1988 Philosophical Perspectives, 2, Epistemology,

THE DEONTOLOGICALCONCEPTIONOF EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

P. Alston William Syracuse University

I. The DeontologicalConception and their are most The terms, 'justified', 'justification', cognates a "deontological" way, naturally understood inwhat we mayterm as having and blame, todo with obligation, permission, requirement, thelike.We maythink ofrequirement, andpermission prohibition, as thebasicdeontological with as species terms, obligation, andduty ofrequirement, andwith blameworthiness, reproach, responsibility, consepraiseworthiness, merit, being intheclear, etc.as normative ofan agent's situation with towhat isrequired, proquences respect or permitted. More specifically, when we consider the hibited, ofactions, on which we havea firmer grip justification something in havthan thejustification ofbeliefs, itis clearthat to be justified ofany is for that notto be in violation ingdonesomething action relevant orcounsels, the rules, regulations, laws, obligations, duties, ofthat It is a matter oftheaction's ones that sort. actions govern To say that ofprinciples.1 being permitted by therelevant system the actionwas justified thatit was required or does not imply that itsnegation orobligatory. This wasnotrequired obligatory, only holds true whether we are thinking ofmoral, institutional, or legal, was(morally) ofactions. To saythat Herman prudential justification in refusing to taketimeoutfrom hisbookto join justified writing ina peace march, istosaythat therelevant moral do not principles to himto march; itis notto saythat he is morally obliged require

P. Alston 258 / William that hisbook, also.Likewise stick towriting though to maybe true inleaving is to saythat Joan was legally thestate saythat justified so contravened no law; itis notto say that herdoing anylaw reingiving hertodo so. Finally quired consider mybeing justified my rather thanone to be taken classa takehomefinal epistemology ofinstitutional intheclassroom. Herewe might be thinking justificain which wouldbe thatno regulations ofmy case thepoint tion, or university a classroom final department, college, require exam; that butmybeing so justified doesnotimply anyregulations require a takehome exam.Orwe might be thinking ofpedagogical justificainwhich be that sound tion, case thepoint would pedagogical prinallowfor a takehomeexamfor this kind ofcourse, notthat ciples they require it;though, again,thelatter be truealso. might The most natural wayofconstruing thejustification ofbeliefs is inparallel To saythat inbelieving fashion. S isjustified that p attime t istosaythat therelevant rules orprinciples do notforbid S's believthat of ingthat p at t. In believing p at t,S is notin contravention itis nottosaythat S is required anyrelevant requirements. Again, that also be true. or obligated to believethat p at t,though might With to beliefs various modesof we can againdistinguish respect and epistemic. Thesemaydiverge. justification: moral, prudential, I may, intrusting that e.g.,be morally justified myfriend (believing rehe is wellintentioned toward me),and I mayevenbe morally all myevidence to do so, though tends quired strongly against it, Inthis so that thebelief is notepistemically justified. paperourconHow is that from cernis with epistemic justification. distinguished inX'sbetheother modes? Thejustification ofanything, X,consists ing permitted by the relevant principles: epistemic, moral,or is:What whatever. Thusthecrucial question distinguishes epistemic ofview" from moral the"epistemic principles principles? Well, point is characterized twin of with the the by a concern goals believing true To setthis outproperly we would and notbelieving thefalse. havetogointo ofjust howthese aretobe weighted thequestion goals a number relative toeachother, andinto ofother but thorny issues; for suffice itfor nowtosaythat theassessment epistemic principles ofbelief howthis willgradethem in thelight ofthesegoals.Just is donedepends on theconception ofjustification with one which the is working. On a deontological of conception justification, prininsucha wayas to be likely to be forbid beliefs formed cipleswill in sucha wayas falseand either orrequire formed permit beliefs

Deontological Justification / 259 Thuson thedeontological ofthe tobe likely tobe true.2 conception ofbelief that isas closeas possible tothestanepistemic justification ofaction, tobe justified ofthejustification inbelievdard conception ingthat p at t is for one'sbelief that p at t notto be inviolation of anyepistemic principles, principles that permit only those beliefs that tobe true.3 that are sufficiently likely Let'ssay,for example, beliefs in generalizations are permitted onlyifbased on adequateinduca perceptual tive evidence, otherwise forbidden; andthat belief that if(a) itis formed on thebasisofitsperceptually p is permitted only toonethat seeming p and(b)onedoesnothavesufficient overriding it is forbidden. One willbe justified in a belief reasons; otherwise of the specified sortifthe relevant of pernecessary conditions willbe unjustified. are satisfied; otherwise thebelief missibility itis notsurprisSincethis is thenatural waytouse 'justification', itis theone most often formulated ingthat by thosewhoseek to abouttheir themostemibe explicit epistemic concepts. Perhaps However is Roderick Chisholm.4 nentcontemporary deontologist ofChisholm's becauseofthecomplexities view,I shalltakeas my with admodeldeontologist CarlGinet. He setsouttheconception mirable directness. in beingconfident thatp ifand onlyifit is One is justified notto be confident thatp; one notthecase thatone ought for that couldnotbe justly reproached beingconfident p.5 if ofepistemic isviable beliefs Nowthis conception justification only to render as are sufficiently under control suchconcepts voluntary andblame requirement, permission, obligation, reproach, applicable that"Ought to them. By thetimehonored principle implies can", one can be obliged to do A onlyifone has an effective choiceas no senseto to do A.6Itis equally obvious that itmakes to whether or A if of S's forbidden to do S lacksan effecspeak being permitted And as to whether to do A. it seems even more choice tive obvious, A ifpossible, that be rightly for S cannot blamed doing (notdoing) A.7 ifS is incapable of effectively or not to do whether deciding issueraised like Therefore themost fundamental bya formulation Ginet's is as to whether belief is under control. voluntary Onlyifit of is can thequestion ariseas to whether theepistemic justification As shall are beliefs be construed we there can deontologically. see, that notbeenfully various modes ofvoluntary haveusually control treatment. intheliterature and that distinguished require separate

P. Alston 260 / William I willcalldirect I will be arguing inthis paperthat (a) we lackwhat we haveonlya rather overbeliefs, weak voluntary control (b) that degreeof"longrange" voluntary control over(only) someofour ourvoluntary beliefs, and(c)that although actions caninfluence our notion ofjustification beliefs thedeontological basedon this indirect influence is not the sort of notionwe need for the usual to which theterm is put. epistemological purposes 'justification' Controlof Belief II. The Problemof Voluntary that ofbelieving There are many locutions encourage us tothink andpermission. as subject torequirement, prohibition, Wesay"You shouldn't so readily that hewouldn't havesupposed comethrough", "I hadevery "Youhaveno right toassume that", right tothink that "I ought shewashonest", tohavegiven him the benefit ofthedoubt", and"Youshouldn't jump toconclusions". Wealsooften seemtosugofbelief: "I finally thathe was decided gestthevoluntary control themanforthejob","Makeup yourmind; is it coreopsis or isn't I hadno choice" it?", "I hadtoaccepthistestimony; (thesuggestion inother Andphilosophers that being casesone doeshavea choice). frequently fallinwith this, speaking ofa subject's beingin a situainwhich hehastodecide toaccept or"withhold" tion whether reject, Alltheseturns ofphrase, and many seemto a proposition.8 more, imply that we frequently havethecapacity to effectively decideor what we aretobelieve, andhence that we canbe held choose respontheoutcome ofthose Itis natural tothink ofthis siblefor decisions. ofthemaximally onthemodel we haveover direct control capacity ofourlimbs themotions andother ofourbody, parts thevoluntary ofwhich movements we perform constitute "basicactions", actions "atwill", or decision to do so, justbyan intention, volition, choice, we "just elsevoluntarily. Let's things do",not"by"doing something callthekind ofcontrol we haveoverstates ofaffairs we typically9 Ifwe do control." aboutbybasicactions, "basicvoluntary10 bring ofbeliefs, ofreason havevoluntary control we havethesamesort forsupposing it to be basic control thatwe have forsupposing ourselves tohavebasiccontrol movements ofour overthe(typical) we are hard tospecify limbs, viz.,that pressed anyvoluntary action which we getthelimbs moved orthebeliefs bydoing engendered. has that Henceitis notsurprising thebasicvoluntary control thesis

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thehistory ofphilosophy, throughout haddistinguished proponents and Newman.11 Descartes, Kierkegaard, e.g.,Augustine, Aquinas, it stillhas itsdefenders.12 outoffavor today, Though distinctly we must thethesis makesomedistincBefore critically examining forourentire discussion. notethat First, tionsthatare important is solely in terms ofbelief, we need although theabovediscussion attitudes that arecontrary tobelief. torange alsooverpropositional interms ofa trichotomy of"believe", and Chisholm "reject", speaks withbelieving "withhold" p is identified thatp.13Sincerejecting innonewkind somecontrary ofp,itbrings ofpropositional attitude; itnoranycontrary, does.The butwithholding neither p, believing isthat type tobe noted here onehascontrol overa given basicpoint ofincompatible ofstate ifonealso hascontrol oversomefield only that alternatives. To havecontrol overbelieving p is to havecontrol that one p ornot, i.e.,overwhether overwhether onebelieves alterbelievesthatp or engenders insteadsome incompatible One cannot chooseto believethatp without effectively native.14 an incompatible norcan one alternative; refraining from choosing from that without choosesuchan alternative p. refraining believing to contraries; thepowerto extends necessarily Voluntary control itshall at willwhether chooseA at willis thepowerto determine we of)not-A. tobe strictly accurate be A or (someform Therefore, overproposhould ourproblem concerns control voluntary saythat willoften inthesequeltheformulation sitional attitudes. Although as having thismore ofbelief, itshould be understood be in terms general bearing. between needsto be said abouttherelation Second, something Nowa belief, thetwo. inthepsychological oscillating freely between with sense sensethat is being theabstract usedhere(as contrasted ofthat is believed), is a moreor less long-lived stateofthe which various a modification ofthewiring that accan influence psyche, it And same and of so as the tions reactions thesubject long persists. ofvolunThusin speaking holdsfor other attitudes. propositional ofstates. of ofbeliefs, control we havebeenspeaking thecontrol tary Butcouldn't we justas wellspeakofthevoluntary control of,and theaction ofbringing about such states: accepting, responsibility for, orrefraining a belief, orwitholding a proposition, forming rejecting, and control The two loci of responsibility may from believing?15 on either. well focus seemstrictly so that we can equally correlative,
thecontrol ofactionsand ofstatesofaffairs. Thus farwe have been

P. Alston 262 / William overa type ofstate, control Foroneexercises voluntary C,byvolunitaboutor inhibit to bring it.Andfrom tarily doing something the be of as action can the other side,every thought bringing aboutof a state we are responsible orblameworthy ofaffairs. Whenever for a stateofaffairs ofhaving itabout, byvirtue brought we mayjust for ofbringing as wellspeakofbeing responsible theaction itabout. for there are thefollowing reasons in terms However proceeding ofstates. that First, in holding beliefs are subject to deontological evaluaone neednotrestrict tion oneself to sinceunder voluntary control, that wereformed beliefs act.I can be intentionally bya voluntary for ofadequate blamed that believing p intheabsence evidence, even though thebelief was formed quite automatically, notbyvoluntarioutan intention to do so. Provided ingeneral lycarrying believing isunder canbe assessed voluntary control, anybelief deontologically. that I couldhaveadopted Itis enough orwithheld theproposition favors a bya voluntary act,had I chosento do so. Thisdefinitely for ofbelief, we want toevaluate on responsibility states since focus is no actionofforming beliefs wherethere them. deontologically thatdecisively favors Another thefocus on states consideration is that, as we shallsee latter, there is a wayin which one can be a state for ofbelief, orother andblameworthy even responsible state, ifone lacksthecapacity to bring aboutsuchstates intentionally. Thefinal noteis this. Ourissuedoesnotconcern free preliminary will orfreedom ofaction, at leastnotinanysenseinwhich that goes one'saction's under ofthewill. thecontrol Ona "liberbeyond being tarian" offree willthis is notsufficient; itis required in conception addition thatbothA and not-A be causally possible, givenall the on theagent. causalinfluences Andother requirements maybe imA libertarian no doubt, maintain posedconcerning agency. will, that ifdeontological aretoapply tobelievings inthesameway concepts as to overt all ofhisconditions willhave then for freedom actions, tobelievings as well.However inthis toapply be paperI shallonly concerned with theissueofwhether areunder believings voluntary as I shallargue, this is notsatisfied for believcontrol. condition If, that will toshowthat intheliberbe sufficient arenotfree ings, they tarian senseas well.

