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The I love Arno edition Pages 5 7 (end) of Part 2 Stop and Frisk (Terry vs. Ohio) to Criminal Liability and Civil Damages (MHP Garments vs. CA) c. Stop and Frisk, Roadblocks & Checkpoints, and Other Less Intrusive Searches Stop and Frisk: Terry vs Ohio Facts A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a downtown beat which he had been patrolling for many years, observed two strangers (petitioner and another man, Chilton) on a street corner. He saw them proceed alternately back and forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window, which they did for a total of about 24 times. Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a stickup," the officer followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in front of a store. The officer approached the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The men "mumbled something," whereupon McFadden spun petitioner around, patted down his outside clothing, and found in his overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol. The officer ordered the three into the store. He removed petitioner's overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer garments of Katz or under petitioner's or Chilton's outer garments until he felt the guns. The three were taken to the police station. Petitioner and Chilton were charged with carrying concealed weapons Issues WON it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest Held Ratio No The Fourth Amendment applies to "stop and frisk" procedures. o Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. o A careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing in an attempt to find weapons is a "search" under that Amendment. Where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the circumstances of a given case in believing that his safety or that of others is endangered, he may make a reasonable search for weapons of the person believed by him to be armed and dangerous regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest that individual for crime or the absolute certainty that the individual is armed. The officer's protective seizure of petitioner and his companions and the limited search which he made were reasonable, both at their inception and as conducted. o The actions of petitioner and his companions were consistent with the officer's hypothesis that they were contemplating a daylight robbery and were armed. o The officer's search was confined to what was minimally necessary to determine whether the men were armed, and the intrusion, which was made for the sole purpose of protecting himself and others nearby, was confined to ascertaining the presence of weapons. The revolver seized from petitioner was properly admitted into evidence against him, since the search which led to its seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Justice Harlan, Concurring Officer McFadden's right to interrupt Terry's freedom of movement and invade his privacy arose only because circumstances warranted forcing an encounter with Terry in an effort to prevent or investigate a crime. Once that forced encounter was justified, however, the officer's right to take suitable measures for his own safety followed automatically. Justice White, Concurring It is temporary detention, warranted by the circumstances, which chiefly justifies the protective frisk for weapons. Justice Douglas, Dissenting The infringement on personal liberty of any "seizure" of a person can only be "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment if we require the police to possess "probable cause" before they seize him. Only that line draws a meaningful distinction between an officer's mere inkling and the presence of facts within the officer's personal knowledge which would convince a reasonable man that the person seized has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a particular crime. Minnesota vs. Dickerson June 7, 1993 White FACTS

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Two Minneapolis police officers, while patrolling, found respondent Timothy Dickerson coming out of an apartment. That apartment was considered a notorious crack house by the police as there were a lot of reported sales of drugs that happened here. Dickerson was initially going to the direction of the police, but when he saw the squad car and the police, he turned about and began walking on the other direction and entered an alley. The police got alerted and they drove to the alley and ordered Dickerson to stop. They did a pat-down search on him, found no weapons, but one of the police got curious by a small lump on Dickersons jacket. That lump was found to be crack cocaine. So respondent was tried and convicted by the trial court of possession of a controlled substance ISSUES and HELD Whether the patdown search was constitutional or not. (YES) Whether the use of the recovered crack cocaine is valid or not. (NO) RATIO: When police encounter suspicious conduct and has reason to believe that something criminal might be going on, its OK to stop the suspicious person and make reasonable inquiries regarding the suspicions If the police suspects that the individual is armed, he may pat down the individual ONLY for the purpose of getting any weapons AND NOT to get evidence If the item from the search can be immediately seen as incriminating, the police officers can seize it If the item in plain view cannot be immediately classified as illegal or incriminating, and you need some more investigation to determine its nature, then it cannot be seized under the plain view doctrine Here, since the lump had to be tested to confirm its nature/identity, it was unlawful for the police to have seized it. Florida v. J.L. Ginsburg, J. (March 28, 2000) Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, C. J. FACTS: On October 13, 1995, an anonymous caller reported to the Miami-Dade Police that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. There is no audio recording presented of the tip, and nothing is known about the informant. Sometime after the police received the tip, two officers were instructed to respond. They arrived at the bus stop about six minutes later and saw three black males in the location. One of the three, named, J. L., was wearing a plaid shirt. Apart from the tip, the officers had no reason to suspect any of the three of illegal conduct. The officers did not see a firearm, and J. L. made no threatening or otherwise unusual movements. One of the officers approached J. L., told him to put his hands up on the bus stop, frisked him, and seized a gun from his pocket. The second officer frisked the other two individuals, against whom no allegations had been made, and found nothing. J. L., who was at the time of the frisk barely 16 years of age, was charged under state law with carrying a concealed firearm without a license and possessing a firearm while under the age of 18. He moved to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unlawful search, and the trial court granted his motion. The intermediate appellate court reversed, but the Supreme Court of Florida quashed that decision and held the search invalid under the Fourth Amendment. ISSUE: Will an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun be sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person? HELD: An anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is not sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person. An officer, for the protection of himself and others, may conduct a carefully limited search for weapons in the outer clothing of persons engaged in unusual conduct where, the officer reasonably concludes in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons in question may be armed and presently dangerous. (Terry v. Ohio) The officers' suspicion that J. L. was carrying a weapon arose not from their own observations but solely from a call made from an unknown location by an unknown caller. The tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make a Terry stop: It provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility . The contentions of Florida and the United States as amicus that the tip was reliable because it accurately described J. L.'s visible attributes misapprehend the reliability needed for a tip to justify a Terry stop. The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person. The Court likewise declines to adopt the States argument that the standard Terry analysis should be modified to license a "firearm exception," (under such an exception, a tip alleging an illegal gun would justify a stop and frisk even if the accusation would fail standard pre-search reliability testing). Such an exception would enable any person seeking to harass another to set in motion an intrusive, embarrassing police search of the targeted person simply by placing an anonymous call falsely reporting the target's unlawful carriage of a gun. The reasonableness of official suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew before they conducted their search. Concurring: Justice Kennedy, with whom Rehnquist, C.J. joins. The courts can weigh the officer's credibility and admit evidence seized pursuant to the frisk even if no one, aside from the officer and defendant themselves, was present or observed the seizure. Instant caller identification is widely available to police, and, if anonymous tips are proving unreliable and distracting to police, squad cars can be sent within seconds to the location of the

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telephone used by the informant. Voice recording of telephone tips might, in appropriate cases, be used by police to locate the caller. It is unlawful to make false reports to the police, (based on Florida statutes) and the ability of the police to trace the identity of anonymous telephone informants may be a factor which lends reliability to what, years earlier, might have been considered unreliable anonymous tips. ESQUILLO V. PEOPLE August 25, 2010 J. Carpio-Morales FACTS: On the basis of informants tip, PO1 Cruzin proceeded at around 4pm in Pasay to conduct a surveillance on the activities of an alleged notorious snatcher Ryan Cruzin saw Esquillo placing a transparent plastic sachet containing white substance inside her yellow cigarette case Cruzin became suspicious as she acted strangely when he started to approach her He introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about the plastic sachet but Esquillo tried to flee so when she was apprised, the plastic sachet was confiscated Esquillos story: she was at home and the police planted the evidence NBI confirmed that she was carrying 0.1224 g of shabu and her urine test came out positive for presence of shabu TC convicted her of illegal possession of shabu CA affirmed and said that police officers had probable cause to search petitioner under the stop-and-frisk concept ISSUE: WON the stop-and-frisk search conducted on Esquillo was valid HELD: Yes RATIO: Esquillo did not question her warrantless arrest early on Circumstances under which petitioner was arrested indeed engender the belief that a search on her was warranted Given Cruzins training as police officer, it was instinctive on his part to be drawn to curiosity and to approach her Esquillo attempted to flee after he introduced himself Stop-and-frisk searches are valid as long as the police properly introduced himself, restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, and he must have a genuine reason (in accordance to his experience and the surrounding conditions), to warrant the belief that person has weapons/contraband concealed. SC says the stop-and-frisk operation on Esquillo was valid

J. BERSAMIN, DISSENTING: Petitioners failure to assail the invalidity of her arrest does not involve a waiver of the inadmissibility of the evidence CA confused the stop-and-frisk principle with a search as incidental to a lawful arrest Terry search is strictly limited to what is necessary for the discovery of weapons that may be used to harm the officer of the law or others nearby Flight alone is not a basis for reasonable suspicion Esquillo also did not appear to have a weapon and there was no probable cause to arrest her

Roadblocks & Checkpoints: Delaware vs. Prouse Michigan vs. Sitz Alabama vs. White 11 June 1990 White, J. FACTS: Police received an anonymous telephone tip that Vanessa White would be leaving an apartment at a particular time in a brown Plymouth station wagon (her vehicle) with the right taillight lens broken to a motel and would be possessing an ounce of cocaine inside a brown attach case. The police observed White holding nothing leave the apartment building and enter the station wagon. They followed her along the route to the motel and stopped her vehicle just short of the motel. Corporal Davis asked respondent to step to the rear of her car, where he informed her that she had been stopped because she was suspected of carrying cocaine in the vehicle. He asked if they could look for cocaine, and White said they could look. A consensual search of her vehicle revealed a locked attach case, the combination to which she gave upon request. Police found marijuana and arrested her. After she was arrested, cocaine was found in her purse. CA of Alabama reversed her conviction because officers did not have reasonable suspicion necessary under Terry vs. Ohio to justify the investigatory stop of the vehicle. Because of differing views in the state and federal courts over whether an anonymous tip may furnish reasonable suspicion for a stop, petition for certiorari pushed through. ISSUE: Did the tip, as corroborated by independent police work, exhibit sufficient indicia of reliability to provide a reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop? HELD: YES, under a totality of the circumstances. When police officers stopped White, the anonymous tip had been sufficiently corroborated to furnish reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaged in criminal activity, and that the investigative stop therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

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was asked by the officers as to what was loaded in the jeep, to which he did not respond, appearing pale and nervous. The officers checked the cargo and discovered bundles of galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation. Caballes and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station, where he was imprisoned for 7 days. The trial court found Caballes guilty of the crime of Theft of property. Upon appeal, the Court fo Aooeaksm affirmed the trial courts judgment of conviction. Issue: WON the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible against Caballes Held: No; the evidence are not admissible in evidence. Ratio: The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute, but admits of certain exceptions. The situation in the case at bar does not fall under any of the accepted exceptions. 1. Search of a moving vehicle (ito yung sense ng case talaga) The rules governing searches and seizures of moving vehicles have been liberalized for the purposes of practicality. Obtaining a warrant for a moving vehicle is particularly difficult for want of a specific description of the place, things, and persons to be searches. Also, it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Still, however, there must be probable cause to conduct such warrantless search. One form of search of moving vehicles is the stop-and-search without warrant at checkpoints, which has been declared as not illegal per se, for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search. Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search. The circumstances in this case, however, do not constitute a routine inspection. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers have probable cause to believe that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. In this case, the officers flagged down the jeep because they became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves, which, to them, was unusual and uncommon. The Court believes that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not

