Rather than waiting for the local government authorities that are closest to them (and with a lot

of money), the local people in oil-producing communities, through self-organizing and self-governing activities, have planned and executed essential social services.

Coping With Social Deprivation through Self-Governing Institutions in Oil Communities of Nigeria Shittu R. Akinola

In spite of the fact that Nigeria relies on oil for the main source of its revenue, the communities where crude oil is extracted lack important social services. The politics of exclusion adopted by the Nigerian state is largely responsible for this lack, which in turn breeds resentment and aggression on the part of the people, who respond in various ways, using various strategies for various reasons. Some people have adopted a negative approach, using violent and confrontational means, but others have revived their old traditions, rooted in collective action: through self-organizing and selfgoverning capabilities, they have worked to meet the needs of their communities and have achieved some success in providing social services. Social disparities among the Nigerian state, its oil partners, and the oil communities can be addressed if a new institutional arrangement, one that could use existing self-organizing and self-governing institutions as building blocks for reconstituting order from the bottom up, is designed and implemented.

Introduction
The Nigerian state relies on oil as the main source of its revenue, but the communities where crude oil is extracted generally suffer poverty, neglect, environmental degradation, and the denial of fundamental human rights (Naanen 1995; Obi 2004:450). The affluence exhibited by many oil-company workers and political officeholders in Nigeria sharply contrasts with the social deprivation of most residents of oil communities (Akinola 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003b, 2005; Obi 2004:448). A consequence of such deprivation has been violent protests and demonstrations by marginalized youths. The impact of oil production on local social life and the threat to the ecology of human livelihoods in oil communities are well documented (Akinola, 1998:290, 2000:178; Boele 1995; Esparza and Wilson 1999; Omoweh

1993; Robinson 1996; Rowell 1994). In response, the people of oil communities resist this oppression in various ways (Douglas and Ola 1999:334; Obi 2000b:281). These people can be divided into four groups on the basis of their perception of the problem and their methods of addressing it. The first two groups are elites; the other two are nonelites. The first group, the politicians and bureaucrats, adopts clientelism, constantly adjusting its strategies to romanticize with and benefit from all governments in power, whether military or civilian. The other group of elites, though very few, condescends to the level of ordinary person in oil communities and continues to champion the course of freedom from oppression, exploitation, injustice, and poverty. In this group were people like Ken Saro Wiwa and the other eight Ogonis hanged by the military regime of the Late General Sanni Abacha on 15 November 1995. Similarly, the nonelites organize themselves into two groups. The first adopts a crude approach, by using violence in putting pressure to bear on the federal government and oil multinationals; this group is not interested in any orderly manner and has been responsible for most pipeline explosions, takings of hostages, vandalization of oil installations, and so on. In the second group of nonelites are the grassroots people, who invest their sovereignty horizontally in one another through collective action and self-organizing arrangements to address infrastructural problems at the community level. Several studies examine the first three groups, but little is known about the fourth; hence, my concern is to study this group so as to ascertain its contributions or otherwise to the development of the oil communities. A self-governing institution (SGI) can be defined as an institution crafted by the people, without external interference, in an attempt to solve their common problems within their locality or community. It is also called a people-oriented, people-centered, or community-based institution (Akinola 2005; Ayo 2002; McGinnis 1999; Olowu and Wunsch 2004; E. Ostrom 1990, 1999; E. Ostrom, J. Walker, and R. Gardner 1992; V. Ostrom 1994, 1997, 2000; V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom 2003; Sawyer 2005; Wunsch and Olowu 1995). This paper examines how such institutions cope with the challenges of social deprivation in selected oil communities in Nigeria. It identifies factors that favor collective action among local people and how they organize themselves to address their lack of social services. To ascertain the role that these institutions play in coping with the challenges of social deprivation, empirical data were collected on the provision of social servicesroads, bridges, water supply, education, health, and so onin the Niger Delta region.

