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Assurance Guidelines
The
Table of Contents
I. Acknowledgements.....................................................................................................................................1
III. Partnering......................................................................................................................................................17
A. Utilities................................................................................................................................................................17
B. The State.............................................................................................................................................................18
C. The Federal Government....................................................................................................................................19
D. National Associations.........................................................................................................................................20
IX. Bibliography................................................................................................................................................... 63
X. Appendices..................................................................................................................................................... 67
T
he U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) funded the
production of this publication. The OE is the primary DOE office responsible for energy emergency planning
and response. This office is dedicated to ensuring a robust, secure, and reliable energy supply to local
governments. Protecting and enhancing the resiliency of the energy sector from natural and human caused disasters
requires that local governments be vigilant and aware of the interdependencies of the system. Fortunately, officials
within OE’s Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration (ISER) Division recognize the value of assisting local
governments with the development of their energy assurance plans. Our deepest thanks are extended to Alice Lippert
and her staff for embracing and empowering a committed group of local government leaders and associations.
These local government energy assurance guidelines were developed by Public Technology Institute (PTI). PTI is
a national non-profit technology research organization for city and county governments. As the only technology
organization created by and for cities and counties, PTI works with a core network of leading local government
officials—the PTI membership—to identify opportunities for technology research, to share best practices, to promote
technology development initiatives, and to develop enhanced educational programming. PTI shares the results of
these activities and the expertise of its members with the broader audience of the thousands of cities and counties
across the U.S. For additional information see the PTI web site at www.pti.org.
We gratefully acknowledge the National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO) and the work of their
Energy Data and Security Committee. This NASEO Committee was funded by the U.S. Department of Energy to
produce a State Energy Assurance Guidelines document which served as the template for this local government
energy assurance publication. Before the oil price surge of 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy was committed to
assisting local governments build resilient energy systems. Because of this effort, it is possible that resilient energy
supplies can supplant the most vulnerable oil-related supplies that we now depend on for our most basic energy and,
energy emergency needs. To move toward more dependable, cost-effective energy supplies it takes focused attention
and thoughtful planning by local government officials. There has never been a more important time in American
history for local governments to begin the drive toward energy resiliency, with a strong energy assurance plan; this
document will assist in taking the first steps toward the development of such a plan.
Erik Kropp, The City of Phoenix, AZ Larry Alford, The City of Austin, TX
Brian Boerner, The City of Fort Worth, TX John Morrill, Arlington County, VA
James Gorby, Fairfax County, VA Kent Koehler, Sedgwick County, KS
Doug Yoder, Miami-Dade County, FL Mike Armstrong, The City of Portland, OR
Margaret Downey, Barnstable County, MA
A noteworthy thank you is extended to Kevin Magner, Utilities Administrator, City and County of Denver. Kevin
embraced this effort from the outset by not only sharing the project vision but also by helping to shape this vision.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 1
He did this by seeing the relevance of this work to Denver’s overall ESF 12 effort and by providing PTI project staff
with access to key city and county decision-makers.
This publication would not have been possible without the hard work, dedication, and extraordinary research and
analysis skills of Steve Foute, Ph.D. formerly of the City and County of Denver, and George Burmeister, President
of the Colorado Energy Group. This work was managed by Ronda Mosley, Senior Director for Research and
Governmental Services, Public Technology Institute.
2 ACKNOW LEDGEMENTS
II. Overview and
Introduction
A. Purpose of This Document
These guidelines were compiled to help local governments understand the importance of preparing energy assurance
plans, and to help local officials assess the state of their readiness. Assessing the current state of readiness is a
positive first step for any local government, and this document will help in this regard. This guide is also designed to
help link to other cities and counties, and link to the resources necessary to move forward on energy assurance plans.
More specifically, these guidelines are written to help:
■■ Assess the readiness of a local jurisdiction to an energy emergency;
■■ Identify dozens of national and local government experts that can help with energy assurance planning needs;
■■ Build organizational relationships and responsibilities within local government, the private sector and
the region;
■■ Discover actions that can ease the impacts of short-term energy disruptions;
■■ Define long-term strategies and options for dealing with sustained disruptions or outages;
■■ Identify pertinent government and industry contacts that can help with energy assurance planning;
■■ Identify steps necessary to work with industry minimizing and resolving the impacts of an energy
supply disruption;
■■ Identify mitigation measures to improve the energy distribution systems and enhance supply delivery;
■■ Elevate the awareness of energy security and assurance issues;
■■ Introduce new, valuable energy assurance resources;
■■ Improve all hazards emergency preparedness through regional collaboration; and
■■ Learn about innovative and traditional financing mechanisms for energy assurance needs.
This resource guide is a compilation of information from more than three hundred written sources and personal
interviews with local government energy and emergency officials who have experienced and responded to energy
emergencies. Information in this document also came from important tabletop energy (and water) exercises
and training seminars for state and local governments provided by the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
A distinction between preparing for an energy emergency and responding to one needs to be made here. At the
request of PTI’s National Local Government Energy Assurance Advisory Committee, the majority of text within
these guidelines is devoted to preparation efforts. Preparation involves proactive planning, investment, coordination,
communication, and monitoring and assuring energy supply, whereas responding is usually driven by a specific event
and involves mitigating damage while restoring the energy supply. In addition, adequate planning is crucial and
necessary for an adequate response.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 3
An All-Hazards Approach
Community leaders have the responsibility of deciding which assets need to be protected. Scarce resources, including
time, money, personnel, and materials, make this a very tough job. Therefore, an “all hazards approach” is used in
this document. An all hazards approach involves adequately preparing for numerous hazards across many categories,
including sabotage and terrorism, civil disturbances, flooding, natural disasters, infrastructure failures, and
public health emergencies. Due to the intricate interdependencies of the U.S. energy industry, preparing for one
type of hazard will often also be adequate for others.
Energy assurance efforts generally involve three primary areas, energy security, emergency preparedness, and critical
infrastructure protection. The three are often intertwined and linked. For example, an understanding of infrastructure
and security will help in updating an emergency preparedness plan.
Importantly, this document contains an Energy Assurance Assessment Tool (Appendix B) that can help identify and
prioritize mission critical facilities, while protecting key energy operations, components, and systems. Use this tool
to help calculate where energy assurance efforts are currently and where they could be based on local government
goals. It is recommended that this entire document be reviewed to understand its contents and determine its relevance
before embarking on using the assurance assessment tool.
This is meant to be a living document, which will be updated and changed regularly as new research sheds light on
what it is that local governments actually want, and need to accomplish in the energy assurance area. It is a broad,
general document used to help launch a multi-year outreach effort to local governments. Many important emerging
issues identified in this document will be covered in more depth in subsequent publications and training sessions as
part of this U.S. DOE multiyear effort.
The following timeline indicates the project’s goals, tasks and their associated year of completion. For example,
Goal #1, Energy Assurance Guidelines, Task 1.1 indicates that although it will be completed in 2008, it will continue
to be improved through 2011. Likewise, Goal #3, energy finance (task 3.1) will be a stand-alone document in 2009
even though it is contained in this document under Section 6.D. as a preliminary work product.
There are three goals/work products associated with this project: energy assurance guidelines, an educational/
dissemination plan, and supplemental educational papers.
Local governments are on the front lines of virtually all energy emergencies. Experts agree that these governments
are going to be faced with an ever increasing number of energy-related emergencies. The reasons for the rise in these
numbers are at least three-fold: (1) aging energy infrastructure (2) these aging energy systems are not matched to the
complicated demand profile of today’s user and (3) all-hazard events are increasing in number, severity, and length.
■■ The average generating plant was built in 1964 using 1959 technology, and more than one-fifth of U.S. power
plants are more than 50 years old.
■■ On any given day more than 500,000 U.S. customers are without power for two hours or more.
■■ Today’s high voltage transmission lines were designed before planners even considered security measures or
imagined that electricity would be sold across state lines, therefore, the lines are subject to overloading and
blackouts..
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 5
■■ Line losses have increased from five-percent to 10 percent since the 1980s, placing a little recognized $12
billion “tax” on consumer that didn’t exist 20 years ago. (Let Energy Innovation Thrive, Richard Munson,
NE-MW Economic Review.)
■■ Most of the equipment that guides the flow of electricity dates back to the 1960s and 1970s. Real time
tracking of disturbances and interruptions does not, and cannot, occur in most places—the information is
usually relayed 30-seconds after the fact.
■■ Smart, “self healing” power grid that anticipates problems before they happen are non-existent. While
the technology needed to make the power grid smarter is available, due to a number of factors, including
overwhelming costs and varying utility regulations across state lines, these technologies are years away
from implementation. So, blackouts and power outages are not only likely to happen in the future, they are
guaranteed.
Energy interdependencies are increasing in complexity, and the economic stakes are huge. A May 2007 Scientific
American article noted that the estimated cost from all U.S. electrical outages ranges from $70 to $120 billion per
year. It is no longer simply about keeping the lights on at the local factory or the corner drug store. It is about keeping
internet businesses accessible to consumers, ensuring that high tech factories have guaranteed back-up power, and
guaranteeing that the banking and financial industries have reliable power round-the-clock. Literally, billions of
dollars are at stake. Therefore, energy assurance planning requires careful thought and preparation.
Energy assurance planning has evolved from the relatively simple state energy office petroleum shortage analysis
and scenario responses in the 1970s, to state public utility commission electricity and natural gas supply reliability
analysis and planning in the 1980s and 1990s to government-wide energy analysis and planning since September
11, 2001. Emergency preparedness and the quality of a response to interrupted energy depend largely on the first
responder’s energy supply. Local governments are the first responders, so energy supply and energy back-up systems
are crucial.
Energy assurance planning is back on the forefront of local government agendas for a number of very compelling
reasons:
■■ Substantially higher energy prices outstripping the ability of many local governments to deliver basic services
■■ Hurricane Katrina and the documented disarray and loss of life which resulted from the lack of adequate
energy planning;
■■ Major “economy-freezing” electrical outages in the northeastern U.S.;
■■ Unusually severe weather and associated heavy flooding throughout the U.S. in recent years;
■■ Concerns about how to address possible climate change and the accompanying emphasis on minimizing
carbon use at the local government level;
■■ Drinking water and wastewater treatment plant service issues arising from knocked-out power supplies and
failed back-up systems;
■■ A coordinated outreach effort by key federal agencies to educate local governments about local and regional
energy assurance planning benefits;
■■ A national trend toward more sustainable planning and development, including calls for much more green
building, energy efficiency, and renewable energy development; and
■■ Sustainability—preparing for numerous hazards through energy assurance planning will move government
toward sustainability goals. Linking energy assurance planning with sustainability efforts can be a crucial link
in capturing the hearts and imagination of City and County leaders and the general public. Folding energy
assurance plans into sustainability planning increases the likelihood that key buildings, transportation, utility,
public infrastructure, and industrial-related issues are addressed.
Energy assurance is also about guaranteeing citizens that reliable services (power cannot be guaranteed) will be there
when they are needed. It is about assuring citizens that planning for energy emergencies is occurring while partners
are engaged. Energy assurance generally involves three key areas:
It is crucial that mission critical operations (which are jointly comprised of facilities, systems, and components)
be identified, data be collected on how they are powered, and notes made of any available back-up power systems.
This document contains a newly developed “PTI Local Government Energy Assurance Assessment Tool” that
can help with this important task (Appendix B). The practice of identifying critical operations is new to most
local government officials—a changing world demands that locals consider undertaking this task as soon as
possible. By prioritizing operations now, a jurisdiction will be better prepared for decision making during
an actual energy event.
When identifying mission critical operations the security and protection of drinking water and wastewater protection
should also be considered. The health effects associated with a widespread water distribution problem are potentially
catastrophic. Water is important in many manufacturing processes, as well as for drinking and ice for preserving
food and medicine and for fighting fires. As much as twenty percent of energy costs are from simply moving water
to where it is needed; there are significant interdependencies. Critical water customers should be identified and a
priority established on which ones will be given first priority for restored service.
Restoration Priorities….
It is important to establish energy (electric and natural gas) infrastructure priorities, independent of, but in concert
with the local utility. Identify essential customer services and ensure that these customers are considered priority
customers by the utility. It is easy to look over this last point. If the jurisdiction and utility do not discuss priority
customers (like the emergency operations center) then when a brown-out occurs for example, they may not direct
power to the facilities that are deemed as important and essential!
Generation capacity is usually repaired first by utilities, along with high-tension transmission lines. Local distribution
lines usually are repaired next. Local governments are important but only one of a long list of priorities. The Florida
Public Service Commission supports the following Florida Power and Light (FPL) order of restoration (Florida
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 7
State’s Energy Emergency Response to the 2004 Hurricanes, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity
Delivery and Energy Reliability, NASEO, June 2005), and it may help establish a new priority list:
■■ Hospitals;
■■ Public service entities including, emergency operations centers, critical government facilities,
and Red Cross facilities;
■■ Communications with emergency responders including police and fire, telecommunications and the media;
■■ Water and sewage facilities;
■■ Transportation infrastructure;
■■ Gas supply utilities;
■■ Electric company facilities;
■■ Other essential entities such as schools, nursing homes, and critical care facilities; and
■■ Others as designated in coordination with government and the emergency operation centers.
The Chicago Metropolitan Area Critical Infrastructure Protection Program published an excellent document,
Planning for Electrical Power Disruptions: Critical Infrastructure Assurance for Municipal Governments (February
2001), which lists the following typical critical facilities and criteria for determining their criticality.
a
The types of facilities and examples are illustrative rather than comprehensive.
b
These specific criteria are illustrative. There is no universal agreement on the numbers or types of facilities shown here. Municipalities must
adjust these criteria to meet local needs.
Source: http://www.oe.energy.gov/information_center/electricity101.htm
The United States has more than 6,000 power plants nationally with 54% owned by utilities and the other 46%
owned by non-utilities. Fifty percent of these are coal powered, nineteen percent are nuclear, nineteen percent are
natural gas, seven percent are hydro, three percent are oil, and three percent are other (solar, wind, geothermal).
(Energy, Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources, Sector-Specific Plan As Input to the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan, U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Department of Energy, Page 11, May 2007.)
No single entity, public or private, can ensure that energy is delivered to the end user. Due to the interdependency
of the energy infrastructure, collaboration at all levels is necessary. During the last half of the 20th century,
technical innovations and developments in digital information and telecommunications dramatically increased
interdependencies among the Nation’s critical infrastructures. Disruptions in a single infrastructure can generate
disturbances within others over long distances and the pattern of interconnections can extend or amplify the effects
of a disruption.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 9
Energy infrastructure provides essential fuel to all of the other critical infrastructures, and in turn is dependent
upon transportation, communications, finance, and governmental systems to remain viable. For example, coal
shipments are highly dependent on rail. There are also independencies within the energy infrastructure itself,
particularly the dependence of petroleum refineries and pipeline pumping stations on a reliable electricity supply and
backup generators and utility maintenance vehicles to be supplied with diesel and gasoline fuel. (Energy: Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, May
2007, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Energy, page 17).
The electric power system is generally described in terms of three components: generators, transmission, and
distribution. Generators are power stations that produce electricity. Electricity is usually generated through
various technologies, including coal, gas, oil, hydro, and nuclear. While increasing in importance, as noted earlier,
renewables such as wind and solar do not account for a significant portion of generated electricity (<3%). Generators
come in many power output sizes ranging from 1 MW (1 million watts, which is expressed as 1 megawatt or 1
MW) to 1,200 MW. Some plants called base load units run continuously, while others called peakers run only
during times of high demand. Transmission systems are composed of high-voltage equipment (lines) that move
large quantities of electricity from the generator to the distribution system. The distribution system takes the power
from the transmission lines and sends it to the retail customer. Together, these transmission lines form the electric
power “grid.” The grid is the interconnected group of power lines and associated equipment for moving electric
energy at high voltage between points of supply and points at which time it is delivered to other electric systems or
transformed to a lower voltage for delivery to customers.
An interruption of service power (utility failure) is an interruption of power for a few hours or less and can be a
simple nuisance to some, but it can also be a very serious event for others. Interruptions to computer equipment
can result in a loss of information. Interruptions to manufacturing processes can result in loss to a batch process.
Interruptions to people who rely on life support equipment can result in a medical emergency. Some of the relevant
terms used in this industry follow.
Fluctuations:
Voltage fluctuation—a change in the voltage of the electricity provided to customers, either up or down, without
loss of power to customers. Also known as “brownouts,” voltage fluctuations often occur during peak demands for
electricity, and are used by utilities to avoid a power outage.
Frequency fluctuation—change in the frequency of alternating current (AC) power that is supplied to customers.
This is extremely rare. The nominal frequency is 60 cycles and normally varies only slightly.
Interruptions:
Intentional (scheduled) interruption—some interruptions are intentional and can be scheduled in advance, such as
when equipment is taken off line for normal maintenance.
Intentional (unscheduled) interruption—some intentional disruptions must be done “on the spot.” For example, a
fire department may request that power be cut-off during a fire or accident.
Intentional interruption (load shedding)—when the power system is under heavy stress, it is sometimes necessary
to intentionally cut off power to some customers to keep the entire system from collapsing. One form of load
shedding is called a “rolling blackout”—where service is cut to key customers for a predetermined amount of time,
usually no more than two hours. As power is restored to one block of customers, another block of customers is
usually cut off, to better manage the situation.
Unplanned interruption—these are outages that come essentially with no advance notice. These are interruptions
that are the most problematic, and the ones that are of the highest concern in this document. Preparing for these
interruptions is an important part of energy assurance efforts. Some utilities use the following categories to classify
unplanned interruptions:
Any energy assurance plan should include a section referencing the appropriate legal authorities. The goal for
this section is to clarify and document exactly what authority the jurisdiction has to implement the strategies that
are outlined in the plan. It is not necessary to include all of the legal language. There should, however, be a list
of applicable local legal authorities and references which provide the framework and necessary legal authority.
Understanding exactly what the jurisdiction can and cannot do from a legal perspective in an emergency will help
avoid most legal repercussions.
Both the state and federal governments have specific mandates in relation to emergency management systems during
a proclaimed disaster or emergency. The national mandate is the National Incident Management System (NIMS) as
described in the National Response Framework. A local government plan should provide a section that documents
how the plan complies with these and any other applicable mandates. (“Energy Assurance Planning Handbook for
Local Governments”, May 2008, California Energy Commission, Draft Report)
Former Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Director James Lee Witt and his firm James Lee Witt
Associates reviewed the emergency response capabilities of the City of Philadelphia for almost one year, and made
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 11
valuable suggestions for improvement in a July 2006 Emergency Preparedness Review Committee Report. Other
local government leaders around the United States can benefit from the eight major Strategic Themes: Assessment
and Recommendations in the report that emerged after working with several hundred Philadelphia-area experts
across multiple committees. These eight themes contain what many believe to be the core of effective local
government energy assurance planning:
From these eight themes come many of the ideas found below in Top 10 Things Local Governments Can Do to
Improve Energy Assurance Efforts.
a. Designate an Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinator (see page 37, Section D. for a description of the
Federal EEAC System)
Begin the energy assurance planning process by designating an Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinator (or
equivalent title). This designation could be done by the County Board of Supervisors/Commissioners, the City
Council, or other appropriate government body. This usually does not mean creating a new position within the
local government or emergency structure. Instead, designate energy emergency coordinator responsibilities to
existing personnel who have a working knowledge of emergency services, a broad-based knowledge of local
government infrastructure, and established working relationships with all levels of government and the private
sector. Examples of possible Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinators include:
The Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinator (EEAC) will have primary responsibility for developing the
energy assurance plan. The EEAC will also have overall responsibility of coordinating essential supplies
during an energy supply disruption and providing energy support operations during a disaster. The EEAC’s
primary duties during an emergency are:
Monitor the progress of the energy emergency by obtaining information via established communication
lines and prepare an analysis of the probable effects;
Assist in procuring and distributing essential energy resources to support emergency response operations;
Monitor the distribution of essential energy supplies;
Coordinate energy suppliers to support emergency restoration of disrupted services;
Attend all emergency staff briefings and keep other appropriate management and staff up to date as needed;
To prepare for these duties, the Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinator should:
Depending on the size of the jurisdiction, the EEAC may want to form a task force composed of members
from both the public and private sectors to help during the plan development process. This task force may
already exist within the local government organization as another type of planning committee such as
a disaster council or an emergency preparedness committee. The purpose of the task force is to provide
general input, direction, and information on departmental functions and to identify the general nature of
critical energy needs and vulnerabilities to an energy disruption.