RATIO: Reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. Like probable cause, it is dependent upon both the content of the information possessed by the police and its degree of reliability. Both factors quantity and quality are considered in the totality of circumstances, the whole picture that must be taken into account when determining probable cause. (US vs. Cortez) If a tip that has a low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion. The Gates Court applied the totality of the circumstances approach in this manner, taking into account the facts known to the officers from personal observation, and giving the anonymous tip the weight it deserved in light of its indicia of reliability as established through independent police work. The same approach applies in the reasonable suspicion context, the only difference is the level of suspicion that must be established. Every detail mentioned by the tipster was verified. Because an informant is shown to be right about some things, he is probably right about other facts that he has alleged, including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity. (Illinois vs. Gates) It is important that the anonymous tip contained a range of details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted. Independent corroboration by the police gave the tip some degree of reliability. DISSENT: Stevens (Brennan and Marshall joining): The records in this case do not say whether Officer Davis made any effort to ascertain the informer's identity, his reason for calling, or the basis of his prediction about respondent's destination. The tipster may well have been another police officer who had a "hunch" that respondent might have cocaine in her attach case. Anybody with enough knowledge about a given person to make her the target of a prank, or to harbor a grudge against her, will certainly be able to formulate a tip about her like the one predicting Vanessa White's excursion. But the 4th Amendment was intended to protect the citizen from the over-zealous and unscrupulous officer, as well as from those who are conscientious and truthful. This decision makes a mockery of that protection.

Caballes vs Court of Appeals (January 15, 2002) Ponente: Puno Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals Facts: While on a routine patrol in Brgy Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, Sgt. Victorino Nocejo and Pat. Alex de Castro spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with kakawati leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two officers flagged down the vehicle. Being the driver of the jeep, Caballes

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common for such to be covered in kakawati leaves does not constitute probable cause to justify a search without a warrant. In addition, there was no tip or confidential information that could have backed up their search, as jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become sufficient to constitute probable cause. 2. Plain view doctrine It is clear from the records that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because they were placed in sacks and covered with leaves. They had no clue as to what was underneath the leaves. Object was not in plain view which could have justified mere seizure without further search. Held: Yes Ratio: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant. However, this is not absolute and exceptions have been contemplated by the law: 1. Search incidental to a lawful rrest 2. Search of moving vehicles 3. Seizure in plain view 4. Customs search 5. Waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. In the cited cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as essential requirement. Probable cause (in relation to search and seizure): Existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item, article, or object sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. A stop-and-frisk operation is another exception to the general rule. In this case, probable cause was established with Manalilis suspicious behaviour. Malacat vs. CA G.R. No. 123595 December 12, 1997 Facts: Sammy Malacat was charged with violating PD 1866 (possession of a hand grenade without first securing the necessary license and/or permit from the proper authorities. The police authorities were not armed with a search warrant nor warrant of arrest at the time they arrested the petitioner.

3. Consented search At most, there was only implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. Manalili vs Court of Appeals (October 9, 1997) Ponente: Panaganiban Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals Facts: Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas were patrolling the vicinity of the Kalookan City Cemetery due to reports of drug addicts roaming the area. They chanced upon a male (who turned out to be petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon) who seemed to be high on drugs in front of the cemetery. He was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When Manalili tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and asked what he was holding in his hands. Manalili tried to resist, but the policemen were persistent until he yielded his wallet which they examined and found to contain crushed marijuana residue. Further examination by the Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI confirmed the findings. Trial court convicted Manalili of violation of Section 8, Article II, of RA 6425. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. (In his defense, Manalili claimed that he was not walking; that he was riding a tricycle until the three policemen ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop because the driver and passenger were allegedly under the influence of marijuana. He claimed that he was searched and his pants were turned inside-out but nothing was found. To some extent he implied that the marijuana sample found in his entity was framed up by the policemen.) Issue: WON the evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk operation is admissible.

The arresting officer (Rodolfo Yu) said that he was on foot patrol in response to bomb threats within the area. They spotted Muslim-looking men near the Mercury Drug Store who were acting suspiciously with their eyes moving very fast. They approached the group of men who then fled to different directions. The police caught up and apprehended the petitioner. Upon searching the petitioner, the police officer found a grenade tucked inside the petitioners front waist line. The investigating officer (Josefino Serapio) conducted the inquest of the suspects, informing them of their rights to remain silent and to be assisted by a competent counsel. The suspects said theyre willing to answer questions without the assistance of a lawyer. The petitioner admitted the possession of the grenade. (Serapio took the confession knowing it was inadmissible in evidence ~ wasnt waived in writing). Petitoner was a lone defense witness. He mentioned that the policemen approached them and ordered all males

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to stand aside. The policemen searched the petitioner and two other men, but found nothing in their possession. He saw the grenade only once when it was presented in court. RTC ruled that the warrantless search and seizure was a stop and frisk, where a "warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information." Probable cause wasnt required. The trial court emphasized that the policemen were confronted with an emergency, that obtaining a warrant will result in delay which could destroy the evidence. Trial court also ruled that the seizure was of the grenade was incidental to a lawful arrest. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. He argued that the warrantless search/arrest was invalid and that the hand grenade should be made inadmissible in evidence. CA affirmed the ruling and said that the arrest was lawful on the ground that there was probable cause for the arrest. (There was an issue of jurisdiction. The appeal was originally transferred to CA but it should be noted that the maximum of the penalty and not the minimum should be taken into account in determining appellate jurisdiction. The punishment for the alleged crime was reclusion perpetua which means the appeal shouldve been with the SC.) Issues: a. Was the petitioner able to establish the petitioners guilty with moral certainty? b. Was the warrantless search and seizure was valid? Ratio: a. No. Prosecution failed! b. No. Held: Serious doubt surrounds the story of the police officer. Yu didnt identify the grenade he seized. It couldve been a different grenade. No evidence that it was the same grenade. The confession wasnt admissible in evidence since no lawyer was present when the custodial investigation was conducted. Even if the petitoner waived his rights, the waiver is invalid because it wasnt in writing and it wasnt done in the presence of counsel. The valid warrantless are as follows: Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawful A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (in flagrante delicto) (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; (hot pursuit) and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped Valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk. The RTC confused stop and frisk and search incidental to warrantless arrest. They are different! Search incidental to a lawful arrest the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. Lawful arrest is required before a search is made. In the case at bar, no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit due to the lack of knowledge of Yu. No overt physical act indicated that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. The arrest was invalid thus making the search invalid as well. Stop and frisk limited protective search of outer clothes for weapons. Probable cause is not required to conduct a stop and frisk. It serves a two-fold purpose: a) approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause and b) the more pressing interest of safety and selfpreservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon. In the case at bar, the stop and frisk was invalid for 3 reasons: 1) There were doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. 2) Nothing in petitioners behavior that elicited any suspicion. Eyes that move very fast just doesnt cut it. 3. No ground to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. The bulge of the grenade couldnt have been visible to Yu. The petitioner is therefore acquitted. People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996) People v. Laserna, 278 SCRA 561 (1997); People vs. Malmstedt June 19, 1991 G.R. No. 91107 Facts: Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. Accused arrived in the country and left for Baguio City. He took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days. At around 7:00 in the morning of the 2 nd day, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City > Angeles City > out of the country.

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Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Two officers boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. During the inspection, Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish , a derivative of marijuana. Accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. Before he alighted the bus, he got his two traveling bags from the luggage carrier. The officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag which turned out contain illegal drugs as well. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport. For his defense, accused said that the marijuana found in his pouch was planted by the NARCOM officers. He claims that the two bags werent his but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station. The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the officers was belied by his failure to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. It was only two (2) months after said investigation when he told his lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as well as having hashish in his pouch bag. RTC found the accused guilty. Issue: Was the search conducted by the NARCOM officers valid? Held: Yes. Ratio: Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused, there was no time to obtain a search warrant. The officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. When accused failed to show his passport, this aroused the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused Narvasa (dissenting) I believe that the appellant should be absolved on reasonable doubt. There was in this case no confidential report from, or positive identification by an informer; no attempt to flee; no bag or package emitting tell-tale odors; no other reasonably persuasive indications that Malmstedt was at the time in process of perpetrating the offense for which he was subsequently prosecuted. Hence, when the soldiers searched Malmstedt's pouch and the bags in his possession, they were simply "fishing" for evidence. Cruz (dissenting) It is so easy to condemn a person on the basis of his appearance but it is also so wrong. It seems to be the inclination of some judges to wink at an illegal search and seizure as long as the suspect has been actually found in possession of a prohibited article. That fact will retroactively validate the violation of the Bill of Rights for after all, as they would rationalize, the suspect is a criminal. What matters to them is the fact of illegal possession, not the fact of illegal search and seizure. This kind of thinking takes us back to the intolerant days of Moncado, which was discredited in Stonehill. The ponencia notes that the military had advance information that a Caucasian was coming from the Sagada with prohibited drugs in his possession. This is what the military says now, after the fact, to justify the warrantless search. It is so easy to make such a claim, and I am surprised that the majority should readily accept it.

