Spouses Laperal vs Spouses Katigbak FACTS: CFI Manila declared the property covered by TCT No.

57626 as separate or paraphernal property of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak. The spouses Laperal disagree with this finding reiterating that its improvements and income are conjugal assets of the Spouses Katigbak. When the spouses Katigbak got married, neither of them brought properties unto the marriage. Ramons occupation rendered him a monthly in come of P200.00. The property in question was registered in the name of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak married to Ramon Katigbak. The latter declared that her mother was the one who bought the property for her and had placed it only in her name as the practice of her mother in buying properties and placing them directly in the names of her children. The husband having no interest with the property only signed the document for the purpose of assisting his wife. In August 1950, the Laperals filed a case and was granted by the trial court against the Katigbaks in recovery of P14,000 and jewelry amounting to P97,500 or in lieu thereof, to pay such amount. A month after the decision was rendered, Evelina filed a complaint against her husband for judicial separation of property and separate administration which was granted by the court and was sought for annulment by the Laperals. ISSUE: WON the property in question constitutes the paraphernal property of Evelina. HELD: All properties acquired during the marriage are presumed conjugal. It is however not conclusive but merely rebuttable, unless it be proved that the property belong exclusively to the husband and wife. In the case at bar, the deed of the land is under the name of the wife. At the time it was purchased, the property was of substantial value and as admitted, the husband by himself could not have afforded to buy considering the singular source of income. Hence, the property covered by TCT 57626 is considered a paraphernal property of the wife. PLATA VS YATCO FACTS: Amalia Plata resorts to for a writ of certiorari to annul and set aside its order finding her in contempt of court for refusing to vacate certain property -Amalia Plata, in 1954, had purchased a parcel of land in name of Amalia Plata, single, Filipino citizen. she sold the property to one Celso Saldaa, -Saldaa resold the same property to "Amalia Plata, married to Gaudencio Begosa." ( -Amalia Plata of legal age, Filipino, married to Gaudencio Begosa", in consideration of a loan of P3,000, mortgaged to Cesarea Villanueva married to Gregorio Leao, the identical property and its improvements "of which the mortgagor declares to be her(s) as the absolute owner thereof". -The mortgage was also signed by Gaudencio Begosa, as co-mortgagor

-For failure to pay the mortgage, the same was extrajudicially foreclosed -the respondent, Villanueva, sued Gaudencio Begosa alone for illegal detainer - Amalia Plata resisted all efforts to eject her from the property, and she filed a third party claim, averring ownership of the property -She claims that she was never lawfully married to Begosa, and that she had acquired the property while still single, and was in possession there when the Sheriff of Rizal attempted to enforce the writ of ejectment. -Respondent Villanueva claim that Plata had repeatedly acknowledged being married to Begosa; that she had lived with him openly as his wife, and their marriage is presumed; that, therefore, she is to be deemed as holding under Begosa, and is bound by the judgment against the latter. -Upon motion of the judgment creditors, the court belfound her guilty and sentenced her, as stated at the beginning of this decision. ISSUE: WON property is parahernal HELD: YES -Granting that the evidence before us against the marriage of petitioner Amalia Plata to Gaudencio Begosa is weak, considering her admissions of married status in public documents -the well-known presumption that persons openly living together as husband and wife are legally married to each other, and that the prior marriage of -Begosa to someone else does not necessarily exclude the possibility of a valid subsequent marriage to herein petitioner; -still the respondents Villanueva could not ignore the paraphernal character of the property in question, which had been unquestionably acquired by Plata while still single, -The subsequent conveyance thereof to Celso Saldaa, and the reconveyance back to her several months afterward of the same property, did not transform it from paraphernal to conjugal property, there being no proof that the money paid to Saldaa came from common or conjugal funds -It is true that Gaudencio Begosa signed the mortgage as a co-mortgagor; but by itself alone that circumstance would not suffice to convert the land into conjugal property, considering that it was paraphernal in origin. -Plata's possession thereof was not derived from Gaudencio Begosa. The illegal detainer judgment against the husband alone can not bind nor affect the wife's possession of her paraphernal, which by law she holds and administers independently, and which she may even encumber or alienate without his knowledge or consent

