PART III III. Elective Officials, Vacancies, Succession, Disciplinary Actions Sec. 39-75 LGC a. i.

Elective Officials Qualifications

Abella v COMELEC 1991 Facts: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office. The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the Governor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second highest votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte. The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is erroneous when it relied on the provisions of the Family Code to rule that the petitioner lacks the required residence to qualify her to run for the position of governor of Leyte. She opines that under "the Election Law, the matter of determination of the RESIDENCE is more on the principle of INTENTION, the animus revertendi rather than anything else." In this regard she states that ... "her subsequent physical transfer of residence to Ormoc City thereafter, did not necessarily erased (sic) or removed her Kananga residence, for as long as she had the ANIMUS REVERTENDI evidenced by her continuous and regular acts of returning there in the course of the years, although she had physically resided at Ormoc City." Issue: Whether or not the candidate who got the second highest vote may be proclaimed as governor when the candidate for such position was disqualified. Held: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact remains that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. As regards the principle of ANIMUS REVERTENDI (Faypon v. Quirino:[M) ere absence from one's residence or origin-domicile-to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.' ... The determination of a persons legal residence or domicile largely depends upon intention which may be inferred from his acts, activities and utterances. The party who claims that a person has abandoned or left his residence or origin must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss.) In the instant case, there is no evidence to prove that the petitioner temporarily left her residence in Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to pursue any calling, profession or business. What is clear is that she established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers herself a resident therein. The intention of animus revertendi not to abandon her residence in Kananga, Leyte therefor, is nor present. The fact that she occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte through the years does not signify an intention to continue her residence therein. It is common among us Filipinos to often visit places where we formerly resided specially so when we have left friends and relatives although for intents and purposes we have already transferred our residence to other places. Whether or not the petitioner is a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte (the petitioner insists that she is such a registered voter based on the following antecedents: 1 She cancelled her registration in Ormoc City on

Nov 25, 1987, and 2 she then transferred her registration to Kananga, Leyte on November 25, 1987 by registering thereat and 3) she later voted on election day (Feb 1, 1988) in Kananga, Leyte. ) We find the version pressed by respondent unworthy of belief. The story is marked by so many bizarre cirumtances not consistent with the ordinary course of events or the natural behavior of persons. Among these are: The application for cancellation of registration by respondent Adelina Y. Larrazabal happened to be misplaced by a clerk in the Election Registrar's Office for Ormoc City so it was not sent to the Board of Election Inspectors in a sealed envelope; The 'inadverterment' (sic) misplacement was discovered only on January 9,1988; The voter's affidavit was delivered by itself without any endorsement or covering letter from the Election Registrar or anybody else; The election clerk delivered the application for cancellation only towards the last hour of the revision day, allegedly at 4:30 P.M., January 9, 1988; All the members of the BEI had already signed the Minutes indicating that no revision of the voter's list was made as of 5:00 PM The poll clerk and the third member prepared another minutes stating that the election clerk had delivered the application for cancellation at 4:30 P.M. without any reference to the minutes they had previously signed; Emeterio Larrazabal, who was supposed to have registered in Precinct 17, Mahawan, Kananga, was supposed to have filled up an application for cancellation of his registration in Precinct No. 15, Ormoc City at Precinct 17 concurrent with his registration. His application for cancellation was never submitted in evidence. The serial number of the voter's affidavits of the spouses Larrazabal in Precinct No. 17 are far removed from the serial numbers of the other new registrants in November 28, 1987 in the same precinct. The most telling evidence is the list of voters, that the Chairman and the poll clerk had written in Part II of the same, closed by the signatures of both officials showing that there were only 9 additional registered voters in Precinct 17, petitioner was not there. It was only on February 15, 1988, or two weeks after the election day that the same Registrar certified for the first time that there were two voters lists, the first without the names of the Larrazabals and the second, which appeared only after February 1, submitted by the Chairman of the Board for Precinct 17 which contained the spouses Larrazabals' names. Failing in her contention that she is a resident and registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, the petitioner poses an alternative position that her being a registered voter in Ormoc City was no impediment to her candidacy for the position of governor of the province of Leyte. Section 12, Article X of the Constitution provides: Relating therefore, section 89 of R.A. 179 to section 12, Article X of the Constitution one comes up with the following conclusion: that Ormoc City when organized was not yet a highly-urbanned city but is, nevertheless, considered independent of the province of Leyte to which it is geographically attached because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for the provincial elective officials. The question now is whether or not the prohibition against the 'city's registered voters' electing the provincial officials necessarily mean, a prohibition of the registered voters to be elected as provincial officials. The argument is untenable. Section 12, Article X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly-urbanized cities, component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are independent of the province. In the same provision, it provides for other component cities within a province whose charters do not provide a similar prohibition. Necessarily, component cities like Ormoc City whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are treated like highly urbanized cities which are outside the supervisory power of the province to which they are geographically attached. This independence from the province carries with it the prohibition or mandate directed to their registered voters not to vote and be voted for the provincial elective offices. The resolution in G.R. No. 80716 entitled Peralta v. The Commission on Elections, et al. dated December 10, 1987 applies to this case. While the cited case involves Olongapo City which is classified as a highly urbanized city, the same principle is applicable. Moreover, Section 89 of Republic Act 179, independent of the constitutional provision, prohibits registered voters of Ormoc City from voting and being voted for elective offices in the province of Leyte. We agree with the COMELEC en banc that "the phrase 'shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the

provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte' connotes two prohibitions one, from running for and the second, from voting for any provincial elective official." The petitioner takes exception to this interpretation. She opines that such interpretation is "wrong English" since nowhere in the provision is there any reference to a prohibition against running for provincial elective office. She states that if the prohibition to run was indeed intended, the provision should have been phrased "Shall not be qualified TO RUN in the election FOR provincial governor." A comma should have been used after the word qualified and after the word "vote" to clearly indicate that the phrase "in the election of the provincial governor" is modified separately and distinctly by the words "not qualified" and the words "not entitled to vote." The Court finds the petitioner's interpretation fallacious. In the case of Mapa v. Arroyo, the conjunction and between the phrase shall not be qualified and entitled to vote refer to two prohibitions as ruled by the COMELEC in relation to the demonstrative phrase "in the election of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte." Finally, the petitioner contends that the February 14, 1991 decision of the COMELEC's second division is null and void on the ground that on that date, the term of Commissioner Andres Flores, one of the signatories of the majority opinion (vote was 2-1) had already expired on February 2, 1991. Commissioner Flores was appointed for a three-year term from February 15, 1988 to February 15, 1991. In these three years he exercised his duties and functions as Commissioner. Granting in the absence of a statute expressly stating when the terms of the COMELEC Chairman and members commence and expire, that his term expired on February 2, 1991 to enable a faithful compliance with the constitutional provision that the terms of office in the COMELEC are on a staggered basis commencing and ending at fixed intervals, his continuance in office until February 15, 1991 has a color of validity. Therefore, all his official acts from February 3, 1991 to February 15, 1991, are considered valid. Issue: WON Abella can assume position of governor by virtue of Section 6 RA 6646 Ratio: Abella claims that the Frivaldo and Labo cases were misapplied by the COMELEC. According to him these cases are fundamentally different from SPC No. 88-546 in that the Frivaldo and Labo cases were petitions for a quo warranto filed under section 253 of the Omnibus Code, contesting the eligibility of the respondents after they had been proclaimed duly elected to the Office from which they were sought to be unseated while SPC No. 88-546 which was filed before proclamation under section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code sought to deny due course to Larrazabal's certificate of candidacy for material misrepresentations and was seasonably filed on election day. He, therefore, avers that since under section 6 of Republic Act 6646 it is provided therein that: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes case for him shall not be counted. The votes cast in favor of Larrazabal who obtained the highest number of votes are not considered counted making her a non-candidate, he, who obtained the second highest number of votes should be installed as regular Governor of Leyte in accordance with the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 88004. While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed the fact remains that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona-fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. In the Frivaldo and Labo cases, this is precisely the reason why the candidates who obtained the second highest number of votes were not allowed to assume the positions vacated by Frivaldo the governorship of Sorsogon, and Labo, the position of mayor in Baguio City. The nature of the proceedings therefore, is not that compelling. What matters is that in the event a candidate for an elected position who is voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes is disqualified for not possessing the eligibility requirements at the time of the election as provided by law, the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes for the same position can not assume the vacated position. It should be stressed that in G.R. No. 88004, the Court set aside the dismissal of SPC No. 88-546, and directed the COMELEC to conduct hearings to determine whether or not Larrazabal was qualified to be a

candidate for the position of governor in the province of Leyte. This is the import of the decision in G.R. No. 88004. Thus, the Court ruled in the case of Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City. The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then, with three dissenting and another two reserving their vote. One was on official leave. ... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid the vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary politics and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. In sum, the Court does not find any reason to reverse and set aside the questioned decision and resolution of the COMELEC. The COMELEC has not acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion Labo v COMELEC (1989) FACTS: Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the Philippines. He was granted Australian citizenship in 1976. In 1980, the marriage was declared void for being bigamous. Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980, using an Australian passport, and obtained an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). He later applied for a change in status from immigrant to returning Filipino citizen. However, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation denied his application for the cancellation of his ACR since he has not applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship. According to the records of the Australian Embassy (as certified by the Australian Consul), Labo was still an Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although no direct evidence was presented to prove that he took an oath of allegiance as a naturalized Australian citizen, the laws of Australia at the time required any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. The wording/text of this oath includes a renunciation of all other allegiance. Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City in the local elections held on January 18, 1988. The second-placer, Luis Lardizabal, filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Labo is disqualified from holding public office on the grounds of alienage, and asking that the latter's proclamation as Mayor be annulled. ISSUES: *The original issue raised before the Supreme Court concerned only the COMELEC's jurisdiction over Lardizabal's petition. Labo contended that the petition for quo warranto was not filed on time, hence the COMELEC lacks the jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry regarding his citizenship. However, the SC decided to rule on the merits of the case, given that the issue is also of considerable importance (a foreign citizen holding public office in the Philippines), and in the interest of the speedy administration of justice. Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire into Labo's citizenship? Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen? Is he qualified to hold public office in the Philippines? If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor, can Lardizabal, as the runner-up in the elections, replace him?

HELD/RATIO: Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. Lardizabal did not immediately pay the filing fee because the COMELEC had at first considered the petition as a pre-proclamation proceeding, which does not require the payment of such a fee. When the COMELEC reclassified the petition, Lardizabal immediately paid the filing fee -- thus, he still complied with the prescribed 10-day period. Furthermore, the Court held that such technicalities should not hinder judicial decisions on significant issues, such as the one being decided in this case. Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his Philippine citizenship by all 3 modes specified in the Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation of citizenship, and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. He has not reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of the 3 methods prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of Congress, (2) naturalization, and (3) repatriation. Contrary to Labo's claim, his naturalization in Australia did not confer him with dual citizenship. The Constitution explicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to national interest. The contention that his marriage to an Australian national did not automatically divest him of Filipino citizenship is irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo had automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. Also, his Filipino citizenship has not been automatically restored upon the annulment of his Australian citizenship, when his marriage was declared void on the grounds of bigamy. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation held in in 1988 that Labo was not a Filipino citizen. The earlier contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is totally baseless, and is even alleged to have been politically motivated. The latter can be reversed because the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship. Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the Philippines. He was not even a qualified voter when he was elected. Despite getting the second highest number of votes, Lardizabal cannot assume the position of Mayor because he has not been duly elected by the people of Baguio City. Labo's disqualification alone does not entitle him to take office. Instead, the elected Vice Mayor shall replace Labo. *Separate concurring opinion (Gutierrez Jr., J.): Although no decision has been rendered by the COMELEC and elevated to the SC for review, it is undeniable that a foreigner cannot be allowed to hold public office in the Philippines. It is regrettable, however, that Labo should be disqualified on the basis of his citizenship because he has already achieved a lot while serving as Mayor during the pendency of the case. Labo v COMELEC (1992) Facts: petitioner Ortega filed on March 26, 1992, a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on the ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated therein that he (Labo) is a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Ortega presented the decision of this Court in Labo v. Commission on Elections (176 SCRA 1 [1989]) declaring Labo not a citizen of the Philippines. Labo, on the other hand, though represented by counsel, did not present any evidence. It was only on May 5, 1992 that petitioner submitted his Answer claiming Filipino citizenship. COMELEC: cancelled Labos COC. May 10, 1992, the Commission resolves that the decision promulgated on May 9, 1992 disqualifying respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., shall become final and executory only after five (5) days from promulgation. Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as candidate for City Mayor of Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to the final outcome of this case in the event the issue is elevated to the Supreme Court either on appeal or certiorari. On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the City Mayor of Baguio.