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Theoretical Framework
This paper adopts public-choice theory, which recognizes the fundamental defects in the centralist model of governance and the persistent failure of the state to meet the collective yearnings and aspirations of the citizenry. This school of thought focuses on a polycentric approach to the constitution of

order in a human societyan approach in which people are seen as sharing a community of understanding in offering solutions to the problems of daily life in a rule-ordered relationship (V. Ostrom et al. 1988:51). Public-choice scholars emphasize the development of an alternative institutional paradigm by calling attention to the peoples self-governing and self organizing capabilities. Though this paradigm was originally conceived within the context of American experiences, it has become a potent alternative effectively employed by African scholars (Akinola 2005; Ayittez 1991; Ayo 2002; Olowu 1999, 2006), who have confirmed the resilience and effectiveness of institutions designed and managed by the people. Self-governance demonstrates the self-organizing capabilities of local communities and the tendency to relate with one another in a rule-ordered relationship, sharing ideas, and using their own initiatives and institutional potentials to address problems of daily existence. Self-governance empowers citizens, protects individual choice, and allows for polycentric institutional arrangement: it permits citizens to join with one another to take collective action. Through self-organizing capacities, it helps promote human development (Wunsch and Olowu 1995:274). Theories of collective action suggest that individuals under certain institutional arrangements and shared norms can organize and sustain cooperation that advances the common interest of the group in which they belong (see, for example, E. Ostrom 1990). This line of thought recognizes that human beings can organize and govern themselves according to appropriate institutional arrangements and mutual agreements in a community of understanding. This is the fundamental of institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework, which emphasizes institutional arrangement designed by people who cooperate based on rules and constitution of their choice, and can thereby resolve socioeconomic and political problems that others (external to their conditions) are incapable of doing for them. The existence and operation of these institutions does not replace the role of government: rather, it redefines it. The most important role of government in a polycentric order is to help local people resolve their conflicts of interest in ways that remain consistent with societal standards of fairness: government should not be involved in too many things; it should play the roles of facilitator and supervisor to ensure fairness and justice. IAD considers the role of evolution, culture, learning, and social norms in the discourse on collective action (E. Ostrom and Walker 2003). Institutional structures that people have developed avail individuals in the community to make inputs to development in their locality by contributing toward projects (labour, finance, and materials) and decision-making, especially in rural settings. According to Sawyer (2005:3), institutional analysis helps us better understand how individuals within communities, organizations, and societies craft rules and organize the rule-ordered relationships in which they live their lives. To understand institutions, according to E. Ostrom (2005:3), one needs to know what they are, how and why they are crafted and sustained, and what consequences they generate in diverse

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settings. Understanding institutions is a process of learning what they do, how and why they work, how to create or modify them, and eventually how to convey that knowledge to others. Examples of local peoples provision of public goods using institutions designed by the people are well documented throughout African continent (Akinola 2000, 2003a, 2004, 2005; Barkan, McNulty, and Ayeni 1991; Institute of Development Studies 2001; McGaffey 1992; Okotoni and Akinola 1996; Olowu, Ayo, and Akande 1991; Olowu and Erero 1997; Smock 1971). Many African societies support a vibrant associational life (Hyden 2006), in which community institutions deliver goods and services better than state-run institutions do. Similarly, indigenous structures of governance in communities across Nigeria help people order their lives and solve their problems (Ayo 2002). The success and achievement of CDAs traverse cultural, linguistic, and national boundaries. As an institution, a CDA is gender-neutral (Awotona and Akinola 1996), a universal key to grassroots development, adopted by decentralized democratic systems of governance in developed societies:
In contrast to the general weakness of formal local governments, many informal governance initiatives have developed in Africa, and been quite active in performingwhat are usually the functions of formal local governments, especially in delivering social services, providing policing, and engaging in economic development / income-enhancing activities. (Wunsch 2008)

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These institutions play important roles in socioeconomic development. The self-governing propensities and capabilities of institutional arrangements evolved directly by the people are indispensable for harnessing community potentials to achieve self-reliance and improved governance. The decentralization of governance to the level of local government has not enhanced self-governing capabilities of the people at grassroots levels (Wunsch and Olowu 1995); besides, there is a growing awareness of the need to strengthen community institutions that have facilitated self-reliant development at local levels. Self-governing institutions in oil communities of Nigeria exist at the grassroots without official connection with state-based institutions. They operate in parallel with governments, their agencies (oil commissions), and oil companies. Under ideal circumstances, these people-oriented institutions, governments, and oil companies would operate together as stakeholders in development and as colleagues with equal standing within socioeconomic and political arenas; however, they have not done so: governments and oil companies dominate the decision-making arena and decide for people who have a well established structure of self-governance in their respective communities. Consequently, decisions and policies are at variance with the realities. This is a factor that has accounted for unresolved crises in the oil-

