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How Reagan Strategy Brutalised and Extremised Afghanistan and Pakistan Agha H Amin

The Quranic Concept of War was a book officially sponsored by President Reagans most trusted ally General Zia of Pakistan.It was introduced as a study book in command and staff college quetta pakistan.Much more dangerous than this book were the University of Nebraska pamphlets printed in billions and distributed in pakistan and afghanistan ,glorifying explosives and martrydom.Thus a region where a Hippy could travel from Herat to Kandahar and Kabul to Mazar was brutalised and extremised ? I remembers this from my 1970 family visit to Kabul.
How Afghanistan was Destroyed by USA, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan Agha H Amin

i travelled in 1970 by road from quetta to kabul to meet my relatives with my family . people were friendly , hippies from america and europe camped anywhere without fear .people kept them in their houses. no one attacked anyone. all this craziness started after pakistanis , americans , saudis fuck___ng with mujahids . University of Nebraska printed pamphlets in pashto about explosives as ornament of men. http://natural-beauty-pavocavalry.blogspot.com/2012/12/the-pashtuns-in-history-aghahamin.html the problem with pakistan and ahmad shah masud started when he was told to destroy salaang tunnel and he refused . salaang you know is life artery of afghanistan.

Wednesday, September 14, 2011

A Dark Winter in Afghanistan

Salang Pass

Saturday, December 22, 2012

The Pashtuns in History-Agha.H.Amin

22 March, 2011

The Pashtuns in History-Agha.H.Amin

The Pashtuns


Let the pictures speak as the first part of this summing up of a sad chapter of history !

When I started preparing for my first major bid in Afghanistan " Naghlu-Kabul" Electric transmission line I went for pre bid survey on Kabul Lataband Road.The locals all Pashtuns told us that they were paid 100 USD per tower for destroying a pylon in Soviet Afghan War !

Extremism is a very Pakistani export to all neighbouring countries.

Off course the US was also a monster in this situation as were the Pakistanis who were the US vassals.In course of my 8 years in Afghanistan I discovered that major damage of Afghan war was in Pashtun belt as it was closer to Pakistan and it was easier to logistically support the characters destroying pylons.

As I travelled north I discovered that the north was literally undamaged as it was farther away from Pakistan ! I leave it for experts in Pashtun history to judge whether Pashtun area was damaged in order to keep Pashtuns backward or it was a coincidence ! It would be wrong to brand a Pashtun as a born lunatic !

The greatest poets in the sub continent starting from Nawab Shefta Khan Bangash ,Josh Malihabadi Afridi Akhtar Sheerani and Ahmad Faraz were Pashtuns ! Indeed the most progressive Afghans and Pakistanis have been Pashtuns ! Without Aslam Watanjar the indomitable Paktiawal or without Said Gulabozai the Saur Revolution may have totally failed in Afghanistan ! My dear Zazi lady friend from Khost smoke the maximum joints and drank more vodka than any man that I met in Afghanistan and preferred being intimate with the curtains open ! It would be correct to term Pashtuns as victims of geography , of being divided in two states , being regarded as a political threat by non Pashtuns in both Pakistan and Afghanistan ! Being more adventurous and brave than any race in the region , thanks to geography , historical circumstances and I hate to say some racial factors ! The Pashtuns were thus regarded as cannon fodder by Iranians, Mughals,Turks ,Sikhs ,British and Pakistanis and a useful reason to remain in Afghyanistan by the USA !

When the German Kaiser wanted a revolt against British in India the only ones who cameto rise in revolt were thetribal Pashtuns !
A Pashtun tribe Afridi is the only tribe in history where the British Emperor awarded a Victoria Cross to one cousin and the German Kaiser the Iron Cross to the other cousin ! Both fighting in the same area !

The Mughals imported Iranians against Pashtuns and were ultimately betrayed by the Irianians when the Marathas and Nadir Shah attackedthe Mughals. The backbone of Nadir Shahs armys were the Abdali Pashtuns ! The best Mughal army soldiers apart from Uzbeks were Pashtuns ! Yet this race was regarded by fear and apprehension and throughout history used to fight proxy wars ! Just because it was though politically dangerous that they remained free and grew politically and economically !

There is no denying that a Pashtun is formidable in any role ,be it a leftist Khalqi or a Taliban ! This is so because he is brought up to be totally committed to an idea that he believes in ! This may be an anthropological or sociological explanation ! A Safi or a Zadran or a Kharoti is formidable reagrdless of the fact that he is Rahmatullah Safi with the ISI or a Watanjar who was a die hard leftist or a Gulabozai who was Afghanistans best Interior Minister and yet polled the highest number of votes from Khost in 2005 Elections. My friend a pro Pakistan Pashtun to the core heading an ISI sector confessed that even the best dogs used in dog fight are bred in Pashtun areas ! It may be ironically symbolic but true. My personal observations indicate that the Pashtuns were regarded as cannon fodder to be used in Kashmir and Afghanistan by the Pakistani establishment . Thus ironically while the most progressive section in Afghan socoety were Pashtun Khalqis without whom there would have been no leftist coup in Afghanistan ,the Pashtuns suffered the most in Afghan war and the non Pashtuns gained the most , politically and economically !

Demography is cruel ! It is devastating and Pakistans demography is changing ! Karachi is the largest Pashtun city in the world and we are at a watershed when Pashtuns may not be manipulated any longer the way they have been manipulated in the past ! As they say the wheel turns in history !

-A.H Amin

Deliberate Attacks on Iconic Women initiated by Pakistani,Saudi US sponsored Mujahideen in Soviet Afghan War
Deliberate Attacks on Iconic Women initiated by Pakistani,Saudi US sponsored Mujahideen in Soviet Afghan War
Agha H Amin Our memories are short and we are being fooled by the so called advanced states in the name of Malala. The first attacks on women in name of ideology were started by the so called Afghan Mujahideen tutored by Pakistani state with moral and material support of the US , Saudi Arabia,UK. At the bottom was lust for dollars which defined Pakistans Afghan policy and Pakistani state benefitted from both Afghan Wars the first 1978-92 and the second 2001-2013 .Generals who could not afford a car battery became billionaires.



My dear friend and relative Jagran Zakir a Safi Pashtun trained at Riga Police Academy remembers travelling in an Antonov with Naghma from Kabul to Mazar Sharif and fondly remembered how Naghma ravished Stolichnaya and chain smoked top quality Afghan Hashish .

Zakir prepares a joint as we celebrate Nowroz 2008,in the middle is Afghan Intelligence Major trained at Tashkeny Intelligence school.He was unfortunately dismissed as part of the Mujahideen dominated Afghan Intelligence after 2001

a puff near Khost,despite Pakistani and US propaganda the leftist Interior Minister Said Gulabozai got the maximum votes from Khost in Afghan elections


I remember driving to Okara in a Volkswagon in 1978 to meet Major General Mirza Aslam Baig a family friend .The road was so bad that the Volkswagons shocks were literally broken into non existence.The Pakistani state did not have the money to even repair the road connecting two main towns of Lahore and Multan.

MY CAT SHAREEF IN SAFE HANDS OF A TIGRESS Female singers played a crucial role in Soviet Afghan War.Said Gulabozai the indomitable Afghan Interior Minister organised a cultural troupe in Ministry of Interior.The aim was to raise morale of the DRA armed forces and Sarandoy ? The troop included Naghma,Wajeeha,Parastoo and many more. Gulabozai is the man who created Sarandoy , the Ministry of Interior troops who bore the brunt of Afghan war. Gulabozai was financially honest and no one can state that he ate eben a penny ? He did not have even his own car or a house and was given a house in Old Makroyan ? Gulabozai led from the front.His morning started with brisk jogging rounds of Ministry of Interior. He had a healthy taste for women and thoroughly enjoyed the cultural troupe.