May 15, 1992 petitioner Ortega filed before the Comelec an urgent motion for the implementation of its May 9, 1992 resolution cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy. After an exchange of pleadings, respondent Comelec, in its resolution dated May 26, 1992, denied Ortega's motion in view of the pending case (G.R. No. 105111) earlier filed by Labo of the same nature before this Court. I. GR 105111 Petitioner faults the Comelec for the supposed abbreviated proceedings in SPA No. 92-029 which denied him adequate opportunity to present a full-dress presentation of his case. Thus: a) only one (1) day was set for hearing of the case, i.e., May 4, 1992; b) two days later, May 6, 1992 the hearing was set; c) instead of holding a hearing, the Comelec issued the questioned resolution on May 9, 1992. SC: records disclose that summons were issued by respondent Comelec as early as March 27, 1992 followed by a telegram on April 1, 1992. But petitioner chose to ignore the same. Came April 15, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a motion to declare petitioner Labo in default. Over-extending him (Labo) the benefit of due process, respondent Comelec issued another order dated April 24, 1992, this time directing the Acting City Election Registrar of Baguio to personally serve the summons. The alleged delay in the resolution of SPA No. 92-029 can only be attributed to petitioner Labo and no one else. Petitioner (Labo) filed his verified Answer, insisting that he is a Filipino citizen and continue to maintain and preserve his Filipino citizenship; that he does not hold an Australian citizenship; that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply in citizenship; and that "existing facts support his continuous maintenance and holding of Philippine citizenship" and "supervening events now preclude the application of the ruling in the Labo v. Comelec SC: No evidence has been offered by respondent to show what these existing facts and supervening events are to preclude the application of the Labo decision. The Commission is bound by the final declaration that respondent is not a Filipino citizen. The fact remains that he has not submitted in the instant case any evidence, if there be any, to prove his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship either before this Court or the Comelec. On this score alone, We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Comelec in cancelling his (Labo's) certificate of candidacy and declaring that he is NOT a Filipino citizen pursuant to our ruling in the 1989 case of Labo v. Comelec Petitioner Labo claims, however, that Sec. 72 2 of the Omnibus Election Code "operates as a legislatively mandated special repatriation proceeding" and that it allows his proclamation as the winning candidate since the resolution disqualifying him was not yet final at the time the election was held. SC: In the first place, Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, to wit: Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or the Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Comelec can legally suspend the proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning number of votes notwithstanding, especially so where, as in this case. Labo failed to present any evidence before the Comelec to support his claim of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Petitioner Labo's status has not changed in the case at bar. To reiterate, he (Labo) was disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His election does not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable requirement for holding public office. Mere application for repratriation, does not, and cannot, amount to an automatic reacquisition of the applicant's Philippine citizenship. II. GR 105384 Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a temporary restraining order as regards the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy, said resolution has already become final and executory. Ortega further posits the view that as a result of such finality, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes should be declared Mayor of Baguio City. SC: At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition (GR No. 105111) on May 15, 1992, the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labo's) certificate of candidacy had already become final and executory a day earlier, or on May 14, 1992, said resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on the same day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in the interim no restraining order was issued by this Court. The resolution cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992 constrains Us to rule against his proclamation as Mayor of Baguio City. To begin with, one of the qualifications of an elective official is that he must be a citizen of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. As mandated by law: "An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines." The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number of votes to proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio City. While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect. The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos v. Commission on Election, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA 435), which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of the Court. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.

The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of this case. As a consequence of petitioners' ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor, in accordance with Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code Frivaldo v COMELEC 1996 Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegation but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that his naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the Martial Law Dictators agent abroad. Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election. Held: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure. Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as a Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. In the certificate of candidacy he filed, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in his answer. Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a measure of protection from the persecution of the Marcos government through his agents in the United States. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of allegiance to the United States, unlike the petitioner who solemnly declared "on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen," meaning in his case the Republic of the Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the

impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime. The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole question presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our own laws, regardless of other nationality laws. We can decide this question alone as sovereign of our own territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention providing that "it is for each State to determine under its law who are its nationals." It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in Liechtenstein whereas in the present case Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United States. If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings. Gutierrez Jr, Concurring: I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the higher interests of the State are involved, the public good should supersede any procedural infinities which may affect a petition filed with the Commission on Elections. I fail to see how the Court could allow a person who by his own admissions is indubitably an alien to continue holding the office of Governor of any province. It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the filing of a protest whether quo warranto or election contest is mandatory and jurisdictional. As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner's election and proclamation should have been filed with ten days after the proclamation of election results. The purpose of the law in not allowing the filing of protests beyond the period fixed by law is to have a certain and definite time within which petitions against the results of an election should be filed and to provide summary proceedings for the settlement of such disputes. The Rules of Court allow the Republic of the Philippines to file quo warranto proceedings against any public officer who performs an act which works a forfeiture of his office. However, where the Solicitor General or the President feel that there are no good reasons to commence quo warranto proceedings, the Court should allow a person like Estuye or his league to bring the action. I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of an alien holding an elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. Where the disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, I believe that the tenday period should be applied strictly. The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it inexpedient to wait for the final decision of COMELEC. This step is most unusual but considering the total lack of any serious grounds for the petitioner's claim of having regained his Philippine citizenship, I am constrained to concur in the procedure pro hac vice. Mercado v Manzano 1999 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare Manzano disqualified to hold the office of vice-mayor of Makati City. Important details on Edu Manzano: born September 4, 1955 in San Francisco, California, USA to Filipino parents. On the May 11, 1998 elections for vice-mayoralty of Makati City, 3 candidates competed for the post: Eduardo B. Manzano, Ernesto S. Mercado, and Gabriel V. Daza III. Manzano won the elections but his proclamation was suspended due to a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril alleging that Manzano was an American citizen. On May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on the grounds of his dual-citizenship, which disqualifies him according

to Sec.40(d) of the Local Government Code. Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration. Mercado sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. Manzano opposed the motion to intervene. The motion was unresolved. But on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc (with 1 commissioner abstaining) reversed the Second Divisions ruling on the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and directing the proclamation of Manzano as winner, saying: Manzano, being born in the USA, obtained US citizenship by operation of the US constitution and laws under principle of jus soli (basis is place of birth). Yet, by being born to Filipino parents, Manzano natural born Filipino citizen, by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution and laws under principle jus sanguinis (the right of blood). Although he is registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and holds and American passport, he has not lost his Filipino citizenship since he has not renounced it and has not taken an oath of allegiance to the USA. Manzano, after the age of majority, registered himself as a voter and voted in the 1992, 1995, and 1998 Philippine elections which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had US citizenship. Private respondent Manzano was then proclaimed as vice-mayor of Makati City. ISSUES: WON petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was his motion for leave to intervene granted. WON respondent Manzano is a dual citizen and if so, WON he is disqualified from being a candidate for viceREASONS: Manzano argues that Mercado has neither legal interest in the matter of litigation nor an interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment. This assumes that at the time intervention was sought, there had already been a proclamation of the election results for the vice-mayoralty elections when in fact, there has not been such a proclamation. Certainly, the petitioner had, and still has an interest in ousting private respondent from the race when he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC only applies when the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is WON the second placer may be declared winner. If Mamaril was competent to bring action, so was Mercado, being a rival candidate. Petitioner has right to intervene even if he filed the motion on May 20, 1998, when it was shown that the private respondent had the most votes. Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 provides that intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has been no final judgment rendered. Failure of COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for intervention was tantamount to denial of the motion, justifying this petition for certiorari. Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner contends that through Sec.40(d) of the Local Government Code (which declares as disqualified from running for elective local position Those with dual-citizenship), Congress has command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold elective office. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is involuntary; it arises out of circumstances of birth or marriage, where a person is recognized to be a national by two or more states. Dual allegiance is a result of a persons volition; it is a situation wherein a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. Dual citizenship is an issue because a person who has this raises a question of which states law must apply to him/her, therefore posting a threat to a countrys sovereignty. In Sec.5 Article IV of the Constitution on Citizenship, the concern was not with dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain allegiance to their countries of origin even after naturalization. Hence, dual citizenship in the aforementioned disqualification clause must mean dual allegiance. Ther efore, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. It should suffice that upon filing of certificates for candidacy, such persons with dual citizenships have elected their Philippine citizenship to terminate their dual citizenship. In private respondents certificate of

candidacy, he made these statements under oath on March 27, 1998 : I am a Filipino citizenNaturalborn. I am not a permanent resident of , or immigrant to , a foreign country. I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dualcitizen. In Frivaldo v. COMELEC, it was held that By laws of the United States Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government. Therefore, petitioner Mercados contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute his renunciation of his American citizenship. Also, equally without merit is his contention that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been made upon reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age. Plus, the fact that Manzano admitted that he was registered as an American citizen with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he used for his last travel to the US dated April 22, 1997should not be such a big deal. At the time of said travel, the use of an American passport was simply an assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. Admitting that he was a registered alien does not mean that he is not still a Filipino ( Aznar v. COMELEC). Manzanos oath of allegiance, together with the fact he has spent his life here, received his education here, and practiced his profession here, and has taken part in past Philippine elections, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. WHEREFORE, petition for certiorari, DISMISSED. *Ineligibility refers to lack of qualifications prescribed. Coquilla v COMELEC (2002) Nature: Petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution, dated July 19, 2001, of the Second Division of the COMELEC, ordering the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Teodulo M. Coquilla for the position of mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar in the May 14, 2001 elections and the order, dated January 30, 2002, of the COMELEC en banc denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.Special Civil Action in the SC. Certiorari Facts: February 17, 1938 Coquilla was born of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he joined the US Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen. 1970-1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy. Otherwise, even after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the U.S. October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the U.S. the last of which took place on July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5, 2000. Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 81715 to the Special Committee on Naturalization which was approved Nov. 7, 2000 Nov. 10, 2000 oath-taking as Filipino citizen; issued Certificate of Repatriation No. 000737 and Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate No. 115123 three days after November 21, 2000 - applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. Approved by Election Registration Board on January 12, 2001. February 27, 2001 filed certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for "two (2) years." March 5, 2001, Neil M. Alvarezrespondent, incumbent mayor of Oras and reelectionist sought cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. COMELEC unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May 14, 2001 where petitioner won over private respondents by 379 votes.

May 17, 2001 - petitioner proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers and subsequently took his oath of office. July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted private respondents petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the basis the respondents frequent or regular trips to the Philippines and stay in Oras, Eastern Samar after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985 cannot be added to his actual residence thereat after November 10, 2000 until May 14, 2001 to cure his deficiency in days, months, and year to allow or render him eligible to run for an elective office in the Philippines. The 1-yr residency requirement of Sec 39(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to Secs 65 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code contemplates of the actual residence of a Filipino citizen in the constituency where he seeks to be elected. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on January 30, 2002. Hence this petition. Issues: WON the 30-day period for appealing the resolution of the COMELEC was suspended by the filing of a motion for reconsideration by petitioner. Private respondent contention: petition should be dismissed cause his motion for reconsideration was denied for being pro forma and did not suspend the running of the 30-day period for filing this petition, pursuant to Rule 19, 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, so and since the resolution was received on July 28, 2001 and the petition in this case was filed on February 11, 2002, the same should be considered as having been filed late and should be dismissed. Petitioners MFR and petition for certiorari were filed within the prescribed periods. 5 -day period for filing MFR under Rule 19, 2 should be counted from receipt of decision, resolution, order, or ruling of COMELEC. In this case, petitioner received a copy of COMELECs Second Division July 19, 01 resolution on July 28, 2001. 5 days later, on Aug. 2, 01, he filed his MFR. On Feb. 6, 02, he received a copy of the order, dated Jan. 30, 02, of the COMELEC en banc denying his MFR. 5 days later, on Feb 11, 02, he filed this petition for certiorari. Contention that petitioners MFR did not suspend the running of the period for filing this petition because the motion was pro forma and, thus, petition shouldve been filed on or before Aug 27, 01 is not correct. It was actually filed, however, only on February 11, 2002. The MFR was not pro forma and its filing did suspend the period for filing the petition for certiorari in this case. The mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed upon by the court does not make a motion pro forma; otherwise, the movants remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial o r some other remedy. In the cases where MFR was held to be pro forma, the motion was so held because it was a second motion for reconsideration, or it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the evidence,or it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law, or the adverse party was not given notice thereof. Petitioners MFR suffers from none of these defects, and COMELEC erred in ruling that petitioners MFR was pro forma because the allegations raised therein are a mere "rehash" of his earlier pleadings or did not raise "new matters." Hence, the filing of the motion suspended the running of the 30-day period to file the petition in this case, which, as earlier shown, was done within the reglementary period provided by law. WON COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide this case notwithstanding the proclamation of petitioner. R.A. No. 6646, Sec 6 & 7: Candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall not be voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be counted. But those against whom no final judgment of disqualification had been rendered may be voted for and proclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainant, the COMELEC suspends their proclamation because the grounds for their disqualification or cancellation of their certificates of candidacy are strong. Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been begun before the elections, should continue even after such elections and proclamation of the winners.

