6.) Bernabe vs Alejo (Art.3 Art.

256 Family Code)

Bernabe vs. Alejo GR No. 140500, January 21, 2002 FACTS: The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina Alejo and was named Adrian Bernabe who was born on September 18, 1981. After Ernesto Bernabe and Rosalina (legal wife) died, the sole surviving heir left was Ernestina. Carolina, in behalf of his son Adrian, filed a complaint that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and be given a share of his fathers estate. Trial courts ruling: Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent to give the latter an opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs filiation. CA ruling: The rights of Adrian are governed under Article 285 of the Civil Code which allows an action for recognition to be filed within 4 years after the child has attained the age of majority and that subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away his right. ISSUE: Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son. HELD: The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. Furthermore, the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children. Hence, the petition was denied and assailed decision was affirmed

7 ) Republic of the Philippines vs Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller

306 SCRA 183. April 21, 1999 Fact of the Case: On July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, both American citizen,filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag. On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition foradoption. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed originally to the Court of Appeals from the decision of RTC granting the petition of respondent spouses to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag. In its decision promulgated on April 17, 1996, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court because the petition raised question of law. Issue:

Whether or not the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite prohibition the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, when the petition for adoption was filed on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allowed aliens to adopt. Held: Yes. An alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family Code, although denied the right to adopt under Article 184 of the said Code, may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code. They acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a newlaw disqualifying him. The Supreme Court hereby affirm the appeal decision of the Regional Trial Court.

8.)
FACTS:

ATIENZA v. BRILLANTES, Jr. March 29, 1995 (A.M. No. MTJ-92-706)

PARTIES: Complainant: LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA Respondent: JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila

This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr.

Complainant alleged that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro with whom respondent Judge was cohabiting with. Complainant claimed that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children. Respondent alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony (1965) before a Nueva Ecija town Mayor, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license. Respondent also argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code. ISSUE:

WON Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar.

HELD:

Yes. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of

procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.

Atienza vs Brillantes 243 SCRA 32 Topic: Retroactive effects of law SF: An administrative case was filed by herein complainant against Judge Brilliantes of MTC, Manila. Complainant alleges that he has two children with De Castro who stays in Makati, Manila in the house he bought and stayed while he is in Manila. Sometime in 1991 he saw Respondent Judge sleeping on his bed, upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent was cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant further alleged that respondent was married to a certain Zenaida Ongkiko and begot five children. In reply respondent alleged that the complainant was not married to De Castro, he also denied having been married to Zenaida ongkiko, however admitted having five children with her. He stated that the marriage between him and Ongkiko was not valid since there was no marriage license and further claimed that when he married De Castro he believed in all good faith of its intent and purpose. I: Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code that required nullity of previous marriage for purpose of remarriage shall apply?

H: As a general rule provided in Article 4 of the NCC: Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. R: Article 40 of the Family Code provides that a Judicial Declaration of Nullity is required before a party can enter into second marriage however the said Code took effect only on August 3, 1988 and the marriages that respondent contracted was 1965 and 1991 however the provisions of this code shall apply regardless of the date of the marriage, besides under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given retroactive effects in so far as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws this is particularly true with Article 40 which is a rule of Procedure, herein respondent has not shown any vested rights that was impaired by the application of Article 40 ti his case.

9.) Ty vs CA Case Digest

Ty vs. CA G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000 Facts: Edgardo Reyes, private respondent, married to Anna Maria Villanueva both in a civil and church ceremony respectively. However, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of marriage of license.

Before the decree of was issued in nullifying the marriage of said spouses, private respondent wed Ofelia Ty, petitioner, in the City Court of Pasay and thereafter in a church wedding in Makati. Out of their union bore two daughters. Until private respondent petition that their marriage be declared null and void for lack of marriage of license and that at the time they got married, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. Ofelia defended that lack of marriage license in their marriage is untrue. She submitted the marriage license in court and private respondent did not question the evidence. However, RTC and CA affirmed their decision in favor of private respondent. Issue: Whether or not petitioner may claim damages for failure to comply with marital obligations of the respondent. Ruling: There can be no action for damages merely because of a breach of marital obligation. Supreme Court also viewed that no damages should be awarded in the present case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should they grant her prayer, they would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity.

Ty vs. CA [GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000] Post under case digests, Civil Law at Saturday, March 10, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Facts: Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977. Both weddings were declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties. Even before the decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner on April 1979 and had their church wedding in Makati on April 1982. The decree was only issued in August 1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage with petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage with Anna must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. However, SC found that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case for doing so would prejudice the vested rights of the petitioner and of her children.

Issue: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.

Held: SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the wife who sought damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her mental anguish,anxiety,

besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Aside from the fact, that petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant her petition for damages would result to a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.

Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared valid and subsisting and the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and maintained as monthly support to their 2 children for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto.

10.) Ablaza v. Republic, G. R. 158298, August 11, 2010

Post under case digests, Civil Law at Friday, December 16, 2011 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind HAD8J5EKCNKC FACTS: On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother A and B.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between A and B had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage voidab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license.

ISSUE: Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the OLD Civil Code?

RULING: YES. Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:

Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

Considering that the marriage between A and B was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

11.) BENJAMIN G. TING v. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TINGG.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009
FACTS: On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oates findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. On October 19, 2000, the petitioner appealed to the CA, reversing the trial courts ruling .ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized HELD No, by the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings. But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a partys alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.

The petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED

*** (ART. 15, 16, 17, 50, 51 (NEW CIVIL CODE); ART. 26, FAMILY CODE

12.) VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO, G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985 (Art 15, 16, 17, 50, 51 NCC Art.26 Family)
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, VS. HON. MANUEL ROMILLO JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON, respondents October 8, 1985 FACTS: Alice Reyes, the petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and they established residence in the Philippines. They had two children and they were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. The petitioner remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. The private responded filed against petitioner stating that the petitioners business is a conjugal property of the parties and that respondent is declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court, where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property as of June 11, 1982. ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent as petitioners husband is entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets? RULING: The petition is granted. Complaint is dismissed. The policy against absolute divorce cover only Philippine nationals. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law. From the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves marriage, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage between them with the petitioner. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

13)Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera
TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653 FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued. HELD: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

14.) GARCIA vs. RECIO G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, VS. RODERICK A. RECIO, respondent October 2, 2001 ((Art 15, 16, 17, 50, 51 NCC Art.26 Family)_ FACTS: The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. Since October 1995, they lived separately; and in 1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondents former marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven. 2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia. RULING: The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient; and compliance with the rules on

evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioners failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility. Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. However, there are two types of divorce, absolute divorce terminating the marriage and limited divorce merely suspending the marriage. In this case, it is not known which type of divorce the respondent procured. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree a party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute commits the offense of bigamy. This shows that the divorc e obtained by the respondent might have been restricted. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other evidences submitted, they dont absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to the alleged foreign law. Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between the petitioner and respondent can not be declared null and void based on lack of evidence conclusively showing the respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner. With the lack of such evidence, the court a quo may declare nullity of the parties marriage based on two existing marriage certificates.

16.) Morigo vs People (Art 15, 16, 17, 50, 51 NCC Art.26 Family)
Morigo vs. People GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004 FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith. ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case. HELD: Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.