Seek advice on county or city policies which may affect the development of the plan. For example,
the status of any interagency emergency fuel agreements within the jurisdiction or neighboring
jurisdictions such as an agreement between a city and its unified school district to share motor
fuel during shortages.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 13
and Energy Reliability), it is important to involve many of these stakeholders on the Emergency Review
Task Force.
2) Prepare a “Gap Analysis” of where the jurisdiction is now versus where it should be based on
generally accepted standards and best practices
Identifying strengths and weaknesses and designing a plan to address those weaknesses with concrete
implementation deadlines is a productive early step for any jurisdiction. The local government energy
assurance assessment tool contained in Appendix B will help in discovering and documenting gaps in the
planning process.
Unfortunately, energy assurance best practice data are hard to find. State data exists through the
National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO), the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners (NARUC), the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), the National Governors
Association (NGA)-Center for Best Practices, but this information is tailored to state officials. The U.S.
Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability’s (OE’s) Infrastructure
Security and Energy Restoration (ISER) Division is aware of this lack of data and is funding PTI and others
to fill this gap. For now, one of the best places to find best practices is through Ronda Mosley,
Senior Director for Research and Government Services at PTI at rmosley@pti.org.
4) Build people redundancy into the energy emergency and energy assurance systems; train staff and
regularly update the energy assurance plan
One of the primary recommendations made by an OE-funded October 2005 Energy Assurance Stakeholder
meeting in Washington, DC was to ensure that valuable information currently housed only in the minds of a
few people is moved to more people through both person-to-person verbal communication and also through
hard copy. A recurring energy assurance issue across the country is the dwindling number of qualified energy
assurance staff and the fact that the information they possess has not been documented. If such a person is
unavailable during an energy emergency, the jurisdiction is more vulnerable. Systems need to be put in place
that will address this important issue.
5) Identify and track the location of, and fuel needed for, all generators
Research over the past two years has shown that a significant portion of firefighters across the country do
not know how to start their emergency power generators! This alarming finding is a relatively easy one
to address. Embarking on a “Generator Identification Program” will result in the location of all known
generators and the specific fuel needed to power them. This can be combined with a training program to
ensure that the fuel and people needed to power the generators are readily and easily available when needed.
The Energy Industries of Ohio organization has experience in working with firefighters in communities in
the Cleveland, Ohio area to identify generators. They can be found at http://www.energyinohio.com/.
A report outlining their activities and an assessment tool for generator identification can be found in
Appendix D of this document.
As noted in the regional cooperation section, one of the most important trends in both the energy
8) Establish a priority list for fuel end users based on your profile
One of the noteworthy recommendations in NASEO’s State Energy Assurance Guidelines worth replicating
by local governments is to establish a “Priority End User Program” which requires that suppliers provide
police, fire, and emergency medical services 100% of their current requirement upon certification to their
suppliers. The list of priority users should be kept as short and clear cut as possible to avoid disputes on
the question of whether some service is a priority. The priority uses may also need to be tailored to the
particulars of an event. For example, diesel fuel for backup generators to support water systems may need
to be included in the priority list in the event the petroleum shortage is coupled with a power outage. After
identifying the priority list, “pre-event” contracts and mutual aid agreements can be entered into with fuel
suppliers. This action can be completed in concert with other regional local governments and with the active
involvement and advice of state government. A checklist to assist in fuel supply issues is found in Appendix
B. A list of priority uses could include:
Therefore, it is recommended that fuel use demographics, fuel delivery routes, and the possible impacts of
a short- or long-term emergency on the government, residential, commercial, industrial, and transportation
sectors be determined. This information will be useful at the time of an emergency.
The key to successfully managing a human-caused or natural disaster for local and state governments is
preparing in advance of the event through training exercises. Preparation can include utilizing many training
programs and emergency scenario tabletop exercises offered through the U.S. Department of Energy (see
http://www.oe.energy.gov/our_organization/iser.htm). One state energy emergency official interviewed
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 15
during the development of these guidelines commented, “Energy assurance training is crucial if you expect
to respond effectively. It is like running a marathon—your body needs to know what to expect when it is
running for 26 miles. The same thing applies to getting ready for an extended energy emergency—your
local government needs to know what to expect when you lose power to its critical facilities, operations, or
systems. For now the best way to learn what to expect is through training exercises.” Information learned
and best practices obtained during these tabletop exercises can be brought back to the local government
and shared.
An energy profile can be composed of two elements. The first is a description of the local government
energy sources. The second is a description of how and where energy is used in the government including
an assessment of vulnerability associated with that use and its location. Be sure to know how much energy
is consumed for critical operations (see Appendix B). Ensuring city operations continue to operate for a
minimum of 72 hours requires such information.
Fuels: This topic is covered in NASEO’s State Energy Assurance Guidelines document. Useful energy
emergency planning begins with knowledge of the fuels used. Knowledgeable staffs within government
understand the sources, volume, import routing of these fuels, and location of facilities (power plants, major
transmission lines, natural gas pipelines, and petroleum infrastructure, refineries, pipelines, distribution
terminals, retail facilities, etc.).
As the NASEO document suggests, it is important to know the relationship of local energy markets to
regional and national markets. Make sure all of the energy and fuel types are covered:
Electricity;
Natural Gas;
Motor Gasoline;
Aviation Fuels;
Propane;
Heavy industrial fuels;
Distillates; and
Renewables.
A working knowledge of seasonal supply, demand, and price trends for energy is also helpful.
Use: Since local governments vary considerably in geographic size, population and many other areas, this
use profile needs to be tailored for each specific jurisdiction. Examples of items of interest to consider are
1) the amount of electricity, natural gas, and petroleum products normally used in the city and 2) where this
energy is used (facilities, transport etc).
A. Utilities
It is important that excellent relations with the electric, gas, and water utilities exist so that when a disaster occurs
quick access to reliable, accurate data and information is possible. City and county leaders should be on a first name
basis with key utility contacts, and contact information should be shared with a handful of other local government
“back-up” contacts. Utilities have a vested interest in energy assurance and most are more than willing to foster new
energy assurance-focused relationships with local governments.
Understanding energy supply routes is crucial. The U.S. has enough natural gas distribution lines to wrap around
the equator 15 times. The U.S. has enough transmission lines to go around the globe 12 times. Many of these lines
may be local. Accurate information as to the precise location of these local lines, where they are most vulnerable and
which routes trucks take to deliver diesel and natural gas to local facilities is all important.
■■ Identification and analysis of potential system vulnerabilities in terms of worst performing or overloaded
feeders and overloaded substations;
■■ Communications protocols with the City and public during energy emergencies;
■■ Location of portable emergency generators, emergency trailers, and emergency response vehicles;
■■ A list of critical repair materials and storage locations;
■■ A location of spare transformer cable and replacement equipment;
■■ A listing of siting availability for portable substations; and
■■ Deployment and routing plans for the above-mentioned equipment.
■■ Install back-up generator interconnections at critical city facilities, with maps of both generator and
interconnection locations;
■■ Perform annual, or semi-annual, walking inspections of utility substations to verify that the utility has
completed maintenance activities at its substations; and
■■ Purchase of renewable energy-supplied portable generators.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 17
NASEO’s State Energy Assurance Guidelines reference an important list suggested by the National Association
of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC). Taken from the perspective of electric and gas utilities, NARUC
suggests questions to explore with the local utility.
■■ Have key energy assets been identified, digitally mapped, and ranked from a security and vulnerability
perspective?
■■ Have critical physical and cyber risks and vulnerabilities been identified?
■■ Have interdependencies, such as the linkage between natural gas supply and the reliability of gas-fired
generation been quantified?
■■ What is the planning horizon and geographic scope of the energy assessment process? Does it accurately
characterize and quantify extended and multiple contingencies?
■■ Have appropriate options for response to these vulnerabilities been developed and tested?
■■ Have downstream impacts on other sectors (e.g., water, transportation, and telecommunications) and societal
impacts been identified?
■■ Has the energy sector presented an appropriate business case for making security investments and sought to
recover prudent critical infrastructure investments?
■■ Has the energy sector implemented changes that will enhance reliability and security, including business
continuity?
■■ How has security been integrated into the ongoing business strategy of the energy sector?
■■ Have investments in utility and end-user efficiencies or alternative energy sources been investigated to
minimize the adverse impacts resulting from an energy shortage or emergency?
■■ Has a mechanism been established to update planning and response plans?
■■ “Post-event” to improve the energy sector’s best practices?
Utilities often have the human and financial resources available to assist with energy assurance planning efforts.
They are a valuable ally in order to move forward on these efforts.
B. The State
State Energy Offices (SEO) can assist with energy assurance efforts. Much of the federal funding over the last five
years for state and local energy assurance education has gone to the National Association of State Energy Officials
(NASEO), so the organization and its members have significant information and resources that can help: http://
naseo.org. SEO officials typically coordinate responses to energy emergencies, develop energy emergency plans, and
conduct training exercises with local governments.
NASEO’s State Energy Assurance Guidelines point out that all states are presumed to have legal authority for
general emergencies, and most have laws pertaining to energy emergencies. Many states depend upon their
emergency management (or civil defense) organization for energy emergency planning and response. Others may
focus energy emergency responsibilities for some or all entities that might be involved. These can be grouped into
four broad categories.
1. Monitoring the energy supply system for the purpose of detecting any unusual imbalances that indicate
the potential for an energy emergency and, if so, to advise the appropriate state officials.
2. Developing, administering or coordinating energy emergency contingency plans.
3. Communicating with federal, state and local agencies related to energy emergency planning and
management.
4. Maintaining ongoing contact with stakeholders in the energy industry including regulated utilities,
cooperatives, municipally owned and unregulated providers.
18 PARTNERING
State emergency and/or disaster plans are designed to delineate responsibilities among state agencies and between
the state and local jurisdictions. These efforts are managed through the federal government and relevant agencies,
which are described in the federal government section.
There are a number of federal agencies that can help provide a safe and secure energy supply, including
the following: (Energy Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as Input to the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan, May 2007, Department of Homeland Security and U.S.
Department of Energy):
■■ Department of Agriculture (USDA). DOE coordinates with USDA’s Rural Utilities Service, which
provides funding and support for rural electric utilities.
■■ Department of Defense (DOD). The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) serves the Armed
Forces and the Nation by providing vital engineering services and capabilities, as a public service, across
the full spectrum of operations—from peace to war—in support of national interests. DOE coordinates with
USACE regarding maintenance of the nation’s dams.
■■ Department of Energy (DOE). The US Department of Energy (DOE) leads the Federal Government’s
efforts to advance the energy security of the United States. This function is accomplished in partnership with
the Energy Sector security partners in Federal, State, local tribal, and Territorial governments. Importantly, it
is accomplished in close cooperation with private sector asset owners and operators which represent more
that eighty five (85) percent of the Nation’s energy sector assets
■■ Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DOE works with DHS, which leads, integrates, and
coordinates Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) activities across the Federal Government. As previously
noted, certain segments of the Energy Sector are directly coordinated by DHS and DOD, including nuclear
power and hydroelectric power (dams). The DHS Transportation Security Administration oversees pipeline
safety and security and works closely with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMS) to address
natural disasters and security issues related to the provision of energy and public safety. The United States
Coast Guard (USCG) has protective responsibility for offshore oil and gas facilities, and for implementing
regulations under the Maritime Transportation Security Act that impact Energy Sector facilities. DOE
also coordinates with USCG regarding problems at terminals and waterways. DOE is working with
DHS to coordinate current and future threat identification and assessment, mapping threats against U.S.
vulnerabilities, issuing timely warnings, and taking preventive and protective action. DOE is also working
with the DHS Office of Cyber Security and Communications to address and enhance the security of
the sector’s cyber infrastructure through such efforts as the Control Systems Security Program. DHS is
responsible for implementing chemical security regulations that will impact some important Energy
Sector assets.
■■ Department of the Interior (DOI). The Mission of the Department of the Interior is to protect and provide
access to our Nation’s natural and cultural heritage and honor our trust responsibilities to Indian Tribes and
our commitments to island communities. DOE, through the Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs),
coordinate power generation and river operations with DOI hydro generation projects. DOE also coordinates
with DOI’s Minerals Management Service (MMS), which manages the Nation’s natural gas, oil, and other
mineral resources on the Outer Continental Shelf.
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■■ Department of State (DOS). Energy is imported and exported each day. DOE works with other agencies
on energy movements across U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico, and cooperates through international
agreements led by the DOS and DHS.
■■ Department of Transportation (DOT). The Energy Sector relies on pipelines, barges, tankers, railways, and
highways to transport all raw and refined energy products. DOE is already coordinating activities regarding
oil and natural gas pipelines with DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
and is a member of the interagency committee charged with developing a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) to facilitate prompt repair of oil and natural gas transmission pipelines.
■■ Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). EPA is responsible for the enforcement of the Clean Air Act.
DOE coordinates with EPA during energy emergencies and supply disruptions to assess the availability of
transportation and boutiques fuels and the need for environmental fuel waivers. DOE also coordinates with
EPA on air quality and fuel-related emissions.
■■ Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). FREC is an independent agency that regulates the
interstate transmission of natural gas, oil, and electricity, as well as natural gas and hydropower projects.
FERC oversees approval of electric reliability standards and enforcement of those standards, which are
developed by NERC in its capacity as the Energy Reliability Organization (ERO) under the Energy Policy
Act of 2005. FERC can also impose safety requirements to ensure or enhance the operational reliability of
LNG facilities within its jurisdiction. DOE coordinates with FERC on energy security issues.
■■ Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). DOE will continue to coordinate with NRC on energy security
issues related to electricity generated by nuclear fission, relying on the experience gained from DOE’s own
operation of numerous nuclear facilities.
D. National Associations
PTI works with several national associations that can be valuable partners and resources for to assist in energy
assurance efforts. These include the National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO), the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), the National Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL), and the National Governors Association (NGA)–Center for Best Practices, United States Conference
of Mayors (USCM), International City/County Managers Association, the National League of Cities, and the
National Association of Counties. All of these organizations have unique expertise and/or information to offer local
governments in the energy assurance area.
Since disasters usually involve more than one local government, regional cooperation is desirable. In the
electricity sector regional cooperation between utilities has been taking place for decades. Regional cooperation
among cities and counties has occurred for as many years, but this cooperation typically has not been centered
on energy, and certainly not energy assurance issues. While focused mostly on communications and IT
issues, regional Y2K efforts are sometimes credited with starting earnest energy assurance collaboration. The
complicated nature of the energy delivery system came to light for many local public policy makers as they
prepared for Y2K. Although the data from Y2K may in some cases be outdated, much of it is still relevant and
has not changed. Depending on the jurisdiction’s file retention policies, mining this information source can prove
very beneficial.
20 PARTNERING
IV. Regional Cooperation
and Collaboration
Collaboration during energy emergencies often occurs through regional energy organizations. These organizations
include Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs) that operate large hydropower dams under Department of Energy
jurisdiction. Bonneville Power Administration in the Northwest and the Tennessee Valley Authority in the Southeast
are two such PMAs. Regional state energy policy organizations such as the Southern States Energy Board (www.
sseb.org) and the Western Interstate Energy Board (www.westgov.org) may provide valuable coordination services
during emergencies also.
Regional cooperation is almost always necessary after an emergency event. Fuel and food supplies usually need to be
transported across highways to affected areas, often requiring close collaboration and communication. A major event
that knocks out power to many grocery stores and wholesale food supplies for an extended period of time can require
importing generators from neighboring jurisdictions. It is important to know the locations of these generators and to
have the contact numbers available to multiple people.
Small and/or rural communities often benefit from a regional approach since many of these communities cannot
afford and/or do not have the resources available to implement energy assurance plans by themselves. One regional
resource available to rural and large communities is the Infrastructure Security Partnership (TISP), a national public-
private partnership. TISP promotes collaboration to improve the resilience of the nation’s critical infrastructure
against the adverse impacts of natural and man-made disasters. TISP can be found at http://www.tisp.org.
TISP members (representing the design, construction, operation, and maintenance communities; local, state, and
federal agencies; academe; and other organizations concerned with disaster preparedness) work together to develop
and implement cost-effective solutions to enhance the resilience of the nation’s critical infrastructure by leveraging
their collective resources, experience, technical expertise, research and development capabilities, and knowledge of
public policy regarding natural and man-made disasters. Their objectives are to:
1. Raise awareness of the importance of achieving national and regional disaster resilience for critical
infrastructure;
2. Create effective, task-focused, multi-disciplinary work groups to improve regional disaster resilience for
critical infrastructure;
3. Foster creation and development of regional public-private partnerships to address infrastructure
interdependency and interoperability;
4. Disseminate knowledge on infrastructure security and disaster preparedness;
5. Mobilize TISP members to respond to significant issues and events;
6. Promote the improvement and application of risk assessment and management methodologies; and
7. Promote development and review of national and regional plans and policies.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 21
TISP suggests in their publication, Regional Disaster Resilience: A Guide for Developing an Action Plan, The
Infrastructure Security Partnership, June 2006, which regional energy assurance planning is critical today, and they
provide 29 fundamental assumptions that should underlay any regional action plan. Below is an abbreviated list of
eight of the 29 assumptions particularly relevant to local governments.
1. The creation of regional public-private partnerships is necessary to bring together key stakeholders to
build trust, to foster information sharing and coordination, to identify and assess vulnerabilities and other
preparedness needs, and to develop and implement solutions. Such partnerships should include all levels
of government.
2. Security and disaster resilience should be incorporated into cyber and physical systems in the development
phase on the basis of assessed risk under various scenarios. Resilience can include system hardening,
building in redundancies, implementing backup systems, and other mitigation measures.
3. A major challenge is obtaining the necessary data on infrastructure interdependencies to enable the
development of assessment and decision tools to provide greater understanding of associated cyber and
physical vulnerabilities and how best to minimize them.
4. Development of maintenance and mutual assistance agreements, user agreements, memorandums of
understanding (MOUs), and other types of cooperative arrangements are essential to sound preparedness
planning and disaster management.
5. Sorting out and defining roles and responsibilities—including determining who is in charge of particular
functions—is fundamental to ensuring effective disaster preparedness, response, recovery, and restoration.
6. Assuring supply chains and the delivery of critical products, materials, and components is essential to
disaster resilience and the vitality of the industrial base and has a direct and profound impact on regional/
national economies and national security.
7. Where useful, codes, standards, and guidelines should be applied within and across organizations and
jurisdictions to enhance security and preparedness and to minimize costs.
8. Costs for technology solutions, maintenance, and upgrades must be affordable to states, localities, and
private-sector organizations.
In the vast majority of incidents, local and state resources and regional mutual aid will provide the first line of
emergency response and incident management support. The overwhelming majority of emergency incidents
are handled daily by a single local government at the local level—and many of these incidents involve energy.