The women under the DRA regime were an enlightened lot who enjoyed smoking Hashish and Stlichnaya Vodka ? It was the US/Saudi/Pakistani/UK sponsored Afghan war that pushed the Afghans in general and Pashtuns in particular into the dark ages ? Afghanistan was the most peaceful state in Asia in 1970s when I first time drove with my father from Quetta to Kabul in 1970.Hippies from Americas and Europe could camp anywhere safely , even Kandahar and Helmand ? Bakht Zameen was a thorn in the eyes of many who wanted to destroy the only Pashtun state in the world ? Afghanistan ? Her fiery Pashto songs galvanised many and thus her cowardly murder by the so called Mujahideen .

Bakht Zamina

Bakht Zamina was a famous Afghan singer who performed in major Pashto music events in Kabul. She was famous for both folk and pop Afghan songs. Rumours are that Bakhtzamina was murdered by Islamic militants after she sang "Khejja pa Morcha Bande". Wikipedia

So many Afghans killed that Graveyards became Picnic Spots Afghan Nation was bombed and killed so much that Graveyards like Shuhada i Sualiheen became a place for Melas (Picnics)

My grandfathers brother was doctor with Nadir Shah and Zahir Shah

On US Pakistan Saudi Soviet Afghan War Propaganda

this is real assorted bull shit that i am reading. i personally knew Aslam Watanjar and know Sayed Gulabozai.

Gulabozai was known as one of the most outstanding and efficient ministers of interiors in afghan history. a pashtun from khost he was so popular that in 2005 he got the highest number of votes from Khost. an extremely honest man he did not have a single car in 2005 and lived in a modest state donated apartment in which his wife was killed from a rocket fired by US Pakistan Saudi sponsored Murd____ao paid mujahideen his reforms in police , his raising of sarandoy is still remembered in afghan police perhaps his one failing although excusable one was that he excessively L___d Naghma but that was Asmat Muslim Achakzais failing too Another popular man from leftist regime was General Ulumi , a Barakzai from Kandahar who was corps commander in Kandahar for almsot five years and got the second highest numbers of votes from Kanadahar despite rigging by Karzais brother in 2005 elections The leftists are still rememberd for many great reforms.

the best which most afghans remember is abolishing the infamus practice of charging bride money above all they empowered the minorities , a Hazara Keshtmand became prime minister , a Kasgmiri Karmal became president , Tajiks who were previously sweapers and puncture man only in pre 1978 afghan society were empowered with people like great poet Dastgir Panjsheri in lead note that the leftists led both mujahideen and talibans after 1996 with Parchamis being the real core of northern alliance and Mulla Borjan a Khalqi Pashtun officer the real leader of Taliban till he was killed by Pakistan sponsored Talibs near Sarobi.His grave is still there on the road there and I stop to say Fateha there......and after that we drink three doubles of stolichnaya vodka to remember him and today what do we have pakistani military killing the tribals just like the USSR was doing in 1978-92. the issue was not just religion or ideology but superpower rivalry the hard fact is that the pakistani state destroyed by design the only pashtun state in the world , afghanistan and is still doing so till today.

Agha H Amin

http://biographies-pavocavalry.blogspot.com/2013/07/pakistan-garrison-state-usbased-social.html Pakistan -Garrison State -US based social scientist Dr Helal Pasha Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed Great Scholar , Great Author , good friend I came to know Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed through e mail. It so happened that a very honourable and fine gentleman Brigadier Yasub Dogar who I knew through e mail gave Dr Ishtiaq my e mail address. Our friendship became very strong when Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed crossed swords with a brilliant lawyer who I held in very high esteem . I was deeply disappointed on Dr Ishtiaqs revelation that this brilliant lawyer regarded me as a nut and stupid man ? However no hard feelings as this is a common occurrence ! I remember in 1987 an officer of 10 FF my brigade unit borrowed my Pajero SUV to lay a

famous politician of Multans daughter ! However a very close friend in 10 FF told me that he regarded me as a nut and warned all 10 FF officers not to meet me as the then divisional commander of our division was against me ! These things happen in life. Myself and Dr Ishtiaq agreed on our iconoclastic views about Mr Jinnah . I found great intellectual inspiration in Dr Ishtiaqs writings. It was a great honour for me when Dr Ishtiaq interviewed me for his book . Oxford University had some reservations about interviewing me but Dr Ishtiaq brushed them aside . I was very glad that Dr Ishtiaq reproduced the great injustice that Admiral Sharif meted out to my friend Syed Zafar Abbas Bukhari in FPSC interview simply because Bukhari wrote that his favourite poet was Faiz Ahmad Faiz. Bukhari fought a legal battle and moved from postal group to police service and is a DIG in Karachi now. It is important that the injustices done to people in the Zia regime are brought tp light. Dr Ishtiaq has boldly done so . My best wishes for Dr Ishtiaqs future life and intellectual endeavours .

Brigadier Yasub Dogar played a crucial role in giving inputs on Dr Ishtiaqs book and Dr Ishtiaq was gracious and magnanimous to acknowledge Brigadier

Dogars contribution.

It was a great honour to meet Dr Ishtiaq visiting Pakistan from Sweden. He is a great scholar indeed and I consider myself lucky that I have the honour of being one of his friends. He was kind enough to interview me for his book. When he told me that he would meet me in Pakistan I bought a Grants Whiskey to celebrate , although Dr Ishtiaq does not drink !

Dear All, The reviews of my garrison state book are now picking momentum. The latest is by Dr Helal Pasha who lives and works in the United States. I find it extremely erudite even when he seems somewhat ambivalent about the description of Pakistan as a garrison state. In fact without the concept of the garrison state and the theory which I propose the book could be like any other well researched work. It is this conceptual and theoretical framework which I maintain makes possible the analysis which I proffer. I argue that whereas Harold Lasswell theorized that the garrison state would appear in an advanced-industrialized country I have demonstrated out that is possible if a third world state can link itself to such an economy by manipulating the tensions, contradictions and anarchy in international politics.

Apart from this important point on which we disagree, Dr Pasha's review is a welcome contribution in understanding my new book both in terms of its theoretical and empirical features. Best regards, Ishtiaq PhD (Stockholm University); Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Stockholm University; and Honorary Senior Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. Latest publications: Pakistan: The Garrison State, Origins, Evolution, Consequences (19472011), Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013; The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed: Unravelling the 1947 Tragedy through Secret British Reports and First-Person Accounts (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012; New Delhi: Rupa Books, 2011). He can be reached at: billumian@gmail.com Pakistan and Army "Pakistan: The Garrison State" deals with ever-expanding influence of the Pakistan army over political, social, and economic milieus in Pakistan since 1947 By Helal Pasha Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed's recent book "Pakistan: The Garrison State", published in 2013, by Oxford University Press, immediately after his seminal work "The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed" in 2011, is a remarkable achievement in terms of time spent on research, reviewing numerous sources, and analysing multiple events spread well over 70 years. His dedication in recording Pakistan's history and unearthing, previously unknown, undocumented events is laudable. Dr Ishtiaq travelled extensively, interviewed incredibly large number of people, including former president Gen. Musharraf, and many top India army officers. As the title suggests, the book principally deals with everexpanding influence of the Pakistan army over political, social, and economic milieus in Pakistan since 1947. In the last decade, luminaries such as Ambassador Husain Haqqani, Ayesha Siddiqa, Ahmed Rashid, and many others wrote books discussing the Pakistan army. Ayesha Siddiqa's Military Inc. stands out for her breakthrough research in

