G.R. No.

110526 February 10, 1998 ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS, petitioner, VS PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY, respondent FACTS: Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA's Administrative Order, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, writ of preliminary injunction, while the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court, the Governing Board of the PCA issued a Resolution for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. While it continues the registration of coconut product processors, the registration would be limited to the "monitoring" of their volumes of production and administration of quality standards. The PCA issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines for not to approve the resolution in question. Despite follow-up letters sent petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President. The "certificates of registration" issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new coconut mills to operate. ISSUES: At issue in this case is the validity of a resolution, of the Philippine Coconut Authority in which it declares that it will no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply to it for a license or permit as a condition for engaging in such business. HELD: The petition is GRANTED. PCA Resolution and all certificates of registration issued under it are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine Coconut Authority to adopt or issue. The PCA cannot rely on the memorandum of then President Aquino for authority to adopt the resolution in question. The President Aquino approved the establishment and operation of new DCN plants Subject to the guidelines to be drawn by the PCA . In the first place, it could not have intended to amend the several laws already mentioned, which setup the regulatory system, by a mere memoranda to the PCA. In the second place, even if that had been her intention, her act would be without effect considering that, when she issued the memorandum in question on February 11, 1988; she was no longer vested with legislative authority.

Settlement of Boundary Dispute THE MUNICIPALITY OF SOGOD vs.ROSALMEDIALDEA; September 24, 1991NATURE Petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court FACTS - On June 15, 1950, Congress passed Republic Act No. 522 creating the municipality of Bontoc, formerly a barrio of the municipality of Sogod in the province of Leyte, which shall be composed of the barrios of Bontoc, Divisoria, Onion,Pacu, Beniton, Catmon, Hilaan, Taa, Sta. Cruz, Mahayahay and their corresponding sitios.- A boundary dispute however, later arose between the municipality of Bontoc and the municipality of Sogod with the latter claiming that the former exercised jurisdiction not only over the barrios above-mentioned but also over other ten(10) barrios allegedly belonging to Sogod.- The Provincial Board of Leyte issued Resolution No. 617 directing the holding of a plebiscite to determine whether the people in these barrios would like to remain with the municipality of Sogod or with Bontoc. The plebiscite was conducted on August 1, 1952, and the results thereof show that more votes were cast in favor of Sogod than those in favor of Bontoc.- On April 4, 1959, the Provincial Board of Leyte issued Resolution No. 519 recommending to the President of the Philippines and/or to the Congress of the Philippines that Republic Act 522 be amended so as to include in said Act creating the municipality of Bontoc, the following barrios claimed by Sogod which are in the heart of Bontoc but not included in said law, namely: Baugo, Himakilo, Esperanza, Hibagwan, Pamahawan, Mahayahay, Bunga, Da-o andMaoylab The Board also recommended that a law be enacted annexing to the municipality of Sogod the following barrios which are very near Sogod and are claimed by the latter but are included in the law creating Bontoc, namely: Laogawan,Taa Tuburan, Sta. Cruz and Pangi he board further recommended that the boundary line between the two municipalities be placed at Granada Creek.- On December 28, 1959, Carlos P. Garcia, then President of the Philippines, promulgated Executive Order No. 368,which approved the recommendation of the provincial board of Leyte, and reconstituted the barrios and sitios which shallcompose the municipalities of Bontoc and Sogod. The executive order also specified Granada Creek as the boundary line separating Bontoc and Sogod. - However the President of the Philippines sent a telegram to the Provincial Board of Southern Leyte suspending the implementation of EO 368. - The Provincial Board of Southern Leyte passed Resolution No. 62 suspending the implementation of Executive Order 368. The Board also created a committee to conduct the holding of a plebiscite in the barrios and sitios affected by Executive Order 368 and to finally settle the boundary dispute. - The municipality of Sogod filed two civil cases: 1. Certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the provincial board and provincial governor from taking cognizance of the long pending boundary dispute between the two municipalities and to enjoin the municipality of Bontoc from exercisingterritorial jurisdiction over the barrios allegedly belonging to the municipality of Sogod.2. For recovery of taxes with receivership against the municipality of Bontoc alleging that the municipality of Bontoc, without any legal basis, exercised jurisdiction not only over the barrios enumerated in Republic Act No. 522 but also over ten (10) barrios belonging to the complainant municipality of Sogod. The complaint prayed that the municipality of Bontoc be ordered to pay Sogod one half of the total amount of taxes collected by the former from the inhabitants of the

