned by petitioner Emiliano Ma nuel . Due to the i mpa ct, the Scout ca r wa s thrown backwards a gainst a protective ra iling. Were it not for the ra iling, the Scout ca r would have fallen i nto a deep ra vi ne. Al l i ts ten occupants, who incl uded four chi l dren were i njured, s even of the vi cti ms s us ta i ned s eri ous phys i ca l i njuri es ( Rollo, p. 28). Emi l iano Ma nuel, the driver of the bus, was prosecuted for multipl e phys i ca l i njuri es through reckl es s i mprudence i n the Muni cipal Court of Sta. Elena, Ca marines Norte. As he could not be found a fter he ceased reporting for work na few da ys fol l owi ng the i nci dent, the pri va te res pondents fi l ed the i ns ta nt a cti on for da ma ges ba s ed on quasi-delict. After tri a l, the court a quo rendered judgment a gainst petitioners a nd Perla Compania de Seguros, that covered the i ns ura nce of the bus. The court ordered them to pay, jointly a nd severally, the a mount of P49, 954.86 i n da mages to respondents . On a ppea l , the Court of Appea l s , a ffi rmed the deci s i on of the tri a l court. Hence thi s peti ti on Issue: Whether or not Ferna ndo Abcede, Jr., dri ver of the Scout ca r, wi l l nega te l i a bi l i ty due to a bs ence of l i cens e? Held: No. The fa ct that the Scout ca r was found a fter the impact at rest against the guard ra iling s hows tha t i t mus t ha ve been hi t a nd thrown backwards by the bus ( Rollo, p. 103). The phys i ca l evi dence do not s how tha t the Superl i nes Bus whi l e tra vel ing at high speed, usurped a portion of the l a ne occupi ed by the Scout ca r before hi tti ng i t on i ts l eft s i d e. On col l ision, the impact due to the force exerted by a heavier a nd bigger passenger bus on the smaller a nd l i ghter Scout ca r, hea vi l y da ma ged the l a tter a nd threw i t a ga i ns t the gua rd ra i l i ng. Peti ti oner's contention that the Scout car must have been mo ved backwards i s not only a s pecul a ti on but i s contra ry to huma n experience. There was no reason to move it backwards a gainst the guard railing. If the purpos e wa s to cl ea r the roa d, a ll that was done was to l eave i t where i t was at the ti me of the collision, which was well ins i de i ts a s s i gned l a ne. Bes ides, even petitioners a ccept the fact that when the police a rrived a t the s cene of the a cci dent, they found no one thereat ( Rollo, p. 13). This further weakens the possibility that some pers ons moved the Sco ut ca r to res t on the gua rd ra i ling. The evidence with respect to the issue that Fernando Abcede, Jr. who was not duly licensed, wa s the one dri vi ng the Scout ca r at the time of the a ccident, could not simply exempt petitioner's liability because they were parti es a t fa ul t for encroa chi ng on the Scout ca r's l a ne

4.

Da ngerous Wea pons a nd Subs ta nces Pri ma fa ci e pres umpti on. There is prima facie presumption of negl i gence on the pa rt of the defenda nt i f the dea th or i njury res ul ts from hi s pos session of dangerous weapons or s ubstances, s uch as fi rearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof i s i ndi s pens a bl e i n hi s occupa ti on or bus i nes s . (Art. 2188, New Civil Code)

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6969 October 26, 1990 AN ACT TO CONTROL TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND HAZARDOUS AND NUCLEAR WASTES, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Be i t ena cted by the Sena te a nd Hous e of Repres enta ti ves of the Phi l i ppi nes i n Congres s a s s embl ed: Section 1. Short title. Thi s Act s ha l l be known a s the "Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990." Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. It i s the policy of the State to regulate, restrict or prohibit the i mportation, ma nufacture, processing, sa l e, di s tribution, use a nd disposal of chemical substances a nd mi xtures tha t pres ent unrea s ona bl e ri s k a nd/or i njury to hea l th or the envi ronment; to prohibit the entry, even i n tra nsit, of hazardous a nd nuclear wastes and their disposal i nto the Philippine t erritorial limits for wha tever purpos e; a nd to provi de a dva ncement a nd fa ci l i ta te res ea rch a nd s tudi es on toxi c chemi ca l s . Section 3. Scope. Thi s Act s hall cover the importation, manufacture, processing, handling, storage, tra nsportation, sale, distribution, use a nd disposal of a ll unregulated chemical substances a nd mixtures in the Philippines, i ncluding the entry, even i n tra ns i t a s wel l a s the keepi ng or s tora ge a nd di s pos a l of ha za rdous a nd nucl ea r wa s tes i nto the country for wha tever purpos e.

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Sec. 4. Objectives. The objecti ves of thi s Act a re: a ) To keep an i nventory of chemicals that a re presently being imported, manufactured, or used, i ndicating, among others , thei r exi s ti ng a nd possible uses, test data, names of firms manufacturing or using them, a nd s uch other information as may be cons idered rel eva nt to the protecti on of hea l th a nd the envi ronment; b) To moni tor a nd regulate the importation, manufacture, processing, handling, s tora ge, tra ns porta ti on, s a l e, di s tri buti on, u s e a nd di s posal of chemical s ubstances and mixtures that present u nreasonable risk or injury to health or to the environment i n a ccordance with na ti ona l pol i ci es a nd i nterna ti ona l commi tments ; c) To i nform a nd educate the populace regarding the hazards and risks a ttendant to the manufacture, handling, s torage, trans p orta ti on, proces s i ng, di s tri buti on, us e a nd di s pos a l of toxi c chemi ca l s a nd other s ubs ta nces a nd mi xture; a nd d) To prevent the entry, even in transit, as well as the keeping or s torage and disposal of hazardous and nuclear wastes i nto the country for wha tever purpos e. Sec. 5. Definition. As us ed i n thi s Act: a ) Chemi ca l s ubs ta nce mea ns a ny orga ni c or i norga ni c s ubs ta nce of a pa rti cul a r mol ecul a r i denti ty, i ncl udi ng: i ) Any combi nation of such subs ta nces occurri ng i n whol e or i n pa rt a s a res ul t of chemi ca l rea cti on or occurri ng i n na ture; a nd i i ) Any el ement or uncombi ned chemi ca l . b) Chemi cal mixture means a ny combination of two or more chemical substances i f the combination does not occur in nature and i s not, i n whole or in part, the result of a chemical reaction, if none of the chemical s ubstances comprising the combination i s a new chemi ca l s ubstance a nd i f the combination could have been manufactured for commercial purposes without a chemical rea cti on a t the ti me the chemi ca l s ubs ta nces compri s i ng the combi na ti on were combi ned. Thi s s ha l l i ncl ude nonbi odegra da bl e mi xtures . c) Proces s mea ns the prepa ra ti on of a chemi ca l s ubs ta nce or mi xture a fter i ts ma nufa cture for commerci a l di s tri buti on: i ) In the s ame form or physical state or i n a different form or p hysical s tate from that which it was received by the pers on s o prepa ri ng s uch s ubs ta nce or mi xture; or i i ) As pa rt of a n a rti cl e conta i ni ng a chemi ca l s ubs ta nce or mi xture. d) Importation means the entry of a products or s ubstances into the Philippines (th rough the s eaports or airports of entry) a fter ha vi ng been properly cl eared through or s till remaini ng under cus toms control , the product or s ubs ta nce of whi ch i s i ntended for di r ect cons umpti on, mercha ndi s i ng, wa rehous i ng, or for further proces s i ng. e) Ma nufacture means the mechanical or chemical tra nsformation of s ubs ta nces i nto new products whether work i s performed by power-driven machines or by ha nd, whether i t is done i n a fa ctory or i n the worker's home, a nd whether the products a re s ol d a t whol es a l e or reta i l . f) Unrea sonable risk means expected frequency of undesirable effects or a dverse responses a rising from a given exposure to a substance. g) Ha za rdous s ubs ta nces a re s ubs ta nces whi ch pres ent ei ther: 1) s hort-term a cute hazards, such as acute toxicity by i ngestion, i nhalation or s kin abs orpti on, corros i vi ty or other s ki n or eye conta ct ha za rds or the ri s k of fi re or expl os i on; or 2) l ong-term environmental hazards, including chronic toxicity upon repeated exposure, carcinogenicity (which may i n s om e cases res ul t from a cute exposure but with a long latent period), resistance to detoxification process s uch as biodegradation, the potentia l to pol l ute underground or s urfa ce wa ters , or a es theti ca l l y objecti ona bl e properti es s uch a s offens i ve odors . h) Ha zardous wastes are hereby defined as s ubstances that are without a ny s afe commercial, i ndustrial, agricultural or economi c us a ge a nd a re shipped, tra nsported or brought from the country of ori gin for dumping or dispos a l i nto or i n tra ns i t through a ny pa r t of the terri tory of the Phi l i ppi nes . Ha za rdous wastes shall also refer to by-products , s i de -products , proces s res i dues , s pent rea cti on medi a , conta mi na ted pl a nt or equi pment or other s ubs ta nces from ma nufa cturi ng opera ti ons , a nd a s cons umer di s ca rds of ma n ufa cture products . i ) Nucl ear wastes a re hazardous wastes ma de radioactive by exposure to the ra di a ti on i nci denta l to the producti on or uti l i za t i on of nucl ear fuels but does not i nclude nuclear fuel, or ra dioisotopes which have reached the final s tage of f abrication so as to be us a bl e for a ny s ci enti fi c, medi ca l , a gri cul tura l , commerci a l , or i ndus tri a l purpos e. Sec. 6. Function, Powers and Responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources . The Depa rtment of Envi ronment a nd Natural Resources shall be the implementing agency ta sked with the following functions, powers, and responsibi l i ti es : a ) To keep an updated i nventory of chemicals that are presently being manufactured or used, indicating, a mong others, their e xisting and pos sible uses, quality, test data, names of firms manufacturing or using them, a nd s uch other information as the Secretary ma y cons i der rel eva nt to the protecti on of hea l th a nd the envi ronment; b) To require chemical s ubstances and mixtures that present unreasonable risk or i njury to hea l th or to the envi ronment to be tes ted before they a re ma nufa ctured or i mported for the fi rs t ti me; c) To requi re chemical substances and mixtures which are presently being manufactured or processed to be tested if there is a reas on to bel i eve tha t they pos e unrea s ona bl e ri s k or i njury to hea l th or the envi ronment; d) To eva luate the characteristics of chemicals that have been tested to determine their toxicity a nd the extent of their eff ects on hea l th a nd the envi ronment; e) To enter i nto contra cts a nd ma ke gra nts for res ea rch, devel opment, a nd moni tori ng of chemi ca l s ubs ta nces a nd mi xtures ; f) To conduct i nspection of a ny establishment i n which chemicals are ma nufa ctured, proces s ed, s tored or hel d before or a fter thei r commerci a l di s tri buti on a nd to ma ke recommenda ti ons to the proper a uthori ti es concerned;

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g) To confi scate or impound chemicals found not falling wi thin sa i d a cts ca nnot be enjoi ned except a fter the chemi ca l s ha ve b een i mpounded; h) To moni tor a nd prevent the entry, even i n tra ns i t, of ha za rdous a nd nucl ea r wa s tes a nd thei r di s pos a l i nto the country; i ) To s ubpoena witnes s es a nd documents a nd to requi re other i nforma ti on i f neces s a ry to ca rry out the provi s i ons of thi s Act; j) To ca l l on any department, bureau, office, agency, s tate universi ty or col l ege, a nd other i ns trumenta l i ti es of the Government for a s s i s ta nce i n the form of pers onnel , fa ci l i ti es , a nd other res ources a s the need a ri s es i n the di s cha rge of i ts functi ons ; k) To di sseminate information a nd conduct educational awareness ca mpaigns on the effects of chemical substances, mixtures and wastes on hea l th a nd envi ronment; a nd l ) To exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to ca rry out i ts duties and responsi bi l i ti es under thi s Act. Sec. 7. Inter-Agency Technical Advisory Council. There i s hereby created an Inter-Agency Technical Advi s ory Counci l a tta ched to the Department of Environment and Natural Res ources whi ch s ha l l be compos ed of the fol l owi ng offi ci a l s or thei r dul y a uthori z ed repres enta ti ves : Secreta ry of Envi ronment a nd Na tura l Res ources Secreta ry of Hea l th Di rector of the Phi l i ppi ne Nucl ea r Res ea rch Ins ti tute Secreta ry of Tra de a nd Indus try Secreta ry of Sci ence a nd Technol ogy Secreta ry of Na ti ona l Defens e Secreta ry of Forei gn Affa i rs Secreta ry of La bor a nd Empl oyment Secreta ry of Fi na nce Secreta ry of Agri cul ture Cha i rma n Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member Member

Representative from a non-governmental organization on hea l th a nd s a fety Member The representative from the non-governmenta l orga ni za ti on s ha l l be a ppoi nted by the Pres i dent for a term of three (3) yea rs . The Counci l s ha l l ha ve the fol l owi ng functi ons : a ) To a ssist the Department of Envi ronment a nd Na tural Resources i n the formulati on of the perti nent rul es a nd regul a ti ons for the effecti ve i mpl ementa ti on of thi s Act; b) To a s sist the Department of Environment and Natura l Res ources i n the prepa ra ti on a nd upda ti ng of the i nventory of chemi ca l s ubs ta nces a nd mi xtures tha t fa l l wi thi n the covera ge of thi s Act; c) To conduct preliminary evaluation of the characteristics of chemical substances and mixtures to determine their toxicity a nd effects on hea lth a nd the environment a nd make the necessary recommendations to the Department of Envi ronm ent a nd Na tural Res ources ; a nd d) To perform s uch other functi ons a s the Secreta ry of Envi ronment a nd Na tura l Res ources ma y, from ti me to ti me, requi re. Sec. 8. Pre-Manufacture and Pre-Importation Requirements. Before any new chemical substa nce or mi xtu re ca n be ma nufa ctured, processed or imported for the first time as determined by the Department of Environment a nd Na tura l Res ources , the ma nufa ctur er, processor or importer shall submit the following i nformation: the name of the chemical s ubstance or mixture; i ts chemi ca l i denti ty a nd mol ecular structure; proposed categories of use; a n estimate of the a mount to be manufactured, processed or imported; processing a nd di s posal thereof; and a ny test data related to health and environmental effects whi ch the m a nufa cturer, proces s or or i mporter ha s . Section 9. Chemicals Subject to Testing. Tes ti ng s ha l l be requi red i n a l l ca s es where: a ) There i s a reason to believe that the chemical substances or mi xture may present an unreasonable risk to health or the environment or there ma y be s ubs ta nti a l huma n or envi ronmenta l expos ure thereto; b) There are insufficient data a nd experience for determi ni ng or predi cti ng the hea l th a nd envi ronmenta l effects of the chemi ca l s ubs ta nce or mi xture; a nd c) The tes ti ng of the chemi ca l s ubs ta nce or mi xture i s neces s a ry to devel op s uch da ta . The ma nufacturers, processors or i mporters s ha l l s houl der the cos ts of tes ti ng the chemi ca l s ubs ta nce or mi xture tha t wi l l be ma nufa ctured, proces s ed, or i mported. Sec. 10. Action by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources of his Duly Authorized Representative. The Secreta ry of Envi ronment a nd Natural Resources or his duly a uthorized representative shall, withi n ni nety (90) da ys from the da te of fi l i n g of the noti ce of manufacture, processing or importation of a chemical substance or mixture, decide whether or not to regul a te or prohi bi t i ts i mportation, manufacture, processing, sale, distribution, use or disposal. The Secretary ma y, for justifiable reasons, extend the ninety-day pre-ma nufa cture peri od wi thi n a rea s ona bl e ti me.

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Sec. 11. Chemical Substances Exempt from Pre-Manufacture Notification. The ma nufacture of the following chemi ca l s ubs ta nces or mi xtures s ha l l be exempt from pre -ma nufa cture noti fi ca ti on: a ) Those i ncluded in the ca tegori es of chemi ca l s ubs ta nces a nd mi xtures a l rea dy l i s ted i n the i nventory of exi s ti ng chemi ca l s ; b) Thos e to be produced i n s ma l l qua nti ti es s ol el y for experi menta l or res ea rch a nd devel opmenta l purpos es ; c) Chemi ca l s ubs ta nces a nd mi xtures tha t wi l l not pres ent a n unrea s ona bl e ri s k to hea l th a nd the envi ronment; a nd d) Chemi cal s ubstances and mixtures that exist temporarily a nd which have no human or environmental exposure s uch a s thos e wh i ch exi s t a s a res ul t of chemi ca l rea cti on i n the ma nufa cture or proces s i ng of a mi xture of a nother chemi ca l s ubs ta nce. Sec. 12. Public Access to Records, Reports or Notification. The public s hall have access to records, reports, or informa ti on concerni ng chemi cal s ubstances and mixtures i ncluding safety data s ubmitted, da ta on emi s s i on or di s cha rge i nto the envi ronment, a nd s uch documents shall be available for i nspection or reproduction during normal business hours except that the Depa rtment of Envi ro nment a nd Na tural resources may consider a record, report or i nformation or particular portions thereof confi denti a l a nd ma y not be ma de public when s uch would divulge tra de s ecrets , producti on or s a l es fi gures or methods , producti on or proces s es uni que to s uch ma nufacturer, processor or distributor, or would otherwise tend to affect a dvers el y the competi ti ve pos i ti on of s uch ma nufa cturer, processor or distributor. The Department of Environment a nd Natural Resources, however, ma y release information s ubject to cl a i m of confi dentiality to a medical research or scientific i nstitution where the i nformation is needed for the purpos e of medi ca l di a gnos i s or trea tment of a pers on expos ed to the chemi ca l s ubs ta nce or mi xture. Sec. 13. Prohibited Acts. The fol l owi ng a cts a nd omi s s i ons s ha l l be cons i dered unl a wful : a ) Knowingly use a chemical substance or mi xture which is i mported, manufactured, processed or distributed i n vi ol a ti on of thi s Ac t or i mpl ementi ng rul es a nd regul a ti ons or orders ; b) Fa ilure or refusal to s ubmit reports, notices or other information, a ccess to records, as required by thi s Act, or permi t i ns pecti on of es ta bl i s hment where chemi ca l s a re ma nufa ctured, proces s ed, s tored or otherwi s e hel d; c) Fa i l ure or refus a l to compl y wi th the pre -ma nufa cture a nd pre -i mporta ti on requi rements ; a nd d) Ca us e, aid or fa cilitate, directly or i ndirectly, i n the s torage, importation, or bringing into Philippines territory, i ncl udi ng i ts ma ri ti me economic zones, even in tra nsit, either by means of land, air or s ea tra ns porta ti on or otherwi s e keepi ng i n s tora ge a ny a moun t of ha za rdous a nd nucl ea r wa s tes i n a ny pa rt of the Phi l i ppi nes . Sec. 14. Criminal Offenses and Penalties. a ) (i ) The penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and one day to six (6) yea rs and one day a nd a fine ra nging from Si x hun dred pes os (P600.00) to Four thousand pesos (P4,000.00) s hall be i mposed upon any person who shall violate s ection 13 (a ) to (c) of this Act and shall not be covered by the Probation La w.f the offender is a foreigner, he or s he s hall be deported a nd barred from a ny s ubsequent entry i nto the Phi l i ppi nes a fter s ervi ng hi s or her s entence; i i ) In case a ny vi olation of this Act i s committed by a partnership, corporation, association or a ny juridical person, the pa rtner, pres i dent, di rector or manager who shall consent to or s hall knowingly tol erate such vi olation shall be directly liable a nd responsi bl e for the a ct of the empl oyee a nd s ha l l be cri mi na l l y l i a bl e a s a co -pri nci pa l ; (i i i) In case the offender i s a government offi ci a l or empl oyee, he or s he s ha l l , i n a ddi ti on to the a bov e pena l ti es , be deemed a utoma ti ca l l y di s mi s s ed from offi ce a nd perma nentl y di s qua l i fi ed from hol di ng a ny el ecti ve or a ppoi nti ve pos i ti on. b) (i ) The penalty of i mprisonment of twelve (12) years a nd one day to twenty (20) yea rs, shall be imposed upon a ny pe rs on who s ha l l vi ol ate section 13 (d) of this Act.f the offender is a foreigner, he or s he s hall be deported a nd barred from a ny s ubsequent entry i nto the Phi l i ppi nes a fter s ervi ng hi s or her s entence; (i i ) In the case of corporations or other a ssociations, the a bove penalty s hall be i mposed upon the managing partner, pres i dent or chi ef executive in a ddition to an exemplary damage of at l east Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).f i t i s a forei gn fi rm, th e di rector a nd a ll officers of s uch foreign firm shall be barred from entry i nto the Philippines, i n additi on to the ca ncel l a ti on of i ts l i cens e to do bus i nes s i n the Phi l i ppi nes ; (i i i) In case the offender is a government official or employee, he or she in a ddition to the a bove pena l ti es be deemed a uto ma ti ca l l y di s mi s s ed from offi ce a nd perma nentl y di s qua l i fi ed from hol di ng a ny el ecti ve or a ppoi nti ve pos i ti on. c) Every penalty i mposed for the unlawful i mportation, entry, tra ns port, ma nufa cture, proces s i ng, s a l e or di s tri buti on of che mi ca l s ubstances or mixtures into or within the Philippines s hall ca rry wi th it the confiscation a nd forfeiture in favor of the Government of the proceeds of the unlawful act a nd i nstruments, tools or other i mprovements i ncluding vehicles, sea vessels, a nd aircra fts us ed i n or wi th whi ch the offense was committed. Chemical substances s o confiscated and forfeited by the Government a t its option shall be tu rned over to the Depa rtment of Envi ronment a nd Na tura l res ources for s a fekeepi ng a nd proper di s pos a l . d) The person or fi rm responsible or connected with the bringing or i mportation i nto the country of hazardous or nuclear wastes s hall be under obl i ga ti on to tra ns port or s end ba ck s a i d prohi bi ted wa s tes ; Any a nd a ll means of tra nsportation, i ncluding all facilities and a ppurtenances tha t ma y ha ve been us ed i n tra ns porti ng to or i n the s tora ge in the Philippines of any significant amount of hazardous or nuclear wastes s hall a t the option of the government be forfei ted i n i ts fa vor. Sec. 15. Administrative Fines. In a ll cases of violations of this Act, i ncluding vi olations of implementing rules a nd regulations which have been duly promulgated and published i n a ccordance with Sec. 16 of thi s Act, the Secreta ry of Envi ronment a nd Na tura l Res ource s i s hereby a uthorized to impos e a fi ne of not l es s tha n Ten thous a nd pes os (P10,000.00), but not more tha n Fi fty thous a nd pes os

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(P50,000.00) upon a ny person or entity found guilty thereof. The administra ti ve fi nes i mpos ed a nd col l ected by the Depa rtment of Envi ronment a nd Natural Resources shall accrue to a s pecial fund to be administered by the Depa rtment excl us i vel y for projects a nd res ea rch a cti vi ti es rel a ti ve to toxi c s ubs ta nces a nd mi xtures . Sec. 16. Promulgation of Rules and Regulations. The Department of Environment and Na tura l Re s ources , i n coordi na ti on wi th the member a gencies of the Inter-Agency Technical Advisory Council, shall prepare and publish the rules and regulations i mplementi ng thi s Act wi thi n s i x months from the da te of i ts effecti vel y. Sec. 17. Appropriations. Such a mount as may be necessary to i mplement the provisions of this Act i s hereby a nnually appropriated and i ncl uded i n the budget of the Depa rtment of Envi ronment a nd Na tura l Res ources . Sec. 18. Separability Clause. If a ny provision of this Act i s declared void or uncons ti tuti ona l , the rema i ni ng provi s i ons thereof not a ffected thereby s ha l l rema i n i n ful l force a nd effect. Sec. 19. Repealing Clause. Al l l aws, presidential decrees , executi ve orders a nd i s s ua nces , a nd rul es a nd regul a ti ons whi ch a re i ncons i s tent wi th thi s Act a re hereby repea l ed or modi fi ed a ccordi ngl y. Sec. 20. Effectivity. Thi s Act s hall take effect after fifteen (15) days following i ts publication in the Official Gazette or i n a ny news pa per of genera l ci rcul a ti on.