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III. Basic Voluntary Control ofthebasiccontrol thesis, examination Let'sturn nowtoa critical whatever attitude propositional thethesis that onecantakeupatwill view Those whohaveattacked this aredivided between onechooses. atwill islogically impossible andthose whohold that believing those a capacity that impossible, whoholdthat itis onlypsychologically one we conceivably couldhavehad.'6I canwe infact lackthough claim, and so I shall reasons for thestronger notsee anysufficient as tobe ableto take that we are notso constituted contend merely at will.Myargument for ifitcan be this, attitudes up propositional in asking you whether calledthat, consists youto consider simply that moment, start tobelieve Canyou, atthis haveanysuchpowers. to do so. Britain, justbydeciding theU. S. is still a colony ofGreat Ifyoufind ittooincredible that be sufficiently motivated youshould offers totry tobelieve that someone you$500,000,000 this, suppose inthemoney than moreinterested tobelieveit,andyouare much ittakes togetthat reward? inbelieving thetruth. Could youdo what aboutbelieving at will.No doubt, Remember that we are speaking do that would increase theprobability there are things youcould butthat willbe discussed Can ofyour tobelievethis, later. coming that toward attitudes proposition justby youswitch propositional I haveno suchpower. to do so? Itseemsclearto methat deciding inthe don't hook orchoosings upwith anything decisions, Volitions, don'thook attitude justas they inauguration, wayofpropositional ofgastric orcellmetabolism. There could thesecretion juices upwith in this Some can be individual differences regard. people conceivably I very ofus cannot. movetheir earsat will, whilemost However, thepower thatany human are endowed with muchdoubt beings at will.The temptation to supoftaking on propositional atittudes from that with others we otherwise stem conflating power may pose If I were to set out are do havebut clearly distinct.17 undoubtedly to bring intoa stateofbelief that p, justby an act ofwill, myself or dwell I might of conviction, assertthatp withan expression a sentence on theidea thatp, or imagine p expressing favorably inthe with an angelic emblazoned intheheavens chorus background I can do at Mass.Allthis theKyrie ofMozart's Coronation intoning that to taking on a belief butnoneofthis amounts p. It is all will, all ofbelieving. an elaborate Having gonethrough pretence show, or willremain werebefore; attitudes justas they this, mydoxastic

P. Alston 264 / William ifthere is somechangeit willbe as a resultofthesegyrations. to believeat willis We shouldnot supposethatour inability also false. Theinability areobviously topropositions that restricted A few true. pagesback at least, tothose that areobviously extends, tocontrary pairs, attaches that voluntary control we madethepoint Ifthesphere ofmyeffecofalternatives. ortomore complex arrays then toA andtonot-A, both control doesnotextend tive voluntary IfI don'thavethepower to choosebetween itattaches to neither. tosaythat I did then we arewithout sufficient reason A andnot-A, Itis than bya volition. A, accompanied A at will,rather justdoing and ifpossible, that obligation, responsibility, evenmoreobvious, their kindred attach to doingA onlyiftheagenthas an effective A. IfI wouldstill have done choicebetween doingand notdoing I can hardly for I willed, orpreferred, be blamed A whatever chose, doingit. form, e.g.,perceptual ornotunwillingly, Thus, evenifI willingly, I form that those follows beliefs inthe beliefs wayI do,itbynomeans oversuchbelief or that I havevoluntary control formation, at will, fordoingso. It or blameworthy or thatI can be heldresponsible over I have to true that have effective control voluntary would be on it I that the tree has leaves when whetherdo or do notbelieve with I see a treewith me inbroaddaylight leaveson itjustbefore in this Anditis perfectly clearthat working perfectly. myeyesight from that belief. Andso I haveno powerat all to refrain situation to us. have that obvious We else seems perfectly with everything informed over beliefs by ordinary little control voluntary justas and uncontroversial inferences. simple memory, trospection, willsuggest to thevoluntarist that he to this Thediscussion point do notseemclearly true makea stand on propositions that canstill to adopt one (often) has thecapacity or false, and holdthat there In attitude onechooses. religion, philosophy, whatever propositional it is often thecase that, so faras and high levelscientific matters the settle one can see, therelevant do notdefinitively arguments I engage inprolonged ofthemindmatter onewayortheother. study examine or of the existence of God. I carefully bodyproblem none Itseems tomethat for andagainst various positions. arguments there even ofthepositions havedecisively their though case, proved ofeach. thatcan be urgedin support are weighty considerations even with all thecompeting positions, There areserious difficulties than one conmore leavestanding so far as I can see,they though,

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in each case. So whatam I do in this situation? I couldjust tender I could,so it seems,simply abandonthequest.Butalternatively and/or one or decideto adoptone ofthepositions decideto reject notwhatI must moreofthecontenders. Is that do ifI am to make Andisn't happens? anyjudgment onthematter? that what typically I decideto embrace theism or epiphenomenalism, andforthwith it is embraced. inwhich with There arealsopractical situations we areconfronted to a certain noneofwhich we see incompatible answers question, to be clearly do nothave theluxury trueor false.Herewe often ofleaving we must than another, thefield; since actinonewayrather to form, we are forced and acton,somebelief aboutthematter. It would be a goodideafor metoplant these flowers ifandonly today ifitwill rain tomorrow. Butitisnotatallcleartomewhether tomoror not, and rowwillbe rainy. I must either plant theflowers today in itwouldsurely be unwise to simply thematter, thereby ignore ontheassumption that not rain tomoritwill effect acting uncritically ofwisdom be tomakesomejudgrow.Hencethebetter part would on thematter, ment thebestthatI can. On a larger scale,a field inwartime with is often faced aboutthecurcommander questions at his rentdisposition ofenemy forces. Butoften theinformation him a situadisposal doesnottell just what that disposition is.Insuch tion is itnotclearthat, weighing available indications as besthecan, and he simply on thematter decidesto makea certain judgment act on that? Whatelse can he do? I should to theseclaims outthat evenif Before responding point a itwould still notfollow that deontological conthey werecorrect, ofjustification for Forthevolunis adequate ception epistemology. tarist oftheterritory. abandoned vaststretches He has hasalready that or and true false, these givenup all propositions seemclearly and difficult issues constitute thebulkofourbeliefs. Controversial ifwe are intellectuals, on ourattention, force themselves especially ofourtime to resolve them. justbecausewe spendso much trying ofourcognitive they Butifwe survey thewholerange operations, none will ona vast sea ofitems about as a few straws appear floating thevastnumber ofwhich theslightest doubt. we entertain Consider ofperceptual form environment as we move we aboutour beliefs most ofthem short-lived aboutin itthroughout ourwaking hours, thesethe and many ofthem unconscious. Bycomparison justwith and controversial beliefs we havein religion, politics, philosophy,

P. Alston 266 / William innumber, arenegligible however signifiofouraffairs theconduct Henceifonlytheuncertain beliefs cantthey maybe individually. notenable that will ustoform a generalcontrol, areunder voluntary ofepistemic justification.18 concept ly applicable deontological andmilitary commander, gardener, To return toourphilosopher, is better construed I wouldsuggest that in each case thesituation Themost obthan a belief at will.19 insomewayother as initiating coninthese casesthesupporting is that although vioussuggestion are seen as lessconclusive, heretoo thebelief follows siderations from thewaythings without intervention bythewill, automatically, In thecases of(subjective) to thesubject. cerseemat themoment or,alternativebythat senseofcertainty, tainty belief isdetermined or whatever; in the experience ly,bywhatleadsto it,thesensory belief is still determined by what cases of(subjective) uncertainty is more likeonealternative an analogous role, thesensethat plays or by what leads to that.Thus when our ly thanthe others, "decides" to embrace theism or the or religious seeker philosopher at that moment whathashappened isthat this posiidentity theory, tohaveweighter more tobe true, seems consideration seems likely alternative. HenceS is,at that initsfavor, than anyenvisaged tions inor epiphenomenalism no moreable to acceptatheism moment, obthan ortheidentity seemed he would be iftheism theory stead, andindubitably our true. This canbe verified byconsidering viously in a in the are not above conditions situation which capacities on the and contenders mindorthevarious theism atheism, satisfied; to be true, wellor ill seemequally equally likely bodyissue, really Ifthat itseldom werestrictly thecase (andperhaps is), supported. to do so? When then couldS adopt, e.g.,theism, justby choosing I would I contemplate that itseemstomethat be as little possibility, if it at will I would seemed obviously true abletoadopt theism as be I am with orobviously likeBuridan's confronted (subass, false. Here, Ifitwerea choicebetalternatives. equivalent jectively) perfectly theass, I need notperish weenactions, suchas thatconfronting I couldarbitrarily makea choice, as we often indecision. through twoalternative do ina cafeteria linewhen saladslookequally tempdoxthan But this more others.) quickly ting. (Some peoplenegotiate matter. HowcouldI simply choosetobelieve astic is another choice on a parwith thantheother whenthey seemexactly one rather that probwhen subjective tothe likelihood oftruth, especially respect in the is rather low?To do so wouldbe to choosea belief ability

/ 267 Deontological Justification inclination tosuppose ittobe true. faceofthelackofanysignificant ourpower.20 It seemsclearto me thatthisis notwithin interms probability ofcomparative subjective Theaboveaccount andpractical. allourcases,theoretical Thusthe be correct for might aboutthedisposimight adoptthesupposition military commander atthemoment supported that tohim best seems tion ofenemy forces at hisdisposal. ButI believe that there arecases,both bythereports inwhich theupshot isnot bysome triggered andpractical, theoretical I havealready ofthealternatives. differential probability subjective inthose be theformation ofa cannot that cases theupshot argued Butthenwhat?Here is one whether at willor otherwise. belief, S is doing is to resolve to actas ifp is true, adopt What possibility. a correct ofsituadescription itas a basisfor action. Thisis often He may wellhavesaidtohimself: the military commander's. tions like even ofenemy forces is; I don't "I don'tknow whatthedisposition ButI haveto guess. information tomakean educated haveenough itis X and so I'lljustassumethat proceed on somebasisor other, that the Thisis nottoform thebelief makemyplansaccordingly." that thedisposiis X; itis nottoaccepttheproposition disposition Itwouldsimply be incorrect action. tionis X, exceptas a basisfor thatthe disposition of the commander as believing to describe belief aboutthematter. He is X,or having anyother enemy forces thetruth concerning on a certain assumption, is simply proceeding an at all.One mayalso make assumption ofwhich he hasno belief in order to see howit "pansout",in the fortheoretical purposes, someadditional reasons for one willthereby obtain suphopethat ittobe true orfalse. Thusa scientist canadopt"as a working posing thatthe atomicnucleus is positively the proposition hypothesis" and totest draw from seek those various it, consequences charged, that the form thebelief atomic Thescientist neednot consequences. to carry outthisoperation; charged in order nucleus is positively knowwhatto he wouldbe doingthisbecausehe didn't typically take believe about the matter. Likewisea philosopher might outinapmaterialism as a working tosee howitworks hypothesis Theremay also be blendsof the to variousproblems. plication inGod,orsome belief theoretical andthepractical. Onemayadopt out morerobust setofreligious as a guidetolife, setting doctrines, one's totry toliveinaccordance with toactandfeel them, seeking howthe in order to determine community, wayintothereligious interms ofhowsatisfawork both doctrines outintheliving ofthem,