producing communities. For instance, several federally established commissions and agencies have relied on a centralized system of governance, which excludes the grassroots from making decisions. Hitherto, emphasis has been on physical capital at the expense of social capital and people-oriented institutions. Since 1999, especially after the inception Nigerias nascent democracy (in that year), the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, the Niger Delta Development Commission, and oil companies have been focusing their attentions on infrastructure: roads, electricity, health facilities, water supply, and training and vocational programs in the oil communities. They have spent a lot of money on these projects, but with little local impact; hence, problems in the region have accumulated and worsened. An important factor that accounts for the negligible impact of officials operations in the region is corruption, which may be difficult to address until appropriate institutional arrangements are put in place. Over the years, several initiatives have been established for the oil region, initiatives such as the Oil Mineral Areas Development Commission, the Niger Delta Development Board, the River Basin Development Authority, the Presidential Task Force on Niger Delta Development, the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission, and the Niger-Delta Development Commissionnone of which has left an enduring legacy. Despite these federally authorized programs and commissions, the residents of oil-producing communities still have unfulfilled hopes and aspirations. Oil money is allegedly stolen and plundered by Nigerian leaders at all levels of government, or by their agencies. For instance, the European Union (EU) representative, Richard Gozney, part of the EU fact-finding mission to Rivers State, stated that:
circumstances surrounding the spending attitudes of government at all levels in the country (Nigeria), especially in the Niger-Delta states, and the recent windfall in the global oil market indicated that the country was rich. (Nigerian Tribune, 26 October 2004, p. 3)

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The level of pillage and plundering of public resources is not limited to oil communities; it is emblematic of the corruption pervading Nigerias larger society. The picture was captured by the IMF and World Bank when they described Nigeria as a country where oil wealth has not benefited its populace (Vanguard, 12 August 2003, p. 1). In the same manner, a report by Human Rights Watch asserts: Much greater sums of money are flowing from the Federal Government to the Delta region but ordinary people living in the Delta see little, if any, benefit from these funds (2003, p. 37). What puzzles analysts and observers is that while some groups are agitating for more resources to be allocated to the region, some elitesmostly government officialsare embezzling the money. An important missing element in the conduct of public affairs in the region by the governments, oil companies, and other agencies is the

involvement of self-governing people-oriented institutions. Consequently, the misuse of public resources, corruption, and low accountability of government officials in the region continues. The marginalized people of oilproducing communitieswhose poverty rate (measured as the share of the population subsisting on less than $1 per day) increased from close to 36 percent in 1970 to just less than 70 percent in 2000have not received benefits from oil-windfall revenues, estimated cumulatively to total US$350 billion (Ogon 2005). Governments and their agencies have been unable to respond to the needs and aspirations of the people because of a centralized system of governance, but the local people in oil communities have responded to their common challenges through shared strategies and problem-solving interdependencies. They rely on rules in use1 to regulate their conduct and interaction toward the provision of social services. Public-choice scholars may well ask what role culture plays in collective action and self-governing arrangements in oil communities of Nigeria: what kinds of incentives can promote cooperation and self-governing arrangements? If constitutional choice structures human relationships in some fundamental sense, how can constitutional institutions influence cooperation, collective action, and self-governing arrangements in oil communities of Nigeria? This paper attempts to answer some of these questions using empirical analysis of how communities are self-organized to produce social services that can sustain peoples livelihoods.

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Research Methodology
Oil communities in Nigeria comprise nine states: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and River States. Six of these states form the area commonly called the Niger Delta; the remaining three (Abia, Imo, and Ondo) do not belong to the Niger Delta region, but are called oilproducing states. In the Niger Delta area live members of several minority tribes, such as the Ijaws (mostly in the riverine area), the Ilaje, the Itsekiri, the Urhobo, and others. In this paper, for the purpose of uniformity, all nine states are called oil-producing states, and the communities where oil is extracted are called oil communities. In the course of generating data for this paper, seven local government areas (LGAs) from three of the oil-producing states were surveyed between 2003 and 2004. Between June and September 2003, data were collected from three oil-producing states: Bayelsa, Ondo, and Rivers. Similar data were collected between October and November 2004 from Gokana, Khana, and Tai LGAs, Rivers State; Brass, Sagbama, and Yenegoa LGAs in Bayelsa State; and Ilaje LGA in Ondo State. At the community level, data were collected from seven community-based associations across the seven local governments. Under these associations were several associations, and data were collected on twenty-three2 of them at the community level.

Community leaders and leaders of community development associations (CDAs) were interviewed using an interview guide to ascertain the degree of social-services provision by these associations, particularly on how decisions are made, priorities determined, projects executed, and so on. Data were collected on the resource-mobilization strategies of the selected associations and the cost the associations expended on community projects, including roads, bridges, water supply, education, and health. Data on the amount of money spent on these projects were collected from all the associations covered during the survey: for space considerations, the information is merely summarized here; however, to demonstrate certain operational strategies, detailed analysis on some of these associations is presented. Financial statistics were collected from local government officials to determine the contributions of local governments to social-service development at the grassroots. Similarly, financial statistics were extracted from official documents in the office of the Accountant General of the Federation in Abuja (The Federal Capital Territory) to determine the amount of money transferred from the central government to the local government councils in the oil region.