Tribal and local authorities, not federal, have the primary responsibility for preventing, responding to, and
recovering from energy-related emergencies and disasters. Mutual aid agreements can help line-up resources
far in advance of a human-made or natural disaster. Unprecedented intergovernmental collaboration and
planning are necessary as part of any energy assurance effort. A sample mutual aid agreement in provided in
Appendix C. It was prepared by the well-respected Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
(http://www.emacweb.org/?150).
Mutual aid agreements are needed between local governments. Indeed, in a recent edition of State Government
News, the author wrote: “Through the National Strategy on Homeland Security, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) placed a new focus on state and local (emphasis added) mutual aid as a key to the nation’s
emergency response capabilities for all hazards, man-made or natural. The National Incident Management System
(NIMS), currently under development by DHS, provides an operational framework for the response by federal, state
and local agencies. In the NIMS, mutual aid is emphasized as an indispensable tool for the swift and coordinated
response to disasters of all kinds.”
“Many local jurisdictions have agreements in place, but they vary widely across the country. Moreover, many are
not formal agreements, and do not address key issues such as liability and compensation; and encompass multi-
disciplines. To be able to move assets effectually between local jurisdictions and across state lines, mutual aid
agreements should be robust, inclusive, demonstrate an effective relationship to EMAC and address liability and
compensation issues in a manner consistent with state law.”
As part of a grant awarded NEMA by FEMA in 2003, NEMA agreed to develop and market model intrastate mutual
aid legislation along with several other related tasks. Local government experts reviewed the information and the
model mutual aid agreement available in the Appendix C is the final product that resulted from this process.
One of the most important aspects of the model is that adoption by jurisdictions is entirely voluntary. The model is
meant to be a tool and resource for jurisdictions to utilize in developing or refining regional or statewide mutual aid
agreements. It is anticipated that states and jurisdictions may wish to modify the model to conform to their own laws
and authorities, or to address unique needs and circumstances. Further, the proposed articles and provisions in the
model are complementary to the recommended minimum elements to be included in mutual aid agreements that are
a part of the draft National Incident Management System Plan.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 23
24 REGIONAL COO P ERATION AND COLLAB ORATION
V. Federal Energy
Assurance Incentives
A. The National Response Framework (NRF)/ESF 12
The National Response Framework (NRF) is designed to establish a single, comprehensive approach to domestic
incident management. Required by a Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, the NRF provides
the structure and mechanisms for the coordination of federal support to state, local, and tribal incident managers
and for exercising direct federal authorities and responsibilities. The NRF uses an “all hazards approach” to
assist in the homeland security missions of preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing
the vulnerability to all natural and human caused hazards, and minimizing the damage and assisting in the
recovery from any type of incident that occurs. Appropriately, the NRF is built on the premise that incidents
are generally handled best at the lowest jurisdictional level possible. In the vast majority of incidents, local and
state resources and interstate mutual aid will provide the first line of emergency response and incident
management support.
The NRF is built on the template of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which is designed to
provide a consistent framework for incident management at all jurisdictional levels regardless of the cause, size, or
complexity of the incident.
The NRF is designed to be a flexible mechanism that local governments can use to partially, or fully, implement in
preparation for an anticipated event, or in response to an incident, which may ultimately require a federal response
due to national implications. Examples of such events include public health emergencies, cyber incidents and long-
term energy disruptions. This “selective implementation” through the activation of one or more NRF elements
theoretically allows local governments with maximum flexibility in any situation that requires interaction with local,
tribal, state, federal and non-governmental entities.
State emergency or disaster plans are designed to delineate responsibilities among state agencies and between the
state and local jurisdictions. Beyond this definition, these plans seek to define the relationship of both state and local
response mechanisms to the federal emergency management system.
The NRF establishes a comprehensive approach to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic
incidents. The plan incorporates best practices and procedures from incident management disciplines—homeland
security, emergency management, law enforcement, firefighting, public works, public health, responder and recovery
worker health and safety, emergency medical services, and the private sector—and integrates them into a unified
structure. It establishes protocols to help:
■■ Save lives and protect the health and safety of the public, responders, and recovery workers;
■■ Ensure security of the homeland;
■■ Prevent an imminent incident, including acts of terrorism, from occurring;
■■ Protect and restore critical infrastructure and key resources;
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■■ Conduct law enforcement investigations to resolve the incident, apprehend the perpetrators, and collect and
preserve evidence for prosecution and/or attribution;
■■ Protect property and mitigate damages and impacts to individuals, communities, and the environment; and
■■ Facilitate recovery of individuals, families, businesses, governments, and the environment.1
The NRF contains five sections, including the Basic Plan, Appendices, the Emergency Support Function Annexes,
Support Annexes and Incident Annexes. The Basic Plan presents the policies and concept of operations that
guide how the federal government will respond and coordinate with state and local governments and provides a
compendium of National Interagency Plans. Appendices provide more detailed supporting information, including
terms, definitions, acronyms, authorities, and a compendium of national interagency plans. The Emergency Support
Function (ESF) Annexes describe the roles and responsibilities of primary and support agencies for key response
functions, like transportation and communications, which supplement state and local activities.
The “Emergency Support Functions” under the National Response Plan provide guidance on these relationships.
1
Emergencies & Disasters: National Response Plan. Department of Homeland Security Web site. http://www.dhs.gov/
dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0566.xml .
The purpose of Emergency Support Function (ESF) 12 is to provide guidance to governments support agencies
and organizations in responding to and recovering from shortages and disruptions in the supply and delivery of
electricity, natural gas, and other forms of energy and fuels that impact or threaten significant numbers of citizens
and visitors.
■■ ESF 12 involves close coordination with electric and natural gas utilities operating in the jurisdiction to ensure
the integrity of the power supply systems are maintained during emergency situations and that damaged
infrastructure is repaired and services restored in an expeditious manner. As such local governments have four
(4) primary responsibilities to their constituents. In descending order they are: assuring that communications
are maintained or re-established;
■■ employing necessary life saving strategies;
■■ assuring life sustaining activities are implemented and;
■■ re-habilitating critical facilities.
The purpose of Emergency Support Function (ESF) 12 is to promulgate the policies and procedures to be used
by City, support agencies and organizations in responding to and recovering from shortages and disruptions in
the supply and delivery of electricity, natural gas, and other forms of energy and fuels that impact or threaten
significant numbers of citizens and visitors.
Shortages and disruptions in the supply of electricity may be caused by such events as unusually cold or
hot weather, storms, power generation, fuel supply disruptions, and electric transmission and distribution
disruptions. Other energy and fuel shortages affecting the private sector may be caused by such events as
severe weather, flooding, and labor strikes.
ESF 12 involves close coordination with the electric and natural gas utility operating in the City to ensure
that the integrity of the power supply systems are maintained during emergency situations and that damaged
utility infrastructure is repaired and services restored in an expediential manner. The Department of ______
(Department) will have primary responsibility to monitor and coordinate the availability and supply of natural
gas, and the supply and transportation of generation fuels and emergency power. ESF 12 will have primary
responsibility to monitor and coordinate with private sector petroleum fuel suppliers to ensure that adequate
supplies of transportation fuels (diesel and gasoline) are available and deliverable.
yy Emergencies or disasters could occur in or near the City at any time causing significant human suffering,
injury and death; public and private property damage, environmental degradation, loss of essential
services, economic hardship to businesses, families and individuals, and disruption to local and other
governmental entities.
yy The City is vulnerable to many natural, technological or man-made hazards such as the damaging effects of
hazardous materials and chemical incidents, power failures, transit incidents, energy failures, civil disorders,
dam failures and acts of terrorism.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 27
yy Primary and secondary effects of hazards must be considered.
yy The occurrence of an emergency or disaster incident can destroy or damage portions of the energy supply,
production and distribution systems.
yy Widespread and prolonged electric power failures can occur in a major disaster.
yy The transportation, media, telecommunications and utility infrastructure will be disrupted.
yy Delays in the production, refining, and delivery of petroleum-based products can occur as a result of
transportation infrastructure problems and loss of commercial electric power.
A. General
1. When electric utility operating reserves are nearly exhausted and there is an imminent possibility
of curtailment or loss of firm load, threat of distribution service disruptions due to an emergency
or disaster incident, or when other energy supplies such as natural gas or automotive transportation
fuels are disrupted, an appraisal of the situation is made by designated authorities and personnel, and
action is taken is accordance with ESF 12. ESF 12 personnel are notified and mobilized to direct and
coordinate relief efforts, communicate with the public and appropriate governmental agencies, and
restore normal service as soon as possible. These response actions are carried out to maintain energy
system integrity and to minimize the impact on the City, citizens and visitors.
2. Activities during an emergency or disaster incident include but is not limited to:
a. Coordinating closely with local jurisdiction officials for safety and energy providers and
establishing energy restoration priorities for essential public services.
b. Assessing fuel and electric power damage.
c. Assessing energy supply and demand.
d. Assessing the requirements for restoration.
e. Coordinating temporary, alternative, or interim sources of emergency fuel and power.
B. Organization
1. The Department of ________ is the lead agency for ESF 12. A critical support agency
is_______________. During an emergency or disaster, the primary and support agencies of ESF 12
will assign personnel to the City’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC). ESF 12 will report to the
Operations Section Chief.
C. Notification
1. The Office of Emergency Management (OEM) shall notify the ESF 12 primary agency, when
an area of the City is threatened or has been impacted by an emergency or disaster incident. The
Department will notify ESF 12 support agencies as appropriate.
2. ESF 12 will identify respective support agency, private sector personnel to assist in coordinating
response activities associated with utility infrastructure damage and restoration needs. Per the
request of ESF 12, support agency personnel will report to the EOC.
D. Actions
1. Preparedness
a. All Department personnel designated to serve as emergency operations center representatives
shall be trained on all related Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) associated with ESF 12.
b. All staff responsible for interacting with the OEM and EOC shall complete a review of SOPs
during each 6-month period to ensure their familiarization with any changes in procedures
and/or data.
2. Response
a. ESF 12 procedures shall be implemented when notified by the OEM. The Department and other
support agencies and organizations will cooperate with City, state and federal agencies and public
or private entities in achieving the purposes or activities of ESF 12.
b. The assets available to ESF 12 will be used to assist other ESFs with their emergency response
and recovery efforts to provide power and fuel and other resources as necessary.
c. ESF 12 shall coordinate with support agencies and organizations to ensure sufficient power and
fuel supplies to City agencies, emergency response organizations, and areas along evacuation
routes.
d. Maintain communication with utility representatives to determine response and recovery needs.
e. Maintain communication with major fuel providers to determine response and recovery needs.
f. Assist the American Red Cross and other relief organizations to identify emergency shelter power
generation needs for emergency shelters.
g. Complete an initial assessment that identifies necessary recovery actions. Develop strategies for
meeting local energy needs, monitor utility repair actions; and communicate with and monitor
state and utility response actions.
h. Receive and assess requests for aid from City, state and federal agencies, energy offices, energy
suppliers and distributors.
i. Work with the OEM and other ESFs to establish priorities to repair damaged utility systems.
j. Update ESF 15 with assessments of energy supply, demand, and requirements to repair or restore
energy systems for public information.
3. Recovery
a. Upon request, coordinate the provision of resources to assist City agencies in restoring
emergency power and fuel needs.
b. Review recovery actions, develop strategies for meeting City energy needs, and continue to
monitor utility actions, and communicate with and monitor utility response actions.
c. Receive and assess requests for aid from City, state and federal agencies, energy offices, energy
suppliers and distributors.
d. Work with the EOC Incident Commander and other EFS to establish priorities to repair damaged
energy systems.
e. Update ESF 15 with assessments of energy supply, demand, and requirements to repair or restore
energy systems.
f. Keep accurate logs and other records of emergency response activities and costs.
4. Mitigation
a. ESF 12 will work collaboratively with other ESFs, private energy suppliers and fuel companies
to ensure adequate supplies and resources are available to meet demand created by potential
emergencies or disasters.
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E. Command and Control
1. In the wake of a disaster, many of the local resources will be unavailable due to damage,
inaccessibility, or insufficient supply. The Department will coordinate a response to electric
and natural gas energy related requests with assistance from the ESF 12 support agencies and
organizations.
2. When the Department is notified by the OEM that the EOC has been activated, it will staff ESF 12
in the EOC. The Department will identify which support agencies for ESF 12 are needed, and take
the necessary steps to ensure that these agencies are activated, or at least placed on alert status, as
appropriate.
3. The Department will coordinate a response to non-utility sector energy and transportation fuel
related requests with assistance from other ESF 12 support agencies and organizations as well as
assistance from other ESFs.
IV. RESPONSIBILITIES
yy The primary responsibility for coordinating the development and maintenance of ESF 12 rests with the
Manager of the Department. Other agencies supporting this ESF will assist the Manager through the
development and maintenance of their own agencies Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and mutual
aid agreements, in support of this ESF.
yy A periodic review (no less than annually) will be conducted of this ESF for revalidation and necessary
changes. Appropriate signatures and approval dates will identify revisions to this plan. The revision process
will include incorporation of changes based upon periodic tests, drills and exercises, as appropriate. All
revisions will be submitted to OEM for updating the EOP and distribution to all agencies.
In coordination with support agencies and organizations, the primary agency will schedule and conduct
training and drill activities that ensure a comprehensive understanding of all ESF roles and responsibilities.
The Department will at least annually, coordinate with the OEM Exercise and Training Officer to develop
and conduct an exercise of the ESF. The exercise will focus on the execution of all roles and responsibilities
including those of supporting agencies and organizations, and their respective SOPs that support the ESF
to ensure they are prepared to readily respond when activated. All exercise activities will be documented in
an After Action Report (AAR) that will identify necessary improvements and potential changes to the ESF
document. The ESF will be updated as necessary and revisions distributed to update the EOP.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 7 establishes a national policy for federal departments and
agencies to identify and prioritize U.S. critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist
attack. HSPD-7 identifies 15 sectors that require protective actions to prepare for, protect, or mitigate against a
terrorist attack or other hazards.
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Purpose
This directive establishes a national policy for Federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize United
States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist attacks.
Background
(1) Terrorists seek to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit critical infrastructure and key resources across the United States
to threaten national security, cause mass casualties, weaken the economy, and damage public morale and confidence.
(2) America’s open and technologically complex society includes a wide array of critical infrastructure and key
resources that are potential terrorist targets. The majority of these are owned and operated by the private sector and
State or local governments. These critical infrastructures and key resources are both physical and cyber-based and
span all sectors of the economy.
(3) Critical infrastructure and key resources provide the essential services that underpin American society.
The Nation possesses numerous key resources, whose exploitation or destruction by terrorists could cause
catastrophic health effects or mass casualties comparable to those from the use of a weapon of mass destruction,
or could profoundly affect national prestige and morale. In addition, there is critical infrastructure so vital that its
incapacitation, exploitation, or destruction, through terrorist attack, could have a debilitating effect on security and
economic well being.
(4) While it is not possible to protect or eliminate the vulnerability of all critical infrastructure and key resources
throughout the country, strategic improvements in security can make it more difficult for attacks to succeed and
can lessen the impact of attacks that may occur. In addition to strategic security enhancements, tactical security
improvements can be rapidly implemented to deter, mitigate, or neutralize potential attacks.
Definitions
(5) In this directive:
(a) The term “critical infrastructure” has the meaning given to that term in section 1016(e) of the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)).
(b) The term “key resources” has the meaning given that term in section 2(9) of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(9)).
(c) The term “the Department” means the Department of Homeland Security.
(d) The term “Federal departments and agencies” means those executives departments enumerated in 5
U.S.C. 101, and the Department of Homeland Security; independent establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C.
104(1); Government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C. 103(1); and the United States Postal Service.
(e) The terms “State,” and “local government,” when used in a geographical sense, have the same meanings
given to those terms in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101).
(f) The term “the Secretary” means the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(g) The term “Sector-Specific Agency” means a Federal department or agency responsible for infrastructure
protection activities in a designated critical infrastructure sector or key resources category. Sector-Specific
Agencies will conduct their activities under this directive in accordance with guidance provided by the
Secretary.
(h) The terms “protect” and “secure” mean reducing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or key
resources in order to deter, mitigate, or neutralize terrorist attacks.
Policy
(6) It is the policy of the United States to enhance the protection of our Nation’s critical infrastructure and key
resources against terrorist acts that could:
(7) Federal departments and agencies will identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure
and key resources in order to prevent, deter, and mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts to destroy, incapacitate, or
exploit them. Federal departments and agencies will work with State and local governments and the private sector to
accomplish this objective.
(8) Federal departments and agencies will ensure that homeland security programs do not diminish the overall
economic security of the United States.
(9) Federal departments and agencies will appropriately protect information associated with carrying out this
directive, including handling voluntarily provided information and information that would facilitate terrorist
targeting of critical infrastructure and key resources consistent with the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and other
applicable legal authorities.
(10) Federal departments and agencies shall implement this directive in a manner consistent with applicable
provisions of law, including those protecting the rights of United States persons.
(12) In accordance with guidance provided by the Secretary, Sector-Specific Agencies shall:
(a) collaborate with all relevant Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, and the
private sector, including with key persons and entities in their infrastructure sector;
(b) conduct or facilitate vulnerability assessments of the sector; and
(c) encourage risk management strategies to protect against and mitigate the effects of attacks against critical
infrastructure and key resources.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 33
Coordination with the Private Sector
(13) In accordance with applicable laws or regulations, the Department and the Sector-Specific Agencies will
collaborate with appropriate private sector entities and continue to encourage the development of information sharing
and analysis mechanisms. Additionally, the Department and Sector-Specific Agencies shall collaborate with the
private sector and continue to support sector-coordinating mechanisms:
(a) to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources; and
(b) to facilitate sharing of information about physical and cyber threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, potential
protective measures, and best practices.
Implementation
(15) Consistent with the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary shall produce a comprehensive,
integrated National Plan for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection to outline national goals,
objectives, milestones, and key initiatives within 1 year from the issuance of this directive. The Plan shall
include, in addition to other Homeland Security-related elements as the Secretary deems appropriate,
the following elements:
(a) a strategy to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources,
including how the Department intends to work with Federal departments and agencies, State and local
governments, the private sector, and foreign countries and international organizations;
(b) a summary of activities to be undertaken in order to: define and prioritize, reduce the vulnerability of,
and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources;
(c) a summary of initiatives for sharing critical infrastructure and key resources information and for
providing critical infrastructure and key resources threat warning data to State and local governments and
the private sector; and
(d) coordination and integration, as appropriate, with other Federal emergency management
and preparedness activities including the National Response Plan and applicable national
preparedness goals.
The Secretary of Homeland Security released the National Incident Management System (NIMS) in March 2004.
In a September 8, 2004, letter to the nation’s governors, DHS outlined a phased approach to local government
implementation of the NIMS, with full compliance required by September 30, 2006. Notably, local jurisdictions are
required to meet NIMS implementation requirements put forward in the federal fiscal year 2006 as a condition of
receiving federal preparedness funding assistance in FY 2007 and beyond. Therefore, it makes sense to learn about
NIMS and to move forward on NIMS implementation at the local government level.
Some states have taken actions to ensure that the NIMS are integrated into the state’s emergency management
system. California did this through an Executive Order. The Executive Order required the state’s Office of
Emergency Services to report on the status of NIMS implementation of the National Incident Management System
by a date certain. Pennsylvania mandated that NIMS be utilized for all incident management issues within its borders
through a Proclamation.