268 / William P. Alston a life enableonetoliveandinterms ofwhat tory andfulfilling they one or against them evidence for acquires. the"acceptance" ofa proposition intheabsence ofa signifiWhere is not the adoptionof a working cant subjective probability there are other alternatives. for hypothesis, (1) S maybe seeking, a position into ofbelieving tobring himself p; and whatever reason, which S orothers canbe undertaken volunmay confuse this activity, the to be (2) As tarily, with believing or judging proposition true. perhaps notedearlier, S may assertthatp, overtly or covertly, and in a firm and this, which can be donevolunrepeatedly tone, a "judgment" with that tarily, maybe confused p, ofthesortthat a state ofbelief. and/or inaugurates (3)S may align herself, objectively that to with some is committed certain doctrines-a subjectively, group a group a political a movement, ofthinkers-and this, church, party, with which coming to can be donevoluntarily, maybe confused I am convinced that ofa wide theanalysis believe thosedoctrines. atwill intheabsence variety ofsupposed casesofbelieving ofsignifiineach case forming wouldrevealthat cantsubjective probability, a belief with else.ThusI think that p hasbeenconfused something that no one everactheproposition that there is a strong case for a belief aboutthat, theabove quires at will.ButevenifI amwrong that itisofrelatively rare considerations do atleast show occurrence, a generally andthat itcertainly be usedas thebasisfor apcannot plicable deontological concept ofepistemic justification. IV. Non-BasicImmediate Control Voluntary However thedemise ofbasiccontrol is byno meanstheend of thethesis that as we may term onehasvoluntary con"voluntarism", after trol ofpropositional attitudes. disavowing Many deontologists, towhat control anycommitment they usually call"direct voluntary ofbelief" andwhat we we havecalled "basic control", provoluntary thatbeliefs to whattheyterm ceed to insist are subject "indirect Allofthem use theterm 'indirect control' in voluntary control".21 an undiscriminating ofcontrol that is not fashion to coveranysort failto distinguish the between "direct", i.e.,basic.As a result they Someof I shallbe distinguishing.22 three ofnon-basic sorts control The their fit one ofmythree someanother. examples categories, between these discussion willshowimportant differences ensuing

/ 269 Deontological Justification three modesofcontrol. let'sfirst notethat we takemany familiar nonTo getintothis, to be voluntary actions to be under (andtheir upshots basicovert for required, issufficient their being voluntary control) ina waythat a door, andprohibited. informing someConsider opening permitted, To succeedin anyofthesereon a light. one that p, and turning on thepartoftheagent;in each case quiresmorethana volition movements I must bodily movements andthese perform oneormore in order causalor conventional, must havecertain consequences, thenon-basic action in questhat I can be saidto haveperformed I openeda certain for itto be truethat doorI must tion.In order orput someother ofmy into body suitable kick part pull it, push it, it, it(assuming that I lackpowers oftelekinesis), andthis with contact H to be open.In order to inform must in thedoor'scoming result perceptible that various sounds, marks, or other p, I must produce fallunder linguistic rules must products, and either theseproducts a vehicle that p (ifwe in sucha wayas to constitute for asserting as an illocutionary orH,uponperceivact), arethinking ofinforming thebelief that p (ifwe are be led to form ingtheseproducts, must like ofinforming as a perlocutionary act).Henceactions thinking andso are not on a volition consequent theseare notimmediately I might Nevertheless be blamed for done"atwill". myfailure strictly to do so. The point to turn on thelight whenitwas myobligation ofsuccessfor is thatin manycases we taketheextraconditions that if will exert herself voluntarily Wesuppose theagent just granted. anditsuptheactwillbe done.Herewe might theaction, saythat oftheagent isunder the"immediate control" (more voluntary shot, more eventhough non-basic immediate voluntary control), strictly, I callthis than an actofwillis required oftheagent. "immediate"23 isabletocarry control since theagent outtheintention "right away", tothe inoneuninterrupted toreturn intentional act,without having a with other after having beenoccupied attempt number oftimes imcontrol" for both basic and I will use the term "direct matters.24 if mediate Itisclearthat beliefs wereunder one'simmediate control. torender them todeontological control that would suffice susceptible evaluation. voluntary or ever,within ourimmediate Butare beliefs always, Ourdiscussion a rerun control? ofthis willbe largely ofthediscuswith discussionofbasiccontrol, someaddedtwists. Asintheearlier from situations serious sionwe canfirst most ofourdoxastic exempt

270 / William P. Alston toalmost allnormal With consideration. respect perceptual, introspecitisabsurd andmemory tothink tive, propositions, that onehasany over oneaccepts, control whether orwitholds such rejects, thepropoI lookoutmy andsee rain sition. When window falling, water dripptheleavesoftrees, and carspassing ingoff by,I no morehaveimmediate control overwhether I accept those propositions than I have I thebeliefs thatrainis falling, basiccontrol. form etc.willy-nilly. Thereis no wayI can inhibit these beliefs. Atleastthere is no way I can do so on thespot,incarrying outan uninterrupted intention to do so. How wouldI do so? Whatbutton wouldI push?I could ina confident the try asserting contrary tone ofvoice. I could rehearse I somesceptical could invoke the arguments. Vedantic doctrine of andcommand towithold thepromaya.I could grit myteeth myself I am a very Butunless position. unusual noneofthese will person, havetheleasteffect. Itseemsclearthat human nothing anynormal theuninterrupted ofan intention being can do during operation to, theproposition that itis raining e.g.,reject (intheabovesituation) willhaveanychanceat all to succeed.Andthesamecan be said theconclufor inferential beliefs inwhich itisquite cleartoonethat sion is correct. Since cases in whichit seemsperfectly clear to is thecase constitute an enormously thesubject what largeproporthat tion areeither theobject (I would sayalmost all)ofpropositions ofa definite attitude as a candidate for theconorconsidered such, ofthisparagraph siderations showthatimmediate convoluntary trol cannot be a basisfor theapplication ofdeontological concepts to mostofourpropositional attitudes. a propoButwhat about situations inwhich itis notclearwhether sition is trueor false? Thisis where voluntarists tendto taketheir stand. After all,they say,that is whatinquiry toresolve matis for, ters whenitis notclearwhatthecorrect answer is. One certainly has voluntary control overwhether to keeplooking forevidence or reasons, and voluntary control overwhereto look,whatsteps to take,and so on. Sinceone has control overthosematters that I havecalled amounts towhat immediate over voluntary control one's propositional attitudes. Ifself-control is whatis essential to activity, someofour ourbelievings, wouldseemto be acts.Whena man beliefs, deliberates and comesfinally to a conclusion, is hisdecision as muchwithin as is anyother hiscontrol deed we attribute

Deontological Justification / 271 was unreasonable, a conclusion to him.Ifhisconclusion he we should nothaveaccepted, maypleadwith him:"Butyou that so-and-so needn't havesupposed was true. Whydidn't oftheseother you takeaccount facts?" We assumethathis decision is one he couldhave avoidedand that, had he only to do he could have a chosen so, made morereasonable inference. is nottheresult ofa Or,ifhisconclusion we maysay,"Butifyou had only deliberate inference, to think", had he chosen, he could stopped implying that, have stopped to think. We suppose, as we do whenever we or moral thatthere was applyourethical predicates, else theagentcouldhave done instead.25 something To be sure, themere fact that oneoften looks for evidence todecide an unresolved issuedoesnotshowthat one hasimmediate control, oranyother sort ofcontrol, overone'spropositional atittudes. That ofsuccess in theseenterprises. And also depends on theincidence sometimes one finds decisive evidence andsometimes one doesn't. Butlet'signore this complexity and justconsider whether there is a case forimmediate ofpropositional in thesuccontrol attitudes cessful cases. is not,and primarily forthefollowing reason.These No, there A inorder claims thedifference between tobring about ignore doing A so that E, for somedefinite E, anddoing someeffect within a cerwill tainrange ensue.Inorder that the"looking for more evidence" we haveimmediate wouldshowthat conphenomenon voluntary overpropositional attitudes inbasically thewaywe do overthe trol itwouldhaveto be thecase ofdoorsand light positions switches, that thesearchfor evidence was undertaken with theintention of a particular attitude toward taking up a certain particular proposiwe have tion.Foronlyin that case wouldtheoutcome showthat attitude we take exercised control overwhat voluntary propositional I can't AlKaline's that remember lifetime up.Suppose batting average andI lookitupintheBaseball I readthere Almanac. thefigure .320, and I thereby demonstrate conacceptit.Does that myvoluntary Kaline's trol overmybelief that lifetime batting averagewas .320? itshows I haveimmediate Notat all.Atmost that control voluntary overwhether I takeup some propositional attitude toward some Thisis not proposition ascribing a lifetime batting average toKaline. at all analogous to getthedooropen tomyexercising mycapacity

272/ William P. Alston inthat I choosetodo so. Itsnearest areawould analogue whenever and I am motivated to bring be something likethis. I am a servant chooses.He has an thedoorintowhatever position myemployer that involves automatic control elaborate electronic ofmany system ofthehousehold, doors. Eachmorning he leaves aspects including on household ina computer. Doors detailed instructions operations be operated inaccordance thecomputer with his can only through I can carry outan intention instructions. Thereis no wayinwhich the ofmyowntoopenor toclosea door.AllI can do is to actuate take theircourse. Since the relevant program and let things willbe carried ifI actuate outonly theproinstructions employer's whatever position gram, I am responsible for thedoors'assuming fortaking he specified, up someattitude justas I was responsible within a given ButI most orother toward someproposition range. am notresponsible forthe front door'sbeingopen emphatically over control rather than closed, norcan I be saidto havevoluntary itsspecific Henceitwouldbe idleto applydeontological position. ofthedoor:to forbid to me vis-a-vis thespecific concepts position meorrequire meto openit,or toblameor reproach me for itsbeitwas notsubject to mywill. ingopen.I hadno control overthat; I haveover Andthat's thewayitiswhere theonly control voluntary will is toenter ontoan investigation that mypropositional attitudes insomepropositional attitude orother, onwhat depending eventuate meresponsible for holding isuncovered. Thatwould be nobasisfor or no basis that thanrejecting witholding for it, believing p rather p, or for reproaching requiring meor forbidding metobelievethat me for doingso. IfChisholm's is onlythat one can voluntarily putoneself in claim a position from which somedoxastic attitude top willbe forthcoma thatone can putoneself in a position suchthat ing(or perhaps desirable doxastic attitude to p willbe forthcoming), thiscapacity we extends to all sorts ofpropositions, thoseoverwhich including haveno voluntary concercontrol. Consider propositions obviously I havethepower eyesandlookabout ning what isvisible. toopenmy in a position, are when conditions me, thereby putting myself to reliably environform aboutthevisible favorable, propositions I can "searchmy ment. to past experiences Again,withrespect ofthemiddle ofyesterfor thedetails ofmyexperiences memory" to in an excellent position day,thereby, usually, putting myself No one,I at that time. reliably form beliefs aboutmyexperiences