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Self-Governing Institutions in Oil Communities of Nigeria

Self-governing institutions (SGIs), otherwise known as community-based institutions, can be classified into two broad categories in the oil communities: indigenous and endogenous. Indigenous SGIs are a legacy of precolonial experiences, and endogenous SGIs are a postindependence development, one that grew or arose from indigenous contexts to address modern-day challenges. Western influence, particularly education and religion, has undoubtedly shaped them, but they take their inspiration from indigenous settings, and they have emerged in response to present-day realities. They are not exogenous in any respect, but were merely influenced by Western culture. Detailed histories of them can be found elsewhere (Adedeji and Onigu 1997). Though these institutions exhibit variation in their origin, they share common experiences in their community-development operations. Before the advent of British government, the people of Niger Delta and the Ibos in Abia and Imo states had operated an egalitarian system, which had enabled these societies to be self-governing. Similarly, oil communities in Ondo State (the Ilaje part of Yorubaland) had a self-regulating system of governance before the colonial invasion. In the first group (indigenous institutions) are traditional institutions, community-development associations (CDAs) or town-development unions (TDUs), age-grade societies, trade groups (e.g., fishermens associations, blacksmiths associations, market-womens associations). The second group (endogenous institutions) comprises the local branches of the Nigeria Union of Road Transport Workers; commercial motorcycle operators associations; social groups like Lions, Rotary, and Alfa clubs; carpenters associations; bricklayers associations; factional groups; ethnic militias; and so on.

Two examples of self-governing community-based institutions discussed in this paper are CDAs, and TDUs, and age-grade societiesinstitutions that mobilize people and their material resources for community projects. Many function as a nonpartisan umbrella for rallying community members to address common problems. An age-grade association is organized along gender and age lines, while a CDA is gender-neutral and age-neutral. CDAs, TDUs, and age-grade societies at the grassroots level perform several functions, including (a) infrastructural development of the village or community; (b) settlement of individual and intervillage disputes; (c) promotion of community relations; (d) maintenance of sociocultural functions; and (e) overall local governance of the community, including the formulation and execution of policies and laws. CDAs and TDUs (or village-development committees) are found in every community, town, and village. Their officers are elected by members through an open ballot system during annual meetings. The offices consist of chairman or president, vice chairman or vice president, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer, financial secretary, public-relations officer, and auditor. Officers hold office for between two and five years, depending on each institutions constitution. Some of these institutions have written constitutions, but others depend on oral methods. Oral constitutions are very common and useful, because they are usually crafted and amended through a community assembly that benefits from participation by members endowed with sharp memories. Each age grade is social, but has political implications, as its functions make the structures and processes of indigenous government diffuse to involve everybody. Even children are not left out, as they watch their parents and elders legislate and judge cases in the town hall. Similarly, kindred or kinship associations occur throughout the region, as do councils of elders, which are also sociopolitical organizations. Membership in such organizations is a mark of identity and belonging. An age-grade organization operates more or less as a mass party with features of essentially compulsory membership and participation in local community work. Because such associations are made up of hometown citizens, members living outside the community are expected to participate in local affairs and development by sending monetary contributions. All the people participate in the conduct of their own affairs through free discussion, and they act as the final arbiters in processes directed by elders, who seek the opinion of their executive assistants, the age-group leaders, and make their own investigations into particular aspects of the towns government, administration, and welfare. Generally, age grades, in healthy competition, undertake specific projects, such as constructing wooden bridges, culverts, and new roads, and building village or community halls and squares. Decisions taken at the community level easily pass down to all members of the community through the local associations that constitute communication channels. In the light of this, three key factors are central to self-governance: the democratic conditions underpinning self-governance; resource mobilization

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and public accountability; and the contributions of CDAs vis--vis those of local governments.