The NIMS is a comprehensive system that improves local response operations through the use of the Incident
Command System (ICS) and the application of (new) standardized procedures and preparedness measures. The
NIMS promotes cross-jurisdictional, statewide and interstate regional mechanisms for coordinating responses and
obtaining help during complex incidents.
The list of NIMS-related local government needs can be overwhelming to some jurisdictions. (For a federal fiscal
year 2006 NIMS Implementation Matrix for Tribal and Local Jurisdictions please see http://www.fema.gov/txt/
emergency/nims/nims_tribal_local_compliance_activities.txt.)
By the end of the federal Fiscal Year 2006 (September 2006), DHS/FEMA required that NIMS be adopted at the
community level for all government departments and agencies. This could be done through a formal Executive
Order, a proclamation, resolution, or legislation. This was to be done in concert with NIMS local government
outreach to associations, utilities, non-governmental entities and private sector incident management and response
organizations.
The NIMS Integration Center is responsible for managing a helpful “NIMS On-Line” web site at http://www.
nimsonline.com/.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 35
Incident response organizations are numerous, and include:
■■ Ensure common and proven incident management doctrine, practices, and principles are used to plan for,
protect against, respond to, and recover from emergency incidents and preplanned events;
■■ Maintain a response operation capable of expanding to meet an escalating situation and the ability to integrate
resources and equipment from intrastate and interstate mutual aid agreements, state-provided assistance, and
federal government response;
■■ Order and track response assets using common resource typing and definitions, and draw on mutual aid
agreements for additional assistance;
■■ Establish staging and allocation plans for the re-distribution of equipment, supplies, and aid coming into the
area from other localities, states, or the federal government through mutual aid agreements;
■■ Conduct situational assessments and establish the appropriate ICS organizational structure to effectively
manage the incident; and
■■ Establish communication processes, procedures and protocols that will ensure effective interoperable
communications among emergency responders, 9-1-1 centers, and multi-agency coordination systems
(Emergency Operations Centers).
The Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) maintains a password-
protected Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinators (EEAC) website through which authorized state energy
emergency coordinators may access valuable energy security information, including daily news summaries,
emergency situation reports, lessons learned from other states, links to outage and curtailment information, and the
ability to email messages to up-to-date listings of colleagues in other jurisdictions.
The EEAC is a cooperative effort among NASEO, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners,
the National Conference of State Legislatures, the National Governors Association-Center for Best Practices, Public
Technology Institute, and OE’s Infrastructure Security and Energy Reliability Division (ISER). It establishes a secure
cooperative communications environment for state and local government personnel with access to information on
energy supply, demand, pricing and infrastructure. Designated members have expertise in electricity, petroleum and
natural gas. The current membership of approximately 180 people is made up of representatives from state energy
offices, public utility organizations, state legislators, emergency management agencies, homeland security offices,
and Governors’ offices. Local governments will be added, by PTI, to the system soon. Until that time, locals can
benefit from a fundamental understanding of how this system operates.
Each state has designated at least one primary and one secondary designee per energy source, up to six individuals
per state, for the EEAC list. In the event of an energy supply disruption or emergency, OE relies upon the EEAC
contacts to provide an up-to-date assessment of energy markets in the affected states. During these emergency
situations, as well as other non-emergency situations in which the list may be used, the EEAC serves as the link
between the state, industry and OE.
In an energy emergency, OE may need to disclose sensitive and privileged information, and in these situations, may
contact only the primary coordinator. From that point, it is the primary coordinator’s responsibility to follow the
state’s plan for disclosure of information. In most other non-emergency or less sensitive emergency or disruption
situations, both the primary and secondary coordinators may be contacted. Communications can be sent directly to
the OE via email; an EEAC can use the listserves to send information to different regions and the EEAC bulletin
board is available and provides a great way to share information.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 37
An EEAC should keep in touch with the state’s key energy sector contacts, including key players in the state’s
primary energy supply and energy consuming sectors, as well as key emergency or energy-related personnel in other
agencies of state government and local governments. Additionally, it is important to keep in contact with other
EEACs in the state.
The types of events that warrant communication with the EEAC network include:
■■ Large-scale events, such as an attack on the power grid, international oil disruption, hurricane, major ice
storm, etc.;
■■ Emerging problems, such as the spring gasoline change in non-attainment air quality areas that cause a
significant increase in the number of terminals without a supply; very cold weather with requests for fuel
driver hour waivers; price spikes; and other indicators of stress on the supply/distribution system’s ability to
supply fuel;
■■ Routine summer and winter energy assessments; and
■■ Simulations and exercises.
■■ Information that quantifies the size, scope and potential duration of the problem;
■■ Geographic area affected;
■■ Effects upstream and downstream in the energy supply/distribution system;
■■ Public statements by state officials;
■■ Specific actions taken by state or local governments to mitigate impacts;
■■ Requests from industry for assistance and response; and
■■ In-state media reports that accurately describe the problem.
An EEAC should consider sending information out to the EEAC list when market indicators suggest the
potential for supply problems and monitoring will be stepped up. In addition, information should be sent
when an event occurs that affects energy supply, demand or price, or when an energy emergency or state of
disaster is declared which affects energy supply. In the case of an international event that affects energy supply,
OE will likely communicate its analysis to the EEAC list and the states, or the states may request
such information from OE.
The EEAC list may also be used by OE to request information from a state in which there are reports of energy
problems. States should use the list to communicate regionally to counterparts, because problems are often not
limited to a single state. Too much information is often better than little or no information—if in doubt, use the list.
A brief message can go a long way and communication is key to a successful outcome.
If a message is received from another EEAC, and the state has information to lend further insights to the problem,
all those who received the message should receive a response. The response should indicate whether or not similar
problems are being observed in the state. The information should be verified—it is probably not wise to rely solely
on personal knowledge.
An EEAC must be a credible and timely source of information. If answers are immediately available, they need to
be obtained from previously established contacts in state government and industry. The EEAC website needs to be
checked regularly for postings on the bulletin boards and additional information should be added as warranted. An
EEAC should also “exercise” the list periodically by sending status information to states in the region, just to get in
the habit of using it. It is also a good idea to check contact information on the list and update it as necessary.
On the secure ISERnet website (http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/isernet), there are several communications tools for
exchanging information, including the EEAC listserves, the EEAC member list, and the bulletin board. Only
designated EEACs have access to the secure website; designation determinations should be reviewed with the State
Energy Office, or by contacting the ISER Division of the OE office. Designated EEACs can obtain the URL for the
website by contacting EO’s contractor at 703-676-8308 and asking for technical assistance.
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and supporting Sector-Specific Plans (SSPs) provide a
coordinated approach to critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) protection roles and responsibilities
for federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector security partners. The NIPP sets national priorities, goals, and
requirements for effective distribution of funding and resources that will help ensure that our government, economy,
and public services continue in the event of a terrorist attack or other disaster.
■■ Strong public-private partnerships that will foster relationships and facilitate coordination within and
across CI/KR sectors.
■■ Robust multi-directional information sharing that will enhance the ability to assess risks, make prudent
security investments, and take protective action.
■■ Risk management framework establishing processes for combining consequence, vulnerability, and threat
information to produce a comprehensive, systematic, and rational assessment of national or sector risk.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) describes the NIPP as providing a unifying structure for the
integration of existing and future critical infrastructure and key resources into a single national program that result in
a more resilient America. The NIPP promotes building security partnerships, and local governments are key partners
in implementing the objectives of the NIPP. Specifically, the DHS expects local governments to build regional
partnerships across jurisdictions while also developing formal, tailored CI/KR plans as part of the own homeland
security efforts. The DHS wants jurisdictions to incorporate the NIPP into their existing security initiatives where
possible.
Consistent with HSPD-7 (mentioned earlier) the NIPP attempts to delineate specific roles and responsibilities for
local governments implementing CI/KR programs. It is designed as an over-arching risk management framework
from which to measure progress in CI/KR areas.
DHS is serious about providing local government training, exercises and education opportunities, and funds for
energy assurance efforts. They oversee a Competitive Training Grant Program (CTGP) for local governments and
others. For information about the CTGP and fiscal year 2007 CTGP award recipients, please see: http://www.dhs.
gov/xgovt/grants/gc_1191005841137.shtm.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 39
40 F EDERAL ENERGY ASSURANCE INITIATIVES
VI. Local Government Energy
Assurance: Preparation and
Assessment
A. Suggested Components of Critical Infrastructure Protection
NASEO’s State Energy Assurance Guidelines document contained 10 excellent suggested components of critical
infrastructure protection. The following 10 components were taken from this document. However, most of the
accompanying information with each component is new and tailored to apply to local governments. They include:
1. Critical (physical) Assets
2. Threat Environment;
3. Policies and Procedures;
4. Physical and Cyber Security;
5. Operations Security;
6. Information System Network Architecture and Penetration Testing;
7. Consequence Analysis;
8. Risk Characterization;
9. Protection of Sensitive Information; and
10. Alternative Energy Sources.
In a few states, municipal governments own and operate utilities and in some cases, states own or exercise
authority over these energy production facilities. Opinions vary about what level of detail government needs to
know with regard to physical assets, however, from an emergency planning perspective, knowledge of major
assets, location, and impact on the delivery of energy assists in the local government’s ability to respond.
2. Threat Environment
Most cities and counties have emergency preparedness plans that address redundancy of operations,
provide public notification, acknowledge chain of command, provide media response, provide emergency
response, and provide emergency water, communication, and energy supplies. These plans can provide the
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 41
backbone for preparedness planning for an attack for natural disaster, but should be seriously reviewed and
updated to include a checklist to prepare for a threat. Threat has many meanings in local government energy
assurance and preparedness. While much of the current focus remains on the threat of terrorism, the national
strategy for the physical protection of critical infrastructure takes an all hazards approach. Understanding
these threats is a part of a sound vulnerability analysis. Knowing what may cause a disruption can increase
defensive steps to enhance assurance as well as create a more efficient response. Categories of attacks or
threats to consider in an all-hazards approach include:
yy Deliberate attacks caused by people (e.g. terrorists, criminals, hackers, delinquents, employees);
yy Natural attacks caused by nature (e.g., hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, wildfires, earthquakes);
yy Accidental attacks caused by technological failure (e.g., pipeline rupture, levee breaches, chemical spills,
nuclear, or biological contamination); and
yy Systemic threats caused by the physical inability of energy delivery systems tomeet demand.
yy Government has existing natural gas pipeline safety rules. Continuing to work with the industry to assure
that these rules are followed increases energy assurance.
yy Government has extensive rules pertaining to the reliable delivery of electricity. Energy emergency
planning can include general descriptions of existing physical security measures as well as
illustrative descriptions of the steps energy companies take to restore power or supply. This
information will help planners respond to a disruption efficiently and assist officials with their
explanation to the public.
yy The infrastructure of the petroleum markets is usually understood in general terms only. However,
the more that is known about the location of pipelines, storage, loading terminals, preferred highway
delivery routes and the nature and location of retail outlets, the more can be done to assist in a shortage.
Knowledge of regional refining facilities and competing finished product markets are other pieces of the
physical structure with potential security issues affecting vulnerability.
5. Operations Security
Local government officials are unlikely to need extensive knowledge of energy company operations
security. It is useful to know that this security is in place and that energy companies train personnel in its
implementation. The role of government regarding operational security should be to ask questions and
require site-specific security measures. Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) may include operational security
requirements in a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity, or other rules, for energy entities regulated
Local governments may wish to have their own information technology specialists work with the energy
industry and the federal government to improve such systems, thus increasing energy assurance. Due to the
sensitivity of such detailed information, it may not be prudent to include such information in an emergency
plan, however policy makers and planners will benefit by having up-to-date knowledge of information
networks and their operating characteristics (architecture).
7. Consequence Analysis
Consequence analysis means understanding the effects of an energy disruption. Some consequences are
impacts on related energy systems; others are societal impacts such as people displaced from their homes
and/or jobs, costs to state and local government, and loss of business income.
Widespread energy outages, such as the power failure in the Midwest and Northeast in August 2003,
clearly highlight the need to consider the consequences of not only energy disruptions, but also actions
taken to alleviate them. A detailed knowledge of the energy profile and the impacts associated with an
energy disruption is suggested. This should be part of a thorough vulnerability assessment. It is strongly
recommended that this be undertaken in close coordination with large power and energy providers whose
emergency response actions can lead to devastating downstream system failure. Some potential downstream
effects might be:
The response to downstream impacts may be to alter operational and emergency procedures, provide alerts
and warnings where none have been given in the past, or seek to assure that automatic alternatives and
backup are understood and acquired.
8. Risk Characterization
Up-to-date state energy emergency plans often contain a vulnerability analysis associating state energy
infrastructure with demographics. Risk is also associated with operating any type of energy power
system or energy delivery system, and better understanding of this will allow planners to pre-determine
the magnitude of possible damage for any given geographical area of impact.
Most states already prioritize energy user risk through utility outage and restoration rules or sometimes
through a critical user list contained in a state petroleum set-aside. It is strongly suggested that all
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 43
local planners re-examine existing state priorities, help make them more relevant, and update them
periodically.
Adequate planning may also determine which prioritized energy end users can best protect them with
backup supply or access to energy alternatives.
In addition, because of the Freedom of Information Act and sunshine laws in many states, there is a question
as to whether sensitive information can be protected from disclosure. In the final analysis, accomplishing
this is a delicate task and will require careful coordination and cooperation among stakeholders.
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/PCII_Program_Fact_Sheet_8-22.pdf
This document goes beyond NASEO’s Energy Assurance Guidelines by providing important details
about specific technologies, financing options, and policies available to (local and state) governments
interested in promoting alternative energy as a means to energy assurance. These details can be found in
the text immediately following this section (Sections B. Energy Efficiency and C. Renewable Energy).
First it is necessary to provide some background information on these resources and their role in energy
assurance efforts.
Many local governments have promoted energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy since the early
1970’s. When tracing the modern-day genesis of local government efforts in the alternative energy area,
most historians point to the Arab oil embargo in 1973, the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 and the resulting
second oil price shock. During this time, the Carter Administration emphasized moving federal funds to
cities and states for energy efficiency and renewable energy. It was also during this time that the National
Renewable Energy Laboratory and the four regional solar energy centers were formed to assure research and
development and the market development of renewable energy technologies.
Petroleum overcharge funds levied on oil companies were also used to fund innovative local and state
government energy efficiency and renewable energy efforts in the 1970s. A little known fact is that these
At a minimum, the increased use of alternative energy resources is beneficial to the public for national
security, environmental, and fuel diversity reasons. These resources tend to be located locally and not
dependent upon vulnerable fuel delivery systems and/or price swings due to external factors, ranging from
weather to war. A significant share of renewable energy in the electricity generation fuel mix can dampen
potential electricity price swings caused by fossil fuel price volatility. These resources can also offset the
potential disruption of other generation sources.
Most importantly, when combined as part of any energy assurance effort, energy efficiency and renewable
energy can help diversify and improve the resiliency of the energy supply. Local government officials
should continue to promote these resources, recognizing the importance of their role in emergency
preparedness and response.
B. Energy Efficiency
Energy efficiency refers to actions that are aimed at reducing the energy used by specific end-use devices and
systems, typically without affecting the services provided. Energy efficiency is not lowering comfort standards such
as temperature or lighting levels to reduce energy use.
Energy efficiency investments should be considered a cost-effective complement to investments in other more
traditional energy supplies. In addition to assisting in managing day-to-day operations, energy efficiency programs
can be effective resources for reducing electricity and peak demand. Rapid increases in the capabilities of metering
and communications (e.g. “smart meters”) can yield lower costs for the local government. Energy efficiency can
also lower the cost of power when the power grid is most stressed. (Examining the Peak Demand Impacts of Energy
Efficiency: A Review of Program Experience and Industry Practices, February 2007, American Council for an
Energy-Efficient Economy).
Many efficiency technologies, including LED traffic lights, efficient compact fluorescent electric lighting—as
well as the use of design elements such as daylighting and passive solar heating and natural ventilation—reduce
the amount of electricity needed to operate facilities in all situations. In an emergency, efficient facilities need less
backup power.
Energy efficiency programs are proven now with decades of utility and government experience behind them. New
energy efficiency technologies come to the market almost weekly. For example, some consumers participate in new
time-of-day programs in which they voluntarily reduce consumption upon receipt of a utility signal. These “smart
meter” programs will be much more common soon, such as the $100 million investment in mid-2008 by Excel
Energy into new and existing homes in the City of Boulder, Colorado. The program will allow Excel to manage the
energy used in thousands of homes in the next year. The obvious potential for such systems to assist in an energy
emergency is huge.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 45
Energy Efficiency Technologies and Policies That Work….
New energy-efficient technologies now enjoy significant market share in many areas. For example, the sales of
ENERGY STAR-qualified compact fluorescent lights (CFLs) nearly doubled last year, according to estimates
by the Environmental Protection Agency; in 2007, 290 million CFLs (which use approximately 75 percent
less energy) were sold and now account for about 20 percent of the U.S. light bulb market. Many communities
purchase and/or sell CFLs in formal campaigns to raise energy efficiency awareness. The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency’s “Change a Light, Change the World” campaign involved local governments and encouraged
them to distribute CFLs. This campaign is credited with improving CFL market share. CFLs generally use around
1/3 the electricity of traditional incandescent bulbs while lasting 8 to 10 times as long. Lighting can account for 60
percent of the energy consumed in commercial buildings (State Energy Alternatives website, National Renewable
Energy Laboratory, 2004.)
As gas prices continued to climb, U.S. registrations of new hybrid vehicles rose 38 percent in 2007 to a record
350,289, while fuel cells continue to make inroads in the transportation and building sectors – e.g., 12 fuel cells
totaling 4.8 MW (megawatts) will help power the Freedom Tower and three other new towers under construction at
the World Trade Center site in lower Manhattan.
Energy-efficient heating, ventilating and cooling (HVAC) systems can save the city considerable money. One in
four furnaces is more than 20 years old (State Energy Alternatives website, National Renewable Energy Laboratory,
2004). New heating systems can achieve efficiencies as high as 97 percent, whereas older furnaces and boilers
typically have efficiencies in the 60-70 percent range.
Building codes were originally designed with health and safety in mind first, but the energy component has become
increasingly important in recent years. Building codes in the commercial buildings sector are especially important
since commercial buildings can include retail and wholesale service stores, offices, hotels, restaurants, hospitals,
warehouses, public and private schools and universities, correctional institutions and religious organizations.
Building codes for new residential construction are also important, especially where substantial growth in the
number of new homes is expected.
C. Renewable Energy
Renewable energy is called renewable because the sources used to harness the energy renew themselves constantly
over short periods of time—months or years, instead of centuries. These sources of energy usually include water,
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 47
wind, solar, biomass, and geothermal heat from the earth’s interior.
Battery Backup Systems While quickly replenished, these resources tend to be intermittent
(e.g., the wind does not always blow and the sun does not always
Legislation passed in California sets shine), on either a daily or seasonal basis. Local governments have
aside $10 million in matching grants to moved toward renewable energy technologies more recently because
help pay for battery backup systems of one major benefit: relative price stability. The supply of renewable
for traffic signals. Newly installed traffic energy resources is virtually unlimited and the price of extracting or
signals use more efficient, LED lamps
harnessing these resources is relatively low with more predictable
that cut the amount of electricity used
by each light from as much as 150
and less dramatic price swings than traditional fossil fuel resources.
watts to between 10 and 25 watts.
Since the electricity needed to operate While some renewables are intermittent, there are energy storage
LED lights can be 85 percent less than technologies that can be installed to improve the ability of renewables
that needed by incandescent lamps, to meet demand when it arises. While promising and proven,
it’s now technically possible to provide renewable energy can help meet demand but will in most cases not
backup power for critical intersections. come close to satisfying all demand during an energy emergency.