DeontologicalJustification / 273

wouldtakethis to showthat I haveimmediate suppose, voluntary overwhatI believe aboutthevisible control environment orabout Andyetthis is essentially myremembered experiences. thesame ofthing as thesearch for additional sort evidence, differing onlyin thetypeofbelief mechanism involved. forming I suspect that likeChisholm deontologists secretly that suppose the than additional rather thedoxevidence, "automatically" determining in a position asticattitude, simply putsthesubject to makean informed Thatis,despite choiceofan attitude. their official position, locatethevoluntary in themoment they really control ofattitude formation than inthepreliminary rather thus ineffect investigation, thedirect taking control voluntary position. Butthen, faced with the ofthat think to save theapcrashing implausibility position, they plication ofdeontological concepts by pushing thevoluntary control search for backtothepreliminary decisive Itis, considerations. their then, secret, unacknowledged tothe basiccontrol clinging thesis thatprevents themfrom of theinseeingthatvoluntary control toground thedeontological vestigative phasehasnotendency treatI must ment ofpropositional attitudes. thatI haveno real confess textual for evidence thisspeculation, and thatI am attracted to it it by thefactthat explains an otherwise failure ofacute puzzling to see theirrelevance philosophers (tothis issue)ofourvoluntary control overtheconduct ofinquiry. I havebeenconsidering Thusfar one wayinwhich deontologists seektodefend a claim ofimmediate control overbeliefs. voluntary We haveseenthat to fail it since has todo with way byirrelevance, in a position voluntarily oneself to form themostrational putting whatever thatmaybe, rather thanvoluntarily attitude, taking up somespecific attitude. there is no doubt butthat However, people do sometimes setoutto getthemselves tobelievethat some p, for toconvince that X lovesthem, that specific p. Peopletry themselves Y willturn outall right, that thebossdoesn't really havea negative attitude toward that theRedSox willwintheWorld them, Series, that materialism istrue, orthat Godexists. don't like Epistemologists to citesuchdisreputable proceedings as a ground fortheapplicationofdeontological To try to getoneself to believe concepts. that to being ina goodposition p, prior to tellwhether or not, p is true is nota procedure tobe commended from theepistemic standpoint. theseundertakings in a comNevertheless, haveto be considered prehensive ofpossible survey modes ofvoluntary control. Proceeding

274 / William P. Alston thepoint to notehereis that suchgoings on provide inthat spirit, a of immediate voluntary control over no support for supposition carried outonlyas belief. Forsuchenterprises can be successfully IfI,notcurrently X lovesme,were believing that long-term projects. in one fellswoop,i.e.,during to set outto bring aboutthatbelief ofactivity to proa period guided bytheintention uninterruptedly I am unless abnormal markedly psychologicalducethat belief, then, We justdon'twork that way.Again, I ly,I am doomedto failure. know what Myonly hopeofsuccess would wouldn't button topush. lieinbringing various influences tobearuponmyself andshielding inthehopeofthereby from eventually moving myself myself others, include dwelling on thoseenfrom disbelief to belief. Thismight in whichX had actedlovingly toward counters me,shutting out evidences ofindifference ordislike, encouraging romantic fantasies, etc.Thusthis sort ofenterprise to thecategory of belongs, rather, we nowturn. longrangevoluntary control, a topicto which V. Long Range Voluntary Control we cannot be credited with either sort We haveseenthat plausibly attitudes. ofdirect control overourpropositional Taking upsuchan a basicaction likeraising one'sarmnora attitude can be neither action likeflipping a switch. treatnon-basic Hencethedeontological ment ofbelief canborrow nosupport theapplicability ofdeonfrom still remains terms toactions likethese. Butthepossibility tological overbelief. Theconvoluntary control that we havemore long-range at least ofthelastparagraph this encourage supposition, siderations I willfirm for somecases.Before this possibility up the examining one. distinction between thistypeofcontrol and theprevious Inintroducing I saidthat thenotion of"immediate control" when one has this overa typeofstate, C, one is able speciesofcontrol a C "right inoneuninterrupted tobring about intentional act". away, When conditions arepropitious, onecangeta dooropen, geta light on, getone's shoeson,or tellSusiethemailhas come,by doing intenvarious under thedirection ofa single uninterrupted things tobring state tion aboutthat ofaffairs. Onedoesnothavetoreturn with a number after to theattempt oftimes having beenoccupied other whentheintention to bring aboutC was notperformatters, Andsince oneis notora monitoring anddirecting function.26 ming

Deontological Justification / 275 an intention inan active state for more dinarily capableofkeeping short the sortsof actions thana relatively periodof time, over must be capable ofexecution which onehasimmediate control within timeafter a short their inception. control issimply thefoil ofimmediate Longrange control. Itisthe tobring about a state ofaffairs, capacity C,bydoing something (usuallya number ofdifferent things) repeatedly overa considerable period toother oftime, directed interrupted byactivity goals.One hasthis toa greater orlesser sort ofcontrol, degree, overmany things: one's weight, cholesterol concentration, bloodpressure, and disposition; theactions ofone'sspouse orone'sdepartment. Onecan,with some set out on a long-range hope of success, project to reduceone's weight, improve one'sdisposition, or getone'sspouseto be more friendly to theneighbors. The degreeofcontrol variesmarkedly I have,within these control over among examples. limits, complete motivation isrequired sufficient toachieve andmainmy weight; only tain a certain tochange ortochange weight. My ability my disposition inmy ismuch less.Butallthese behavior patterns spouse cases,and one can havelongrangeconillustrate thepoint that many more, overmany overwhich I cannot trol one lacksdirect control. things reduce my weight markedly right away, by the uninterrupted outofan intention to do so, e.g.,bytaking a pill, carrying running orsaying Butthat around theblock, "Abracadabra". doesn't nullify thefact thatI have longrangecontrol. Itdoes seemthat we havesomedegree oflongrangevoluntary control overat leastsomeofourbeliefs. As justnoted, peopledo setouton longrange to themselves believe a certain to projects get proposition, andsometimes they succeed inthis. Devicesemployed include selective exposure to evidence, selective attention to supthe of believers and porting considerations, seeking company and more bizarre avoiding non-believers, self-suggestion, (possibly) methods likehypnotism. induce Bysuchmethods peoplesometimes themselves tobelieve inGod, inmaterialism, inCommunism, inthe proposition that they are lovedbyX, and so on. Why doesn't this a kindofvoluntary constitute control thatgrounds deontological treatment? itwould we do havesufficient control ofthis sort. Well, if, indeed, Note that be their people could properly held responsible for attitudes toward ina certain propositions range onlyifthosewhosetoutto a certain attitude toward sucha proposition, intentionally produce

276 / William P. Alston Foronly and madesufficient werefrequently successful.27 efforts, ifwe are generally inbringing successful abouta goal,G,whenwe try hard todo so,do we haveeffective enough control overwhether G obtains. AndifI don'thaveeffective control overG,I can hardly for be held toblame its non-occurrence. EvenifI haddoneeverything I couldto produce it,I wouldhavehad little chanceofsuccess; so howcouldI rightly itsabsence? be blamed for be blamed (I might for to produce itor for nottrying nottrying hardenough, butthat is another matter.) Thisis a generally applicable principle, by no IfI am so constituted meansrestricted to thedoxastic sphere. that the mostI can do withrespect to my irritability is to make it somewhat lesslikely itwill that a certain exceed (rather high) average threshold, I can hardly be blamedforbeingirritable. It is verydubious that we havereliable longrangecontrol over anyofourbeliefs, eveninthemost favorable cases,suchas beliefs aboutreligious and philosophical matters and aboutpersonal relaingetting Sometimes tionships. succeed themselves tobelieve people ButI doubt that thesuccess rateis substan(disbelieve) something. tial.To myknowledge there are no statistics on this, butI would ifattempts be verymuch ofthissortborefruit in more surprised than a small ofthecases.Inthinking proportion aboutthis, let'sfirst setasidecases in which theattempt succeeds becausethesubject ontoconclusive happens evidence that would haveproduced belief without deliberate anyway effort on hispart toproduce belief. These are irrelevant becausetheintention to believe no efthat p played fective role.Thuswe are considering cases in which thesubject is a preponderance swimming against either ofcontrary evidence or a lackofevidence either way.S is fighting very tendencies strong tobelieve when andonly when something seems true toone.Some ofthesetendencies are probably innate and someengendered or reinforced bysocialization; inanyevent aredeeply they rooted and ofgreat To combat orcircumvent them onemust exercise strength. in monitoring considerable theinput ofinformation and ingenuity inexposing oneself tonon-rational is a influences. This tricky operation, as wellas considerable requiring constant vigilance and skill, itwould be very surprising ifitweresuccessful ina significant proofthecases.I amnotsuggesting portion that itisunusual for people to form and retain beliefs without adequategrounds, or reasons, Thisisalltoocommon. justification. Butinmost such casestheproposition in question seemsclearly illsupported. however The true,

/ 277 DeontologicalJustification

is notone in which S manages to believe typical case ofprejudice tohim tobe thecaseorsomething towhat seems something contrary he has no definite oftruth or falsity. which impression concerning true hasled itto seemclearly Itis a case inwhich hissocialization inferior. to himthat, e.g.,blacksare innately control thesis doesnotprovide much grounding Thusa long-range even forthe sortsof propositions people do fordeontologism, less to getthemselves tobelieve ordisbelieve. Much sometimes try to for thosepropositions with respect is there anysuchgrounding eventry tomanipulate their attitudes. which peopledon't normally that ofourbeliefs, beliefs, noted most e.g.perceptual Wehavealready to perfrom tendencies that are toodeeply rooted spring doxastic mit effort. Most ofthematters onwhich ofmodification bydeliberate are suchthat theproject ofdeliberately producing we form beliefs isonethat belief ordisbelief isnever because seriously envisaged, just itis tooobvious that there is no chanceofsuccess. Thusevenifwe a propositional wereusually successful whenwe setouttoproduce thus manifested would notground the the control attitude, voluntary to beliefs ofdeontological So, once concepts generally. application that themost we couldconceivably have(andI haveargued again, fall short ofa generally apwould we do notinfact haveeventhat) ofjustification. concept plicable deontological ConA Different VI.Indirect Influence: Deontological Voluntary ceptionof EpistemicJustification thesupport for a deonI have been examining Up to this point ofepistemic justification provided bythetreattological conception atttitude onthemodel ofintentional ment ofpropositional formation itis inour ortowhatextent, action. We haveconsidered whether, outan intention to takeup a certain propositional powerto carry at will(basiccontrol), orwhile guideither uninterruptedly attitude, to do so (immediate or as a complex ed by theintention control), for most We haveseenthat control). longterm project (long-range and that for we havecontrol ofnoneofthesesorts, ofourbeliefs of and unreliable theothers we have,at most, somespotty control we do notgenerally havethe thelong-range sort.I conclude that to takeup a certain outan intention propositional powerto carry as believofepistemic attitude. Insofar as theconception justification

P. Alston 278 / William to depends on that ingas one is permitted itmust assumption, be rejected. Theinauguration ofpropositional attitudes simply doesnot worklikeintentional action. However this is notnecessarily theendofthelinefor thedeonAs I point outinAlston tologist. (1985),he has another move.We a stateofaffairs can be heldresponsible for thatresults from our actions evenifwe didnotproduce that state ofaffairs intentionally, provided itis thecase that something we did(didn't do) andshould havenot done(done) wasa necessary condition (inthecircumstances) ofthat oftherealisation stateofaffairs, that stateof i.e.,provided affairs would nothaveobtained hadwe notdone(done)something we should nothavedone(done).Supposethat, I didnot although do anything theintention with ofbringing about my cholesterol build I couldhaveprevented itifI haddonecertain up,still I could things and should havedone,e.g.,reducefatintake. In that case I could still be heldresponsible for thecondition; itcouldbe myfault. This isa wayinwhich canbe applied tome,with deontological concepts toa certain respect state ofaffairs, eventhough that ofaffairs state didnotresult from out to produce it. mycarrying an intention This that evenifpropositional suggests attitudes arenotunder our effective we might still be heldresponsible for voluntary control, them, provided we couldandshould haveprevented them; providis something ed there we couldand should havedonesuchthat if we haddoneitwe wouldnothavehad theattitude inquestion. If this is thecase itcouldprovide a basisfor theapplication ofdeontopropositional tological concepts for a deonattitudes, and,perhaps, of epistemic tological concept one thatbypasses justification, the abovecritique. Let'susetheterm "indirect influence" for voluntary this kind orbetter, ofvoluntary we may control, "voluntary impact" haveon ourbeliefs. Itmaybe helpful to display inoutline thevarious form modesof we have distinguished. voluntary control I. Direct control. A. Basiccontrol. B. Non-basic immediate control. II. Long-range control. III.Indirect influence. Nowitdoesseemthat we havevoluntary control overmany things that influence belief. These canbe divided into that (1)activities bring