detailing the army's flourishing entrepreneurial endeavours and control of the economy. Ironically, the army is more or less openly involved in business and industry highlighting most of its enterprises by using prefix 'Fauji' (army man in vernacular) or 'Defense', and there is nothing secret about it. Siddiqa did not focus entirely on army's business interests. She veered off to itemising personal monetary benefits enjoyed by the generals. That triggered a backlash and an angry retort by the generals. Dr Ishtiaq takes a different route. He starts off by examining ideological inclination of the army. His inquisitiveness on the use of metaphor 'Fortress of Islam' by a former president in his speech, in 2001, ignited the urge to get to the core of such a haughty vow. The result is a phenomenal book that will make scholars' proud libraries richer, and readers immensely conversant with insight from the early development of the idea of Pakistan to a state incapable of untying the Gordian knot for the last several decades. "Pakistan is Islam's fortress," an arrogant declaration adopted by Pakistan army from an old Jamaat-e-Islami political slogan during the army rule in the 1980s. The army concomitantly embraced "Jihad, for Allah" as one of the armed forces guiding maxim around the same time. The book largely deals with the ideological progression translated into political dominance of the army over the country, as well. Primarily, due to the ideological mishmash of the independence movement, the Pakistan army catapulted itself as indubitable protector, and arbiter of the ideology of the nation after independence. Dr Ishtiaq seeks to decipher the origins of the concept garrison state that certainly is not a religious concept. The roots of garrison state are in the early human development along with the concepts of area boundaries and protection of communities.

The first question that needed to be resolved was: whether Pakistan is a garrison state or not? A dominating army does not make a garrison state. He has candidly pointed out, despite the ominous cries of military-industrial complex, US is not a garrison state. Many historian and defense analysts would not accept it kindly. The Pentagon's influence extends far beyond just the defense policy. There are many institutions including the largest eavesdropping organisation in the world, National Security Agency (NSA) that report to the Pentagon and information to the White House is filtered through the Pentagon. Pentagon usually overrides the US Foreign Office. Dr Ishtiaq rightly implies that the purpose of small forts or fortresses or cantonments now, was primarily to keep the populations under control. The British extended the concept when they organised the volunteer army in undivided India. Their patterns of recruitment solidified the Pakistan army's influence on certain areas of the country. Dr Ishtiaq then embarks upon a discussion assessing national security state and garrison state. He traces the roots, the reasons, the Mughal and the British influences that Pakistan inherited. He enforces his views using strong arguments by various academics. He concludes that Pakistan fits the profile of a garrison state. He observes that Pakistan can continue as a post-colonial garrison state as long as the donors are proving the required resources. At this point, the reader is left with only one answer: Pakistan will probably disappear as soon as the donors lose interest in Pakistan. Is that an accurate conclusion?

Dr Ishtiaq pronouncement appears to be rushed and needs further examination. Having cantonments, large army, and overbearing generals, does not qualify Pakistan to be billed as a garrison state. Considering that the garrisons are supposed to help in controlling the population and frontiers, Pakistan army's garrisons are located smack in the middle of the large cities that render them useless in their basic functions. Cantonments in Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Peshawar, Multan, Gujranwala, and many other cities do not intimidate the population. They are commercial hubs, and it would be better for the army to sell the prime lands, and use the proceeds to take the cantonments as far away from the cities as possible. Money from selling two cantonment Karachi and Hyderabad would finance almost ten new cantonments in rural areas. However, these cantonments are a major source of income for the army and former army personnel. Similar to the business interests that Ayesha Siddiqa pointed out in her book. The new breed of army officers and generals prefer to stay close to the cities, and personal comfort takes precedent over war readiness. The harsh reality is that looking at the current state of affairs, Pakistan might qualify as a dysfunctional national security state that is, paradoxically, incapable of supporting its security needs. The state acquired nuclear option, as the US looked the other way to maintain balance of power in the region. The US still provides finances for the maintenance of nuclear warheads. A garrison state or a security state; the Pakistan army still manages to control the country in many ways, and the distinction between the two does not diminish the quality of the book and effort that has gone in to documenting complex, controversial, and highly noticeable army position in Pakistan politics.

To be concluded Pakistan: The Garrison State Author: Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed Publisher: Oxford University Press Pages: 508 Price: Rs1,295 Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed is a Lahore born Swedish political scientist and author. He is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Stockholm University. Readers in India and Punjab enthusiastically welcomed his previous book "The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed". The book won him many laurels including 'Best Non-Fiction Book' Prize at Karachi Literary Festival in 2013.

The Prostitute and Her American Client-Pakistans Real Strategic Position Pakistan may get $1.18 bn in 48 hours Mehtab Haider Thursday, July 26, 2012 From Print Edition 6 1 4 0

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan will receive $1.18 billion from the US within the next 48 hours in the shape of reimbursement of expenditures incurred in the fight against the militants.A top

official of the Finance Division told The News late Wednesday night that Islamabad was expecting $1.18 billion inflow from the US on account of the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) either on Thursday or Friday. To a query regarding the rejection of $1.3 billion out of the total forwarded bills of $2.5 billion, the official said that the US had always reimbursed 60 to 65 percent of the total forwarded bills in the last 10 years but this ratio had gradually declined and had now come down to almost 50 percent reimbursement only.

Dear All, A superb review of my Garrison State book by a leading US-based political scientist professor Taj Hashmi has been published in the Daily Times. The one by Razi Azmi was good and competent but it missed some of the key n arguments that I had presented in the book.

Farooq Sulehria did an outstanding review recently in the Daily Times. Now a political scientist has written an exhaustive review in two instalments was was published on 16 and 17 July when I was in London.

Best regards, ishtiaq Daily Times, Tuesday, July 16, 2013 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\07\16\story_16-72013_pg3_5

PhD (Stockholm University); Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Stockholm University; and Honorary Senior Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. Latest publications: Pakistan: The Garrison State, Origins, Evolution, Consequences (19472011), Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013; The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed: Unravelling the 1947 Tragedy through Secret British Reports and First-Person Accounts (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012; New Delhi: Rupa Books, 2011). He can be reached at: billumian@gmail.com Book Review : Pakistan, a state within a state I By Taj Hashmi Book Review: Pakistan The Garrison State: Origins, Evolutions, Consequences, 1947-2011 Author: Ishtiaq Ahmed Publisher: Oxford University Press, Karachi; 2013 Ishtiaq Ahmed's latest book is another outstanding piece of

scholarship by an erudite scholar. This intellectually stimulating work is an important addition to the corpus of writings on modern and contemporary Pakistan, which by design and default has emerged as a 'Garrison State'. While Farzana Shaikh's Making Sense of Pakistan helps us understand why political Islam has become the most powerful political ideology and symbol of national identity in Pakistan, the volume under review makes us understand why the military is so preponderant, powerful and influential in the country, so much so that 'Garrison State' has become the right expression to describe the country. This wellwritten book is complementary to several recent publications on Pakistan, especially Husain Haqqani's Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military; Ayesha Siddiqa's Military Inc.; Ahmed Rashid's Pakistan on the Brink; Imtiaz Gul's The Most Dangerous Place; and last but not least, Anatol Lieven's Pakistan: A Hard Country. Ishtiaq Ahmed has quite convincingly proved his thesis that Pakistan's armed forces have virtually become the state, and the main custodian and proponent of political Islam, including ones championed by the Jamaat-e-Islami, Deobandi clerics, the Taliban and other Islamist extremists. The author reveals that thanks to the growing influence of army officers recruited during the Zia regime (1977-1988) the so-called 'Zia bhartis' (Zia recruits so far as the Pakistan Army is concerned, the so-called "folk-Islam" or liberal Sufi Islam of the Barelvi school of ulema has receded into the background. This informative and analytical work elucidates the following features of the Garrison State: a) how the Pakistani armed forces, especially the army, have established themselves not only as the defenders of the nation's borders (albeit purportedly, as they were instrumental in the disintegration of the country in 1971) but also of Islam, the state ideology, which seems to be in a constant state of 'danger' since 1947; and b) from time to time ever since the first military takeover in 1958, the armed forces invent new philosophies and policies that have been moulding the nation into a pre-modern civil-military