Strict Liability Principle 1. If the s ubs ta nces a re ha za rdous to the communi ty, the one res pons i bl e i s negl i gent. Clean Up Liability 2. The pers on res pons i bl e for the pol l uti on i s a l s o res pons i bl e for cl ea nup a nd other da ma ges ca us ed. Available Defenses: 1. Contributory Negligence If the pl a i nti ff i s gui l ty of contri butory negl i gence, da ma ges s ha l l be mi ti ga ted. When the plaintiffs own negligence wa s the i mmedi a te a nd proxi ma te ca us e of hi s i njury, he ca nnot recover da mages. But i f his negligence was only contributory, the i mmediate a nd proxi ma te ca us e of the i njury bei ng the defendants l ack of due ca re, the plaintiff ma y recover damages, but the courts s ha l l mi ti ga te the da ma ges to be a wa rded. (Art. 2179, New Civil Code) Chi l dren bel ow 9 yea rs ol d a re concl us i ve pres umed to b e i nca pa bl e of contri butory negl i gence.

Jarco Marketing vs C.A. (GR. No. 129792 - December 21, 1999 - 321 SCRA 375) Facts: Peti ti oner Ja rco Ma rketing Corp i s the owner of Syvels Department Store. Petitioners Kong, Tiope a nd Pa nel o a re the s tores bra nch manager, operations manager a nd s upervisor, respectively. Pri vate respondents are spouses a nd the parents of Zhieneth Aguil a r. Cri s elda (mom) a nd Zhieneth were at the 2nd floor of Syvels Department Store. Cri selda was signing her credit ca rd slip a t t he pa yment a nd verification counter when she felt a s udden gust of wind and heard a l oud thud. She looked behind her a nd saw her daughte r on the fl oor, her young body pinned by the bulk of the stores gift -wrapping counter/structure. Zhieneth was cryi ng and screaming for help. With the a ssistance of people around, Zhieneth was retrieved and rushed to the Makati Med where s he was opera ted on. The next da y, s he l os t her s peech a nd 13 da ys therea fter, pa s s ed a wa y. After the burial of Zhieneth, her parents demanded reimbursment of the hospitalization, medical bill s a nd wa ke a nd funera l expenses, which they had i ncurred from petitioners. Upon petitioners refusal, the parents fi l ed a compl a i nt for da ma ges . Tri a l court a bs olved petitioners. It ruled that the proximate ca use of the fall of the counter on Zhieneth was her a ct of cl i ngi ng to i t. Furthermore, Cri s eldas negligence contributed to her daughters a ccident. Basically, the court reasoned that the counter wa s s i tua ted a t the end or corner of the 2nd floor as a precautionary measure a nd hence it could not be considered as an a ttractive nuisance. The court a dded tha t the counter has been in existence for 15 yea rs and i ts s tructure safe and well-balanced. Court of Appea l s revers ed. It found tha t the peti tioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. (The counter was s haped l ike an inverted L wi th a top wi der tha n the base. It was too heavy a nd the weight of the upper portion was neither evenly distributed nor s upported by i ts na rro w ba s e. Thus the counter was defective, unstable and dangerous.) Moreover, Zhieneth who was below 7 yea rs old at the ti me of the i nci dent was a bs ol utel y i nca pa bl e of negl i gence s i nce a chi l d under 9 coul d not be hel d l i a bl e even for a n i ntenti ona l wrong. Issue: 1.

Whether or not the dea th of Zhi eneth wa s a cci denta l or a ttri buta bl e to negl i gence?

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2. In ca s e of a finding of negligence, whether a ttributable to private respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to Cris elda a nd Zhi eneth for fa i l i ng to exerci s e du e a nd rea s ona bl e ca re whi l e i ns i de the s tore premi s es .

Held:

The death was not an accident and attributed to negligence. Acci dent a nd negligence a re intrinsically contradictory; one ca nnot exi s t wi th the other. Acci dent occurs when the pers on concerned is exercising ordinary ca re, which i s not caused by fault of a ny person and which could not have been prevented by a ny mea ns s ugges ted by common prudence. The test i n determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in Pi ca rt vs . Smi th, thus : Di d the defenda nt i n doi ng the a l leged negligent a ct use that reasonable ca re and caution which an ordinarily prudent person woul d ha ve us ed i n the s a me s i tua ti on? If not, then he i s gui l ty of negl i gence. Peti ti oner i s negl i gent. Accordi ng to the testimony of Ge rardo Gonzales, a former gift-wrapper, who was at the s cene of the i nci dent: Whi l e i n the emergency room the doctor asked the child what did you do to which the child replied nothing, I did not come near the counter a nd the counter jus t fel l on me. Moreover, Ra mon Gueva rra, another former employee, testified to the effect that the counter needed s ome nailing becaus e i t wa s s ha ky, but tha t i t wa s not a ttended to. Undoubtedly, petitioner Pa nelo a nd a nother store supervisor knew the danger of the unstable counter yet did not remedy the s i tua ti on. Anent the negligence imputed to Zhieneth, the conclusive presumption that fa vors children below 9 yea rs old i n tha t they a re i nca pable of contributory negligence, applies (criminal cases- conclus i vel y pres umed to ha ve a cted wi thout di s cernment). As s uming Zhieneth committed contributory negligence when s he cl i mbed the counter, no i njury s houl d ha ve occurred i f peti tioners theory that the counter was sta bl e a nd s turdy wa s true. Indeed, the phys i ca l a na l ys i s of the counte r revea l otherwi s e, i .e. i t wa s not dura bl e a fter a l l . Cri s elda should likewise be absolved from contributory negligence. To be able to s i gn her credi t ca rd, i t wa s rea s ona bl e for Cri s el da to momenta ri l y rel ea s e her chi l ds ha nd. Peti ti on DENIED. Court of Appea l s deci s i on AFFIRMED.

Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance One who maintains on his premises dangerous contrivances that a re attractive to children, and fails to exercis e di l i gence to prevent children from playing therewith, is liable for i njuri es s uffered by a chi l d, even i f the chi l d i s a tres pa s s er. 2. Last Clear Chance It a pplies i n a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not a ppl y where a pa s s enger dema nds res ponsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For i t would be i nequitable to exempt the negl i gent dri ver of the jeepney a nd i ts owners on the ground tha t the other dri ver wa s l i kewi s e gui l ty of negl i gence.

Bustamante et. al. vs. C.A (G.R. No. 89880 - February 6, 1991) Facts: A col lision occurred between gra vel and sand truck and a Ma zda passenger bus along the national road a t Ca vite. The front l eft s i de portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus , ri ppi ng off the s a i d w a l l from the dri ver's s eat to the l ast rear s eat. The ca rgo truck was driven by defendant Montesiano a nd owned by defenda nt Del Pi l a r; whi l e the pa ssenger bus was driven by defendant Susulin. The vehicle was registered i n the name of defenda nt Novel o but wa s owned a nd/o r opera ted as a passenger bus jointly by defendants Ma gtibay a nd Serrado. The ca rgo truck a nd the passenger bus were a pproaching ea ch other, coming from the opposite directions of the highway. While the truck was s till about 30 meters a way, Susulin, the bus d ri ver, s a w the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not mi ndi ng thi s ci rc ums ta nce due to his belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted from fourth to third gear i n order to gi ve more power a nd s peed to the bus, which was ascending the i nclined part of the road, i n order to overtake or pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a pers on a l ong the s houl der of the hi ghwa y. Whi le the bus was i n the process of overtaking or p assing the hand tra ctor a nd the truck wa s a pproa chi ng the bus , the two vehi cles sideswiped each other a t each other's left side. After the impact, the truck skidded towards the other s ide of the road and landed on a nearby residential lot, hitting a coconut tree and felling i t. Due to the i mpact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out a nd di ed a s a res ul t of the i njuri es they s us ta i ned. Tri a l Court conclude that the negligent a cts of both drivers contributed to or combined with each other i n directl y ca us i ng the a cci dent which led to the death of the aforementioned persons. The liability of the two dri vers for thei r negl i gence i s s ol i d a ry. Onl y

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defendants Federico del Pilar a nd Edilberto Montesiano, owner a nd driver, respectively, of the sand and gra vel truck have interposed a n a ppeal. CA dismissed the complaint i nsofar a s defendants-appel l a nts Federi co del Pi l a r a nd Edi l berto Montes i a no a re concerned. Issue: Whether or not the respondent court has properly a nd legally a pplied the doctrine of "last cl ear cha nce" i n the pres ent ca s e des pi te i ts own fi ndi ng tha t a ppel l a nt ca rgo truck dri ver wa s a dmi ttedl y negl i gent i n dri vi ng hi s ca rgo truck. Held: No. Doctri ne of La s t Cl ea r Cha nce i s not a ppl i ca bl e i n thi s ca s e. TC decl ared that the negligent a cts of both drivers directly ca used the a ccident which led to the death of the pa s s engers . CA, rul i ng on the contrary, opined that the bus driver had the last clear cha nce to a voi d the col l i s i on a nd hi s reckl es s negl i gence i n proceedi ng to overta ke the ha nd tra ctor wa s the proxi ma te ca us e of the col l i s i on. The doctri ne of last cl ear chance, s tated broadly, i s that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where i t appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable ca re and prudence, might have a voi ded injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctri ne of l a st cl ear cha nce means that even though a person's own acts may ha ve placed him i n a pos i ti on of peri l , a nd a n i njury res ults, the injured person is entitled to recovery. As the doctrine is usually s tated, a person who has the last clea r cha nce or opportunity of a voiding a n accident, notwithstanding the negl i gent a cts of hi s opponent or tha t of a thi rd pers on i mputed to the opponent i s cons i dered i n l a w s ol el y res pons i bl e for the cons equences of the a cci dent. The pra ctical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plainti ff who ha s been grossly negligent in placing hi ms el f i n peri l , i f he, a wa re of the pl a i nti ffs peri l , or a ccordi ng to s ome a uthorities, s hould have been aware of it i n the reasonable exercise of due case, had in fact a n opportunity l ater than tha t of the pl a i nti ff to a voi d a n a cci dent. The pri nciple of last clear chance applies in a suit between the owners a nd drivers of colliding vehi cl es . It does not a ri s e where a passenger demands res pons i bi l i ty from the ca rri er to enforce i ts contra ctua l obl i ga ti ons . For i t woul d be i nequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its owners on the ground tha t the other dri ver wa s l i kewi s e gui l ty of negl i gence. Furthermore, as between defendants, the doctrine ca nnot be extended i nto the fi el d of joi nt tortfea s ors a s a tes t of whether only one of them should be held liable to the i njured person by reason of his discovery of the latter's peril, a nd i t ca nnot be invoked as between defendants concurrently negligent. As a ga i ns t thi rd pers ons , a negl i gent a ctor ca nnot defend by pl ea di ng tha t a n other ha d negl i gentl y fa i l ed to ta ke a cti on whi ch coul d ha ve a voi ded the i njury. Wel l s ettled is the rule that parties, counsel a nd witnesses are exempted from liability i n libel or sla nder ca s es for words otherwise defamatory, uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the s tatements a re pertinent or rel eva nt to the ca s e. The Court i s convinced that the respondent Court committed an error of law in a pplyi ng the doctrine of la s t cl ea r cha nce a s between the defendants, s ince the case a t bar i s not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a s uit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the res pondent court erred i n a bs ol vi ng the own er a nd dri ver of the ca rgo truck from l i a bi l i ty. Peti ti on i s gra nted. CA deci s i on revers ed a nd s et a s i de. TC deci s i on rei ns ta ted.

Emergency Rule One who finds himself i n a place of danger a nd is required to do an act without ti me to consider the best mean s tha t ma y be a dopted to a void the impending danger, i s not guilty of negligence, i f he fails to adopt what subsequently a nd upon reflection may a ppear to have been a better method, unless the emergency i n which he finds himself is brought a bout by hi s own negl i gence. (McKee, et. al. vs. IAC - G.R. No. L-68102 - July 16, 1992) McKee, et. al. vs. IAC (G.R. No. L-68102 - July 16, 1992 - 211 SCRA 517) Facts: Between 9 a nd 10 o'clock i n the morning of January 1977, i n Pul ong Pulo Bridge a long Ma cArthur Hi ghway, between Angel es Ci ty a nd Sa n Fernando, Pa mpanga, a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck, Loads ta r, owned by Ta ya g a nd Ma na lo, driven by Galang, and a Ford Es cort ca r driven by Jos e Koh, res ul ti ng i n the dea ths of Jos e Koh, Ki m Koh McKee a nd Loi da Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all pa s s engers of the Ford Es cort. Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with 200 ca va ns of rice weighing a bout 10,000 ki l os , wa s tra vel i ng s outhward from Angeles Ci ty to San Fernando Pa mpanga, a nd was bound for Ma nila. The Ford Es cort, on the other hand, was on i ts wa y to Angel es Ci ty from Sa n Ferna ndo When the Ford Es cort was about 10 meters a way from the s outhern approach of the bridge, 2 boys suddenl y da rted from the ri ght s ide of the road a nd i nto the lane of the car moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other s i de or turn ba ck. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, s werved to the l eft a nd entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the

25
ca r, a pplied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. But before he could do s o, hi s ca r col l i ded wi th the truck. The col l i s i on occurred i n the l a ne of the truck, whi ch wa s the oppos i te l a ne, on the s a i d bri dge As a res ult of the a ccident, 2 ci vi l cases were filed for damages for the death and phys i ca l i njuri es s us ta i ned by the vi cti ms boa rding the Ford Escort; a s well as a cri minal case a gainst Galang. During the trial, evidence were presented showing tha t the dri ver of the Truck wa s speeding resulting in the s kid marks it ca used i n the scene of the a cci dent. The l ower court found Ga l a ng gui l ty i n the cri mi nal case, but the civil cases were dismissed. On a ppeal, the CA a ffirmed the conviction of Galang, and reversed the deci s i on i n the ci vi l ca s es , orderi ng the pa yment of da ma ges for the dea th a nd phys i ca l i njuri es of the McKee fa mi l y. On MR, the CA revers ed i ts previ ous deci s i on a nd rul ed i n fa vor of t he owners of the truck Issue: Whether or not the owner a nd dri ver of the Truck were res pons i bl e for the col l i s i on ? Held: The over speeding of the truck is the proximate cause. The tes t of negligence a nd the facts obtaining i n this case, it is ma nifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jos e Koh. Any rea s onable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid runni ng over the two boys by s wervi ng the ca r a wa y from where they were even i f this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding s uch i mmedi a te peri l woul d be the na tura l cours e to take particularly where the vehicle i n the opposite lane would be several meters away a nd could very well slow down, move to the s ide of the road and give wa y to the oncoming ca r. Moreover, under what i s known as the emergency rul e, "one who s uddenly finds himself in a place of danger, a nd i s required to a ct without time to consider the bes t mea ns tha t ma y be a dopted to a void the i mpending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to a dopt what s ubsequently a nd upon refl ecti on ma y a ppear to have been a better method, unless the emergency i n whi ch he fi nds hi ms el f i s brought a bout by hi s own negl i gence. Cons idering the sudden i ntrusion of the 2 boys into the lane of the ca r, the Court finds that Jose Koh a dopted the bes t mea ns pos sible in the given s ituation to a void hitting them. Applying the above test, therefore, i t i s cl ea r tha t he wa s not gui l ty of negl i gence . In a ny case, a ssuming, arguendo that Jose Koh i s negligent, it ca nnot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the col l ision. Galang's negligence is apparent i n the records. He himself said that his truck was running at 30 mi les (48 ki l ometers ) per hour a long the bridge while the maximum s peed a llowed by l aw on a bridge i s only 30 ki lometers per hour. Under Arti cl e 2185 of the Ci vi l Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent i f at the ti me of the mishap, he was vi olating a ny tra ffi c regul a ti on. Even i f Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of l ast cl ear chance finds a pplication here. La st clear chance i s a doctrine i n the l a w of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party i njured will not defeat the cl aim for dama ges i f i t i s s hown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prud ence, ha ve a voi ded the cons equences of the negligence of the i njured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to a void the mishap is considered in law s ol el y res pons i bl e for the cons equences thereof Appl yi ng the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary ca re to a voi d the collision which was, in l aw, the proximate ca us e of the col l i s i on. As empl oyers of the truck dri ver, Ta ya g a nd Ma na lo a re, under Arti cle 2180 of the Ci vil Code, directly a nd primarily liable for the resulting damages. The pres umpti on tha t they a re negligent fl ows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris ta ntum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good fa ther of a fa mi l y to prevent the da ma ge, whi ch they fa i l ed to do. Peti ti on GRANTED. Res ol uti on SET ASIDE a nd previ ous DECISION REINSTATED. Force Majeure Except i n cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by s tipulation, or when the na ture of the obligation requires the assumption of ri sk, no person shall be responsible for thos e events whi ch, coul d not be fores een, or whi ch, though fores een, were i nevi ta bl e. (Art. 1174, New Civil Code) Requi s i tes : a . The ca us e of the brea ch of the obl i ga ti on mus t be i ndependent of the wi l l of the debtor; b. The event mus t be ei ther unfores eea bl e or una voi da bl e. c. The event must be such as to render it i mpossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a mora l ma nner. d. The debtor mus t be free from a ny pa rti ci pa ti on i n, or a ggra va ti on of the i njury to the credi tor. Excepti on: a . The pri nciple embodied in the a ct of God doctrine s trictly requires tha t the a ct mus t be one occa s i oned excl usively by the vi olence of nature a nd all human a gencies a re to be excluded from crea ti ng or enteri ng i nto the ca use of the mischief. When the effect, the ca use of which is to be cons i dered, i s found to be i n pa rt the result of the participation of man, whether it be from active intervention or negl ect, or fa i l ure to a ct, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules a ppl i ca bl e to the Acts of God.

3.

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4.

As s umpti on of Ri s k Except i n cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by s tipulation, or when the na ture of the obligation requires the assumption of ri sk, no person shall be responsible for thos e events whi ch, coul d not be fores een, or whi ch, though fores een, were i nevi ta bl e. (Art. 1174, New Civil Code) In Sports: One ma y be hel d l i a bl e for i njuri es ca us ed i f he does not fol l ow the rul es of the ga me. Workmens Compensation Act: Even i f the employee knew that his work was dangerous, employee may receive the benefits provided for in thi s l a w.

5.

