The People of the Philippines vs. Jabinal GR. No.

L-30061 (February 27, 1964) Ponente: Antonio J: FACTS: Plaintiff-Appellees: The People of the Philippines Defendant-Appellant: Jose Jabinal Y Carmen The defendant was accused that on or about 9 oclock pm., September 5, 1954 in the Municipality of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the defendant, a person not authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession, custody and direct control a revolver calibre 22, German made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing necessary permit or license to possess the same. The defendant claimed that he is entitled to exoneration because although he had no license or permit he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas (December 10, 1962) and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander (March 15, 1964). Defendant was accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an intermediate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises issue the validity of his conviction based on retroactive application of the ruling in People v. Mapa.

ISSUE/S: WON the defendant should be acquitted based of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine

RULING: YES, Based on Article 8 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.

ANALYSIS: Decisions of the Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the law mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence

of the law, of the land, at the time the appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the court.

It is true that the doctrine in Macarandang and Lucero case was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when there is a new doctrine and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine.

CONCLUSION/S: Wherefore, the judgement appealed from is hereby reversed and appellant is acquitted, with cost de oficio.

Martinez vs. Buskirk GR. No. L-5691 (December 27, 1910) Ponente: Moreland, J.: FACTS: Plaintiffs-Appellees: S.D. Martinez and his wife, Carmen Ong de Martinez Defendant-Appellant: William Van Buskirk On the 11th of September, 1908 the plaintiff Carmen Ong de Martinez and her child, was riding in a carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila, when delivery wagon belonging to the defendant used for the purpose of transportation of fodder by the defendant and to which attached a pair of horses came along the street opposite direction to that of which the plaintiff was proceeding , and that thereupon the driver of the plaintiffs carromata , observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at a great speed crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street and stopped, in order to give defendants delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but instead of passing by the defendants wagon and horse ran into the carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it. The defendant presented evidence to the effect that the cochero who was driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred was a good servant and was considered a reliable cochero. The cochero tied the driving lines of the horses in front of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the wagon in the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered, while unloading the forage another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some other noises which frightened the horses attached to the wagon and they ran away and the driver was thrown from the outside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and was unable to stop the horses. From undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable The cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven the horses several years and the other five or six months; that he had been in habit, during all the time of leaving them in condition in which they were left on the day of the accident. That to leave the horses and assist in the unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in questioned. Upon the facts presented the court found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave a judgement against him for P442.do with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 17th of October, 1908 and for the cost of the action.

ISSUE/S: WON the act of the cochero was in fact customary to all cochero of delivery wagons. WON the cochero was negligent of his duty

RULING: YES, the manner of the cochero described on the day of the accident was customary to all cochero of delivery wagons, as supported by Article 11 and 12 of the New Civil Code (CC) of the Philippines and cases either under the Spanish and American Jurisprudence. NO, since the act the cochero committed is a widespread practice by all cocheros who delivers the same merchandise.

ANALYSIS: As Art 11 of the CC states that Customs which are contrary to law, or public policy shall not be countenanced, and Art 12 A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence, the manner in which the cochero left the horses to help in unloading the merchandise was a custom to all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in questioned. Also in the case of Hayman vs. Hewitt, Lord Kenyon said: o He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the house, if every person who suffered a cart to remain in the street while he took goods out of it was obliged to employ another to look after the horses, it would be impossible for business of the metropolis to on. While in the case of Griggs vs. Fleckenstein, the court said: o xxx It cannot be said that the fact of leaving the horse unhitched is itself negligence. Whether it is negligence to leave a horse unhitched must depend upon the disposition of the horse; The act of the defendants driver in leaving the horses in a manner proved was not unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by the society for so long a time that they have been ripened into custom, cannot be held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent. The very reason why they have been permitted in the society is that they are beneficial rather than prejudicial. Accidents may sometimes happen and injuries may result from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not natural or customary results. To hold that because such an act once resulted in an injury, the actor is necessarily negligent

CONCLUSION/S: It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is universal practice of merchant to deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of injury, and that it is a universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the time of the accident. This is a custom of all cities. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries and the public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without objection. Thus, the judgement is reversed, without special finding as to cost.