In Abella v. COMELEC and Salcedo II v. COMELEC the SC, in the first case, affirmed and, in the second, reversed the decisions of the COMELEC rendered after the proclamation of candidates, not on the ground that the latter had been divested of jurisdiction upon the candidates proclamation but on the merits. WON petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy. No. First, 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides: An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. Residence" is to be understood as referring to "domicile" or legal residencethe place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the pla ce where the childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until Nov. 10, 00, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien. If immigration to the United States by virtue of a "greencard," which entitles one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines (Caasi v. CA), much more does naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines, as was the case with the petitioner. Petitioner was repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630, which applies to the repatriation of those who lost their Philippine citizenship by accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the US, but under R.A. No. 8171, which provides for the repatriation of, among others, natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost his Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines and had not reacquired it until November 10, 00 Second, petitioner did not reestablished residence in this country in 1998 when he came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate in that year and by "constantly declaring" to his townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately, when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under 13 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress, in which case he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien. In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioners status when he entered the country on Oct and Dec 98, Oct 99, and June 00 is the statement "Philippine Immigration () Balikbayan" in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on Aug 5, 00, the stamp bore the added inscription "good for one year stay. " Under 2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a "visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year" (3(c)). It would appear then that when petitioner entered the country on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for 1-yr only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident only on Nov 10, 00 upon taking his oath as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras Petitioner cannot invoke the ruling in the cases Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections and Bengson as residency was not an issue in these.

Third, petitioners contends that his registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in January 2001 is conclusive of his residency as a candidate because 117 of the Omnibus Election Code requires that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. But, registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a candidates lack of residency (Nuval v. Guray). Fourth, petitioner was not denied due process because the COMELEC failed to act on his motion to be allowed to present evidence. Under 5(d), in relation to 7, of R.A. No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), proceedings for denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy are summary in nature. The holding of a formal hearing is thus not de rigeur. In any event, petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to be heard since he filed a Verified Answer, a Memorandum and a Manifestation, all dated March 19, 2001, before the COMELEC in which he submitted documents relied by him in this peti tion, which, contrary to petitioners claim, are complete and intact in the records. WON COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy since the statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy that he had been a res ident of Oras, Eastern Samar for "two years" at the time he filed such certificate is not true. Yes. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. Sec 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning a candidates qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified. Judgment: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections, dated July 19, 2001, and the order, dated January 30, 2002 of the Commission on Elections en banc are AFFIRMED. Japzon v COMELEC 2009 Facts: Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007. Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition5 to disqualify and/or cancel Tys Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino). Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country. In fact, even after filing his application for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007. Moreover, although Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 Ty claimed, however, that prior to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already performed the following acts: (1) with

the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Tys application was approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured and signed his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur, in which he stated that his address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his address as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. Ty won pending resolution of the case. COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the requirements of Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship. Although [Ty] has lost his domicile in [the] Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts thereof proved that he has been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year before the elections held on 14 May 2007 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy Issue: WON Ty is DQ-ed Held: No Ratio: On 2 October 2005, Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225. 16 At this point, Ty still held dual citizenship, i.e., American and Philippine. It was only on 19 March 2007 that Ty renounced his American citizenship before a notary public and, resultantly, became a pure Philippine citizen again. It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain17 his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for public office. Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

That Ty complied with the second requirement is beyond question. On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine citizenship. The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)." 18 A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In Coquilla,19 the Court already acknowledged that for an individual to acquire American citizenship, he must establish residence in the USA. Since Ty himself admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen, then he must have necessarily abandoned the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, as his domicile of origin; and transferred to the USA, as his domicile of choice. As has already been previously discussed by this Court herein, Tys reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth. The principle of animus revertendi has been used to determine whether a candidate has an "intention to return" to the place where he seeks to be elected. Corollary to this is a determination whether there has been an "abandonment" of his former residence which signifies an intention to depart therefrom. In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondents immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, the Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term "residence," as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. The Court explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. As espoused by Ty, the issue of whether he complied with the one-year residency requirement for running for public office is a question of fact. Its determination requires the Court to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties before the COMELEC. The COMELEC, taking into consideration the very same pieces of evidence presently before this Court, found that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. It is axiomatic that factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the COMELEC, which have acquired expertise in their field are binding and conclusive on the Court

Tys intent to establish a new domicile of choice in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and securing CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his address as A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. The fact that Ty did come back to the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, after said trips, is a further manifestation of his animus manendi and animus revertendi. There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence. In Aquino v. COMELEC,25 the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. Robredo v Tan [2008] Facts: A Complaint8 dated 16 December 1991 was filed by complainant (herein respondent) Orlando P. Tan (Tan, for brevity) against respondents (herein petitioners) Jose Lim Robredo alias Jose Chan Robredo (Jose, for brevity) and Jesse M. Robredo (Jesse, for brevity) for Compulsory Registration as Chinese Nationals and Deportation filed before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. Tan alleged that Robredos parents were Chinese (mother is lotus feet) did not naturalized and neither did their children . Robredos sister even applied for naturalization but Robredo still failed to do so. Jose misrepresented himself as a Filipino and passed this misrepresentation to his son Jesse, by falsely registering himself as a Filipino citizen with the Local Civil Registrar; when Jose applied for a Philippine Passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs, he concealed the fact that he has personal knowledge of the fact that his Record of Birth is intact and on file with the Records Management and Archives Office; by this falsity, Jose was granted by the DFA with Philippine Passport Case was elevated to the Board of Special Inquiry for further proceedings.12 Respondents Robredo filed their Motion to Dismiss13 dated 11 April 1992 and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss14 dated 18 March 1992 praying that the case be dismissed, they being Filipino citizens and the Board of Special Inquiry has no jurisdiction over the case and over their persons. MTD was denied even on appeal. Tan then filed petition to reconstitute records of the case mssing and lost. After protracted hearings and resolutions on the matter, the petition was eventually granted. Thus Office of the President ruled - The issue of jurisdiction aside, we agree with DOJ Acting Secretary (now Ombudsman) Gutierrez that respondents' citizenship is best settled by the Board of Special Inquiry in a proceeding for that purpose after the parties have reconstituted the\ records of the case. Under the principle of equity, respondents must be given a chance to prove their true citizenship and controvert whatever evidence that complainant would present. This case should be remanded back to the Bureau of Immigration and/or Board of Special Inquiry for reception of evidence and reconstitution of the records.

Petitioners contend that: the ruling of the Office of the President, if implemented will result in disregarding an elementary tenet in the law of procedure, i.e., a judgment or ruling which has attained finality cannot be disturbed; from the issuance of the 20 April 1995 Order of the Bureau of Immigration up to the time that the respondent filed his Petition to Reconstitute Records and to Re-Open the Complaint for Compulsory Registration as Chinese Nationals and Deportation for Further Proceedings on 14 March 2000, almost five (5) years or 1,778 days had already passed, thus, the decision has already acquired finality and becomes immutable and unalterable. Petitioners posit that: the Office of the President committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the reconstitution and reopening of the Complaint for further proceedings despite failure of the respondent to comply with the mandate of Act. No. 3110, which is applicable in supplementary character and despite his lack of personality to initiate the same; no notice of loss was issued by the office of the clerk having custody of the records of the case D.C. No. 92-736 and neither was such notice published in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation. In support of their prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, petitioners basically argues that the continuation by the Bureau of Immigration of its reconstitution of records and the reopening of the case against them will work injustice to the petitioners and the people of Naga City as petitioner Jesse is serving them as their duly elected local chief executive. Issue: only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the Office of the President erred in directing the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration to take immediate action for the reconstitution of the records in Deportation Case Held: No Ratio: It is worthy to note that the whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or replace records lost or destroyed so that said records may be complete and court proceedings may continue from the point or stage where said proceedings stopped due to the loss of the records.40 The matter concerning petitioners' citizenship is not an issue to be passed upon or resolved by Us in the instant Petition but by the Bureau of Immigration in D.C. No. 92-736. As aptly stressed by the Office of the President, the controversy devolves solely upon the issue of reconstitution of the records in said D.C. No. 92-736. Thus, without reconstitution of the records in said deportation case which was filed against petitioners, no further proceedings can be had. As found by the Office of the President, x x x the Board did not conduct any proceedings thereon as the records of the case mysteriously disappeared and (c)omplainant was later informed of the missing records The reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as the defense43 and the mysterious disappearance of the records is an event which weighs equally against all. The said reconstitution cannot be considered as a filing anew of the complaint but it is merely the reproduction and replacement of the missing or lost records in D.C. Case No. 92-736. The Bureau is the best agency that can best determine whether petitioners violated certain provisions of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. In this jurisdiction, courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative departments over matters falling within their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts.47 Petitioners insist that respondent failed to comply with the

mandate of Act No. 3110 with respect to the notice and publication requirement. We are not persuaded. Act No. 3110,48 is the general law that governs the reconstitution of judicial records. Clearly, it can be gleaned from the foregoing, that the notice and publication requirements of Act 3110 pertain only to judicial reconstitution of records and not to the reconstitution of records of a pending deportation case before the Bureau of Immigration. ii. Disqualifications Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; (c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic; (d) Those with dual citizenship; (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad; (f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and (g) The insane or feeble-minded. Election Code on Disqualifications Caasi vs. CA 1990 Facts: Private respondent Merito Miguel was elected as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan during the local elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by herein petitioner, Mateo Caasi, on the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code private respondent was not qualified because he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao. Issues: 1. Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States. 2. Whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988. Held: The Supreme Court held that Miguels application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local election on January 18, 1988, the Courts conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void. Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law. In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines provides: SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila

before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay ," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the following information is printed: Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the United States." Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently. Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of immigrating the entering into a country with the intention of residing in it. As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the country in which he resides. This is in return for the protection given to him during the period of his residence therein. Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18,1988 local elections, waive his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States? To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office. The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least 1 year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42, LGC). Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only 3 months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in Nov 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on Jan 18, 1988. In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof. Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent residence in the United States, he never really intended to live there permanently, for all that he wanted was a green card to enable him to come and go to the U.S. with ease. In other words, he would have this Court believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under false pretenses; that all this time he only had one foot in the United States but kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even if that were true, this Court will not allow itself to be a party to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it, and giving him the best of both worlds so to speak. Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his

occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void. Marquez, Jr. vs. COMELEC 1995 Facts: It is averred that at the time respondent Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged flight from that country. Before the May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation of respondents certificate of candidac y on the ground of the candidates disqualification was filed by petitioner, but COMELEC dismissed the petition. Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon. Petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings against private respondent before the COMELEC but the latter dismissed the petition. Issue: Whether private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 provides: Article 73. Disqualifications The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) xxxx (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment. It is clear from this provision that fugitives from justice refer only to persons who has been convicted by final judgment. However, COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not private respondent is a fugitive from justice when it outrightly denied the petition for quo warranto. The Court opted to remand the case to COMELEC to resolve and proceed with the case. The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the possible constitutional infirmity of Section 40(e) of RA 7160 if the disqualification therein meant were to be so taken as to embrace those who merely were facing criminal charges. A similar concern was expressed by Senator R. A. V. Saguisag who, during the bicameral conference committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives, made this reservation: . . . de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung language especially 'yung, the scope of fugitive. Medyo bothered ako doon, a. The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It provided: Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position: (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment. Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight . The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente, that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment." is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law. Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact, private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion.