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a particular influences from, situation influences tobear,orwithold field ora particular ofcandidates, candidate, involving a particular and(2)activities that affect ourgeneral belief forming habits for belief, of(1). With to Thereare manyexamples respect or tendencies.28 I havevoluntary and how control overwhether, a particular issue, relevant evidence or reasons, lookfor long,I consider thematter, from other people, search argument, seekinput reflect ona particular for analogous cases,andso on. Herewe comebackto mymemory as theinwrongly classify peoplelikeChisholm theactivities that attitude. Although thefact ofa propositional tentional inauguration ornot further evidence itis within mypower toeither lookfor that I havevoluntary atcontrol overwhat to do so,doesnotshowthat control I taketoward p, itdoes showthatI havevoluntary titude on that attitude. Thesecond includes such category overinfluences to be morecritical ofgossip, instilling activities as training myself before making carefully in myself a stronger disposition to reflect on highly into bea judgment controversial matters, talking myself sento authority, and practicng greater ingless(more) subservient to thecondition ofother mypowerto people.It is within sitivity I with like and when do them sufficient assiduido things this ornot, tendencies, to mypropositional attitude tyI makesomedifference ofsuchattitudes.29 and thusindirectly to theformation inincluding inthefirst category there would be no harm Actually, and a certain the successful tobring about attitude, specific attempts Forthese whenand ifthat occurs. outofsuchan attempt carrying inwe havevoluntary control that toowouldbe things overwhich Thepoint ofstressing other things attitudes. fluence ourpropositional for thinkhaveprovided reason is that, sinceourearlier discussions I want the toemphasize suchattempts arerarely successful, ingthat if in an that even we are never successful carrying out intenpoint over there are many things withhold) p, still tionto believe(reject, that on what do havea bearing we havevoluntary control which attitudes are engendered. propositional menIthardly activities ofthesorts voluntary needsargument that so thatit will our propositional attitudes, tioneddo influence some sometimes be thecase that hadwe performed (not performed) is as attitude we didnot(did)takeup.Theonly remaining question ofactivities we towhether tothesorts deontological concepts apply not we ought orought havebeendiscussing. Is iteverthecase that
actionsA, B, . . ., we wouldhave (nothave) takenup some voluntary

280 / William P. Alston ofsearching toengage insomeactivity for newevidence orrefrainwe ought ingfrom doing so? Is iteverthecase that (ought not)to to makeourselves more(less)critical ofgossip or more strive (less) sensitive tocontrary evidence? Deontologists typically averthat we in suchmatters, haveintellectual obligations obligations rooted in toseekthetrue andavoidthefalse, ourbasicintellectual obligation in ourbasicaim,need,or commitment rooted to or,alternatively, believethetrueand avoidbelieving thefalse. Let'sgo alongwith I candoso with onthis a clear ouropponents point. conscience, since I amseeking toshowthat evenifwe admit this, andmaketheother a deontological concessions I have been making, conception of is notviable. epistemic justification Thusitwillsometimes be thecase,whenI believethat p, thatI in thepastthat would nothavedoneso had I donevarious things I couldandshould I accept havedonebutfailed todo. Suppose that totheeffect is trying toundermine some idlegossip that Jim Susie's ofthedepartment. Itmaybe that as chair hadI beendoing position ofgossip, and by morecritical myduty by wayofmaking myself I would nothaveforminto this wayofchecking particular matter, itfor orwould nothaveretained so long.Inthat case edthat belief, inthesamewayas that Icould for this be held responsible believing for build inwhich I canbe heldresponsible mycholesterol up.I can I didnotintentionally for blamed beproperly it,eventhough bring
itabout.

to beliefs Notethatthisapplication ofdeontological concepts is i derivative one.What is primarily andforbidrequired, permitted, intwocategories, various lenarethevoluntary we ranged activities ;orts ofactivities that are influence belief. Deontological concepts ipplied tobeliefs only becauseofsomerelation these attitudes have ofpermission, relao those etc.Thisasymmetrical primary targets oneisresponionofdependence toallthose casesinwhich attaches for for without an action of ;ible a state ofaffairs being responsible itabout. ntentionally bringing Nowlet'sconsider terms can be applied justwhatdeontological is to be in thisderivative o beliefs wayand howthisapplication inderstood. Remember that we aretaking requirement, prohibition, Whendealmnd permission to be thebasicdeontological concepts. itis bestto think intentional first ofgeneral ngwith actions printhat under an action ofa certain :iples laydownconditions which a parortis required, or permitted; and then consider forbidden,

DeontologicalJustification / 281

becauseit exemplifies to have one ofthesestatuses ticular action ofa belief to Thusifwe taketheforming somegeneral principle. we will that be an intentional action, envisage general principles hold, itis forbidden that tobelieve e.g.,that p intheabsenceofsufficient belief without evidence. ThenifI form a particular sufficient grounds I haveviolated that belief is forbidden, or,ifyouprefer, a prohibitionin forming that belief. We can thenapplyother deontological terms like'responsible', 'blame', and'praise' on this basis.Ifone infalls under a principle tentionally doessomething that ofone ofthe whatone has done.Ifin doing above sorts, one is responsible for itone hasviolated or a prohibition, a requirement one can rightly it.Ifone hasnotviolated orprohibibe blamed for anyrequirement one is justified in doingit. tion, Buton thepresent wayoflooking at thematter, we can haveno a belief is required, principles laying downconditions under which orpermitted, we lacksufficient because conforbidden, just voluntary trol will overbelief formation. What therelevant principles require, inturn, areactivities that aredesigned toinfluence factors etc., that, is no basisfor Hencethere willinfluence belief formation.30 taking a particular belief to be required, or forbidden. Andso prohibited, if we aretosay, ontherationale given above, that onecanbe respona belief, for that be thecase eventhough sibleandblameworthy will is notprohibited. Ifoneis puzzled thebelief bythis, thecurecomes on requirefrom that andblamesupervene realizing responsibility intwoquitedifferent andpermission ment, prohibition, ways. First, and most one is to blamefor forbidden or simply, doing something todo something Butsecond, oneisalsotoblame for failing required. ifthat for theobtaining wouldnothaveobtained ofsomefact fact ifone hadnotbehaved in somemanner for which one is to blame inthefirst forbidden orfailing to do sense,i.e. for doing something something required. indiscussing we haveseenthat one can So far, indirect influence, be toblame for a certain attitude onewouldn't propositional provided havethat attitude hadonenotfailed toconform tosomeintellectual orprohibition. Butthis must be refined. On requirement formulation inwhich reflection itturns outtobe toobroad. There arecertain ways dereliction ofduty cancontribute formation without rendertobelief thatbelief. ingthesubject blameworthy forforming Supposethat I fail intraining tocarry a certain outmyobligation tospend period to I the time thus freed look for counter-evidence. use myself up to

P. Alston 282 / William I theneighborhood. In thecourse ofthis stroll takea walkaround thattheyare thereby acquiring thebelief see twodogs fighting, I didn't fulfill, intellectual obligation fighting. Therewas a relevant ifI hadfulfilled itI wouldn't that haveacquired which is suchthat normal I amsurely is a perfectly belief, perceptual belief. Butifthat it.31 notto blameforhaving formed simpofduty contributed tobelief-formation Herethedereliction ofcontribulybyfacilitating accesstothedata.Thatis notthekind ofwere tionwe hadin mind. The sorts ofcases we werethinking obligathose most bythetwosorts ofintellectual directly suggested the (a) cases in which we acquireor retain tions we distinguished: from adverse considerations belief onlybecausewe are sheltered ina waywe wouldn't havebeenhadwe donewhat we should have thebelief was acquired by theactivation done;(b) cases in which nothavepossessed hadwe fulfilled ourintellecofa habit we would Thus we canavoidcounter-examples like theabove tual obligations. reformulation: by thefollowing ifS that p iff to blameforbelieving (1) S is (intellectually) all herintellectual had fulfilled thenS's belief obligations, or S's accessto habits wouldhavechanged, forming in wouldhave changed, relevant adverseconsiderations thatp. sucha way thatS wouldnothave believed of the Anotherissue has to do with the "absoluteness" involved in thisformulation. the flat counterfactual (1) involves thatS wouldnot have believedthatp underthese requirement for that Butperhaps S is also blameworthy conditions. believing p itwould if lesslikely be much someweaker condition holds, e.g.,that herintellectual thatS wouldhave believedthatp had S fulfilled and(1) depends on between this Ofcourse, therelation obligations. we neednot Forpresent one'saccount ofcounterfactuals. purposes I am shortly to arguethatthe enter thisforbidding swamp. going that from ofepistemic (1)isinadequate emerges concept justification willnotreston taking the and thatargument forepistemology; to be stronger or weaker. counterfactual of a deontological notion We can now moveon to developing isobvious: above.Onepoint that isbasedonthe epistemic justification that belief is notjustified. whenS is to blamefor believing p, that ofbeliefs. What will cover only a tiny proportion But that presumably abouttheothers?

DeontologicalJustification / 283

would be totreat as themirror Onepossibility being justified image ofbeingunjustified. To justifiably believethat is for p, then, one's belief That that p tobe toone'scredit. inbelieving is,oneisjustified that p iff one wouldn't havebelieved that p unless one hadfulfilled one's intellectual in some way: by doing what is obligations from intellectually ofone orbyrefraining what required one doing is intellectually to do. forbidden This might seemtoleaveuswith precious few beliefs. How justified haveintellectually ofourbeliefs dutiful deedsas an essential many Butbefore thatconclusion partof their we ancestry? embracing that should remember thathas to do with partoftheformulation from whatis forbidden. The formulation refraining doing does not we are justified imply that somepositive onlywhere actofduty is inthecausalancestry. itis always One might arguethat opento us to engage in attempts to buildup disreputable beliefforming and that tendencies, e.g.,wishful often we wouldn't thinking; have theperfectly respectable beliefs we do haveifwe hadengaged in that with enterprise sufficient Butevenso itstill vigor. remains that no suchcounterfactual wouldholdfor that are beyond beliefs the reachofvoluntary endeavors, liketypical perceptual, memory, and beliefs. introspective No amount ofstriving after wishful thinking would ofthese. dislodge most Hence fall they would outside thescope ofjustified belief on thisconstrual. There is a simple waytosetup thejustified-unjustified distinction on thebasisof(1) without into a conflict so violent with coming our We can takeanybelief that ordinary is notunjustified judgments. bytheabovecriterion tobe justified. On this construal, 'unjustified' wouldbe theterm that "wears thetrousers" (Austin), and 'justified' wouldsimply be itsnegation. A belief is justified thesubject iff is notintellectually to blamefor it.Thisbrings holding us backto the deontological of justification conception advocated and by Ginet others. that Remember we quoted Ginet as saying that oneisjustified that provided "onecould not be justly for confident reproached being thatp". The onlydifference is thatwhereas Ginet was thinking of blame as attaching tobelief as something that isitself under voluntary we are thinking ofitinthemore control, derivative complex, way in thissection. developed