-the petitioner-wife could validly ignore the judgment of eviction against her husband, and it was no contempt of court for her to do so, because the writ of execution was not lawful against her -We need not decide here whether the property was validly conveyed to respondents Villanueva -The writ of certiorari prayed for is granted, and the order of the lower court dated 4 January 1963, is annulled and set aside. Javier v. Osmena Facts: In 1890, Petrona Javier (Javier), daughter of Felix Javer and Matea, married Florentino Collantes. Before 1892, Florentino, husband, was employed by his father-in-law in a commission business. One of their clients was Osmena who consigned tobacco to them from Cebu. Upon retirement of FJ, Florentino took over the commission business as an independent commission merchant(broker). He also assumed the debt owed by Father in law to Osmena. No records could show the origin of the debt but it was admitted that the same was assumed by Florentino upon taking over the business. The original amount was P4000-P5000 but in 1908,FC gave Osmena a statement saying that the debt incurred was now P14,000-P15,000. however, FJ dies as well, allowing Javier to inherit two properties. For purpose of consolidating full ownership of the properties, Javier secured a loan and then purchased from FJs second wife, Pascuala, the latters usufructory rights husband of Javier, was ordered by the court to pay his debt toOsmena The sheriff was thereby ordered to auction rights, title, interests, and shares of the property of FC (including the inherited properties of his wife and the usufructory right spurchased in 1911.) Notwithstanding protests from Javier, the two properties were sold to the estate of Osmena for P500 each. This included the usufructory rights. Javier filed a complaint against Osmena alleging that the inherited properties, as well as the usufructory rights were exclusive and not part of conjugal property and thus prayed for the sale to be annulled. Respondent estate of Osmena,admitting that the properties involved were indeed exclusive, still claimed that the usufructory rights, being purchased from the conjungal funds, should be deemed conjugal in nature.

He also claimed that the payment due should come from the fruits of the said properties and thus, a receiver should be appointed to manage such revenues due to the respondent. CFI annulled the sale and cancelled ther egistration of property in the name of respondent Osmena. Osmena then appealed to the SC. Although Osmena never claimed the debt during his lifetime, upon his death, the administrator of his estate sought to collect it in his stead. The amount owed was now P26,000. Then-appellee, Javier, sought to use Art. 1386 against the appellant but the court disproved this by pointing to earlier jurisprudence, Issues/Held/Ratio: WON sum owed to Osmena estate can/should be paid from fruits/revenues of the exclusive properties of the wife Yes. The court delved into the nature of the debt. It stated that there was a presumption in fact that family expenses come from salaries for services rendered. Since debt was incurred by the husband during the marriage (by virtue of him assuming the debt from his father-in-law) and such a debt was for the support of the family fruits and revenues of separate properties, being conjugal in nature, should answer the obligation . These debts are not personal or private debts at all. WON a receiver should be assignedto collect fruits of exclusive properties as prayed for by Osmena estate. No. Art. 1984 of the CC says that th ewife has the right to manage her paraphernal property and Art. 1412 says that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal property. Appointment of a receiver shall deprive both the husband and the wife of these rights. There is therefore no need for such an appointment. VDS. DE STA. ROMANA VS PCIB FACTS: PCIB as Administrator of the estate of the deceased C.N. Hodges, filed and action for rescission with damages and for the recovery of a parcel of land which Ramon Sta. Romana purchased from the late C. N. Hodges under a Contract to Sell. Sheriff levied on the rights and interests of Ramon Sta. Romana over the Lot and the improvements existing thereon, which lot Ramon Sta. Romana also purchased from C. N, Hodges under another Contract to Sell. A third party claim was filed by a certain Emilio Sta. Romana who claimed that and its improvements had been sold to him by Ramon Sta. Romana