Battery systems cost between $1,800 Critical facilities that can benefit from renewable energy and
and $3,000, depending on the number
energy-efficient technologies include “911” call centers, airports,
of lights at the intersection. Each
system provides enough electricity
emergency shelters, hospitals, first responder facilities, water
to operate the traffic signals in the pumping and communications equipment (cellular).
normal, fully functioning mode or as
red flashing lights for two hours. After While still minor for most local governments, renewable energy
that time, the signals will flash red for technologies such as photovoltaics (direct conversion of sunlight to
another two hours, alerting motorists electricity) are starting to replace or complement traditional back-up
that the intersection is operating as a power supplies for local governments, especially the fuel of choice
four-way stop. for most back-up systems, diesel fuel.
City energy planners are probably the most familiar with renewable technologies, especially trend-setting cities such
as Portland, Oregon, Boulder, Colorado, Chicago, Illinois and Austin, Texas. Renewables have progressed to the
mainstream thanks to the efforts of these cities and more.
On-site electric power generation markets are expanding by more than twenty five percent per year. Primarily these
markets are addressing power quality for businesses that utilize digital controls or equipment (computer, transmitters,
and sensors) and for power reliability (back-up power beyond the usual 3 minutes to 3 hours for battery banks).
Since September 11th, greater concerns about hardening the nation’s infrastructure to make it less vulnerable
to terrorism (as well as acts of nature) resulted in Congress sending hundreds of millions of dollars to states for
critical infrastructure protection. Experts say that more than one-third of these “first responder” funds are used for
training, protective equipment, and hiring specialized personnel. The remaining funds can be used to harden critical
This market represents a robust opportunity for clean distributed power (advanced batteries and controls, energy
efficiency, fuel cells (and co-generation/combined heat and power), heat engines, micro hydro power, mini-
gas turbines, modular biomass, photovoltaics, small wind, and solar thermal). But this emerging industry lacks
standardization that keeps costs high as well as more complicated installation and repairs because it is still a
“custom” industry.
In addition, large energy and security companies and larger potential commercial and industrial users seek to have
distributed generation aggregated and have the performance wirelessly monitored. Monitoring systems that alert
users to a systems’ functioning ability, degree of performance, whether electric output matches energy resources,
whether batteries hold charge, and other indicators are increasingly important.
Using solar power to produce electricity is not the same as using solar to produce heat.
Solar thermal principles are applied to produce hot fluids or air. Photovoltaic principles
are used to produce electricity. A solar panel (PV panel) is made of the natural element,
silicon, which becomes charged electrically when subjected to sun light.
Solar panels are directed at solar south in the northern hemisphere and solar north in
the southern hemisphere (these are slightly different than magnetic compass north-south
directions) at an angle dictated by the geographic location and latitude of where they are
to be installed. The intensity of the Sun’s radiation changes with the hour of the day, time
of the year and weather conditions. To be able to make calculations in planning a system,
the total amount of solar radiation energy is expressed in hours of full sunlight per m²,
or Peak Sun Hours. This term, Peak Sun Hours, represents the average amount of sun
available per day throughout the year.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 49
yy smooth price fluctuations;
yy strengthen homeland energy assurance;
yy provide greater stability to the electricity grid;
yy lead to lower emissions; and
yy improve energy efficiency particularly in combined heat and power (CHP) applications.
Distributed energy also has important implications for homeland energy assurance and reliability. A number of small,
dispersed energy resources are less vulnerable to disruption than large systems. This is true whether the disruption is
the result of natural disaster, human error, or act of terrorism.
Distributed energy relies on effective but not cumbersome interconnection standards. In the case of backup power for
emergencies, having the ability to automatically (or at least quickly) disconnect from the grid and employ alternative,
on-site power is critical. Some utilities raise the concern that DE may reduce utility revenues. Others, however, point
out that utilities benefit from distributed generation by delaying the need for major capital investment in to additional
generating capacity, transmission upgrades, and other improvements. (See State Energy Alternatives Web Site)
Combined heat and power (CHP) systems are among the many emerging technology choices for cities interested in
diversifying fuel supplies. One attraction of CHP is that it may be used as a distributed generation resource. Some
cities such as New York, Atlanta, and Portland have had success with CHP. CHP is widely used in the chemical,
petroleum refining, and paper industries. Commercial buildings, college campuses, hospital complexes, and
government facilities are also good candidates.
Local governments planning for effective and reliable backup power during emergencies are using the following
technologies successfully:
Fuel Cells
Fuel cells are similar to batteries. Fuel cells can be used in a variety of applications ranging from powering cars,
trucks, and buses to powering portable devices such as cell phones and laptop computers. Today, fuel cells are used
most widely as a stationary source of backup power and are often fueled with natural gas. Of course, natural gas is
susceptible to price fluctuations. A few municipal water treatment facilities are experimenting with fuel cells using
methane-rich gases that are by-products of the sewage treatment process.
Fuel cells potentially could help reduce greenhouse gas emissions and air
Fuel Cell Backup pollution. The only by-products created by fuel cells are heat and water,
making them a cleaner alternative to traditional internal combustion engines
The municipal wastewater and power plants. Fuel cells are not yet cost competitive with traditional
treatment plant in Portland, technologies. In 2005, the most widely deployed fuel cells cost about $4,500
Oregon, uses a methane- per kilowatt; by contrast, a diesel generator costs are $800 to $1,500 per
powered fuel cell and four kilowatt, and a natural gas turbine can cost even less.
microturbines to provide
emergency backup for critical
However, fuel cells can be a cost effective replacement for battery backup
treatment plant operations.
systems. Batteries can fail without warning, and they require regular
expensive maintenance to provide reliable backup power. Increasingly,
communication network operators are using fuel cell systems in critical communication applications in the
wireless, wireline, utility and government sectors.
Microturbines
Microturbines are small combustion turbines, approximately the size of a refrigerator, with can generate outputs of
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 51
Regardless of the type of system chosen, renewable energy systems should be carefully sized to keep costs down.
(Nature’s Power on Demand: Renewable Energy Systems as Emergency Power Sources, U.S. Department of Energy
(EERE), October 1995.
With respect to energy hardening, power backup systems must be effective and reliable so that public broadcast
systems, hospitals, water/waste treatment plants, and decision-making networks, at the very least, remain in
operation. Though backup systems are critical if all other systems fail, distributing and diversifying the power
supply is the most effective way to protect against emergencies. This is typically referred to as distributed energy
(DE). A building that generates its own power all the time using photovoltaics, with a fuel cell and battery backups
for emergency situations, will allow building operation to continue even when the grid goes down. In addition,
an energy-diverse community that harvests at least some of its energy from wind, large- or small-scale solar
technologies, and hydropower—in addition to coal and natural gas—may be less affected in the event that one, two,
or even three of these facilities become inoperable in an emergency.
The purpose of this section is to provide some basic information on the various finance instruments, and how
jurisdictions might use them in order to make cost-effective investments in energy back-up systems. In future versions
of these guidelines, specific examples of how various financing options can be used to underwrite back-up systems
will be addressed. Barriers to implementation and how to best address them will be included. In addition, loan
programs (conditional sales agreements, installment purchase agreements etc), tax increment financing, certificates of
participation and the like will be presented. We thank Neil Zobler, President of Catalyst Financial Group, Inc. for his
keen insights and assistance in preparing this section. Neil can be reached at nzobler@catalyst-financial.com.
A final area under development is the utility finance market. Two of these are “on-bill” and tariff-based financing
(typically termed “pay as you save”). Both offer potential for local governments. An excellent resource for this
information is “Paying for Energy Savings Through Utility Bills” and is authored by Matthew H. Brown, President
of InterEnergy Solutions. This document is to be published in 2008 by the Alliance to Save Energy.
Generally speaking, financing options are relevant to energy assurance in the context of these guidelines due to the
fact that many jurisdictions will find that a number of their critical facilities are lacking adequate back-up power.
Distributed and renewable energy systems are likely candidates for the financing options listed in this section.
In today’s political and economic environment, assuring energy security and mitigating energy shortages is no easy
task. According to The National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO), “while there are many similarities
and sharing of energy resources on regional bases, each state has its own unique set of needs, response mechanisms,
laws and experience.”
When financing these energy projects it is helpful to think about them as belonging to three different asset type
groups: (1) energy efficiency, (2) renewable energy, and (3) backup power supply, on-site or distributed power
generation. Traditional debt financing vehicles available to public sector organizations (e.g., loans, bonds, etc.)
can be used to finance energy assets in all three groups. However, over the years, the financial community has
developed financing structures that can take advantage of parameters that may be unique to energy projects and,
even more specifically, the type of asset or project being financed, particularly energy efficiency and renewable
energy projects.
Implementing energy efficiency projects (lighting, HVAC, motors, energy management systems, etc.) is a good
place to start energy planning; it is always important to reduce the total KwH or therms consumed, which will
immediately reduce utility bills. Not many local governments allow the operating budget dollars saved by installing
these measures to be used to pay for the energy efficiency assets being installed. This makes implementing energy
efficiency projects problematic for Energy Performance Contracting which can be funded in any number of ways
including Tax Exempt Lease Purchasing Agreements. However, renewable energy projects that offer certain
federal and local tax incentives are not attractive for local government self-financed projects because most local
governments can not take advantage of them by definition, because they are tax exempt. In such cases financing
vehicles like Power Purchase Agreements that can reflect the tax savings benefits in the pricing will be of interest to
public sector organizations.
Renewable energy projects (e.g. photovoltaic cells, fuel cells, wind power, etc.) typically replace the energy being
purchased directly off of the grid (i.e. from the local utilities) by energy being produced locally. Any energy savings
comes from the ability to manufacture energy more efficiency and at a lower cost than if it had to be purchased from
the local utility. Emergency back-up power (i.e., generators) are typically financed using traditional financing
structures while on-site or distributed power generation (e.g., co-generation assets) lends itself to more flexible
financing structures, which vary depending on who wants to own the asset. When the end-user owns the asset,
leasing and loans may be appropriate, assuming they are not running into debt ceilings issues. Having a third party
own the asset lends itself to having the end-user purchase output from the equipment, which may keep the asset off
of the balance sheet of the end-user and avoid debt ceiling
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 53
towards new obligations to improve earnings, which means that the FEDs efforts to lower the cost of borrowing may
not be trickling down to the borrower.
Major capital projects are funded by some form of debt, which is categorized as either short term (for periods of
less than one year) or long term (for periods greater than one year). Most borrowings by public sector organizations
require citizen approval, either directly through referendum or indirectly through actions of an appointed board or
elected council. However, revenue bonds and tax-exempt lease-purchase agreements may not require local voter
approval (see details below).
Frequently used short-term debt instruments include bank loans (term loans or lines of credit), anticipation
notes (in anticipation of bond, tax, grant or revenues to be received), commercial paper (taxable or tax-exempt
unsecured promissory note that can be refinanced or rolled over for periods exceeding one year), and floating-rate
demand notes (notes that allow the purchaser to demand that the seller redeem the note when the interest
rate adjusts).
Long-term debt is frequently in the form of bonds. In the public sector, bonds fall into two categories: general
obligation (GO) bonds and revenue bonds. GO bonds are backed by the issuer’s full faith and credit and can only
be issued by units of government with taxing authority. Because the issuer promises to levy taxes to pay for these
obligations, if necessary, these bonds have the lowest risk of default and, therefore, the lowest cost. Interest paid on
GO bonds is typically exempt from federal income taxes and may be exempt from state income taxes.
Revenue bonds are also issued by local governments or public agencies. However, because they are repaid only
from the specific revenues named in the bond, they are considered to be riskier than GO bonds. Revenue bonds may
not require voter approval and often contain covenants intended to reduce the perceived risk. Typical covenants
include rate formulas, the order of payments, establishing sinking funds, and limiting the ability to issue new debt.
Small municipalities that have difficulty issuing debt often add credit enhancements to their bonds in the form of
bond insurance or letters of credit.
In the case of most energy efficiency projects, the source of repayment is the actual energy savings (considered part
of the operating budget) realized by the project. When the approval process to obtain the necessary debt is a barrier,
public sector organizations may be able to limit the repayment of the financing costs to their operating budget by
using a tax-exempt lease purchase agreement. This solution may avoid the capital budget process altogether.
In most states, a tax-exempt lease-purchase agreement usually does not constitute a long-term “debt” obligation
because of non-appropriation language written into the agreement and, therefore, rarely requires public approval.
This language effectively limits the payment obligation to the organization’s current operating budget period
(typically a 12-month period). The organization will, however, have to assure lenders that the energy efficiency
projects being financed are considered of essential use (i.e., essential to the operation of your organization), which
minimizes the non-appropriation risk to the lender. If, for some reason, future funds are not appropriated, the
equipment is returned to the lender; and the repayment obligation is terminated at the end of the current operating
period without placing any obligation on future budgets.
Public sector organizations should consider using a lease-purchase agreement to pay for energy efficiency equipment
and related services when the projected energy savings will be greater than the cost of the equipment (including
financing), especially when a creditworthy energy service company (ESCO) guarantees the savings. If your
financial decision makers are concerned about exceeding operating budgets, they can be assured that this will not
happen because lease payments can be covered by the dollars to be saved on utility bills once the energy efficiency
equipment is installed. Utility bill payments are already part of any organization’s normal year-to-year operating
budget. Although the financing terms for lease-purchase agreements may extend as long as 20 years or more, they
are usually less than 12 years and are limited by the useful life of the equipment.
There may be cases, however, when tax-exempt lease-purchase financing is not advisable for public sector
organizations; for example, when (1) state statute or charter may prohibit such financing mechanisms;
(2) the approval process may be too difficult or politically driven; or (3) other funds are readily available
(e.g. bond funding that will soon be accessible) or excess money exists in the current capital or
operating budgets.
In general, lease-purchase payments on energy efficiency equipment are small when compared to the overall
operating budget of a public organization. This usually means that the accounting treatment of such payments
may be open to interpretation. Because savings occur only if the energy efficiency projects are installed,
the projects’ lease-purchase costs (or the financing costs for upgrades) can be paid out of the savings in the
utility line item of the operating budget. Outside auditors may, however, take exception to this treatment
if these payments are considered “material” from an accounting perspective. Determining when an expense is
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 55
“material” is a matter of the auditor’s professional judgment.2 While there are no strictly defined accounting
thresholds, as a practical guide, an item could be considered material when it equals or is greater than 5% of the total
expense budget in the public sector (or 5% of the net income for the privtl rarely be considered “material” using this
practical guideline.
The definition of a performance contract may be found in some state statutes; however, in general, it is not clearly
defined and usually includes a variety of services such as energy audits, designing, specifying, selling and installing
new equipment, providing performance guarantees, maintenance, training, measurement and verification protocols,
financing, indoor air quality improvements, and more. One major benefit of using a performance contract is
the ability to analyze the customer’s needs and craft a custom agreement to address the organization’s specific
constraints due to budget, time, personnel, or lack of internal expertise. This includes choosing the financing vehicle
that best suits the organization’s financial and/or tax strategies.
Designed for larger projects, performance contracting allows for the use of energy savings from the operating
budget (rather than the capital budget) to pay for necessary equipment and related services. Usually there is little or
no upfront cost to the organization benefiting from the installed improvements, which then frees up savings from
reduced utility bills that would otherwise be tied up in the operating budget. An energy performance contract is
an agreement between the organization and an ESCO to provide a variety of energy saving services and products.
Because these improvement projects usually cover multiple buildings and often include upgrades to the entire
lighting and HVAC systems, the startup cost when not using an EPC may be high and the payback period lengthy.
Under a well-crafted EPC, the ESCO will be paid based on the verifiable energy savings.
The ESCO will identify energy saving measures through an extensive energy audit, and then install and maintain
the equipment and other upgrades. This includes low- and no-cost measures which contribute to the projects overall
savings. The ESCO works closely with the client throughout the approval process to determine which measures to
install, timing of the installations, staffing requirements, etc. The energy savings cover the costs of using the ESCO
and financing for the project.
The most common type of performance contract is called a “Guaranteed Savings Agreement,” whereby the
ESCO guarantees the savings of the installed energy-efficiency improvements (equipment and services). The
ESCO assumes the performance risk of the energy-efficient equipment so that if the promised savings are not met,
the ESCO pays the difference between promised savings and actual savings. If the savings allow, a performance
contract may include related services such as the disposal of hazardous waste from the replacement of lighting
systems, or from the removal of asbestos when upgrading ventilation systems. The ESCO usually maintains the
system during the life of the contract and can train staff to assist or to continue its care after the expiration of the
contract period. The ESCO can also play a major role in educating the customer organization about its energy use
and ways to curb it.
2
According to Dr. James Donegan, Ph.D. (Accounting), Western Connecticut State University, an amount is
“considered material when it would affect the judgment of a reasonably informed reader when analyzing financial statements.”
3
http://www.ornl.gov/info/esco/legislation/
Regardless of the type of energy services agreement, it is important to remind the reader of two critical components
that are needed to ensure that the energy performance and operational goals are met: (1) Commissioning, and (2)
Measurement and Verification. Commissioning is the process of making sure new buildings function as intended and
communicating the intended performance to the building management team. This usually occurs when the building
is turned over for occupancy. Ongoing and carefully monitored measurement and verification protocols are vital to
ensure the continuing performance of the improvements, especially when the energy savings are the source of the
financing repayment.
Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs), also know as Design–Build–Own–Operate Agreements, are ones in which
the customer purchases the measurable output of the project (e.g., kilowatt hours, steam, hot water) from the ESCO
or a special purpose entity established for the project, rather than from the local utility. And they purchase at lower
rates or on better terms than they would have received by staying with the utility. These agreements work well for
on-site energy generation and/or central plant opportunities. PPA’s are frequently used for renewable energy and
Cogeneration projects (also known as Combined Heat and Power projects). Due to the complexities of the contracts,
projects using PPAs are typically very large. PPA’s are frequently considered “off balance sheet” financings.
Commercial Leasing
Energy efficiency equipment that is considered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as personal property (also
known as “movable property” or “chattels”) may be leased. The traditional equipment lease is a contract between
two parties in which one party is given the right to use another party’s equipment for a periodic payment over a
specified term. Basically, this is a long-term rental agreement with clearly stated purchase options that may be
exercised at the end of the lease term. Commercial leasing is an effective financing vehicle and is often referred to
as “creative financing.” Leases can be written so the payments accommodate a customer’s cash flow needs (short-,
long-, or “odd-” term; increasing or decreasing payments over time; balloon payments; skip payments, etc.). Leases
are frequently used as part of an organization’s overall tax and financing strategy and, as such, are mostly used in the
private sector.
From a financial reporting perspective, however, commercial leases fall into only two categories (an operating lease
or a capital lease); each has substantially different financial consequences and accounting treatment. The monthly
payments of an operating lease are usually lower than loan payments because the asset is owned by the lessor
(“lender”), and the lessee’s (“borrower’s”) payments do not build equity in the asset. The equipment is used by the
lessee during the term, and the assumption is that the lessee will want to return the equipment at the end of the lease
period. This means that the lease calculations must include assumptions that the residual value of the leased asset
can be recovered at the end of the lease term. In other words, equipment that has little or no value at the end of the
lease term will probably not qualify under an operating lease. For example, lighting systems would not qualify, while
a well maintained generator in a cogeneration project might. Operating leases are considered “off balance sheet”
financing, and payments are treated as an operating expense.