The omission is understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter. Davide, Concurring. The term "fugitive from justice" refers not only to those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but also to those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug finds the definition given to it by the Oversight Committee, i.e., "a person who has been convicted by final judgment," as appearing in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, as inordinate and as undue circumscription of the law. I agree. But this is only one side of the coin. I further submit that it also unreasonably expands the scope of the disqualification in the 1991 Local Government Code because it disqualifies all those who have been convicted by final judgment, regardless of the extent of the penalty imposed and of whether they have served or are serving their sentences or have evaded service of sentence by jumping bail or leaving for another country. The definition thus disregards the true and accepted meaning of the word fugitive. This new definition is unwarranted for nothing in the legislative debates has been shown to sustain it and the clear language of the law leaves no room for a re-examination of the meaning of the term. I do not share the doubt of Mr. Justice Vitug on the constitutionality of the disqualification based on the presumption of innocence clause of the Bill of Rights. There are certain fundamental considerations which do not support the applications of the presumption Firstly, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution recognizes the authority of Congress to determine who are disqualified from exercising the right of suffrage. Since the minimum requirement of a candidate for a public office is that he must be a qualified voter, it logically follows that Congress has the plenary power to determine who are disqualified to seek election for a public office. Secondly, a public office is a public trust. Thirdly, the disqualification in question does not, in reality, involve the issue of presumption of innocence. Elsewise stated, one is not disqualified because he is presumed guilty by the filing of an information or criminal complaint against him. He is disqualified because he is a "fugitive from justice," i.e., he was not brought within the jurisdiction of the court because he had successfully evaded arrest; or if he was brought within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried and convicted, he has successfully evaded service of sentence because he had jumped bail or escaped. The disqualification then is based on his flight from justice. In the face of the settled doctrine that flight is an indication of guilt, it may even be truly said that it is not the challenged disqualifying provision which overcomes the presumption of innocence but rather the disqualified person himself who has proven his guilt. Rodriguez vs. COMELEC, 1996 Facts: The petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez was a candidate for Governor in the Province of Quezon in the May 8, 1995 elections. His rival candidate for the said position was Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr., herein private respondent. Private respondent filed a petition for disqualification before the COMELEC based principally on the allegation that Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice. Private respondent revealed that a charge for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property is pending against the petitioner before the Los Angeles Municipal Court. Rodriguez is therefore a fugitive from justice which is a ground for his disqualification/ ineligibility under Section 40 (e) of the Local Government Code according to Marquez. Rodriguez, however, submitted a certification from the Commission of Immigration showing that Rodriguez left the US on June 25, 1985- roughly five (5) months prior to the institution of the criminal complaint filed against him before the Los Angeles Court. The COMELEC complied therewith by filing before the Court, on December 26, 1995, a report entitled "'EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES and COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" wherein the COMELEC, after calibrating the parties' evidence, declared that Rodriguez is NOT a "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision, thus making a 180-degree turnaround from its finding in the Consolidated Resolution. In arriving at this new conclusion, the COMELEC opined that intent to evade is a material element of the MARQUEZ Decision definition. Such intent to evade is absent in Rodriguez' case because evidence has established that Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines long before the criminal charge was instituted in the Los Angeles Court.

But the COMELEC report did not end there. The poll body expressed what it describes as its "persistent discomfort" on whether it read and applied correctly the MARQUEZ Decision definition of "fugitive from justice". Issue: Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice. Held: No. The Supreme Court reiterated that a fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates ones flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment or of a promulgated judgement of conviction. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigrations dated April 27 3 and June 26 of 1995, preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by the same foreign court, by almost five (5) months. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such time. What prosecution or punishment then was Rodriguez deliberately running away from with his departure from the US? The very essence of being a "fugitive from justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just nowhere to be found in the circumstances of Rodriguez. The circumstantial fact that it was 17 days after Rodriguez' departure that charges against him were filed cannot overturn the presumption of good faith in his favor. The same suggests nothing more than the sequence of events which transpired. A subjective fact as that of petitioner's purpose cannot be inferred from the objective data at hand in the absence of further proof to substantiate such claim. In fact, the evidence of Rodriguez sufficiently proves that his compulsion to return to the Philippines was due to his desire to join and participate vigorously in the political campaigns against former President Marcos. For indeed, not long after petitioner's arrival in the country, the upheaval wrought by the political forces and the avalanche of events which occurred resulted in one of the more colorful events in the Philippine history. And being a figure in these developments, Rodriguez began serving his home province as OIC-Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Quezon in 1986. Then, he was elected Governor in 1988 and continues to be involved in politics in the same capacity as re-elected Governor in 1992 and the disputed re-election in 1995. Altogether, these landmark dates hem in for petitioner a period of relentless, intensive and extensive activity of varied political campaigns first against the Marcos government, then for the governorship. And serving the people of Quezon province as such, the position entails absolute dedication of one's time to the demands of the office. Having established petitioner's lack of knowledge of the charges to be filed against him at the time he left the United States, it becomes immaterial under such construction to determine the exact time when he was made aware thereof. While the law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, does not countenance flight from justice in the instance that a person flees the jurisdiction of another state after charges against him or a warrant for his arrest was issued or even in view of the imminent filing and issuance of the same, petitioner's plight is altogether a different situation. When, in good faith, a person leaves the territory of a state not his own, homeward bound, and learns subsequently of charges filed against him while in the relative peace and service of his own country, the fact that he does not subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former state does not qualify him outright as a fugitive from justice. However, Marquez and the COMELEC seem to urge the Court to re-define "fugitive from justice". They espouse the broader concept of the term and culled from foreign authoritie scited in the MARQUEZ Decision itself, i.e., that one becomes a "fugitive from justice" by the mere fact that he leaves the jurisdiction where a charge is pending against him, regardless of whether or not the charge has already been filed at the time of his flight.

Suffice it to say that the "law of the case" doctrine forbids the Court to craft an expanded re-definition of "fugitive from justice" (which is at variance with the MARQUEZ Decision) and proceed therefrom in resolving the instant petition. The various definitions of that doctrine have been laid down in People v. Pinuila. To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice") are involved in the MARQUEZ Decision and the instant petition. The MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal from EPC No. 92-28 (the Marquez' quo warranto petition before the COMELEC). The instant petition is also an appeal from EPC No. 92-28 although the COMELEC resolved the latter jointly with SPA No. 95-089 (Marquez' petition for the disqualification of Rodriguez). Therefore, what was irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule in the MARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant petition. And we specifically refer to the concept of "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision which highlights the significance of an intent to evade but which Marquez and the COMELEC, with their proposed expanded definition, seem to trivialize. Besides, to re-define "fugitive from justice" would only foment instability in our jurisprudence when hardly has the ink dried in the MARQUEZ Decision. Torres, Jr: Petitioner returned to the Philippines from the United States on June 25, 1985 while the criminal complaint against him for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property was filed almost 5 months later, or on November 12, 1985. Verily, it cannot be said that he fled to avoid prosecution for at the time he left the United States, there was yet no case or prosecution to avoid. That petitioner did not know of the imminent filing of charges against him and that he did not flee to avoid prosecution are bolstered by the facts that: 1.) he returned to the United States twice: on August 14 and October 7 of the same year but arrived in the Philippines on October 26 likewise in the same year; 2.) he left his wife in the United States; and 3.) his wife was later on arrested for the same charges. Had petitioner been aware of the imminent filing of charges against him, he would never have returned to the United States and he would not have left his wife in there. Petitioner is a citizen of this country. Why should he not come home? Coming home to the Philippines was the most natural act of the petitioner, who happens to maintain his residence in the country. The fact that he remains here even after he was formally accused cannot be construed as an indication of an intent to flee, there being no compelling reason for him to go to the United States and face his accusers. On the contrary, it is his official duty, as an incumbent Governor of Quezon, to remain in the country and perform his duties as the duly elected public official. "Fugitive from justice" must be given a meaning in the instant case having regard to "the circumstances and the time it is used." Philosophers and jurists have tried unsuccessfully at an exact definition of such an abstruse term as justice. Unfortunately, whether in the metaphysical sense or otherwise, the question of justice is still unanswered as it ever was albeit characterized by secular skepticism. If the question is asked: What standard of justice should we enforce? The American sense of justice or the Philippine sense of justice? Undoubtedly, the forum in which it is raised should be controlling. By way only of hypothesis, if an American flees to escape from Philippine Laws to the United States, may we enforce in the United States our standard of justice based on Philippine Laws? I am tempted to ask these questions considering our zealousness to solve legal problems in the light of laws obtaining in the United States. At any rate, an accused charged with a crime in the Philippines cannot be a candidate and at the same time flee from prosecution. Once he goes campaigning his opponent would have him arrested. For this and the reasons above discussed, the provision on disqualification of fugitive from justice, being unnecessary and serving only to undermine one's constitutional right to equal access to opportunities for public service, should even be scantily considered. Finally, petitioner appears to have garnered 285,202 votes. According to the election results, petitioner won over private respondent by a majority of 140,000 votes more or less. As it is, to disqualify petitioner on the shaky ground of being a "fugitive from justice" would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. De La Torre vs. COMELEC 1996 Facts: Rolando P. Dela Torre filed an instant petition for certiorari seeks the nullification of resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) allegedly with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a case for disqualification filed against him before the COMELEC. The first assailed resolution dated 6 May 1995 declared dela Torre disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of

Cavinti, Laguna in the 8 May 1995 elections, citing as the ground therefor, Section 40(a) of RA 7160 (i.e. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by 1 year or more of imprisonment within 2 years after serving sentence); the other is the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude Held: A crime involving moral turpitude is one which is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. The elements of the crime of fencing (as gleaned from the definition of fencing in Section 2 of PD 1612, Anti-fencing Law) are: (1) A crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which have been deprived from the proceeds of the said crime; (3) The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. Thus, the COMELEC did not err in disqualifying the petitioner on the ground that the offense of fencing of which he had been previously convicted by final judgment was one involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that good morals. The duty not to appropriate, or to return, anything acquired either by mistake or with malice is so basic it finds expression in some key provisions of the Civil Code on Human Relations and Solutio Indebiti. Verily, circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object of the property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree, both the fence and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded ones peaceful dominion for gain - thus deliberately reneging in the process private duties they owe their fellowmen or society in a manner contrary to x x x accepted and customary rule of right and duty x x x, justice, honesty x x x or sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such circumstances include the time and place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord with the usual practices of commerce. The nature and condition of the goods sold, and the fact that the seller is not regularly engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise suggest the illegality of their source, and therefore should caution the buyer. This justifies the presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that mere possession of any goods, x x x, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing - a presumption that is, according to the Court, reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of x x x possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. All told, the COMELEC did not err in disqualifying the petitioner on the ground that the offense of fencing of which he had been previously convicted by final judgment was one involving moral turpitude. Anent the second issue where petitioner contends that his probation had the effect of suspending the applicability of Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code, suffice it to say that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioners conviction of fencing which we have heretofore declared as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40 (a), subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation. Clearly then, petitioners theory has no merit. Magno vs. COMELEC 2002

Facts: This is a petition for the disqualification of Nestor Magno as mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the May 14, 2001 elections on the ground that petitioner was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery. Thereafter, petitioner applied for probation and was discharged on March 5, 1998 upon order of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. The Comelec ruled that petitioner was disqualified from running for the position of mayor by virtue of Section 12 of BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code) (crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon, or granted amnesty.) According to the COMELEC, inasmuch as petitioner was considered to have completed the service of his sentence on March 5, 1998, his five-year disqualification will end only on March 5, 2003. The MR was denied the by Comelec. Issue: WON direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude Held: Yes

Ratio: Petitioner argues that direct bribery is not a crime involving moral turpitude. Likewise, he cites Section 40 of RA 7160, which he claims is the law applicable to the case at bar, not BP 881 or the Omnibus Election Code as claimed by the COMELEC. Said provision reads: Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence. Petitioner insists that he had already served his sentence as of March 5, 1998 when he was discharged from probation. Such being the case, the two-year disqualification period imposed by Section 40 of the Local Government Code expired on March 5, 2000. Thus, petitioner was qualified to run in the 2001 elections. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It frequently depends on the circumstances surrounding the violation of the law. In this case, we need not review the facts and circumstances relating to the commission of the crime considering that petitioner did not assail his conviction. By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct bribery: the offender is a public officer; the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another ; such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his official duties. Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. Issue: What law should apply in this case Held: Local Government Code Ratio: It is the second sub-issue which is problematical. There appears to be a glaring incompatibility between the five-year disqualification period provided in Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code and the two-year disqualification period in Section 40 of the Local Government Code. It should be noted that the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) was approved on December 3, 1985 while the Local Government Code (RA 7160) took effect on January 1, 1992. It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. In enacting the later law, the