aforesaid barrios during the period from 1950 to 1959. - The trial court issued an order dismissing the two civil cases for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.MR denied. ISSUE WON the trial court gravely erred in dismissing the two cases for lack of jurisdiction. HELD NO. The law vested the right to settle boundary disputes between municipalities on the provincial board pursuant to Section 2167 of the Revised Administrative Code, which reads: SEC. 2167. Municipal boundary disputes How settled? Disputes as to jurisdiction of municipal governments over places or barrios shall be decided by the province boards of the provinces in which such municipalities are situated, after an

EPITACIO DELIMA, PACIANO DELIMA, FIDEL DELIMA, ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. NO. L-46296 201 SCRA 641 SEPTEMBER 24, 1991PONENTE: MEDIALDEA, J. Doctrine: No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. The exception however is that the from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question is no longer one of partition but of ownership.

Facts: Lino Delima acquired Lot. No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu by saleon installments from the government. After his demise in 1921 he had his three brothers and a sister listed as his heirs. The heirs were Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima, and Vicente Delima. Anew Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of the Legal Heirs of Lino Delima represented by Galileo Delima. On September 22, 1953, Galileo executed an affidavit of ExtraInvestigation at which the municipalities concerned shall be duly heard. From the decision of the judicial Declaration of Heirs adjudicating to himself the subject property excluding the other heirs. He provincial board appeal may be taken by the municipality aggrieved to the Secretary of the Interior declared the lot to be of his own and paid for its taxes. On February 29, 1968, the surviving heirs of (now the Office of the Executive Secretary), whos decision shall be final. Where the places or Eulalio and Juanita Delima, filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu an action for reconveyance barrios in dispute are claimed by municipalities situated in different provinces, the provincial boards and partition of property and for the annulment of the certificate of title issued plus damages against of the provinces concerned shall come to an agreement if possible, but, in the event of their failing to their Uncle Galileo. Vicente Delimawas also later included as party defendant for his refusal to help agree, an appeal shall be had to the Secretary of Interior (Executive Secretary), whose decision in the action. The trial court decided in favor of the petitioners rendering the TCT No. 3009 null and shall be final. (Municipality of Hinabangan v. Municipality of Wright, 107 Phil. 394). void and declaring Vicente, the Heirs of Juanita, the Heirs of Eulalio and the Heirs of Galileo to be owners of the property, each sharing a pro-indiviso share of one-fourth of the whole. The Reasoning respondents, Heirs of GalileoDelima, appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision It is clear from the foretasted legal provision that the authority to hear and resolve municipal in their favor. It upheld the claim of Galileo that the other brothers and sisters have already waived boundary disputes belongs to the provincial boards and not to the trial courts. The decisions of the their rights to the property being that it was Galileo alone that paid for the balance of the purchase boards are then appealable to the Executive Secretary. Records in the instant case show that when price and the realty taxes for the property. petitioner municipality filed the civil actions in 1970 before the trial court, the provincial board of Southern Leyte had not yet conducted a plebiscite as ordered by the Executive Department in 1960 Issue: or rendered any order settling the dispute. Petitioner municipality should have elevated the matter of Whether or not petitioners action for partition is already barred by the statutory period delay to the then Secretary of Interior (now Executive Secretary) for action instead of bringing it to provided by the trial court. Although existing laws then vested on the provincial board the power to determine or Law which shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive even alter municipal boundaries, the Secretary of Interior or the Executive Department for that prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their shared in the disputed property? matter, was not precluded during that time from taking necessary steps for the speedy settlement of the boundary dispute. In Pelaez v. Auditor General, No. L-23825, December 24, 1965, 15 Held: SCRA569, which applied Republic Act No. 2370, known as the Barrio Charter, We held that the Yes, Article 494 (5) of the Civil Code provides that: power to fix common boundaries in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining No prescription shall municipalities may also partake of an administrative nature that can be decided by the administrative Run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or department, involving as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the laws impliedly recognized the cocreating said municipalities. Ownership. DISPOSITION By this it is therefore understood that possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse The petitions are DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the respondent judge are AFFIRMED to the others, but will be held to benefit all. Being that Galileo was holding the property in