Prescription The fol l owi ng a cti ons mus t be i ns ti tuted wi thi n four yea rs : 1. Upon a n i njury to the ri ghts of the pl a i nti ff 2. Upon a qua s i -del i ct (Art. 1146, New Civil Code) The ti me for prescription for a ll kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shal l be counted from the da y they ma y be brought.

Capuno, et. al. vs, Pepsi-Cola et. al. (G.R. No. L-19331 - April 30, 1965 - 13 SCRA 659) Facts: The ca se a rose from a vehicular collision which occurred on January 3, 1953 i n Apalit, Pa mpanga. Invol ved were a Peps i -Col a del ivery truck dri ven by Jon Elordi and a private ca r driven by Ca puno. The collision proved fatal to the latter as well as t o his passengers , the s pouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras. Elordi was charged with tri ple homicide through reckless imprudence i n the Court of Fi rs t Ins tance of Pa mpanga (criminal ca se No. 1591). The i nformation was s ubsequently a mended to i nclude cl aims for damages by the heirs of the three vi cti ms . Whi le the cri minal ca se was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan s pous es a nd thei r hei rs fi l ed a ci vi l a cti on, a l s o for da mages, in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines a nd Jon Elordi (ci vi l ca s e No. 838). Incl uded in the complaint was a cl aim for indemnity in the sum of P2,623.00 a llegedly pa i d by the Es ta te to the hei rs of Ca puno under the Workmen's Compens a ti on Act. On June 11, 1958 the pa rti es i n Ci vi l Ca s e No. 838 entered i nto a "Compromi s e a nd Settl ement." For P290,000.00 the Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages , i ncl udi ng the cl a i m for rei mburs ement of the s um of P2,623.00 previ ously paid to the heirs of Ca puno "under the Workmen's Compensation Act." The Court a pproved the compromi s e a n d a ccordi ngl y di s mi s s ed the ca s e on the fol l owi ng June 17. At tha t ti me the cri minal case was still pending; judgment was rendered only on April 15, 1959, wherein the accused Elordi wa s a cquitted of the charges against him. Pri or thereto, or on September 26, 1958, however, herein a ppellants commenced a ci vi l a cti on for da mages against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines a nd Jon Elordi. This is the a ction which, upon appellees' motion, was di s mi s s ed by the Court a quo i n i ts order of Februa ry 29, 1960, from whi ch order the pres ent a ppea l ha s been ta ken. Issue: Whether or not the a cti on ha d a l rea dy pres cri bed? Held: Yes. The action has prescribed. The ci vi l action for damages could have been commenced by a ppellants immediately upon the dea th of thei r decedent, Ci pri ano Ca puno, on Ja nuary 3, 1953 or therea bouts , a nd the s a me woul d not ha ve been s ta yed by the fi l i ng of the cri mi nal a ction for homicide through reckless i mprudence. But the complaint here was filed onl y on September 26, 1958, or a fter the l a ps e of more tha n fi ve ye a rs . In the ca se of Diocosa Pa ulan, et al. vs . Zacarias Sarabia, et al., G.R. No. L-10542, promulgated July 31, 1958, thi s Court held tha t a n action based on a quas i -del i ct i s governed by Arti cl e 1150 of the Ci vi l Code a s to the ques ti on of when the pres criptive period of four years shall begin to run, that is, "from the day (the a ction) may be brought," which means from the da y the qua s i -del i ct occurred or wa s commi tted. The foregoing considerations dispose of a ppellants' contention that the four-year period of prescription i n thi s ca s e wa s i nterrupted by the filing of the cri minal a ction against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they ha d neither waived the ci vi l a cti on nor res erved the right to i nstitute it s eparately. Such reservation was not then necessary; wi thout havi ng ma de i t they coul d fi l e a s in fact they did a s eparate civil a ction even during the pendency of the cri minal case (Pacheco v. Tuma ngday, L-

27
14500, Ma y 25, 1960; Azucena v. Potenciano, L-14028, June 30, 1962); a nd consequentl y, a s hel d i n Pa ul a n v. Sa ra bi a , s upra, "the i nstitution of a cri minal a ction ca nnot have the effect of interrupting the i nstitution of a ci vil action based on a qua s i -del i ct." Note: Admi ni s tra ti ve a nd cri mi na l ca s es do not tol l the pres cri pti ve peri od for fi l i ng a ca s e ba s ed on qua s i -del i ct. 6. Bonus Pater Familias Di l i gence of a good fa ther of a fa mi l y. The obligation imposed by Arti cle 2176 i s demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but a lso for thos e of pers ons for whom one i s res pons i bl e. The fa ther and, in case of his death or i ncapacity, the mother, a re responsible for the damages ca us ed by the mi nor chi l dren who l i ve i n thei r compa ny. Gua rdians are liable for damages caused by the minors or i ncapacitated persons who a re under thei r a uthori ty a nd l i ve i n thei r compa ny. The owners and managers of a n establishment or enterprise a re likewise responsibl e for da ma ges ca us ed by thei r empl oyees i n the servi ce of the branches in which the latter a re empl oyed or on the occa s i on of thei r functi ons . Empl oyers s hall be liable for the damages ca used by their employees a nd household helpers a cting withi n the s cope of thei r a s s i gned ta s ks , even though the former a re not enga ged i n a ny bus i nes s or i ndus try. The Sta te is responsible i n like manner when i t acts through a s peci a l a gent; but not when the da ma ge ha s been ca us ed by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which ca se what is provided i n Arti cle 2176 s hall be a ppl i ca bl e. La s tly, teachers or heads of establishments of a rts and trades s hall be l iable for damages caused by thei r pupi l s a nd s tudents or a pprenti ces , s o l ong a s they rema i n i n thei r cus tody. The res ponsibility treated of in this a rticle s hall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove tha t they obs erved a l l the di l i gence of a good fa ther of a fa mi l y to prevent da ma ge. (1903a ) (Art. 2180, New Civil Code) Common ca rriers are l iable for the death of or i njuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the former's empl oyees, although s uch employees may have acted beyond th e scope of their authority or i n violation of the orders of the common ca rri ers . Thi s liability of the common ca rriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good fa ther of a fa mi l y i n the s el ecti on a nd s upervi s i on of thei r e mpl oyees . (Art. 1179, New Civil Code)

7. 8.

Res Judicata Waiver

Types of Liabilities as to Negligence: 1. Direct Liability Li a bi l i ty for ones own a ct. Various Liability Li a bi l i ty of a pers on for the a cts of a nother for whom the former i s res pons i bl e. See Art. 2180, New Ci vi l Code a . Pa rents a nd Gua rdi a ns .

2.

Exconde vs. Capuno (G.R. No. L-10134 - June 29, 2957 - 101 Phil 843) Facts: Da nte Ca puno was a member of the Boy Scouts organization a nd a student of the Balintawak Elementary School. He attended a pa ra de i n honor of Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city s chools supervisor. He boarded a jeep, took hol d of the wheel a nd drove i t whi le the driver sat on his left side. The jeep turned turtle a nd a nd two passengers (Isidiro Ca perina a nd Amado Ticzon) died. At the ti me

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thi s happened, Dantes father, Delfin was not with him, nor did he know that his s on wa s goi ng to a ttend a pa ra de. Da nte wa s then cha rged wi th doubl e homi ci de through reckl es s i mprudence. After convi ction by the RTC a nd CA, petitioner Sabina Exconde (mother of one of the deceas ed) fi l ed a s epa ra te ci vi l a cti on a ga inst Dante a nd Delfin for damages i n the amount of P2, 959.00. Defendants averred a s a defense that Dante shoul d be the onl y one ci vi l l y l i a bl e beca us e a t the ti me of the a cci dent he wa s not under the control , s upervi s i on, a nd cus tody of Del fi n. The l ower court s us ta i ned the defens e, a nd s o Exconde a ppea l ed, the ca s e certi fi ed to the SC. Issue: Whether or not Del fi n ca n be hel d joi ntl y a nd s evera l l y l i a bl e wi th hi s s on Da nte for da ma g es ? Held:

Yes. Delfin is jointly and severally liable. Arti cl e 1903, 1s t a nd 5th paragraphs: The father, and, in case of his death or i ncapacity, the mother, a re liable for any da mages ca us ed by mi nor children who live with them. Teachers and director s of arts a nd tra des a re liable for a ny da mages ca us ed by thei r pupi l s or a pprenti ces whi l e they a re under thei r cus tody. The 5th pa ragraph only a pplies to a n institution of arts and tra des and not to a ny a ca demi c educa ti ona l i ns ti tuti on. Hence, nei ther the head of the s chool, nor the ci ty schools supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent a ct of Da nte beca us e he wa s not then a s tudent of a n i ns ti tuti on of a rts a nd tra des a s provi ded by l a w. The ci vi l liability i mposed upon the father and mother for any damages that ma y be caused by the minor children is a necessary cons equence of the parental authority they exercise over them, which imposes upon pa rents the duty of s upporti ng them, keeping them i n their company, educating them and instructing them i n proportion to their means, while, on the other ha nd, gi ves them the ri ght to correct a nd punish them i n modera ti on. The onl y wa y to rel i eve them i s i f they prove tha t they exerci s ed a l l the di l i gence of a good fa ther of a fa mi l y. Thes e defenda nts fa i l ed to do. Peti ti on GRANTED. Deci s i on MODIFIED. Defenda nts Da nte a nd Del fi n s ha l l pa y Exconde P2, 959.00.

Dissenting Opinion: Reyes :

We s houl d a ffi rm the deci s i on rel i evi ng the fa ther of l i a bi l i ty. The words a rts a nd tra des does not qua l i fy tea che rs but onl y hea ds of es ta bl i s hments . Where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter s hould be a ns wera bl e for the torts commi tted while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not s upposed to interfere with the di s ci pl i ne of the s chool nor wi th the a uthori ty a nd s upervi s i on of the tea cher whi l e the chi l d i s under i ns tructi on. Del fi n coul d not ha ve properl y refus ed to a l l ow the chi l d to a ttend the pa ra de, i n defi a nce of s chool a uthori ti es . If a tea cher was present, he/she should be the one responsible for a llowing the minor to drive. If there was no teacher present, the s chool a uthori ti es a re the ones a ns wera bl e . The fa ther should not be held liable for a tort that he was in no way a ble to prevent, and which he ha d every ri ght to a s s ume the s chool a uthori ti es woul d a voi d.

Cuadra vs. Monfort (G.R. L-24101 - Sept. 30, 1970) Facts: Ma ri a Teresa Cuadra, 12, a nd Ma ria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Gra de Six. Their teacher assi gned them, together wi th three other cl assmates, to weed the grass i n the s chool premises. Ma ria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband. Jokingly s he sa i d a l oud that s he had found an earthworm a nd, to fri ghten the Cuadra girl, tos s ed the object a t her. At tha t preci s e moment the l a tter turned a round to face her fri end, a nd the object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, s he rubbed the i njured part a nd treated it with s ome powder. The next day, the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related the i nci dent to her pa rents , who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She underwent s urgical operation twice, first on July 20 a nd again on Augus t 4, 1962, a nd s ta yed i n the hos pi ta l for a tota l of twenty-three da ys , for a l l of whi ch the pa rents s pent the s um of P1, 703.75. Des pite the medi ca l efforts , however, Ma ri a Teres a Cua dra compl etel y l os t the s i ght of her ri ght eye. In the ci vi l s ui t s ubsequently i nstituted by the parents i n behalf of their minor daughter a gainst Alfonso Monfort, Ma ri a Teres a Monfo rt's fa ther, the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 a s a ctual damages; P20,000.00 a s moral damages; and P2,000.00 a s a ttorney's fees , pl us the cos ts of the s ui t. Issue:

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Whether or not the parents are liable for the acts of their mi nor child when the a ct or omission of the child is committed i n the a bs ence of the pa rents ? Held:

No. There is no meticulously ca librated measure a pplicable; and when the law simply refers to "a ll the diligence of a good fa ther of the fa mily to prevent damage," i t implies a consideration of the a ttendant ci rcumstances in every i ndividual case, to determi ne whether or not by the exerci s e of s uch di l i gence the da ma ge coul d ha ve been prevented. There is nothing from which i t may be i nferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observa nce of due ca re, or tha t he was in any wa y remiss in the exercise of his parental a uthority in fa i l i ng to fores ee s uch da ma ge, or the a ct whi ch ca used it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to s end her a nd where s he wa s , a s he ha d the ri ght to expect her to be, under the ca re a nd s upervi s i on of the tea cher. The a ct which ca used the i njury wa s concerned, it was a n innocent prank not unusual a mong chi l dren a t pl a y a nd whi ch no pa rent, however ca reful, would have any s pecial reason to anticipate much l ess guard a gainst. Nor did it reveal a ny mischievous propensity, or i ndeed any tra it in the child's character which would reflect unfavorabl y on her upbri ngi ng a nd for whi ch the bl a me coul d be a ttri buted to her pa rents . The vi cti m, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration a nd s ympathy for the tra gedy that befell her. But i f the defenda nt i s a t a l l obligated to compensate her suffering, the obl i ga ti on ha s no l ega l s a ncti on enforcea bl e i n court, but onl y the mora l compul s i on of good cons ci ence.

b. Owners a nd Ma na gers of Es ta bl i s hments

Filamer Christian Institute vs. CA (G.R. No. 75112 - October 16, 1990 - 190 SCRA 485) Facts: Potenciano Ka punan, Sr., a n eighty-two-year old retired schoolteacher (now deceased), was struck by the Pi noy jeep owned by peti tioner Filamer and driven by i ts alleged employee, Funtecha as Ka punan, Sr. was walking along Roxa s Avenue, Roxa s Ci ty a t 6:30 i n the evening of October 20, 1977. As a res ult of the accident, Ka punan was hospitalized for a total of twenty days. Evi dence s howed tha t a t the ti me of the accident, the jeep had only one headlight functioning a nd that Funtecha onl y ha d a s tudent dri vers permi t, ha vi ng pers uaded Allan Masa, the a uthorized driver, to turn over the wheels to him. Ka punan instituted a cri minal case against Funtecha a l one for s eri ous physical injuries through reckless imprudence. He then commenced a ci vil ca se for damages naming a s defenda nts Fi l a mer a nd Funtecha. Also included was Agustin Ma sa, director a nd president of Filamer Chri stian Institute. Allan Ma sa was not impleaded as codefenda nt. The tri al court rendered judgment finding not only Filamer a nd Funtecha to be a t fault but a l s o Al l a n Ma s a , a non -pa rty. On a ppea l , the Appel l a te Court a ffi rmed th e tri a l courts deci s i on i n toto . Issue: Whether or not Fi l a mer i s l i a bl e? Peti ti oner: It ca nnot be held responsible for the 201ortuous a ct of Funtecha on the ground that there is no existing empl oyer-empl oyee rel a ti ons hi p between them. Held:

No. Fi l a mer i s not l i a bl e. Art. 2180 provi des that xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages ca used by their employees a nd household helpers a cting wi thi n the s cope of thei r a s s i gned ta s ks , even though the former a re not enga ged i n a ny bus i nes s or i ndus try. In di s cl a i mi ng res pons i bi l i ty, Fi l a mer ha s i nvoked Secti on 14, Rul e X of Book III of the La bor Code whi ch rea ds : Sec. 14 Worki ng scholars. There is no employer-employee relationship between s tudents on the one ha nd, a nd s chool s on the other, where s tude nts work for the l a tter i n excha nge for the pri vi l ege to s tudy free of cha rge Under the just-quoted provision of law, Filamer ca nnot be considered as Funtechas employer. Funtecha belongs to that s pecial ca tegory of s tudents who render servi ce to the school in exchange for free tui ti on. Funtecha worked for peti ti oner for two hours daily for fi ve days a week. He was assigned to clean the s chool passageways from 4-6a m with s ufficient ti me to prepa re for hi s 7:30 a m cl a s s es . He wa s not i ncl uded i n the compa ny pa yrol l . Even i f we were to concede the s tatus of a n employee on Funtecha, i t has been sa ti s fa ctori l y s hown tha t a t the ti me of the a cci dent, he was not a cting within the s cope of his s upposed employment. Taking the wheels of the Pi noy jeep was not wi thi n the a mbi t of the ja ni tori a l s ervi ces for whi ch he wa s empl oyed.

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Soliman vs. Tuazon (G.R. No. 66207 - May 18, 1992 - 209 SCRA 47) Facts: Peti ti oner Sol i ma n Jr. fi l ed a ci vi l compl a i nt for da ma ges a ga i ns t res pondents Republic Central Colleges, R.L. Security Agency, a nd Solomon, a s ecurity guard a t Republic. The complaint alleges that one morning, while Sol i ma n wa s i n the premi s es of Republic, as he was still a regular enrolled student, Solomon with i ntent to kill a ttacked a nd s hot him in the a bdomen. It is further alleged tha t s uch wound would have caused his death, were it not for ti mely medical assis ta nce, a nd beca us e of thi s he ma y not be a bl e to a ttend hi s regul a r cl a s s es a nd perform hi s us ua l work from three to four months . Republic Colleges filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Soliman had no action against it. It averred tha t i t s houl d be free from l i ability because it was not the employer of the s ecurity guard. Moreover, Article 2180 (7th pa ra gra ph) di d not a ppl y, s i nce s uch hol ds tea chers a nd hea ds res pons i bl e onl y for da ma ges ca us ed by thei r pupi l s a nd s tudents /a pprenti ces . The MTD wa s gra nted by the judge. Hence thi s i ns ta nt peti ti on. Issue: Whether or not Republ i c Centra l Col l eges ma y be hel d l i a bl e for da ma ges ? Held:

Republic Central Colleges may not be held l iabl e under Art 2180. However, i t ma y be hel d l i a bl e under i mpl i ed contra ct. Under Arti cle 2180 of the NCC, employers shall be liable for the damages ca used by their employees a nd hous ehol d hel pers a cti ng within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former a re not enga ged i n a ny bus i nes s or i ndus try. Al s o, tea chers or heads of establishments of arts a nd tra des shall be liable for damages ca us ed by thei r pupi l s , thei r s tudents or a pprenti ces , s o l ong a s they rema i n i n thei r cus tody. There is no basis to hold Republic liable under Article 2180. The employer of security guard Solomon wa s R.L. Securi ty Agency Inc. Where the s ecurity a gency, a s here, recruits, hires a nd assigns the work of its watchmen or s ecurity gua rds , the a gency i s the employer of s uch guards or watchmen. Liability for i llegal or harmful a cts committed by the security guards a ttaches to the empl oyer a gency, a nd not to the cl i ents or cus tomers of s uch a gency. The fa ct that a client company ma y give instru ctions or directions to the s ecuri ty gua rds a s s i gned to i t, does not, by i ts el f, render the cl i ent res pons i bl e a s a n empl oyer. Sol omon was neither a pupil nor a student of Republic. Hence, the provision with regard to the liability of teachers and heads i s a l s o not a va i l a bl e to ma ke Republ i c l i a bl e for da ma ges . Nevertheless, Republic may be held liable on the basis of an implied contract between i t and Soliman, because of i ts obliga ti on to ma i ntain peace a nd order within the ca mpus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. Should this be the ca s e, the s chool ma y still avoid liability by proving that the brea ch of i ts contra ctua l obl i ga ti on to the s tudents wa s not due to i ts negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of obligati on a nd corres pondi ng to the ci rcums ta nces of pers on, ti me a nd pl a ce. Res pondent trial judge was i n s erious error when he s upposed that petitioner could have no ca us e of a cti on other tha n one ba s ed on Arti cle 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but ra ther should ha ve, i n the i nterest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex l ege on the pa rt of res pondent Col l eges . Peti ti on GRANTED. Order REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Ca s e REMANDED to thecourt a quo for further proceedi ngs .

c. Empl oyers (not enga ged i n bus i nes s ) d. Sta te Meritt vs. Government (G.R. No. L-11154 - March 21, 1916) Facts: Merri tt wa s ri ding on a motorcycle a t a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue a nd when he wa s ten feet from the s outhwestern i ntersection of said s treets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said a venue, ins tea d o f turni ng towa rd the s outh, after passing the center thereof, s o that it would be on the left side of said a venue, as is prescribed by the ordi na nc e a nd the Motor Vehicle Act, turned s uddenly and unexpectedly a nd l ong before reaching the center of the s treet, into the ri ght s ide of Taft Avenue, without ha vi ng s ounded a ny whi s tl e or horn, by whi ch movement i t s truck Merri tt, who wa s a l rea dy s i x feet from the s outhwes tern poi nt or from the pos t pl a ce there. By rea son of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely i njured. As a consequence of the loss the pl a i nti ff s uffered i n the effi ci ency of hi s work a s a contra ctor.