legislature is presumed to have knowledge of the older law and intended to change it. Furthermore, the repealing clause of Section 534 of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code states that: (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. In accordance therewith, Section 40 of RA 7160 is deemed to have repealed Section 12 of BP 881. Furthermore, Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and not the other way around. When a subsequent law entirely encompasses the subject matter of the former enactment, the latter is deemed repealed. The intent of the legislature to reduce the disqualification period of candidates for local positions from five to two years is evident. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law. The reduction of the disqualification period from five to two years is the manifest intent. Therefore, although his crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner nonetheless could not be disqualified from running in the 2001 elections. Article 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yield to Article 40 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160). Petitioners disqualification ceased as of March 5, 2000 and he was therefore under no such disqualification anymore when he ran for mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2001 elections. Unfortunately, however, neither this Court nor this case is the proper forum to rule on (1) the validity of Sonia Lorenzos proclamation and (2) the declaration of petitioner as the rightful winner. Inasmuch as Sonia Lorenzo had already been proclaimed as the winning candidate, the legal remedy of petitioner would have been a timely election protest. Lingating vs. COMELEC 2002 Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for the disqualification of Sulong, pursuant to 40(b) of RA 7160 which disqualifies from running for any elective local position those removed from office as a result of an administrative case. It appears that Sulong had previously won as mayor of Lapuyan on January 18, 1988. In the May 11, 1992, and again in the May 8, 1995 elections, he was reelected. In a petition for disqualification, petitioner alleged that in 1991, during his first term as mayor of Lapuyan, Sulong, along with a municipal councilor of Lapuyan and several other individuals, was administratively charged with various offenses, and that, on February 4, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur found him guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office. Petitioner claimed that this decision had become final and executory, and consequently the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, took his oath as mayor. The comelec was unable to render judgment before the elections, Rulong was voted for in the elections and he won as mayor. The comelec then rendered a decision declaring Sulong disqualified as he was guilty of violating the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Sulong filed an MR contending that the decision has not become final and executor as the final disposition thereof was overtaken by the local elections of May 1992. The comelec en banc, however, reversed. It ruled that while it is true that one of the disqualifications from running in an elective position is removal from office as a result of an administrative case, said provision no longer applies if the candidate whose qualification is questioned got re-elected to another term. The reelection of Sulong in the 1992 and 1995 elections would be tantamount to a condonation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan decision which found him guilty of dishonesty, malversation of public funds etc[.], granting said decision has become final and executory. Moreover, the people of LAPUYAN have already expressed their will when they cast their votes in the recent elections as evidenced by the results which found respondent Sulong to have won convincingly. Issue: WON Sulong was entitled to occupy the office thus vacated Held: Yes Ratio: We stated in Reyes: Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, in which it was held that a public official could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection operated as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the righ t to remove him therefor. But that was because in that case, before the petition questioning the validity of the administrative decision removing petitioner could be decided, the term of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged

misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected [for] another term. This is the rationale for the ruling in the two Aguinaldo cases. The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, the decision in the administrative case, was served on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to 40(b) of the Local Government Code, he was disqualified from running for reelection. It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision similar to 40(b) which disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on the ground that he has been removed as a result of an administrative case. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect. However, Reyes cannot be applied to this case because it appears that the 1992 decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, finding respondent Sulong guilty of dishonesty, falsification and malversation of public funds, has not until now become final. The records of this case show that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur rendered judgment in AC No. 12-91 on February 4, 1992, a copy of which was received by respondent Sulong on February 17, 1992; that on February 18, 1992, he filed a mo tion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal; that on February 27, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, required Jim Lingating, the complainant in AC No. 12-91, to comment; and that the complainant in AC No. 12-91 has not filed a comment nor has the Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolved respondents motion. The filing of his motion for reconsideration prevented the decision of Sangguniang Panlalawigan from becoming final. While R.A. No. 7160 on disciplinary actions is silent on the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the same cannot be interpreted as a prohibition against the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Thus, it was held that a party in a disbarment proceeding under Rule 139-B, 12(c) can move for a reconsideration of a resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines although Rule 139-B does not so provide: Although Rule 139-B, 12(c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its text or history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed . . . . Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before [an appeal is] resort[ed] to . . . as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the judgment [an] opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of evidence. There is thus no decision finding respondent guilty to speak of. As Provincial Secretary of Zamboanga del Sur Wilfredo Cimafranca attested, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan simply considered the matter as having become moot and academic because it was overtaken by the local elections of May [11,]1992. Neither can the succession of the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, and the highest ranking municipal councilor of Lapuyan, Romeo Tan, to the offices of mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, be considered proof that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final because it appears to have been made pursuant to 68 of the Local Government Code, which makes decisions in administrative cases immediately executory. Indeed, considering the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to resolve respondents motion, it is unfair to the electorate to be told after they have voted for respondent Sulong that after all he is disqualified, especially since, at the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had been rendered nearly ten years ago. Flores vs. Drilon 1993 Facts: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this original petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Under said provision, for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority. Petitioners, as taxpayers, contend that said provision is unconstitutional as under the following constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall appoint all other

officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code. Issue: WON the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts Held: Yes Ratio: The rule expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a public officer or employee, like the head of an executive department described in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. v. Philip Ella C. Juico, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 83815, should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental duties or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency. In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment. It is argued that Sec. 94 of the LGC permits the appointment of a local elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office. But, the contention is fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land. Moreover, since the constitutionality of Sec. 94 of LGC is not the issue here nor is that section sought to be declared unconstitutional, we need not rule on its validity. Neither can we invoke a practice otherwise unconstitutional as authority for its validity. In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning agency; the Vice-President, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City, hence, an excepted circumstance, citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, where we stated that the prohibition against the holding of any other office or employment by the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants during their tenure, as provided in Sec. 13, Art. VII, of the Constitution, does not comprehend additional duties and functions required by the primary functions of the officials concerned, who are to perform them in an ex officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation therefor. This argument is apparently based on a wrong premise. Congress did not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of appointment. The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the word "appointed" and, instead, "ex officio" would have been used. Even in the Senate deliberations, the Senators were fully aware that subject proviso may contravene Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, but they nevertheless passed the bill and decided to have the controversy resolved by the courts. Indeed, the Senators would not have been concerned with the effects of Sec. 7, first par., had they considered the SBMA posts as ex officio.

Cognizant of the complication that may arise from the way the subject proviso was stated, Senator Rene Saguisag remarked that "if the Conference Committee just said "the Mayor shall be the Chairman" then that should foreclose the issue. It is a legislative choice."The Senator took a view that the constitutional proscription against appointment of elective officials may have been sidestepped if Congress attached the SBMA posts to the Mayor of Olongapo City instead of directing the President to appoint him to the post. Without passing upon this view of Senator Saguisag, it suffices to state that Congress intended the posts to be appointive, thus nibbling in the bud the argument that they are ex officio. Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President. Section 13, par. (d), itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer of SBMA, although he really has no choice under the law but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some office or trust," or "[t]he selection or designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge the duties of the same. In his treatise, Philippine Political Law, Senior Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines appointment as "the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office." Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion. Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to the appointee. In other words, the choice of the appointee is a fundamental component of the appointing power. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Once the power of appointment is conferred on the President, such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently, when the qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual, such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can qualify for the posts in question, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Where, as in the case of Gordon, an incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to other government posts, he does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility. As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised . . . . under color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public . . . . [or] under color of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such . Sobejana Condon v COMELEC 2012

Facts: petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon. On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen. 6 The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010. Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan 7 and Luis M. Bautista,8 (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioners eligibility before the RTC - failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. RTC: petitioners failure to comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. As admitted by the petitioner herself during trial, the personal declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia was not under oath. The law clearly mandates that the document containing the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before any public officer authorized to administer oath. COMELEC: COMELEC en banc concurred with the findings and conclusions of the RTC Petitioner: argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a mandatory requirement. In support thereof, she cites portions of the Journal of the House of Representatives dated June 2 to 5, 2003 containing the sponsorship speech for House Bill (H.B.) No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225. She claims that the private respondents are estopped from questioning her eligibility since they failed to do so when she filed certificates of candidacy for the 2007 and 2010 elections. Issues: I) WON the COMELEC en banc may resolve the merits of an appeal after ruling on its reinstatement; II) WON the COMELEC en banc may order the execution of a judgment rendered by a trial court in an election case; III) WON the private respondents are barred from questioning the qualifications of the petitioner; and IV) For purposes of determining the petitioners eligibility to run for public office, whether the "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma requirement. Held/Ratio: 1. Yes. An appeal may be simultaneously reinstated and definitively resolved by the COMELEC en banc in a resolution disposing of a motion for reconsideration. The power to decide motions for reconsideration in election cases is arrogated unto the COMELEC en banc by Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved by the division which issued the order. Considering that the above cited provisos do not set any limits to the COMELEC en bancs prerogative in resolving a motion for reconsideration, there is nothing to prevent the body from directly adjudicating the substantive merits of an appeal after ruling for its reinstatement instead of remanding the same to the division that initially dismissed it. 2. Yes. There is no reason to dispute the COMELECs authority to order discretionary execution of judgment in view of the fact that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly sanctioned by Section 1, Rule

41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.15 Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal may be issued by an appellate court after the trial court has lost jurisdiction. In Batul v. Bayron,16 we stressed the import of the provision vis--vis election cases when we held that judgments in election cases which may be executed pending appeal includes those decided by trial courts and those rendered by the COMELEC whether in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction. 3. No. The fact that the petitioners qualifications were not questioned when she filed certificates of candidacy for 2007 and 2010 elections cannot operate as an estoppel to the petition for quo warranto before the RTC. Under the Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code), there are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised, to wit: (1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that: Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election; and (2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz: Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. (Emphasis ours) 4. No. Pet is DQ-ed from running. R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic. Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine. On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath. To obviate the fatal consequence of her inutile renunciation, the petitioner pleads the Court to interpret the "sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) to be a mere pro forma requirement in conformity with the intent of the Legislature. She anchors her submission on the statement made by Representative Javier during the floor deliberations on H.B. No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225. At the outset, it bears stressing that the Courts duty to interpret the law according to its true intent is exercised only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning. The first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law. The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC,21 we declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. The same meaning was emphasized in Jacot v. Dal,22 when we held that Filipinos re-acquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 must explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines, thus: The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign

citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines The intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship. The above-quoted excerpts of the legislative record show that Representative Javiers statement ought to be understood within the context of the issue then being discussed, that is whether former natural-born citizens who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship under the proposed law will revert to their original status as natural-born citizens and thus be qualified to run for government positions reserved only to natural-born Filipinos, i.e. President, Vice-President and Members of the Congress. It was Representative Javiers position that they should be considered as repatriated Filipinos and not as natural-born citizens since they will have to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Natural-born citizens are those who need not perform an act to perfect their citizenship. Representative Libanan, however, maintained that they will revert to their original status as natural-born citizens. To reconcile the renunciation imposed by Section 5(2) with the principle that natural-born citizens are those who need not perform any act to perfect their citizenship, Representative Javier suggested that the sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship be considered as a mere pro forma requirement. Petitioners argument, therefore, loses its point. The "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" must be deemed a formal requirement only with respect to the re-acquisition of ones status as a natural -born Filipino so as to override the effect of the principle that natural-born citizens need not perform any act to perfect their citizenship. Never was it mentioned or even alluded to that, as the petitioner wants this Court to believe, those who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship and thereafter run for public office has the option of executing an unsworn affidavit of renunciation. Indeed, the solemn promise, and the risk of punishment attached to an oath ensures truthfulness to the prospective public officers abandonment of his adopted state and promis e of absolute allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to say that it is only for ceremonial purposes; it would also accommodate a mere qualified or temporary allegiance from government officers when the Constitution and the legislature clearly demand otherwise. Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under which she is already deemed to have lost her citizenship, is entitled to judicial notice. We disagree. Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven This Court as the government branch tasked to apply the enactments of the legislature must do so conformably with the wisdom of the latter sans the interference of any foreign law. If we were to read the Australian Citizen Act of 1948 into the application and operation of R.A. No. 9225, we would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed wise to require. To do so would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.32