Democratic Conditions in Self-Governing Institutions in Oil Communities

The organizational structure and management of self-governing institutions in the region is unique. The configuration of relationships that bind the people together in these institutions is cultural value, which plays an important role in the operational performance of the institutions. In spite of socioeconomic deprivation, the people of Niger Delta still demonstrate commitment to the development of their communities. What could have accounted for this? The reason may not be unconnected with their culture. Their contact with Western culture notwithstanding, they still rely on precolonial traditions and experiences of social organization and cooperation. An important aspect of this culture is a system of trust and reciprocity, one that sustains peoples cooperation. People with a good track record easily secure popular confidence in daily interactions. This has tremendously helped these community institutions build and sustain trusted institutional arrangements. Consequently, these arrangements serve as incentives for leadership in these institutions in rallying their members around community decisions and projects to combat challenges of daily life where government efforts have faltered. The intervention of Western influence on local culture tends to weaken the culture, especially among the urban-based people of Niger Delta, but the people have resorted to utilizing certain elements of their culture, such as naming and burial ceremonies and rotatory funds (financial assistance) to strengthen their culture and secure popular loyalty. For instance, a person who defaults in payment of a community contribution and levy is considered a free-rider. Such a person will find it difficult to get his people to attend his naming ceremony or a family burial ceremony, or to secure funding for business assistance. To the people of Niger Delta, these ceremonies and events are vital. To be deserted by ones people in such occasions would signify societal stigma and disgrace to the entire family and relations. As expected, these cultural values have tended to secure and reinforce compliance and the cooperation of community members toward community tasks and at the same time reduce free-riding. This cultural factor, invariably, has generated and strengthened patriotic attitudes that the local people in self-governing institutions have demonstrated. For example, in the mid-1980s, Oza-Ngogo community of Ika South LGA of Delta State, having been disappointed by a councilor who promised to provide a borehole for the community, decided to raise money and construct a borehole through self-efforts. The success of this project spurred the community into actions in the early 1990s and provided electricity to the community through self-organizing arrangements without assistance from government. Another important aspect of local culture is courtesy. Once a decision is taken and supported by the elders, community members abide by it. This is because they respect their elders, community

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leaders, and leaders of community institutions, especially those with good track records. This, however, does not mean that such elders or leaders are immune from sanctions, if and when they err. The case of the four Ogoni chiefs lynched for their perceived collaboration with Shell and Nigerias military government proves that political consciousness is gaining ascendancy over traditional power that oppresses the people. Generally in the oil region, communities are organized into compounds, with compound heads responsible to the community leader or paramount chief. At the same time, the executives of all the self-governing institutions, though independent of the community leader or paramount chief, respect the community leader or paramount chief. Community development is usually addressed by the local CDA. The whole community is headed by the community leader with his council of elders, and the CDAs operations are directed by its executives. The CDA operates by dividing the community into wards or quarters, from which representatives meet with the central executives of the association. Each ward or quarter is composed of compounds, and each compound in turn comprises households or families. At the same time, age-grade societies, womens associations, and so on are all connected to the traditional and CDA or TDU structures. In this form, information is passed to the people through interactive links among institutions and associations.

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Resource Mobilization and Public Accountability in Oil Communities

Resource mobilization is not an easy task in any society. The Niger-Delta people depend on their cultural values to harness resources from their sons and daughters, whether at home or abroad. Families constitute the units of contribution within each ward. At the community level, once a project is decided upon, the money for it will be allocated on the basis of the number of the families in each quarter or ward. Each quarter-representative will go back to his quarter and divide the monetary commitments on the basis of the number of compounds in the quarter. The compound representatives (not compound heads) will then mobilize the money according to the number of adults in that compound. Through family heads, financial contributions of family members outside the community are collected. At times, a progenitor pays the money on behalf of his children (to be collected from them later), or he may send for the children. In most cases, people at home pool their labor during construction of projects to reduce the cost of the projects, at least, in financial terms. A familiar code of social justice is applied, and there is prudent management of public matters and financial accounts when one considers the impact of mobilized resources (as is shown later in this paper). The moral pressure surrounding the public expectation of prudent spending of public resources is a living source of public accountability. Embezzlement is rare because of the social stigma it attracts; when it occurs, however, the culprit is made to refund the money and fined or suspended, or has his property

confiscated and sold to recover the funds. Nevertheless, the CDAs and TDUs did not accomplish their goals and objectives without employing sanctions on defaulting members. Sanctions vary from community to community: in some communities in Rivers State, for example, defaulters household materials are removed and put outside the house. Because of the common problems that unite them, it is rare to find somebody who would not want to pay except in adverse circumstances, like sickness, loss of property, and so on. Most people pay their dues. Another factor that enhances the achievement of these institutions is lineage consciousness. All people want to protect their fathers names by paying the appropriate amount. Individuals are usually tasked according to their status to contribute some amount of money: wealthy people are asked for larger donations. Above all, launching is organized and funds are raised for specific projects. Unlike governments, these institutions are not in the habit of securing loans from banks or other financial institutions. Although local governments also contribute money, their percentage contribution is small in comparison with their regular monthly allocation from the federal government, as shown in the last column of table 1.