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People v Encinada(1997) Facts: At around 4 p.m., SPO4 Bolonia received a tip from an informant that Encinada would be arriving in Surigao City from Cebu City the next day (May 21, 1992) at 7 a.m on board the M/V Sweet Pearl bringing with him marijuana. Because the information came late (i.e. at about the closing time of the offices of various courts), there was no more time to secure a warrant. At about 8:15 a.m. of May 21, 1992, the M/V Sweet Pearl finally docked. The police officers saw Encinada walk briskly down the gangplank, carrying two small plastic baby chairs in his hand. The police officers followed Encinada who immediately boarded a tricycle. As the tricycle slowly moved forward, Bolonia chased it and ordered the driver to stop after identifying himself as a police officer. When the vehicle stopped, Bolonia identified himself to Encinada and ordered him to alight from the tricycle. Bolonia asked Encinada to hand over the plastic chairs, to which the latter complied. Bolonia examined the package between the stack of chairs closely and smelled the peculiar scent of marijuana. Making a small tear in the cellophane cover, Bolonia could see and smell what appeared to be marijuana. Encinada was then brought to the central police station. Bolonia, in the presence of one NonoyLerio who is a member of the local media and a friend of Encinada, opened the package. It was discovered that the contents consisted of dried leaves known as marijuana. The forensic chemist then tested the leaves and confirmed that they were positive for marijuana. In his defense, Encinada denied the ownership and possession of the plastic baby chairs. He said that he was singled out after the body search was conducted on all passengers and that he openly protested the action taken by the police and demanded from them a copy of search warrant or warrant of arrest. TC found Encinada guilty of illegal transportation of prohibited drugs. It emphasized that the appellant was caught carrying marijuana in flagrante delicto; hence, the warrantless search following his lawful arrest was valid and the marijuana obtained was admissible in evidence. Issues: 1. WON the evidence showing Encinadas possession of marijuana was sufficient 2. WON the search conducted on the person and belongings of Encinada was valid Held: 1. 2. Yes. No; hence, inadmissible. Encinada is acquitted. committing a crime in the presence of the Surigao City policemen. Evidence did not even show any suspicious behavior on Encinadas part. Morever, the lawmen did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed an offense. Also, Bolonias testimony shows that the search preceded the arrest. Police officers could have secured a warrant: Even if the information was received by Bolonia about 4 p.m., there was sufficient time to secure a warrant of arrest as the M/V Sweet Pearl was not expected to dock until 7 a.m. the following day. Administrative Circular No. 18 and Circular No. 19, series of 1987 (Amended Guidelines and Procedures on Applications for Search Warrants for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Other Serious Crimes Filed in Metro Manila Courts and Other Courts with Multiple Salas) allow applications for search warrants even after office hours. Not a consented search: Encinada did not voluntarily consent to Bolonias search of his belongings. His silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search search. SC cannot appreciate consent based merely on the presumption of regularity of the performance of duty. VS.People v Lacerna: In this case, no checkpoint was established. The policemen stopped the tricycle and forthwith subjected the passengers to a search of their persons and baggage. Also, appellant openly objected to the search by asking for a warrant. People vs Cuizon (April 18, 1996) (PREVIOUS) Checkpoints: Valmonte v. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211 (1989); People vs. Vinecario, 420 SCRA 280 (2004); Aniag vs. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 424 (1994); People vs. Escano Jan. 28, 2000 Ponente: Davide, Jr. Facts: On 5 April 1995 and during a COMELEC gun ban, some law enforcers of the Makati Police, namely, PO3 Eduardo P. Suba, PO3 Bernabe Nonato, SPO4 Juan de los Santos, and Inspector Ernesto Guico, were manning a checkpoint at the corner of Senator Gil Puyat Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX). They were checking the cars going to Pasay City, stopping those they found suspicious, and imposing merely a running stop on the others. At about past midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride car with Plate TBH 493. P03 Suba saw a long firearm on the lap of the person seated at the passenger seat, who was later identified as Virgilio Usana. They asked the driver, identified as Julian D. Escao, to open the door. P03 Suba seized the long firearm, an M-1 US Carbine, from Usana. When Escao, upon order of the police, parked along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., the other passengers were searched for more weapons. Their search yielded a .45 caliber firearm which they seized from Escao. The three passengers were thereafter

Ratio: 1. Encinadas denial of having possessed the marijuana was rebutted by Bolonias testimony that he was seen carrying the plastic baby chairs. Furthermore, proof of ownership (cause he also denied such) of marijuana is not necessary in the prosecution of illegal drug cases, it is sufficient that such drug is found in apellants possession. 2. Search cannot be said to be merely incident to a lawful arrest: Apellant was not

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brought to the police station Block 5 in the Kia Pride driven by PO3 Nonato. Upon reaching the precinct, Nonato turned over the key to the desk officer. Since SPO4 de los Santos was suspicious of the vehicle, he requested Escao to open the trunk. Escao readily agreed and opened the trunk himself using his key. They noticed a blue bag inside it, which they asked Escao to open. The bag contained a parcel wrapped in tape, which, upon examination by National Bureau of Investigation Forensic Chemist Emilia A. Rosaldos, was found positive for hashish weighing 3.3143 kilograms. Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez, together with Julian D. Escao, were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, in Criminal Case 95-936 with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, as amended. Escao and Usana were also charged in Criminal Cases 95-937 and 95-938 with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree 1866. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. In its Decision of 30 May 1997, which was promulgated on 17 June 1997, the trial court convicted Escao, Lopez and Usana in Criminal Case 95936, Escao in Criminal Case 95-937, and Usana in Criminal Case 95-938. Escao filed on 19 June 1997 a Notice of Appeal, but on 16 July 1997, he filed a Manifestation and Withdrawal of Appeal, which was granted by the trial court in its Order of 17 July 1997. Usana and Lopez filed a Notice of Appeal on 30 June 1997, manifesting therein that they were appealing to the Supreme Court and to the Court of Appeals. Considering the penalties imposed, the decision in Criminal Case 95-936 was appealed to the Supreme Court, while the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the appeal from Criminal Case 95-938. In its Order of 30 June 1997, the trial court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the transmittal of the record in Criminal Case 95-936 to the Supreme Court and the record of Criminal Case 95-938 to the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, it is only the appeal from the judgment in Criminal Case 95-936 that is before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the search conducted on Escanos car is illegal, and whether the evidence acquired therein would be sufficient to convict Lopez and Usana for possession of illegal drugs. Held: The Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists right to free passage without interruption, but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicles occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs. The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without opening the cars doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands. Despite the validity of the search, the Court cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez for violation of RA 6425, as amended. The following facts militate against a finding of conviction: (1) the car belonged to Escao; (2) the trunk of the car was not opened soon after it was stopped and after the accused were searched for firearms; (3) the car was driven by a policeman from the place where it was stopped until the police station; (4) the cars trunk was opened, with the permission of Escao, without the presence of Usana and Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the police station and until the opening of the cars trunk, the car was in the possession and control of the police authorities. No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car. Their having been with Escao in the latters car before the finding of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an appreciable time and without their presence left much to be desired to implicate them to the offense of selling, distributing, or transporting the prohibited drug. In fact, there was no showing that Usana and Lopez knew of the presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before it was seized. d. Moving vehicles/hot pursuit Caroll v. US 1925 Taft ang crazy ng pagkakasulat ng facts ng case na to. I tried my best to decipher everything. I hate US cases, especially this one. Facts: Cronenwett and Scully were in an apartment in Grand Rapids with three men, Kruska and the two defendants, Caroll and Kiro Cronenwett pretended to be Stafford who wanted to buy 3 cases of whiskey The three men promised to get the liquor from the east end of Grand Rapids However, when they came back, they said they could not get the liquor and promised to deliver it the next day When the 3 came into the apartment, they rode an Oldsmobile Roadster the number of which Cronenwett and Scully were able to identify The sale did not push through the next day as the 3 did not show up

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However, while Cronenwett and his subordinates were patrolling the road leading from Detroit to Grand Rapids, looking for violations of the Prohibition Act (something to do with intoxicating liquor), Cronenwetts Roadster passed them by When they finally caught up with the defendants, they stopped them and searched the car They found behind the upholstering of the seats 68 bottles of so-called bonded whiskey and gin The defendants were convicted for transporting in an automobile intoxicating spirituous liquor, in violation of the National Prohibition Act During the time the defendants were caught, the officers were not anticipating that they would be coming through on the highway but when the officers met them there, they believed they were carrying liquor thus the search, seizure and arrest The measure of legality of such a seizure is, therefore, that the seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported. In this case, based on facts and circumstances w/in the officers knowledge, they had reasonable cause to believe that the automobile is transporting liquors

Issue: WON the search of the vehicle without a warrant violates the 4th Amendment Held: NO It will make it impossible to stop the rum running automobiles engaged in like illegal traffic. It would take from the officers the power that they absolutely must have to be of any service, for if they cannot search for liquor without a warrant, they might as well be discharged. It is impossible to get a warrant to stop an automobile. Before a warrant could be secured, the automobile would be beyond the reach of the officer, with its load of illegal liquor disposed of On reason and authority, the true rule is that, if the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid. The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens. The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

Separate Opinion of Reynolds concurred by Sutherland: Basically, hes saying that what happened was an arrest before a search So, the search was illegal because it followed an illegal arrest Generally, arrest should be made with a warrant except under certain circumstances like in flagrante delicto The case at bar is not an exceptional circumstance California vs Carney Facts A Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent, who had information that respondent's mobile motor home was being used to exchange marihuana for sex, watched respondent approach a youth who accompanied respondent to the motor home. The agent and other agents then kept the vehicle under surveillance, and stopped the youth after he left the vehicle. He told them that he had received marihuana in return for allowing respondent sexual contacts. At the agents' request, the youth returned to the motor home and knocked on the door; respondent stepped out. Without a warrant or consent, one agent then entered the motor home and observed marihuana. A subsequent search of the motor home at the police station revealed additional marihuana, and respondent was charged with possession of marihuana for sale.

Issues WON the warrantless search of home violated the Fourth Amendment Held Ratio No When a vehicle is being used on the highways or is capable of such use and is found stationary in

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a place not regularly used for residential purposes, the two justifications for the vehicle exception come into play. o o First, the vehicle is readily mobile. Second, there is a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on highways. Obra regarding illegal mining activities conducted by the Brett spouses in a property belonging to the Gillies. Upon receipt of the letter, Dir. Obra referred the letter to Brig. Gen. Tomas Dumpit and requested assistance in apprehending a truck allegedly used by the Bretts in the said illegal mining activity. The letter included details of the truck to be apprehended, i.e a truck which is colored with a blue and yellow lining. The following day, Obra wrote the Bretts and Ms. Grybos, informing them that the BMGS was going to conduct an ocular inspection and field investigation on a certain date at the vicinity in connection with Grybos' complaint and requesting them and their witnesses to be present at the investigation. Dumpit was copy furnished with these letters. Accordingly, officers under Dumpit seized an Isuzu "ELF" truck belonging to the Bretts and later impounded it and prevented from leaving the area except on mercy missions to transport sick soldiers and workers to the hospital and when used to buy food supplies for the men inside the camp. The Bretts filed a complaint for injunction and damages, with an application for temporary restraining order, with the RTC of Baguio and Benguet alleging that the truck had been seized without prior investigation to determine the existence of probable cause and that this was in violation of private respondents' constitutional rights under Art. 32, in relation to Arts. 19, 20 and 21, of the Civil Code. TC: Ruled that the Bretts were deprived of the use and enjoyment of property without due process of law. CA: Affirmed in toto. Contention: The seizure is valid as it is in performance of the police officers duty, in good faith, applying P.D. No. 1281, as amended, authorizing the Regional Director of the BMGS to "order the seizure and confiscation, in favor of the Government, of the tools and equipment used in the commission of an offense" and "to deputize, when necessary, any member or unit of the PC, police agency, barangay or any qualified person to police mining activities." That these provisions of the Decree were justified under Art. IV, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution. ISSUE: Is there proper investigation and determination of probable cause to order the seizure and impoundment of the Bretts vehicle? HELD: None. The constitutional provision merely validated the grant by law to nonjudicial officers of the power to issue warrants of arrest or search warrants, but did not in any way exempt these officers from the duty of determining the existence of probable cause as basis for the issuance of such warrants. Obra's only basis for ordering the seizure of the vehicle was an alleged certification from the BMGS that no mining permit had been issued to the Bretts, which was not presented in Court. Later on, it was proved that the Bretts have a license to operate. The seizure of the vehicle cannot likewise be justified under the "moving vehicle" doctrine, as it was seized while it was entering the mining area, not transporting minerals outside of the area. The search of moving vehicles is justified on the ground that the mobility of motor

While respondent's vehicle possessed some attributes of a home, it clearly falls within the vehicle exception. To distinguish between respondent's motor home and an ordinary sedan for purposes of the vehicle exception would require that the exception be applied depending on the size of the vehicle and the quality of its appointments. Moreover, to fail to apply the exception to vehicles such as a motor home would ignore the fact that a motor home lends itself easily to use as an instrument of illicit drug traffic or other illegal activity. The search in question was not unreasonable. It was one that a magistrate could have authorized if presented with the facts. The DEA agents, based on uncontradicted evidence that respondent was distributing a controlled substance from the vehicle, had abundant probable cause to enter and search the vehicle.