The petitioners act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While this Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship, 33 such ruling was already adjudged superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.34 The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.35 In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.36 The rule applies to all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public office. iii. Election Cases Involving Local Elective Officials Galido v COMELEC 1991 Facts: Galido and private respondent Galeon were candidates during the January 1988 local elections for mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected Mayor. Private respondent filed an election protest before the RTC. After hearing, the said court upheld the proclamation of petitioner. Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC. Its First Division reversed the RTC decision and declared private respondent the duly-elected mayor. After the COMELEC en banc denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration and affirmed the decision of its First Division. The COMELEC held that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the initial C after the name Galido wer e marked ballots and, therefore, invalid. Undaunted by his previous failed actions the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and injunction before the Supreme Court and succeeded in getting a temporary restraining order. In his comment to the petition, private respondent moved for dismissal, citing Article IX (C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, that Final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal offices are final and executory, and not appealable. Issue: Whether or not a COMELEC decision may, if it sets aside the trial courts decision involving marked ballots, be brought to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party? Held: Yes Ratio: The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari. Under Article IX (A), Section 7 of the Constitution, which petitioner cites, it is stated, Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt thereof. We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. The petition involves pure questions of fact as they relate to appreciation of evidence (ballots) which is beyond the power of review of this Court. The COMELEC found that the writing of the letter "C" after the word "Galido" in the fifteen (15) ballots of Precinct 14 is a clear and convincing proof of a pattern or design to identify the ballots and/or voters. This finding should be conclusive on the Court. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials and has appellate

jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. (Article IX (C), Section 2 (2), paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution). In the present case, after a review of the trial court's decision, the respondent COMELEC found that fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the letter "C" after the name Galido are clearly marked ballots. May this COMELEC decision be brought to this court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party (the herein petitioner)? Under Article IX (A) Section 7 of the Constitution, which petitioner cites in support of this petition, it is stated: "(U)nless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each (Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." On the other hand, private respondent relies on Article IX, (C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the Constitution which provides that decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable. (Emphasis supplied) We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari. The proceedings in the Constitutional Commission on this matter are enlightening. We do not, however, believe that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision. It is settled that the function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court or tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As correctly argued by the COMELEC, it has the inherent power to decide an election contest on physical evidence, equity, law and justice, and apply established jurisprudence in support of its findings and conclusions; and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion, the exercise of which should not be controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either party. Finally, the records disclose that private respondent had already assumed the position of Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez as the duly-elected mayor of the municipality by virtue of the COMELEC decision. The main purpose of prohibition is to suspend all action and prevent the further performance of the act complained of. In this light, the petition at bar has become moot and academic. Rivera v COMELEC 1991 Facts: Juan Garcia Rivera and Juan Mitre Garcia II were candidates for the position of Mayor of Guinobatan, Albay, during the local elections in January 1988. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Rivera as the duly elected Mayor by a majority of 10 votes. Garcia filed an election protest with the RTC, which rendered its verdict finding Garcia to have obtained 6,376 votes as against Rivera's 6,222. On appeal to the Comelec, the Comelec sustained with modification the judgment. It ruled that Juan Garcia was the duly elected municipal mayor by a majority of 153 votes over Juan Rivera instead of plurality of 154 votes. Upon MR, the Comelec affirmed the decision. Garcia commenced to discharge the duties and functions of Mayor of Guinobatan on 10 October 1990, by virtue of a writ of execution implementing the COMELEC decision of 6 September 1990. He continued as mayor until 10 November 1990 when he was served notice of this Court's temporary restraining order, issued upon Rivera's motion. In this petition, Rivera prayed for the issuance of a restraining order arguing that the judgment had not yet become final and executory. He cites Article IX-C, Section 2, Par. (2) of the 1987 Constitution, in relation to Part VII, Rule 39, Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. He also contends that since the COMELEC decision has not yet become final and executory, the COMELEC has no authority to issue the assailed order and writ of execution. Petitioner maintains further that he has a period of thirty (30) days from 6 September 1990 or until 6 October 1990 within which to elevate the COMELEC decision, on certiorari, to this Court, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 39 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. He submits that the questioned COMELEC

decision is not one that became final and executory unless restrained by this Court as provided under Section 3, Rule 39 of the COMELEC Rules, as said rule applies only to "decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course or to disqualify a candidate, and postpone or suspend elections." Lastly, according to petitioner, Section 13(a) of Rule 18 (finality of Comelec decisions or resolutions) and Section 1 of Rule 39 (review by the Supreme Court of Comelec decisions, orders and rulings) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, should be read in the context of Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution (Supreme Court authority to review on certiorari a Comelec decision, order or ruling). Garcia contends that the Constitution declares that the Comelec decision on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials are to be final, executor and not appealable. Issue: WON the decisions of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials, being final and executory and not appealable, preclude the filing of a special civil action of certiorari Held: Yes Ratio: Under Article IX (A), Section 7 of the Constitution, which petitioner cites in support of this petition, it is stated: "(U)nless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each (Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. On the other hand, private respondent relies on Article IX, (C), Section 2 (2), paragraph 2 of the Constitution which provides that decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory and not appealable. We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari. The proceedings in the Constitutional Commission on this matter are enlightening. Flores vs Comelec: Obviously, the provision of Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution that "decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable" applies only to questions of fact and not of law. That provision was not intended to divest the Supreme Court of its authority to resolve questions of law as inherent in the judicial power conferred upon it by the Constitution. We eschew a literal reading of that provision that would contradict such authority. Actually, the main thrust of the present petition for certiorari is that the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the decision of its First Division, promulgated on 2 May 1990, annulling the proclamation of the petitioner as the duly elected Mayor of Guinobatan, Albay and when it did not exclude from the total votes of Garcia at least 10 votes which were allegedly misappreciated in Garcia's favor. We have closely scrutinized the challenged COMELEC decision and find that the said decision was not arrived at capriciously or whimsically by respondent COMELEC. A painstaking re-evaluation of the questioned 67 ballots was made by the COMELEC en banc. In fact, fourteen (14) ballots originally adjudicated in Garcia's favor were overruled by the Commission en banc, thus reducing the number of votes in his favor to 894 votes out of the 2,445 contested ballots. On the other hand, 16 ballots were added in Rivera's favor, thus increasing the votes in his favor to 1,087 votes. Moreover, the appreciation and re-evaluation of ballots are factual determinations. It is settled that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of administrative bodies are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual determinations. We find none in this case. Regalado, concurring: What the foregoing observations actually boil down to is that the decisions, orders, or rulings of said constitutional commissions are not subject to appellate review, that is, with this Court acting in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction and exercising its power of review over alleged errors of law and, sometimes, of fact or both. Such decisions, orders or rulings are not, however, invulnerable to an original civil action of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court, under its power of control and supervision over the lower courts, to pass upon errors of jurisdiction imputed to said commissions. This is inevitable and justified because no appeal or any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law lies from said adjudications. Narvasa, dissenting: It bears stressing that the final, executory and unappealable character of the COMELEC's rulings, orders or decisions in election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices, is

pronounced not by statute or presidential issuance, but by the Constitution itself. This is a relevant consideration because while Congress is granted by Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution the "power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, . . . (it) may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5" of the same Article VIII; and said Section 5 declares it to be one of the powers of the Supreme Court to "(r)eview, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in . . . (specifically listed cases)." It is in truth this fundamental limitation on the legislative prerogative to "define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction" of courts which is, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived by law of jurisdiction over certain particular cases that underlay this Court's doctrines allowing review by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of judgments and final orders of the National Labor Relations Commission under the Labor Code, and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, from which no appeal is prescribed by law. It cannot be gainsaid however that while Congress may not deprive the Supreme Court of its constitutionally stated powers, that self-same Constitution may itself effect that deprivation; and this appears to be precisely the purpose and intent of said Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution as written: to remove from this Court's power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari final judgments and orders of the COMELEC in "election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices." iv. Term of Office; Three Term Limit Rule Art. X, Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Section 43. Term of Office. (a) The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided for by law, except that of elective barangay officials: Provided, That all local officials first elected during the local elections immediately following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. (c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994. Bolos vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 184082. March 17, 2009 Facts: For three consecutive terms, petitioner was elected to the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the Barangay Elections held in 1994, 1997 and 2002. In May 2004, while sitting as the incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, petitioner ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol and won. He assumed office as Municipal Councilor on July 1, 2004, leaving his post as Punong Barangay. He served the full term of theSangguniang Bayan position, which was until June 30, 2007. After serving his term as SB, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the October 29, 2007Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. Respondent Rey Angeles Cinconiegue, the incumbent Punong Barangay and candidate for the same office, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of petitioner as candidate on the ground that he had already served the three-term limit hence disqualified under Sec. 8 Art X and Sec. 43 of LGC. Cinconiegue contended that petitioners relinquishment of the position of Punong Barangay in July 2004 was voluntary on his part, as it could be presumed that it was his personal decision to run as municipal councilor in the May 14, 2004 National and Local Elections.

Pet: countered that in the May 14, 2004 National and Local Elections, he ran and won as Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol. By reason of his assumption of office as Sangguniang Bayan member, his remaining term of office as PunongBarangay, which would have ended in 2007, was left unserved. He argued that his election and assumption of office as Sangguniang Bayanmember was by operation of law; hence, it must be considered as an involuntary interruption in the continuity of his last term of service. COMELEC: petitioners relinquishment of the office of Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as a consequence of his assumption of office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on July 1, 2004, was a voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay. Issue: WON relinquishment of pets office during his thord term as Punong brangay to serve as SB is voluntary hence DQ-ed from running again as PB. Held: Yes Ratio: David v. Commission on Elections[5] elucidates that the Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office forbarangay officials, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service. The discussions in the Constitutional Commission showed that the term of office of barangay officials would be [a]s may be determined by law, and more precisely, [a]s provided for in the Local Government Code.[6] Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code provides that barangayofficials are covered by the three-term limit, while Section 43(c)[7] thereof states that the term of office of barangay officials shall be five (5) years. Socrates v. Commission on Elections[8] held that the rule on the three-term limit, embodied in the Constitution and the Local Government Code, has two parts: The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service . Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections,[10] the Court stated that the second part of the rule on the three-term limit shows the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the threeterm limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term. The Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same government post; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms, satisfying the first condition for disqualification. The Court agrees with the COMELEC that there was voluntary renunciation by petitioner of his position as Punong Barangay. When he filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office of Sangguniang Bayan of Dauis, Bohol, in the May 10, 2004 [elections], he was not deemed resigned. Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit of his election as municipal councilor point out to an intent and readiness to give up his post as Punong Barangay once elected to the higher elective office, for it was very unlikely that respondent had filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Sangguniang Bayan post, campaigned and exhorted the municipal electorate to vote for him as such and then after being elected and proclaimed, return to his former position. He knew that his election as municipal councilor would entail abandonment of the position he held, and he intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary Indeed, petitioner was serving his third term as Punong Barangay when he ran for Sangguniang Bayan member and, upon winning, assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as Punong Barangay which the Court deems as a voluntary renunciation of said office.

operation of law - Black's Law Dictionary also defines it as a term that expresses the manner in which rights, and sometimes liabilities, devolve upon a person by the mere application to the particular transaction of the established rules of law, without the act or cooperation of the party himself.[14] An interruption in the service of a term of office, by operation of law, is exemplified in Montebon v. Commission on Elections.[15] The respondent therein, Sesinando F. Potencioso, Jr., was elected and served three consecutive terms. However, during his second term, he succeeded as Vice-Mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of the Vice-Mayor pursuant to Section 44 of R.A. No. 7160.[16] Potenciosos assumption of office as Vice-Mayor was considered an involuntary severance from his office as Municipal Councilor, resulting in an interruption in his second term of service.[17] The Court held that it could not be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law. [18] Hence, Potencioso was qualified to run as candidate for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu in the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections. Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[19] respondent therein, Jose T. Capco, Jr., was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros onJanuary 18, 1988 for a term ending on June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, Capco became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 election. The Court held that Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law.[21] Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor.[22] Dizon vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 182088. January 30, 2009 Facts: Dizon, hereinafter referred to as petitioner, is a resident and taxpayer of the Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga. Marino P. Morales, hereinafter referred to as respondent, is the incumbent Mayor of the Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga. Petitioner alleges respondent was proclaimed as the municipal mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga during the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections and has fully served the same. Respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 28, 2007 again for the same position and same municipality. Petitioner argues that respondent is no longer eligible and qualified to run for the same position for the May 14, 2007 elections under Section 43. Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that he is still eligible and qualified to run as Mayor of the Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. He avers that the Commission en banc in SPA Case No. A-04-058, entitled Atty. Venancio Q. Rivera III and Normandick P. De Guzman vs. Mayor Marino P. Morales, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga in the 1998 elections. Respondent alleges that his term should be reckoned from 2001 or when he was proclaimed as Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga. Respondent further asserts that his election in 2004 is only for his second term. Hence, the three term rule provided under the Local Government Code is not applicable to him. Comelec 2nd division: Supreme Court ruled that respondent has violated the three-term limit under Section 43 of the Local Government Code. Respondent was considered not a candidate in the 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections. Hence, his failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap and allows him to run again for the same position in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. Comelec en banc: affirmed. Respondents certificate of candidacy for the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections was cancelled pursuant to the above-mentioned Supreme Court decision which was promulgated on May 9, 2007. As a result, respondent was not only disqualified but was also not considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections. Another factor which is worth mentioning is the fact that respondent has relinquished the disputed position on May 16, 2007. The vice-mayor elect then took his oath and has assumed office as mayor of Mabalacat on May 17, 2007 until the term ended on June 30, 2007.