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Socioeconomic Activities of Self-Governing Institutions in Oil Communities

Table 1 shows that the selected institutions have initiated and provided public goods and services worth more than 83 million, an amount that constituted 77.4 percent of 107.3 million, the total cost of the projects. The local governments in the selected communities contributed 24.2 million, which accounts for 22.6 percent of the total money spent on the same projects. Eight pipe-borne water projects in Nonwa Tai community in Tai Local Government were initiated and executed by the Gbogbara Development Association in 1994. In 1999, the number of mono-pump projects at strategic places in the community was increased to 55. Consequently, the social impact is immeasurable, as deaths caused by pollution of stream water from the activities of the oil companies is drastically reduced through the efforts of these self-governing institutions. Similarly, the healthcare project in Tai LGA between 1994 and 1995 was initiated by the women, popularly known as Kawas Forum. It was a three-year plan, at an estimated cost of 5.0 million. Initially, a launching was conducted, and 531,000 was realized from within the community and the local government. The breakdown of the contributions is as follows: youths, 15,000; men, 95,000; women, 205,000; elders, 64,000; chiefs, 52,000; and the local government, 100,000. The total contributions were 5,332,435 (see table 2), which exceeded the projected amount of 5.0 million by 332,435. Inflation did not permit the construction of the five planned bungalows, but three bungalows, each having eight rooms, were completed. The cottage maternity clinic now serves the purposes of child delivery and primary healthcare service in the LGA.

Table 1: The Activities of Self-Governing Institutions (SGIs) in Oil Communities.

S/N Self-Governing Institution 1 SGIs in Gokana and Khana LGAs, Rivers State SGIs in Tai LGA, Rivers State SGIs in Yenegoa, Sagbama and Brass LGAs in Bayelsa State SGIs in Ilaje LGA in Ondo State Projects Executed Contribution by SGI Roads, bridge, water supply, health, and market Water supply, health, bridge, and market Contribution Allocation by LG to LG (June 2002)

35.3 million 12.9 million 29.9 (73.2%) (26.8%) million

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21.8 million 4.1 million (82.15%) (17.85%)

29.9 million 32.9 million

Water supply, 18.5 million 4.0 million bridge, transport, (82.2%) (17.8%) education and health Town hall, 7.5 million water, transport, (70.0%) education and market 83.05 (77.4%) 3.2 million (30.0%)

30.1 million

Total/Average

24.21 (22.6%)

30.7 million

Source: Survey, 20032004 and Office of the Accountant-General of the Federation, Abuja. Note: While LGA (local government area) is a geographical coverage of a government at the local level, LG (local government) is a government at the local level.

The census of 1992 ranked Bunu Tai, a community of 25,000 people in Tai LGA, as the largest community in Tai LGA. In spite of the population density and the landmass, the community had no electricity, no pipe-borne water, and not even a maternity home. Though these social amenities were important for the people, their priority was the construction of a bridge to connect the community with its farms and ports. Several efforts had been made to get the government construct a bridge, but to no avail. When all hopes appeared to have failed, several community-development associations in the LGA resolved to shoulder the responsibility of generating funds for the construction of the bridge. Table 3 shows the details of the money contributed by the people through CDAs in the community. Between 1994 and 1998, the five CDAs (Gboko, Gbomene, Piatam, Waaadam and Yugudam) in the community contributed 11,243,874.00, which accounted for 91.8 percent of the cost of the project, while the percentage contribution by the local government was considerably low (8.2 percent). The project was awarded to Gininwa and Sons, Ltd., at the cost of 11,450,320.00, and was completed on 8 May 1998, within the expected time, largely because the project was monitored by these institutions. At the time of survey, the road was motorable, and it has greatly increased

Table 2: Kawas Annual Contribution toward Maternity Home in Naira (19941996).

Year 1994 1995 1996 Total/Average Kawas contribution Kawas % Local Govt. LGAs % 413,500 520,420 2,417,250 3,351,170 77.5% 61.9% 61% 62.8% 120,000 320,950 1,540,315 1,981,265 22.4% 38.1% 38.9% 37.2% Total 533,500 841,370 3,957,565 5,332,435

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Source: Local Government Annual Report, July 1999, Saakpenwa, River State.