Armigos vs. Court of Appeals GR. No. L-50654 (November 6, 1989) Ponente: Padilla, J.: FACTS: Petitioner: Rudy Gleo Armigos Respondents: Court of Appeals, Cristito Mata, and Judge L.D. Carpio in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V Review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition filed and docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. SP-07192-R, entitled: Rudy Gleo Armigos, petitioner, versus Judge L.D. Carpio, respondent, and the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. The private petitioner, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint against herein the petitioner for the collection of damages and attorneys fees which judgement when rende red was in favour of the private respondent A copy of the decision was received by the petitioner on June 8, 1977 and the following day June 9, 1977 he filed a notice of appeal and completed the other requirements for the perfection of an appeal, including filing of an appeal bond and payment of the appellate court docket fee on June 24, 1977. Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V ruled that the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period and the appeal was dismissed Petitioner claims that only fifteen (15) days had elapsed from the time(June 8, 1977) when he received a copy of the decision to the time he perfected his appeal on June 24, 1977, thus the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V is erroneous and contrary to the law. Petitioner contended that the computation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour he received copy of the decision, so that the first of the 15 day period is 4:00 oclock of June 9, 1977 to 4:00 oclock of June 10, 1977, and the last is to 4:00 oclock of June 23, 1977 to to 4:00 oclock of June 24, 1977.

ISSUE/S: WON the appeal filed by the petitioner was within the reglementary period.

RULING: NO, the rule stated in Article 13 of the civil code to the effect that In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.

ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals, rejected the novel interpretation suggested as it would resuly in many confusing situations and unreliable testimonies as to time a copy of a decision, order or pleading is received. Besides, human memory on dates or days is frail unless the day is an extraordinary one for a person. Also in the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Encarnacion, the Court held that when a law was to effective upon approval by the President and the President signed the same on 16 June 1950, the law should be considered to have taken effect not on the exact hour when the President signed the same on 16 June 1950 but from the very first minute or hour of June 16, 1950.

CONCLUSION/S: While it is true procedures and statutes are to be interpreted liberally so that the real matter in dispute maybe submitted to the judgement of the court, that the court is vested with discretion to admit an appeal filed out of time, this discretion is not unconditional. There must be a justifiable reason to warrant some action. Also in applying the 15-day rule, the Court considered the day as synonymous with the date and find no reason to adopt a different view. Wherefore, the petition is denied.

NAMARCO vs. Tecson GR.No. L-29131 (August 27, 1969) Ponente: Concepcion, C.J.: FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant: National Marketing Corporation Defendants: Miguel Tecson, et al. The defendant Miguel Tecson seeks dismissal of the complaint the petitioner re the revival of judgement (Civil Case No. 63701, December 21, 1965) in the said Case no. 20520 entitled Price Stabilization Corp. vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. o DECISION (Case no 20520, copy of this decision was served upon the defendants November 21, 1955) Ordering the defendants Miguel D. Tecson and Alto surety Insurance Co., Inc. to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff PRATRA the sum of P7,200.00 plus 7% interest from May 25, 1960 until amount is fully paid, plus P500 for the attorneys fees and plus cost Ordering defendant Miguel D. Tecson to indemnify his co-defendant Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. on the cross-claim for all the amounts it would be made to pay in this decision, in case defendant Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. pay the amount adjudged to plaintiff in this decision. From the date of such payment defendant Miguel Tecson would pay the Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., interest at 12% per annum unil Miguel Tecson has fully reimbursed plaintiff of the said amount. AS for lack of jurisdiction, as the amount involved is less than P10,000.00 as actually these proceedings are revival of a decision of the same court, the matter of jurisdiction must be admitted. Plaintiff admit the decision of the court became final on December 21, 1955, case was filed December 21, 1965-more than 10 years have pased, A year is a period of 365 days (Art 13 CCP) Pllaintiff forgot 1960, 1964 are leap year that when the present case was filed it was days late. NAMARCO appealed to Court of Appeals on March 20, 1969

ISSUE/S: WON the present action for the revival of a judgement is barred by statute of limitation.

RULING: YES, as provided by Article 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

ANALYSIS: Pursuant to Art 1144(3) of the CCP, an action upon judgement must be brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues, which, in the language of Art. 1152 of the same code, commences from the time the judgement sought to be revived has become final. This, in turn took place on December 21, 1955 or thirty days from notice of the judgement (No appeal from the defendant was taken) Plaintiff-appellant contends that when law speaks of years pertains to calendar years as per Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, by Crawford, p 383. Thus, there is no question whether it is not a leap year; December 21 to December 21 of the following years is one year. But as per Article 13 of the CCP 1 year is equivalent to 365 days --- 1960 and 1964 being leap years, so that 10 years of 365 days each or an aggregate of 3,650 days from December 21, 1955, expired on December 19, 1965. With this argumentation the filing of the petition was 2 days late.

CONCLUSION/S: With the facts presented and pursuant to Article 13 of the Civil code the present action for the revival of a judgement is barred by statute of limitation. Thus, the appeal of the defendant is affirmed.