Justice Stevens, Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, dissenting Inherent mobility is not a sufficient justification for the fashioning of an exception to the warrant requirement, especially in the face of heightened expectations of privacy in the location searched. Motor homes, by their common use and construction, afford their owners a substantial and legitimate expectation of privacy when they dwell within. Although it may not be a castle, a motor home is usually the functional equivalent of a hotel room, a vacation and retirement home, or a hunting and fishing cabin. Hence, a warrantless search of living quarters in a motor home is "presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances." Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 (1968); - Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002; (see above @ page 4 ) - Asuncion v. CA, 302 SCRA 490 (1999); - Roldan v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336 (1975); - People v. Balingan, 241 SCRA 277 (1995);

Benjamin Obra v. Court of Appeals, Sps. Brett Mendoza, J. (October 28, 1999) FACTS: This case arises from a complaint written by Jeannette M. Grybos addressed to Director Benjamin

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vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. But this does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. Obiter: Dumpit cannot evade responsibility for his acts by claiming that he merely performed a ministerial duty in ordering the implementation of petitioner Obra's request. Otherwise, Art. 32 could easily be avoided by the mere plea that the officer concerned was only carrying out a ministerial duty. People vs Lo Ho Wing 193 SCRA 122 January 21, 1991 Gancayco FACTS: Reynaldo Tia was hired by the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the Criminal Investigation Service of the PC to be a confidential man or deep penetration agent in one of the SOGs operations to capture a certain group involved in drug smuggling and importation, etc. So Tia, a spy in short, was hired by accused Lim Cheng Huat as a male travelling companion for co-accused Peter Lo. Both of them went to Hongkong. Tia notified his SOG boss as to their expected date of return (date plus time). So Lo and Tia, in Hongkong, checked into a hotel. Tia saw some people who gave Lo some tin cans of tea. When he asked about it, he was told that they are Chinese drugs. They went back to the Phils. Customs did not closely examine the tin cans of Lo (placed in a bag). The SOG agents were already positioned in the airport. After Tia talked to co-accused Lim, they boarded a taxi and placed the bag with the tin cans on the trunk and the taxi sped away. Lim was on another taxi. The agents overtook the taxi of Tia and Lo, cut into its path, and the taxi driver was forced to stop. They went to the taxi, requested the driver to open the trunk and retrieve the luggage. The agents requested the suspects for permission to search the luggage. The tin can was opened, a tea bag was taken out by an agent, he pinched it to feel its contents and some white powdery substance came out. He opened it and upon seeing the contents, he suspected it was a dangerous drug. The agents got all the tin cans and nothing else. Lims taxi was also stopped and he was also apprehended. The contents of the tea bags in the tin cans were found to be methampethamine. ISSUE Whether the search and seizure of the tin cans was legal or not. HELD and RATIO The search and seizure was legal Even though the SOG had advance notice of the arrival of accused Lo, and thus had time to procure a search warrant, the search was done while in a moving vehicle. Manipon Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan stated that there are at least 3 exceptions for a warrantless search: 1. Search incidental to an arrest, 2. Search of a moving vehicle, 3. Seizure of an evidence in plain view. So here, the case falls under no.2 so no need for search warrant The reason for this is because the judge cannot state with particularity the place to be searched, given that vehicles are very mobile Here, the agents had reasonable ground to believe that the accused would bring in contraband from another country. While this might be inadequate to justify the issuance of a search warrant, this is enough to serve as probable cause for a warrantless search. Even though the packages did not reach their intended destination, it was still transported from place to place. e. "Plain View" Doctrine: Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 472 (1971); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) People v. Bolasa, 321 SCRA 459 (1999); People v. Evaristo, 216 SCRA 431 (1992); HARRIS V. US March 5, 1968 Per Curiam FACTS: Harris was charged with robbery He was seen leaving the site of robbery; the car was traced and was arrested as he was entering his home Police decided to impound the car as evidence A regulation of the metropolitan police department requires the officer who takes an impounded vehicle in charge to search the vehicle thoroughly, to remove all valuables from it and to attach the vehicle a property tag listing certain information about the circumstances of the impounding Police officer saw the registration card (with the name of the victim) and confronted the petitioner with the said registration card ISSUE: WON officer discovered the registration card by means of an illegal search HELD: No

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Can seizure never be justified on less than probable clause then? The Court says it can! It can when the seizure is minimally intrusive and operational necessities render it the only practicable means of detecting certain types of crime (ex. US vs. Place, seizure of suspected luggage to permit exposure to trained dog). However, no special operational necessities are relied on in this case. They only rely on the mere fact that they came lawfully within their plain view. Plain view alone cannot supplant the requirement of probable cause. The plain view doctrine cannot be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. (Coolidge vs. New Hampshire) Neither search nor seizure is inferior or requires lesser protection, although the interest protected is different in their injunctions under 4th Amendment. Dissent: Powell, Chief Justice and OConnor: This decision holds for the first time that the requirement of probable cause operates as a limitation on the application of plain-view doctrine. There was no exploratory search or rummaging around in this case; the moving of the suspicious object only results in a minimal invasion of privacy. What they saw hardly suggested the occupancy of a law-abiding citizen (weapons were seized). The officers' suspicion that the stereo components at issue were stolen was both reasonable and based on specific, articulable facts The State was unwise to concede the absence of probable cause. The distinction between "looking" at a suspicious object in plain view and "moving" it even a few inches trivializes the Fourth Amendment. This decision may handicap law enforcement without enhancing privacy interests. What would you have had Officer Nelson done in these circumstances? If he did lack probable cause, he could not have obtained a warrant. Neither could he have remained in the premises to prevent the removal of the components. People vs Musa (January 27, 1993) Ponente: Romero Nature: Appeal from the judgment of the RTC of Zamboanga City Facts: In the morning of December 13, 1989, the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) team in Zamboanga conducted a surveillance and test-buy on Mari Musa, after having received information that Mari Musa was selling marijuana. In said test-buy operation, the team was able to buy one pack of newspaper-wrapped marijuana for P10. A buy-bust operation was conducted the following day. Sgt. Amado Ani acted as the poseurbuyer, and bought two packs of marijuana wrapped in newspaper for P20 (marked money). Ani opened the contents of the pack and convinced that it was marijuana, he gave the signal to his companions who

RATIO: Nothing in the 4th amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant in these narrow circumstances Once the door had lawfully been opened, the registration card, with the name of the robbery victim on it, was plainly visible Objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence Arizona vs. Hicks 3 March 1987 Justice Scalia Facts: After a bullet had been fired through Hicks apartment floor and injured a man below, police officers came and entered his apartment to search for the shooter, for other victims and for weapons. They seized 3 weapons, a sawed-off rifle, and a stocking-cap mask. In the course of the search, Officer Nelson noticed 2 sets of stereo components (more expensive looking than anything in the apartment). Suspecting that they were stolen, he moved the components including a turntable and recorded their serial numbers. He phoned the headquarters and was advised that the turntable was indeed stolen. He seized the turntable right away. Later, it was found out that the other serial numbers matched those taken during an armed robbery. A warrant was obtained to seize the others as well. Both trial court and CA granted to suppress the evidence seized. Although the initial entry into the apartment was justified by the exigent circumstance of the shooting, CA viewed that the recording of the serial numbers was an additional search and was unrelated. CA found a violation of the 4th amendment. Issue: Can the plain view doctrine be invoked when the police have less than probable cause that an item in question is evidence of a crime? Held: No. Probable cause is still required. CA decision is affirmed. Ratio: It is clear that the search here was valid if the "plain view" doctrine would have sustained a seizure of the equipment. It would have done so if there was probable cause. In this case there was only reasonable suspicion but no probable cause to believe that the components had been stolen. Probable cause is required. Justifying exceptions to warrantless search is worlds apart from permitting a lesser standard of cause for the seizure that a warrant would require. There is no apparent reason for lowering the standards for probable cause requirement in this case.

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consequently sped towards the house of Musa where the marijuana was bought to make the arrest. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari Musa and searched him to retrieve the marked money but didnt find it. Musa said that he gave the money to his wife. Thereafter, Belarga and another officer went to the kitchen and noticed a cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen. They asked the appellant about its contents, but Musa did not respond so they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves. Issue: WON the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing marijuana which the NARCOM agents found in the appellants kitchen was valid Held: No; the plastic bag is not admissible in evidence Ratio: A warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon the person arrested. In a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without the arrest and search warrants. In such warrantless searches and seizures, objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Also, even if an object is observed in plain view, the plain view doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the plain view of the object. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items may be evidence of a crime, contraband, etc. In the case at bar, the agents went from room to room with the obvious intention of fishing for more evidence. They had no clue as to the contents of the bag, and had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the plain view of the object. Note: Musa still convicted; other pieces of evidence were sufficient to prosecute him. People vs. Doria G.R. No. 125299 January 22, 1999 Facts: Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (NARCOM), received information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one Florencia Doria was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest Doria in a buy-bust operation. Doria appeared and the informant introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed Doria the marked bills worth P1,600.00. Doria instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his associate. An hour later, Doria appeared and gave the marijuana to the officers. Thats the time they arrested him. They frisked Doria but did not find the marked bills on him. Doria revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named Violeta Gaddao. Doria led the police team to Gaddaos house nearby at Daang Bakal. The team found the door of Violeta Gaddaos house open and a woman inside. Doria identified the woman as his associate. SPO1 Badua asked Gaddao about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over Gaddaos house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from Gaddao. The policemen arrested Gaddao. They took Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao together with the box, its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. Both of the accused denied the accusations. RTC convicted the accused. Issue: (1) Was the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of accused-appellant Doria valid? (2) Was the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and house valid? Are the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom admissible? Held: (1) Yes. (2) No. The evidence are inadmissible. Ratio: Doria was caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of an offense. Entrapment has received judicial sanction when undertaken with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards. (Lengthy discussion about entrapment and instigation. Main distinction: In instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the peace officer for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan.) Theres a subjective and objective test in determining if the results of a buy-bust operation is valid. First one is called subjective test, wherein the focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind and inclination before his