trial court rendered its decision in Civil rescinding the Contract to Sell and ordering Ramon Sta. Romana to return the possession of to the herein private respondent, as well as to pay rentals or damages for use and occupation thereof. Court of Appeals which affirmed the same and further ordered Ramon Sta. Romana to pay the land taxes and the interest thereon. Sheriff issued a notice of sale at public auction of the rights and interests of Ramon Sta. Romana over Lot and its improvements for the satisfaction of the damages awarded in the decision. Ramon Sta. Romana died

obligation was contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. (Art. 161 [1], Civil Code.) There is no rule or law requiring that in a suit against the husband to enforce an obligation, either pertaining to him alone or one chargeable against the conjugal partnership, the defendant husband must be joined by his wife. -obviously in recognition of the legal status of the husband as the administrator of the conjugal partnership. (Art. 112, Civil Code.) WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED G TRACTORS VS CA

petitioner Socorro L. Vda. de Sta. Romana, the surviving spouse of Ramon Sta. Romana, filed a motion to quash the writ of execution alleging principally that proceedings did not affect her rights and interests over Lot inasmuch as she was not a party in said action. The trial court denied the said motion to quash the writ of execution. The public auction sale was held and the private respondent was issued the corresponding certificate of sale. A Motion for Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioner was likewise denied Petitioner prayed that the writ of execution and the levy on execution made annulled insofar as her ONE HALF (1/2) share in the said properties is concerned, and that she be declared the lawful and absolute owner of said ONE-HALF (1/2) share of the said properties. Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. the respondent court granted the motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and laches. ISSUE: WON levied property if conjugal and petitioner is entitled to of it HELD: conjugal but it is paid for conjugal debt The action filed by private respondent against the petitioner Ramon Sta. Romana was clearly a suit to enforce an obligation of the conjugal partnership. -obligation was out of the failure of Ramon Sta. Romana to pay the purchase price of a lot he bought from C. N. Hodges presumably in behalf of the conjugal partnership. Petitioner does not deny the conjugal nature of both Lots . It may not be denied, therefore, that the liability incurred by Ramon Sta. Romana is chargeable against the conjugal partnership assets, it being undisputed that the said

Private respondent Luis R. Narciso is a businessman. He is engaged in business as a producer and exporter of Philippine mahogany logs and operates a logging concession at del Gallego, Camarines Sur. He is legally married to the other private respondent Josefina Salak Narciso. Petitioner G-Tractors, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged primarily in the business of leasing heavy equipments such as tractors, bulldozers, and the like. private respondent Luis R. Narciso entered into a Contract of Hire of Heavy Equipment with petitioner G-Tractors . The contract provided for payment of rental for the use of said tractors. Luis R. Narciso defaulted in his rental payments. G-Tractors instituted an action against him to collect the total amount of P155,410.25 with legal interest thereon, representing unpaid rentals for the leased tractors, 25% thereof as liquidated damages, P30,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, and the costs of suit, before the then Court of First Instance Luis R. Narciso was declared in default. On his representations, however, G-Tractors accepted his offer for a compromise agreement. A compromise agreement was thereupon signed by G-Tractors and Luis R. Narciso. The compromise agreement stipulated for payment by Luis R. Narciso of the total claim of G-Tractors on an installment plan. Luis R. Narciso failed to comply , G-Tractors filed a motion for execution. This was opposed by Luis R. Narciso who asked for the suspension of the issuance of a writ of execution on the ground that he allegedly has a pending loan with a banking institution.