31
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is l iable? Held:

The col lision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the a mbulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur. As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by a n a gent or employee of the Government, the i nquiry a t once a rises whether the Government is l egally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom. Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, rea ds: An Act a uthorizing E. Merri tt to bring suit a gainst the Government of the Phi l ippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of s aid Islands to appear in said suit. Al l admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) ca nnot be sued by a n i ndividual without i ts consent. It is also a dmitted that the i nstant case is one a ga inst the Government. As the consent of the Government to be s ued by the plaintiff was entirely vol untary on its part, i t i s our duty to l ook ca refully i nto the terms of the consent, a nd render judgment accordingly. The pl aintiff was authorized to bring this a ction a gainst the Government "i n order to fi x the res pons i bi l i ty for the col l i s i o n between his motorcycle a nd the a mbulance of the General Hospital and to determine the a mount of the da ma ges , i f a ny, to whi ch Mr. E. Merri tt i s entitled on a ccount of s a i d col l i s i on, Thes e were the two ques ti ons s ubmi tted to the court for determination. The Act wa s passed "in order that said questions may be decided." We have "deci ded" tha t the a cci dent wa s due s olely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the ti me a n employee of the defendant, a nd we have a l s o fi xed the a mount of da ma ges s us ta i ned by the pl a i nti ff a s a res ul t of the col l i s i on. Tha t the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to a nother by his fault or negligence is based, on t hat the person obligated, by his own fault or negligence, ta kes pa rt i n the a ct or omi s s i on of the thi rd pa rty who ca us ed th e da mage. It follows therefrom that the s tate, by vi rtue of s uch provisions of l aw, is not responsible for the damages s uffered by pri va te i ndividuals i n consequence of acts performed by i ts employees in the di s cha rge of the functi ons perta i ni ng to thei r offi ce, because neither fa ult nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organiza ti on of bra nches of publ i c s ervi ce a nd i n the a ppoi ntment of i ts a gents . Tha t the responsibility of the state is limited by a rticle 1903 to the case wh erein it a cts through a special agent (a nd a s peci a l a gent, in the s ense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a s pecial official) so th at i n representation of the s tate a nd being bound to a ct a s a n a gent thereof, he executes the trus t confi ded to hi m. Thi s concept does not a ppl y to a ny executi ve a gent who i s a n empl oyee of the a cting a dministration and who on his own responsibility performs the functi ons whi ch a re i nherent i n a nd na tura l l y perta i n to hi s offi ce a nd whi ch a re regul a ted by l a w a nd the regul a ti ons ."

Fontanilla vs Maliaman (G.R. No. L-55963, December 1, 1989) Facts: It a ppears that on August 21, 1976 a t a bout 6:30 P.M., a pi ckup owned a nd opera ted by res pondent Na ti ona l Irri ga ti on Admi nistration, a government agency bearing Pl ate No. IN-651, then driven officially by Hugo Ga rcia, a n employee of s a i d a gency a s i ts regul ar driver, bumped a bicycle ri dden by Fra ncisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Ma as i n, Sa n Jos e Ci ty a l ong the Ma ha rl i ka Hi ghway. As a result of the i mpact, Fra ncisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were i njured and brought to the Sa n Jos e Ci ty E mergency Hos pital for treatment. Fontanilla was l ater transferred to the Ca banatuan Provi ncial Hospital where he died. Garcia wa s then a regul a r dri ver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who, at the ti me of the a ccident, was a l i cens ed profes s i ona l dri ver a nd who qua lified for employment a s such regular driver of respondent after having passed the wri tten and oral examinations on tra ffic rules a n d ma i ntena nce of vehi cl es gi ven by Na ti ona l Irri ga ti on Admi ni s tra ti on a uthori ti es . Thi s petition is an off-shot of the action (Civil Ca se No. SJC-56) ins ti tuted by peti ti oners -s pous es on Apri l 17, 1978 a ga i ns t res pondent NIA before the then Court of First Instance of San Jose Ci ty, for damages in connection with the death of thei r s o n res ul ti ng from the a cci dent. The tri al court re ndered judgment which directed respondent Na ti ona l Irri ga ti on Admi ni s tra ti on to pa y da ma ges (dea th benefits) a nd a ctual expenses to petitioners. Respondent National Irrigation Administration thus appealed s aid deci s i on to th e Court of Appeals. Instead of filing the required brief i n the aforecited Court of Appeals case, petitioners filed the i nstant petiti on wi th thi s Court. Issue: Whether or not the a ward of moral damages, exemplary damages a nd a ttorney's fees i s l ega l l y proper i n a compl a i nt for da ma ges ba s ed on qua s i -del i ct whi ch res ul ted i n the dea th of the s on of herei n peti ti oners ? Held:

32
Yes. Art. 2176 thus provides: Whoever by a ct omission ca uses damage to another, there being fa ult or negligence, is obli ged to pa y for da mage done. Such fault or negligence, i f there i s no pre-existing cotractual relation between the parties, is ca lled a qua s i del i ct a nd i s governed by the provi s i ons of thi s Cha pter. Pa ra graphs 5 a nd 6 of Art. 21 80 rea d as follows: Employers shall be liable for the da ma ges ca us ed by thei r empl oyees a nd hous ehold helpers a cting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even the though the former a re not engaged in any busines s or i ndustry. The State is responsible i n like manner when i t acts through a s pecial agent. But not when the d a ma ge ha s been ca us ed by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which ca se what is provided i n Art. 2176 s hall be a ppli ca b l e. The l i a bi l i ty of the Sta te ha s two a s pects . na mel y: 1. Its publ i c or governmenta l a s pects where i t i s l i a bl e for th e tortuous a cts of s peci a l a gents onl y. 2. Its pri vate or business aspects (as when i t engages in priva te enterprises) where i t becomes l i a bl e a s a n ordi na ry empl oyer. (p. 961, Ci vi l Code of the Phi l i ppi nes ; Annota ted, Pa ra s ; 1986 Ed. ). In thi s jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage ca used by the torti ous a cts or conduct of i ts s peci a l a gent. Under the a forequoted paragraph 6 of Art. 2180, the Sta te has voluntarily a s s umed l i a bi l i ty for a cts done through s peci a l a gents. The State's agent, i f a public official, must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular ta sk but that s uch ta s k mus t be foreign to said official's usual governmental functions. If the State's agent is not a public official, and is commi s s i oned to perform non-governmental functions, then the State a ssumes the role of an ordinary employer a nd will be held liable as such for i ts a gent's tort. Where the government commissions a private individual for a s pecial governmental ta sk, i t is acting through a s peci a l a gent wi thi n the mea ni ng of the provi s i on. (Torts a nd Da ma ges , Sa ngco, p. 347, 1984 Ed.) Certa i n functions and activities, which ca n be performed only by the government, a re more or l es s genera l l y a greed to be "governmental" in character, and so the State is immune from tort l iability. On the other hand, a s ervice which might as well be provi ded by a priva te corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a "propri et a ry" one, a s to whi ch there ma y be l i a bi l i ty for the torts of a gents wi thi n the s cope of thei r empl oyment. The Na tional Irrigation Administration i s an a gency of the government exercising proprietary functions, by express provisi on of Rep. Act No. 3601. Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality a nd not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corpora te body performing nongovernmental functions, i t now becomes l i a bl e for the da ma ge ca us ed by the a cci dent res ulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibili ty of a n ordi na ry empl oyer a nd as such, it becomes a nswerable for damages. This as s umpti on of l i a bi l i ty, however, i s predi ca ted upon the exi s tence of negligence on the part of respondent NIA. The negl i gence referred to here i s the negl i gence of s upervi s i on. It s hould be emphasized that the a ccident happened a long the Ma harlika National Road within the city l imits of Sa n Jos e Ci ty, a n urban area. Considering the fa ct that the victim was thrown 50 meters a wa y from the poi nt of i mpa ct, there i s a s trong i ndication that driver Garcia was driving a t a high speed. This i s confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered substantia l a nd hea vy da mage as above-described and the fact that the NIA group wa s then "i n a h urry to rea ch the ca mps i te a s ea rl y a s pos sible", as shown by their not s topping to find out what they bumped as would have been their normal a nd i ni ti a l rea cti on. Evi dently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they we re tra velling a t a high s peed wi thi n the ci ty l i mits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to ca ution a nd make the dri ver obs erve the proper a n d a l lowed s peed l imit within the ci ty. Under the situation, s uch negligence is further a ggra va ted by thei r des i re to rea ch thei r des tination without even checking whether or not the vehicle s uffered da ma ge from the object i t bumped, thus s howi ng i mprudence a nd reckel es s nes s on the pa rt of both the dri ver a nd the s upervi s or i n the group. Cons idering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby di rected to pay herein petitioners-spouses the a mounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hos pitalization a nd burial expenses of the aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 a s mora l da ma ges ; P8,000.00 a s exempl a ry da ma ges a nd a ttorney's fees of 20% of the tota l a wa rd.

e. Tea chers or Hea ds of School s

Amadora vs. C.A. (160 SCRA 115) Facts: Al fredo Amadora is a s tudent of Col egio de San Jose Recoletos. While he was in the s chools a uditoriu m he was shot to death by a cl a ssmate in the name of Pablito Daffon. The latter was then convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The vi ctims pa rents s ued for damages pursuant to Art. 2180 of the Ci vi l Code a ga i ns t the s chool , the pri nci pa l , dea n for boys , the Phys i cs tea cher, the a ccus ed, hi s pa rents a nd s ome other s tudents a l ong wi th thei r pa rents .

33
La ter, the complaint against the other students and their parents were dropped. The Amadoras contend tha t the pres ence of Al fredo was by reason of a Phys ics experiment; hence the student is s till under custody of the s chool a t the ti me of the i nci dent. The s chool, however, denies liability s ince his presence was merely to s ubmit the Physics project a nd that the semester ha d a l rea dy ended. Issue: Whether or not pri va te res pondents a re l i a bl e ? Held:

No. Arti cl e 2180 a pplies to s chools whether a cademic or non-academic. The student is deemed i n the custody of the school as l ong a s he i s under the control a nd i nfluence of the school and is within its premises, whether the school semester has just begun or ha s ended. The l iability of the article is by the head superior i n-charge to the student a nd not by the s chool who coul d be l i a bl e under res pondeat superior. Both have the defense of bonus pater fa milias. In thi s ca s e the evi dence di d not s upport who the i n cha rge tea cher wa s other tha n the fa ct he s ubmi tted hi s Phys i cs report. And even if the Physics teacher was in fact in charge there i s no showing that he was negligent in the supervision a nd discipline of the a ccus ed. The pri va te res pondents properl y a dduced evi dence to prove they exerci s ed bonus pa ter fa mi l i a s .

Salvosa vs. IAC (G.R. No. 70458 - October 5, 1988) Facts: Peti ti oner Ba guio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is a n academic institution and an institution of a rts and tra de. Petitioner Benja mi n Sa l vosa is the President and Chairman of the Board of BCF. The Baguio Colleges Founda ti on ROTC Uni t ha d Ji mmy B. Abon a s i ts dul y a ppointed a rmorer. As a rmorer of the ROTC Unit, Abon received his a ppointment from the AFP. Not being a n empl oyee of the BCF, he a l so received his s alary a nd orders from the AFP. Abon was a lso a commerce student of the BCF. On 3 Ma rch 1977, a t a round 8:00 p.m., i n the parking s pace of BCF, Abon s hot Napoleon Ca stro a student of the Univers i ty of Ba gui o wi th a n unl i cens ed fi rea rm whi ch the former took from the a rmory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Castro died and Abon wa s pros ecuted for, a nd convi cted of the cri me of Homi ci de by Mi l i ta ry Court. The heirs of Ca stro sued for damages, and the trial court sentenced Abon, Salvosa and BCF, jointly a nd s evera l l y l i a bl e to pa y the hei rs of Ca s tro, whi ch CA a ffi rmed wi th modi fi ca ti on i n the a mount of da ma ges . Issue: Whether or not Salvosa and BCF ca n be held s olidarity l iable with Abon for damages under Arti cle 218012 of the Ci vil Code, as a cons equence of the torti ous a ct of Abon? Held:

No. Abon ca nnot be considered to have been "at attendance i n the school ," or i n the cus tody of BCF, when he s hot Ca s tro. Logi cally, therefore, Salvosa and BCF ca nnot under Art. 2180 of the Ci vi l Code be held solidarity l iable wi th Abon for da ma ges res ul ti ng from hi s a cts . Ra ti onale behind Art. 2180: So l ong as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in l oco parentis [as to the s tudent] a nd [is] called upon to exercise reasonable s upervision over the conduct of the [s tudent]. 12 Tea chers or heads of establishments of arts a nd tra des a re l i a bl e for "da ma ges ca us ed by thei r pupi l s a nd s tudents or a pprenti ces , s o l ong a s they rema i n i n thei r cus tody." Art. 2180 's o l ong as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective a nd s upervi s ory cus tody tha t the s chool a nd i ts heads a nd teachers exercise over the pupils a nd s tudents for as l ong as they a re a t attendance in the s chool , i ncl udi ng reces s ti me. A "recessat a ttendance i n the s chool," contemplates a situation of temporary a djournment of s chool a cti vi ti es where the s tudent still remains within call of his mentor a nd is not permitted to leave the s chool premises, or the a rea wi thi n whi ch the s chool a cti vi ty i s conducted. A s tudent not "a t a ttenda nce i n the s chool " ca nnot be i n "reces s " therea t. The mere fact of being enrolled or being i n the premises of a s chool without more does not cons ti tute "a ttendi ng s chool " or bei ng i n the "protecti ve a nd s upervi s ory cus tody' of the s chool , a s contempl a ted i n the l a w. Moreover, Abon wa s s uppos ed to be worki ng i n the a rmory wi th defi ni te i ns tructi ons from hi s s uperi or, the ROTC Comma nda nt, when he s hot Ca s tro. 3. Primary Liability a. Pos s es s ors /Us ers of a ni ma l

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The possessor of a n a nimal or whoever ma y make use of the same is responsible for the damage which i t ma y ca use, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility s hall cease only i n case the d a ma ge s hould come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905) (Art. 2183, New Civil Code)

Vestil vs. IAC (G.R. No. 74431 - November 6, 1989) Facts: On Jul y 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the peti ti oners i n the hous e of the l a te Vi cente Mi randa, the father of Purita Vestil. She was rushed to the hospital but although she was dis cha rged a fter ni ne da ys , s he wa s rea dmi tted one week l a ter. She di ed of bronchopneumoni a . Uys s ued ves ta l s for da ma ges . Issue: Whether or not Ves ti l i s res pons i bl e for the dog bi te? Held:

Yes. Art. 2183. The possessor of a n a nimal or whoever ma y make use of the same is responsible for the da ma ge whi ch i t ma y ca us e, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility s hall cease only i n case the damage s houl d come from force ma jeure or from the fa ul t of the pers on who ha s s uffered da ma ge. Ves til is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Mi randa's estate. She and her husba nd were i ts pos sessors at the ti me of the incident i n question. There i s evidence showing that s he and her family regularly went to the hous e, once or twice weekly a nd used i t vi rtually a s a second house. Interestingly, her own da ughter wa s pl a yi ng i n the hous e with Theness when s he was bitten by the dog.The dog rema i ned i n the hous e even a fter the dea th of Vi cente Mi ra nda i n 1973 a nd until 1975, when the i ncident i n question occurred. Also, the Vestils offered to a s s i s t the Uys wi th thei r hos pi ta l i za ti on expens es a l though Puri ta s a i d s he knew them onl y ca s ua l l y. The contention that broncho pneumonia is not related to the dog bite is belied by the statement of the doctors that it i s a compl i ca ti on whi ch ma y a ri s e from ra bi es . Thenes s s howed s i gns of hydrophobi a , a s ymptom of ra bi es . La s tly, the court ruled that for 2183 a pplies not only to wild and vi cious animals but also tame According to Ma nres a the obl igation imposed by Arti cle 2183 of the Ci vil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed l ack of vi gilance of the possessor or user of the animal ca using the damage. It is based on natural equity a nd on the principle of social i nterest tha t he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or s ervice must a ns wer for the da ma ge whi ch s uch a n i ma l ma y ca us e.

b.

Owners of motor vehi cl e In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner i s solidarily liable with his dri ver, i f the former, who wa s i n the vehi cle, could have, by the us e of the due di l i gence, prevented the mi s fortune. It i s di s puta bl y pres umed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless drivi ng or vi olating tra ffi c regul a ti ons a t l ea s t twi ce wi thi n the next precedi ng two months . (Art. 2184, New Civil Code)

First Malayan Leasing vs. C.A. (G. R. No. 91378 - June 9, 1992) Facts: The i mportance of motor vehicle registration i n determi ni ng who s houl d be l i a bl e for the dea th or i njuri es s uffered by pa ssengers or third persons as a consequence of the operation of a motor vehicle. On June 26, 1984, Cri s ostomo B. Vi tug filed a civil case a ga inst First Malayan Leasing a nd Finance Corporation (FMLFC for s hort), to recover da ma ges for phys i ca l i njuri es , l os s of pe rs ona l effects, a nd the wreck of his ca r as a result of a three-vehicle collision. Vitug's car was a t a full s top a t the intersection of New York Street a nd Epifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA) i n Cubao, Quezon Ci ty, northward -bound, the oncomi ng Is uzu ca rgo truck bumped, a Ford Gra na da car behind him with such force that the Ford car was thrown on top of Vitug's car crushing i ts roof. The ca rgo truck therea fter s truck Vi tug's ca r i n the rea r ca us i ng the ga s ta nk to expl ode a nd s etti ng the ca r a bl a ze. Stunned by the i mpact, Vi tug was fortunately extri cated from his car by s olicitous bys ta nders before the vehi cl e expl oded. However, two of his passengers were burned to death. Vi tug's ca r, valued at P70, 000, wa s a total l oss and he lost va luables amounting to a l most P50 k, whi ch i ncluded GP watch, a gold Cross pen, necklace with a diamond pendant, a pair of Bally s hoes a nd a pa i r of Chri s ti a n Di or eyeglasses. Upon his physician's a dvice, he received further medical treatment i n the United States which cos t hi m US$2, 373.64 for hi s fi rs t tri p a nd US$5,596.64 for the s econd.

35
At the ti me of the accident the Isuzu ca rgo truck wa s regi s tered i n the na me of the Fi rs t Ma l a ya n Lea s i ng a nd Fi na nce Corpora tion (FMLFC) but the latter denied any liability, alleging that i t was not the owner of the truck. Neither the employe r of the dri ver Cri s pi n Si ca t, beca us e i t ha d s ol d the truck to Vi cente Tri ni da d, a fter the l a tter ha d pa i d a l l hi s monthl y a morti za ti ons . Issue: Whether or not FMLFC i s liable as the registered owner of the Isuzu truck even i f i t ha s a l rea dy s ol d the s a me to Tri ni da d?

Held: Yes. Thi s Court has consistently ruled that regardless of who the actual owner of a motor vehi cl e mi ght be, the regi s tered owner i s the operator of the same with respect to the publ i c a nd thi rd pers ons , a nd a s s uch, di rectl y a nd pri ma ri l y res pons i bl e for the cons equences of i ts opera ti on. In contemplation of l aw, the owner/operator of record i s the employer of the driver, the a ctua l opera tor a nd empl oyer bei ng cons i dered merel y a s hi s a gent. In order for a tra nsfer of ownership of a motor vehicle to be va lid against third persons. i t mus t be recorde d i n the La nd Tra ns portation Office. For, a lthough valid between the parties, the sale ca nnot affect third persons who rely on the publ i c regi stration of the motor vehicle as conclusive evidence of ownership. In law, FMLFC wa s the owner a nd opera tor of the Izus u ca rgo truck, hence, fully l iable to third parties i njured by i ts operation due to the fa ul t or negl i gence of the dri ver thereof. c. Ma nufa cturers a nd Proces s ors Ma nufacturers a nd processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods s ha ll be l i a bl e for dea th or i njuries ca used by a ny noxious or harmful substances used, a lthough no contractual rel a ti on exi s ts between them a nd the cons umers . (n) (Art. 2187, New Civil Code) See a l s o R.A. 7394 or the Cons umer Act of the Phi l i ppi nes . Muni ci pa l Corpora ti ons Provi nces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries s uffered by, a ny person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildi ngs , a nd other publ i c works under thei r con trol or s upervi s i on. (Art. 2189, New Civil Code)

d.

City of Manila vs. Tentico (G.R. No.L-23050 January 29, 1968) Facts: On Ja nuary 27, 1958, a t a bout 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was a t the corner of the Ol d Luneta a nd P. Burgos Avenue, Ma ni l a , wi thin a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to ta ke him down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to ha i l a jeepney that ca me along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, a nd took a few s teps, he fel l i nsi de a n uncovered and unlighted ca tch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the ri m of the manhol e brea ki ng hi s eyegl asses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his l eft eyelid. In addition to the lacerated wound in hi s l eft upper eyelid, Teoti co s uffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper a rm, the right l eg a nd the upper l ip apart from a n abrasion on the ri gh t infra -pa tel l a regi on. At the ti me of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a businessman and a professor a t the Univers i ty of the Ea s t. He held responsible positions in va rious business firms like the Philippine Merchandising Co., the A.U. Valenci a a nd Co ., the Si l ver Swa n Ma nufacturing Company a nd the Sincere Packing Corporation. He was also a ssociated wi th several ci vic organizations s uch a s the Wa ck Wa ck Golf Cl ub, the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Y's Men Cl ub of Ma nila a nd the Knights of Ri za l . As a res ul t of the i nci dent, plaintiff was prevented from engaging i n his customary occupation for twenty days . Because of the i ncident, he wa s s ubjected to humi liation and ridicule by his business associates a nd friends. During the period of his treatment, plainti ff wa s under c ons ta nt fea r a nd a nxi ety for the wel fa re of hi s mi n or. Issue: Whether or not the present case i s governed by Secti on 4 of Republ i c Act No. 409 (Cha rter of the Ci ty of Ma ni l a ) rea di ng:

36
The ci ty s hall not be liable or held for da ma ges or i njuri es to pers ons or property a ri s i ng from the fa i l ure o f the Ma yor, the Muni cipal Board, or a ny other ci ty officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negli gence of s a i d Ma yor, Muni ci pa l Boa rd, or other offi cers whi l e enforci ng or a ttempti ng to enforce s a i d provi s i ons ; or by Arti cl e 2189 of the Ci vil Code of the Philippines which provides: Provi nces, cities and municipalities s hall be l iable for damages for the death of, or i njuries suffered by, a ny person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other publ i c works under thei r control or s upervi s i on. Held:

Secti on 4 refers to liability a rising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, wherea s Arti cl e 2189 governs l i ability due to "defective s treets," i n particular. Since the present action is based upon the a l l eged defecti ve condi ti on of a roa d, s a i d Arti cl e 2189 i s deci s i ve thereon. As a defense, Ci ty of Manila held that they ca nnot be liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident involving hi m took pl a ce i n a na ti ona l hi ghwa y; a nd 2) beca us e the Ci ty of Ma ni l a ha s not been negl i gent i n connecti on therewi th. Under Arti cle 2189 of the Ci vil Code, i t is not necessary for the liability therein established to a ttach that the defective roa ds or s treets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility i s exacted. What said articl e requi res i s tha t the provi nce, ci ty or municipality have either "control or supervisi on" over s a i d s treet or roa d. Even i f P. Burgos Avenue we re, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or s upervi s i on" by the Ci ty of Ma ni l a , under Republ i c Act 409.

Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan (G.R. No. 61516 - March 21, 1989 - 71 SCRA 382) Facts: On Jul y 25, 1978, pl a intiff Florentina A. Guilatco, a Court Interpreter of Branch III CFI Dagupan Ci ty, whi l e s he wa s a bout to boa rd a motorized tri cycle a t a sidewalk l ocated a t Perez Blvd. (a Na tional Road under the control and supervision of the Ci ty of Dagupan) a cci dentally fell into a manhole l ocated on the s idewalk, thereby ca using her right l eg to be fractured. The manhole was partially covered by a concrete flower pot l eaving a gaping hole a bout 2ft. l ong by 1. Feet wide or 42 cm wi de by 75 cm l ong by 150 cm deep. As a res ul t thereof, s he had to be hospitalized first at Pa ngasinan Provi ncial Hos pi ta l where s he i ncurred expens es of P8, 053.65. The pa i n ha s pers isted even a fter her discharge from the Medical Ci ty General Hospital to the present. She s till wea rs crutches a nd s he ha s not yet reported for duty a s a court i nterpreter a s s he ha s di ffi cul ty of l ocomoti on i n goi ng up the s ta i rs of her offi ce. Defendant Alfredo Tangco, Ci ty Engineer of Dagupan Ci ty a nd admittedly exofficio Highway Engineer, Ci ty Engineer of the Public Works a nd Building Official for DAgupan Ci ty, a dmitted the existence of the manhole and that said manhol e i s owned by the Na ti ona l Government. In his a nswer, he expressly a dmitted that he exercises supervision a nd control over National roads including the Perez Blvd. The Lower Court found in favor of Guilatco but on a ppeal, the appellate court reversed the l ower court findings on the ground tha t no evidence was pres ented by the pl a i nti ff to prove tha t the Ci ty of Da gupa n ha d contro l or s upervi s i on over Perez Bl vd. Issue: Whether or not W/N control or supervision over a national road by the ci ty of Da gupa n exi s ts , i n effect bi ndi ng the ci ty to a ns wer for da ma ges i n a ccorda nce wi th Arti cl e 2189? Respondent City: Perez Bl vd. i s a national road that is not under the control or s upervision of the Ci ty of Dagupan hence no liability should a tta ch. Held:

Yes. Ci ty of Da gupa n i s l i a bl e Art. 2189 provi des that Provinces, ci ties a nd municipalities s ha l l be l i a bl e for da ma ges for the dea th of, or i njuri es s uffered by, a ny person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings , a nd other publ i c works under thei r control or s upervi s i on. It i s not even necessary for the defective road or s treet to bel ong to the provi nce, ci ty, or muni ci pa l i ty for l i a bi l i ty to a tta ch. The arti cl e onl y requi res tha t ei ther control or s upervi s i on i s exerci s ed over the defecti ve roa d or s treet. Thi s control or s upervision is provided for i n the charter of Dagupan exercised through the Ci ty Engineer who accordi ng to Secti on 22 has the following duties, xxx He s hall ha ve the ca re a nd cus tody of the publ i c s ys tem of wa terworks a nd s ewers xxx The s ame charter also provides that the laying out, construction and improvement of s treets a nd regul a ti on of the us e thereof ma y be legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus the charter clearly i ndicates that the city i ndeed ha s s upervi s i on a nd control over the s i dewa l k.

37
The ci ty ca nnot be excused from l iability by the argument that the duty of the Ci ty Engineer to supervise or control the said roa d belongs more to his functions as an ex-officio Highway Engi neer or the Mi ni s try of Publ i c Hi ghwa y tha n a s a ci ty offi cer. This is because while he is entitled to a n honora ri um from the Mi ni s try, hi s s a l a ry from the ci ty government s ubs ta nti a l l y exceeds the honora ri um. e. Bui l di ng Propri etors The proprietor of a building or s tructure is responsi bl e for the da ma ges res ul ti ng from i ts tota l or pa rti al collapse, if it s hould be due to the l ack of necessa ry re pa i rs . (1907) (Art. 2190, New Civil Code) Propri etors s ha l l a l s o be res pons i bl e for da ma ges ca us ed: (1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been ta ken ca re of with due di l i gence, a nd the i nflammation of explosive s ubstances which have not been kept in a s a fe a nd a dequa te pl a ce; (2) By exces s i ve s moke, whi ch ma y be ha rmful to pers ons or property; (3) By the fa lling of trees situated a t or near highways or l anes , i f not ca us ed by force ma jeure; (4) By ema nations from tubes, ca na l s , s ewers or depos i ts of i nfecti ous ma tter, cons tructed wi thout preca uti ons s ui ta bl e to the pl a ce. (1908) (Art. 2191, New Civil Code) The head of a family that lives i n a building or a part thereof, is res pons i bl e for da ma ges ca us ed by thi ngs thrown or fa l l i ng from the s a me . (1910) (Art. 2193, New Civil Code) Engi neers / Archi tects / Contra ctors If da ma ge referred to i n the two precedi ng a rti cl es s houl d be the res ul t of a ny defect i n the cons truction mentioned in Arti cle 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed on ly a ga i ns t the engineer or a rchitect or contractor i n a ccordance with said a rticle, within the period therein fi xed. (1909) (Art. 2192, New Civil Code)

f.

Nakoil & Sons vs. C.A. (G.R. No. L-47851 - October 3, 1986 - 144 SCRA 596) Facts: Pl a intiff, Philippine Bar Assoc decided to construct an office building in Intramuros. The cons tructi on wa s underta ken by the Uni ted Construction, Inc on an administration basis. The plans a nd s pecifications were prepared by 3rd -party defendants Jua n Na kpi l & Sons . The building was completed i n June 1966. In the early morning of August 2, 1968, a n us ua l l y s trong ea rthqua ke hi t Ma ni l a . The bui lding s ustained major damages. The front columns of the building buckled, causing the bldg to tilt forward dangerous l y. The tena nts va ca ted the bl dg a nd Uni ted Cons tructi on s hored up the bl dg a t i ts expens e a s a tempora ry remedi a l mea s ure. On Nov 29, 1968, pl a intiff commenced this action for the recovery of damages aris i ng from the pa rti a l col l a ps e of the bl dg a ga inst United Construction a nd i ts President as defendants. Defendants filed a 3rd -party complaint against the a rchitects who prepa red the pl ans and specifications. The parties referred the technical issues to a Commissioner who submitted a report fi ndi ng tha t whi l e the da mage sustained by the PBA bldg was caused directly by the earthqua ke whos e ma gni tude wa s 7.3, they were a l s o ca us ed by the defects in the plans & s pecs prepared by the architects, deviations from the plans by the contractors a nd failure of the l a tter to obs erve the requisite workmanship in the construction of the bldg a nd of the contractors, architects a nd even the owners to exercise the requisite degree of s upervi s i on i n the cons tructi on of s ubject bl dg. The Tri al Court a greed w/ the findings of the Commissioner. The amicus curiae gave the opinion tha t the pl a ns &s pecs of the Na kpils were not defective. United Construction a nd the Nakpils claimed that i t was an a ct of God tha t ca us ed the fa i l ure of the bl dg whi ch should exempt them from responsibility a nd not the defective construction, poor workmans hi p, devi a ti ons from pl a ns &s pecs . Issue: Whether or not a n act of Godan unusually s trong earthquakewhich caused the failure of the bldg, exempts the parties who a re otherwi s e l i a bl e beca us e of thei r negl i gence from l i a bi l i ty? Held: The a pplicable law governing the rights a nd liabilities of the parties herei n i s Arti cl e 1723 of the New Ci vi l Code, whi ch provi des: Art. 1723. The engineer or a rchitect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable for damages i f wi thin fifteen years from the completion of the structure the same s hould collapse by reason of a defect i n thos e pl a ns a nd s pecifications, or due to the defects i n the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damage i f the edi fi ce fa gs within the same period on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of i nferior qual i ty furni s hed by hi m, or due to any vi olation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or a rchitect s upervi s es the cons tructi on, he s ha ll be s olidarily l iable with the contractor. Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of a ny of the ca uses of a ction by reason of a ny defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The a ction must be brought wi thin ten yea rs fol l owi ng the col l a ps e of the bui l di ng.

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On the other hand, the general rule i s that no person s hall be responsible for events which could not be foreseen or which though fores een, were i nevi ta bl e (Arti cl e 1174, New Ci vi l Code). An a ct of God has been defined as a n a ccident, due directly a nd exclusively to na tural causes without human intervention, whi ch by no a mount of fores i ght, pa i ns or ca re, rea s ona bl y to ha ve been expected, coul d ha ve been prevented. There i s no di s pute tha t the ea rthqua ke of Augus t 2, 1968 i s a f ortui tous event or a n a ct of God. To exempt the obligor from l iability under Arti cle 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of a n obl i ga ti on due to a n "a ct of God," the following must concur: (a ) the ca use of the breach of the obliga ti on mus t be i ndependent of the wi l l of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be s uch as to render i t impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal ma nner; a nd (d) the debtor mus t be free from a ny pa rti ci pa ti on i n, or a ggra va ti on of the i njury to the credi tor. The pri nciple embodied in the a ct of God doctrine s trictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclus i vel y by the vi ol ence of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded from creating or enteri ng i nto the ca us e of the mi s chi ef. When the effect, the ca use of which i s to be considered, is found to be i n pa rt the res ul t of the pa rti ci pa ti on of ma n, whether i t be from a ctive i ntervention or neglect, or failure to a ct, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, a nd removed from the rul es a ppl i ca bl e to the a cts of God. Thus , i f upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding fra ud, negligence, del a y or vi ol ation or contravention i n a ny manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for i n Arti cle 1170 of the Ci vi l Code, whi ch res ul ts i n l os s or da ma ge, the obl i gor ca nnot es ca pe l i a bi l i ty. The negligence of the defendant a nd the third -party defendants petitioners was established beyond di s pute both i n the l ower court a nd in the Intermediate Appellate Court. Defendant United Constructi on Co., Inc. wa s found to ha ve ma de s ubstantial deviations from the plans a nd specifications. a nd to have failed to observe the requisi te workma ns hi p i n the cons truction a s well a s to exercise the requisite degree of s upervision; while the thi rd -pa rty defenda nts were found to ha ve i nadequacies or defects in the plans a nd s pecifications prepared by them. As correctly assess ed by both courts , the defects in the construction and in the plans a nd s pecifications were the proximate ca uses that rendered the PBA bui l di ng una ble to wi thstand the earthquake of August 2, 1968. For thi s reason the defendant a nd third-party defenda nts ca nnot cl a i m exempti on from l i a bi l i ty. In a ny event, the relevant a nd l ogical observations of the tri al court as a ffirmed by the Court of Appeals that "while it is not pos sible to state with certainty that the building woul d not ha ve col l a ps ed were thos e defects not pres ent, the fa ct rema ins that several buildings i n the same area withstood the ea rthqua ke to whi ch the bui l di ng of the pl a i nti ff wa s s i mi l a rl y s ubjected," ca nnot be i gnored.

EPG Construction vs. C.A. (GR 131544 - March 16, 2001) Facts: In 1983, the Mi nistry of Human Settlement, through the BLISS Devel opment Corpora ti on, i ni ti a ted a hous i ng project on a government property i n Pasig Ci ty. Mi nistry of Human Settlement entered i nto a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) wi th the Mi nistry of Publ ic Works a nd Highways, where the latter undertook to develop the housing site a nd construct thereon 145 housing units. By vi rtue of the MOA, the Mi nistry of Public Works a nd Highways forged i ndivi dual contra cts wi th herei n peti ti oners for the cons tructi on of the housing units. Under the contracts, the scope of construction and funding therefore covered onl y a round "2/3 of ea ch hous i ng uni t. After compl ying with the terms of said contracts, a nd by reason of the verbal request and assurance of then DPWH Undersecreta ry Aber Ca nl as tha t a ddi ti ona l funds woul d be a va i l a bl e a nd forthcomi ng, peti ti oners a greed to underta ke a nd perform "a ddi ti ona l cons tructions"4 for the completion of the housing units, despite the a bsence of appropriations and written contracts to cover subsequent expens es for the "a ddi ti ona l cons tructi on s ." Peti ti oners then received payment for the construction work duly covered by the i ndividual wri tten contracts, l eavi ng the s um for the a dditional constructions unpaid. Petitioners s ent a demand l etter to the DPWH Secreta ry a nd s ubmi tted tha t thei r cl a i m for pa yment was favorably recommended by DPWH Assistant Secretary for Legal Services, who recognized the existence of implied contracts coveri ng the additional constructions. DPWH Assistant Secretary Ma damba opined that payment of petitioners' money claims s houl d be ba s ed on quantum meruit a nd should be forwarded to the Commission on Audi t (COA) for i ts due cons i dera ti on a nd a pprova l . COA returned the cl aim to DPWH for a uditorial action. On the basis of the Ins pecti on Report of the Audi tor's Techni ca l S ta ff, the DPWH Audi tor i nterpos ed no objecti on to the pa yment of the money cl a i ms s ubject to wha tever a cti on the COA ma y a dopt. The documents were returned by COA to DPWH s tating that funds should first be made a vailable before COA coul d pa s s upon a nd a ct on the money cl aims. The Sec. of Budget a nd Ma nagement released the funds. However, respondent Vigila r a s DPWH Secreta ry deni ed the money cl a i ms .

Issue:

39
Whether or not the "existence of a ppropriations and a vailability of funds as certified to a nd verified by the proper a ccounti ng offi ci a l s a re condi ti ons sine qua non for the executi on of government contra cts ? Held:

No. Whi l e "implied contracts", are void, in vi ew of vi olation of a pplicable laws, a uditing rules and lack of l egal requi rements ,11 we nonetheless find the i nstant petition laden wi th meri t a nd uphol d, i n the i nteres t of s ubs ta nti a l jus ti ce , peti ti oners contra ctors' right to be compensated for the "a dditional constructions " on the publ i c works hous i ng project, a ppl yi ng the pri nci pl e of qua ntum merui t The i llegality of the s ubject contracts proceeds from a n express declaration or prohibition by l aw,16 a nd not from any i ntri ns i c i l legality. Sta ted differently, the subject contracts are not illegal per s e. The construction of the hous i ng uni ts ha d a l rea dy been completed by petitioners-contractors and the subject housing units had been, since their completi on, under the control a nd di s pos i ti on of the government purs ua nt to i ts publ i c works hous i ng project. Where payment is based on quantum meruit, the a mount of recovery woul d onl y be the rea s ona bl e va l ue of the thi ng or s ervi ces rendered rega rdl es s of a ny a greement a s to va l ue 4. Solidary Liability The res ponsibility of two or more persons who are l iable for quasi-delict is s olidary. (n) (Art. 2194, New Civil Code)

Gelisan vs. Alday (G.R. No. L-30212 - September 30, 19870 - 154 SCRA 388) Facts: Gel isan is the owner of a freight truck. He a nd Espiritu entered into a l ease contract under which Espiritu hired the freight truck to ha ul ri ce, sugar, flour a nd fertilizer within the Ci ty of Ma nila for P18.00 per tri p, provided that the l oad would not exceed 200 s acks. Moreover, the contract provided that Es piritu shall bear all losses and damages a ttending the ca rriage of goods. Petitioner Alday, a trucki ng operator who had known Es piritu as a truck operator had a contract to haul the fertilizers of Atlas Fertilizer Corporation. Es piritu offered the use of the freight truck he rented from Gelisan a t 9 centavos per bag of fertilizer, which offer Alday a ccepted. Es pi ritu, however, failed to deliver the fertilizers to Atlas, as evidenced by the signatures i n the way bill receipts which were not of a ny of the representatives or empl oyees of Atl a s . Si nce he coul d not be found, Al da y reported the l os s to the Ma ni l a Pol i ce Department, a nd Espiritu was later a rrested a nd booked for theft. Subsequently, the frei ght truck of Gel i s a n wa s i mpounded by the pol ice. When Gelisan tried to retrieve the truck, however, he could not produce the registration papers . Hence, he wa s ma de to pa y a premi um of P300 to the s urety company. Meanwhile, Alday wa s compelled to pay for the 400 bags of fertilizer to Atlas Corp. Be ca us e of thi s , he filed a complaint against Espiritu a nd Gelisan. Espiritu was declared i n default. Meanwhile, Gelisan denied responsibility, cl aiming tha t he had no contractual relations with Alday wi th regard to the fertilizers, a nd that the hauling/delivery a nd alleged mis appropri a ti on by Es pi ritu were entirely beyond his knowledge and control. Moreover, he invoked the provision i n his contract with Espiritu which stated tha t the l a tter woul d be l i a bl e for a l l l os s es a nd da ma ges i n rel a ti on to the ca rri a ge of goods . CFI rul ed the Espiritu alone was l iable, s ince Gelisan was not privy to his contract with Alday. However, the CA held that Gelisan wa s l i kewi s e l i a bl e for bei ng the regi s tered owner of the truck. Hence thi s peti ti on. Issue: Whether or not Gel i s a n i s joi ntl y a nd s evera l l y l i a bl e wi th Es pi ri tu? Held:

Yes. Gel i s a n i s joi ntl y a nd s evera l l y l i a bl e wi th Es pi ri tu. The registered owner of a public servi ce vehicle is responsible for damages that may a rise from consequences i nci dent to i ts opera ti on or tha t ma y be ca us ed to a ny of the pa s s engers therei n. The cl aim of Gelisan that he cannot be l iable i n vi e w of the l ea s e contra ct ca nnot be s us ta i ned beca us e i t ha d not been a pproved by the Publ i c Servi ce Commi s s i on. As s uch, i t ca nnot be bi ndi ng upon the publ i c a nd thi rd pers ons . Gel isan, is not however without recourse. He has the ri ght to be indemnified by Eespiritu for the a mount he may be required to pa y a s da ma ges for the i njury ca us ed to Al da y, s i nce the l ea s e contra ct i s bi ndi ng between the contra cti ng pa rti es . There is a lso no merit i n Gelisans contention that his liabil i ty i s onl y s ubs i di a ry. The Court ha s cons i s tentl y hel d tha t the regi stered owner/operator of a public servi ce vehicle to be jointly and severally l iable with the driver for dama ges i ncurred by pa s s engers or thi rd pers ons a s a cons equence of i njuri es s us ta i ned i n the opera ti on of s a i d vehi cl es . Petition DENIED.

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De Guzman vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 90856 - Feb 1, 1996) Facts: De Guzman was the general manager of the Ma nila Office of Affiliated Ma chineries Agency, Ltd. (AMAL). He was i mpleaded for a l legedly s elling part of AMALs assets and applying the proceeds of the same, as well as the remaining assets, to satis fy hi s own cl a i ms a ga inst the company. The NLRC rul ed against petitioner granting a ward of damages and the order to return the a ssets of AMAL which he a ppropriated for being unwarra nted. He a ssails the decision a rguing that the same were beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to grant in a compl aint for illegal dismissal in the a bsence of an employer-employee relationship between peti ti oner a nd res pondent empl oyees . Issue: Whether or not De Guzma n i s l i a bl e for da ma ges ? Held:

Yes. In l a bor disputes, a n EER is not essential. It is enough that there be a showing of a reasonable ca usal connecti on between the cl a i m a s s erted a nd the empl oyer-empl oyee rel a ti ons . On thi s score, it is evid ent that petitioners acts of bad faith were offshoots of the termination of thei r empl oyment rel a ti ons wi th AMAL. The companys decision to close down i ts business i mpelled petitioner to a ct preci pi ta tel y i n a ppropri a ti ng the a s sets of AMAL, fearing perhaps that the same might not be enough to satisfy all the legitimate cl a i ms a ga i ns t i t. Even i f the peti tioner had a l egitimate claim with the corporation, his acts were in contravention of the law on preference of credi ts . The l a borers cl a i ms ma y ha ve been pa i d off ha d i t not been for the a cts of peti ti oner.