Table 3: The Money Contributed by Bunu Tai CDAs in Tai LGA in Naira.
Years Yugudam Waadam Dev. Dev. Assn.* Assn. 175,000 165,000 495,250 1,205,250 805,485 205,000 450,415 785,450 415,850 320,680 Gboko Dev. Assn. 305,195 345,702 905,745 175,820 650,415 Piatam Dev. Assn. 165,195 485,905 658,415 485,920 420,000 Gbomene Dev. Assn. 302,145 175,185 745,452 321,400 78,000 LGA Total

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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total

500,000 75,000 205,000 135,000 95,000

1,652,535 1,697,207 3,795,312 2,739,240 2,369,580

2,845,985 2,177,395 2,382,877 2,215,435 1,622,182 1,010,000 12,253,874 All Associations = 11,243,874 (91.8%) 8.2%

Source: Local government annual report, July 1999, Saakpenwa, River State. *Dev. Assn. = Development Association.

the rate of production, enhancing the local standard of living. This type of accomplishment is rare among officials, whether government or oil multinational companies in the Niger Delta. The activities of community-based institutions in Bayelsa State (19751986) parallel the activities in Rivers State. The five associations (Yenegoa CDA in Yenegoa LGA, Kuma Youth Association in Kolo Kuma LGA, Fisherman Association in South Ijaw LGA, Sagba Elele Association in Sagbama LGA, and Local Professional Association in Brass LGA) like their counterparts in other Niger Delta communities, focused on the water supply, a bridge, water transport, education, and health. The summary shows that the contributions of these institutions in Bayelsa accounted for 82.2 percent, while that of the LGs was 17.8 percent, confirming that grassroots people represent the prime mover of socioeconomic development at the community level. The same pattern exists across all the selected oil communities in the Niger Delta region, as shown in table 1. Analysis confirms that from time to time, these communities organize themselves into cooperative and social groups that undertake different community based projects such as the manual grading of earth-surface roads, the hiring and payment of casual health workers for the community

and dispensary centers, and the building of bus-stops or sheds at strategic points of the community. Age-grade activities in Aduku community in Sagbama LGA of Bayelsa State provide a vivid operation of self-organized community in the Niger Delta. Each age gradeyoung children, youth, women, adult, the agedis organized under a distinctive leadership for a specific aspect of community development. Adult men handle tasks such as roads, culverts, and bridges, which require manual labor; women take care of market maintenance; and girls between the ages of 8 and 15 years are in charge of environmental sanitation. Hunters take care of security. The type of media used at the community level is the beating of a drum or a gong (depending on the age grade or task at hand) to call community members together for a meeting in the market or town hall. This medium is otherwise used to assemble a designated category of age grade for a particular assignmentfor example, to remind a group of vigilantes the time to report for duty or the general community for community project. This system of mass media seems to be crude, but it works. It is not the sophistication of a particular method that matters, but its effectiveness, durability, and sustainability. By this, everyone is kept abreast of the news, instructions, or advice designed for the local people. Girls in Aduku community perform the task of environmental sanitation on a daily basis. The leader, who normally wakes up her colleagues as early as six oclock on weekdays and seven oclock on weekends, moves from street to street or house to house as the case may be, and gathers other girls with a gong at the community square, where the assignment will be distributed. On weekdays, they sweep the streets in the community before they go to school; they attend to shrubs and grasses on Saturdays. This pattern suggests that right from their early years in life, these girls have imbibed the culture of sacrifice, community attachment, patriotism, and for some of them, leadership. The discussions so far confirm that self-organizing and self-governing institutions have positively affected grassroots development in the oil region. The sampled local governments that received an average of 30.7 million per month from the federal government performed less than expectation in terms of service provision for the people at the grassroots in oil communities. Since 2002, Nigerian local government managers have demanded an upward review of allocations due to them from the federal government, and this demand has yielded dividends, as the money released to the councils has increased by considerably more than 200 percent. Consequently, the local governments received an average 71.4 million in 2004 (The News, vol. 23, no. 11, Sept. 2004, pp. 2236) and 83.8 million per month in 2005 (Tell, no. 42, 17 October 2005, pp. 2944). In spite of the increase in revenues that the local governments have received, common hopes and aspirations in oil communities remain a mirage. This situation confirms what several observers and analysts have identified as the major source of the rising waves of militancy and insecurity in the region.