representation of the co-owners; he was therefore acting as an administrator who took care of the property yet still having the ultimate obligation to deliver the property to his co-owners. However this rule shall no longer apply when one of the co-owners begin to claim the absolute and exclusive ownership and denies the others any share therein. The imprescriptability of the action for partition shall no longer apply since Galileo is adversely claiming lone ownership over the property. In order that a possession is considered adverse amounting to a repudiation of the co-ownership, the following elements must concur: (1) that the trustee has performed the unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust ; (2) That such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust ; And (3) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive. Since Galileo, having executed a deed of partition and obtained subsequent to that the cancellation of the old title and the creation of a new one wherein he appears as the new owner of the property, he thereby in effect denied and repudiated the ownership of the other co-owners over their shares. From this act, the statute of limitations started to run. Since an action for reconveyance. Villegas vs. Subido On December 4, 2011 Political Law Women Workers Then Mayor Villegas approved the appointing of 91 women street sweepers in the City of Manila. But the appointing would still have to be approved by the Office of Civil Service Commission under Subido. Subido on the other hand refused to extend approval to such appointments on the ground that appointing women to manual labor is against Memorandum Circular No. 18 s 1964. Villegas however pointed out that the said Memo has already been set aside by the Office of the President hence the same is no longer in effect. HELD: The reliance of then respondent Commissioner was not on any law or rule but simply on his own concept of what policy to pursue, in this instance in accordance with his own personal predilection. Here he appeared to be unalterably convinced that to allow women laborers to work outside their offices as street sweepers would run counter to Filipino tradition. A public official must be able to point to a particular provision of law or rule justifying the exercise of a challenged authority. Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights. The government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the state is expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid of power. What they do suffers from a fatal infirmity. That principle cannot be sufficiently stressed. In the appropriate language of Chief Justice Hughes: It must be conceded that departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute. Neither the

high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth. Such an eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid. REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORP. V SENDINO FACTS Respondent Sendino entered into a reservation agreement with petitioner Realty Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a lot Located in Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat for P307, 800. Sendino paid a total of P5000 as reservation fee. Six months thereafter Sendino paid 16K as down payment. She was however advised by REVI to change her co-maker. Sendino agreed, to which she asked for an extension of one month or so. For alleged noncompliance with the appropriate Documentary requirements, REVI unilaterally rescinded the contract. Sendino sued for Specific Performance against REVI with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of The HLURB. REVI argued that OAALA-HLURB has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because EO 90 which created the HLURB Did not grant such powers to it. Although such quasi-judicial function was exercised by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), HLURBs predecessor. ISSUES 1. Whether the HLURB has quasi-judicial functions notwithstanding the absence of such grant of power by EO 90. 2. Whether a decision can be rendered by OAALA- a subordinate office of the Board of Commissioners. RULING 1. YES. The HLURB has quasi-judicial functions. Although such power was not granted by the law creating the HLURB, it can be implied from the fact that HLURB is the Sole regulatory board for housing and land development. HLURB would have been reduced to a functionally sterile entity If it lacked the powers exercised by its predecessor, the HSRC, which included the power to settle disputes concerning Land use. 2. YES. The Board of Commissioners may delegate such function to the OAALA. The power conferred upon an administrative agency to issue rules and regulations necessary to carry out its functions

