PANEL FIVE

Aviation Security on 9/11: The Regulators

17) Suggested Questions for Panel Five

18) Prepared Testimony

• Jane F. Garvey
• Cathal L. "Irish" Flynn
• Claudio Manno

19) Witness Biographies

• Jane F. Garvey
• Cathal L. "Irish" Flynn
• Claudio Manno

20) Background Materials

• Garvey MFR
• Flynn MFR
• Manno MFR
• Transcript of Jane Garvey's Testimony to the Commission on May 23, 2003
• Transcript of Mike Canavan's Testimony to the Commission on May 23, 2003
 SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR PANEL FIVE
Aviation Security on 9/11: The Regulators

Designated Commissioners: Slade Gorton and Tim Roemer

For Ms. Garvey:

1. At the May 2003 Commission hearing, you were asked about what intelligence
you had received about a 9/11-type of attack on civil aviation, and on the possible
use of an airplane as weapon. You testified that you were aware of a growing
threat to civil aviation, "but the threat was much more focused on overseas
targets." You also indicated that you were "not aware of any information of it (an
airplane) being used as a weapon that was credible." Do you have anything you
would like to add or to change with respect to this testimony?

2. Do you recall reviewing the following documents in which an FAA document

submitted to the Joint Inquiry indicated that "suicide hijacking as a terrorist tactic
was mentioned:"

a. March 1998 FAA assessment entitled "Usama Bin Laden/World Islamic Front
Threat to US Civil Aviation"
b. July 1999 FAA assessment with the same title
c. 2000 Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment (prepared by
FAA's Office of Intelligence) entitled "Prospects for Aircraft Hijackings to
Free Incarcerated Terrorists"

3. Do you recall reviewing the pre 9/11 2001 Terrorism Threat Presentation
prepared by Pat McDonnell and his office for presentation to aviation security
personnel at airports and with air carriers?

a. To the extent you recall this and the previous documents, how did they
influence your thinking, and the system's policy response to the terrorist
threat?
b. In retrospect, do you believe there was more the FAA could or should have
done with respect to this information?

4. How did you receive reporting on the performance of the civil aviation security
system, including the results from the FAA's regular compliance testing and from
your Special Assessments Office's clandestine testing?

a. How did such information influence policy-making, including the rule-making

process?
b. In retrospect, is there anything additional you now wish you had done or had
asked for to improve your access to such information?

Suggested Questions for Panel Five

 With the threat information you received from your intelligence unit, and the
vulnerability data you received from your testing and evaluation units, what
consequence assessment and risk management techniques did you use in
allocating your security resources?

6. Please answer the following question submitted by the 9/11 Families to the
Commission: Why did screening contractors pay 10 cents on the dollar for fines
imposed on them for violations? Why were the fines lowered?

7. Please describe in detail your responsibilities and actions on the day of 9/11/01
with respect to the terrorist hijackings of that day.

a. Please include what steps you took, or required to be taken, to learn what was
occurring.
b. Also, please provide us with your understanding of the roles of other FAA
personnel, and other federal agencies, with respect to a hijacking within the
United States.

8. We have received testimony that you and your Deputy Monte Belger were in
contact with airline CEO's during the morning of September 11. Is this accurate?

a. If so, what did you convey to the airlines?

b. What did you ask them to do?
c. For example, did you make any request that they contact their other 9/11
flights with respect to warning against cockpit intrusion?
d. If you didn't make such a request, in retrospect, do you wish that you had?

9. At the May 2003 Commission hearing, you were asked about your personal
knowledge about the use of guns, bombs and box cutters on the hijacked flights.
In each case, you testified you had seen "no evidence" with respect to the usage of
such weapons. More specifically with respect to the gun issue, you testified that
"There was a report that at one point surfaced, and it may have been even part of a
written report that had surfaced from somewhere in the field - it may have been
from American Airlines in particular - that spoke about a gun." Do you have
anything you would like to add or to change with respect to this testimony?

10. On the day of September 11, 2001 did you read two FAA documents, both titled
"EXECUTIVE SUMMARY," the first dated September 11,2001, and the second
dated September 12,2001, though we have been informed that it was produced
sometime later on the same day as the first document? If you did not receive or
read these documents, which include the report of gun use on Flight 11, why was
that the case? Do you think you should have seen them?

Suggested Questions for Panel Five

11. Once the national ground stop was ordered, what was your and the FAA's role in
dealing with the screening of grounded aircraft and passengers?

a. Did you issue any guidance to the Air Traffic Control System, to the FAA
filed offices, or to any other government personnel with respect to these
flights?
b. Did you then or subsequently receive any credible information about other
hijacking plots on 9/11?
c. In retrospect, do you believe you could or should have taken additional action
with respect to this matter?