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initial exposure to government agents. The second one is called the objective test, which is focused on the inducements used by government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to commit the crime. In our country, both tests are used, first objective and then later the subjective test. Both should concur. It was established that Doria was caught selling drugs to one of the officers. His arrest was valid. Gaddao, on the other hand, was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused. Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her coaccused in pushing drugs. Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. Could the plain view doctrine be applied? It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. PO3 Manlangit admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. People v Valdez (2000) Facts: On September 24, 1996, SPO3 Tipay received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation allegedly owned by Valdez (accused-appellant). The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to appellants hut. Police Inspector Parungao then formed a reaction team whom he gave specific instructions to uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of the same. At 5:00 am the following day, the police team, accompanied by the informer, left for the site were the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a 3-hour uphill trek from the nearest barangay road, the police operatives arrived at their destination. The police found Valdez alone in his nipa hut. They then proceeded to look around the area where Valdez had his kaingin and saw 7 5-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from accuseds house. When PO2 Balut asked who owned the prohibited plants, Valdez admitted that it was his. The police then uprooted the 7 marijuana plants which weighed 2.194 kg. Thereafter, they took photos of Valdez standing beside the cannabis plant. He was then arrested. Upon analysis in the crime laboratory, the findings gave a positive result to the test for marijuana. Valdez contends that he was coerced/threatened to admit owning the marijuana plants. Further, he said that the nearest house to the marijuana plantation was that of one Pascua who bore a grudge against him. TC found Valdez guilty for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of lethal injection. This case is an automatic review of said decision. Issues: 1. Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case lawful? 2. Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused? 3. Has the prosecution proved appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt? 4. Is the sentence of death by lethal injection correct? Held& Ratio: 1. Confiscated plants were obtained during an illegal search and seizure. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least 1 day to obtain a warrant to search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their possession, they could have convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. Plain view doctrine is not applicable. o PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants before appellant was arrested without a warrant.Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's premises. o The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. o We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal plants.Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. Right against unreasonable search and seizure

Page 16 of 29
protects people not places; thus, it is of no moment that the lot where marijuana plants were located was unfenced. Said plants, as product of an unlawful search and seizure, cannot be used as evidence against appellants for being fruits of the proverbial poison tree. No. Presumption of innocence in accuseds favor stands. Both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to appellants voluntary confession of ownership of the prohibited plants relied upon to his guilt failed to meet the test of Constitutional competence. Without these, the prosecutions remaining evidence did not even approximate the quantum of evidence necessary to warrant appellants conviction. (RE: Confession) o While the police operation was supposedly meant to merely "verify" a tipsters information, the police chief had likewise issued instructions to arrest appellant as a suspected marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter was already under investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the police was no longer a general inquiry. At this point, he was already under custodial investigation and had a right to counsel even if he had not yet been arrested. o Appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its admissibility. Admission by appellant was verbal Uncounselled Valdez is acquitted and ordered released immediately from confinement unless held for another lawful cause. of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession (Requirements): (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.

2.

3.

People v. Salanguit April 19, 2001 Ponente: Mendoza Facts: On 26 December 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariias, Cavite, to search the residence of Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from Salanguit. The sale took place in Salunguits room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by Salunguit from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol. At about 10:30 p.m. of said day, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of Salunguit to serve the warrant. The police operatives knocked on Salanguits door, but nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the house. After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but Salanguit refused to sign it. After the search, the police operatives took Salanguit with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized. PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence. The white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana. Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358, respectively) were filed on 28 December 1995. After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, convicting Salanguit in Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively, RA 6425, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of 6 months of arresto mayor and a maximum of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, and reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00, respectively. Salanguit appealed; contesting his conviction on the grounds that (1) the admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his

4.

Notes: Plain View Doctrine: For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. When is there an investigation: An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry but startsto focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. Custodial Inverstigation: questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way Constitutional Rights of a Person under Investigation: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably

Page 17 of 29
residence as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid; (2) the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Salanguit to the plain view doctrine; and (3) the employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant. Issue: Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the seizure of drug paraphernalia, and whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the plain view doctrine. Held: The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia. Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu from Salanguits residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. With respect to, and in light of the plain view doctrine, the police failed to allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on Salanguits person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-64357 only. f. Private Searches & "State Expansion of Private Search" He opened the suitcase upon the request of the security and there were found small plastic packs containg white crystalline substance believed to be shabu The security reported the matter to the ship captain and the Phil Coast Guard Several police officers arrived and took custody of Bongcarawan and the seized items He was brought to the PAOCTF HQ while the substance were sent to the NBI for lab examination Lab examination confirmed the substance to be shabu Bongcarawans version of the story is that he was not the owner of the bag and that the security forced open the lock of the baggage He was charged with violation of Section 16, Art III of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drug Act of 1972)

Issue: WON the security personnel of the ship is deemed to perform the duties of a policeman or won, the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to security personnel (this is the issue related to the topic. There was another issue involved regarding the true owner of the baggage) Held: NO The theory of the defense that the security personnel should be considered as one conducted by police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order is untenable The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a right against transgression committed by the govt or its agents and can be invoked only against the State The security personnel is a private employee and does not discharge any governmental function Police officers, on the other hand, are agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law State vs Von Bulow (sorry, ang haba) Facts Martha von Bulow suffered her first coma.

People vs Marti (previous) People v. Bongcarawan July 11, 2002 Puno Facts: Bongcarawan was on board the M/V Super Ferry 5 when he was approached by the ships security officer after a report by a fellow passenger, Loreta Canoy, regarding missing jewelry Bongcarawan was bodily searched by the security and after not finding anything, he was asked to get his baggage Bongcarawan took his bags including a Samsonite suitcase

The defendant did call a doctor, but Maria, the personal maid of Marth, testified that the description of Mrs. von Bulow's condition given by defendant to the doctor was untrue. She was transported to the hospital and later discharged. Her diagnosis says that she has "broncho-pneumonia * * * cardio-respiratory arrest due to massive aspiration of gastric contents * * * hypoglycemia of undetermined etiology."

Page 18 of 29
Maria further testified that in February 1980 she found something in the von Bulows' New York apartment which disturbed her. While cleaning a walk-in closet off defendant's bedroom, she noticed a large black traveling bag belonging to defendant. Upon looking inside this bag, she discovered a smaller black bag or Maria removed the black bag, opened it, and examined its contents. Inside the black bag she found three vials one containing pills, one containing powder, and one containing liquid. She then replaced the black bag and its contents inside the larger traveling bag. Around Thanksgiving, Maria once again examined the contents of the bag. In addition to the three vials that she had seen previously, she stated that it now contained two or three needles, a syringe, and a small bottle labeled "insulin." Shortly thereafter, she called Alex, Mathas son, into the room and showed him the contents of the black bag. By mid-December, Alex testified that he noticed that his mother was experiencing symptoms of weakness and lack of coordination similar to those he had observed the previous December. Suspecting that defendant may have poisoned his wife, Alex; Marthas daughter Ala; and Marthas mother, Mrs. Aitken, hired former Manhattan District Attorney Richard Kuh to investigate the cause of Mrs. von Bulow's condition. Alex hired a locksmith to enable them to search the room of the defendant. Together with Lambert, a private investigator, Alex was able to enter the room. In defendant's desk Alex found a vial with French wording upon which he believed the word "Valium" was printed. In the closet, he again found the opaque black small bag with different pills in it and a light blue liquid. It also contained two packets of ampules in plastic packaging, a syringe, and three hypodermic needles, one of which was unsealed. Alex had it examined by doctors of Boston Medical lab. It was revealed the presence of insulin in the needle washing. Other contained amobarbital and diazepam (Valium). Alex came to Rhode Island State Police headquarters for the purpose of handing over the black bag and its contents. The state continued the investigation, expanding upon the work of Kuh and the others involved in the family's investigation. Their efforts resulted in the indictment, trial, and ultimate conviction of defendant on two counts of assault with intent to murder his wife. Issues

Held Ratio

WON the activities of Alex et als search of defendant's closet, bathroom, desk, and study violates the Fourth Amendment WON the states evidence-gathering techniques in this case violates the Fourth Amendment No Yes

The Constitutional prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures applies only to governmental conduct. However, such will not apply on the evidencegathering techniques employed by the state. Courts decision in State v. Eiseman, requires an application of an analysis that clearly separates the Fourth Amendment standards to be applied to the private search of Clarendon Court, from those governing the subsequent chemical testing of certain fruits of that search by the Rhode Island State Police. Since the independent governmental search is subject to the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment. o First, there is no dispute about the fact that the state failed to obtain a warrant before chemically testing the pills received from Alex.

Second, there is no evidence in the record to support a finding that any recognized exception to the warrant requirement existed to justify the chemical testing.

Plain-view doctrine wont apply since it has been held that it cannot be used "to justify conduct that may constitute a `significant expansion' of the private search. Harmless error doctrine also wont apply since a determination of whether error is harmless must turn upon whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error complained of contributed to the conviction. And before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, there must be a declaration first that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In here, the chemical tests of certain contents of the black bag formed a significant part of the state's case. The importance of these chemical tests is demonstrated by the fact that the state explicitly relied upon the results of these tests to prove its theory of the case. Because no warrant was procured to authorize the chemical testing and no exception to the

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warrant requirement exists to justify its absence, the admission of these test results by the trial justice can only be permitted if it is determined that the subsequent testing was not a significant expansion of the prior private search.

g. Extraordinary circumstances: People vs De Gracia 233 SCRA 716 / July 6, 1994 / Regalado FACTS: The facts of this case happened during a coup d'etat season (Dec.1989) by the Reform the Armed Forces MovementSoldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP). Dec.1, Major Soria was doing surveillance inside a car on Eurocar Sales Office in EDSA with 5 other team members. The said car sales office was tipped as being occupied by the RAM-SFP. There was a nearby crowd watching a bombardment in Camp Aguinaldo. 5 men separated from it and went to the police car and fired at it. One agent was wounded. The team was not able to retaliate because they hid in the car and were afraid of hurting civilians. 4 days later, a searching team WITHOUT search warrant raided Eurocar. They found 6 cartons of M-16 ammo, 5 bundles of dynamites, M-shells of various calibers and molotov bombs. They also found Rolando De Gracia, appellant, alone in a room owned by a certain Col. Matillano, peeping thru the door and holding a C-4 (an explosive?). The team arrested him and 2 janitors. The trial court convicted him of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion (RPC 135 par 2). ISSUE and HELD: Was the warrantless search legal? YES RATIO: the occupants of Eurocar initially denied the raiding team entrance Eurocar is not a gun store, it's a car store and the weapons and ammo had no business being there there were too many weapons.. it's obvious that it's not just for self-defense this is an exception to the prohibition on warrantless searches: there was general chaos and disorder w/in the Eurocar office, the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was still being bombed by rebel forces they had reasonable ground to believe that in Eurocar, a crime was being committed (see tip above) the courts were closed! How can they apply for a search warrant? related cases: People vs. Malmstedt, Umil vs. Ramos (re: the crime:) SC said the trial court used the wrong law. It should be PD 1866 (a special law on illegal possession of firearms) since it's a special law, crime is malum prohibitum, intent is not important. Here, De Gracia had control. He was a former military man and thus knowledgeable on firearms. He also seems to be very trusted by Col. Matillano, so he was made the guard of the