oligarchy. The author has rightly traced the roots of the Garrison State to the British occupation of the Punjab in 1849, and their subsequent reliance on the province as the 'sword arm' of the Empire till the end of the Raj. One finds beautiful narration and critical appraisal of the post-independence history of Pakistan in this volume with regard to the further entrenchment of the military in the body politic of the country. The author has shed new light on the old story as to how and why the bulk of Pakistanis often legitimise military rule, and consider the military the custodians of their freedom, dignity, and most importantly, of Islam. We find Pakistan is the only nuclear-armed "Islamic nation" tied to the belief that the "enemies of Islam' within and beyond the region are hell-bent on destroying Islam and Muslims to subjugate them forever "in the eternal conflict between Dar-ul-Islam and Dar-ul-Harb" or between the "House of Islam" and the "House of War". The author's illustration of the indoctrination process of the Pakistani masses by their leaders is fascinating. How elite manipulation and cultural hegemony work in neutralising the so-called autonomous domain of mass consciousness (through "false consciousness") is crucial. As the author demonstrates, contrary to what we find in neo-Marxist Subaltern historiography, elite manipulation has programmed the Pakistani masses into believers of the "evil triumvirate" of the Hanud-Yahud-Nasara (Hindus-JewsChristians) as the main enemy of Islam, and their country (that even the self-styled "enlightened moderate" General Pervez Musharraf considers) "Islam ka qila" or the "fortress of Islam". Thanks to the promotion of the siege mentality, and the consequential popularity of the threat perception, the average Pakistani favours strong armed forces and nuclear weapons. The book has written 18 well-written chapters. The author has competently used historical, economic, sociological and

contemporary data and methods in preparing this significant work on the Garrison State of Pakistan, which academics, analysts, policymakers and security practitioners within and outside Pakistan will find very useful. This volume is a departure from all the previously written traditional and modern works on contemporary Pakistan, its armed forces, Islamic militancy and the immediate and long-term future of the country. I find chapter one, "The Fortress of Islam: A Metaphor for a Garrison State" the most well-written and important chapter of the work. Other chapters are on the British, American and Soviet attitudes towards Pakistan in its formative phase; the colonial roots of its army; the First Kashmir War of 19471948; the First Military Takeover; the 1965 War; the growing disenchantment of East Pakistan; the 1971 War and the separation of Bangladesh; the Bhutto and Zia regimes; Islamisation of the polity; the Afghan jihad and other security and governance issues in Pakistan under General Musharraf, and the subsequent civilian government in relation to Islamist militancy, India, the US and the world at large. The concluding appraisal of the state of affairs in Pakistan is not promising but very important to reflect on by Pakistani elites, policymakers, security analysts and the country's old and new friends and donors like the US, China and Saudi Arabia: "The state seems to have lost control in the internal domain as fanatics have been able to hit targets almost at will. Pakistan's reputation as the epicenter of global terrorism and a rogue state is there to stay for quite some time. Another major terrorist attack outside Pakistan can create a dangerous situation for the security and existence of Pakistan. It is, therefore, imperative that the stakeholders in the Pakistan power equation especially the military work out a long-term policy and strategy that can create stability, peace, and prosperity within Pakistan as well as

help normalise relations with its neighbours provided they, too, nurture similar aspirations" [p.470]. (To be continued) The writer is a professor of Security Studies at the Austin Peay State University, Tennessee, USA Daily Times, Wednesday, July 17, 2013 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\07\ 17\story_17-7-2013_pg3_6 BOOK REVIEW: Pakistan, a state within a state II Pakistan The Garrison State: Origins, Evolutions, Consequences, 1947-2011 Author: Ishtiaq Ahmed Publisher: Oxford University Press, Karachi; 2013 Ishtiaq Ahmed's interesting book demonstrates how and why a weak and apolitical army evolved into the most powerful institution in Pakistan, virtually having de facto veto power over politics. It also controls Pakistan's nuclear weapons and formulates its domestic and foreign policies. The circumstances that turned the Pakistan army into one of the most pampered armies in the world and the "custodian of Islam" are interesting. The author has beautifully narrated the story in historical and contemporary perspectives as to how Pakistan has become a Garrison State. We learn from the book that as the British promoted a "proto-garrison state" in what is Pakistan today, the Cold War also played an important role in the ascendancy of the military in the country; and that Pakistan's "three donors", the US, China and Saudi Arabia, have played important roles in this regard. The author also elucidates as to how from the

1980s onward, hawkish and Islamist officers have been nurturing the concepts of global jihad and Pan-Islamism beyond South Asia. "Along with hard-core Islamists, the hawks began to imagine Pakistan as a great, expansive, regional power extending to western and central Asia and a liberated Kashmir free from Indian occupation," explicates the author (p.4). Ahmed has rightly pointed out that while officially Pakistan spends around 2.6 percent of its GDP on defence or around $ 5.5 billion (compared to India's $ 34 billion), it actually spends much more. In 2009 it spent around 23 percent on defence and only 1.3 percent on health and 7.8 percent on education. The corresponding figures for India are18 percent on defence, 3.4 percent on health and 12.7 percent on education. And that Pakistan's rich and powerful hardly pay any income tax. Relying on Ayesha Siddiqa's data, the author reasserts the fact that a Pakistani general legally acquires assets worth Rs 150 to 400 million. We know that Pakistan is possibly the worst example of a post-colonial state. After the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951, the bureaucracy literally ran the country until the first military takeover in October 1958. The overdeveloped bureaucracy and military along with a well-entrenched "feudal" aristocracy have been running the country, while the weak and marginalised civil society and further marginalised masses remain subservient. Thanks to the Cold War exigencies, while Islamists flourished, leftist and even liberal democratic opposition have remained weak and disorganised. The author points out that Hamza Alavi ignored the Cold War aspect in the marginalisation of the left and the corresponding rise of Islamist forces in Pakistan. Weak civilian organisations have failed to tackle better-organised armed forces that also carry arms. The military has not only legitimised itself as the custodian of freedom and Islam but has also promoted the culture of mistrust towards democracy and civilians. The military from time to time also projects "internal threats" as the biggest security challenge to Pakistan. The author has aptly suggested that Pakistan's physical distance from the