A common capital lease is a “finance lease,” which is similar to a conditional sales agreement because the asset must
be reflected on the lessee’s (borrower’s) balance sheet. A finance lease is easily recognized because the customer
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 57
can buy the equipment at the end of the lease term at a stated price that is less than its fair market value (“bargain
purchase option”). For example, a lease with a one dollar purchase option is clearly a capital lease. Other conditions
that define a capital lease deal with the term of the lease, transfer of ownership, and lessor’s equity in the asset.4
Public sector organizations frequently lease equipment. However, because most public sector organizations are tax-
exempt, tax strategies are not usually a consideration when deciding which type of lease to enter into.
A good place to find a listing of these benefits is at www.dsireusa.org (DSIRE), an acronym for Database of State
Incentives for Renewables and Energy, is “a comprehensive source of information on state, local, utility, and federal
incentives that promote renewable energy and energy efficiency.” (See Appendix A for more information). Also, the
Alliance to Save Energy is publishing (2008) “State Energy Efficiency Financing Policies” by Matthew H. Brown,
President of InterEnergy Solutions.
If energy savings is an important source of repayment of financing, ENERGY STAR has developed a tool using
Microsoft EXCEL® called the Cash Flow Opportunity Calculator (“CFO Calculator”) that is helpful when structuring
financing. It was developed to help decision-makers address three critical questions about energy efficiency
investments: (1) How much of the new energy efficiency project can be paid for using the anticipated savings? (2)
Should this project be financed now, or is it better to wait and use cash from a future budget? (3) Is money being
lost by waiting for a lower interest rate? In addition, this set of spreadsheets helps create a sense of urgency about
implementing energy efficiency projects by quantifying the costs of delaying the project implementation. It is in the
public domain and can be downloaded from www.energystar.gov/ia/business/cfo_calculator.xls.
These tax-credit bonds may be issued by qualified bond lenders, cooperative electric companies, and government
bodies (including public power systems). The borrower must be a cooperative electric company or a government
body, and must use the financing for wind, biomass (including landfill gas), geothermal, or solar energy projects,
or for hydropower expansions, trash combustion facilities, or refined coal production facilities. The act allows, in
total, government bodies to borrow up to $500 million for such projects, with at least $300 million set aside for
cooperative electric companies. Since the federal government essentially pays the interest via tax credits, the IRS
must allocate such credits in advance.
4
See Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 13 for more information.
Note that the financial treatment of Operating Leases is currently under review and may change.
Best practices are being compiled which are unique to local government. They will be included in a future version
of these guidelines. One such example is the establishment of a local Medical Reserve Corps. The Corps’ function
in Colorado can be found at http://www.bouldercounty.org/health/Volunteer/MRC.htm. The usefulness of such a
volunteer corps is that most often locals are short of human resources for response and recovery activities. A corps
can fill needed gaps and may make the difference in a successful response and recovery effort.
Although it was developed for state government, the Governor’s Guide to Energy Assurance is also a very helpful
document: http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0612GOVGUIDEENERGY.pdf. It recommends that preparedness and
mitigation include conducting periodic infrastructure assessments, investing in infrastructure, building effective
relationships, updating energy assurance plans, developing coordinated risk response and exercising plans and
procedures. With respect to Response, the Guide suggests monitoring conditions, communicating with the
public, reducing energy demand, declaring a state of energy emergency, and requesting federal assistance. Finally
concerning Recovery it discusses facilitating resupply, assessing infrastructure and conducting after-action reports
and lessons learned. Certainly most if not all of these e finding are germane to local governments as well. Over
time, PTI will investigate the applicability of these findings for inclusion in this local government energy assurance
guidelines document.
One excellent source of lessons learned comes from the New York City World Trade Center experience of 9/11.
These lessons can be read at: www.colorado.edu/hazards/publications/sp/sp39/sept11book_ch9_zimmerman.pdf.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 59
60 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ENERGY ASSURANCE : RES P ONSE AND RECOVERY
VIII. Significant Research
Findings
Many surprising facts while researching and preparing this document. The local government energy emergency
community talks about renewable energy technologies and distributed generation technologies occasionally, and
most of these officials believe there is a role for these technologies in energy assurance plans. However, renewable
energy technologies and non-diesel back-up applications are precious few. Diesel back-up power is still the fuel of
choice for most local governments, and solar technologies and applications are desirable, yet insignificant for the
time being relegated to the background…for now.
Utility partnerships are crucial for local government energy assurance efforts. After extensive research, it was found
that there continues to be a large gap between what local governments know about power outages during these
outages, versus what the utilities know during this same time. Information is available, yet not shared in many cases.
Establishing strong, first name relationships with utility representatives in advance of an event is time well spent.
It was also discovered that local government officials are often generally aware of energy use and water
consumption numbers; however there is very little awareness of the tremendous energy expense associated with
moving and treating drinking water and waste water. Twenty-percent of the energy used in California is related to
moving and treating water. Other (non-hydro) states can expect similar numbers. In addition, there are significant
health risks associated with not checking and testing back-up generators for wastewater treatment plants. It is
quite common for untreated sewage to back-up into public waterways due to a failed back-up generator after
power outages to occur due to lightning strikes and other causes. Monthly testing of these generators is a simple,
yet underutilized practice.
Surprisingly, local government wastewater plant staff is often unaware of the energy required by their own pumps.
This leads one to believe that huge efficiency opportunities are available in water and wastewater treatment plants.
These energy savings should be tapped as soon as possible.
But intelligence officials have already recognized the importance of studying how crises caused by concerns over
global warming are also motivating local governments to look at energy assurance more closely. A 2007 report
written by several retired generals and admirals concluded that climate changes posed a “serious threat to America’s
national security,” and could further weaken already unstable governments in developing countries. Extended heat
waves and resulting power outages, extreme droughts and water shortages due to less volume in snow pack-fed
rivers and streams are but a few of the effects that local governments may experience due to the changing climate.
The PTI Local Government Energy Assurance Advisory Group and management team uncovered many significant
issues during months of research.
■■ Locals have considerable responsibilities under Emergency Support Function 12, Energy
■■ Locals need to increasingly collaborate with states, utilities, and regulatory bodies with respect to Energy
Assurance (EA)
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 61
■■ Locals have a mandate and mission to deliver customer-driven services with acceptable levels of performance
on EA
■■ Locals do not know the many benefits that come from energy assurance
■■ Locals do not know how to or have means by which to assess the energy hardness of their critical facilities,
components, and systems collectively termed critical operations or infrastructure
■■ Local governments need financial assistance for energy assurance plans, and they need help finding
innovative funding for their plans
■■ Knowledge of the National Response Framework is extremely limited—local governments want to align with
the NRF, but they need assistance
■■ There are “pockets of excellence” out there where good things are getting done in the EA area, but word is not
quick to spread. There is interest in learning from existing, successful EA plans and/or new models
■■ EA self-assessment is needed at the local government level
■■ Fuel-supply routing and fuel-efficient vehicle use is a growing part of EA plans
■■ Emergency back-up generators are important, and mass procurement of the same may be helpful
■■ Based on our survey results, ~40 percent of local governments do not have emergency plans in place for a
major energy disruptions
■■ Training is necessary and desired, but funding is limited
■■ Renewable technologies are becoming more important in EA plans
■■ Rising energy costs are changing traditional ways that local governments view EA
■■ There exists a significant lack of understanding of the magnitude of the number of critical facilities under each
local government’s jurisdiction
Generally speaking, local government officials spoken to who were uninvolved in energy emergency activities were
under the incorrect impression that the amount of critical facilities in their jurisdiction numbered in the dozens, rather
than the hundreds or thousands. Local officials tended to think of city-owned facilities first, along with medical,
police, and fire facilities. However, privately owned and county facilities are usually numerous. For example, the
City of Chicago identified more than 9,000 critical facilities that the City deemed must remain operational during any
energy emergency. Of these 9,000 facilities, 181 were hotels, 921 were day care facilities, 591 were senior facilities,
1259 were schools, 118 were fire stations, 305 were colleges or universities, 3,255 were high-rise buildings, 69 were
police stations, 150 were medical facilities and around 3,000 were intersections and/or bridges.
2005 Winter Fuels Outlook Conference, Update on State Energy Assurance Activities, A PowerPoint Presentation by
Alice Lippert, U.S. DOE, October 12, 2005.
America’s Energy Straightjacket, R. Neal Elliott, PhD, P.E., ACEEE, April 2006.
Energy and Environment Best Practices, U.S. Conference of Mayors, May 2006
Energy: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources, Sector-Specific Plan As Input to the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan, U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Department of Energy, May 2007.
Energy Security and Emergency Preparedness: How Clean Energy Can Deliver More Reliable Power for Critical
Infrastructure and Emergency Response Missions—An Overview for Federal, State and Local Officials,
Clean Energy Group, October 2005.
Energy Security: Evaluating U.S. Vulnerability to Oil Supply Disruptions and Options for Mitigating Their Effects,
GAO Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives, GAO/RCED-97-6,
December 1996.
Enhancing the Safety, Security, Reliability of our Energy and Water, Les Shephard, Vice President Energy and
Infrastructure Assurance, Sandia National Laboratory, undated.
Florida State’s Energy Emergency Response to the 2004 Hurricanes, U.S. DOE, Office of Electricity Delivery and
Energy Reliability, June 2005.
Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration (ISER) web site, U.S. DOE, http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/.
Keeping the Lights On, A Primer for Local Governments on Utility Industry Restructuring and Competition, PTI, 1996
Keeping the Lights On, A Resource Guide for Local Governments on Utility Industry Restructuring and Competition,
PTI, 1996
Keeping the Lights On, Case Studies, Local Government Experiences in Preparing for a Competitive Electricity
Market, PTI, 1998
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 63
Let Energy Innovation Thrive, NE-MW Economic Review, Richard Munson, Fall 2005.
Municipalization in a New Energy Environment: It Doesn’t Work, Solem and Associates for the Edison Electric
Institute (EEI), 2002, 2005.
The National Response Plan, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, May 2006.
Planning for Electric Power Disruptions, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Guidelines for Municipal Governments
Chicago Metropolitan Area Critical Infrastructure Program, February 2001
Planning for Natural Gas Disruptions, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Guidelines for Municipal Governments,
Chicago Metropolitan Area Critical Infrastructure Protection Program, December 2002
Prudent, Cost-Effective State Actions to Mitigate Volatile Energy Prices and Prepare for Potential Natural Gas Supply
Problems, John Nunley, Chairman of the National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO), undated.
Quick Reference Guide for the National Response Plan, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, May 22, 2006.
Regional Disaster Resilience: A Guide for Developing an Action Plan, The Infrastructure Security Partnership,
June 2006.
Renewable and Distributed Energy as a Security Tactic, Presentation by Scott Sklar, the Stella Group, EE World
Engineering Conference, October 2002.
State Energy Assurance Guidelines, National Association of State Energy Officials, Version 2, November 2005
Statement (on Y2K evaluation) of Dr. Roger Molander, Senior Researcher, RAND Corporation, for the Joint
Economic Committee, February 23, 2000.
The State Energy Assurance Planning Workshop, Using the Energy Assurance Guidelines, 110-page PowerPoint
presentation, June 30, 2004
64 BIB LIOGRA P H Y
State Initiatives in Energy Assurance, PowerPoint Presentation by Alice Lippert, U.S. Department of Energy, Critical
Infrastructure Resilience, Infrastructure Security for the Built Environment, ISBE 2006 Congress and Exp,
February 16, 2006.
Tribal Government and Local Jurisdiction Compliance Activities: Federal Fiscal Year 2006, the NIMS Integration
Center, DHS/FEMA, October 4, 2005.
U.S. Fire Administration web site, What is CIP and Why is it Important?, http://www.usfa.fema.gov/subjects/
emr-isac/what_is.shtm.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 65
66 BIB LIOGRA P H Y
APPENDIX A
National Database of
Incentives for Energy Efficiency
The national Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy (DSIRE, www.dsireusa.org) is the one-stop source
of information about government and utility renewable energy incentives and policies. DSIRE has now expanded
to include state and federal incentives for energy efficiency upgrades, purchases of energy efficient products or
systems, and construction of new energy efficient buildings. Incentives include:
Users can search for efficiency incentives by state, by technology (lighting, insulation, etc.), by incentive type (tax
credit, rebate, etc.), and by other criteria.
Established in 1995, DSIRE is an ongoing project of the Interstate Renewable Energy Council (www.irecusa.org)
managed by the North Carolina Solar Center and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy. For details for any state,
please refer to the DSIRE website at www.dsireusa.org.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 67
68 A PPENDI X A : NATIONAL DATA BASE O F INCENTIVES F OR ENERGY EF F ICIENCY
APPENDIX B
Executive Summary
This document provides energy assurance guidelines designed to assist local governments in preparing for energy-
related disruptions to their key facilities, systems and components. The primary means by which a local government
can provide for its own needs in times of emergency is to assure that: 1) adequate backup generation is available;
2) fuel to operate these backup devices is in place; and 3) assigned personnel are adequately trained to operate and
maintain these devices. In order to address these three items, a systematic assessment and response plan needs to be
developed. These guidelines will assist decision-makers and operational personnel in formulating such a plan.
Local governments are encouraged to reduce their sole dependence on their local utility. They should not just put into
place stop-gap energy systems for emergency situations but rather go through a strategic, sustainable energy market
transformation for their key facilities, systems and components. These guidelines include three checklists—aligned
with the three emergency-related topics presented above--that local governments can use as a guide to determine and
assure that any energy emergency will result in the least amount of disruption possible to the essential functions that
customers and citizens have come to expect from government. Essentially, being aware of and addressing these three
checklists prepares local government for such an energy emergency and gives them a sense of their “readiness” for
such an emergency.
The focus of theses guidelines is not to avert an energy shortage resulting from failed generation, transmission and/or
distribution of energy across the electric grid or gas pipeline network. Rather, they have been developed to mitigate
the impact of such a shortage by empowering the local government to provide for its own needs until the grid or
network can be returned to normal service.
These guidelines are a recommended and useful approach to enhancing local government energy assurance. They
have been designed to be flexible. As such they should be modified and adapted according to local needs, policies,
politics, and energy systems.
Table of Contents
I. Overview
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 69
4. Prioritize facilities based on their functions/impacts
5. Identify required operations for critical and essential facilities
6. Identify energy sources for required operations
7. Calculate energy demand for required operations
8. Identify Low Cost: No Cost back-up alternatives
9. Estimate energy demand contribution for alternatives
10. Identify current back-up systems, locations and energy output
11. Calculate energy shortfall for each facility
12. Calculate reduced energy demand from alternatives and options
13. Identify and evaluate opportunities for meeting shortfall
14. Develop a strategic investment plan to harden facilities
Checklist C: Personnel
1. Onsite generators are routinely exercised including fueling, start-up, checking for functionality of stand-by mode etc.
2. Plans are in place and practiced to deliver fuel citywide (i.e., numerous tanker vehicles, adequate number of
trained personnel, etc)
3. Refueling routes are in place, current, known and practiced if necessary
4. Primary and alternate personnel have been identified to operate equipment (refueling, trucks, etc)
5. Personnel routinely exercise inventory of roll-up generators if applicable
6. Personnel are aware of what fuel reserve sensors are and how they function
7. Personnel are aware of how required operations fuel priority decisions are made
8. Plans for facility consolidation are in place and staff is aware of these alternate work sites
9. Communication plans for all energy emergency operations are in place and personnel regularly review and
exercise these plans
I. Overview
This appendix offers the city a tool with which to develop a comprehensive energy assurance plan. It draws upon
the rich information contained in the Critical Facilities Energy Assurance Guidelines. Throughout this document, the
term energy will be used to refer to electric power and all types of fuel whether they are natural gas, diesel, fuel oil
There are several principles important to increasing the likelihood of project success:
■■ Be clear on the objectives and expected outcomes for the project: A clear statement of objectives and what is
expected and by when will enhance the probability that others will align themselves with the overall vision for
the project.
■■ Be as inclusive as possible: A department or agency that may have a role to play or information to share
should be invited to a kick-off meeting. Any relevant agencies external to city operations should be
invited and encouraged to participate. Narrow this group/team down to a working group as soon
as possible. This smaller group/team will do most of the planning and communication with the
larger group.
■■ Select a champion: Any city-wide project of this sort needs a champion who will advocate for the project and
who can command the necessary resources to see it through to completion.
■■ Select team members who can speak for the agency and/or have access to agency subject matter information.
Many projects fail because the wrong people are involved. Select subject matter experts to the extent possible
but not agency heads as they will not have the time to be meaningfully involved.
■■ Communicate with the team members only when necessary (e.g., email) and be reasonable in expectations to
avoid the perception that there is not sufficient time to fully engage.
■■ Provide regular project updates and success stories. It has been found that many projects die due to lack of
inertia. Ensure superior project organization and clear objectives for any meetings: any project will succeed or
fail based on how well they perceive it is being managed and that the objectives are clear and obtainable.
There are other principles but these few will allow the project to get off the ground and build early successes to keep
it moving. The project may benefit from management by a person or persons who stand to gain the most from its
success and who has the necessary project management skills. The person or agency responsible for maintaining
energy utilities to buildings, emergency management or like vested interest should be selected. This could be
the utilities manager who may also be involved with the city’s franchise agreement and have ESF 12 planning
responsibilities.
Although the Steps are facility neutral (they can be applied to any facility) they do need to be taken with a certain
facility in mind. Each of the Steps in the three (3) checklists is explained in this document. In most cases, there are
simple tables that can be adapted and utilized to assist the city in moving through the process.
These checklists can be printed out and used as a guide. Each step can be checked off when the associated task has
been completed.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 71
Checklist A: Facility Analysis
Step Done?
Task
Number √
A1 Inventory Facilities
A14 Identify and evaluate opportunities for meeting this shortfall including
costs, benefits from renewables (e.g., emissions) etc
1. Inventory facilities
There are two aspects to assembling the necessary information on facilities. The first is the name of the
facility and the second is its address. The inventory needs to include city facilities and any non-city facilities
that may be important in maintaining essential or required city services. The city may not own or operate
such facilities. Note that Step 2 requests information on which entity owns or manages the facilities in the
inventory. That Step allows the city to declare that although a facility may be deemed a key asset, it may not
have responsibility for its energy assurance and thus may not be investing limited capital into its hardening.
If non-city key facilities are not listed here as part of Step 1, there will be a lost opportunity in pointing out
that such a facility needs to be hardened in order to assure key public services are maintained.
Step 1a Step 1b
Others
2. Identify ownership/management
Identify the entity having primary responsibility for each key facility in an emergency such as the city itself
for facilities it owns and/or operates, and for any other non-city facilities such as a regional hospital, state/
federal government for high level laboratory analyses, or a private sector entity from whom the facility
is being leased. The city may need to work with the responsible party to implement the hardening. This
information will be important in Step 14 when investment strategies are being contemplated (for example,
the type of financing and staging these investments), developing partnerships, determining lead roles etc.).
3. Determine facility criticality by identifying its functions and impacts: communication, life saving,
life sustaining, maintaining orderly functioning.
Once the key facilities have been identified and the owner/manager noted, an assessment of the impacts on
city operations and the public can occur next. This can be accomplished by looking at the functions that
each facility performs and the associated impacts were these functions to become compromised. There are
four (4) functional areas in need of consideration: a) insuring communications; b) saving lives; c) sustaining
lives; and d) systems rehabilitation to maintain orderly functioning.
Communication services are those which allow systems and individuals to freely communicate.
Public Health and Safety: Life saving services would be those where the loss of electricity or other
fuel (natural gas, heating oil etc.) would aversely affect the ability to save lives. Examples would include
emergency room operations and some police and fire services (EMT operations).