In Eiseman, four specific factors to consider in determining whether a governmental expansion of a private search is so significant as to invoke the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Applied to this case, these include the following: 1. The police officer's experience and expertise; 2. The question of whether in light of his expertise, the officer had formed an opinion with a reasonable degree of certainty concerning the identity of the substance previously searched by private parties before expanding the search; 3. The extent of the intrusion required to perform the expansion; and The question of whether such intrusion impinged upon any further expectation of privacy that remained after the exposure of the contents by private persons. Having reviewed the evidence in light of these factors, Court is convinced that all four militate against the trial justice's conclusion and in favor of Courts finding that the state's subsequent toxicological examination was a significant expansion of the private search subject to the protection of the Fourth Amendment: 1. Lieutenant Reise and his subordinate, Detective Miranda, both had extensive experience with the State Police; 2. Despite his expertise, Lieutenant Reise was unable to identify with a reasonable degree of certainty those substances that he had received from Alex without further testing; 3. And 4. defendant originally possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the pills and other contents of the black bag and the fact that they were unexpectedly seized, inspected, and delivered to the State Police by a private party does not alter defendant's legitimate original expectation of privacy. Even if defendant's Fourth Amendment rights had not been violated by the State Police's chemical testing, US own constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures mandates that the evidence obtained through the state's toxicological examination of the contents of the black bag be suppressed. Article I, sec. 6, of the Rhode Island Constitution is an alternative, independent foundation upon which we rest our holding that the toxicological testing was an illegal search. The admission of the evidence by the trial court is therefore wrong. defendant's appeal is sustained, the judgment of conviction appealed from is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial on both counts.

Page 20 of 29
weapons. He had no license to possess them. Plus, De Gracia was identified as one of the 5 men who fired at the surveillance team. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, et al. Roberts, C. J. (May 22, 2006) Stevens, J., concurred FACTS: This case arises out of a commotion that occurred in a Brigham City, Utah, home in the early morning hours of July 23, 2000. At about 3 a.m., four police officers responded to a call regarding a loud party at a residence. Upon arriving at the house, they heard shouting from inside, and proceeded down the driveway to investigate. There, they observed two juveniles drinking beer in the backyard. They entered the backyard, and saw--through a screen door and windows--an altercation taking place in the kitchen of the home. According to the testimony of one of the officers, four adults were attempting, with some difficulty, to restrain a juvenile. The juvenile eventually "broke free, swung a fist and struck one of the adults in the face." The officer testified that he observed the victim of the blow spitting blood into a nearby sink. The other adults continued to try to restrain the juvenile, pressing him up against a refrigerator with such force that the refrigerator began moving across the floor. At this point, an officer opened the screen door and announced the officers' presence. Amid the tumult, nobody noticed. The officer entered the kitchen and again cried out, and as the occupants slowly became aware that the police were on the scene, the altercation ceased. The officers subsequently arrested respondents and charged them with contributing to the delinquency of a minor, disorderly conduct, and intoxication. TC: Stuart, et al. filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained after the officers entered the home, arguing that the warrantless entry violated the 4th Amendment. Granted. Utah CA: Affirmed TC. Utah SC: Affirmed CA. There is insufficient reason to apply emergency aid doctrine. ISSUE: May the police enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury? HELD: Police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. Because the Fourth Amendment's ultimate touchstone is "reasonableness," the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions (e.g. one exigency is the need to render emergency assistance to occupants of private property who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury). Stuarts argument that the officers motives are merely to make arrests not to render aid does not lie. Subjective motivation of the officers is irrelevant, it does not matter whether they entered the kitchen to arrest respondents and gather evidence or to assist the injured and prevent further violence. An important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made. Here, the officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adult might need help and that the violence was just beginning. The officers announcement of their presence was likewise equivalent to a knock on the screen door and, under the circumstances, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment's knock-and-announce rule. Court reverses and remands the case for further proceedings. General Rule: Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Exceptions: Law enforcement officers may make a warrantless entry onto private property to fight a fire and investigate its cause, to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, or to engage in "hot pursuit" of a fleeing suspect, or when 'the exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable (e.g. the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury) Justice Stevens, concurring. Federal interests are not offended when a single State elects to provide greater protection for its citizens than the Federal Constitution requires. Joins the Court's opinion, buts still remains persuaded to deny the State's petition for certiorari. h. Concepts of : "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree"; "Attenuation"; "Inevitable Discovery" NARDONE V. US December 11, 1939 J. Frankfurter FACTS: Nardone was convicted of smuggling alcohol, possession and concealment of the smuggled alcohol, and conspiracy to smuggle and conceal smuggled alcohol Federal agents intercepted Nardones messages by tapping telephone wires Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act says that no person who, as an employe, has to do with the sending or receiving of any interstate communication by wire shall divulge or publish it or its substance to anyone other than the addressee or his authorized representative or to authorized fellow employes, save in response to a subpoena issued by a court of competent jurisdiction or on demand of other lawful authority Lower court evidence can be properly admitted ISSUE: WON evidence can be admissible HELD: No RATIO:

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Any claim for the exclusion of evidence relevant in criminal prosecutions must be justified by an overriding public policy There are two opposing concerns, on the one hand the stern enforcement of the criminal law and on the other protection of the realm of privacy left free by Constitution Court stated that once a defendant has established that evidence was illegally seized, the trial court "must give opportunity, however closely confined, to the accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree." Timely steps must be taken to secure judicial determination of claims of illegality on the part of agents of the Government Wong Sun vs. US 14 Jan 1963 Brennan, J. FACTS: This case involves 4 participants. Having had Hom Way under surveillance for 6 weeks, federal narcotics agents in San Francisco arrested him and found heroin in his possession. He then claimed that he had bought an ounce of heroin the night before from Blackie Toy, owner of a laundry on Leavenworth. The agents went to the laundry on the said street operated by James Wah Toy. But no record identifies him as Blackie Toy. Toy slammed the door and ran to his living quarters where he was arrested. He denied having sold any narcotics but directed the agents to Johnny who lived on Eleventh Avenue who had a piece of heroin. They found Johnny Yee in his bedroom and Yee took from a drawer several tubes containing less than an ounce of heroin. Yee and Toy were taken to the office of the Bureau of Narcotics where Yee said that Toy and Sea Dog brought him the heroin 4 days before. Toy said that Sea Dog was Wong Sun. Agents took Toy to Wong Suns neighborhood and Toy pointed out a house where Wong Sun lived. They entered his house and one of the officers brought Wong Sun from the bedroom in handcuffs. No narcotics were discovered after a thorough search of the apartment. The Governments evidence consisted of 4 items which the trial court admitted were admissible as fruits of unlawful arrests or attendant searches: 1. 2. 3. statements Toy made in his bedroom at the time of his arrest the heroin Yee surrendered to the agents Toys pretrial unsigned statement (he didnt want to sign until other petitioners had signed theirs) Wong Suns similar statement substantive offense of fraudulent and knowing transportation and concealment of illegally imported heroin). ISSUES: Was the agents uninvited entry to Toys living quarters unalwful? Were the verbal statements he made in his bedroom admissible? Their entry and the arrest were unlawful. Toys declarations in the bedroom are to be excluded from evidence as fruits of the agents unlawful action. There was no basis for considering Hom Ways information as reliable yet they acted upon it. The information given was not sufficiently accurate to lead the officers directly to the suspect. There was no reason for them to equate Blackie Toy and James Wang Toy (they had not looked into his criminal record or any record at all). Guilty knowledge could not be attributed to the flight of Toy to his quarters since the agent had not clearly presented his purpose before breaking open the door. It is required that an officer must state his authority and his purpose at the threshold, and be refused admittance, before he may break open the door. Verbal evidence which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized arrest as the officers' action in the present case is no less the "fruit" of official illegality than the more common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion. It is unreasonable to infer that his act of making the statements he did was of free will since he did so in the presence of 7 officers in his bedroom. Since Toys statements were excluded, should the narcotics taken from Yee also be excluded? The narcotics may not be used against Toy since they were fruits of illegality.This is not the case envisioned by this Court where the exclusionary rule has no application because the Government learned of the evidence "from an independent source, ; nor is this a case in which the connection between the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence has "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Could their unsigned statement of Toy be admitted as evidence? Any admission of guilt in Toys statement requires corroboration. No reference to Toy in his codefendant's statement constitutes admissible evidence corroborating any admission by Toy, and Toy's conviction must be set aside for lack of competent evidence to support it. Could the unsigned statement of Wong Sun be admitted as evidence? The fact that the statement of Wong Sunwas unsigned, whatever bearing this may have upon its weight and

4.

Petitioners were tried without a jury for violation of the Federal Narcotics. Acquitted of the first count (charged with conspiracy) but convicted of the second count (the

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credibility, does not render it inadmissible; Wong Sun understood and adopted its substance, though he could not comprehend the English words. The connection between his unlawful arrest and the making of that statement was so attenuated that the unsigned statement was not the fruit of the unlawful arrest and, therefore, it was properly admitted in evidence. Could the narcotics surrendered by Yee be admissible as evidence? Not admissible against Toy but may be admissible against Wong Sun. The exclusion of the narcotics as to Toy was required solely by their tainted relationship to information unlawfully obtained from Toy, and not by any official impropriety connected with their surrender by Yee. The seizure of this heroin invaded no right of privacy of person or premises which would entitle Wong Sun to object to its use at his trial. The only competent source of corroboration for Wong Sun's statement was the heroin itself. Case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. DISSENT: Clark, J (Harlan, Stewart and White join): The Court sets up rigid standards. While probable cause must be based on more than mere suspicion, it does not require proof sufficient to establish guilt. The sole requirement has been that the knowledge in the hands of the officers at the time of arrest must support a "man of reasonable caution in the belief" that the subject had committed narcotic offenses. statements to elicit a guilty feeling. He made comments referring to how he wished he could give the girl a Christian burial for her family before Christmas. He went on to say that since they would be passing the area the body was buried on the way, he wish he knew where to look. Williams directed the police to where he had buried the body of the girl. At that time, the search party was only 2 miles from the body, and would have eventually been covered by the search team. Williams was charged with murder. His lawyer moved to suppress all evidence that came from the discovery of the body, arguing that it is the fruit of a poisonous tree, it having been obtained by violating Williams right against self-interrogation. (The theory was that what transpired between Williams and the officer during the trip amounted to interrogation.) The motion was denied and Williams was convicted. On appeal, this was reversed, the Court ruling that it indeed amounted to interrogation. During the second trial, the prosecution was able to use the body, and show its condition. However, they made no reference to Williams knowing the location of the body, or other statements Williams had made. The court had concluded by a preponderance of the evidence, that had Williams not lead police to the body, the search would have found it within a short period of time, in the same condition it was found. Williams was again convicted of first degree murder. Issue: WON the evidence pertaining to the discovery and condition of the victims body was properly admitted Held: Yes. Ratio: In this case, the Court introduces the concept of inevitable discovery, saying that if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means (in this case, the large scale search), then the evidence could be brought forth in court. In this case, records clearly show that the searchers were approaching the actual location of the body, and that the search would have continued had appellant not led the police to the body, and that the body inevitably would have been found. II. Procedure for service of warrant; post-service procedure A. Service of warrant 1. Time of search Rule 126 Section 9 Section 9. Time of making search. The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night.