US has been a factor behind the country's enjoying "considerable autonomy" when compared to Latin American countries with regard to US intervention. This work helps us understand Harold Lasswell's arguments that a) advanced military technology alters the civil-military relations to the advantage of the military; and b) a broad social base rather than the traditional narrow social base of the ruling classes supports the garrison state. Military officers in a garrison state provide a broad range of services besides security. They run the state and its economy; create jobs; and provide other services. Most importantly, they create an "obedient and docile population indoctrinated to believe in the inevitability of war" and the indispensability and superiority of the armed forces. As the author argues, Pakistan has become an ideal Machiavellian garrison state where political Islam being the state ideology has turned the country into the "Fortress of Islam". The book is very enlightening both for experts and general readers. I find the following expositions by the author very useful that: a) all coup makers justify their action as "unpleasant" but "necessary" for the safety and integration of the country, to protect from internal threats (from politicians); b) as articulated by Asghar Khan, the Pakistan Army was responsible for all the four wars it fought against India. The author has aptly argued that the rationale for the Garrison State lies in the successful manufacture of fear of foreign aggression and fear of internal subversion by civilians in cahoots with politicians, by manipulating the generals. We cannot agree more with the author that: "In addition to the fear of foreign aggression, historical and cultural factors can help generate an ideology of the garrison state." A state needs a "damning narrative about the enemy, a victimhood self-identity, and an imperative to maintain a strong and powerful military." Consequently, as the author argues, in Pakistan "threat perception" rather than "threat" has become the main steering force of statecraft. He has succinctly narrated the history of the failure of civil

administration in Pakistan after the assassination of its first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951. As the author has elaborated the internal dynamics of "garrison states", he has also discussed the external factors behind such states. He has rightly pointed out the US as the superpower that tolerated and promoted several garrison states besides Pakistan, such as Taiwan, Israel, South Korea and Indonesia during the Cold War. I find the author's following observation very interesting for understanding why countries like Pakistan are under military tutelage: "Pakistan can continue as a post-colonial garrison state as long as the donors are willing to provide it with the required resources, and it can convince or coerce its population that the struggle for survival necessitates prioritisation of the allocation of scarce resources to security and defence." Last but not least, the author has shattered the myths that only the military is responsible for turning a democracy into a Garrison State. Civilian politicians play an important role in this regard; and that a country under military rule is better able to fight external enemies. Pakistan narrowly survived the 1965 war against India and in the next encounter with India in 1971 it lost its eastern wing. And during both the wars that Pakistan forced on India, generals ran the country. (Concluded) The writer is a professor of Security Studies at the Austin Peay State University, Tennessee, USA

PhD (Stockholm University); Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Stockholm University; and Honorary Senior Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. Latest publications: Pakistan: The Garrison State, Origins, Evolution, Consequences (19472011), Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013; The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed: Unravelling the 1947 Tragedy through Secret

British Reports and First-Person Accounts (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012; New Delhi: Rupa Books, 2011). He can be reached at: billumian@gmail.com Dear All, This is to share with you my joy at the very fine book presentation ceremony in the House of Lords on 15 July. We meet in Committee Room 2, which can accommodate 60 persons but many more turned up so some had to stand. Many members of the British parliament and even some descendants of British officers who had served in the Punjab, a cross section of Pakistanis and Indians and even a Sri Lankan gentleman attended the ceremony. Baroness Shreela Flather, great granddaughter of Sir Ganga Ram, received my book as a symbolic gesture from me to express the gratitude of the citizens of Lahore to her great ancestor who built the Sir Ganga Ram Hospital. Baroness Flather, veteran honourable member of the House of Lords spoke about her memories of a very peaceful and friendly Lahore which suddenly in a matter of weeks degenerated into a violence torn city and she and her family had to flee from it in May 1947. She has subsequently been to Lahore and said that she was always very well received by the Lahoris and her relations to Lahore remain a permanent bond of love and pride. Eminent Punjab poet and the leading scholar of Sufi Punjab, Sarwat Mohiuddin travelled all the way from Lahore to speak at the ceremony. In her authoritative address she examined the Sufi roots of the old Punjab and related it to my book and how she found evidence of the Sufi influence permeating the Punjab despite the rioting that took place in 1947. The next speaker was Dr Arunabha Roy, who presented a Bengali perspective on the partition of the Punjab. He won the heart of everyone in the hall with his extremely perceptive observations and remarks. He admitted that before reading my book he had a very one-sided view of the partition but all that had changed. Professor Pritam Singh, Oxford Brookes University, a dear old friend then delivered a very animated and stimulating address and related his authoritative views on the role of the state in fomenting and making possible ethnic cleansing and how this was amply confirmed by my research.

In my presentation I explained how the book was conceived and how I went about researching the events in the Punjab of 1947. The great difficulties I encountered and how I overcome them. Professor Amin Mughal also spoke and told the audience about my Lahore days and radical politics. The Q and A session was also extremely invgiorating and I thoroughly enjoyed responding to the queries. Barnoness Flather told me that she had attended many such book launching events in the past but nothing compared to the magic that was produced this time. That was the best compliment I could receive. It was a great day for me. I know how my friends all over the world share this joy of mine. Thank you to all of you. Best regards, Ishtiaq PhD (Stockholm University); Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Stockholm University; and Honorary Senior Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. Latest publications: Pakistan: The Garrison State, Origins, Evolution, Consequences (1947-2011), Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013; The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed: Unravelling the 1947 Tragedy through Secret British Reports and First-Person Accounts (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012; New Delhi: Rupa Books, 2011). He can be reached at: billumian@gmail.com Religion & Pakistan Army



http://www.scribd.com/doc/117470292/Careerism-ApplePolishing-Strategic-Assassination-and-History-Flattery-willget-you-somewhere CAREERISM,APPLE POLISHING , STRATEGIC ASSASSINATION AND HISTORY-FLATTERY WILL GET YOU SOMEWHERE

In order for a Guerrilla war to succeed three factors matter.First that the war has an indigenous character , ie it has internal support in the country where it is launched.Second and most important , that it has state actors in support who are determined to support it and who hold the view that they will gain more than what they spend if the guerrilla forces that they support will win the war or destabilize the target state. A pioneer ISI , commando officer who was the first to train Afghan guerrillas on behalf of the ISI had the following to state about the Afghan War and his experiences:--"We began with idealistic motives. Let me clarify that the Afghan by nature is not a fighter of pitched battles.He bargains , manipulates both sides , charges his rent from both sides and rarely fights a pitched battle.Occasional sniping is his style.

The extremely low Russian casualties in Afghan War , 14,000 killed in ten years compare to 60,000 killed in Vietnam prove that there was little fighting on the ground. Most of the real fighting perforce had to be done by Jihadists brought from Middle East and by Pakistani army regulars and civilian Jihadis recruited from various parts of Pakistan. We started the affair inspired by real idealism but soon discovered that it was all about money.Zia and his cronies were all from humble background and saw the Afghan war as a personal affair to preserve their illegally usurped power and to amass private fortunes. I was one of the first to deal with Haqqani who was a third rate average village mullah.Such was the stink emanating from this character that I made him sit in the trucks back body. It is my conviction that Haqqani network is a Pakistani show.Haqqani without Pakistani protection and support is less respectable than a village cobbler or a village hand. I regularly went as far as Kabul city , Gardez city and Shindand Air base to carry out raids. From the beginning the Afghan Mujahids first priority was to make money selling weapons.Jihad we discovered was a misnomer. I was personally disillusioned with the ISI as a biased sectarian outfit. Although I stayed on to train Sikhs for India , Kashmiri Mujahideen for India , I was deeply disillusioned. The dirty game started by Zia destroyed Pakistan and today as I see it our total demise as a state is not far away.All thanks to a promiscuous flirtation with Jihad adopted as a facade to mint money. Even today the vast bulk of Taliban in Afghanistan are Pakistani proxies.The Afghan part of Taliban are good business men.Afghan war was actually a blessing for both corrupt Afghan Jihadis and their ultra corrupt Pakistani intelligence Jihad masters.The amount of money Afghanistan saw in between 1978 and 1992 and between 2001 and to