Other Types of Torts: 1. Abuse of Right: Every pers on must, in the exercise of his ri ghts and in the performance of his duties, a ct with justice, give everyone his due, a nd observe honesty a nd good faith. (Art. 19, New Civil Code)

Velayo vs. Shell G.R. No. L-7817 - October 31, 1956 - 100 PHIL 186) Facts: Commerci al Ai r Li nes (CALI) was supplied by Shell Co. of the Philippines Islands (defendant) ever s ince it s tarted i ts opera t i ons . As per the books of the defendant, it had reasons to believe that the financial condi ti on of CALI wa s fa r from bei ng s a ti s fa ctory. The ma nagement of CALI informally convened i ts principal creditors and informed them that CALI was in a s tate of i nsolvency a nd h ad to s top opera tions. The creditors present agreed to the formation of a working committee to continue the discussion of the pa yment of cl a i m s a nd preferences a lleged by certain creditors, and it was further a greed that said working committee would supervise the prese rvati on of the properties of the corporation while the creditors a ttempted to come to an understanding as a fair distribution of the a s s ets a mong them. To thi s committee, it was agreed upon that the creditors would not file suit to a chieve a fair pro-rata distribution, although CALI a nnounced that i n the event of non-agreement, i t was to file for i nsolvency proceedings. However, on the very da y of the meeting of the worki ng committee, the defendant effected a telegra phi c tra ns fer of i ts credi t a ga i ns t CALI to the Ameri ca n corpora ti on Shel l Oi l Compa ny, Inc., assigning i ts credi t, whi ch wa s s ubs equentl y fol l owed by a deed of a s s i gnment of credi t da ted Augus t 10,1948. The American corporation then sued CALI i n the superior court of California, USA for the amount of the credi t thus a s s i gned. And a wri t of attachment was issued against a C-54 PLANE i n Ontario International Ai rport. A judgment by default had been issued by the Ameri can court a gainst CALI. The stockholders of CALI were unaware of this.When the s uit in the American court was found out, on the fi rs t weeks of September1948, CALI i mmediately file for voluntary i nsolvency a nd the court i ssued the order of i nsolvency a cc ordingl y on the s a me da y. The court a ppoi nted Mr. Vel a yo a s As s i gnee. Vel ayo filed for a writ of injunction to s top the foreign court from prosecuting the claim, a nd i n the a l terna ti ve, he pra yed for da ma ges i n doubl e the a mount of the pl a ne whi ch wa s a tta ched. The pl aintiff having failed to restrain the progress of the attachment s uit in the US by denial of the a ppl i ca ti on of the wri t of i njunction a nd the consequences on execution of the C-54 plane i n the s tate of Ca lifornia, USA, he confines his acti on to the recovery of da ma ges a ga i ns t the defenda nt. The compl a i nt wa s di s mi s s ed, hence thi s peti ti on. Issue: Whether or not the defendant a cted i n ba d fa i th a nd betra yed the trus t a nd confi dence of the other credi tors of CALI? Held:

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Yes, the defenda nt compa ny a cted i n ba d fa i th. Cha pter 2 of the preliminary ti tle of the ci vil code on human relations , provi des the fol l owi ng; Arti cl e 19.Every pers on mus t, i n the exercise of his ri ghts a nd in the performance of his duties, a ct with justice, give everyone his due, a nd observe hones ty a nd good fa i th. The DEFENDANT could not have a ccomplished the tra nsfer of i ts credit to i ts sister corporation if all the s hel l compa ni es throughout the world would not have a sort of union, relation or understanding among themselves to come to the a i d of ea ch other. The telegraphic tra nsfer ma de without the knowledge and at the back of the other creditors of CALI ma y be a s hrewd a nd s urprise move that enabled the DEFENDANT to collect almost all if not the entire amount of its credit, but the Court of Jus tice ca nnot countenance such a ttitude a ta ll, a nd much l es s a forei gn corpora ti on to the detri ment of our Government a nd l oca l bus i nes s .

Filinvest vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 115902 - September 27, 1995 - 248 SCRA 549) Facts: Pl a intiff Nestor B. Sunga Jr., businessman and owner of the NBS Ma chineries Ma rketing a nd the NAP-NAP Tra nsit, all eged tha t he purchased a passenger mi nibus Ma zda from the Motor center, Inc. a t Ca l a s i a o, Pa nga s i na n on Ma rch 21, 1978 a nd for whi ch he executed a promissory note to cover the amount of P62,592.00 pa ya bl e monthl y i n the a mount of P2,608.00 for 24 months due a nd pa ya ble the 1s t day of each month s ta rti ng Ma y 1, 1978 thru a nd i ncl us i ve of Ma y 1, 1980. On the s a me da te, however, a cha tte l mortga ge wa s executed by hi m i n fa vor of the Motor center, Inc. The Cha ttel Mortgage and Assignment was assigned to the Filinvest Credit Corpora ti on wi th the conformi ty of the pl a i nti ff. Nes tor Sunga cl aimed that on October 21, 1978, the mi ni bus wa s s ei zed by two (2) empl oyees of the defenda nt Fi l i nves t Credi t Corpora tion upon orders of the branch manager Mr. Ga s par de los Santos, without any receipt, who claimed that he wa s del i nquent i n the pa yments of his vehicle. The plaintiff reported the loss to the PC a nd after proper verification from the office of the F ilinvest, the sai d vehi cle was recovered from the Crisologo Compound which was later released by Rosario Fronda As sistant Ma nager of the Filinves t, a nd Arturo Ba l a tba t a s ca reta ker of the compound. The police blotter of the Integrated National Police of Dagupan Ci ty s hows that Nestor Sunga a nd T/Sgt. Is i dro Pa s cua l of the 153rd PC Compa ny s ought the assistance of the Dagupan police a nd one Florence Onia of the Filinvest explained tha t the mi ni bu s wa s confi scated because the balance was already past due. After verification that his a ccounts are all i n order, Florence Onia admitted i t wa s thei r fa ul t. The motor vehi cl e wa s returned to the pl a i nti ff upon proper recei pt. The tri al court rendered a decision i n favor of Sunga ordering Filivest to pay Moral damages, Actual da ma ges , l os s of i ncome a nd a ttorneys fees among others. Upon appeal, I.A.C. a ffirmed the decision of the trial court a nd increased the damages agai nst Filinvest from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00. Issue: Whether or not s uch a wa rd of da ma ge i s proper? Held:

The petition was granted partially. It was said that "there is no hard and fast rule in the determination of what woul d be a fa i r a mount of moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own pecul i a r ci rcums ta nces ." Be tha t a s i t ma y a nd i n a mplification of this generalization, we s et the criterion that "in the ca se of moral damages, the ya rds ti ck s houl d be tha t the "a mount a warded should not be palpably a nd scandalously exces s i ve" s o a s to i ndi ca te tha t i t wa s the res ul t of pa s s i on, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court. Moreover, the actual l osses sustained by the a ggri eved pa rti es a nd the gra vi ty of the i njuri es mus t be cons i dered i n a rri vi ng a t rea s ona bl e l evel s ." There is no dispute that the private respondent, a businessman and owner of the NBS Ma chi neri es Ma rketi ng a nd NAP-NAP Tra ns it, is entitled to moral damages due to the unwa rra nted s ei zure of the mi ni bus Ma zda , a l l egedl y beca us e he wa s del inquent in the payment of its monthly a mortizations, which as s ta ted a bove, turned out to be i ncorrect. N o doubt s uch i ntent ta inted private respondent Sunga's reputation in the business community, thus ca us i ng hi m menta l a ngui s h, s eri ous a nxi ety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, a nd s ocial humiliation. Considering, however, that responde nt Sunga was dispos s es s ed of hi s motor vehi cl e for ba rel y three da ys , tha t i s , from October 21, 1978 to October 23, 1978, pos session of which was restored to him soon a fter the accounting errors were ironed out, we fi nd tha t the a wa rd of mora l da mages even i n the sum of P30,000.00 i s excessive for it must be emphasized that "damages are not i ntended to enri ch the compl ainant at the expense of a defendant. They a re a warded only to enable the injured parties to obtain means, diversions or a musements that will s erve to a lleviate the moral sufferings the i njured pa rti es ha ve undergone by rea s on of defenda nt's cul pable a ction. In other words, the award of moral damages i s aimed at a restoration within the l imits of the pos s i bl e, of t he s pi ritual status quo a nte; a nd therefore it must be proportionate to the s uffering i nfl i cted." 28 Moreover, "(M)ora l da ma ges though not i ncapable of pecuniary estimations, a re in the category of a n a ward designed to compensate the claimant for a ctual i njury s uffered a nd not to i mpos e a pena l ty on the wrongdoer.

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SC therefore to reiterate the caveat to lower courts "to guard a gainst the award of exorbi ta nt da ma ges tha t a re wa y out of proportion to the environmental circumstances of a case a nd which time a nd a ga i n, thi s Court ha s reduc ed or el i mi na ted. Judi cial discretion granted to the courts in the assessment of damages must a lways be exercised with balanced res tra i nts a nd mea s ured objecti vi ty. Contrary to Morals and Law Every pers on who, contrary to l aw, wilfully or negligently ca uses damage to a nother shall i ndemnify the latter for the s a me. (Art. 20, New Civil Code) Any pers on who wilfully ca uses l oss or i njury to a nother in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public pol icy s hall compensate the l atter for the damage. . (Art. 21, New Civil Code)

2.

Hermosisima vs. C.A. (G.R. No. L-14628 - September 30, 1960 - 109 SCRA 629) Facts: Compl ainant Soledad Ca gigas, was born in July 1917. Si nce 1950, Soledad then a teacher i n the Sibonga Provincial Hi gh School i n Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go a round together a nd were rega rded a s enga ged, a l though he had made no promise of ma rriage prior thereto. In 1951, s he gave up teaching a nd became a life i ns ura nce underwri ter i n the Ci ty of Cebu, where intimacy developed a mong her and the peti ti oner, s i nce one eveni ng i n 1953, when a fter comi ng from the movi es, they had s exual intercourse i n his ca bin on board M/V "Es cao," to which he was then attached as a pprentice pi l ot. In Februa ry 1954, Sol edad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chri s Hermo s i s i ma , wa s born on June 17, 1954, i n a priva te ma terni ty a nd cl i ni c. However, s ubs equentl y, or on Jul y 24, 1954, defenda nt ma rri e d one Roma nita Perez. A complaint, filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child a nd moral dama ges for a l l eged brea ch of promi s e. Issue: Whether or not mora l da ma ges a re recovera bl e, under our l a ws , for brea ch of promi s e to ma rry ? Held:

Mora l Damages are recoverable for breach of promise to marry. In the light of the clear and manifest i ntent of our la w ma ki ng body not to s anction actions for breach of promi s e to ma rry, the a wa rd of mora l da ma ges ma de by the l ower courts i s , a ccordingly, untenable. Moreover, i t appearing that because of defendant-appellant's s educti on power, pl a i nti ff-a ppel l ee, overwhelmed by her l ove for him finally yi elded to his s exual desires i n spite of her a ge a nd s el f -control , s he bei ng a woma n a fter a ll, we hold that said defendant-appellant is l iable for s eduction and, therefore, moral dama ges ma y be recovered from hi m under the provi s i on of Arti cl e 2219, pa ra gra ph 3, of the new Ci vi l Code. Apa rt from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, pa rticularly the paragraphs preceding and thos e fol l owi ng the one ci ted by the Court of Appeals, a nd the language used in said paragraph s trongl y i ndi ca tes tha t the "s educti on" therei n contemplated i s the crime punis hed a s s uch i n Arti cl e a s s uch i n Arti cl e 337 a nd 338 of the Revi s ed Pena l Code, whi ch a dmittedly does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say tha t petitioner is morally guilty of seducti on , not onl y because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who around thirty-six (36) yea rs of a ge, a nd a s highly enlightened a s a former high s chool teacher a nd a life i ns ura nce a gent a re s uppos ed to be when s he beca me i nti mate with petitioner, then a mere a pprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first i nstance found tha t, compl a i na nt "s urrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her l ove" for him, s he "wa nted to bi nd" "by ha vi ng a frui t of thei r enga gement even before they ha d the benefi t of cl ergy."

Shookat vs. C.A. (G.R. No. 97336 - February 19, 1933) Facts: On 27 October 1987, pri va te respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for da mages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their a greement to get married. She alleges i n said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character a nd reputation duly respected in her community; peti tioner, on the other hand, is a n Iranian citizen residing a t the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan Ci ty, a nd is an exchange student ta ki ng a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted a nd proposed to ma rry her; s he a ccepted his love on the condition that they would get married. They therefore agreed to get married a fter the end of the school semester, which was i n October of that year; petitioner then vi s i ted the private respondent's parents in Baaga, Bugallon, Pa ngasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; s ometim e in August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; s he was a vi rgin before s he began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's a ttitude towards her started to change; he maltreated a nd thre atened to kill her; as a res ult of such maltreatment, s he s ustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the Barangay Ca ptain of Guilig a day

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before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore a nd; the peti tioner i s already ma rried to s omeone livi ng i n Bacolod Ci ty. Pri va te respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the peti ti oner to pa y her da ma ges i n the a mount of not l es s tha n P45,000.00, rei mbursement for a ctual expenses amounting to P600.00, a ttorney's fees and costs, a nd gra nting her such other rel i ef a nd remedi es a s ma y be jus t a nd equi ta bl e. In hi s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner a dmi tted onl y the pers ona l ci rcums ta nces of the pa rti es a s a verre d i n the compl aint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or i nformation s uffi ci ent to form a bel i ef a s t o the truth thereof or because the true facts are those a lleged as his Special and Affirmative Defens es . He thus cl a i med t ha t he never propos ed ma rri age to or a greed to be married with the private respondent; he neither s ought the consent and approval of her pa rents no r forced her to l i ve i n his a partment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place becaus e he di s covered tha t s he ha d deceived him by s tealing his money a nd passport; a nd fi nally, no confrontation took place wi th a representative of the barang ay ca pta i n. Ins i s ti ng, i n hi s Countercl a i m, tha t the compl a i nt i s ba s el es s a nd unfounded a nd th a t a s a res ul t thereof. He was unnecessa rily dra gged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a bes mi rched reputa ti on , he p ra yed fo r a n a wa rd o f P5,000.00 fo r mi s cell a neous expens es a nd P25,000.00 a s mo ra l da ma ges . Issue: Whether or not Arti cle 21 of the Ci vil Code applies to the case a t bar? Held:

Yes, s uch provision applies i n the case a t bar. In the l ight of the a bove laudable purpose of Arti cle 21, We a re of the opinion, and s o hol d, tha t where a ma n's promi s e to ma rry i s i n fact the proximate ca use of the a cceptance of his love by a woman and his repres enta ti on to ful fi l l tha t promi s e thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him i n a s exual congress, proof that he had, in rea l i ty, no i ntention of ma rrying her a nd that the promise was only a s ubtle s cheme or deceptive devi ce to entice or i nveigle her to a cce pt hi m a nd to obtain her consent to the sexual a ct, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of s uc h promi se to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behi nd i t a nd the wi l l ful i njury to her honor a nd reputa ti on whi ch fol l owed thereafter. It is essential, however, that s uch i njury s hould have been committed i n a manner contrary to morals, good cus toms or publ i c pol i cy. In the i nstant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of l ove for a nd promi se to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her vi rtue a nd womanhood to him a nd to l ive with him on the hones t a nd s i ncere belief that he would keep s aid promise, a nd i t was l ikewise these fraud and deception on a ppel l a nt's pa rt tha t ma de pl a intiff's parents a gree to their daughter's livi ng-in with him preparatory to their s upposed ma rri a ge." In s hort, the pri va te res pondent s urrendered her vi rginity, the cherished possession of every s ingle Filipina, not because of l ust but because of moral s eduction the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in i ts example earlier a dverted to. The petiti oner coul d n ot be hel d l i able for cri minal seduction punished under either Arti cle 337 or Arti cl e 338 of the Revis ed Pena l Code beca us e the pri va te res pondent wa s a bove ei ghteen (18) yea rs of a ge a t the ti me of the s educti on. Malicious Prosecution

3.

Ponce vs. Legaspi (G.R. No. 79184 - May 1992 - 208 SCRA 337) Facts: The ca se s temmed from the filing before the SC of a complaint for disbarmentagainst respondent Atty. Va l enti no Lega s pi by peti tioner Erl inda Ponce. At the time of the filing of the disbarment proceedings, Ponce owned forty threepercent of the stockholdings of L'NOR Ma ri ne Services (L'NOR). She was thenTreasurer and director of the Board of Directors of L'NOR while her husband wasa d i rector. Forty ei ght percent of L'NOR's s tocks was owned by the spousesEdward a nd Norma Porter who were then servi ng as President/Genera l Ma na gera nd Secreta ry res pecti vel y. Duri ng the time respondent is the legal counsel of the corporation, there occurredcertain fraudulent ma nipulations by certa i n offi cers of s a i d corpora ti on, Porter et a l . Edwa rd J. Porter a nd Norma Y. Porter, together with Zenaida T. Ma naloto,facilitated, assisted and aided by herein res pondent Lega spi i ncorporated theYrasport Drydocks, Inc., hereinafter designated YRASPORT, which they controlthat di rectl y co mpetes wi th the bus iness of LNOR. That respondent Legaspi ha s commi tted gros s mi s conduct i n offi ce a s a pra cti ci ng l a wyer a nd member of the Phi l ippine Bar, because, a s legal counsel, he vi olated hisduty to a nd the trust of his client, L'NOR when he assisted the Porter s pous es i n i ncorpora ti ng s a i d corpora ti on. Thi s is now an a ction to recover a gainst Ponce commenced by Legaspi, alleging the disbarment proceedings a re malicious a nd unfounded

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Issue: Whether or not the a ction by Ponce is malicious and would entitle Atty. Legaspi damages? Held: No, Ponce i s not ma l i ci ous tha t woul d enti tl e Atty. Lea ga s pi da ma ges . For the ma licious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the fact of the prosecution a nd the further fa ct tha t the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action finally terminated wi th a n a cqui tta l ; (2) tha t i n bri ngi ng the a cti on, the prosecutor a cted without probable cause; a nd (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or i mpelled by l egal malice, that i s by i mproper or s i ni s ter moti ve. The foregoing requisites a re necessary s afeguards to preserve a person's ri ght to litigate which may otherwise be emascul a ted by the undue fi l i ng of ma l i ci ous pros ecuti on ca s es The petitioner, a t the time of her filing of the a dministrative complaint against the respondent, held substantial stockholdings in L'NOR. She believed that L'NOR was defrauded by i ts President/General Ma nager, Edwa rd Porter, a nd fi l ed a compl a i nt for es tafa against the latter. Porter was convicted by the tria l cou rt but, upon a ppea l , wa s a cqui tted by the a ppel l a te court. Appa rently, at that ti me, petitioner Ponce saw a conflict of interest situation. True, a t that time, the Corpora ti on La w di d not prohi bit a director or a ny other person occupying a fiduciary position i n the corporate hiera rchy from enga gi ng i n a venture whi ch competed with that of the corporation. But as a lawyer, Atty. Legaspi s houl d ha ve known tha t whi l e s ome a cts ma y a ppear to be permitted through sheer lack of s tatutory prohibition, these acts are nevertheless ci rcumscribed upon ethical and mora l cons i dera ti ons . Unjust Enrichment Every pers on who through a n act of performance by a nother, or a ny other means, a cquires or comes i nto pos s es s i on of s omething at the expense of the latter without just or l egal ground, shall return the s ame to hi m. (Art. 22, New Civil Code) Even when a n a ct or event ca using damage to a nother's property wa s not due to the fa ult or negligence of the defendant, the l a tter shall be liable for i ndemnity i f through the act or event he was benefited. (Art. 23, New Civil Code) El ements: a . Enri chment of or benefit to respondent b. Los s or damage to plaintiff c. No mora l or l egal ca use for enrichment or benefit d. Enri chment of respondent is due to loss of plaintiff

4.

Pecson vs. C.A. (G.R. No. 115814 - May 26, 1998 - 244 SCRA 407) Facts: Pecs on was a n owner of a commercial l ot with a four-door two-storey a partment building. For his failure to pay realty ta xes, the l ot wa s sold at a public action. It was bought by a certain Nepomuceno who i n turn sold i t to private respondents Spouses Nuguid. Pecson cha l lenged the sale but the tri al court upheld such, excluding the apartment building. The Court of Appeals a ffirmed such dec ision, saying tha t there was no proof that the building was i ncluded in the sale. Spouses Nuguid then filed for del i very of pos s es s i on of the l ot a nd bui lding. Both tri al court and CA found Pecson to be a builder in good faith, a nd that Nuguid should compensate him P53,000 f or the cos t of the bui l di ng when he cons tructed i t i n 1965. Issue: Whether or not the basis for indemnity was correct? Held:

No, the computa ti on of i ndemni ty s houl d be ba s ed on the current ma rket va l ue of the a pa rtment bui l di ng. Technically, Pecson could not be a builder in good faith as contemplated in the relevant provisions of the civil code for he bui l t the bui l di ng when he wa s s ti l l the va l i d owner of the l ot. However, s uch provi s i ons ma y be a ppl i ed i n a na l ogy. The res pondent court and the private respondents espouse the belief that the cost of construction of the a partment building in 1965, a nd not its current market va lue, i s sufficient reimburs ement for neces s a ry a nd us eful i mprovements ma de by the peti tioner. This position is, however, not i n consonance with previ ous rulings of this Court i n s i mi l a r ca s es . The objecti ve of Arti cl e 546 of the Ci vil Code is to a dminister justice between the parties involved. The said provision was formulated i n tryi ng to a djust the ri ghts of the owner a nd possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to administer complete justice to both of them i n s uch a way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him. Guided by this precept, i t i s therefore the current ma rket va l ue of the i mprovements whi ch s houl d be ma de the ba s i s of rei m burs ement.