Issue: Is the 2007-2010 term really Morales fifth term? Held: No Ratio: In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales during his fourth term. We cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This cancellation disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004 elections. The votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes. For purposes of determining the resulting disqualification brought about by the three-term limit, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times.6 There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales involuntary severance from office with respect to the 2004 2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.8 Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayors office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. We concede that Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007. However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Dizon alleges that Morales "was able to serve his fourth term as mayor through lengthy litigations. x x x In other words, he was violating the rule on three-term limit with impunity by the sheer length of litigation and profit from it even more by raising the technicalities arising therefrom." 10 To this, we quote our ruling in Lonzanida v. COMELEC: There is no specific allegation nor proof that the delay was due to any political maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office. Moreover, protestant Alvez, was not without legal recourse to move for the early resolution of the election protest while it was pending before the regional trial court or to file a motion for the execution of the regional trial courts decision declaring the position of mayor vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to assume office while the appeal was pending with the COMELEC. Rivera III vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 167591. May 9, 2007 Facts: In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, Marino Morales ran as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat. On January 5, 2004, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy. On January 10, petitioners filed before the Comelec a petition to cancel Morales certificate of candidacy on the ground that the was elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat contrary to RA 43(b) of RA 7160. Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term), but he served the second term from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a caretaker of the office or as a de facto officer because he was not validly elected as his proclamation as mayor was declared void by the RTC and thereafter, he was preventively suspended by the ombudsman. The Comelec ruled that Morales was disqualified to run for public office. Morales MR was however granted. The Comelec ruled that his proclamation before was void and that the discharge of the duties is that of a de facto mayor.

In the other case filed by Anthony Dee: After Morales was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor, Anthony Dee filed a petition for quo warranto before the RTC. Dee reiterated the previous arguments of petitioners. The RTC dismissed Dees petition for quo warranto on the ground that Morales did not serve the three-term limit since he was not the duly elected mayor of Mabalacat, but Dee in the May 1998 elections for the term 1998 to 2001. Comelec affirmed. Issue: WON Morales is disqualified from running for mayor Held: Yes Ratio: This Court, through Mr. Justice Cancio C. Garcia, resolved the same issue in Ong v. Alegre with identical facts, thus: For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms. We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, service for the full term, and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position. It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850, that it was Francis opponent (Alegre) who won in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule. The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would-under the three-term rule-be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election. It bears stressing that in Ong v. Alegre cited above, Francis Ong was elected and assumed the duties of the mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for three consecutive terms. But his proclamation as mayor in the May 1998 election was declared void by the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte in its Decision dated July 4, 2001. As ruled by this Court, his service for the term 1998 to 2001 is for the full term. Clearly, the threeterm limit rule applies to him. Indeed, there is no reason why this ruling should not also apply to respondent Morales who is similarly situated. Here, Morales invoked not only Lonzanida v. COMELEC, but also Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections which is likewise inapplicable. In Borja, the Court held that Capcos assumption of the office of mayor upon the death of the incumbent may not be regarded as a term under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code). He held the position from September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992, a period of less than three years. Moreover, he was not elected to that position. Similarly, in Adormeo v. COMELEC, this Court ruled that assumption of the office of mayor in a recall election for the remaining term is not the term contemplated under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code). As the Court observed, there was a break in the service of private respondent Ramon T. Talanga as mayor. He was a private citizen for a time before running for mayor in the recall elections. Here, Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution can not be more clear and explicitRespondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years.

This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive term as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it. This is the very situation in the instant case. Morales maintains that he served his second term (1998 to 2001) only as a caretaker of the office or as a de facto officer. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated when an official serves in the same position for three consecutive terms. Whether as caretaker or de facto officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him to stay on indefinitely. Morales should be promptly ousted from the p osition of mayor of Mabalacat. Having found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. In the light of the foregoing, Morales can not be considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections. Not being a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray votes. Since respondent Morales is DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as mayor of Mabalacat, the instant petition for quo warranto has become moot. Issue: WON it is the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee who shall serve for the remaining portion of the 2004 to 2007 term. Held: Yes Ratio: In Labo v. Comelec, this Court has ruled that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner. As a consequence of petitioners ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code. Montebon vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 180444. April 9, 2008 551 SCRA 50 Facts: Montebon, Ondoy and Potencioso, Jr. were candidates for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007 Elections. Petitioners and other candidates filed a petition for disqualification against respondent with the COMELEC alleging that respondent had been elected and served three consecutive terms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he is proscribed from running for the same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his fourth consecutive term. Respondent admitted having been elected, but claimed that the service of his second term in 2001-2004 was interrupted on January 12, 2004 when he succeeded as vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Petronilo L. Mendoza. Consequently, he is not disqualified from vying for the position of municipal councilor in the 2007 elections. Petitioners, on the other hand contended that voluntary renunciation of the office shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the official concerned was elected. The comelec denied the petition for disqualification. On appeal, the Comelec en banc affirmed and ruled that there was no voluntary renunciation of office, but rather, an effective disruption in the full service of his second term as councilor. Issue: WON respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 interrupted his 2001-2004 term as municipal councilor. Held: Yes Ratio: In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections the Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the Court emphasized that the term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer

to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Thus, for the disqualification to apply, it is not enough that the official has been elected three consecutive times; he must also have served three consecutive terms in the same position. While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal councilor for three consecutive terms, the issue lies on whether he is deemed to have fully served his second term in view of his assumption of office as vicemayor of Tuburan on January 12, 2004. Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor. In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Respondent, being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law. It is clear therefore that his assumption of office as vice-mayor can in no way be considered a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor. In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained the concept of voluntary renunciation as follows: The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, `Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected.' The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Thus, respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law. Succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it involves the performance of a public duty by a government official, the non-performance of which exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public functions. It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary. Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 133495. September 3, 1998 295 SCRA 157 Facts: Jose Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998. Jose Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Benjamin Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that. Comelec ruled in favor of petitioner and declared Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros. On motion, the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. It ruled that Capcos succession into office is not counted as one term for purposes of the computation of the three term limitation under the Constitution and Local Government Code. Capco was voted for in the elections. He received 16,558 votes against petitioners 7,773 votes and was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Issue: WON Capco is eligible to run for mayor Held: Yes Ratio: (Purpose of the three term rule) First, to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy embodied in the constitutional provision in question. The other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider, therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the official concerned came to that office whether by election or by succession by operation of law would be to disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional provision in question.

Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. Monsod warned against prescreening candidates (from) whom the people will choose as a result of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution provision recognizing peoples power. Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved. It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of reelection. Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose whom they please to govern them. To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three terms, although the first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to violate this principle. Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local officials and bars such official[s) from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. The term served must therefore be one for which (the official concerned) was elected. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term now withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration. Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas comment on Art. VI, 7, which similarly bars members of the House of Representatives from serving for more than three terms. Commissioner Bernas states that if one is elected Representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive te rms allowed. This is actually based on the opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide: Yes, because we speak of term and if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House. There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On the other hand, the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such Representative serves a term for which he was elected. As the purpose of the constitutional provision is to limit the right ot be elected and to serve in Congress, his service of the unexpired term is rightly counted as his first term. Rather than refute what we believe to be the intendment of Art. X, 8 with regard to elective local officials, the case of a Representative who succeeds another confirms the theory. Petitioner also cites Art. VII, 4 of the Constitution which provides for succession of the Vice-President to the Presidency in case of vacancy in that office. This provision says that No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time. Petitioner contends that, by analogy, the vice-mayor should likewise be considered to have served a full term as mayor if he succeeds to the latters office and serves for the remainder of the term. The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without it, the Vice-President, who simply steps into the Presidency by succession would be qualified to run for President even if he has occupied that office for more than four years. The absence of a similar provision in Art. X, 8 on elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference between the two cases. It underscores the constitutional intent to cover

only the terms of office to which one may have been elected for purpose of the three-term limit on local elective officials, disregarding for this purpose service by automatic succession. There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the Presidency and serves in that office for more than four years is ineligible for election as President. The Vice-President is elected primarily to succeed the President in the event of the latters death, perma nent disability, removal or resignation. While he may be appointed to the cabinet, his becoming so is entirely dependent on the good graces of the President. In running for Vice-President, he may thus be said to also seek the Presidency. For their part, the electors likewise choose as Vice-President the candidate who they think can fill the Presidency in the event it becomes vacant. Hence, service in the presidency for more than four years may rightly be considered as service for a full term. This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the local Government Code, he is the presiding officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials and employees of such local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions, succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therein being only one of them. It cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in the event of a vacancy in the Presidency, that in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks the mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit. To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. Borja Supplement: Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of the incumbent. Six months before the next election, he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the next election. Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and subsequently resigned from office before the full term expired, he has not actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the term limit. Under Art. X, 8, voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one for which he was elected. Since A is only completing the service of the term for which the deceased and not he was elected. A cannot be considered to have completed one term. His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected Mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next election? Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively. In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the application of the disqualification provisions have not concurred, namely, that the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times and that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local official is considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has not been elected three times. In the second case, the local official has been elected three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three consecutive terms. Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a total failure of the two conditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. X 8. Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he qualified to run again in the next election? Yes, because he was not elected to the office of the mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death , of the deceased mayor. To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation by simply not reelecting him for another term. But if, on the other hand, he proves to be a good mayor, there will be no way the people can return him to office (even if it is just the third time he is standing for reelection) if his service of the first term is counted as one of the purpose of applying the term limit.

To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed. Lonzanida vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 135150. July 28, 1999 311 SCRA 602 Facts: Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, which in a decision dated January 9, 1997 declared a failure of elections. On November 13, 1997 the COMELEC resolved the election protest filed by Alvez and after a revision and reappreciation of the contested ballots declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. On February 27, 1998 the COMELEC issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post, which he obeyed, and Alvez assumed office for the remainder of the term. In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio. On April 21, 1998 his opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner. COMELEC granted petition. COMELEC found that Lonzanida's assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term Issue: whether petitioner Lonzanida's assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials. Held: No Ratio: 1. The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term limit which is now embodied in section 8, Art. X of the Constitution was initially proposed to be an absolute bar to any elective local government official from running for the same position after serving three consecutive terms. The said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of massive political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in office. The delegates also considered the need to broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to infuse new blood in the political arena. The drafters however, recognized and took note of the fact that some local government officials run for office before they reach forty years of age; thus to perpetually bar them from running for the same office after serving nine consecutive years may deprive the people of qualified candidates to choose from. Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art X, section 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of "the-term of office of elective local officials" and bars "such officials" from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that "voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected." The term served must therefore be one "for which the official concerned was elected." The purpose of the provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve." This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three

consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral elections. He assumed office and discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998 when he was ordered to vacate the post by reason of the COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 on the election protest against the petitioner which declared his opponent Juan Alvez, the duly elected mayor of San Antonio. Alvez served the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term. The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. After a reappreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all 5 and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest. 6 Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections. Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. "The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. 2. The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years and resultantly extended the petitioners incumbency in an office to which he was not lawfully elected. We note that such delay cannot be imputed to the petitioner. There is no specific allegation nor proof that the delay was due to any political maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office. Moreover, protestant Alvez, was not without legal recourse to move for the early resolution of the election protest while it was pending before the regional trial court or to file a motion for the execution of the regional trial court's decision declaring the position of mayor vacant and ordering the vicemayor to assume office while the appeal was pending with the COMELEC. 3. The petitioner's contention that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner is without merit. The instant petition for disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the May 1998 elections and was resolved on May 21, 1998 or after the petitioner's proclamation. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC and Trinidad 7 that the proclamation nor the assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre vs. Duavit in effect disallows what R.A. No. 6646 imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of its authority. Interpretative rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative

agencies must always be in perfect harmony with statutes and should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general provisions into effect. Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee. A candidate guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the dismissal of the disqualification case against him simply because the investigating body was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to determine before the election if the offenses were indeed committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. Adormeo vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 147927. February 4, 2002 Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were the only candidates for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. Petitioner filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3) consecutive terms as follows: (1) in the election of May 1992, where he served the full term; (2) in the election of May 1995, where he again served the full term; and, (3) in the recall election of May 12, 2000, where he served only the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the 1998 election. Petitioner contended that Tal agas candidacy as Mayor constituted a violation of Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. On March 9, 2001, private respondent responded that he was not elected City Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms but only for two (2) consecutive terms. He pointed to his defeat in the 1998 election by Tagarao. Because of his defeat the consecutiveness of his years as mayor was interrupted, and thus his mayorship was not for three consecutive terms of three years each. Respondent added that his service from May 12, 2001 until June 30, 2001 for 13 months and eighteen (18) days was not a full term, in the contemplation of the law and the Constitution. The Comelec found Talaga disqualified for the position of city mayor. The Comelec en banc reversed and ruled that 1) respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms because he did not win in the May 11, 1998 elections; 2) that he was installed only as mayor by reason of his victory in the recall elections; 3) that his victory in the recall elections was not considered a term of office and is not included in the 3-term disqualification rule, and 4) that he did not fully serve the three (3) consecutive terms, and his loss in the May 11, 1998 elections is considered an interruption in the continuity of his service as Mayor of Lucena City. Issue: WON Talaga is disqualified to run for mayor Held: No Ratio: The issue before us was already addressed in Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157, 169 (1998), where we held, To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. This point can be made clearer by considering the following case or situation: Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next election? Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively. To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed. Likewise, in the case of Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999), we said, This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: a) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. Accordingly, COMELECs ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two years he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.