date is a million times more than all money in circulation in this region from the time of Alexander the Great ! The problem in Afghanistan is simple .It is Pakistani manipulated game with a lot of Saudi and Chinese money flowing in.The Saudis are against Iran and Pakistanis have a feud with India.If the USA can armtwist the Pakistanis and Saudis and tell Indians to behave all will be OK.The main factor in Afghanistan are Pakistanis and taliban are just a petty Pakistani proxy. When this fact is realised the US can make simple policies. In Pakistan the US is dealing with Pakistani generals from a lower middle class backgrounds.The Punjabi Muslims as a race have no martial tradition till the British inducted them in the army. These people can stand any amount of kicking and this should be foreign policy of any power that wants peace in Afghanistan." The ISI officer quoted above has chosen to remain anonymous in the interest of his security. There could have been no Afghan war without Pakistani state support.This was true in 1978 or 1979 and this is true today . Colonel Salman who was one of the pioneers of Afghan War and trained all the characters starting from Hekmatyar and Masud to Mullah Omar and OBL , standing on the extreme right in 1970.Major Musharraf later General Musharraf on extreme left Colonel Salman my distant relative and close friend is regarded as the Godfather of Afghan , Al Qaeda and Taliban in Af Pak. Salman recounted the Afghan war with pride . He is one who believes that Islamists will ultimately win the ongoing global war between the west and the Islamists. Salman thinks that the network of Islamists is huge and will prevail ultimately.I do not agree with his assertions but then every man has his or her world view. The ISI had been involved in various guerrilla wars in neighbouring countries since its establishment.Colonel Sardar Humayun from 25 Cavalry who also trained Lashkar e Tayyaba on behalf of the ISI much later and also raised the Punjab Elite Force in 1990s recounted in 1983 how he had

operated in Indian NEFA area with the Naga and Mizo Guerrillas with a heavy spool tape recorder on his back to record the sounds in late 1960s . ISIs obsession with guerrilla war began in 1971 when the Indians used Mukti Bahini guerrillas in then East Pakistan.The humiliating 1971 defeat left a deep scar on the Pakistani military psyche. Because 1971 had to be avenged ,Islam became the centre theme of Pakstani military system.The common man could only be galvanized in the name of Islam. Soon after 1971 debacle in 1971 Pakistani military good a second more rude shock when a new guerrilla war started in Pakistani Balochistan.The army nor the special forces were fully trained to fight a guerrilla war on their own soil. Pakistani state picked up guerrilla war as the central pillar of its foreign policy when Pakistans civilian prime minister sanctioned a guerrilla war in Afghanistan. Colonel Salman then a major and an instructor at the Commando SSG School at Cherat became one of the first teachers of obscure Afghan guerrillas named Ahmad Shah Masood,Gulbaddin Hekmatyar,Gillani and Rabbani.This was 1974. In 2004 I with great difficulty persuaded my friend and Chairman of Afghanistan Study Centre to publish the article quoted below in the first issue of Journal of Afghanistan Studies.What had happened was now the household truth but people were still afraid to say it in print:-- "In 1973, the then Inspector General of Frontier Corps (IGFC), Brigadier (later Major General) Naseerullah Khan Babar presented a paper on Afghanistan and Pakistani tribal areas. Frontier Corps is a border paramilitary force led by Pakistani army officers seconded to the militia which guard's the country's western borders. The main thrust of the paper was the fear of Soviet hegemony and potential of Afghan providing support to tribes residing in Pakistani territory. In the light of this assessment, an Afghan Cell was created. This was a high level secret group, which included four members Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Bhutto's advisor on Foreign Affairs Aziz Ahmad, Chief of Army Staff General Tikka Khan and IGFC Babar. Dissidents from Afghanistan were

brought to Pakistan where they were put on the payroll of FC and then sent to different locations and trained in handling of small arms and explosives. Babar's two staff officers Colonel Ataur Rahman Kallu and Captain (later Major and a political leader) Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao helped Babar in coordination of some of these efforts. In this work, the then head of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) detachment in Peshawar, Major (later Brigadier Aslam Bodla) was also brought into the picture. Babar continued to supervise this operation after his retirement from the military when he was appointed governor of North West Frontier Province. Pakistan tried to recruit a small core group from each of the 29 provinces of Afghanistan. They would then go back and recruit more members inside Afghanistan. From 1973-77 about 2000-2500 Afghan dissidents were trained in Pakistan. Pakistanis provided them with Indian guns and explosives to avoid any negative fallout in case of exposure of the plan. (Refers-Love Love Thy Neighbor; Kill Thy Neighbor Pakistan's Afghan policyBy: Dr. Hamid Hussain Published in first issue of Journal of Afghanistan Studies in July 2004)



AGHA H AMIN Pakistan: The Garrison State, Origin, Evolution, Consequencec (1947-2011)

Dear All, The first review of my book, Pakistan: The Garrison State, Origins, Evolution, Consequences (1947-2011), by Dr Ehsan Ahrari, a US based Defence Expert appeared recently in the American online, Asia Times. Comments are welcome.

Best regards, Ishtiaq PhD (Stockholm University); Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Stockholm University; and Honorary Senior Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. Latest publications: Pakistan: The Garrison State, Origins, Evolution, Consequences (19472011), Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013; The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed: Unravelling the 1947 Tragedy through Secret British Reports and First-Person Accounts (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012; New Delhi: Rupa Books, 2011). He can be reached at: billumian@gmail.com Asia Times http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/SOU-01250413.html SPEAKING The garrison By FREELY Pakistan Ahrari

state Ehsan


Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing. The high visibility of Pakistan in regional and global affairs is one of the reasons behind the publication of a number of excellent studies explaining the country's internal affairs as well its regional and global strategic maneuvers. Ishtiaq Ahmed's book, Pakistan the Garrison State , is certainly one such book. Borrowing the concept, "garrison state," from noted American political scientist Harold Lasswell, Ahmed develops an engaging but complex narrative of Pakistan. His account starts from the birth of that nation in a highly volatile environment, and brings it forward to 2011. Since

the Indian top leadership never accepted Mohammad Ali Jinnah's (founder of Pakistan) "two nation theory" as the basis of partition of British India, the chances of any cooperation between the two resulting states after their birth were minimal, to start with.The outburst of the Kashmir conflict in 1947, almost immediately after their inception as separate nations, dealt a severe blow to the prospects of cooperation between the two countries for several decades. The notion of a garrison state suits Pakistan to a tee, in the sense that, in such a state, the military not only remains as the most powerful actor, but also frequently becomes the governing entity. It also subsumes the concept of "national security state", where the power elites of the country under discussion are incessantly preoccupied with both external and internal enemies. In a garrison state, because of the military's (to be precise, the army, since it is the most dominant service in that country) fetish for devouring a substantial portion of the nation's meager but extremely precious capital in order to modernize itself, other vital societal issues - such as investments in developing modern educational institutions, a multifaceted industrial base, and state-of-the-art health care facilities and institutions, etc -are grossly underfunded. The garrison state also describes a state where internal ideological, sectarian, and ethnic conflicts continue to tear the country apart. Sadly, Pakistan not only contains all of these features, but it incessantly suffers from the acutely deleterious effects stemming from them. Domestically, Pakistan was never able to develop into a stable democracy. Consequently, its civilian authorities originally (ie, early 1950s) invited the army to intervene when they could not contain domestic violence and disorder. Later on, the army invited itself to become the ruling power