12. You were asked at the May 2003 hearing about FAA interview reports on relevant
witnesses and you testified you would have to check into the location of such
reports. Have you had an opportunity to do so, and if so, what did you discover?

13. We have received testimony that you were presented a draft Security Directive on
the afternoon of September 11, 2001 which would have imposed security
measures beyond those which you subsequently ordered. We were told that you
blocked the issuance of this SD, after consultation with the airlines. Is this
accurate? If not, please tell us your recollection with respect to the process for
developing and issuing SD's in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.

14. In summary, were you surprised by the 9/11 hijackings? If so, what was the
source of your surprise: the lack of intelligence on the specific threat; the weapons
they used; the tactics they employed; or something else? What could or should
have been done that could have prevented the hijackings?

15. You testified at the May 2003 Commission hearing that for the future we need to
increase the layering of the aviation security system, and make security measures
more unpredictable to the enemy. Would you care to elaborate on your
recommendations for accomplishing these objectives?

16. Were you aware that FAA's Intelligence Office believed that they weren't
receiving much in the way of domestic intelligence, that they were blind about
what terrorists we knew were in the United States were up to and the threat they
posed? If so, what did you do to improve the situation?

17. Can you tell us how often you received intelligence briefings?

18. In 1993 we experienced the bombing of the WTC, later we had the bombing of
the Murrah building in Oklahoma, Khobar towers, the East Africa bombings,
declarations of war on the U.S. by Usama Bin Laden. FAA's baseline working
group in this time period talked about the increased threat. Given this
environment was it wise to ease the consequences of CAPPS selection in 1998 at
a time when the threat of terrorism was on the increase?

Suggested Questions for Panel Five

19. Given the increased terrorist threat in the 1990s, their known presence in the
United States, the continuing occurrence of hijacking overseas and the known
vulnerabilities of the checkpoint screening process, how could we have possibly
believed that hijacking was not a very good possibility in the United States? (If
FAA knew it was a concern why didn't we require pre-screening selectees—those
we thought as more than a minimal threat to the aircraft to have additional
screening of their person and carry-on baggage?).

20. Please tell us the FAA's view of the consequences of hijacking and bombing as
we perceived them.

21. Why didn't the FAA conduct a formal and in depth after action about what
happened on 9-11 to learn lessons and establish facts? We received testimony
that one individual was tasked with trying to bring such an effort together well
after 9-11 but there was little interest from fellow employees and the coordination
of this wasn't a priority.

For Mr. Flynn:

1. Some critics charge that under the FAA, security was entirely reactive in nature,
with the agency unable to move proactively to deal with emerging threats. How
do you respond?

2. Department of Transportation Inspector General Mead testified to the

Commission that the aviation security rulemaking process was one which the
Commission should take a close look at. Over the years, critics have called it
cumbersome, increasingly adversarial and, above all, slow. To take just one
example, the FAA's attempted rulemaking on the certification of screening
companies, which was mandated by 1996 legislation and which you testified on
before Congress on several occasions, including in 2000 before the Senate
Aviation Subcommittee, was still not complete as of 9/11. From your
perspective, how did the rulemaking process impact on your, and the agency's
ability, to make and implement security policy?

3. How would you describe the role of the airlines in the making and enforcement of
aviation security policy during your time at the FAA? Please describe FAA's
relationship with the airlines.

4. Please describe the process you utilized in seeking budgetary and policy
adjustments for civil aviation security. More specifically, what major budget,
manpower and policy adjustments did you seek while you were in charge of civil
aviation security? What is your assessment of the FAA's implementation of the
recommendations of both the Pan Am 103 and Gore Commissions?

Suggested Questions for Panel Five

5. You just heard our Staff Statement with respect to the status of various potential
weapons at the security checkpoints. Would you care to comment on the
Checkpoint Operations Guide with respect to box cutters and small knives?
When the FAA approved this guideline, what was your expectation as to how the
screeners were to differentiate between these two items?

6. Do you recall reviewing the pre 9/11 2001 Terrorism Threat Presentation
prepared by Pat McDonnell and his office for presentation to aviation security
personnel at airports and with air carriers in which the possibility of a suicide
hijacking in the United States was considered but essentially discounted? To the
extent you recall this and other related documents on this subject, how did they
influence your thinking, and the system's policy response to the terrorist threat?
In retrospect, do you believe there was more the FAA could or should have done
with respect to this information?