Patently untenable is petitioners contention that COMELEC in allowing respondent Talaga, Jr. to run in the May 1998 election violates Article X, Section 8 of 1987 Constitution. To bolster his case, respondent adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional Commission member, stating that in interpreting said provision that if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed. As pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, Fr. Bernas comment is pertinent only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike local government officials, there is no recall election provided for members of Congress. Neither can respondents victory in the recall election be deemed a violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as voluntary renunciation for clearly it is not. In Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, we said: The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. Socrates vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 154512. November 12, 2002 Facts: On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates (mayor). The members of the PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn, president of the Association of Barangay Captains, as interim chair of the PRA. The PRA passed a Resolution declaring its loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. Socrates filed a petition to deny due course to the Recall Resolution but the Comelec en banc dismissed the case for lack of merit. Edward M. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election.Ma. Flores F. Adovo and Merly E. Gilo filed a petition before the COMELEC, to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel his certificate of candidacy. The petitions were all anchored on the ground that Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post. The Comelec declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. G.R. No. 154512. Socrates sought to nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution which gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002. Socrates cites the following circumstances as legal infirmities attending the convening of the PRA and its issuance of the Recall Resolution: (1) not all members of the PRA were notified of the meeting to adopt the resolution; (2) the proof of service of notice was palpably and legally deficient; (3) the members of the PRA were themselves seeking a new electoral mandate from their respective constituents; (4) the adoption of the resolution was exercised with grave abuse of authority; and (5) the PRA proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated his and the publics constitutional right to information. G.R. No. 154683. Vicente S. Sandoval, Jr. sought to annul COMELEC Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it fixed the recall election on September 7, 2002, giving the candidates only a ten-day campaign period. He prayed that the COMELEC be enjoined from holding the recall election on September 7, 2002 and that a new date be fixed giving the candidates at least an additional 15 days to campaign. The court gave the candidates an additional 15 days within which to campaign. Thus, the COMELEC reset the recall election to September 24, 2002. G.R. Nos. 155083-84. Petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave assail the COMELECs resolutions declaring Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall election. The Court ordered the COMELEC to desist from proclaiming any winning candidate in the recall election until further orders from the Court. In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall election with 20,238 votes. Rival candidates Socrates and Sandoval obtained 17,220 votes and 13,241 votes, respectively.

Issue: WON the recall resolution was valid Held: Yes Ratio: Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution despite the absence of notice to 130 PRA members and the defective service of notice to other PRA members. The COMELEC, however, found that the proponents for the Recall of incumbent City Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates sent notices of the convening of the PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of the Local Government Code. Notices of the convening of the Puerto Princesa PRA were also sent to the following: [a list of 25 names of provincial elective officials, print and broadcast media practitioners, PNP officials, COMELEC city, regional and national officials, and DILG officials]. The Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within the competence and expertise of the COMELEC, unless the findings are patently erroneous. In the instant case, we do not find any valid reason to hold that the COMELECs findings of fact are patently erroneous. Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt the Recall Resolution on July 2, 2002 because a majority of PRA members were seeking a new electoral mandate in the barangay elections scheduled on July 15, 2002. This argument deserves scant consideration considering that when the PRA members adopted the Recall Resolution their terms of office had not yet expired. They were all de jure sangguniang barangay members with no legal disqualification to participate in the recall assembly under Section 70 of the Local Government Code. Socrates bewails that the manner private respondents conducted the PRA proceedings violated his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. Socrates, however, admits receiving notice of the PRA meeting and of even sending his representative and counsel who were present during the entire PRA proceedings. Proponents of the recall election submitted to the COMELEC the Recall Resolution, minutes of the PRA proceedings, the journal of the PRA assembly, attendance sheets, notices sent to PRA members, and authenticated master list of barangay officials in Puerto Princesa. Socrates had the right to examine and copy all these public records in the official custody of the COMELEC. Socrates, however, does not claim that the COMELEC denied him this right. There is no legal basis in Socrates claim that respondents violated his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the validity of the Recall Resolution and in scheduling the recall election on September 24, 2002. Issue: WON Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election Held: No Ratio: The constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials, the question asked was whether there would be no further election after three terms, or whether there would be no immediate reelection after three terms. What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term.

Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. The debates in the Constitutional Commission evidently show that the prohibited election referred to by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection after the third term, not any other subsequent election. If the prohibition on elective local officials is applied to any election within the three-year full term following the three-term limit, then Senators should also be prohibited from running in any election within the six-year full term following their two-term limit. The constitutional provision on the term limit of Senators is worded exactly like the term limit of elective local officials. The framers of the Constitution thus clarified that a Senator can run after only three years following his completion of two terms. The framers expressly acknowledged that the prohibited election refers only to the immediate reelection, and not to any subsequent election, during the six-year period following the two term limit. The framers of the Constitution did not intend the period of rest of an elective official who has reached his term limit to be the full extent of the succeeding term. In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections. Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full his three consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Under the Constitution and the Local Government Code, Hagedorn could no longer run for mayor in the 2001 elections. The Constitution and the Local Government Code disqualified Hagedorn, who had reached the maximum three-term limit, from running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did not run for mayor in the 2001 elections. Socrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates. From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorns service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. Hagedorns three consecutive terms ended on June 30, 2001. Hagedorns new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One cannot stitch together Hagedorns previous three -terms with his new recall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorns service as mayor. In Hagedorns case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full term of three years, constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear intent is that interruption for any length of time, as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective local officials continuity of service. Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective officials terms in office. In the same manner, Hagedorns recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in office of Socrates. Hagedorn can only be disqualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroact to June 30, 2001, for only then can the recall term constitute a fourth consecutive term. But to consider Hagedorns recall term as a full term of three years, retroacting to June 30, 2001, despite the fact that he won his recall term only last September 24, 2002, is to ignore reality. This Court cannot declare as consecutive or successive terms of office which historically and factually are not. Worse, to make Hagedorns recall term retroact to June 30, 2001 creates a lega l fiction that unduly curtails the freedom of the people to choose their leaders through popular elections. The concept of term limits is in derogation of the sovereign will of the people to elect the leaders of their own choosing. Term limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the sovereign will of the people A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the start of a new term following the interruption. An official elected in recall election serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit. This is clear from the following discussion in the Constitutional Commission. Although the discussion referred to special elections

for Senators and Representatives of the House, the same principle applies to a recall election of local officials. Otherwise, an elective local official who serves a recall term can serve for more than nine consecutive years comprising of the recall term plus the regular three full terms. A local official who serves a recall term should know that the recall term is in itself one term although less than three years. This is the inherent limitation he takes by running and winning in the recall election. Davide, concurring and dissenting. The ponencia is then correct when it holds that the three-term limit bars an immediate reelection for a fourth term. But I disagree when it rules that in the case of Hagedorn he did not seek an immediate reelection for a fourth term because he was not a candidate for reelection in the May 2001 election. It forgets that what would have been his fourth term by virtue of the May 2001 election was for the period from 30 June 2001 to 30 June 2004. The flaw in the ruling results from an apparent confusion between term and election, the root cause of which is the attempt to distinguish voluntary renunciation of office from involuntary severance from office and the term of office to which it relates. I wish to add that the Constitutional Commission debates on the issue of no immediate reelection after three consecutive terms for members of Congress clearly indicated that the no immediate reelection after the 3-term limit would equally apply to the elective local officials. This accounted for the immediate acceptance by the Committee on Local Governments of the aforementioned Amendment of Commissioner Davide, which is now Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. These debates clearly showed the Intent of the Commission that the ban against an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms applies to the fourth term, i.e., the term immediately following the three consecutive terms, to be filled up by the regular election for such fourth term. For one to be able to run again after three consecutive terms, he has to rest for the entire immediately succeeding fourth term. On the next fifth term he can run again to start a new series of three consecutive terms. The dichotomy made in the ponencia between voluntary renunciation of the office as used in Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 and involuntary severance from office is unnecessary, if not misplaced. From the discussion in the ponencia, the latter is made to apply to the banned term, i.e., the fourth term immediately following three consecutive terms. Speaking now of Hagedorn, he cannot have suffered involuntary severance from office because there was nothing to be severed; he was not a holder of an office either in a de jure or de facto capacity. He knew he was disqualified from seeking a third reelection to office. Disqualification is, definitely, not synonymous with involuntary severance. Even if we concede that involuntary severance is an act which interrupts the continuity of a term for purposes of applying the three-term principle the rule laid down in Lonzanida vs. COMELEC (311 SCRA 609), cited in the ponencia, page 17, is not applicable in the case of Hagedorn. The involuntary severance referred to in that case was one that took place during any of the three terms; hence, the term during which it occurred should be excluded in the computation. In the case of Hagedorn, no such involuntary severance took place during any of his three terms brought about by his election in 1992 and reelections in 1995 and 1998. More importantly, the voluntary renunciation referred to in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 is one that takes place at any time during either the first, second, or third term of the three consecutive terms. This is very clear from the last clause of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which reads: shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. The purpose of the provision is to prevent an elective local official from voluntarily resigning from office for the purpose of circumventing the rule on the belief that the term during which he resigned would be excluded in the counting of the three-term rule. In short, the provision excluded is intended to impose a penalty on one who flouts the rule or make a mockery of it by the simple act of resigning. Thus, applying it in the case of Hagedorn, even if he voluntarily resigned on his third term, he would still be barred from seeking reelection in the May 2001 election. Hagedorn cannot likewise avail of the ruling in Adormeo vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 147927, 4 February 2002) because in that case Talaga did not win in his second reelection bid, or for a third term, in the May 1998 elections. He won in the recall election of 12 May 2000. Hagedorn, as earlier stated, fully served three successive terms Mendoza vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 149736. December 17, 2002 For resolution is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra, seeking to set aside the resolution of the Commission on Elections, dated August 15, 2001, in EPC No. 2001-5 and to

declare respondent Leonardo B. Romans election as governor of Bataan on May 14, 2001 as null and void for allegedly being contrary to Art. X, 8 of the Constitution, which provides that: The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. After due deliberation, the Court voted 8 to 7 to DISMISS the petition: VITUG, J., joined by YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., voted to dismiss the petition. He contended that as revealed by the records of the Constitutional Commission, the Constitution envisions a continuous and an uninterrupted service for three full terms before the proscription applies. Therefore, not being a full term, a recall term should not be counted or used as a basis for the disqualification whether served prior (as in this case) or subsequent (as in the Socrates case) to the nine-year, full three-term limit. MENDOZA, J., in whose opinion QUISUMBING, J. joined, voted to dismiss the petition on the ground that, in accordance with the ruling in Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 (1998); Arcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133639, Oct. 6, 1998 (res.); Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 (1999); and Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, Feb. 4, 2002, a term during which succession to a local elective office takes place or a recall election is held should not be counted in determining whether an elective local official has served more than three consecutive terms. He argued that the Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the office by an incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election on that day was actually only his third term for the same position. PANGANIBAN, J., joined by PUNO, J., also voted to dismiss the petition. He argued that a recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary interpretation would in effect cut short the elected officials service to less than nine years and shortchange his constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced against the need to uphold the voters obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes cast. He explained that, in Socrates, he also voted to affirm the clear choice of the electorate, because in a democracy the people should, as much as legally possible, be governed by leaders freely chosen by them in credible elections. He concluded that, in election cases, when two conflicting legal positions are of almost equal weight, the scales of justice should be tilted in favor of the peoples overwhelming choice. AZCUNA, J., joined by BELLOSILLO, J., also voted to dismiss, arguing that it is clear from the constitutional provision that the disqualification applies only if the terms are consecutive and the service is full and continuous. Hence, service for less than a term, except only in case of voluntary renunciation, should not count to disqualify an elective local official from running for the same position. This case is different from Socrates, where the full three consecutive terms had been continuously served so that disqualification had clearly attached. On the other hand, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., with whom DAVIDE, JR., C.J., and AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, and CALLEJO, SR., JJ. concurred, holds the view that the recall term served by respondent Roman, comprising the period June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, should be considered as one term. Since he thereafter served for two consecutive terms from 1995 to 1998 and from 1998 to 2001, his election on May 14, 2001 was actually his fourth term and contravenes Art. X, 8 of the Constitution. For this reason, she voted to grant the petition and to declare respondents election on May 14, 2001 as null and void. CARPIO, J., joined by CARPIO MORALES, J., also dissented and voted to grant the petition. He held that a recall term constitutes one term and that to totally ignore a recall term in determining the three-term limit would allow local officials to serve for more than nine consecutive years contrary to the manifest intent of the framers of the Constitution. He contended that respondent Romans election in 2001 cannot exempt him from the three-term limit imposed by the Constitution.