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Presume neg. A) We assume statements to be false until proven true. That is why we dont believe in conspiracy theories. The lack of a reason something is false does not me it is assumed to be true. B) Statements are more often false then true: to prove that a pen is red, there is only one way to prove it true but an infinite number of ways to prove it false. Permissibility negates. A) Negate means deny the validity of1 thus; the negative burden is to prove a lack of an obligation. B) There is a trichotomy between obligation, prohibition and permissibility: proving one disproves the other two. If an act is permissible, it is not endorsed as a good maxim all should be compelled to follow. C) Affirming takes a proactive action to value rehabilitation over retribution, while negating can just maintain neutrality. I value morality. The value of objects depends on a rational will conferring that value; no object is naturally valuable. Every other source of value stems from the unconditional worth of human rationality. This means that we must treat those with a will as ends in themselves. Korsgaard2 [T]here must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient goodness [of things : [I]t cannot be an object of inclination, for those have only a conditional worth, for if the incli nations founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth . Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. the unconditionally valuable thing must the power to set an end [W]e must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good. since every rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground we must regard others as capable of conferring value by their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves.
In order for there to be objectively good ends, however, condition of their ]. Kant considers what this might be (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them So, Kant asserts, be humanity or rational nature, which he defines as 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that regarding your existence as a rational being in itself is a subjective principle of human action. By this I understand him to mean that the objects of our choice, But other which holds also for himself (G 47/429), reason of Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods.

and the needs

(G

And, in order for an agent to be worthy of moral consideration, they must be able to will actions that take the form of a unified movement. For example, if there are steps to completing any one action, I must move through each of those steps with a unified goal. Each step is part of a unity to complete the action. The notion of a unity of actions is distinct from a judgment, or doing one thing and then another thing independently. Rodl The ground of an intention is a judgment that desires, all in all, speak[s] in favor of doing A. As desires come and go, that judgment contains a reference to a time. It is a judgment that desires now present all in all speak in favor of doing A. Such a judgment made at T1 bears no logical connection with the judgment expressed by the same words at T2, no matter whether the same things are present at T1 and T2, no matter whether it was probably or even necessary that the same things would be present. Rationality meets the unified movement test because the will creates unified judgments without temporal bounds. Any ethical theory that does not produce unified judgments fails. The will is the only thing that can intrinsically valuable, because if moral rules were based on other empirical factors, we would loose the basis for making judgments. This is not saying its morally wrong to affirm, we wont be able to make the judgment of the AC. Furthermore, since reasons come from first-premise judgments and from the
1

Ought and Negate from The American Heritage Dictionary 4 th Ed. (2007)

2 Christine Korsgaard, Two Distinctions in Goodness, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), 182.

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unconditional good, nothing specific about any given individual makes them different with regard to their practical reason since practical reason does not depend upon anything outside of itself. Thus, any practical judgment must equally hold true for all individuals. And, all individuals must respect the right to not be coerced--to maintain a sphere of outer freedom. Disrespecting peoples outer freedom would be an irrational maxim since it would mean each person would maximize their own outer freedom, while simultaneously limiting others. However, this is contradictory because if everyone tried to maximize their own freedom while also limiting everyone elses, everyone would be acting to maximize everyones freedom, while also trying to minimize it. Thus, the standard is consistency with unconditioned judgment. 1. Retribution treats people equally regardless of social or empirical factors, and is only annexed to the crime in question, while rehabilitation treats people as means and is based on conditional judgments. Landa3 In these accounts, retributivism proper may be best thought of as an implication of the arguments about the distribution of punishment (e.g., Holtman 1997a; Byrd 1989; Murphy 1987; Scheid 1983).7 The essence of this view is that the Kantian [retribution theory] categorical treatment of morality disallows the kind of case-by-case judgment about punishment that turns on considerations other than the criminal act itself to determine the appropriate social response to that act. In particular, considerations that are agentspecific, or that invoke the effects of punishment on the probability of committing other crimes or on the general welfare of members of the society, etc., would contradict a priori based law and involve us in the treatment of human beings as means only, directly violating the command of the moral law (e.g., Mundle 1954; Hart 1968; Byrd 1989).The argument, then, proceeds something like the
following:

2. Retributive punishment is the only universalizable maxim because it reasserts the victims reciprocal right toward the criminal. Ripstein4 Kants conception of coercion judges the legitimacy of any particular coercive act not in terms of its effects but a system of equal freedom.
Second, against the background idea of That is, unlike Bentham, he beings with the concept of a rule, but the rules in question govern the legitimate use of force in terms of reciprocal limits on freedom. Coercion is objectionable where it is a hindrance to a persons right to freedom, but legitimate when it takes the form of hi ndering a hindrance to freedom.