284 / William P. Alston VII. Critiqueof This New Conception Theupshot ofthe paper thus far isthat theonly viable deontological ofjustification identifies conception is theone that in being justified toblamefor believing that p with notbeing intellectually believing that in(1).To putthis p, ina senseof'toblamefor' explicated into a canonical formula: (2) S is justified in believing thatp iff it is notthecase thatif S had fulfilled all herintellectual thenS's obligations, belief habits wouldhave changed, or S's access forming to relevant adverseconsiderations wouldhave changed, in sucha way thatS wouldnothave believed thatp. What follows theiff is,ofcourse, thedenial oftheaccount ofbeing toblamefor a belief given by(1)."Ofcourse", sinceon this conception, being justified inbelieving that p is justnotbeing toblamefor thatp. believing In theremainder ofthepaperI shallpresent reasons for denying that usa concept ofjustification (2)gives that iswhat weare,orshould inepistemology. be,looking for I shallpoint outwaysinwhich one canbe justified to(2),andyetnotjustified according inanywaythat iscrucial for epistemological concerns; and,conversely, that onecan in an epistemologically be justified crucial wayand yetnotdeontologically justified, as spelledoutby (2). Butfirst a terminological disclaimer. intuitions tell me that'justified' My linguistic and its are properly used onlyin a deontological cognates sense.To be indoing orbelieving is to nothaveviolated justified something just or principles in so doing, anyrelevant rules, . If, norms, believing as I believe, mostepistemologists use 'justified' for somequitedifferent are speaking thisway notion, they infelicitously. However, oftalking is so firmly I shallgo alongwith entrenched that it,albeit with an uneasylinguistic conscience. IfI amtoargue torealepistemic that (2)doesnotamount justification,I must proceedon thebasisofsomeassumption as to what is.I haveno time epistemic toargue for justification really anysuch the HenceI shallarguethe at assumption tagend ofthispaper.32 for point separately twodifferent onemore conceptions, externalist, theother I shalldevotemost ofthetimeto my moreinternalist.33 favorite is basically which externalist with an internalist conception, twist. Let me beginby briefly that. explaining

/ 285 Justification Deontological from theidea offorming a belief in sucha wayas to be in Start togeta true belief. Callthis, ifyoulike, a "favorable a goodposition inbelieving that Oneisjustified ofjustification. position" conception ifthat belief was formed insucha wayas to makeitat least p only is true, that thebelief said,onlyif or,as is sometimes verylikely is a in a "truth-conducive" theory way.34 Reliability itwas formed thenotion: Thebelief is justified developing natural wayoffurther in a reliable one thatcan generally fashion, onlyifitwas formed Notethat there is no guarantee on toproduce true beliefs. be relied ofthemodeof aspects that thesubject willbe awareofthecrucial that modeis truth that conducive; lessofthefact formation, much twist externalist. Myinternalist that is whatmakes this conception inalsorequiring that thebelief be basedon a "ground" that consists canbe awareoffairly Thistwist doesnotnegate thesubject readily. I do notalso require that thesubject be aware,or theexternalism. theground is an adequateone havethecapacity to be aware,that wasformed ina reliable ora truth conducive way. orthat thebelief noroleinwhat follows. Thearguwill play Myinternalist qualification on therequirement that theground be in ment willdepend solely one(sufficiently ofthetruth ofthebelief). an adequate indicative fact topoint outthat theensuing arguI mention twist only myinternalist on the most extreme ment against (2) does notdepend embracing form ofexternalism. theconcept does not The first to mention about(2) is that point thatlack sufficient reflecsophistication, applyat all to subjects orfreedom tobe subject tointellectual prorequirements, tiveness, andvery young lower animals hibitions, andthelike.Thisincludes tostress ButI don't want children as wellas thementally defective. it that the notion this argued since can be plausibly consideration, hasno significant to suchsubofepistemic application justification IfI wentalongwith thepopular viewthat justification jectseither. I wouldresist this for itis clear claim, is necessary for knowledge, know what tomethat lower animals andvery children often young I to recognize am prepared isgoing onintheir environment. But since I am free that the to acknowledge without justification, knowledge where subjects only notion ofepistemic justification gets a foothold arecapable andthose ofothers ofevaluating their owndoxastic states Hencethediscusandresponding evaluations appropriately. tothose sionwill towhom deontological be restricted tonormal adult humans, are concepts applicable.

P. Alston 286 / William one maybe deontologically NextI shallexplore waysin which in a belief without thebelief in a truth conducive forming justified oneis free ofblame informway.Butfirst, howwe aretotellwhen in the thebelief stemmed, inga belief? Thatdepends on whether ofobligations. Buthoware we to specified way,from anyfailure I am notnowasking think ofthoseobligations? aboutthecontent I shall draw ofourintellectual As for that, simply on the obligations. I amasking Howmuch earlier. rather: isa person illustrations given ina particular todo along these lines situation? Andthemain obliged is that we must between "counsels ofperfection" point distinguish ofa person. With world enough andwhat itis reasonable to expect and timewe couldrequire out an exhaustive inpeopleto carry through alltherelevant literature vestigation ofeachwitness, search for toeachcandidate for check belief, each considerations pertinent do nothavetime tentimes, and so on. Butwe simply calculation for all that. Evenifwe wereexclusively devoted to thesearch for on which we wouldnotbe able to do that for all thematters truth we havevarious Andgiven that other comwe needtoform beliefs. and obligations, itis doubly abandonimpossible. Hence, mitments onecanproperly be blamingcounsels ofperfection, letussaythat in thespecified ed for a belief belief stems, way,from onlyifthat failbe expected ofone;simply failures todo what couldreasonably adequateis notenough. ingto do whatwouldbe ideally 1 presented InAlston twoputative ofsubjects who examples (1985) to getthetruth. butina poorposition are deontologically justified inan isolated Oneisa case ofcultural isolation. S haslived all hislife unhesitatingly acceptsthe primitive community whereeveryone traditions ofthetribe as authoritative. Thesehaveto do with alleged events intime and space,aboutwhich S and hisfellows distant S has neverenhaveno chanceto gather evidence. independent traditions who the and countered anyone questions traditions, these life of tribe. Under these condithe playa keyroleinthecommunal for S is inno wayto blame forming tions itseemsclearto me that He hasnotfailed todo anything beliefs onthebasisofthetraditions. he couldreasonably to do. Hisbeliefs be expected about, e.g.,the stemfrom so faras he can see, are the ofthetribe, what, origins Andyet,letus supbestgrounds one couldhave forsuchbeliefs. a wayas to be formed in such havenotbeen pose,thetraditions a reliable indication oftheir owntruth. S is deontologically justified, buthe is notbelieving in a truth conducive way.

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has been challenged The first half ofthisjudgment by Matthias whotakesa hardlinewith Steup(forthcoming), mytribesman: No matter howgrim thecircumstances are,ifan agentholds a belief contrary to evidence, it is within hispower, given to reflect and thathe is a rational agent, uponhisbelief to find outthathe had better withhold thereby it,or even assentto itsnegation. I wouldsay, Beinga rational agent, involves thecapacity to find out,with respect to anybelief, or notit is beingheldon good grounds. whether (pp. 19-20). ofintellectual Hence, contrary to myjudgment, S is notfree blame and so is notdeontologically justified. I think thatSteupis displaying an insensitivity to cultural diffHe supposes thatthereare standards in all ferences. recognized that determine what isadequate orgoodenough cultures evidence, grounds, for one or another kindofbelief. Thatdoes notseemto wellbe trans-cultural meto be thecase. There mayvery epistemic suchas consistency and reliability, butI see no reason standards, allissues tosuppose that aresufficient tosettle as towhat counts they orgrounds. as adequate reasons Onthecontrary, thecriteria for this from oneculture toanother. Thejudgments ofadevary significantly aretransmitted willdiffer that acrossgenerations quacyofgrounds ofa subacrosscultures. Hencewhatcan reasonably be expected examination ofbeliefs andtheir bases critical jectwith respect to,e.g., willdiffer acrosscultures. We require adultsin our culture to be of"tradition", critical recent butthisis a relatively phenomenon, be reasonably given thetime humans havebeenon earth; itcannot I amnotsaying ofeveryone inevery Note that that required society. I am no cultural what is adequateevidence varies with theculture. that S'sbelief lacks relativist. Onthecontrary. My judgment adequate that there are objective stangrounds wasbasedon thesupposition ofgrounds that hold whatever isaccepted inone dards for adequacy oranother Butthat isjustthepoint. culture. Deontological justificaon what to cultural differences becauseitdepends tionis sensitive inturn onone's canreasonably be expected ofone,andthat depends socialinheritance andtheinfluences to which one is exposed.But truth does notso depend. Hencetheycan diverge. conducivity The other case. It case I presented was a "cognitive deficiency" tofollow a college havewhat ittakes concerned student whodoesn't readparts of abstract orreasoning. philosophical exposition Having

P. Alston 288 / William Book IV of Locke'sEssay,he takesit thatLocke'sview is that of opinion.He is simply everything is a matter incapableof distinguishing betweenthatview and Locke's view thatone's isnothing hecould knowledge isrestricted toone'sownideas.There do,atleastnothing that couldreasonably be expected ofhim, given and obligations, hisother commitments that would lead him to apfor preciate that difference. Hencehecannot be blamed interpreting Lockeas he does;he is doinghe besthe can. Butsurely this belief illgrounded, basedas itis on thestudent's dimwitis outrageously tedimpressions ofLocke. this case byclaiming that evenifthestudent is Steup challenges a better ofattaining ofLocke, hecouldhave incapable understanding donesomething that wouldhaveled him of to withold acceptance in question, "Do I understand theinterpretation viz.,ask himself in assenting Locke'sEssaywellenough to be justified to this interI certainly pretation?". (p. 22) Now,as Steupintimates, don't want thecase insucha waythat thestudent is incapable ofasktodepict I do wantto construe this However itin such inghimself question. thequestion wouldnotlead himto withold asa waythatasking I Thecase haveinmind is one inwhich thestudent feels sent. quite ofhisreading; this is definitely thewayitstrikes and confident him, to doubtit (at leastnotprior he has no tendency to seeingthe is a possigradehe getson thefinal exam).Certainly that scenario thepossibility deonbleoneandit,too,illustrates ofa gapbetween and truth conducive tological justification justification. However itmayhavebeenpoorstrategy outthishapless to trot as of two it student one only cases,for undoubtedly raises toomany issues. tomention thefact that someofmy readers controversial (Not think that thestudent Moreover itmaygive may hasLocke straight!) theimpression that basedon cognitive counterexamples deficiency are limited tosuchextreme cases and,we mayhope,suchunusual as this. in fact We havesucha Whereas are all too common. they a belief, on poorgrounds, on something case whenever one forms andthis a common ocone'sintellectual is surely beyond capacity; currence. Just consider a person whoforms thebelief that socialism are often is contrary to Christianity, for thereasons that for given this viewbytheNewRight, of and whois intellectually incapable out howbad thesereasons are. figuring cases only cultural isolation and cognitive However, deficiency are scratch thesurface. casesthat We haveso far beenconsidering