Has been held to be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function. The board Santos vs. National Labor Relations Commission may adopt rules of [GR 101699, 13 March 1996] Procedure for the conduct of its business for the effective accomplishment of its mandated functions. Facts: Melvin D. Millena, on 1 October 1985, was hired to be the project accountant for Mana REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURES CORPORATIONvs.LUCINA S. SENDINOG.R. No. 109703 Mining and Development Corporation's (MMDC) mining operations in Gatbo, Bacon, Sorsogon. On July 5, 1994KAPUNAN, 12 August 1986, Millena sent to Mr. Gil Abao, the MMDC corporate treasurer, a memorandum J.: calling the latter's attention to the failure of the company to comply with the withholding tax Facts: requirements of, and to make the corresponding monthly remittances to, the Bureau of Internal Private respondent Lucina C. Sendino entered into a reservation agreement with Realty Exchange Revenue (BIR) on account of delayed payments of accrued salaries to the company's laborers and Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a 120-square meter lot in Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat, Paranaque. employees. In a letter, dated 8 September 1986, Abao advised Millena that it was the board's He paid the fulldown payment on the purchase price. However, she was advised by REVI to change decision that it stop production (operation) in Sorsogon due to the upcoming rainy seasons and the her co-maker, which she agreed, asking for an extension of one month to do so. For alleged nondeterioration of the peace and order in the said area; that the corporation will undertake only compliance with the requirement of submission of the appropriate documents under the terms of the necessary maintenance and repair work and will keep overhead down to the minimum manageable original agreement, REVI, informed respondent of the cancellation of the contract. Private level; and that the corporation will not need a project accountant until the corporation resumes fullrespondent filed a complaint for Specific Performance against REVI with the office of Appeals, scale operations. Millena expressed "shock" over the termination of his employment. Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) The HLURB rendered its judgment in favor of private respondent and ordered petitioners to continue He complained that he would not have resigned from the Sycip, Gores & Velayo accounting firm, with the sale of the house and lot and to pay private respondent P5, 000 as moral damages, P5, 000 where he was already a senior staff auditor, had it not been for the assurance of a "continuous job" as exemplary damages andP6, 000 as attorney's fees and costs of the suit. An appeal from this by MMDC's Eng. Rodillano E. Velasquez. Millena requested that he be reimbursed the "advances" decision was taken to the HLURB OAALA Arbiter, which affirmed the Board's decision. The decision he had made for the company and be paid his "accrued salaries/claims." The claim was not heeded. of the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to the Office of the President (OP). The OP rendered its On October 1986, Millena filed with the NLRC Regional Arbitration, Branch No. V, in Legazpi City, a decision dismissing the petitioners' appeal. The Motion for reconsideration of the decision was complaint for illegal dismissal, unpaid salaries, 13th month pay, overtime pay, separation pay and likewise denied. incentive leave pay against MMDC and its two top officials, namely, Benjamin A Santos (the President) and Rodillano A. Velasquez (the executive vice-president). In his complaint-affidavit Issue: (position paper), submitted on 27 October 1986, Millena alleged, among other things, that his Whether or not the HLURB has quasi-judicial functions. dismissal was merely an offshoot of his letter of 12 August 1986 to Abao about the company's inability to pay its workers and to remit withholding taxes to the BIR. On 27 July 1988, Labor Arbiter Held: Fructouso T. Aurellano, finding no valid cause for terminating complaint's employment, ruled that a Yes. The HLURB properly exercised its jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioners with its partial closure of an establishment due to losses was a retrenchment measure that rendered the adjudicative body, the OAALA, in ordering petitioners to comply with their obligations arising from employer liable for unpaid salaries and other monetary claims. the Reservation Agreement. Recognizing the HLURB as the successor agency of the HSRC's powers and functions, it therefore follows that the transfer of such functions from the NHA to the The Labor Arbiter ordered Santos, ET. Al. to pay Millena the amount of P37, 132.25 corresponding HRSC effected by Section 8 of E.O. 648, series of 1981, thereby resulted in the acquisition by the to the latter's unpaid salaries and advances: P5, 400.00 for petitioner's 13th month pay; P3, 340.95 HLURB of adjudicatory powers which included the power to "(h) ear and decide cases of unsound as service incentive leave pay; and P5, 400.00 as separation pay. Santos, ET. Al. was further real estate business practices . . . and cases of specific performance." ordered to pay Millena 10% of the monetary awards as attorney's fees. Alleging abuse of discretion by the Labor Arbiter, the company and its co-respondents filed a "motion for reconsideration and /or Obviously, in the exercise of its powers and functions, the HLURB must interpret and apply appeal." 8 The motion/appeal was forthwith indorsed to the Executive Director of the NLRC in contracts, determine the rights of the parties under these contracts, and award damages whenever Manila. In a resolution, dated 04 September 1989, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor appropriate. Arbiter. A writ of execution correspondingly issued; however, it was returned unsatisfied for the failure of the sheriff to locate the offices of the corporation in the addressed indicated. Another writ of Santos vs. NLRC Case Digest execution and an order of garnishment were thereupon served on Santos at his residence.