To stop you from interfering with another person upholds the others freedom
go, but its rationale is that it upholds the victims right to be free, not that it enforces the kidnappers obligat ion to release the victim. in this instance

. Using force to get

the victim out of the kidnappers clutches involves coercion against the kidnapper, because it touches or threatens to touch him in order to advance a purpose, the freeing of the victim, to which he has not agreed. The use of force is rightful because an incident of the victims antecedent right to be free. The kidnapper hinders the victims freedom; forcibly freeing the victim hinders that hi ndrance, and in so doing upholds the victims freedom. In so doing, it also makes the kidnapper do what he should have done, that is, let the victim

The use of force is an instance of the victims right to independence, and so is a consistent application of a system of equal freedom.
If

coercion is understood as justified if and only if it restricts a restriction on freedom, it does not need to be identified with a sanction. Aggression is coercive; defensive force is also coercive. The latter is not a further wrong that requires a

special justification; it is just the protection of the defenders freedo m. The person using defensive force is neither sanctioning the aggressor nor carrying out a threat that was supposed to deter aggression. Kants claim that it is legitimate to use force to hinder hindrances to freedom thus incorporates his more general idea of a system of equal freedom. He does not start with the idea that it is always wrong to restrict the choice of another per son, and then struggle to show that doing so is sometimes outweighed on balance, in the way that

the initial hindrance of freedom is wrongful because [its] inconsistent with a system of equal freedom; the act that cancels it is not a second wrong because the use of force is only wrongful if inconsistent with reciprocal limits on freedom. So force that restores freedom is just the restoration of the original right.
Bentham, for example, thinks that causing pain is always bad but legitimate when outweighed by a greater good produced. Instead, that mysteriously makes a right,

And, in willing to commit a crime, the criminal consents to punishment. Reiman5 Since reason (like justice) is no respecter of the sheer difference between individuals, when a rational being decides to act in a certain way toward his fellows, he implicitly authorizes similar action by his fellows toward him. A version of the golden rule, then, is a requirement of reason: acting rationally, one always acts as he would have others act toward him. Consequently, to act toward a person as he has acted toward others is to treat him as a
3

Dimitri Landa [Assistant Professor of Politics, New York University], On the Possibility of Kantian Retributivism. (cs.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2790/KantianRetributivismUtilitas.pdf). 4 Ripstein, Arthur. Force and Freedom: Kants Legal and Political Philosophy. Harvard University Press. 2009. Pg. 54-55. 5 Jeffery Reiman (Professor @ University of Phoenix). Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty, Philosophy and Public Aff airs Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 122-125, (1995), JSTOR

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duty to do to offenders what they have done, since

as if his act were the product of a rational decision. From this, it may be concluded that we have a this amounts to accord[s] them the respect due rational beings.

Also, if morality is to guide action we must distinguish between acts and omissions. Affirming is a proactive action, while negating is an omission. The criminal justice system must proactively value rehabilitation over retribution, while omitting to act functionally negates by maintaining neutrality. And, rehabilitation mandates a change to the sentencing policies to suit and differentiate criminal conditions, while retribution maintains enforcement and punishment with accordance to the laws in place. If criminals were not responsible for actions, we would condone those actions, not endorse them as universal maxims. Neg is the status quo, as we currently enforce retribution and have prisons overcrowded with harsh sentencing, affirming is a shift in the status quo, so it is thus a proactive duty to shift from the status quo. Morality has to be able to judge the actions of agents because it would be nonsensical to hold agents morally culpable for situations they didnt cause. Failure to distinguish between action and inaction means we would judge killers and bystanders on the same moral level. However, if the killer did not exist, the bystanders would not have killed. Without this distinction in culpability between action and inaction, morality can no longer judge immorality. Therefore, there is no positive obligation to value rehabilitation over retribution.