Public Health and Safety: Life sustaining services are those which are not likely life threatening but
necessary to for life support. Examples are police and fire stations, hospitals, nursing homes, water pumping
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 73
stations, railroad crossings, and industrial facilities that handle hazardous materials.
Systems Rehabilitation to maintain orderly functioning includes bringing key facilities back on-line to
re-establish normal operations and order. Examples include restoring traffic intersection operations, assuring
elevators serving high rise buildings are operational and seeing that security alarms are functional.
Other functional categories should be discussed and included as necessary. It is left up to the city as to how
these functions as they relate to a specific facility are recorded. Some options are:
■■ yes or no;
■■ a simple check mark; or
■■ prioritize the importance of each function using a scale such as 1-5.
Whatever method is chosen, the next Step (4), will involve prioritizing the facilities based in part on this
functional assessment. So, the more thought that goes into this Step, the easier and more accurate the
prioritization will be.
3 ■■ Critical: failure may result in death, injury, severs financial loss or legal
liability; impossible or impractical to work around.
2
■■ Essential: Cannot fail for an extended period of time; cumbersome or
1 unlikely to work around.
5
■■ Important: Needed and will be evaluated and addressed depending on
the event.
4 ■■ Moderate: Can be postponed pending assessment
■■ Low: Would result in an inconvenience.
Step 3 adapted from Critical Infrastructure Assurance Guidelines for Municipal Governments: Planning
1
for Electric Power Disruptions, Chicago Metropolitan Area Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan, Argonne National
Laboratory, February 2001, Pages 16-20 and Table 4.1. FEMA has established these categories as the top four priorities
in any national emergency.
Step 5
For each critical and essential facility, identify the operations that would
be required to be functional in the first 72 hours of an emergency. These
Energy dependent operations should be only those that rely on energy for their function. For
operations during the
example, automatic doors require energy whereas manually-operated doors
first 72 hours of an
emergency? do not. These operations would be first-in-time to receive back-up energy in
an emergency.
Kitchenware and showers
Fire Trucks If not all operations listed are required, the facility manager may need
to adopt and enforce policies and procedures to limit the load to
Heating and cooling
required operations.
Pumping water
Another way to look at this process is to determine which loads absolutely
Oven, microwave
need to be kept “on-line” in an emergency. Such a determination should
Computers be reviewed at least annually to assure that it is up to date due to
changing priorities.
Step 6
ID current energy source/type for the listed required operations. In many
instances, numerous operations rely on the same energy source (e.g.,
Identify existing energy electricity) for their energy needs. A proposed response would look
sources for required ops. something like: electricity for lights, automatic doors, and elevators, and
Natural Gas so on. This is the bottoms up approach and the most time consuming. The
top-down approach can also be used such as… the entire building uses 50
Diesel, Bio Diesel kW. The short coming to the top down approach is that some non-required
Natural Gas, Electricity operations may get factored in.
Electricity
Electricity
Electricity
This calculation can be based on historical use, or name plate rating of a component or system. For example,
assuming the operation of the showers and dishwasher with hot water uses natural gas, the hot water heater
input in BTUs would be included here (e.g., 40,000 BTU/hr.) Some of this information could be available
is a prior facility energy load calculation has been completed. If not, going through this calculation could
be used to properly size an energy back up generator if one is to be ordered. For example, how much of the
required load would a 125 kV generator satisfy?
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 75
Step 7 Although typically fleet vehicles are fueled at a central
location, if the city determines that backup fuel is desired
Energy demand required for operations on-site, the city needs to know the fuel tank capacity
40,000 BTU/hr. of all vehicles kept on site and size a tank accordingly
whether it is diesel or gasoline. The size of that tank
10,000 gallons
would be entered in Step 10, such as 10,000 gallons.
List ways the energy demand for the required operations could be
Step 8
met or minimized other than through backup systems such as cycling
Low Cost: No Cost systems on and off, limiting or ceasing energy flow to “other” non-
alternatives to reduce energy required operations etc. For example, the automatic doors can be placed
demand for these operations. on manual override saving, say 1kw. A departmental/facility policy
Switch automatic doors and/or procedure would then need to be issued to affect this savings in
to manual an emergency. Or, multiple facilities could be consolidated to fewer
facilities to centralize operations and reduce the cost of maintaining
Switch lights to LEDs
multiple locations.
Change heating set point from
70F to 65F Another example concerns lighting. Since lighting is required if
Change cooling set point from incandescent lamps are currently in use, they could be switched to
68F to 72F compact fluorescents or LEDs to decrease their load. This combined
with say, changing the set point for the heating and air conditioning
Consolidate 5 fire station
operations into 1 central station
systems during an emergency could result in substantial savings. A
thorough discussion of all the potential conservation and other low-cost,
Partnerships no-cost opportunities needs to occur as each unit of energy reduction
will reduce the size of the backup system that needs to be installed.
Step 9 The task now becomes estimating the net reduction in energy use/demand
that these non-technology measures offer. It is realized that there is a limit in
Estimate the energy terms of how precise this process can be and therefore the resulting level of
accuracy. Yet, it is important to be as detailed and accurate as possible. One
1kW approach is to provide a range of energy saving numbers such as “8—9 kW”
for each alternative or to express a level of confidence in any number derived
2kW (90% savings)
such as “ 9kW” with a 10% uncertainty factor”.
The rationale for going through this process in the face of a limited budget is at least two-fold. First, one
never knows when a situation such as policy, politics or budget priorities will shift and the city will need a
quick turn-a-round on which facilities are required and the most vulnerable to an emergency and what the
costs are to harden it. So, like an insurance policy, it is always best to be prepared. Second, when priorities
do shift—as they ultimately always do--the smart energy/facilities manager will be able to capitalize on the
opportunity by being prepared and armed with accurate information positioning him/her to take advantage of
the funds available.
For each high priority facility, the mission critical operations should be evaluated by identifying energy
back-up gaps and needs (e.g., technology) that are capable of meeting any residual energy load. This
information will be used during the strategic planning step.
The options should be categorized into: a) renewable technologies, c) conventional options, and (c) energy
efficiency measures. Soft energy paths can well serve to harden city facilities. They are especially well-
match for decentralized and remote applications. Conservation and operational policies and procedures
should have been addressed under Step 9 as low cost: no cost alternatives. Be reminded that all of these
options are to only address the energy demand for mission critical operations (to minimize the fiscal impact)
and can therefore be termed back-up power. As such, both a) and b) should be de-centralized by definition
and are energy supply options whereas (c) is a demand reduction technique.
11. Estimate energy demand reduction from options for each facility
This step should be more executed with more precision and thus result in a higher level of accuracy that
step 9 where the ‘alternatives’ were estimated. These figures should be quantitatively derived whereas the
alternatives might be better suited to a qualitative analysis.
12. Identify current back-up systems and locations and record their energy output.
This step should be executed by taking the energy demand for each facility and subtracting the demand
reduction from the alternatives (step 9) and options (step 11) and then the energy contribution from any
existing backup generating devices (step 12). This is the unmet energy need for each facility to keep power
going to the identified critical operations. Step 14 takes these energy gaps and recommends that a plan be
developed to address this need.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 77
14. Identify and evaluate opportunities for meeting any shortfall (A12) including costs, benefits from
renewables (e.g., emissions) etc.
The required operations should be evaluated by identifying energy back-up gaps and needs (technology,
partnerships, etc) that are capable of meeting any residual energy load. These opportunities should be
categorized into: a) renewable technologies, c) conventional options, and (c) energy efficiency measures.
Soft energy paths can well serve to harden city facilities. They are especially well-match for decentralized
and remote applications. Conservation and operational policies and procedures should have been addressed
under Step A8 as low cost: no cost alternatives. Be reminded that all of these opportunities are to only
address the energy demand for required (to minimize the fiscal impact) and can therefore be termed back-up
power. As such, both a) and b) should be de-centralized by definition and are energy supply options whereas
(c) is a demand reduction technique.
Cost. Costs need to include first, installation and operation and maintenance costs. Most of the information
for traditional backup systems should be readily available from the local utility or vendors and therefore
familiar to cities. The costs for renewable and green technologies as well as conservation techniques will
need to be gathered or estimated. It is recommended that the normal city bid process be used by the issuance
of a request for information (RFI) and/or request for proposal (RFP) processes.
This document includes a finance paper which should provide assistance in looking at the various options
available.
The city should consider developing short term (12 months), medium term (12 months to three years)
and long term (three to five years) strategies for these high priority facilities to “harden” them over
time. Strategies could include staging investment opportunities over multiple years, developing mutual
aid agreements, training staff to power down certain non-required operations, developing policies and
procedures to maintain continuity of operations followed by exercises to assure precision and expediency so
that operations can be maintained for the 72 hour period.
Unlike Checklist A, Checklist B does not need to be addressed in any specific order. It can be added to or deleted
from at will depending on the nature of the emergency and concerns of the city. The personnel aspects of these
items are presented and discussed in Checklist C.
B2 Fuel storage capacity (diesel and gasoline) for multiple days for required
operations
B3 Numerous storage facilities located strategically around the city are regularly
consumed and refreshed
B12 Plans for facility consolidation are in place and staff is aware of these alternate
work sites
B13 Communication plans for all energy emergency operations are in place
B15 Contracts with fuel suppliers address that the city gets top priority, tankers
can be located onsite, and fuel for a minimum of 72 hours of operation is
mandatory
B1: Onsite generators are routinely exercised, fueled, and in stand-by mode
Generators are key aspect of energy assurance and would be used as the delivery mechanism for back-up power.
However, they need to be routinely exercised to assure they maintain their readiness. In order to accomplish this
routine, they need to maintain adequate (full) fuel levels so that they can run for the maximum time possible
before being refueled. Assurance also needs to be in place that the stand-by mode is operational.
B2: Fuel storage capacity (diesel and gasoline) for multiple days for required operations
Each city needs to have adequate storage (topped off) to insure that its key facilities have ample fuel to sustain the
required operations for at least 72 hours.
B3: Numerous storage facilities located strategically around the city are regularly consumed and refreshed
Storage capacity (B2) needs to be located such that reserves can be delivered to their destination with assurance
and at notice. In order to maintain the quality of the fuel, it needs to be refreshed as necessary (may require
testing) and/or have fuel stabilizer added.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 79
B4: Capability to deliver fuel citywide via numerous tanker vehicles
Even if quality control of the fuel is assured and kept at convenience locations, the demand for fuel at these various
locations may exceed the ability to deliver it in a timely manner. As such, a determination needs to be made as to
how many tanker trucks would be necessary under a worse case scenario. The city needs to have this many vehicles
on hand either through out right purchase, mutual aid agreements, contract or the like.
B6: Identified personnel (primary and alternate) to operate the refueling equipment and trucks.
Required personnel need to be identified in advance and trained (see Checklist C.1.)
B8: Fuel Reserve Sensors in place to automatically alert suppliers and city personnel of impending needs
Fuel reserve sensors are typically located in the fuel tanks so that fuel levels can be monitored and fuel ordered as
necessary. It is critical that these sensors be maintained and are sending accurate information to the fuel supplier.
B9: Facilities with mission required operations have uninterruptable power supply (UPS)
Facility managers rely on their back-up energy source (generator) to come on-line in the event of an energy
emergency. What is sometimes forgotten is that there is usually a downtime before these backup systems become
fully operational. During these times, it is probable that important mission critical functions will not be maintained
(communications, data etc). In order to preserve these important functions, the value of a UPS should be considered.
B12: Plans for facility consolidation are in place and staff is aware of these alternate work sites
As presented under Step A8, one low cost: no cost alternative may be to consolidate operations from multiple
facilities to fewer facilities. This strategy would likely result in the need for fewer essential personnel during the
emergency, simplify communications and reduce the amount of fuel needed to maintain facility operations. There are
other benefits as well. A prime example might be to name a primary fire station for every three that exist. Whatever
the consolidation goal, plans need to be developed among and between these facilities and their personnel in such
areas as primary responsibilities, chain of command, reporting and so on.
B13: Communication plans for all energy emergency operations are in place
Without an adequate communication plan, fuel may be available, but the need for additional fuel, or necessary
re-routing of tanker trucks and the like prevent the fuel from reaching its intended destination or at the very least,
arriving too late.
B15: Contracts with fuel suppliers address that the city gets top priority, tankers can be located onsite, and
fuel for a minimum of 72 hours of operation is mandatory
This task is a subset of B10 and B14. It is broken out for the purpose of this checklist because of its importance. Any
agreement with fuel suppliers needs to contain specific language which addresses these issues: priority; that tankers
can occupy space on city property to deliver fuel and remain there as necessary, and that each site will receive an
amount of fuel—spelled out on the contract—to maintain required operations for a minimum of 72 hours. If the city
has done a credible job with Checklist A, the amount of fuel required for this time period will have been held to an
absolute minimum.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 81
Checklist C: Personnel Training and Education
C2 Plans are in place and practiced to deliver fuel citywide (i.e., numerous tanker
vehicles, adequate number of trained personnel, etc)
C4 Primary and alternate personnel have been identified to operate the refueling
equipment and trucks
C6 Personnel are aware of what fuel reserve sensors are and how they function
C7 Personnel are aware of how required operations fuel priority decisions are
made
C8 Plans for facility consolidation are in place and staff are aware of these alternate
work sites
C9 Communication plans for all energy emergency operations are in place and
personnel regularly review and exercise these plans
Appendix D contains a document—the Emergency Power Planning and Intervention Tool— recently completed by
the Ohio Energy Project. This tool addresses the training requirements for exercising backup energy devices.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 83
84 A PPENDI X B: LOCAL GOVERNMENT ENERGY ASSURANCE ASSESSMENT TOOL
APPENDIX C
SOURCE: http://www.emacweb.org/?150
■■ Introduction
■■ Article I: Preamble
■■ Article II: Emergency Responders Defined
■■ Article III: Participating Political Subdivisions Responsibilities
■■ Article IV: Implementation
■■ Article V: Limitations
■■ Article VI: License, Certificate and Permit Portability
■■ Article VII: Reimbursement, Disputes Regarding Reimbursement
■■ Article VIII: Development of Guidelines and Procedures
■■ Article IX: Workers’ Compensation
■■ Article X: Immunity
■■ Article XI: Severability
■■ Intrastate Mutual Aid Model Legislation Working Group Representatives
Introduction
Over the past two years, emergency disciplines of all types agree there has been a sea change in the country after
the terrorist acts committed on United States’ soil September 11, 2001. Excepting that, the everyday concerns of
emergency responders do not abate as is demonstrated by recent wildfires, earthquakes, mudslides, hurricanes
and floods.
In each of these events, the merit of mutual aid between governments, both intra and interstate, has proven its benefit
time and time again. As has been repeatedly demonstrated by the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC), states can depend on each other to provide manpower and material resources in times of need. EMAC
shines as the states mutual aid system; and currently has 48 states, 2 Territories and Washington D.C. as signatories
to the compact. For over a decade, EMAC has served its members well.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 85
Given recent terrorist fears, the Department of Homeland Security has chosen to focus on mutual aid. It is
unquestionable that mutual aid systems are needed for state-to-state assistance and, particularly, between
local jurisdictions. Indeed, in a recent edition of State Government News, the author wrote: “Through
the National Strategy on Homeland Security, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) placed a new
focus on state and local (emphasis added) mutual aid as a key to the nation’s emergency response capabilities
for all hazards, man-made or natural. The National Incident Management System (NIMS), currently under
development by DHS, provides an operational framework for the response by federal, state and local agencies.
In the NIMS, mutual aid is emphasized as an indispensable tool for the swift and coordinated response to
disasters of all kinds.”1
In mid-July 2003, the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) asking for copies of existing mutual
aid legislation/agreements, enabling legislation and other supporting documents sent a request to all state Emergency
Management Agencies. Preliminary responses were received from 16 states and the District of Columbia confirming
that legislation/agreements were or were not in place. Over the summer, additional responses were received;
documents were sorted and reviewed, then condensed into a monograph summarizing legislation and agreements;
which served as a starting point for development of a model intrastate mutual aid agreement.
“Many local jurisdictions have agreements in place, but they vary widely across the country. Moreover, many
are not formal agreements, and do not address key issues such as liability and compensation; and encompass
multidisciplines. To be able to move assets effectually between local jurisdictions and across state lines, mutual aid
agreements should be robust, inclusive, demonstrate an effective relationship to EMAC and address liability and
compensation issues in a manner consistent with state law.”
As part of a grant awarded NEMA by FEMA in 2003, NEMA agreed to develop and market model intrastate mutual
aid legislation along with several other related tasks.
A multi-discipline review group2 was selected to ensure many voices from across the emergency services and the
public safety fields were included. The interest shown by various associations and entities further demonstrates the
ardent interest in mutual aid by this diverse body.
On January 9, 2004, the working group met in New Orleans, LA to review all work. Local perspectives were brought
to the forefront by those involved with local government emergency response, and incorporated into the model. At
the NEMA Mid-Year Conference, held in Washington, D.C., February 9-13, 2004, the membership unanimously
approved the proposed model.
One of the most important aspects of the model is that adoption by jurisdictions is entirely voluntary. The model is
meant to be a tool and resource for states and jurisdictions to utilize in developing or refining statewide mutual aid
agreements. It is anticipated that states and jurisdictions may wish to modify the model to conform to their own state
laws and authorities, or to address unique needs and circumstances. Further, the proposed articles and provisions in
the model are complementary to the recommended minimum elements to be included in mutual aid agreements that
are a part of the draft National Incident Management System Plan.
1
State Government News magazine, March 2004, by Amy Hughes Senior Policy Analyst, National Emergency
Management Association.
2
Comprehensive contact list included on Page 10.
Participating political subdivisions will be ensured, to the fullest extent possible, eligibility for state and federal
disaster funding. Also created in this legislation/agreement is the committee known as the State or Statewide
Intrastate Mutual Aid Committee. This committee shall be multidisciplinary and representative of emergency
management and response disciplines as well as local government. It shall be the committee’s responsibility to
hold, at a minimum, annual meetings to review the progress and status of statewide mutual aid, assist in developing
methods to track and evaluate activation of the system and to examine issues facing participating political
subdivisions regarding the implementation of this legislation. The committee may be chaired by the State Emergency
Management Agency. The committee may prepare an annual report on the condition and effectiveness of mutual
aid in the state, make recommendations for correcting any deficiencies and submit that report to the appropriate
legislative committee or other governing body. Members of the committee shall serve a maximum two-year term,
with recommendation for appointment coming from each respective association.
All political subdivisions within the state are, upon enactment of this legislation or the execution of an agreement,
are automatically a part of the statewide mutual aid system. A political subdivision within the state may elect not
to participate or to later withdraw from the system upon enacting an appropriate resolution by its governing body
declaring that it elects not to participate in the statewide mutual aid system; and providing a copy of the resolution
to the State Emergency Management Agency. This legislation does not preclude participating political subdivisions
from entering into supplementary agreements with another political subdivision and does not affect any other
agreement to which a political subdivision may currently be a party to, or decide to be a party to.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 87
1. Identify potential hazards that could affect the participant using an identification system common to all
participating jurisdictions.
2. Conduct joint planning, intelligence sharing and threat assessment development with contiguous participating
political subdivisions, and conduct joint training at least biennially.
3. Identify and inventory the current services, equipment, supplies, personnel and other resources related
to planning, prevention, mitigation, and response and recovery activities of the participating political
subdivision.
4. Adopt and put into practice the standardized incident management system approved by the State Emergency
Management Agency.
Article V: Limitations
A participating political subdivision’s obligation to provide assistance in the prevention of, response to and recovery
from a locally declared emergency or in authorized drills or exercises is subject to the following conditions:
1. A participating political subdivision requesting assistance must have either declared a state of emergency in the
manner outlined in Article I or authorized drills and exercises.