45
Security Bank and Trust Company vs. C.A. (G.R. No. 117009 - October 11, 1995) Facts: Pri va te respondent Ys mael C. Ferrer was contracted by herein petitioners Security Ba nk and Trust Company (SBTC) a nd Ros i to C. Ma nhi t to construct the building of SBTC in Davao Ci ty for the price of P1,760,000.00. The contract provided tha t Ferrer woul d fi ni s h the construction i n two hundred (200) working days. Respondent Ferrer was a ble to complete the construction of the building w ithin the contra cted period but he was compel l ed by a dra s ti c i ncrea s e i n the cos t of cons tructi on ma teri a l s to i ncur expens es of a bout P300,000.00 on top of the original cost. The a dditional expens es were ma de known to peti ti oner SBTC thru i ts Vi ce -Pres i dent Fel y Sebastian a nd Supervising Architect Rudy de la Rama as early a s Ma rch 1980. Respondent Ferrer made timely dema nds for pa yment of the i ncreased cost. Said demands were supported by receipts, i nvoices, payrolls a nd other documents proving the additiona l ex pens es . SBTC thru As s istant Vi ce-President Susan Guanio and a representa ti ve of a n a rchi tectura l fi rm cons ul ted by SBTC, veri fi ed Ferrer's cl aims for a dditional cost. A recommendation was then made to settle Ferrer's claim but onl y for P200,000.00.SBTC, i ns tea d of pa yi ng the recommended additional a mount, denied ever authorizing payment of any a mount beyond the origi na l contra ct pri ce. SBTC l i kewise denied a ny l iability for the a dditional cost based on Arti cle IX of the building contract whi ch s ta tes : If a t a ny ti me pri or to the compl etion of the work to be performed hereunder, increase i n prices of construction materials and/or labor s hall s upervene t hrough no fa ult on the part of the contractor whatsoever or a ny act of the government and its instrumentalities which directly or i ndi rectl y a ffects the i ncrease of the cost of the project, OWNER shall equitably make the appropriate a djustment on mutual agreement of both pa rti es . Ys ma el C. Ferrer then filed a complaint for breach of contract wi th damages. Issue: Whether or not Ysmael Ferrer s hould be reimbursed for i ts additional expenses i ncurred during the construction of the bui lding? Held:

Ys ma el s houl d be rei mburs ed for i ts a ddi ti ona l expens es . Art. 22. Every pers on who through an act of performance by a nother, or a ny other means, a cquires or comes into possession of s omething at the expense of the latter without just or l egal ground, shall return the s ame to him. The a bove -quoted a rti cl e i s pa rt of the chapter of the Ci vil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which were formulated a s "ba s i c pri nci pl es to be obs erved for the ri ghtful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order, . . .des i gned to i ndi c a te certa i n norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience,.. guides for human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through s ociety to the end that l aw may a pproach i ts supreme i deal which is the s way a nd dominance of justice." In the present ca s e, petitioners' a rguments to s upport a bsence of liability for the cost of construction beyond the origi na l contra ct pri ce a re not pers uasive. Hence, to allow petitioner bank to acquire the constructed building at a price far below its actua l cons truct i on cos t would undoubtedly constitute unjus t enri chment for the ba nk to the prejudi ce o f pri va te res pondent. Such unjus t enri chment, a s previ ous l y di s cus s ed, i s not a l l owed by l a w. Judicial Vigilance In a ll contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvanta ge on a ccount of hi s mora l dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender a ge or other handicap, the courts must be vi gilant for his protecti on. (Art. 24, New Civil Code)

5.

Clarita Cruz vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 98273 - October 28, 1991) Facts: Cl a ri ta V. Cruz went a broad pursuant to a n employment co ntract that s he hoped would i mprove her future. Al though a hi gh s chool gra duate, s he agreed to work as a domestic helper i n Kuwait. After her two -year contract, she ca me ba ck hi ghl y a ggri eved a nd fi l ed a complaint against EMS Ma npower and Placement Services (Phil.) and its foreign principal, for underpayment of her s alary a nd nonpa yment of her va cation l eave. She alleged that her foreign employer treated her a s a slave a nd required her to work 18 hours a day. She wa s beaten up a nd s uffered facial deformity, head tra uma and decreased sensation i n the ri ght portion of her body a nd wa s pa i d onl y $120 per month and her total salaries were given to her only three hours before her flight back to Ma nila. This was a fter the pl a ne s he wa s supposed to take had left and she had to stay i n the airport for 24 hours before her employer finally heard her plea s a nd del i vered her pa ssport a nd ticket to her. In its a nswer a nd position paper, the private respondent ra ised the pri nci pa l defens e of s ett l ement a s evi denced by a n Affidavit of Desistance, by vi rtue of which, POEA dismissed her claim, and such was upheld by NLRC. Peti tioner fa ults the POEA a nd the NLRC wi th gra ve a bus e of di s creti on for ha vi ng uphel d the Affi da vi t of Des i s ta nce. Cruz rejects the s ettlement as having been obtained from her under duress a nd false pretenses. Her contention i s that s he wa s i nveigled into signing the Affidavit of Desistance without the assistance of counsel. The "Attorney" Alvarado who a s s i s ted he r wa s not rea lly a l awyer but only a helper i n the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration. Atty. Bi olena, on the other hand, merely a cknowledged

46
the document. Moreover, when s he signed the a ffidavit, s he was under the i mpression when she was agreeing to settle only her claim for one month unpaid va cation l eave, as the wording of the receipt she i ssued on the same date showed. Pri vate respondent argues that the peti ti oner i s bound by her Affi da vi t of Des i s ta nce. Issue: Whether or not petitioner ca n s till collect from her a gency despite of the affidavit of desistance? Held:

Yes, s he ca n col l ect from her a gency des pi te of the a ffi da vi t of des i s ta nce. Hi s decision demonstrates once again the tenderness of the Court toward the worker subjected to the l awless exploitation a nd i mpositions of his employer. The protection of our overseas workers is especially necessary because of the inconveniences a nd even ri sks they have to undergo in their quest for a better life in a forei gn l a nd a wa y from thei r l oved ones a nd thei r own government. The domestic helper is particularly susceptible to abuse because s he usually works only by herself in a private household unlike other workers employed i n a n open business concern who are able to share and discuss their problems and bear or s olve them together. The domestic helper is denied that comfort. She has no companions in her misery. She usually broods alone. There i s no one to turn to for help. That is why we must ca refully l isten to her when she is finally a ble to compl a i n a ga i ns t thos e wh o woul d rob her of her jus t rewa rds a nd even of her di gni ty a s a huma n bei ng. Thoughtless Extravagance Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of acute public want or emergency ma y be s topped by order of the courts a t the instance of any government or private charitabl e i ns ti tuti on. (Art. 25, New Civil Code) Disrespect for Person Every pers on s hall respect the dignity, personality, priva cy a nd peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The fol l owing a nd similar a cts, though they ma y not co nstitute a cri minal offens e, s ha l l produce a ca us e of a cti on for da ma ges , preventi on a nd other rel i ef: (1) Pryi ng i nto the pri va cy of a nother's res i dence: (2) Meddl i ng wi th or di s turbi ng the pri va te l i fe or fa mi l y rel a ti ons of a nother; (3) Intri gui ng to ca us e a nother to be a l i ena ted from hi s fri ends ; (4) Vexi ng or humiliating another on account of his religious beli efs , l owl y s ta ti on i n l i fe, pl a ce of bi rth, phys i ca l defect, or other pers ona l condi ti on. (Art. 26, New Civil Code) Dereliction of Duty Any pers on s uffering material or moral l oss because a public serva nt or employee refus es or negl ects , wi thout jus t ca us e, to perform his official duty ma y file an action for damages and other relief against he latter, wi thout prejudi ce to a ny di s ci pl i na ry a dmi ni s tra ti ve a cti on tha t ma y be ta ken. (Art. 27, New Civil Code) Phimco vs. City of Cebu (G.R. No. L-30745 - January 18, 1978)

6.

7.

8.

Facts: Ordi nance No. 279 of Cebu Ci ty is "a n ordinance imposing a quarterly ta x on gros s s a l es or recei pts of mercha nts , dea l ers , i mporters a nd manufacturers of a ny commodity doing business" i n Cebu City. It i mposes a s a l es ta x of one percent (1%) on the gros s s a les, receipts or value of commodities sold, bartered, exchanged or manufactured i n the ci ty i n excess of P2, 000 a quarter. Secti on 9 of the ordi nance provides that, for purposes of the tax, "all deliveries of goods or commodities stored in the Ci ty of Cebu, or if not s tored are s ol d" i n tha t ci ty, "s ha l l be cons i dered a s s a l es " i n the ci ty a nd s ha l l be ta xa bl e. Thus , i t would seem that under the ta x ordinance sales of matches consummated outside of the city a re ta xable as l ong a s the ma tches s old a re taken from the company's s tock stored in Cebu Ci ty. The Philippine Ma tch Co., Ltd., whose principal office is i n Ma ni l a , i s engaged in the manufacture of matches. Its factory i s located at Punta, Sta. Ana, Ma nil a . It s hi ps ca s es or ca rtons of ma tches from Ma ni la to its branch office in Cebu Ci ty for s torage, sale and distribution within the territories a nd districts under i ts Cebu bra nch or the whol e Visayas-Mindanao region. Cebu Ci ty i ts el f i s jus t one of the el even di s tri cts under the compa ny's Cebu Ci ty bra nch offi ce. The company does not question the ta x on the matches of matches consummated i n Cebu Ci ty, mea ni ng ma tches s ol d a n d del ivered within the ci ty. It assails the legality of the ta x which the city treasurer collected on out-of- town deliveries of ma tches , to wi t: (1) s a les of matches booked a nd paid for in Cebu City but s hipped directly to cus tomers outside of the ci ty; (2) tra ns fers of ma tches to news men a ssigned to different agencies outside of the city a nd (3) shipments of matches to provincial customers pursuant to salesmen's i ns tructions. The company paid under protest to the city t the s um of P12, 844.61 a s one perce nt sales ta x on those three classes of outof-town del i veri es of ma tches for the s econd qua rter of 1961 to the s econd qua rter of 1963.

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The company i n i ts letter of April 15, 1961 to the ci ty treasurer s ought the refund of the sales ta x paid for out-of-town deliveries of ma tches. It invoked Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. vs . Municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, 105 Phi l. 1263. In that case sal es of oi l and petroleum products effected outside the territorial limit of Si pocot, were hel d not to be s ubject to the ta x i mpos ed by a n ordi na nce of tha t muni ci pa l i ty. The ci ty treasurer denied the request. His s tand is that under section 9 of the ordinance all out-of-town del i veri es of l a tches s tored in the ci ty a re subject to the sales tax i mposed by the ordi na nce. The compa ny fi l ed the compl a i nt herei n, pra yi ng tha t the ordi nance be declared void insofar as i t taxed the deliveries of matches outside of Cebu Ci ty, tha t the ci ty be ordered to re fund to the compa ny s a i d s um of P12,844.61 a s exces s s a l es ta x pa i d, a nd tha t the ci ty trea s urer be ordered to pa y da ma ges . Issue: Whether or not the ci ty trea s urer i s l i a bl e for exempl a ry da ma ges a nd a ttorneys fees ? Company: The cl aim for damages is predicated on articles 19, 20, 21, 27 a nd 2229 of the Ci vil Code . It i s a rgued tha t the ci ty trea s urer refus ed a nd neglected without just cause to perform his duty a nd to a ct with justice and good faith. The company fa ults the c ity treasurer for not fol lowing the opinion of the ci ty fiscals, as l egal adviser of the ci ty that all out-of-town deliveri es of ma tches a re not s ubject to s a l es ta x beca us e s uch tra ns a cti ons were effected outs i de of the ci ty's terri tori a l l i mi ts . City treasurer: tha t i n enforcing the tax ordinance i n question he was simply complying with his duty a s collector of taxes (Sec. 50, Revised Cha rter of Cebu Ci ty). Moreover, he had no choice but to enforce the ordinance because a ccording to section 357 of the Revise d Manua l of Ins truction to Treasurer's "a ta x ordinance win be enforced in a ccordance with i ts provisions" unti l d i l l ega l or voi d by a competent court, or otherwi s e revoked by the counci l or boa rd from whi ch i t ori gi na ted. Held:

No. Arti cl e 27 of the Ci vil Code provi des that "a ny person suffering material or moral lose becaus e a publ i c s erva nt or empl oyee refus es or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty ma y file a n action for damages a nd other reli ef a ga i ns t the l a tter, without prejudice to a ny disciplinary a dministrative a ction that may be taken." Article 27 presupposes that the refus e or omi ssion of a public official is a ttributable to malice or i nexcusable negl i gence. In thi s ca s e, i t ca nnot be s a i d tha t the c i ty trea s urer a cted wilfully or wa s grossly t i n not refunding to the plaintiff the ta xes which i t pai d under protes t on out-of-town s a l es of ma tches . The record clearly reveals that the city treasurer honestly believed that he was justified under section 9 of the ta x ordinan ce i n col l ecting the sales ta x on out-of- town deliveries, considering that the company's branch office was l oca ted i n Cebu Ci ty a nd tha t a ll out-of-town purchase order for matches were filled up by the branch offi ce a nd the s a l es were dul y reported to i t. The ci ty treasurer a cted within the s cope of his authori ty a nd i n cons ona nce wi th hi s bon a fi de i nterpreta ti on of the ta x ordi nance. The fact that his a ction was not completely s ustained by the courts would not him l iable for. We have upheld his a ct of ta xi ng s a l es of ma tches booked a nd pa i d for i n the ci ty. It ha s been held that a n erroneous i nterpretation of a n ordinance does not consti tute nor does i t a mount to ba d fa i th tha t woul d entitle an aggrieved party to a n a wa rd for da ma ges . Tha t s a l uta ry i n a ddi ti on to mora l tempera te, l i qui da ted or compensatory da mages (Art. 2229, Ci vi l Code). Attorney's fees are being claimed herei n a s a ctua l da ma ges . We fi nd tha t i t woul d not be just a nd equitable to a ward attorney's fees in this case a gainst the Ci ty of Cebu and its (See Art. 2208, Ci vi l Code). Unfair Competition Unfa ir competition in a gri cul tura l , commerci a l or i ndus tri a l enterpri s es or i n l a bor through the us e of force, i nti midation, deceit, ma chination or a ny other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall gi ve ri s e to a ri ght of a cti on by the pers on who thereby s uffers da ma ge. (Art 28m New Civil Code)

9.

10. Violation of Civil and Political Rights Any publ ic officer or employee, or any private i ndividual, who directly or i ndirectly obstructs, defeats, vi olates or i n a ny ma nner i mpedes or impairs any of the following ri ghts and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for da mages: (1) Freedom of rel i gi on; (2) Freedom of s peech; (3) Freedom to wri te for the pres s or to ma i nta i n a peri odi ca l publ i ca ti on;

48
(4) Freedom from a rbi tra ry or i l l ega l detenti on; (5) Freedom of s uffra ge; (6) The ri ght a ga i ns t depri va ti on of property wi thout due proces s of l a w; (7) The ri ght to a jus t compens a ti on when pri va te property i s ta ken for publ i c us e; (8) The ri ght to the equa l protecti on of the l a ws ; (9) The ri ght to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable s ea rches a nd s ei zures ; (10) The l i berty of a bode a nd of cha ngi ng the s a me; (11) The pri va cy of communi ca ti on a nd corres pondence; (12) The ri ght to become a member of a s s oci a ti ons or s oci eti es for purpo s es not contra ry to l a w; (13) The ri ght to ta ke pa rt i n a pea cea bl e a s s embl y to peti ti on the government for redres s of gri eva nces ; (14) The ri ght to be free from i nvol unta ry s ervi tude i n a ny form; (15) The ri ght of the a ccus ed a ga i ns t exces s i ve ba i l ; (16) The ri ght of the a ccused to be heard by himself a nd counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the a ccusation a gainst him, to have a s peedy a nd publ i c tri a l , to meet the wi tnes s es fa ce to fa ce, a nd to ha ve compul s ory proces s to s ecure the a tten da nce of wi tnes s i n hi s beha l f; (17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's s elf, or from being forced to confess gui l t, or from bei ng induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confes s i on, except when the pers on confes s i n g becomes a Sta te wi tnes s ; (18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel a nd unusual punishment, unl es s the s a me i s i mpos ed or i nfl i cted i n a ccorda nce wi th a s ta tute whi ch ha s not been judi ci a l l y decl a red uncons ti tuti ona l ; a nd (19) Freedom of a cces s to the courts . In a ny of the ca ses referred to i n this article, whether or not the defendant's a ct or omissi on cons ti tutes a cri mi na l offense, the aggrieved party has a ri ght to commence an entirely s eparate and distinct civil a ction for da ma ges , a nd for othe r rel i ef. Such ci vil action shall proceed independently of any cri minal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and ma t be pr oved by a prepondera nce of evi dence. The i ndemni ty s ha l l i ncl ude mora l da ma ges . Exempl a ry da ma ges ma y a l s o be a djudi ca ted. The res ponsibility herein s et forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a vi olation of the Pena l Code or other pena l s ta tute. (Aty. 32, New Civil Code) Lim vs. Ponce De Leon (G.R. No. L-22554 - August 29, 1975) Facts: Pl a intiff-appellant Ji kil Taha s old to a certain Ti mbangcaya of Palawan a motor l aunch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A yea r l a ter Ti mbangcaya filed a complaint wi th the Office of the Provi ncial Fiscal of Palawan a lleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forci bl y took a wa y the motor l aunch from him. After conducting a preliminary i nvestigation, Fiscal Ponce de Leon in his ca pacity as Acti ng Provincial Fiscal of Pa l awan, filed with the CFI of Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon Pe rsons a gainst Ji ki l

49
Ta ha . Fiscal Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor l aunch was i n Balabac, Pala wa n, wrote the Provi nci a l Comma nder of Pa l awa n reques ti ng hi m to di rect the deta chment comma nder-i n Ba l a ba c to i mpound a nd ta ke cus tody of the motor l a unch. Fi s cal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provi ncial Commander to i mpound the motor l a unch, expl a i ni ng tha t i ts s ubsequent sale to a third party, pl aintiff-appellant Li m, ca nnot prevent the court from taking custody of the same. So, upon order of the Provi nci al Commander, defendant-appellee Ma ddela, s eized the motor l aunch "SAN RAFAEL" from pl a i nti ff-a ppel l a nt Del fi n Li m a nd i mpounded i t. Plaintiff-appellant Lim pleaded with Ma ddela to return the motor launch but the latter refused. Li kewise, Jikil Ta ha through hi s counsel made representations wi th Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the seized property to plaintiff-appellant Li m but Fi s ca l Ponce de Leon refus ed, on the ground tha t the s a me wa s the s ubject of a cri mi na l offens e. Al l efforts to recover the motor launch going to naught, plaintiffs-appellants Li m a nd Ji kil Tahafiled wi th the CFI of Pa l a wa n a compl aint for damages a gainst defendants-appellees Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon and Ma ddela, alleging that on Ma ddela entered the premi ses of Lim without a search warrant and then a nd there took a wa y the hul l of the motor l a unch wi thout hi s cons ent; tha t he effected the seizure upon order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew well that his office was not vested with a uthority to order the s ei zure of a pri va te property Issue: Whether or not defendants a re civilly l iable to plaintiffs for damages allegedly s uffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor l a unch wa s unl a wful ? Held:

Ponce is liable under Art. 32 of the New Civil Code while defendance Madela cannot be held liable. As to whether or not they a re entitled to damages, plaintiffs-appellants a nchor their claim for damages on Arti cles 32 a nd 2219 of the New Ci vil Code which provide i n pa rt a s fol l ows : ART. 32. Any publ i c offi cer or empl oyee, or a ny pri va te i ndividual, who directly or i ndirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or i n any manner impedes or i mpairs a ny of the fol l owi ng ri ghts and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages, (9) The ri ghts to be secure in one's pers on, hous e, pa pers , a nd effects a ga i ns t unrea s ona bl e s ea rches a nd s ei zures . Purs uant to the foregoing provision, a person whose constitutional ri ghts have been vi ol a ted or i mpa i red i s enti tl ed to a ctua l and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefore. In a ddition, exemplary damages may a l so be awarded. In the i nstant case, plaintiff-appellant Li m cl aimed that he purchased the motor launch from Jikil Taha i n cons ideration of P3,000.00, ha ving given P2,000.00 a s a dvanced payment; that si nce i ts s ei zure, the motor l a unch ha d been moored at Balabac Bay a nd because of exposure to the elements it has become worthless a t the time of the fili ng of the present a ction; that because of the illegality of the seizure of the motor l aunch, he suffered moral da ma ges a nd tha t beca use of the vi olation of their constitutional rights they were constrained to engage the services of a lawyer whom they ha ve pa i d for a ttorney's fees . Defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon wanted to wash his hands of the i ncident by claiming that "he was in good fa i th, wi thout malice and without the slightest intention of inflicting injury to plaintiff-appellant, Jikil Taha" when he ordered the s eizure of the motor l aunch. We a re not prepared to sustain his defense of good faith. To be l iable under Arti cl e 32 of the New Ci vi l Code it is enough that there was a vi olation of the constitutional ri ghts of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defenda nts s houl d ha ve a cted wi th ma l i ce or ba d fa i th. The very na ture of Article 32 i s that the wrong may be ci vil or cri minal. It is not necessary therefore tha t there s houl d be ma l ice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Arti cle 32 which is the effective protection of i ndividual ri ghts. Public officials in the past have a bused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good fa i th i n the performa nce of thei r duti es . But defendant-appellee Orlando Ma ddela cannot be held a ccountable because he impounded the motor l aunch upon the order of his s uperior officer. While a subordinate officer may be held liable for executing unlawful orders of hi s s uperi or offi cer, there are certain ci rcumstances which would warrant Maddela's exculpation from liability. The records s how tha t a fter Fiscal Ponce de Leon made his first request to the Provi ncial Commander on June 15, 1962 Ma ddela was relucta nt to i mpound the motor l a unch des pi te repea ted orders from hi s s uperi or offi cer. Peti ti on gra nted. Deci s i on of Regi ona l Tri a l Court Revi ved a nd a ff i rmed. MHP Garments vs. C.A (G.R. No. 117009 - October 11, 1995)

Facts: MHP Ga rments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the exclusive franchise to s ell a nd distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, s upplies, badges, a nd i nsignias. In their Memorandum Agreement, petitioner corpora ti on wa s gi ven the a uthori ty to "undertake or ca use to be undertaken the prosecution i n court of a ll i llegal s ources of s cout uniforms a nd other s couti ng s uppl i es ." MHP recei ved i nformation that private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz, Mi rasol Lugatiman, a nd Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts i tems a nd paraphernalia without any a uthority. Petitioner de Guzman, a n employee of petitioner corporation, was tasked to underta ke the neces s a ry s urvei l l a nce a nd to ma ke a report to the Phi l i ppi ne Cons ta bul a ry (PC).