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Frontlines Rehabilitation is based on unequal treatment. Rachels6 In a system designed to rehabilitat[ion]e, individuals who have committed similar crimes will not receive similar treatments. What will happen to a particular lawbreaker will depend on his or her particular needs. Typically, a convicted person will be sentenced to prison for an indefinite period of time say, not less than ten nor more than twenty years if the offense is seriousand then he or she will be released when the authorities (the prison officials, a parole board) decide they are ready to be released. Since it takes people different amounts of time to be rehabilitated, the amount of time served will vary from prisoner to prisoner. No empirical condition can be unconditionally good. Johnson Let us, then, return to Kant's first statements about the unique value of a good will. There is a range of things that we think of as being good and desirable in many respects, he says, but which can also be bad and harmful.18 Gifts of nature such as intelligence and decisiveness, for instance, are not good when attached to a terrorist. Even happiness or total wellbeing and contentment with ones condition can make a person bold but consequently often reckless as well or might be found in a creature that never feels the slightest pull of a pure and good will. In these cases, Kant concludes, happiness is not good. In the former case, it seems Kant thinks happiness is can be its own worst enemy, leading the person who enjoys it to recklessness that will undo it. In the latter case, a happy person who does not fall prey to the dangers of bliss still might not deserve their happiness. That a war criminal lives out his days undisturbed somewhere in South America is a terrible state of affairs, but it is made even worse, not better, if he is also happy.

Rachels, James Punishment and Desert 1997

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AT Rehab = punishment Rehab imposes exceptions, and does not assign blameworthy punishment. Only retribution respects criminals as morals equals and rational agents. Flanders7 Morris paints the following picture. Society is made up of equals that all work under the burden of obedience to the law. When a person breaks the law he takes advantage of the rest of us by taking a benefit (freedom from the laws) that we do not have. To take the offender seriously to treat him again as an equal agent -- we must put a new burden upon him; that burden is his punishment. We must force him to accept a deprivation of his liberty for the extra liberty he has enjoyed at our expense. When we punish the criminal by depriving him of his liberty, we are again making him equal to us. As Whitman summarizes the position, [o]nly blame takes the offender seriously as a moral equal.34 To try to cure the offender would be to treat him as a patient, as somehow sick and needing to be managed and manipulated rather than simply held responsible. Nor will it do to
punish simply for the sake of deterring others, because that would be to treat the offender as a means for the sake of others safety. This is why Hegel, following Kant and still in the grips of the Kantian picture, would speak of the prisoners right to be punished.35 right to be treated as an equal, as someone who has

To not punish is a denial of the offenders

autonom[y]ously chosen to break the law, who has at the same time chosen to be punished.

AT Death Penalty 1. Death Penalty is consistent with Kantian Retribution. Merle8 In committing the crime, the criminal obviously decided to accept[s] the regression into the state of nature. In the state of nature, nobody has any right and external freedom is continuously threatened, whereas the categorical imperative commands us to protect it. The criminal accepts the disappearance of the external freedom of his own will
. This means that the criminals will commits a kind of suicide, which makes him unfit to be a citizen (DR VI, 331, Gregor 10 5). The criminal ceases to be able to be treated by the state as a free person, as a rational being. The kind and degree of punishment proposed by Kant show that in a particularly clear way. The most famous example is no doubt capital punishment for murderers. Cohen (Cohen, 1922, p. 341) as well as some contemporary interpreters (cf. Schwarzbild, 1985; Pugsley, 1981, p. 1516) raise the objection against capital punishment that it contradicts the Kantian moral law, since it irremediably suppresses a rational being. For that reason they propose alternative punishments. Their argument has been so successful that today there is barely an interpreter who will take a stand in favor of this part of Kants theory of penal law. Yet this

the rational being does not cease to be only when punished, but as soon as she commits a crime. Thus punishment merely draws the consequence of the fact that by committing a crime a rational being denied her own rational essence. Second, the degree of punishment for all other crimes mentioned by Kant shows clearly that according to Kant the criminal is no longer to be dealt with as a rational being. Let me give only one example: But what does it mean to say, if you steal from someone, you steal from yourself? Whoever steals makes the property of everyone else insecure and therefore deprives himself (by the principle of retribution) of security in any possible property. He has nothing and can also acquire nothing; but he still wants to live, and this is now possible only if others provide for him. But since the state will not provide for him free of charge, he must let it have his powers for any kind of work it pleases (in convict or prison labor) and is reduced to the status of a slave for a certain time, or permanently
point is worth a closer look, because there are two strikes against Cohens position. Firstly

if the state sees fit (VI, 333, Gregor 106). Here Kant fails to distinguish between two things: (a) that someone without pro perty has to work for her living, and (b) that working for