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extreme inourculture or comefrom a very either rather different Butthere are other sorts ofcasesthat culture. are around us every ofthosein which we lackthetime day.I am thinking particularly a matter inan epistemically or resources to lookinto idealfashion. Consider theinnumerable beliefs each ofus form on testimony or Most ofwhat we believe, authority. what we experience beyond perthis we wouldcheckouteach sonally, comesfrom source. Ideally source tomake sure that itisreliable before thetestimony. accepting Butwhohastime for that? We can do itinspecial caseswhere the matter is ofparticular butno one coulddo itfor even importance; a smallpercentage oftheitems proferred for ourbelief. by others Nor isita realoption towithold belief savewhere we do run a check. Thatwould leaveourdoxastic structure so impoverished we would notbe able to function in our society. Practically everything we believe about andcurrent affairs istaken science, history, geography, onauthority. evenif we hadthetime tocheck Moreover, uponeach inmost caseswe lacktheresources for an informed authority, making Forthesamereason that I cannot inastrophysics judgment. engage on myown,I am in no position to determine whois a competent in thefield, thewordofother authority exceptby taking alleged in authorities. Thus most casesinwhich I uncritically accept testimony I havedoneas much as couldreasonably be expected ofme.And nowletus consider those cases inwhich theauthority is incompetent or thewitness is unreliable. Therewe are forming a belief on an objectively unreliable basis, though deontologically justified indoingso. One couldhardly deny that this happens significantly often. Thissamepattern is found outside thesphere oftestimony. Consider perception. Sometimes them peoples' eyesdeceive becauseof orpsychological physiological malfunctioning, orbecauseofabnormalities intheenvironment constructed unusual (cleverly imitations, conditions ofthemedium, Should we checkforsuchabnoretc.). malities eachtime we areontheverge offorming a perceptual belief? we have no timeforthis, Obviously even ifourperceptual belief mechanisms were sufficiently forming undervoluntary control. Hence,exceptwhere there are definite indications that are things we will nothavefailed off, inourintellectual ifwe simpobligations ly form beliefs perceptual and uncritically; and unselfconsciously hence we aredeontologically justified indoing so. Butnowconsider cases inwhich ourvisualimpressions are misleading, eventhough we are notawareofanyindications ofthis. Thereone is forming

P. Alston 290 / William justified indobeliefs onan unreliable basis, though deontologically ingso. irresistible beliefs Next consider andbelief tendencies. If itisstrictly for me to altera certain belief or tendency, thenI can impossible beliefs hardly be expected to do so. Butsomeoftheseirresistible examples maybe formed inan unreliable fashion. Themost obvious emotional attachments thatare, in practice, unconcern strong Formany their orirreligious, shakeable. beliefs have people religious, this as do beliefs one'scountry, one'scloserelastatus, concerning are often or one'spolitical notformed in tions, party. Suchbeliefs a truth-conducive fashion. cannot be blamed for havButtheperson shecan'thelphaving, ingsomething andso we getourdiscrepancy once more. Finally, consider timing problems. Suppose that I cometo realize that itis incumbent on meto lookmorefully intomatters relevant tobasicreligious ofGod, theconditions ofsalvaissues: theexistence rooted beliefs tion, theauthority ofScripture, andso on.I havedeeply I am notgoing them on thesematters; to throw overjustbecause I am reopening noram I obliged thequestions, to do so. Andeven ifsuspension of belief it is nota real wouldbe ideallyrequired, forme until In any I see conclusive evidence. possibility negative I enter ontomyinvestigation. Let'ssaythat theinvestigation event, that wereillfounded reveals mybeliefs all along.As soonas I see I cease to believe, either or after someperiod of that, immediately is proceeding, something readjustment. Butwhile theinvestigation I amdeontologically inconthat justified might occupy many years, I amnotobliged tohold thebeliefs, for togivethem up,even tinuing havebeenraised; are andyetthey ifI could, justbecausequestions And notheldon truth-conducive grounds. Againourdiscrepancy. againit wouldseemthatsuchcases are quitefrequent. of and theactuality, Thiscompletes mycase forthepossibility, Even without truth conducive deontological justification justification. ofsomeoftheabove ifI ammistaken about thepossibility oractuality thepossibility thatI am mistaken about cases,I can safely ignore to capall.We maytakeitthat ourdeontological (2),fails formula, therubric of turewhatwe are looking forin epistemology under intheneighborhood when for we arelooking 'justification', something from ina favorable inbelieving that of"being position p",favorable believthestandpoint and avoiding oftheaimat believing thetrue ingthefalse.

/ 291 DeontologicalJustification

in theopposite direction as well: Butwe can havediscrepancies truth conducive while notdeonbelieving on an adequately ground will be realised Thispossibility where: (1) I form tologically justified. an adequateground a belief that for p on ground G; (2) G is infact on this belief that forming probelief; (3) ifI hadreflected critically as I should havedone,I would havefound sufficient reasons clivity, andas a result this belief nothavebeen would todoubt itsadequacy, itis incumbent Let'ssuppose that on formed. Hereis an example. me to lookinto thecredentials ofanyone on whosewordI believe An acquaintance, ofpractical tells Broom, something importance. whomwe are considering a position me that for in my Robinson, The press has justbeen madean offer department, by Princeton. andmyinstinctive inBroom ofaffairs confidence leadmetoneglect andaccept IfI hadlooked Broom's into myduty report uncritically. I wouldhave found thatBroom thematter evidence is unstrong insuch matters. However this evidence would havebeen trustworthy andinfact Broom is extremely andreliable scrupulous misleading, thebelief on an objectively inreporting suchthings. ThusI formed I wouldhave buthadI donemyintellectual duty adequateground, andhence the belief. I wasjustified mistrusted theground not formed to (2). on truth-conducivity standards butnotaccording I havebeenseeking toshowthat thedeontological of conception that we have to be theonly one of ilk found internally justification, ofjustification fails to deliver whatis expected ifthoseexviable, But not all contemporary pectations includetruth conducivity. inparticular, themost extreme epistemologists go alongwith this; internalists do not.Notthat sever from altogether they justification theaimat attaining thetrueand avoiding thefalse. Theyhold, to itis necessary, putitintomyterms, that for a belief to be justified notthat thebelief itsground be infact suchas torender itlikely that that butthatthesubject be justified in supposing the is true, this, thesubject's ownperspecbelief tobe truth-conducive "from appear this kind ofinternalism is developed tiveon theworld".35 Although in various fit this formula exactly ways, byno meansall ofwhich we cannot in this in thelastsentence, paper. given go intoall that I shallworkwith thecharacterization justgiven. I believethisview to be subjectto an infinite of reregress ofjustification, andto other difficulties.36 However quirements fatal itand(2), between concern is topoint outdivergencies mypresent runs afoul of and henceto showthat thedeontological conception

P. Alston 292 / William After thelengthy bothexternalism and internalism. discussion just completed I canbe briefer here. Thegeneral isthat evenafter point ofoneintellecone hasdoneeverything that is reasonably expected oneisjustified insupposing itisbyno means that tually, guaranteed that theground ofone'sbelief is an adequateone.Let'stakea brief in connection with glanceat a fewofthecases justpresented my externalism. thepointwithrespect to irresistible moderate First, thesame.Ifa belief is irresistible, then no matter beliefs isprecisely I am,I willform that belief whether or howintellectually virtuous insupposing itsground tobe an adequate one.TurnnotI amjustified that let's notefirst we often do nothavetime ingtoresistible beliefs, ofthebelief to lookintowhether theground is an adequateone. thebelief doesn't stemfrom some other In suchcases (assuming one wouldbe deonfailure to carryout intellectual obligations) that a failure toconsider themattologically justified; but, assuming insupposing one'sground ter would prevent onefrom being justified tobe adequate, onewould notsatisfy internalist requirements. Again, oflackofcognitive Itseems consider another version powers. plausiaresimply of bletosuppose that many cognitive subjects incapable ina rational ofwhether thegrounds oftheir engaging consideration ofbeliefs, beliefs sorts (atleastmany e.g.,those involving complex are adequateones.Evenifthey inductive grounds) raisethequestionthey to wellgrounded are notcapableofcoming conclusions. Thesepeoplemight havedoneeverything that couldbe reasonably be expected ofthem inan intellectual andyet, way, becauseoftheir toeffectively oftheir toa critical inability submit thegrounds beliefs insupposing ofa cerassessment, wouldnotbe justified theground tainbelief without tobe sufficient. Again, deontological justification internalist justification. for The internalist thatwe have set our standards might reply in supposing leveljustification too high. To be justified the higher ground ofa certain belief tobe adequate, itis notnecessary to have actively considered thematter. Buteven ifthisis so, one obvious one does requirement for being justified in believing that p is that believethatp.37 And it seems clear thatone could have done and never everything thatcouldbe expected ofone intellectually have formed the belief thatthe ground of a certain normal and veridical perceptual belief is an adequateone; in whichcase one wouldbe deontologically justified butnotinternalistically justified. Iftheinternalist retorts that anyfailure to form sucha belief is in-

Deontological Justification / 293

tellectually and hencethat thecombination culpable justallegedis I would impossible, that itwould reply be intolerable torequire such belief formation for all one'sbeliefs. Ifit is required for all levels, one is requiring an infinite ofbelief. Butevenifwe cut hierarchy offthe requirement at the secondlevel,it wouldstillbe totally torequire unrealistic that onehavesuch a higher level belief for every levelbelief first one has. Moreover, heretoo we getthepossibility ofinternalist justification without deontological justification. Consider onewhoisjustified in supposing theground ofherbelief that thehostages are in Iran to be an adequateone. Thatis,theinformation and general principlesat herdisposal indicate herevidence to be sufficient. She is in thisbelief internalistically justified aboutthehostages. Yet had sheengaged in further as sheshould investigation, havedone,her internal perspective would havebeenenlarged andcorrected insuch a waythat shewould no longer be justified inthis levelbelief. higher Hertotal setofknowledge andjustified belief wouldthen haveinthat herevidence dicated for this is notsufficient. Here proposition we haveinternalist without justification deontological justification. Thusthedeontological conception embodied in(2) matches an internalist of conception justification no better than itmatches an externalist one.I conclude that there isnothing tobe saidfor thedeonthe tological conception, onethat isnot only vitiated byinternal flaws, as a fundamental for concept Thisis notto deny epistemology. that itisan interesting andimportant There concept. are,nodoubt, contexts inwhich itis highly relevant toconsider whether a person has failed inanyintellectual andwhat duty this hason thefact bearing that he nowbelieves that want p. We would toconsider this if, e.g., we wereengaged in training theperson to be moreintellectually ortoimprove responsible hisbelief forming tendencies. But we have seenthat these issues arenotcentral deontological tothebasicconcerns ofepistemology with truth andfalsity, whether this isconceived as theformation ofpropositional externalistically attitudes in such a wayas tomaximize truth andminimize orinternalistically falsity, as theformation ofpropositional inaccordance attitudes with what is indicated bythesubject's as to thechances perspective for maxtruth andminimizing imizing is not falsity. Deontological justification epistemic justification.

P. Alston 294 / William VIII. Conclusion ofthis We haveexamined Let'sdraw thethreads papertogether. ofepistemic ofa deontological justification several forms conception from blameintaking propositional interms offreedom upa certain attitude. All ofthesebutone was seen to be untenable by reason a degree ofcontrol overourpropositional ofrequiring attitudes that The onlyversion that was seen we do notenjoy. escapesthisfate we need to playa central role in to be notthe sortof concept theconnotations oftheterm, we epistemology. Therefore, despite tothink ofepistemic interms offreedom areilladvised justification from blameforbelieving.38
Notes 1. Robert Audihassuggested that for me tohavejustifiably doneA itis also necessary thatI diditbecauseit was permitted bytherelevant A'shaving system ofprinciples (though this isnotrequired, hesays, for for ofthedistinction beenjustified me).Thiswould be on theanalogy that between S's being justified inbelieving that p, andthe proposition p's being justified for S. Thismaybe right, butI am unable to go into perthematter more fully here. Thepoint I needfor this paperis that rather than isnecessary mission, requirement, bytherelevant principles for thejustification ofaction. 2. Principles is formed is nottheonly having to do with thewaya belief A deontologist tomakethepermissibility here. possibility might prefer orgrounds ofa belief on what evidence thesubject has for the depend thanon thegrounds that wereactually belief, rgther usedas a basis in theformation to ofthebelief. Sincethis difference is notgermane I havechosen in terms of theissues ofthis paper, to state thematter wasformed my position, according towhich thebasisonwhich a belief is crucial for itsjustificatory status. ver3. Thisformulation is itself subject toboth internalist andexternalist on whether the sions(infact to several varieties ofeach),depending isobjective Moreoever, "likelihood" or"within thesubject's perspective". inthelastsentence inthetext, as foreshadowed this version ofa deonis only theone that is closest totheusualconcept tological conception inthecourse ofthejustification ofactions; ofthepaperitwill be found nottobe viable that andwill be replaced bya deontological conception is further from theaction case. 4. See Chisholm (1968), (1982). (1977), 5. Ginet whoexplicitly endorse a deon(1975), p. 28.Other epistemologists areBonjour Chs.1,4; tological conception (1985), Ch.1; Moser (1985), Wolterstorff (1983);Plantinga (1983);Pollock (1986), pp. 7-8.Itshould be noted that itexplicit that hewould be just as happy Plantinga makes