The lower court, the request for suspension and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the judgment based on the compromise agreement. Levy was accordingly made by the City Sheriff of Quezon City on certain personal properties of private respondents G-Tractors, being the highest bidder, was awarded the sale of all the personal properties listed under the levy, for the total amount of P4,090.00. Luis R. Narciso offered to redeem and/or buy back all the personal properties sold to G-Tractors for the same amount of P4,090.00 which the latter agreed and for which a Deed of Reconveyance was executed by G-Tractors. Sheriff of Quezon City made a levy on "all rights, interest, title, participation which the defendant Luis R. Narciso" may have over a parcel of residential land which parcel of land is allegedly the conjugal property of the spouses Luis R. Narciso and Josefina Salak Narciso. Sheriff notified the general public the ex-oficio Sheriff of Quezon City sold at public auction to the highest bidder (plaintiff G-Tractors, Inc.) for P180,000.00 the real estate property At that time, however, TCT No. 120923 was mortgaged to Mercantile Financing Corporation to guarantee an outstanding unpaid account of Luis R. Narciso and his wife in the amount of P74,327.52. Luis R. Narciso and G-Tractors, Inc. executed a contract of lease over the aforesaid property whereby the former obligated himself to pay a monthly rental of P1,000.00 and by virtue of the said contract of lease, Luis R. Narciso actually paid to G-Tractors, Inc. the amount of P12,000.00 as rental for one year. Josefina Salak Narciso and her husband Luis R. Narciso filed a complaint in the same Court of First Instance of Quezon City for "declaration of nullity of levy on execution and auction sale of plaintiff's conjugal property with damages and injunction," the complaint alleged that whatever transpired in Civil could be binding only on the husband Luis R. Narciso and could not affect or bind the plaintiff-wife Josefina Salak Narciso who was not a party to that case; that the nature of the Sheriff's sale clearly stated that only the property of the husband may be sold to satisfy the money judgment against him; that the conjugal property of the plaintiffs-spouses could not be made liable for the satisfaction of the judgment in Civil Case considering that the subject matter of said case was never used for the benefit of the conjugal partnership or of the family; and that the levy of the wife's share in the conjugal property to satisfy the money judgment against her husband is null and void. the President of G-Tractors, Inc. executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and on the next day, April 6, 1976, the sheriff issued a Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale. 6 G-Tractors, Inc. filed in Civil Case No. Q-19173, a "Motion for Entry and Issuance of New Torrens Certificate of Title

Luis R. Narciso filed an opposition to the aforesaid motion calling attention to the fact that he and his wife had filed a complaint which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q21267 and pointing out that the Sheriff's final deed of sale and affidavit of consolidation of ownership would have no effect should the levy on execution and the subsequent auction sale of the conjugal property be nullified. 7 Judge Sarmiento issued an Order cancelled TCT No. 120923 and directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to issue in lieu thereof a new title in the name of GTractors, Inc. 8 Luis R. Narciso move to reconsider the lower court enjoined G-Tractors, Inc. from transferring, conveying or in any manner alienating the property covered by TCT No. 218552 until the motion for reconsideration of the order of April 26, 1976 has been resolved. two (2) orders were issued by the lower court, one denying the motion for reconsideration and the other denying the motion for preliminary injunction. A motion to reconsider the order denying the preliminary injunction was likewise denied. spouses Luis R. Narciso and Josefina Salak Narciso filed before the then Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision, annulling the levy on execution G-Tractors, Inc.'s motion for reconsideration having been denied, the instant petition for Review on certiorari was filed before this Court, ISSUE: WON the debt of Luis Narcisio is a conjugal debt for which the conjugal partnership is held liable HELD: YES Article 161 of the New Civil Code provides that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All the debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership. There is no question that private respondent Luis R. Narciso is engage in business as a producer and exporter of Philippine mahogany logs . His account with petitioner G-Tractors, Inc. represents rentals for the use of petitioner's tractors There is no doubt then that his account with the petitioner was brought about in order to enhance the productivity of said logging business, a commercial enterprise for gain which he had the right to embark the conjugal partnership. the contention that the conjugal partnership is not liable because the obligation contracted by the husband is personal in nature is not applicable in this case.