Nix vs Williams (June 11, 1984) Ponente: Burger Nature: Certiorari to the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Facts: On December 24, 1968, Pamela Powers, a 10year old girl disappeared from her family at a YMCA building in Des Moines, Iowa. At about that time, Williams was seen leaving the area carrying a large bundle in a blanket. A boy saw two legs sticking out of the bundle. The next day Williams' car was found approx 160 miles east of the YMCA. Along the road, the police found several items that belonged to the missing girl, as well as items that belonged to Williams. At this point a warrant was issued for Williams' arrest. The police believed that Williams had left Pamelas body somewhere along the road and isolated the general area they believed the girls body would be found, after which they initiated a large scale search. While this was going on, Williams turned himself in to the police several counties away. He immediately contacted his attorney, who was promised by police that Williams would not be questioned during transit back to Des Moines. During the trip to Des Moines, one of the policemen started talking to Williams, making

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2. Two-witness rule - Rule 126, sec. 8; Section 8. Search of house, room, or premise to be made in presence of two witnesses. No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. People vs. Gesmundo G.R. No. 89373 March 9, 1993 Facts: Version of the Prosecution Police officer Jose Luciano gave money and instructed his civilian informer to buy marijuana from the accused at the back of the Cocoland Hotel. Luciano positioned himself at the ground floor of the hotel and watched. He actually saw the accused selling marijuana to his civilian informer by the door outside the house of the accused. Immediately thereafter, that same day Luciano applied for a search warrant. Upon reaching the residence of the accused, the police team were allowed entry inside the house because of the said search warrant shown to the accused. The accused cried upon reading the contents of the warrant. She begged the team not to search and to leave her house. But the police team insisted on their search. The accused led the team into her kitchen and she pointed to a metal basin on top of a table as the hiding place of the dried marijuana flowering tops contained in a plastic bag marked ISETANN Version of the Accused While accused was in the terrace of their house, a jeep with policemen on board arrived. While seated at the sala, Sgt. Yte was showing to accused something which he claimed to be a search warrant when someone uttered the following words "ito na" coming from the direction where the kitchen of the house is. She, together with Sgt. Yte proceeded to the kitchen and saw PFC Luciano holding a plastic bag with four other companions who entered the house through the back door which was opened at that time. Luciano handed the bag to Sgt. Yte who confronted the accused and insisted that the plastic bag came from her. She was made to sign a document with her name printed on it. RTC found the accused guilty for violating Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Issue: Was the search and seizure done by the raiding police of the marijuana valid? (There were inconsistencies as to the amount seized which will be the basis of the penalty.) Held: No, it violated the two-witness rule Ratio: In all their testimonies, there was no mention of any marijuana obtained from a flower pot placed on top of a biscuit can inside a hole at the backyard of the accused's house as stated in the investigation report. It would seem that the raiding party "could not put their act together", as to how much marijuana was recovered and where. Not only are there inconsistencies as to what was recovered and where but also as to whom the marijuana was supposed to have been surrendered by the accused. (Luciano said it was given to Te; Te said it was given to Luciano.) The search of the accused-appellant's house was conducted in violation of Section 7, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which specifically provides that no search of a house, room or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. This requirement is mandatory It is true that the police were able to get an admission from the accused-appellant that marijuana was found in her possession but said admission is inadmissible in evidence against the accused-appellant for having been obtained in violation of her rights as a person under custodial investigation The person making the search has the duty to issue a detailed receipt for the property seized. He is likewise required to deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true and accurate inventory thereof duly verified under oath. The police authorities in the case at bar testified that they submitted an inventory to the court without the marijuana, the latter having been turned over to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Whether an inventory was actually made by the police was not clearly established in the trial court. The police officers cant just retain the property seized from a warrant. Approval by the court which issued the search warrant is necessary for the retention of the property seized by the police officers; and only then will their custody be considered custody of the court. Absent such approval, the police officers have no authority to retain possession of the marijuana and more so, to deliver the property to another agency, like the NBI. Having made no return or inventory to the warrantissuing court, there is no proof that the police really found marijuana in the house of the accused. The forensic chemist even said that there were no identifying marks on the plastic bag. How sure are we then that the marijuana submitted for examination was the same marijuana allegedly seized from the accusedappellant? Accused was acquitted. 3. Breaking of door or window to effect search Rule 126, sec. 7

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Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. People v. Huang Zhen Hua September 29, 2004 Ponente: Callejo, Sr. Facts: prosecution was unable to show that in these four (4) days Huang Zhen Hua committed acts which showed that he was in cahoots with the drug syndicate Henry Lao and Peter Chan. It was not even shown that he was together with Henry Lau and Peter Chan on any occasion. As for Huang Zhen Hua, therefore, there is no direct evidence of any culpability. Nor is there any circumstantial evidence from which any culpability may be inferred. he prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidende) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exits when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.

1) Police operatives of the Public Assistance and

2)

3) 4)

5) 6)

7)

Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) under the Department of Interior and Local Government received word from their confidential informant that Peter Chan and Henry Lao,2 and appellants Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen Hua were engaged in illegal drug trafficking. On October 25, 1996, SPO2 Cesar N. Teneros of the PARAC secured 2 Search Warrants. the policemen found two kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride, popularly known as shabu, paraphernalia for its production, and machines and tools apparently used for the production of fake credit cards Police operatives received information that Lao and Chan would be delivering shabu at the Furama Laser Karaoke Restaurant The policemen saw Chan and Lao on board the latters Honda Civic car. As the two men alighted, one of the men approached them and introduced himself, but Chan and Lao fired shots. Thus, a shoot-out ensued The policemen found two plastic bags, each containing one kilo of shabu, in Laos car. The policemen then proceeded to No. 19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, to enforce Search Warrant on Zhen Hua. Shabu and other paraphernalia were alleged to be found. Antonio Pangan (the condominiums security guard) was a witness in the search and testified that he did not see any shabu that was seized by the policemen.

ON Jogy Lee It was found out that Jogy Lee and Lao were lovers, there is constructive possession of illegal drugs as they shared the same room. Furthermore, all the drugs confiscated were in plain view in the room. Lees denial of the drugs cannot be appreciated as the drugs and other paraphernalia were within her sight and reach (not hidden by his lover Lao so as that only Lao may have possession of the drugs) (topical; Re: Breaking of window to effect search) Jogy Lee, argues that her constitutional rights were violated as the officers forced their way into the condominium. This cannot hold, we rule that the policemen complied with Section 7, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure before entering the condominium unit. Section 7, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: SEC. 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. The police officers were obliged to give the appellant notice, show to her their authority, and demand that they be allowed entry. They may only break open any outer or inner door or window of a house to execute the search warrant if, after such notice and demand, such officers are refused entry to the place of directed search. This is known as the "knock and announce" principle which is embodied in Anglo-American Law. The method of entry of an officer into a dwelling and the presence or absence of such notice are as important

ISSUES: WON Huang Zhen Hua is guilty beyond reasonable doubt WON Jogy Lee is guilty beyond reasonable doubt Held/Reasoning On Huang Zhen Hua the prosecution witnesses admitted that no regulated drug was found in his person. No regulated drug was also found inside his room or in his other belongings such as suitcases, etc. Thus, he had no actual or constructive possession of the confiscated "shabu." Moreover, it is not disputed that Huang Zhen Hua had only been in the country for barely four (4) days at the time when he was arrested. The

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considerations in assessing whether subsequent entry to search and/or arrest is constitutionally reasonable Generally, officers implementing a search warrant must announce their presence, identify themselves to the accused and to the persons who rightfully have possession of the premises to be searched, and show to them the search warrant to be implemented by them and explain to them said warrant in a language or dialect known to and understood by them. The requirement is not a mere procedural formality but is of the essence of the substantial provision which safeguards individual liberty.68 No precise form of words is required. It is sufficient that the accused has notice of the officers, their authority and the purpose of the search and the object to be seized. It must be emphasized that the notice requirement is designed not only for the protection of the liberty of the person to be searched or of his property but also the safety and wellbeing of the officers serving and implementing the search warrant. Unless the person to whom the warrant is addressed and whose property is to be searched is notified of the search warrant and apprised of the authority of the person serving the warrant, he may consider the unannounced intrusion into the premises as an unlawful aggression on his property which he will be justified in resisting, and in the process, may cause injury even to the life of the officer implementing the warrant for which he would not be criminally liable. Also, there is a very real possibility that the police serving and implementing the search warrant may be misinformed as to the name or address of the suspect, or to other material affirmations. Innocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright, shame or embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced intrusion.69 Indeed, a lawful entry is the indispensable predicate of a reasonable search. A search would violate the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure if the entry were illegal, whether accomplished by force, or by threat or show of force or obtained by stealth, or coercion.70 Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible when (a) a party whose premises or is entitled to the possession thereof refuses, upon demand, to open it; (b) when such person in the premises already knew of the identity of the officers and of their authority and persons; (c) when the officers are justified in the honest belief that there is an imminent peril to life or limb; and (d) when those in the premises, aware of the presence of someone outside (because, for example, there has been a knock at the door), are then engaged in activity which justifies the officers to believe that an escape or the destruction of evidence is being attempted. History (just in case sir nitpicks) The principle may be traced to a statute in England way back in 1275 providing that "if a person takes the beasts of another and causes them to be driven into a castle or fortress, if the sheriff makes a solemn demand for the deliverance of the beasts, and if the person did not cause the beasts to be delivered incontinent, the king shall cause the said castle or fortress to be beaten down without recovery." Common law courts appended an important qualification: But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open doors , for the law without a default in the owner abhors the destruction or breaking of any house (which is for the habitation and safety of man) by which great damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party, when no default is in him; for perhaps he did not know of the process, of which, if he had noticed, it is to be presumed that he would obey it65 B. Post-service procedure - People v. Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743 (1993) See above @ page 25 1. Issuance of Receipt Rule 126, sec. 11; Section 11. Receipt for the property seized. The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property. People v. Lacbanes March 10, 1997 Romero Facts: Lacbanes was caught selling marijuana in a buybust operation by the Narcotics Section of the Tacloban Police Station The police officers acted on an information from their confidential agent regarding the operation The confidential agent acted as poseur-buyer After the poseur-buyer gave the marked P5 bills and received sticks of what was believed to be marijuana, Lacbanes was apprehended and the P5 bills and 3 sticks of marijuana cigarettes were seized from him He was brought to the police station, where, among others, he said he was forced to sign a paper which turned out to be a receipt showing that the P5 bills and 3 marijuana sticks were seized from his possession (this is the only fact related to the topic. Im not going to include the other facts anymore) He was charged with violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act Issue: WON the receipt for property purportedly signed by the accused as proof that the 3 sticks of marijuana and the P5 bills were seized from him can be accepted as evidence Held: NO