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The above analyses show that a mass mobilization strategy provides answers to most local development questions that the state has been dodging. Rather than waiting for the local government authorities that are closest to them (and with a lot of money), the local people in oil-producing communities, through self-organizing and self-governing activities, have planned and executed essential social services. All these groups see the need to address their common problems in their localities. It is only at this level of resources that achievements have been realized. This is the doctrine of polycentricity, which provides alternative strategies to address problems of daily existence at the grassroots level in the face of dismal and appalling performance of state institutions. The lesson we can learn from these institutions is how they mobilize and use resources for providing social services. Local governments and other higher levels of governments have access to greater resources, but they have left no significant impact on the peoples lives. The concern is that if these institutions are so accountable to their members, we should begin to conceptualize how they can be used to reconstitute order from the bottom and to serve as alternatives to the modern state institutions. To democratize social relations in the-oil producing communities, two tasks need be accomplished: (1) building on the existing self-governing structures, and (2) improvement on public accountability in the region. The federal government and other tiers of government with oil companies should establish appropriate interinstitutional relations with existing self-governing institutions in the oil region. Self-governing arrangements, inward looking and capable of bridging the gaps between Nigerian leaders and the people of oil communities, should be brought into the decisionmaking mainstream. The involvement of self-governing institutions in making local decisions would enable local government projects to reflect the peoples yearnings and aspirations. In the light of the above, it is clear that the social disparities among the Nigerian state, its oil partners, and the oil communities can be addressed if a new institutional arrangement, one capable of bringing all the stakeholders together for regular discussions and decisions, is designed and implemented. Such an arrangement should regard the existing self-organizing and selfgoverning arrangements that have proved effective as building blocks for reconstituting order from the bottom up. The self-governing institutions can act as checks and balances on the local government officials. Much might be made of community-level government, both to enhance voice and to improve local governance. When representatives of groups and associations (including warring factions) can meet with officials of governments and oil companies, discuss their common problems, and craft working rules together, a shared community of understanding will be established. Interactions between the governments, oil companies and self-governing institutions will eventually produce people-oriented working relations. To benefit the people, governance has to proceed from the people and be guided by them, and they should be able

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to modify the governing institutions as their situations change. If Nigeria wants to address the problem of infrastructural deprivation, corruption, and poverty in the oil communities, it needs to learn how to make efficient use of her physical, human, and institutional resources. Experiences of community-based institutions in oil communities through self-organizing and self-governing capabilities in meeting common challenges in the delivery of common goods and social services need to be taken into consideration in policy formulation in the region.

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Conclusion
Residents of the oil communities of the Niger Delta have responded to social deprivation by reviving traditions that embrace collective action. Through self-governing arrangements, they have achieved a fair level of success in providing social services, showing that self-organizing and self-governing institutions have positively affected development at the grassroots level there. Most people of the oil communities are not benefiting from funds allocated to the local governmentsindicating that the problem of corruption and low public morality among the government officials remains. The adoption of self-governing arrangements in the oil-producing region, whereby existing self-governing institutions will form decisionmaking consortiums, monitor financial and material resources allocated to their communities by government, and resolve issues through self-governing capabilities, may be able to provide lasting solutions to the problems of social deprivation in the region.

Acknowledgement The efforts of the following people are acknowledged for collection of the data: Nkorba Emmanuel, Oke Bojuwomi, Irowainu Raphael, Sakpere Randy, Ovia Ebikaboere, and Omoregbe Nicholas.

Notes
1. Rules in use are rules or prescriptions crafted by the people to order their interactions without input from government or other external agencies. Such rules are, however, not necessarily written. 2. The associations on which data were collected are Bori Youth Association and Bori Development Association, Kono Women association and Kono Youth Association, Bomu/Lewe Town council of Elders, and Kaani/Sogho Cherubum and Seraphim Association in Khana LGA of Rivers State; Deken Town council of Elders, Deken Urban Worker Association, and the Bodo/ Port-Harcourt Worker Association of Gokana LGA of Rivers State; the Gbogbara Development

Association in Nonwa and Kawas Forum in Tai LGA, Rivers State; the Yugudam Development Association, the Waadam Development Association, the Gboko Development Association, the Piatam Development Association, and the Gbomene Development Association of Bunu Tai Community in Tai LGA of Rivers State; Gio-Kpoghor and the Ogu Community Development Association of Tai LGA of Rivers State; the Yenegoa Community Development Association, the Yenegoa LGA, the Kuma Youth Association, the Kolo Kuma LGA, the Fisherman Association, the South Ijaw LGA, the Sagba Elele Association, the Sagbama LGA, the Local Professional Association, and the Brass LGA. of Bayelsa State; and the umbrella Ilaje Development Association in Ilaje LGA of Ondo State.

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