In reality this enslavement has something in common with the death penalty as well as with every other kind of punishment mentioned in the Doctrine of Right, for example with deportation (DR VI, 334, Gregor 107) or with permanent expulsion from civil society (DR, Appendix, part 5, VI, 363, Gregor 130), or even with castration. Indeed, according to Kant, castration is a partial
her living means being enslaved rather than, for instance, working as a day laborer. murder, just as self castration as a partial murder: To deprive oneself of an integral part or organ (to maim oneself) [.] are ways of partially murdering oneself (TL, VI, 423, Gregor, Practical Philosophy, 547). Even if we put aside the question of whether suicide is or should be punishable, castration by another person remains a kind of partial death.

2. At worst, I can defend the resolution on balance and accept the death penalty is bad. I can advocate life imprisonment as a form of retribution; rather the death penalty there is no unique reason why I need to defend the status quo policies of retribution. And, this is only one form of punishment abolishing the death penalty and treating murders through rehab, while prioritizing retribution to all other areas of criminal justice can still mean you negate. 3. This is contradictory, because he doesnt advocate specific policies in the AC, so I shouldnt need to either.

Chad Flanders [J.D. 2007, Yale; Ph.D. 2004, Chicago (philosophy). Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law], Retribution and Reform, 70 Md. L. Rev. 87 (2010-2011) 8 Merle, Jean-Christophe. A Kantian Critique of Kants Theory of Punishment. Law and Philosophy , 2000, Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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Permissibility negates. 1. Negate means deny the validity of9 thus; the negative burden is to prove a lack of an obligation. 2. There is a trichotomy between obligation, prohibition and permissibility: proving one disproves the other two. If an act is permissible, it is not endorsed as a good maxim all should be compelled to follow. 3. Affirming takes a proactive action to value rehabilitation over retribution, while negating has no burden to show a change just maintain neutrality. 4. If there is no obligation to take an action, you have a moral obligation not to take the action because a state is bound by its availability of resources, so taking an action that wastes resources limits states ability to take actions that fulfill authentic obligations. 5. Ought implies proactive justification since we dont take actions unless we have a reason to take the action. Thus, if we dont have any reasons to do anything, we do not take any actions And permissibility comes before presumption. Permissibility is a term used to demonstrate what a debater must do to prove the resolution true or false. Presumption is the concept of what we do if neither debater is able to prove the resolution true or false via conditions established in their truth burdens, ie proving the resolution obligatory or permissible. Insofar as my burden is to prove that negating is permissible, there is no reason to go to presumption since I am sufficiently meeting the requirements to prove the resolution false. NEG is an Omission 1. Affirming takes a proactive action to value rehabilitation over retribution. 2. Rehabilitation mandates a change to the sentencing policies to suit and differentiate criminal conditions, while retribution maintains enforcement and punishment with accordance to the laws in place 3. Governments maintain legitimacy by retributively enforcing punishment towards individuals who break laws in place, for example we have minimum sentencing while rehabilitation requires a proactive change in the sentencing specific on a case-by-case basis. 4. Neg is the status quo, as we currently enforce retribution and have prisons overcrowded with harsh sentencing, affirming is a shift in the status quo, so it is thus a proactive duty to shift from the status quo. 5. Neg is the status quo, affirming traditionally has the burden of proof of changing the current course of action. 6. Affirming distributes resources towards the rehabilitation system, while retribution requires no resource change. Retribution puts people in systems already in place, while rehab forces specific counseling so it requires compensation. Distribution of resources requires a proactive action.