of the state, starting with the coup d'etat of General Mohammed Ayub Khan in 1958. The gross incompetence of Pakistan's army as a governing entity became abundantly clear in the loss of East Pakistan under the military rule of Ayub Khan's successor, General Mohammad Yahya Khan. That tragedy was followed only a few years later by another coup, when the Islamist General Zia ul-Haq, not only overthrew the elected government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1976, but also hanged him. Breaking from the unhappy events that occurred during the Zia regime, the fourth dictator of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf (who captured the reign of government by ousting the elected Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharief in 1999), did not hang any civilian leaders. However, Benazir Bhutto, the prospective prime minister in the then impending elections, was assassinated by Islamist terrorists. Thus, Pakistan became a country where democratic governance appeared only sporadically and was frequently interrupted by military dictators. Those autocrats will be remembered for their utmost incompetence, except for Zia, who will be remembered for transforming Pakistan ostensibly irrevocably - into a highly explosive Islamist polity. Ishtiaq Ahmed's use of garrison state also underscores the notion of "fortress Islam", the rhetoric that the Pakistani military leaders used unsuccessfully to underscore their resolve to snatch the Indian-administered Kashmir from the grip of India's powerful military. The most disconcerting aspect of that rhetoric is that the Kashmir conflict has been permanently couched as a religious issue dividing the two countries. I say "permanently" because, as far as India is concerned, that

conflict was resolved in 1948, and the Line of Control (LOC) separating the armies of those two countries represents the international border between the two countries. Pakistan's emergence, along with India, as a country possessing nuclear weapons since 1998, is an ominous development for two reasons. First, because the conflict between its indigenous Islamists and the army has only intensified since General Musharraf's myopic decision to use brutal force to end the Islamist occupation of the Lal Masjid (red mosque) in 2007. The fact that, under Musharraf, that country had become the frontline state fighting America's "global war on terror" was another principal reason underlying the conflict between the Islamists of that country and Pakistan's military. Since 2007, one can easily chart the worsening of that conflict in the form of several military campaigns in the North-West Frontier Province (now named Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Waziristan. Second, with the growing attacks of the Islamists on the military bases and other facilities of Pakistan-including the General Headquarters of the army and the headquarters of Pakistan's notoriously brutal Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has created worldwide anxieties regarding the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. One regularly hears President Barack Obama and other US officials making public statements assuring the world that the Pakistani weapons are safe, while the Pakistani army remains worried about rumors of US-India, Indo-Israeli plans to either attack that country's nuclear plants or snatch its nuclear weapons. US-Pakistan and Indo-Pakistan ties have been highly dynamic and equally noteworthy features of that country's

role as garrison state. Pakistan, along with Saudi Arabia, played a crucial role in enabling the United States to defeat and oust the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989. Pakistan's growing Islamization in the late 1970s and 1980s, along with the Saudi finances and the China's economic and military support, came in handy for the strategic purposes of the United States-sponsored jihad to win, as it turned out, the Cold War. The Soviet Union imploded only a few years after its humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, once the communist superpower was ousted from Afghanistan, the United States folded its tent and left the area, leaving Pakistan to use the Islamist tool of its foreign policy to establish an acutely Islamist regime of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Ironically, it was also Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban that became the place from where Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist group planned the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Soon after leaving Afghanistan toward the end of the 1980s, the United States also intensified its economic and military sanctions because of Pakistan's not-so-secret program to develop nuclear weapons. The garrison state, though it was devastated by this decision, continued not only to survive, but went ahead with a firm resolve to develop its nuclear weapon. That determination was also mixed with a sense of urgency to develop its own existential nuclear deterrence against India. The highly turbulent nature of the Indo-Pakistan ties is the fuel that has been driving the Pakistan army's India-centric nuclearization objectives, as well as the modalities of its force deployments. Pakistan has always had deep anxieties that India was not happy about the partition and would go to any extreme to unravel Pakistan. The Indo-Pak war of 1971 over East Pakistan left no doubt in the minds of Pakistani

generals about India's "evil" designs toward Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan has not only acquired nuclear weapons of its own, but also has consistently refused to extend the "no first use doctrine" toward India. India, on the contrary, has offered that doctrine to Pakistan. More to the point, the focus of India's nuclear doctrine is primarily aimed at the PRC. However, from time to time, India has amassed troops along the Line of Control in response to terrorist attacks from Pakistan-based Islamist groups. As an added response to such terrorist attacks, India has also publicized such warfighting doctrines as "the doctrine of limited war" and the "Cold Start doctrine", thereby further convincing the Pakistan army that India remains the foremost security threat to their country. US-Pakistan ties suffered another jolt when the lone superpower decided to establish a strategic partnership with its archenemy, India. The process started during the socalled "strategic dialogue" that the United States began with both India and Pakistan. However, the US-India rounds of those negotiations proceeded quite fruitfully, from the strategic perspectives of India. Pakistan felt neglected and marginalized, and its attempts to negotiate a similar arrangement with the lone superpower got nowhere. When President Barack Obama entered the White House in 2008, the US-Pakistan differences stemming Obama's Afghan war and his Af-Pak strategy became a constant source of escalating differences and irritation between Washington and Islamabad. The notion of a garrison state is quite useful in underscoring the struggle between the civilian and military ruling elites to gain the reins of the government and to keep the other side from taking it away. However, the resignation of General

Pervez Musharraf in 2008, and the subsequent return of civilian rule in Pakistan could indeed be viewed as a distant promise of the weakening of the garrison state. Such a promise faced a setback, in the wake of a highly inept performance of the Pakistan Peoples Party-dominated civilian government. Even if the civilian government of Pakistan were to establish a reasonably decent record of good governance, the Pakistani army still would have remained as a chief threat to the long-term prevalence of civilian control of the government. For the first time since the unhappy history of Pakistan, the civilian government was allowed to complete its term of office. With the next general election that is scheduled for May 2013, there is a strong hope that civilian rule will prevail there for the foreseeable future. Still, one must continue to think about the ways to dismantle the garrison state in that country. The continuation of civilian rule in Pakistan will be an auspicious development toward that end. The second one will be the success of civilian leaders to negotiate with their Indian counterparts a political solution to the Kashmir conflict, which, in reality, means acceptance of the Indian stand that the Line of Control is, indeed, the de facto international border between the two warring nations. What that means is that Pakistan should swallow the bitter pill and accept that reality, and look toward negotiating some sort of autonomy for Kashmir along the same line, as was done by General Musharraf with the Indian government in 2006. The control of nuclear weapons is another important symbol of power in Pakistan. However, that authority is not likely to be given up by the army anytime soon. Still, one cannot rule out the likelihood that the future leaders of that entity might be forced to consider that possibility, if or when the civilian

authorities propose an institutional arrangement that either complements the present system of national security council, or radically transforms it in favor of civilian leadership. All of these developments are likely to happen only if the next election in Pakistan results in the election of a competent corps of civilian politicians. Pakistan's army has enough trouble trying to de-Islamitize its own ranks and to fight the militant Islamists groups inside its borders while ensuring that Pakistan's quest for sustaining its own version of strategic parity with India is not seriously jeopardized by "rising" India's most visible resolve to become a great power with its own powerful military to boot. Under a democratic and stable Pakistan, it is likely to be persuaded to transform its role from a praetorian guard to a truly professional entity. That will only happen if the garrison state of that country is at least palpably dismantled. Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, an Independent Defense Consultant, is a specialist in great power relations and transnational security who resides in Alexandria, VA, USA. He has 20 years of experience teaching in various senior military educational institutions, including the US Air War College, Joint Forces Staff College of the National Defense University, and the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. He has consulted with and briefed top officials of USCENTCOM and USPACOM. His latest book on great power relations entitled, The Great Powers and the Hegemon, was published by PalgraveMacmillan in November 2011. Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing. Articles submitted for this section allow our readers to express their opinions and do not necessarily meet the same editorial standards of Asia Times Online's regular contributors.