Contending that he had been denied due process, Santos filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC's resolution along with a prayer for the quashal of the writ of execution and order of garnishment. He averred that he had never received any notice, summons or even a copy of the complaint; hence, he said, the Labor Arbiter at no time had acquired jurisdiction over him. On 16 August 1991, the NLRC dismissed the motion for reconsideration. Santos filed the petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether Santos should be made solidarily liable with MMDC. Held: A corporation is a judicial entity with legal personality separated and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and, in general, from the people comprising it. The rule is that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors, officers and employees, are its sole liabilities. Nevertheless, being a mere fiction of law, peculiar situations or valid grounds can exist to warrant, albeit done sparingly, the disregard of its independent being and the lifting of the corporate veil. As a rule, this situation might arise a corporation is used to evade a just and due obligation or to justify a wrong, to shield or perpetrate fraud, to carry out similar other unjustifiable aims or intentions, or as a subterfuge to commit injustice and so circumvent the law. Without necessarily piercing the veil of corporate fiction, personal civil liability can also be said to lawfully attach to a corporate director, trustee or officer; to wit: When (1) He assents (a) to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or (b) for bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or (b) for conflict of interest, resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other persons; (2) He consents to the issuance of watered stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, does not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto; (3) He agrees to hold himself personally and solitarily liable with the corporation; or (4) He is made, by a specific provision of law, to personally answer for his corporate action. The case of Santos is way of these exceptional instances. It is not even shown that Santos has had a direct hand in the dismissal of Millena enough to attribute to Santos a patently unlawful act while acting for the corporation. Neither can Article 289 of the Labor Code be applied since this specifically refers only to the imposition of penalties under the Code. It is undisputed that the termination of Millena's employment has, instead, been due, collectively, to the need for a further mitigation of losses, the onset of the rainy season, the insurgency problem, in Sorsogon and the lack of funds to further support the mining operation in Gatbo. It is basic that a corporation is invested by law with a personally separate and distinct from those of the persons composing it as well as from that of any, other legal entity to which it may be related. Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding the separate corporate personally. Similar to the case of Sunio vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Santos should not have been made personally answerable for the payment of Millena's back salaries.

American Tobacco Company et al vs. Director of Patents On November 6, 2010 Due Process ATC et al filed before the Philippine Patent Office concerning the use of trade mark and trade name. ATC et al challenged the validity of Rule 168 of the Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear inter partes proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him. These proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office. Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under the law the Director must personally hear and decide inter partes case. Said objections were overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the present petition for mandamus, to compel the Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers. ISSUE: Whether or not the hearing done by hearing officers are within due process. HELD: The SC ruled that the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law; this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made. The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. It is, however, required that to give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.