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This is because the prosecution failed to prove that accused was assisted by his counsel at the time of signing The Court does not condone this practice for this is tantamount to an extra-judicial confession for the commission of the offense As held in People v. Ang Chun Kit: o "conforme to these documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged, since merely unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punished by law. They have been obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the records to show that he was assisted by counsel." This Court also declared in People v. De Las Marinas, that it is the police officers who confiscated the same who should have signed such receipt. Undoubtedly, this is a violation of the constitutional right of appellant to remain silent. Here he was, in effect, made to admit the commission of the offense without informing him of his right. Such a confession obtained in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence. Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequent filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court. (n) - RA 8493, sec. 2(d) (cf. Rule 118, sec. 2[d];) RA 8493 Speedy Trial Act of 1998. Section 2. Mandatory Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases. In all cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan, the justice or judge shall, after arraignment, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following: (a) Plea bargaining; (b) Stipulation of Facts; (c) Marking for identification of evidence of parties; (d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and (e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. Rule 118 (feeling ko me typo lang yung syllabus) Section 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following: (a) plea bargaining; (b) stipulation of facts; (c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties; (d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; (e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and (f) such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case. (secs. 2 and 3, cir. 38-98) Section 2. Pre-trial agreement. All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98) - Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967); (previous) - Bache v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971); (previous) Rakas et. al. v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); FACTS:

2. Delivery of property and inventory; return and proceedings on the return: - Rule 126, sec. 12; Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon. (a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath. (b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with. (c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge. A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.(11a) - People v. Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743 (1993); (see above @ page 25) III. Remedies against unreasonable search and seizure 1. Motion to quash search warrant or suppress evidence : - Rule 126, sec. 14;

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The police received a call about a robbery in a clothing store. A police on patrol received the info and saw a vehicle which he thought might be the getaway car. He followed it and after calling for backup, they stopped the vehicle. Petitioners and 2 girls occupied the car. They were sent out. The police searched the cars interior and found a box of rifle shells in the glove compartment (which was locked) and a sawed-off rifle under the passengers seat. So the police arrested them. Petitioners moved to quash the evidence and argued that they were not the owners of the car, they were simply passengers and the owner was the one driving the car, that the 4th and 14th amendments were violated and they had standing to contest the legality of the search. ISSUE: Whether petitioners have standing to contest the legality of the search HELD and RATIO No standing. They were merely passengers. They did not own the car nor the seized materials. But yes, they were there on the car when the search was done. The case they rely upon, Jones vs US, had different factual circumstances. There, even if Jones was only an occupant of a friends apartment, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Here, cars cannot be equated to apartments. No reasonable expectation of privacy. They failed to allege this even. Petitioners target theory: any criminal defendant at whom a search was "directed" would have standing to contest the legality of that search and object to the admission at trial of evidence obtained as a result of the search. That is not applicable here. In Jones, the Court set forth two alternative holdings: It established a rule of "automatic" standing to contest an allegedly illegal search where the same possession needed to establish standing is an essential element of the offense charged; 4 and second, it stated that "anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress." They were not the targets of the search. They only happened to be there. So since they did not own the premises (car) nor the things seized, no right was violated and they had no standing to contest the legality of the search. as a general proposition, the issue of standing involves two inquiries: first, whether the proponent of a particular legal right has alleged "injury in fact," and, second, whether the proponent is asserting his own legal rights and interests rather than basing his claim for relief upon the rights of third parties. Petitioners argue that even though they are not the owners, they were legitimately on the premises. SC said that is too flimsy. If we rule in your favor, then anyone who just happened to be on a certain place at a certain time (even if for just a few seconds) can contest legality of a search. Extreme example: in a span of one minute, a person enters a house which is not his, a search was conducted, the person left. Its ridiculous if we allow that person to contest the search just because he was there, eh wala naman syang kinalaman dun sa house o sa search (sorry di na kinaya ng brains ko haha) Occupation of premises does not automatically mean a reasonable expectation of privacy, nor a proprietary or possessory interest on the things within his reach

- Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253 (1999); (previous) 2. Waiver of Jurisdiction & Waiver of Admissibility People vs Lapitaje Facts Domingo Colonia testified that three unmasked armed men barged inside his store. He recognized accused Arnold Bacla-an Lapitaje. When his wife shouted for help, neighbors came rushing to their aid, prompting the men to leave hastily. And then a neighbor testified that on that night, he saw a parked taxi marked "Aaron". A speeding Hi-Ace van then arrived. Military men donning firearms alighted from the van and approached the taxi. The military men held the driver of the taxi, a man seated in the first seat and another man about to enter the taxi. The three men who were held by the military were recognized by Fred in the courtroom as the accused Romy Baluyos, Wendel Arellano and Arnold Lapitaje. SPO2 Calixto Nueza further testified that he proceeded to the national highway on his motorcycle upon hearing cries for help from his neighbors. He saw a Hi-Ace van with Air Force men as passengers blocking a taxi marked "Aaron"; when he introduced himself as a person in authority, Mauro Oarga who identified himself as a colonel, turned over to him the persons of accused Romy Baluyos, Arnold Lapitaje and Wendel Arellano; Oarga and his men likewise turned over to him a .22 caliber revolver magnum, five live ammunitions, one empty shell and a hand grenade which was allegedly recovered under the front seat of the taxi much later; he recognized accused Arnold Lapitaje since the latter used to deliver edible oil in their place; he also recognized Wendel Arellano who used crutches, and, Romy Baluyos, as the driver of the taxi. He then brought the three men to the police station for proper investigation; early in the morning of the following day, a dead person, recognized by Domingo Colonia as one of the robbers, was found dead.

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Lt. Col. Mauro Oarga, an officer of the Philippine Air Force, testified that finding the actuations of the men to be suspicious, conducted a search on the taxi as well as on the "four" persons who had already boarded the taxi. Their body search on the "four" persons as well as on the driver of the taxi failed to yield anything but a search conducted on the taxi produced a .22 caliber revolver with five ammunitions and one empty shell found under the front seat of the taxi. A hand grenade was also discovered at the back portion of the vehicle. Although it was already dark at the time, the group was aided in their search by the headlights of the van which were switched on. knowledge of the crime that had just been committed and therefore had no probable cause to believe that they will find the instruments or evidence pertaining to the crime. But the trial court did not err in finding both appellants Arnold Lapitaje and Mario Reyes to be the perpetrators of the crime of robbery. Despite the inadmissibility of the guns and ammunitions, both appellants were positively identified by the prosecution witnesses.

Esquillo vs. People (see above @ page 3 ) 3. Return of property illegally seized: Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 892 (1920); Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 170 (1948); Collector v. Villaluz, 71 SCRA 356 (1976); Mata v. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388 (1984);

Issues WON the arrest of the four men by the military was lawful WON the firearm and live ammunitions allegedly found under the front seat of the taxi can be used as evidence against Wendel and Romy Held and Ratio No o Oarga testified that he caused the arrest of "four men" running towards the taxi since they were acting suspiciously. However, Oarga did not elaborate why he thought said men were acting suspiciously. He did not prove the presence of any of the factors in Rule 113 (Arrest without warrant when lawful). No o Nevertheless, considering that appellant Arnold, had entered his plea and actively participated in the trial of the case, he submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court thereby curing any defect in his arrest. Legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person. o In spite of said waiver, the firearm and live ammunition taken from the taxi during the search, cannot be admitted in evidence against appellants because they were seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful. o The search cannot be justified on the ground that it involves search of a moving vehicle. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. As was earlier found, Oarga and his men did not have personal

4. Criminal liability and Civil Damages: - Rev. Pen. Code, Arts. 128, 129, 130, 206; Title Two: CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE Section Two. Violation of domicile Art. 128. Violation of domicile. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who, not being authorized by judicial order, shall enter any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof, search papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner, or having surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the premises, shall refuse to do so. If the offense be committed in the night-time, or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained. In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other offense, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding P1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall procure a search warrant without just cause, or, having legally procured the same, shall exceed his authority or use unnecessary severity in executing the same. Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses . The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee who, in cases where a search is proper, shall search the domicile, papers or other belongings of any person, in the absence of the latter, any member of his

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family, or in their default, without the presence of two witnesses residing in the same locality. Title Seven: CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS Chapter Two: MALFEASANCE AND MISFEASANCE IN OFFICE Section One. Dereliction of duty Art. 206. Unjust interlocutory order. Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust interlocutory order or decree shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and suspension; but if he shall have acted by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance and the interlocutory order or decree be manifestly unjust, the penalty shall be suspension. MHP Garments, Inc. v CA (1994) Facts: MHP Garments, Inc. was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum Agreement, MHP was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies." Sometime in October 1983, MHP received information that respondents Agnes Villa Cruz, MirasolLugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. De Guzman, an employee of MHP, was tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report to the Philippine Constabulary (PC). On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., De Guzman, Captain Peafiel, and 2 other constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market. Without any warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents. Receipts were issued for the seized items. The items were then turned over by Captain Peafiel to MHP for safekeeping. A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents. On December 6, 1983, after a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents. On February 6, 1984, he also ordered the return of the seized items.The seized items were not immediately returned despite demands. Private respondents then filed a civil case against MHP and De Guzman for sums of money and damages. TC ruled in their favor. CA affirmed. Issue:WON MHP Garments, Inc. and De Guzman be held civilly liable to pay respondents sums of money and damages Held:Yes. Ratio: Search and seizure was illegal. The progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. No probable cause for the seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for unfair competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods. Re: Recovery of (Moral and Exemplary) Damages for Violation of a Constitutional Right (NCC 32 and 2219)- While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should have been included in the complaint for violation of the private respondents' constitutional rights, still, the omission will not exculpate petitioners. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. Secondly, the raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee who did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. Also, MHP and De Guzman refused to surrender the goods for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition. Finally, there can be no doubt that petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings due the tortious raid caused by petitioners Letter of Instruction No. 1299 (1983)directs all law enforcement agencies of the to apprehend immediately unauthorized manufacturers and distributors of Scout paraphernalia, upon proper application by the BSP and/or GSP for warrant of arrest and/or search warrant with a judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law. Petitioners miserably failed to report the unlawful peddling of scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the proper application of a warrant. If petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a third-party complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief, in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. This they did not do.