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De Guzman, Ca ptain Renato M. Peafiel, a nd two (2) other constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion, Sikatuna Vil l a ge, Di l iman, Quezon Ci ty went to the stores of respondents at the Ma rikina Public Ma rket. Without any warrant, they s eized the boy a nd gi rl s couts pants, dresses, a nd s uits on display a t respondents' s talls. The seizure ca used a commotion a nd embarrassed private respondents . Receipts were issued for the seized i tems. The items were then turned over by Ca ptain Peafiel to petitioner-corporation for safekeeping. Issue: Whether or not De Guzman, Ca ptain Penafiel a nd the constabulary men are liable for damages beca us e of thei r wa rra ntl es s s ea rch a nd s ei zure?

Held: Yes. They a re l i a bl e. Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or a ny priva te indivi dual, who directly or i ndirectly obstructs, defeats, vi olates o r i n a ny ma nner i mpedes or i mpairs a ny of the following ri ghts and liberties of a nother person shall be liable to the latter for damages . (9) The ri ghts to be secure in one's pers on, hous e, pa pers , a nd effects a ga i ns t unrea s ona bl e s ea rches a nd s ei zures . The i ndemni ty s ha l l i ncl ude mora l da ma ges . Exempl a ry da ma ges ma y a l s o be a djudged. The very na ture of Article 32 i s that the wrong may be ci vil or cri minal. It is not necessary therefore that there s hould be malice or ba d faith. To make s uch a requisite woul d defea t the ma i n purpos e of Arti cl e 32 whi ch i s the effecti ve protecti on of i ndividual ri ghts. Public officials i n the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good fa i th i n the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official a buse by pl ea of the good fa i t h. In the Uni ted Sta tes thi s remedy i s i n the na tu re of a tort.

11. Interference in Contractual Relations El ements: a . Contra ct b. Knowl edge of the contract c. Inducement d. Brea ch of the contract e. Da mage to the other party Daywalt vs. Recoletos (G.R. L-13505 - Feb. 4, 1919 - 39 Phil 587) Facts: In 1902, pl a intiff a nd Teodorica Endencia entered into a contract for the conveyance of a tra ct of l a nd owned by the l a tter to the former; the deed s hould be executed a s soon as the ti tl e to the l a nd s houl d be perfected by proceedi ngs i n the Court of La nd Regi stration and a Torrens certificate should be produced in the name of Endencia. In 1906, a decree i n favor of Endenci a wa s entered but no Torrens ti tle was issued. Upon entry of the decree, Daywalt and Endencia entered into another contract wi th a vi ew to ca rry out the ori ginal agreement into effect. The 2nd contract was not executed since no Torrens ti tle was i ssued until the period for performa nce contemplated i n the contract expired. In 1908, a 3rd a greement was entered i nto: that upon receiving the Torrens title, Endencia wa s to del iver the s ame to the Hongkong a nd Shanghai Bank i n Ma nila, to be forwarded to the Crocker National Bank in San Francisco, where i t wa s to be del i vered to the pl a i nti ff upon pa yment of a ba l a nce of P3,100. In the course of the proceedings for the issuance of the Torrens title, i t was found that the boundaries i nclos ed were 1,248 ha i ns tead of 452 ha s tated in the contract. As s uch, after the issuance of the Torrens ti tle, Endenci a wa s rel ucta nt to convey the ti tl e to Da ywa lt, contending that s he did not i ntend to tra nsfer a s big a property a s that contained i n the ti tle a nd that s he was misinformed of its a rea . Daywalt filed a n action against Endencia for s pecific performance. On appeal before the SC, Da ywalt obtained a favorable decis i on, however, no da ma ges wa s s ought or a wa rded i n the ca s e a ga i ns t Endenci a . Da ywa l t fi l ed a n a cti on a ga i ns t res pondent for i nterference i n contra ctua l rel a ti ons ba s ed on the ff. ba ckground: Res pondent was the original owner of the property a nd owned a na dja cent tra ct of l a nd ma na ged by Fr. Sa nz, a member of the Order. Fr. Sa nz wa s well a cquainted with Endencia and exerted over her a n influence and ascendency due to hi s rel i gi ous cha ra cter as well as to the personal friendship which existed between them. Teodorica appears to be a woman of little personal force. Fr. Sa nz wa s ful l y a wa re of the contra cts wi th Endenci a a nd wi th i ts devel opments . Between 1909 a nd 1914, l a rge number of ca ttl e of res pondent wa s pa s tured i n the s ubject property.

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When the Torrens title was issued, it was delivered to respondent for s afekeeping and only turned i t over upon order of the SC i n 1914. Issue: Held: Whether or not peti ti oner i s enti tl ed to P24,000 a s compens a ti on for pa s turi ng ca ttl e from 1909 to 1913? Whether or not res pondent i s l i a bl e for i nterference i n contra ctua l rel a ti ons ?

No. It i s i mprobable to pasture 1,000 ca ttl e in 1,248 ha of wild Mi ndoro l and. There is no reason to suppos e tha t the va l ue of the property wa s more (40 per head monthly) before the petitioner obtained posses s i on of i t a nd from whi ch res pondent rented i t a t 50 per hecta re a nnua l l y. No. Defendants believed in good faith that the contract could not be enforced and that Teodorica would be wronged if it should be ca rri ed i nto effect. Any a dvice or assistance which they ma y have gi ven wa s prompted by no mea n or i mproper moti ve. Teodorica would have surrendered the documents of ti tl e a nd gi ven pos s es s i on of the l a nd but for the i nfl uence a nd promptings of members of the defendant-corporation. But the idea that they were i n any degree i nfl uenced to the gi vi ng of s uch a dvice by the desire to s ecure to themselves the paltry pri vilege of grazing their cattle upon the l a nd i n ques ti on to the prejudi ce of the jus t ri ghts of the pl a i nti ff ca nt be credi ted. Wha t constitutes legal justification for i nterference - If a pa rty enters i nto contra ct to go for a nother upon a journey to a remote a nd unhealthful cl imate, and a third person, with a bona fide purpose of benefiting the one who is under contract to go, di ssuades him from the s tep, no a ction will lie. But if the advice is not disinterested a nd the persuasion is used for "the i ndi rect purpose of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff," the i ntermedler i s l i a bl e i f hi s a dvi ce i s ta ken a nd the contra ct broken. If performance is prevented by unlawful means such as force, intimi da ti on, coerci on, or threa ts , or by fa l s e or defa ma tory s ta tements , or by nui s a nce or ri ot, the pers on i s , under a l l the a uthori ti es , l i a bl e for the da ma ge whi ch ens ues . Wha tever may be the character of the liability which a stranger to a contract ma u i ncur by a dvi s i ng or a s s i s ti ng one of the pa rti es to eva de performance, the stranger ca nnot become more extensively liable in damages for the nonperforma nce of the contra ct tha n the pa rty i n whos e beha l f he i ntermeddl es . As to da mages, the defense of res judicata of the ca se between plaintiff a nd Endencia ca nnot apply to the defenda nt who wa s not a pa rty thereto. Damages recoverable i n case of the breach of a contract are two s orts, namel y, (1) the ordi na ry, na tura l , a nd i n a s ens e neces s a ry da ma ge; a nd (2) s peci a l da ma ges . Ordi nary da mages is found i n all breaches of contra ct where there a re no s peci a l ci rcums ta nces to di s ti ngui s h the ca s e es pecially from other contracts. The consideration paid for an unperformed promise is a n instance of this sort of damage. In a l l s uch ca ses the damages recoverable a re such as naturally a nd generally would res ul t from s uch a brea ch, "a ccordi ng to the us ual course of things." In case i nvolving only ordinary damage no discussion is ever i ndulged as to whether tha t da ma ge wa s contemplated or not. This i s conclusively presumed from the immedi a tenes s a nd i nevi ta bl enes s of the da ma ge, a nd the recovery of s uch damage follows as a necessary l egal consequence of the breach. Ordinary damage i s assumed a s a ma tter of l a w to be wi thi n the contempl a ti on of the pa rti es . Special damage is such as follows l ess directly from the breach than ordina ry da ma ge. It i s onl y found i n ca s e where s ome external condition, a part from the a ctual terms to the contract exists or i ntervenes, as i t were, to give a turn to a ffa i rs a nd to i ncrease damage i n a way that the promisor, without a ctual notice of that external condition, could not reasonably be expected to fores ee Da mages claimed could not be recovered from her, fi rst, because the damages in question are s pecial damages which were not wi thin contemplation of the parties when the contract was made, and secondly, because said dama ges a re too remote to be the s ubject of recovery. By a dvi sing Teodorica not to perform the contract, s aid corporation could in no event render itself more extensively l iable tha n the pri nci pl e i n the contra ct. Rubio vs. C.A. (G.R. No. L-50911 - March 12, 1986)

Facts: A TRO wa s issued a gainst the defendant to prevent a nd restrain them from further unlawfully a nd wil l ful l y i nterference wi th the tra nsaction between the plaintiff-corporation with Al fonso T. Yuchengco on the sale of the s hares of s tock of Hacienda Beni to, Inc. It a ppears that the Perez Rubio spouses owned s hares of stock in Hacienda Benito, Inc. The Perez Rubi os , s ol d s a i d s ha res to Robert O. Phi l l i ps a nd Sons , Inc. for P5,500,000.00 pa ya ble in installment. Robert O. Phi llips, i n his behalf a nd i n that of his wife and Robert O. Phillips and Sons, Inc., entered i nto negotiations for the sale of their s hares of stock in Hacienda Benito, Inc. to Al fonso Yuchengco. Upon bei ng i nformed of thi s , the Perez Rubios, through their a ttorney-in-fact, Joaquin Ramirez, reminded the Phillips spouses and the Phi l l i ps corpora ti on i n wri ti ng of thei r obligations under the contract of sale reminded them i n particular that the shares subject matter thereof were s ti l l s ubject to the pa yment of the unpa i d ba l a nce of the s a l e pri ce

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The Phi llips (individuals and corporation), through their a ttorney, Juan T. Da vid, s ent a l etter to the Perez Rubios telling them, in s ubstance, that the only obstacle to the consummation of the Phillips-Yuchengco sale of the s hares of s tock of Hacienda Benito, Inc. wa s thei r l etter of Nove mber 24, 1964 a nd warned that unless the same was withdrawn by Ma rch 29, they would s eek redres s el s ewhere. Perez Rubio did not wi thdraw the letter. Because of the issuance of a preliminary i njunction ex parte which restra i ned peti ti oner Perez Rubi o from interfering with the Yuchengco tra nsaction a nd the denial of a motion to dissolve the injunction petitioner Perez Rubi o wa s cons trained to file a petition for certiorari with this Court alleging that the l ower court committed a grave abuse of discreti on i n i s s ui ng the prel i mi na ry i njuncti on Issue: Whether or not the Perez Rubi o unl a wful l y i nterfered i n the tra ns a cti on between Phi l i ps a nd Yuchengco? Held:

No, he i s not l i a bl e. A thorough examination of the record reveals that the factual fi ndings of the a ppellate court a re incomplete and do not refl ect the a ctua l events tha t tra ns pi red concerni ng the s a l e of s ha res of s tock of Ha ci enda Beni to to Al fons o Yuchengco. The i mportant point left out by the appellate court refers to the controversial l etter of the petitioner to Phillips a nd Sons a nd to the Phi llips spouses wherein the petition s tated that he has a vendor's lien over the s hares of s tock of Hacienda Benito a nd that he s till has the option to rescind the contract as regards his sal e of s tock of the Ha ci enda . A copy of the l etter wa s s ent to Al fonso Yuchengeo, the prospective buyer of the shares of stock of Hacienda Benito, but even a fter recei pt of the l etter, the negoti a ti ons on the s a l e of the s ha res of s tock of Ha ci enda Beni to to Al fons o Yuchengco conti nued. Al l the details of the negotiations in the sale of the s hares of s tock of Ha ci enda Beni to, Inc. from Phi l l i ps a nd Sons to Mr. Yuchengco, there is no factual or legal basis for the a ppellate court's conclusion that the petitioner unlawfully a nd inoffici ous l y i nterfered wi th the negoti a ti ons There is no reason why the petitioner s hould be accused of unlawful i nterference i n maintaining his s tand regarding the sale of s ha res of s tock of Hacienda Benito, Inc. that he still had the option to rescind the contract between him a nd Phil l i ps a nd Sons a nd s ta ti ng the exi s tence of hi s vendor's hen over s a i d s ha res of s tock. The petitioner never pretended that he still had full control of the s hares of s tock which he s old to Phillips and Sons. He i n fa ct a dmitted that the shares of stock were a lready tra nsferred to the corporation and that he did not have a recorded lien therei n. He merely made of record his ri ght to res ci nd under the ori gi na l contra ct of s a l e. The deta i l s perta i ni ng to the ea rl i er tra ns action governing the sale of the s hares of s tock between the petitioner and Phillips and Sons were i n fa ct, a l l known to Yuchengco. And, more important, it i s obvious from the recordsthat the petitioner's i nterest was only i n the payment of the P4, 250,000.00 ba l a nce due hi m from Phi l l i ps a nd Sons . He ha d the right to refuse to withdraw the November 24, 1964 l etter. We s ee nothing illegal or i nofficious a bout the l etter or the refus a l to wi thdra w i t.

Remedies Types of Actions: 1. Culpa Aquilana Defi ned under Arti cle 2176 of the Ci vi l Code a s the fa ul t or negl i gence of a pers on, whether by a ct or omi ssion, that ca uses damage to a nother, if there i s no pre -exi s ti ng contra ctua l rel a ti on between the pa rti es. However, Arti cle 2176 of the Civil Code is l imited to negligent a cts or omissi ons a nd excl udes the noti on of wi l l ful nes s or i ntent. 2. Culpa Contractual Defi ned a s fault incidental i n the performance of a pre -existing contract is known as contra ctua l fa ul t or culpa contractual. And i s governed by Arti cl es 1170, 117 2 a nd 1173 of the New Ci vi l Code. Culpa Criminal Defi ned a s negligence resulting i n the commission of a cri me. The same negligent act ca using damages may produce ci vil liability arising from a crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or crea te a n a cti on for qua si-delict under Arti cle 2176 of the Ci vi l Code. In negl i gent ca s es , the i njured pa rty ma y choos e between cri minal action or ci vil action for damages under Article 2176 of the New Ci vi l Code. Arti cl e 2177 of the Ci vi l Code prohi bi ts twi ce recovery for the s a me negl i gent a ct.

3.

a.

General Rule a ctions to recover ci vil liability a re deemed i ns ti tuted wi th the cri mi na l a cti on. Excepti ons : 1. Wa i ver - giving up the right to s ue for damages for a tort i n fa vour of the other pa rty.

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2. 3. Res erva ti on the ci vi l a cti on i s res erved. The cri mi na l a cti on i s i ns ti tuted fi rs t. Pri or Ins ti tuti on the ci vi l a cti on i s i ns ti tuted before the cri mi na l a cti on.

b.

Genera l Rul e: Cri mi na l a cti ons proceed before the ci vi l a cti on. Excepti ons : When there i s a prejudi ci a l ques ti on. DAMAGES

I. Definition of Damages Genera l a. b. c. d. Pri nci pl es : Da ma ges mus t be proved Amount of da ma ges mus t be fa i r a nd commens ura te to the l os s Da ma ges mus t be a cons equence of the tortuous a ct Remote a nd s pecul a ti ve da ma ges a re not a l l owed

Art. 2195. The provisions of this Title shall be respectively applicable to all obligations mentioned in Article 1157. What are damages? Da mages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for a n injury s ustained, or a s othe rwise expressed, the pecuni a ry cons equences whi ch the l a w i mpos es for the brea ch of s ome duty or the vi ol a ti on of s ome ri ght ( People vs. Ballesteros ) . The obl i ga ti on to repa i r the da ma ges exi s ts whether done i ntenti ona l l y or negl i gentl y a nd whether or not puni s ha bl e by l a w ( Ocena vs. Icamina). Elements for recovery of damages: 1. Ri ght of a cti on 2. For a wrong i nfl i cted by the defenda nt 3. Da ma ge res ul ti ng to the pl a i nti ff II. Kinds of Damages (MENTAL) a . ACTUAL/COMPENSATORY- for l os s a ctua l l y s uffered b. MORAL- menta l a ngui s h, etc. c. NOMINAL- for ri ghts recogni zed a nd vi ol a ted d. TEMPERATE/MODERATE- for da ma ges proved but the a mount wa s not proven e. LIQUIDATED- s ti pul a ted da ma ges i n the contra ct f. EXEMPLARY/CORRECTIVE- to s erve a s a n exa mpl e for the common good (Art. 2197) A. Actua l or Compens a tory When i s a pers on enti tl ed to a ctua l or compens a tory da ma ges ?(Art. 2199) A) B) When provi ded by l a w Or by s ti pul a ti on When there i s a pecuni a ry l os s s uffered by hi m When he ha s a l l eged a nd pra yed for s uch rel i ef (Manchester Devt Corp vs. CA) When he ha s dul y prove d i t

No proof of pecuni a ry l os s i s neces s a ry for: mora l , nomi na l , tempera te, l i qui da ted or exempl a ry da ma ges . The a s s es s ment of s uch da ma ges i s di s creti ona ry upon the court, except l i qui da ted ones . (Art. 2216) Ki nds of Actua l Da ma ges

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CC Art. 2200 A. Da mnum emergente - va l ue of the l os s s uffered B. Lucro ces s a nte - profi ts whi ch the obl i gee fa i l ed to obta i n A. Los s of ea rni ng ca pa ci ty due to i njury (tempora ry or perma nent) B. Da ma ge to Bus i nes s Sta ndi ng or Commerci a l Credi t A. Fi xed i ndemni ty for dea th = Php 50,000 (a s of 2005) B. Los s of Ea rni ng Ca pa ci ty of the Decea s ed Interes t Attorneys Fees & Expens es of Li ti ga ti on

2205

2206

2209 2208

General Principles for Recovery a . The a mount of damages must be fair and just a nd commensurate to the l oss. - In case of contracts, onl y thos e i njuri es whi ch coul d have been reasonably foreseen by the parties by the parties at the time the contract was entered i nto a re recovera bl e. b. The da ma ges mus t be proxi ma te da ma ges a nd not remote or s pecul a ti ve. c. The da ma ges mus t be proven by competent evi dence (a dmi s s i bl e or proba ti ve) -It i s necessary to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty, premi s ed upon competent proof a nd on the bes t evi dence obta i na bl e by the i njured pa rty, the a ctua l a mount of l os s . ( Integrated Packaging Corp. vs. CA; Fuentes vs. CA) d. Compl aint a nd prayer must s pecify a mount of damages and pay filing fees before i t may be accepted a nd a dmi tted for fi l i ng. ( Circ. No. 7, Mar. 24, 1988; Manchester Devt. Corp. vs. CA, 1987). e. The requirement of certainty does not prevent the dra wi ng of rea s ona bl e i nferences from the fa ct a nd ci rcums ta nce i n evi dence.