7. With the threat information you received from your intelligence unit, and the
vulnerability data you received from FAA's testing and evaluation units, what
consequence assessment and risk management techniques did you use in
allocating your security resources?

8. In your written testimony, you highlighted the creation of the Baseline Working
Group and highlighted some of its differences with the subsequent Gore
Commission. Please comment on the specific following recommendations of the
BWG which were dropped in the final Gore Commission recommendations, and
include your assessment as to why they were dropped, and the consequences from
that action:

• 10-year implementation costs to the Treasury of $9.9 billion (versus an

additional $100 million a year in the Gore Commission recommendations)
• a requirement that an FAA-approved passenger profile "be used to identify
selectees, whose persons and property (checked baggage and carry-on
bags/items) will be subjected to additional security scrutiny."
• expansion of the FBI role in civil aviation security
• development of "a comprehensive 'team' approach to security that treats
aviation industry employees as team members with a stake in promoting
aviation security, emphasizing that employees are the first line of defense."

9. We have received much testimony that the Aviation Security system prior to 9-11
was built to stop "crazies and criminals" but not the committed terrorists. Can
you describe your reaction to that?

10. Given the increased terrorists threat in the 1990's, their known presence in the
United States, the continuing occurrence of hijacking overseas and the known
vulnerabilities of the checkpoint screening process, how could we have possibly
believed that hijacking was not a very good possibility in the United States? (If
FAA knew it was a concern why didn't we require the pre-screening of

Suggested Questions for Panel Five

 selectees—those we thought as more than a minimal threat to the aircraft to have
additional screening of their person and carry-on baggage?)

11. Why did the FAA focus so much on the threat overseas rather than here at home?
The FAA itself said that terrorists were present in the United States and would
find the U.S. civil aviation system an attractive target. Please describe your
experiences in dealing with the FBI and the CIA on FAA intelligence
requirements.

12. The Common Strategy made no provision for what to do if the pilots were
incapacitated or the cockpit was taken over. Why did we perceive pilots in an
easily accessible cockpit as invulnerable in an age of both sophisticated terrorist
tactics and of increasing air rage, including cockpit intrusions?

13. Please tell us why you believe the system failed and the terrorists succeeded on
September 11,2001.

14. Please comment on the effectiveness of FAA's enforcement tools in place on

9/11, particularly with respect to civil fines.

15. Please give us your best recollection of how the Computer Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System evolved in the late 1990s. Do you think it was wise to ease
the consequences of CAPPS when the prescreening system was automated in the
late 1990's?

16. Please give us your assessment of the Federal Air Marshal program, and its status
and utility on 9/11.

For Mr. Manno:

1. Were you aware that the FAA's liaisons to the Intelligence Community were
required to spend a significant portion of their time working on non-FAA related
matters? Was this wise given the importance of intelligence to FAA's security
system?

2. Can you describe your understanding prior to 9-11 of the existence of individuals
with terrorist affiliations who were pilot training in the United States?

3. Were you aware of efforts by the FBI to look into pilot training in the late 1990's?

4. Can you tell us about the differences in the volume and quality of intelligence
FAA received from the Intelligence Community on the overseas versus the
domestic threat?

Suggested Questions for Panel Five

5. We perceived that threat to civil aviation was overseas, not at home. Is this
because that's where the threat really was or because we had eyes and ears
focused abroad and not at home?

6. Were you aware that one key fit all cockpits of Boeing 757 and 767 aircraft.
Given all of our efforts to enforce and improve access control, and protect
airplanes from unauthorized access why was this allowed to continue?

7. Do you recall reviewing the pre 9/11 2001 Terrorism Threat Presentation
prepared by Pat McDonnell and his office for presentation to aviation security
personnel at airports and with air carriers in which the possibility of a suicide
hijacking in the United States was considered but essentially discounted? To the
extent you recall this and other related documents on this subject, how did they
influence your thinking, and the system's policy response to the terrorist threat?
In retrospect, do you believe there was more the FAA could or should have done
with respect to this information?

8. Please describe the role of the FAA liaison officers to the CIA and FBI in the
period up to and including 9/11. Do you believe they were able to fulfill the
mission as defined by the Pan Am 102/Lockerbie Commission? Were there any
limitations on their ability to represent the interests of civil aviation security in the
collection and analysis of information by their host agencies? Why did the FAA
not have comparable liaisons present at DIA and, especially, NSA?

Suggested Questions for Panel Five