2. A responding participating political subdivision may withhold resources to the extent necessary to provide
reasonable protection and services for its own jurisdiction.
3. Emergency response personnel of a responding participating political subdivision shall continue under
the command and control of their responding jurisdiction to include medical protocols, standard operating
procedures and other protocols, but shall be under the operational control of the appropriate officials within the
incident management system of the participating political subdivision receiving the assistance.
4. Assets and equipment of a responding participating political subdivision shall continue under the control of their
responding jurisdiction, but shall be under the operational control of the appropriate officials within the incident
management system of the participating political subdivision receiving the assistance.
Should a dispute arise between parties to the system regarding reimbursement, involved parties will make every
effort to resolve the dispute within 30 days of written notice of the dispute by the party asserting noncompliance.
In the event that the dispute is not resolved within 90 days of the notice of the claim, either party may request the
dispute be solved through arbitration. Any arbitration under this provision shall be conducted under the commercial
arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association.
Article X: Immunity
All activities performed under this agreement are deemed hereby to be governmental functions. For the purposes of
liability, all persons responding under the operational control of the requesting political subdivision are deemed to
be employees of the requesting participating political subdivision. Neither the participating political subdivisions nor
their employees, except in cases of willful misconduct, gross negligence or bad faith shall be liable for the death of
or injury to persons or for damage to property when complying or attempting to comply with the statewide mutual
aid system.
■■ Closely tie legislation/agreement to EMAC member states’ legislation and SOP’s for seamless escalation of
disaster response and execution of mutual aid.
■■ Encourage participation by a broad range of emergency responders. Include other definitions as appropriate.
Consider global perspective, e.g., public works, private entities, medical personnel, public transportation
and others.
■■ Make legislation opt-out. Most states have several hundred municipalities and other jurisdictions within their
borders. To attempt to get everyone on board on an opt-in agreement could take years and never achieve a
plurality of participation. By making legislation opt-out, everyone is a part of the system the day it becomes law.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 89
■■ To the extent permitted by applicable law, include automatic renewal language if agreement instead of
legislation.
■■ Agreements/legislation should mandate joint planning, training and exercise with liability immunity as if it
were an actual emergency.
■■ Develop forms to facilitate requests for aid, record-keeping regarding movement of equipment and personnel
and reimbursement.
■■ Require use of a standardized incident command/management system consistent with that used by the state.
■■ In addition to not affecting any existing agreements, should also allow for supplemental agreements between
participants.
■■ Have a liability/immunity article.
■■ Consider arbitration of disputes concerning reimbursement.
■■ Be as concise as possible. Guidelines and procedures should be developed separately, but become part of the
legislations/agreement when adopted.
■■ Establishment of a committee representative of all emergency preparedness and response disciplines and other
stakeholders to examine continual changes in emergency preparedness and insure legislation/agreements meet
the needs of disciplines/stakeholders. Committee may have standing and authority to refer needs to legislature
for rectification. Consider existing committees representative of all stakeholders to determine if they may
perform this function.
A reimbursement provision. This provision may include an offset for any insurance proceeds applicable to the costs
claimed by the responding political subdivision. The insurance claims process should not delay reimbursement.
Reimbursement shall not duplicate any state or federal assistance available for the costs.
lo c a l government e n e r g y a ssu r a n ce g u i d el in es 91
APPENDIX D
92
local gove r n me n t e n e r g y a ssu r a n c e g u id e l in e s 92
The
Presents:
Sponsored by:
United States Department of Energy
Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability
National Energy Technology Laboratory
3610 Collins Ferry Road
Morgantown, WV 26507-0880
Acknowledgements
Energy Industries of Ohio greatly appreciates the assistance of those who have
made contributions to these guidelines, reviewed the comments and offered helpful
additions. In particular, we recognize the contributions of the Public Technology
Institute (PTI), and the Northern Ohio Fire Fighters (NOFF).
VISION 2020
The United States will have the cleanest and most efficient and
reliable energy system in the world by maximizing the use of
affordable distributed energy resources.
Excerpt from page 2 of:
DOE Strategic Plan for Distributed Energy Resources
September 2000
2
Table of Contents Page
Project Overview 4
I. Project Objective 8
II. Background 9
Eminent Domain 14
2. Operating Instructions 16
Quick Start 17
Trouble Shooting 18
3. Training 18
IV. Conclusion 19
3
Project Overview
4
The training component has been addressed through a separate effort also funded
by DOE. To insure a community’s emergency Distributed Generation (DG) (note: DG
and DER are generally used interchangeably in the trade and herein) systems are
capable of being brought on-line as soon as possible after a grid interruption, the
education and training needed for first responders was assessed through curriculum
developed by Energy Industries of Ohio (EIO) in conjunction with Cuyahoga County,
Ohio Homeland Security and Fire Officials. This training enables local firefighters
and first responders to be capable of: 1) connecting mobile power generators to
buildings with “plug & play” power ports 2) bringing emergency power (EP)
equipment on-line when manual intervention/start-up is inherently required, and 3)
light troubleshooting when automatic start-up fails to happen.
This phase of the project addresses the related issue of identifying location, type and
functionality of DER within a community. By collecting this information in advance of
an emergency, local governments can take steps to support greater functionality of
this equipment, while ensuring first responders are adequately trained to react in the
event of an emergency. The report includes Attachment A “Community
Implementation Tool for Emergency Power Planning and Intervention” which
provides specific guidance for conducting an annual DG inspection (as part of the
annual fire inspection) and creating an accompanying database to be retained in the
community.
5
The recommendation of this report is to expand upon the regular annual fire
inspections of facilities to include a survey and inspection of DG equipment and
maintenance logs to enhance the separate training module that prepares first
responders for emergency action. The main objectives of such an annual DG
Inspection include:
6
EIO Charter and Activities
7
I. Project Objective
8
II. Background
The electricity sector is highly complex, and its numerous component assets and
systems span the North American continent and in particular, energy intensive
regions and states such as the industrial Midwest and Ohio. Many of the sector’s key
assets, such as generation facilities, key substations, and switchyards, present
unique protection challenges. While the electricity industry has a history of taking
increasingly proactive measures to assure the reliability and availability of the
electricity system, an enhanced number of strategies and actions must be
implemented to assure the continuation of this reliability and availability during this
time of heightened threats. This is equally true for our oil and natural gas sectors.
While elevating efforts to reduce the vulnerability to our existing energy infrastructure
— we must also expand energy response and mitigation planning in the event major
disruptions in grid power supply occur. Energy sector resources are generally
addressed from the strategic category of Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key
Assets; however a much broader set of perspectives covering the range of
disruption ramifications are also necessary.
At the local level, energy supply and distribution are critical to our economy and to
the well-being of our citizens. In conjunction with national, state and private
activities addressing emergency energy needs1 communities and local governments
can play a central role in providing grass roots measures and response activities
tailored to their populations. Communities will benefit from an honest and thorough
1
Some key reference documents include:
The “National Response Framework” (and related documents) published by the US Department of
Homeland Security http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/
The Energy Sector Specific Plan developed in response to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan ,
coordinated by the Department of Energy
http://www.oe.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/Energy_SSP_Public.pdf
“A Governor’s Guide to Energy Assurance” published by the National Governors Association (NGA)
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0612GOVGUIDEENERGY.PDF
“State Energy Assurance Guidelines” developed by the National Association of State Energy Officials,
http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/docs/prepare/EAGuidelines.pdf
9
evaluation of response mechanisms to mitigate incidents involving widespread or
long-term disruptions in the supply of grid power, natural gas and oil. Reducing
vulnerability and providing appropriate response efforts that mitigate long-term
outages lessens the likelihood of serious economic or safety consequences.
The need to plan explicitly for emergency energy supplies of electric power, oil
(especially gasoline and diesel fuels) and potentially natural gas – is critical.
Furthermore, the need to insure
adequate supplies of energy resources
to key municipal buildings, mission-
critical services and emergency NASEO on the Nature of Energy
Assurance Planning
operations centers is a cornerstone of
continuity. As a consequence of “Any energy emergency planning
emergency power resource needs, effort should be based on good data
incident based mechanisms for the acquisition and information
steady supply of requisite fuels must be management. However, the response
established. Finally, provisions must be to an energy shortage – no matter how
made to furnish shelters that have it is caused – is as much an art as it is
a science. Hence, the nature of energy
adequate energy sources (e.g. electric emergency preparedness is seen as
power and heating/cooling) to provide good data management and response
for basic human needs for a sizable planning as well as the identification
portion of displaced populace. While of multiple stakeholders, their
such facilities are not typically defined interests and the definition of how
as primary critical infrastructure, they their energy interests affect energy
may become “downstream critical emergency planning. “
infrastructure” subsequent to an event. Excerpt from: State Energy Assurance
Identifying greater capacities for Guidelines dated November 2005,
emergency shelter via additional page 8
Published by NASEO – National
prospective facilities – among not only Association of State Energy Officials
government but also private
infrastructures, should be addressed
and the respective cooperative use
agreements must be established in
advance.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) as well as the private and public energy
providers are undertaking a number of efforts for investigating and assessing current
technologies. These will provide increased protection and detection of intrusions to
our energy infrastructure. In addition, a number of programs are aimed at developing
new and improved means of providing physical security of such critical infrastructure
and also for training of designated first responders for mitigating incident based long-
term energy outages. These top down measures provide security to the broadest
range of needs.
10
This project, “Emergency Power Planning and Intervention” for Distributed Energy
Resources, (DER) provides a bottoms up approach that is easily implemented at the
local level. The program is designed to:
- provide first steps for local governments to open a dialogue addressing wide
spread outages that may cause significant disruptions to life and property
- prepare communities to capitalize on the current DER infrastructure already
existing in the community
- provide community officials with a mechanism to collect data about the
existing DER and ensure those resources are operational in the event of an
emergency, and
- enable communities to identify and correct vulnerabilities through a big picture
view of their resources, and
- compliment related projects sponsored by DOE for training of first responders
and fire fighters in operation of DER.
11
III. Implementation
The collection of DG data at the local level is one step a community can take to
increase their knowledge and wherewithal to respond to an energy outage. By
knowing the number, type and locations of such resources, a community can
determine the best ways to ensure this back-up system is fully functional and
utilized, including the extent to which such facilities could be used for other purposes
in an emergency. Fuel requirements to support functionality within the community
could be assessed and plans for provisions coordinated with utilities and state and
federal agencies. Where appropriate, the local officials could seek partnerships with
DG owners regarding potential public use of those facilities in a crisis.
12
Survey for Annual DER Inspection
The survey is in the form of a checklist and was prepared in collaboration with
generator manufacturers. The data to be collected will permit fire fighters and first
responders to seek both the necessary skills and the knowledge to facilitate
equipment startup and maintenance should this be required. This preparation may
be in the form of a general “quick start” type of training offered through the local fire
academy or a training class offered by a particular manufacturer if there are
significant numbers of that manufacturer’s equipment located in the community. The
checklist also was designed to provide other key information to the community
including data related to equipment location, methods for access, system back-up
generation requirements and overall facility capacity.
13
Initially, the collection of such data would be considered voluntary and facility owners
would be given the option to decline the review with the understanding that first
responder support and resources may not be provided because little advance
knowledge of their system will reside in the knowledge-base of the safety forces.
This alone should encourage owners of DG systems to participate. Over time, as
other incentives are introduced, it is anticipated that further voluntary participation
would occur and as the benefits of having a knowledge-base of a community’s back-
up generation become apparent, a more formal system, including supporting laws or
regulations, and system-wide testing, could be created for implementation on a
broader scale.
Eminent Domain
14
Maintenance of City Database
The survey and resulting data base have been designed with simplicity and
convenience in mind. The survey can be conducted clipboard style with paper and
pen, and subsequently entered into the database by a data entry clerk at a later
time. The paper copy is then retained on-file as back-up. As an alternative, the
survey can be conducted directly on a laptop using a template that is set-up to
automatically sort and store the data. In this case, communities may still want to
retain paper copies on file. Once the initial survey is completed, subsequent annual
surveys would be focused primarily on recording only those changes to the data that
may have occurred between the survey periods.
A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet has been created to compliment the survey form.
This spreadsheet allows the user to sort the data by different elements including
business or organization location within the city, type of generator, facilities that
could serve as emergency shelters/dispatch centers, among others. This provides
the big picture that can help local governments determine the breadth of their local
resources as well as the need for servicing such units during an emergency.
It is anticipated that communities will customize the database to best serve their
interests and operating styles. It is recognized that the amount of data to be
collected and recorded will vary significantly depending upon size of the locale and
number of business entities. Larger communities with more DG resources may
need to specifically address and strategize the most advantageous way of storing
and retrieving their data.
15
2. Operating Instructions
During previous assessments, it became clear that there are standard features in all
DER. Basic operating instructions were identified and documented for use by fire
fighters and first responders. Those instructions have been included in the
Community Guidelines found in Attachment A. It was also determined that a 4-6
hour overview course was very helpful in addressing the initial “hands-on”
experience for fire fighters. A course developed under an earlier module to this
project was found to be well received by the first-responder community. Said course
(available through Energy Industries of Ohio) or other DG training is recommended
for implementation as part of this planning process (see Section 3 of this report). It
is important to note that in all cases when first responders are uncomfortable or
unfamiliar with a particular piece of equipment that they not proceed further and
NEVER undertake any action unless they are certain that it can be performed safely.
16
Quick Start
There are roughly a half dozen items on the quick start checklist which can lead a
novice responder to take action to start most facility generators. By ensuring that
complete instructions are retained with the equipment, operators should be well
equipped to ensure start-up of functioning equipment.
17
Trouble Shooting
Troubleshooting failed start-ups for both mobile generators and stationary units is
also addressed in the Community Guidelines. Several common and easily
addressed problem areas are identified and solutions described. Implementation is
easily managed by novice operators.
During previous studies, it was found that the number one critical troubleshooting
area for generators that will not start is dead batteries. Where the dead batteries are
easily accessible (e.g. mobile unit located outdoors) jump-starting with another
vehicle or battery – in the same manner one jump-starts a car with a dead battery –
is required. While more detailed instructions are available in a training course, these
items are deliberately only minimally addressed on the trouble shooting checklist as
the first responder is to take only rudimentary trouble shooting and repair activities.
If there are other minor problems (ones less obvious than a battery cable being
disconnected, dead battery, etc.), operators are instructed to contact the local dealer
for assistance and if unavailable to refrain from further troubleshooting of the device.
The annual survey should ensure that emergency numbers for facility managers and
equipment manufacturers are available, verified and posted at the site.
3. Training
18
Conclusion
In addition to many large undertakings that state and local governments have been
pursuing to be more proactive during an energy emergency, this document outlines
some rather simple, straightforward and inexpensive mechanisms for immediate
implementation. Data collection on DER in a community, coupled with DG training
for fire fighters and other first responders, enables communities to capitalize on
equipment that already exists, thus reducing the negative consequences of an
extended outage. Furthermore, the project promotes collaboration between the
public and private sector, with the potential for opening other areas of dialogue and
exchange. This should serve to facilitate implementation of other more complex or
controversial programs down the line.
A pilot project was conducted in Northeast Ohio from 2005 - 2007 to demonstrate
that the training and data collection can be easily implemented at the local level.
Both aspects of the project have been well received by local governments and first
responders. The materials created during the pilot were designed so that they could
be easily adapted to fit the unique needs of other communities, ultimately
transitioning from a pilot project to an on-going standard operating procedure. The
framework for Community Action set forth in Attachment A entitled “”Community
Implementation Tool for Emergency Power Planning and Intervention” was designed
using this same approach.
These activities, combined with numerous other activities at the local, state and
federal level are serving to promote safe and reliable energy continuity during an
emergency.
Excerpt from: “Energy: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan
as input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Redacted)” May 2007
Published by: The Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability,
U.S. Department of Energy
19
Attachment A
FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY ACTION
20
Attachment A
FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY ACTION
First Responders should have basic training for quick starting emergency generation
devices. These instructions provide information about how to obtain such training.
The packet also includes basic instructions for using portable generators, and a
checklist of on-the spot simple trouble shooting of failed devices.
Approach: The routine annual fire inspections conducted by the Community offer a
simple, straightforward mechanism for collection of data on DER. An instruction
sheet, a survey form and the corresponding spreadsheet have been developed to
assist in the collection and maintenance of Distributed Energy Resources (DER)
data. These documents can be further customized at the local level to meet the
unique needs and requirements, including Information Technology (IT) capabilities,
of each community.
21
Attachment A
FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY ACTION
In the event such equipment is not operational during an outage, communities are
well prepared to support trouble shooting activities to minimize shut downs.
Examples of such support could include dispatch of trained first responders to
assess operability during an outage, where needed implementation of basic trouble
shooting techniques, and/or assistance in ensuring facility managers are contacted
and involved. Each community should determine the specific opportunities based on
available resources and overall community interest and response to the program.
22
Attachment A
FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY ACTION
Model Name/Number:______________________________________________
Serial Number:_____________________________________________________
23
Attachment A
FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY ACTION
Are their any areas that could serve as emergency shelter and/or central
dispatch? YES* NO
24
Attachment A
FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY ACTION
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Other Notes:
Date: _________________
Signature: _______________________________________________________
25
Attachment A
FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY ACTION
NO – Go To Step 3
26
Attachment A
FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY ACTION
Emergency numbers should be posted at the site. If not, refer to the annual survey
report.
NO
Check for Low Battery or Fuel problems
If low battery, connect another battery set (24 volt), if
available and try manual start. If over crank occurs, check
fuel.
Is there fuel in the tank?
YES – Check to see if fuel filters are plugged? (The fuel
could be bad- jelled, if cold and not winterized fuel or it
could be due to old fuel)
NO - Check to see if fuel is available
27
Attachment A
FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY ACTION
If Yes, Did ATS transfer to generator? YES – Problem is in ATS start wiring
or internal engine start wiring, CALL SERVICE TECHNICIAN.
ATS did not transfer to Genset. Is the Voltage and Frequency OK? –YES
NOTE: The ATS can usually be manually transferred to a running generator,
however, for safety reasons, never do this with the Gen Circuit Breaker closed.
28
Attachment A
FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY ACTION
Database: The data collected in each survey are entered into a master database.
A Microsoft Excel template is available to facilitate this process; however each user
should determine the storage approach that complements other existing internal
operating systems. The database will help to highlight key pieces of information
including the most common types of equipment, (to assist in determining first
responder training needs), fuel requirements (to determine any considerations for
deliveries during an emergency), citywide location of resources (to assist with other
emergency planning needs including temporary housing/shelter) etc.
As mentioned above, the use of columns in the database allows users to sort the
data for various interests. For example, in the expanded spreadsheet, the street
address is a single column. Users can sort data by address, thus showing areas of
the city with coverage/servicing needs and those without coverage and potential
vulnerability. Information like the emergency contact numbers, provide critical
information at a quick glance. Sorting by type of DER can help users recommend
and establish the necessary training for their city fire fighters and first responders.
Sorting by available space for shelters and/or dispatch centers aids in advance
planning and coordination.
Follow-up: The first time data is collected and entered will be the most time
intensive. Reviews during later annual fire inspections should serve to
update/correct any information that has changed since the last inspection. These
reviews also serve to enhance the experience and on-the-spot training of fire
fighters, offering them an opportunity to: discuss the equipment with the primary
operator; learn “tricks of the trade” while they become familiar with the operating
techniques; and conduct system-wide tests. Over time, operation of this equipment
will become second nature to the fire fighters.
29