Ought and Negate from The American Heritage Dictionary 4 th Ed. (2007)

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Other Deon FW Justifications Individuals status as free and rational persons informs their ontology. Rawls10 In sum, then, citizens as free persons have the right to view their persons as independent and not identify[y]ied with any particular system of ends. Given their moral power to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception[s] of the good, their public identity as a moral person and a self-originating source of claims is not affected by changes over time in their conceptions of the good, at least so long as these changes are in certain ways continuous and have suitable explanations. These remarks are unhappily extremely vague; their only purpose, however, is to indicate the conception of the person [is] connected with the public cnception of justice in a well-ordered society, and so with the principles of justice that apply to its basic institutions. By contrast, citizens in their personal affairs, or within the internal life of associations, may regard their ends and aspirations differently. They may have attachments and loves that they believe they would not, or could not, stand apart from; and they might regard it as unthinkable for them to view themselves without certain religious and philosophical convictions and commitments. But none of this need affect the conception of the person connected with society's public conception of justice and its ideal of social
cooperation. Within different contexts we can assume diverse points of view toward our person without contradiction so long as these points of view cohere together when circumstances require. As always, our focus here is on the public conception that underlies the principles of social justice.

Thus, agents are constituted by their ability to rationally derive maxims, not through social context. Morality must be based on freedom to will maxims in order to preserve obligations, or morality would become a system of coercion. Legislating moral truth based on social norms or empirics would be antithetical to the freedom of individuals, as it would then be based off of arbitrary factors, not the choice or perspective of the agent. Ontology informs what constitutes an agent and their capabilities. An ethical theory that is inconsistent with ontology would impose impossible obligations, as it would obligate persons to take actions inconsistent with their being. Individuals would reject principles inconsistent with their ontology because it would fail to guide action. The ability to desire, and set unified ends are only possible through self-constitution of the agent. Moshe
The idea that reflective endorsement is constitutive of action has been elaborated by Korsgaard in recent years. Korsgaard has recently argued that self-constitution is constitutive

our reflective ability produces the parts of the soul: we experience certain incentives as making a proposal and need to make decisions about them. Thus, we have at least two separate experiences, namely the workings of the incentive itself and the choice (Korsgaard 2009, p. 119). Since self-consciousness divides our soul, some form of reunification is needed so that actions can be assigned to the person as a whole. It is when we choose the incentives according to which we act that we pull ourselves together and constitute ourselves as unified agents (ibid., ch. 7). Self-constitution, which includes [or] reflective endorsement, is obviously constitutive of action: we literally cannot act
of action and thus the source of normativity. The reflective element still figures in her account, but it is now part of the notion of self-constitution.3 She argues that

without constituting ourselves. And once again normativity arises from what is constitutive of action: the goodness or badness of an action is determined by how well

, self-constitution, which is constitutive of action, sets an intrinsic standard of success to action. Self-constitution of our rational will dictates our ability to rationally endorse maxim and pursue aims. Absent an endorsement by the agent without social considerations, morality would devolve to nihilism since it would be missing the step from incentive and pursuit of action.
or poorly we constitute ourselves as unified agents (ibid., ch. 8). That is

10

Rawls, J. 1980.

Kantian constructivism in moral theory,

Journal of Philosophy

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Universizablilityall individuals must respect the right to not be coerced--to maintain a sphere of outer freedom. Engstrom11
Now on the interpretation weve been entertaining, applying the formula of universal law involves considering whether its possible for every person every subject capable of practical judgmentto [can] share the practical judgment asserting the goodness of every

[it is not] possible for every person to deem good every persons acting to limit others freedom, with a view to augmenting their own freedom. Since here all persons are deeming good the limitation of their own freedom and the extension of others freedom, they are all deeming good both the extension and the limitation of both their own and others freedom. These judgments are inconsistent insofar as the extension of a persons outer freedom is incompatible with the limitation of that same freedom.
persons acting according to the maxim in question. Thus in the present case the application of the formula involves considering whether its where practicable, extension of their own freedom, while on the other hand, insofar as they agree with the similar judgments of others, also

on the one hand deeming good both the limitation of others freedom and the

11

Stephen Engstrom. Universal Law as the Form of Practical Knowledge, pg. 19-20, www.philosophie.uni-hd.de/md/philsem//engstrom_vortrag.pdf