/ 295 DeontologicalJustification rather thanin terms of of "excellence" in terms witha conception to a definite has sinceshifted Thisindifference from blame. freedom (1986), (1988).Goldman See, e.g.,Plantinga for thelatter. preference conception. a deontological also advocates though a reliabilist, havebeennoted See,e.g., recently. totheprinciple 6. Various exceptions involve kinds ofacnoneoftheexceptions Stocker (1971).However, have Hencethey control. under voluntary are notnormally tions that tobelieve be required orforbidden onecould toshowthat notendency Theformulations inthis control overbeliefs. voluntary while onelacks onenormally havevolunthat as requiring should be taken paragraph control over one hasvoluntary notthat control overone'sbeliefs, tary in a particular situation. belief a particular whenwe in thecourse ofthepaper, 7. Thislastclaimwillbe modified andblameone might be responsible is a wayinwhich there see that and control, voluntary beingunder without their forbeliefs, worthy prohibitorequirement, subject being themselves beliefs hence without Fornow, awaitthat development. Butwe must and permission. tion, package. terms as an indivisible ofdeontological treat thefamily we will pp. 14-15. 8. See, e.g.,Chisholm (1977), that we are capableof becausesomething is needed 9. Thisqualification else,e.g.,a movesomething doing aboutnotbyvoluntarily bringing else,e.g., something aboutbydoing onecan bring ment ofone'sarm, theother arm. one armbymoving lifting Inthis ofcontrol. inspeaking themodifier 'voluntary' 10. I willoften omit understood. to be tacitly paperit is always itis not to casesinwhich their voluntarism peoplelimit 11. Most ofthese is true orfalse. Foran excellent thebelief whether cleartothesubject with specific on thissubject, many ofthehistory ofthought account (1986). see Pojman references, ofthesemaintains (1980).Neither 12. See, e.g.,Ginet (1985)and Meiland control. basicvoluntary that is alwaysunder belief 13. (1977), Ch. 1. which ofa number of todetermine onemight lackthepower 14. To be sure, nothavethepower butonecould isrealised; alternatives incompatible at will thepower todetermine alsohaving without tochooseA at will is realized. ofA (at leastnot-A) that somecontrary that riseto gives a proposition as an activity "accepting" 15. I understand I amnotusing the Lehrer a belief. unlike (1979)andothers, Therefore, without a proposition believing accept insuch a sense that onecould term maybe byan acceptance ofcourse, engendered thebelief it;though, ofbelief formation I also recognize processes moreor lesslonglived. ofacceptance. thatdo notinvolve anyactivity isbyWilliams claim ofthelogical impossibility 16. Thebest defence known (1976)andWinters alia,Govier by,inter (1972).It has beencriticized (1979). to be presented shortly. ofa sort 17. Itmayalso stem from misdiagnoses ofunan ascription 18. Ginet "we can interpret He holdsthat disagrees. as saying cannot that thesubject helphaving to a belief justifiedness

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ifthesubjectwere able to helpit,she oughtnotto holdthebelief" that, (1985),p.' 183. Thus we can extenda deontological conceptofjustificaI have twocoma counterfactual. tionto irresistible beliefs by invoking ments to make on thismove.(1) Thisrenders epistemic justification quite from thejustification ofaction, where'justified' and otherdeondifferent from tologicaltermsare withheld actionsthesubjectcouldn'thelpperas we can make a judgment forming. (2) Insofar as to what would be or forbidden were a certain stateswithin permitted rangeofinvoluntary our voluntary itwillturn out thatthedeontological evaluation control, a misleading is simply way ofmakingevaluationsthatcould be stated and morecandidly in otherterms. morestraightfowardly Suppose that we judge thatifwe had voluntary controlover the secretion of gastric juices,thenwe oughtto secretethemin such a way as to be maximally conducive to healthand a feelingof well being; e.g., we should not secretethemso as to producehyperacidity. Butsince gastric juices are notwithin ourvoluntary control, thiswouldseem to be justa misleading way of sayingthata certainpatternof secretionis desirableor worformulation thwhile. The deontological is a wheel thatmoves nothing else in the machine. Cf.Pojman (1986), Ch. 13, forexcellentdiagnosesof putativecases of basic controlof beliefs. In maintaining thatone cannotbelieve thatp without itsat least seeming to one thatp is more probable than any envisaged alternative, I am notjoining, that e.g., Richard Swinburne (1981,Ch. 1),in supposing to believe that p is just to take p to be more probable than some alternative(s). See, e.g., Goldman(1980), Plantinga (1983), Wolterstorff (1983), Moser (1985), Ch. IV, Steup,forthcoming. Even theextendedtreatment in Pojman(1986)fails to makeany distinctionswithin"indirect control". a felicitous is hardly Whenthe'non-basic' qualifier is omitted, 'immediate' I shall, thatcontrasts term for something with basiccontrol. Nevertheless, of'immediate forthe sake ofconcision, control'. mostly speak in terms The 'non-basic'qualifier is to be understood. This notionof doing something "right away" will serve to distinguish the presentformof directcontrolfromthe next category. Chisholm(1968), p. 224. I shouldmake it explicitthatI do not suppose thatan intention must be conscious,muchless focally all the timeitis playconscious,during ing a role in guidingbehavior. I am not sayingthatS could be held responsible A fortakingattitude in intentionally towardp only ifS himself had in factbeen successful is ratherthatp be the about thatattitude. bringing The requirement sortofproposition successful are usually towardwhichpeople generally in bringing about a certainattitude when theytryhardenough to do for actions so. Ifthemorestringent wereadopted, requirement generally, it would preventus fromholdingS reponsibleforan habitualaction from to refrain outan intention wherehe couldhave successfully carried

19. 20.

21. 22. 23.

24. 25. 26. 27.

DeontologicalJustification / 297 ifhe had had suchan intention. that action 28. See Wolterstorff (1983)for an excellent discussion ofthesemodesof influence. 29. Note that theactivities inthis second category areevenfurther removed from formation ofa certain than inthe theintentional belief those first, which themselves from areclearly distinct anysuch thing. Theactivities inthefirst areconcerned with a small category number ofalternatives for attitude formation. theactivities Though arenotundertaken with theaimoftaking up one particular attitude from this field, they aredirected toseeking will outinfluences that resolve this indeterminacy in someway or other. in thesecondgroup While theactivities are directed much more to ourtendencies ofattitude generally formation on a widevariety oftopics andina widevariety ofsituations. Butthe isthat most inneither inquestion important point casedo theactivities involve thecarrying outofan intention totakeupa particular propositional attitude. 30. Thustheclosest we getto theprinciple mentioned above wouldbe like:"Oneshould do whatone can to see to itthat something one is so disposed as to believe that when that belief is basedon adep only quateevidence". Hence thepower todo things that influence forbelief mation can be thought ofas, inter alia,a higher levelcapacity to get ourselves or makeitmorelikely that we willbe in,a condition into, that ofus if would be required we hadsufficient control over voluntary belief. 31. I amindebted toEmily Robertson for calling my attention tothis problem. 32. Fora defence ofa conception ofepistemic justification see Alston (forForan account ofsomedifferences inconcepts ofepistemic thcoming). with a brief ofa chosen justification, together defence see alternative, Alston (1985). 33. Foran account ofthevarieties ofinternalism andexternalism seeAlston (1986). 34. A more lookinto ofthe detailed account would theepistemic status belief attimes inthis subsequent toitsformation as well. that Wemust forego brief discussion. 35. See, e.g.,Foley(1987);Bonjour Ch. 1; Fumerton Ch.2; (1985), (1985), Lehrer(1 986). 36. Fordetails see Alston (1986). 37. Someepistemologist understand 'S isjustified inbelieving that p' tomean like'IfS weretobelieve that that something p,inS's present situation, would belief be justified'. Onthis understanding theaboverequirement doesnothold.However I havethroughout thepaperbeenunderstanin believing that that ding'S is justified p' as 'S justifiably believes p'. 38. Thanks for are due to Robert AudiandJonathan Bennett useful very comments on this I havegreatly from with discussions paper. profited CarlGinet abouttheseissues.

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References Alston,WilliamP. (1985) "Concepts ofEpistemic TheMonist, Justification", 68, no.2. (1986) and Externalism in Epistemology", Phil. Top., 14, no. 1. "Internalism "An Internalist Externalism", Synthese. (forthcoming) Bonjour,Laurence (1985) TheStructure ofEmpirical Knowledge(Cambridge, MA: Harvard U. Press). Chisholm, Roderick (1968) "Lewis' Ethicsof Belief",in The Philosophyof C. L. Lewis, ed. P. A. Schilpp(La Salle, IL: Open CourtPub. Co.). (1977) TheoryofKnowledge,2nd. ed. (EnglewoodCliffs, NJ:PrenticeHall, Inc.). (1982) "A Versionof Foundationalism", in The Foundationsof Knowing (Minneapolis: U. of Minn.Press). Foley, Richard (1987) The Theoryof EpistemicRationality MA: Harvard (Cambridge, U. Press). Fumerton, RichardA. (1985) Metaphysical and EpistemologicalProblems of Perception (Lincoln,NE: U. of Nebraska Press). Ginet,Carl (1975) Knowledge,Perception, and Memory(Dordrecht:D. Reidel Pub. Co.). (1985) "ContraReliabilism", The Monist,68, no. 2. Goldman,A. I. (1980) "The Internalist Conception ofJustification", Midwest Stud.Phil., Vol. 5. (1986) Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, MA:Harvard U. Press). Govier,Trudy (1976) "Belief,Values, and the Will",Dialogue, 15. Lehrer,Keith (1979) "The Gettier Problem and theAnalysis ofKnowledge" inJustificationand Knowledge,ed. G. S. Pappas (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Pub. Co.). (1986) "The CoherenceTheoryof Knowledge",Phil. Top., 14, #no.1). Meiland,Jack (1980) "WhatOughtWe to Believe? or the Ethicsof BeliefRevisited", Amer. Phil. Quart., 17. Moser,Paul (1985) EmpiricalJustification D. Reidel Pub. Co.). (Dordrecht: Alvin Plantinga, (1983) "Reason and Belief in God", in Faith and Rationality, ed. A. Plantinga& N. Wolterstorff (NotreDame: U. of NotreDame Press) (1988) "PositiveEpistemic Statusand ProperFunction", Philosophical Perspectives, thisvolume. Pojman, Louis (1986)Religious Beliefand the Will(London:Routledge& Kegan Paul).

DeontologicalJustification / 299 John Pollock, (1986)Contemporary Theories ofKnowledge NJ: Rowman & (1otowa, Littlefield). Matthia Steup, ofEpistemic (forthcoming) "TheDeontic Phil. Conception Justification", Stud Michael Stocker, (1971)"'Ought' and 'Can"'Australasian 49. Journ. Philos., Richard Swinburne, (1981)Faithand Reason(Oxford: Clarendon Press). Williams, Bemard oftheSelf (1972)"Deciding toBelieve", inProblems (Cambridge: CamU. Press). bridge Barbara Winters, (1979)"Believing at Will", Journ. Philos., 76. Nicholas Wolterstorff, (1983) "CanBelief inGodBe Rational IfItHasNoFoundations?", inFaith andRationality, & N.Wolterstorff ed.,A. Plantinga (Notre Dame:U. of Notre Dame Press).