It is very clear, therefore, that the obligations were contracted in connection with his legitimate business as a producer and exporter in mahogany logs and certainly benefited the conjugal partnership. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership and as long as he believes he is doing right to his family, he should not be made to suffer and answer alone. 13 So that, if he incurs an indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or profession or suffers losses in a legitimate business, the conjugal partnership must equally bear the indebtedness and the losses, unless he deliberately acted to the prejudice of his family. the conjugal partnership of gains of private respondents Narcisos, must answer for the same. the sale at public auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City of TCT No. 120923 belonging to the conjugal partnership of gains of the private respondents Narcisos in order to satisfy the judgment debt of the private respondent Luis R. Narciso with petitioner, was validly and legally made in accordance with law the Decision of the then Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. DPB VS ADIL FACTS: review on certiorari is the validity of a promissory note which was executed in consideration of a previous promissory note the enforcement of which had been barred by prescription. Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan from the Agricultural and Industrial Bank (AIB), now the Development of the Philippines (DBP), in the sum of P2,000.00, Philippine Currency, as evidenced by a promissory note of said date whereby they bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the account in ten (10) equal yearly amortizations. obligation remained outstanding and unpaid even after the lapse of the aforesaid tenyear period, Confesor, who was by then a member of the Congress of the Philippines, executed a second promissory note on April 11, 1961 expressly acknowledging said loan and promising to pay the same on or before June 15, 1961. The new promissory note reads as follows I hereby promise to pay the amount covered by my promissory note on or before June 15, 1961. Upon my failure to do so, I hereby agree to the foreclosure of my mortgage. It is understood that if I can secure a certificate of indebtedness from the government of my back pay I will be allowed to pay the amount out of it.

Said spouses not having paid the obligation on the specified date, the DBP filed a complaint against the spouses for the payment of the loan. Court ruled in favor of DPP ordering that sps must pay jointly and severally Defendants-spouses appealed but was denied Hence this petition wherein petitioner alleges that the decision of respondent judge is contrary to law and runs counter to decisions of this Court when respondent judge (b) that in signing the second promissory note respondent Patricio Confesor can bind the conjugal partnership; or otherwise said respondent became liable in his personal capacity. The petition is impressed with merit. The right to prescription may be waived or renounced. Article 1112 of Civil Code provides: Art. 1112. Persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce prescription already obtained, but not the right to prescribe in the future. ISSUE: WON debt is chargeable to conjugal property HELD: YES Under Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. As such administrator, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the 5 benefit of the conjugal partnership, are chargeable to the conjugal partnership. No doubt, in this case, respondent Confesor signed the second promissory note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence the conjugal partnership is liable for this obligation the court a quo held that in signing the promissory note alone, respondent Confesor cannot thereby bind his wife, respondent Jovita Villafuerte, citing Article 166 of the New Civil Code which provides: Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spend thrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without, the wife's consent. If she ay compel her to refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court m grant the same. -Petition is dismissed

MARIANO VS CA FACTS: The proceedings at bar concern (1) an attempt by a married man to prevent execution against conjugal property of a judgment rendered against his wife, for obligations incurred by the latter while engaged in a business that had admittedly redounded to the benefit of the family, and (2) the interference by a court with the proceedings on execution of a co-equal or coordinate court. Both acts being proscribed by law, correction is called for and will hereby be effected.

The proceedings originated from a suit filed by Esther Sanchez against Lourdes Mariano in the Court of First Instance at Caloocan City, for recovery of the value of ladies ready made dresses allegedly purchased by and delivered to the latter.

Daniel Sanchez, Esthers husband, now made his move. He filed a complaint for annulment of the execution in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City in his capacity as administrator of the conjugal partnership. He alleged that the conjugal assets could not validly be made to answer for obligations exclusively contracted by his wife, and that, moreover, some of the personal property levied on, such as household appliances and utensils necessarily used in the conjugal dwelling, were exempt from execution. ISSUE: WON the claim that property levied on in execution of a judgment is not property of the judgment debtor, Daniel Sanchezs wife, but of the conjugal partnership of the Sanchez Spouses

HELD: In the case at bar, the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a stranger to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife. In any case, whether by intervention in the court issuing the writ, or by separate action, it is unavailing for either Esther Sanchez or her husband, Daniel, to seek preclusion of the enforcement of the writ of possession against their conjugal assets. For it being established, as aforestated, that Esther had engaged in business with her husbands consent, and the income derived therefrom had been expended, in part at least, for the support of her family, the liability of the conjugal assets to respond for the wifes obligations in the premises cannot be disputed.