(Copyright 2013 Ehsan Ahrari) Pakistan: The Garrison State, Origin, Evolution, Consequencec (1947-2011)

Dear All, Last month in a moment of exuberance I announced the publication of my new book. That was wrong as I had not noticed that it was then on the forthcoming list. It is now on the new arrival list. THE BOOK IS NOW A FACT and is available at OUP. Soon it should be available online worldwide as well. Best regards, Ishtiaq The writer has a PhD from Stockholm University. He is a Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Stockholm University.

He is also Honorary Senior Fellow of the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. His latest publication is: The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed: Unravelling the 1947 Tragedy through Secret British Reports and First-Person Accounts (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012; New Delhi: Rupa Books, 2011). He can be reached at: billumian@gmail.com

Description This study seeks to solve the following puzzle: In 1947, the Pakistan military was poorly trained and poorly armed. It also inherited highly vulnerable territory vis--vis the much bigger India, aggravated because of serious disputes with Afghanistan. Defence and security were therefore issues that no Pakistan government, civil or military, could ignore. The military did not take part in politics directly until 1958, although it was called upon to restore order in 1953 in the Punjab province. Over the years, the military, or rather the Pakistan Army, continued to grow in power and influence, and progressively became the most powerful institution. Moreover, it became an institution with de facto veto powers at its disposal to overrule other actors within society including elected governments. Simultaneously, it began to acquire foreign patrons and donors willing to arm it as part of the Cold War competition (the United States), regional balance-of-power concerns (China), and ideological contestants for leadership over the Muslim world (Saudi Arabia, to contain Iranian influence). A perennial concern with defining the Islamic identity of Pakistan, exacerbated by the Afghan jihad, resulted in the convergence of internal and external factors to produce the 'fortress of Islam' self-description that became current in the early twenty-first century. Over time, Pakistan succumbed to extremism and terrorism within and was accused of being involved in similar activities within the South Asian region and beyond. Such developments have been ruinous to Pakistan's economic and democratic development. The following questions are posed to shed further light: 1. What is the relationship between the internal and external factors in explaining the rise of the military as the most powerful institution in Pakistan? 2. What have been the consequences of such politics for the political and economic development in Pakistan? 3. What are the future prospects for Pakistan? A conceptual and theoretical framework combining the notion of a post-colonial state and Harold Lasswell's concept of a garrison state is propounded to analyse the evolution of Pakistan as a fortress of Islam. About the Author / Editor Ishtiaq Ahmed was born in Lahore on 24 February 1947. He received a PhD in Political Science from Stockholm University in 1986. He taught at Stockholm University from 1987 to 2007, and was then invited as Senior Research Fellow and Visiting Research Professor by the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, during 20072010. He is now Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Stockholm University and Honorary Senior Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. He has published extensively on Pakistani and South Asian politics. His research interests cover fields as diverse as political Islam, ethnicity and nationalism, human and minority rights, and, indeed, partition studies.

Hardback 508 pages ISBN: 9780199066360 Price: Rs.1,295.00

Dear All, Please forgive my indulgence, I thought some pictures with the new book are permissible. I received one copy by express DHL mail today. I am convinced the findings I present and the argument I advance will not go unnoticed. Best regards, Ishtiaq PhD and Professor Emeritus, Political Science, Stockholm University; and Honorary Senior Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. Latest publications: Pakistan: The Garrison State, Origin, Evolution, Consequencec (1947-2011), Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013; The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed: Unravelling the 1947 Tragedy through Secret British Reports and First-Person Accounts (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012; New Delhi: Rupa Books, 2011). He can be reached at: billumian@gmail.com The Development of Taliban Factions in Afghanistan and Pakistan: A Geographical Account, February 2010 Amin, Agha , Osinski, David J. , & DeGeorges, Paul Andre http://mellenpress.com/mellenpress.cfm?bookid=8028&pc =9

BOOKS ON PAKISTAN REVIEWED-AMAZON UK http://www.amazon.co.uk/Books-Pakistan-Reviewed-AghaHumayun/dp/1480086193/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8& qid=1354666967&sr=1-1

Military Leadership http://www.amazon.com/Military-Leadership-DecisionMakingHumayun/dp/1480086649/ref=sr_1_4?s=books&ie=UTF8& qid=1354667524&sr=1-4

Taliban war in Afghanistan http://www.amazon.com/Taliban-Afghanistan--WritersTransformedPerceptions/dp/1480085863/ref=sr_1_5?s=books&ie=UTF8 &qid=1354667721&sr=1-5

Atlas and History of Wars http://www.amazon.com/Atlas-Military-History-IndiaPakistan/dp/1480102016/ref=sr_1_7?s=books&ie=UTF8&q id=1354667783&sr=1-7

THE ESSENTIAL CLAUSEWITZ http://www.amazon.com/Essential-Clausewitz-AghaHumayunAmin/dp/1480199826/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid= 1354667218&sr=1-1&keywords=AGHA+HUMAYUN+AMIN

USA,ISI,AL QAEDA and TALIBAN-Setting Straight Bruce Riedels Strategic Narrative http://www.amazon.com/TALIBAN-Setting-StraightRiedels-StrategicNarrative/dp/1481007645/ref=sr_1_17?s=books&ie=UTF8 &qid=1354667320&sr=1-17

1971 War http://www.amazon.com/Pakistan-Army-1971-Indiaafter/dp/1480109770/ref=sr_1_8?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid= 1354667962&sr=1-8

Mans Role in History http://www.amazon.com/Mans-Role-History-AghaHumayun/dp/1480233536/ref=sr_1_9?s=books&ie=UTF8& qid=1354667993&sr=1-9

How a private English Company conquered a sub continent http://www.amazon.com/English-East-India-CompanyConquered/dp/1480234834/ref=sr_1_10?s=books&ie=UTF 8&qid=1354668028&sr=1-10

Atlas of a great tank battle http://www.amazon.com/Atlas-Battle-Chawinda-AghaHumayun/dp/1480242284/ref=sr_1_11?s=books&ie=UTF8 &qid=1354668289&sr=1-11

Atlas of a bloody Indian Pakistan battle http://www.amazon.com/Atlas-Battle-Chamb-1971Humayun/dp/1480247529/ref=sr_1_12?s=books&ie=UTF8 &qid=1354668583&sr=1-12

A forgotten and Bloody British Failure http://www.amazon.com/Atlas-Battle-Chillianwallah-13January1849/dp/1480253081/ref=sr_1_13?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid =1354668621&sr=1-13

The Pakistani Tank Divisions Failure in 1965 http://www.amazon.com/Atlas-Battles-Assal-Uttar-Lahore1965/dp/1480253634/ref=sr_1_14?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid =1354668655&sr=1-14

Second World Wars Forgotten History http://www.amazon.com/Indian-Army-Second-WorldWar/dp/1480269107/ref=sr_1_15?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid= 1354668691&sr=1-15

How Indian Army saved France and Suez Canal http://www.amazon.com/Indian-Army-First-WorldWar/dp/1480274488/ref=sr_1_16?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid= 1354668753&sr=1-16

Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 Reinterpreted http://www.amazon.com/Sepoy-Rebellion-1857-59ReinterpretedHumayun/dp/1480085707/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8& qid=1354667451&sr=1-2

PAKISTAN ARMY THROUGH EYES OF PAKISTANI GENERALS http://www.amazon.com/Pakistan-Army-through-PakistaniGenerals/dp/1480085960/ref=sr_1_3?s=books&ie=UTF8&q id=1354667488&sr=1-3

Posted by sceptic at 7:20 AM