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Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

A. When law takes effect

forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the

Ratio:

completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. (1a)

Said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982

Pesigan v Angeles

It

became effective only 15 days thereafter

They are not bound by the order

Facts:

Anselmo Pesigan and Marcelino Pesigan (petitioners) vs Judge Domingo Medina Angeles; Dra. Bella Miranda and Arnulfo Zenarosa, et al (respondents)

Anselmo Pesiga and Marcelo Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported on April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the destination.

Inspite of the permit to transport and the four certificates, the carabaos were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo Zenarosa (police station manager) and Doctor Bella Miranda (veterinarian) based on Executive Order No. 626-A

Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos

Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for the recovery of the carabaos

Judge Domingo Medina Angeles dismissed the case for lack of cause of action

Pesigans appealed to the court

Issue:

Enforceability, before publication in the Official Gazette of June 14, 1982, of Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing for the confiscation and

Relevant Provisions:

Commonwealth Act No. 638 provides that ―every order or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect‖

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that ―regulations and orders shall become effective only when approved by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or otherwise publicly promulgated‖

Ruling:

Trial court‘s order of dismissal and the confiscation and dispersal are reversed and set aside

Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are ordered to restore the carabaos, with the requisite documents, to the petitioners

Pesigans are entitled to a reasonable rental for each carabao from the 26 farmers who used them

Notes:

Statues generally have no retroactive effect unless the legislative intent is made manifest either by express terms of the stature or by necessary implication

Penal statutes are construed strictly against the state to provide

a precise definition of forbidden acts

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

Facts:

Tanada v Tuvera

Lorenzo Tańada, et al (petitioners) v Hon. Juan Tuvera, et al (respondents)

Petitioners invoke the people‘s right to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette

Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various decrees and orders

Issue:

Locus standi of the petitioners

Whether unpublished laws have binding force and effect

Whether publication is required in light of the clause ―unless otherwise provided‖

Ratio:

When the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest

The publication in the Official Gazette is required to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens

Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of regulations and make penalties binding on the person affected thereby. The publication of all presidential issuances of a ―public nature‖ or ―of general applicability‖ is a mandated by law, and is a requirement of due process. Presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation

or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures fall within this category. Before a person may be bound by law, he must be first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. When not published, such shall have no force and effect.

For without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees

The clause ―unless it is otherwise provided,‖ in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. The legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.

The word ―shall‖ imposes an imperative duty

However, the implementation/enforcement of the presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Gazette is an operative fact, which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored.

Relevant Provisions:

Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that ―the right of people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized‖

Principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette

Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that ―petition for Mandamus When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty… the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant… to do the act required to be done‖

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that ―laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided‖

Commonwealth Act 638

Article 3 of the Civil Code provides that ―ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith‖

Ruling:

Respondents are ordered to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are or general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect

Notes:

Some justices concurred but with qualifications that publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette

Farinas v Executive Secretary

Facts:

Rodolfo Farińas et al (petitioners) v The Executive Secretary et al (respondents)

o

Petition for certiorari and prohibition

 

Gerry

Cong.

Salapuddin

(petitioner)

v

Commission

on

Elections (respondent)

o Petition for prohibition

Two petitions are seeking to declare Section 14 of Rep Act No. 9006 (primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for office other than the one they are holding

in permanent capacity), unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title

Petitioners assert that Rep Act No. 9006 is null and void

Petitioners maintain that Section 67 is a good law

Issue:

Locus Standi a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions

Whether Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which this court had declared in Dimaporo as deriving its existence from the constitutional provision on accountability of public officers, has been validly repealed by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, is one of overarching significance that justifies the Court‘s adoption of a liberal stance vis-à-vis the procedural matter on standing

Enrolled bill doctrine the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment

Ratio:

On legal standing being merely a matter of procedure, this Court, in several cases involving issues of ―overarching significance to our society‖ had adopted a liberal stance on standing

Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 is not a rider

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

o

Court is convinced that the title and objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code

o

―Section 67 as a form of harassment or discrimination‖ is not the concern of the Court. It is not for the Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination

Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 is not violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution

o

Equal protection of the law clause is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification

o

Since the classification of the officials is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is not infringed

The enrolled bill doctrine is applicable in this case

o

Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of the Congress

o

Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.

The effectivity clause is defective

o

But it does not render the entire law invalid

o

See Tanada v Tuvera

o When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power Relevant Provisions:

Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that ―any elective official, whether national or local, running for office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy‖

Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 provides that ―sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code and sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified or amended accordingly‖

Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides that ―Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that ―No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws‖

Section 16 of Rep. Act No. 9006 provides that it ―shall take effect immediately upon its approval‖

Ruling:

Petitions are dismissed

Notes:

Where a petition for mandamus involves the enforcement of constitutional rights to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources matters of transcendental public importance, a citizen has the requisite locus standi

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

Facts:

MRCA v CA

MRCA, Inc. (petitioner) v Court of Appeals, Hon. Benjamin Pelayo; Domingo Sebastian Jr., Lilia Tioseco Sebastian, and Expectacion Tioseco (respondents)

Petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the order of the RTC dismissing the complaint for non-payment of the proper filing fees as the prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney‘s fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered by it from the defendants

Issue:

Is the ruling in the Manchester ineffective for the reason that it has yet been published in the Official Gazette?

Can that said ruling be not given a retroactive effect because it imposes new penalty for its non-observance?

Should it be applied to this present case because the petitioner herein had no fraudulent intent to deprive the government of the proper fees?

Ratio:

The contention that the ruling in the Manchester (enormous amount of damages were claimed in the body of the complaint, but the amounts were not mentioned in the prayer thereof to mislead the court in computing the filing fees to be paid) is ineffective for the reason that it has yet been published in the Official Gazette is not well taken because publication is not a prerequisite for the effectivity of a court ruling even if it lays down new rule of procedure (Aguillon v Director of Lands)

Established rule of statutory construction: Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to

actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.

o

Complaint was filed on March 24, 1988

o

Manchester was promulgated on May 7, 1987

o

Manchester should apply except that it was modified in the Sun Insurance case where it was ruled that the court may allow payment within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the prescriptive or reglementary period

In accordance with the Court‘s ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., the petitioner may be allowed to amend its complaint.

Relevant Provisions:

Ruling:

Petition for review is granted

Order of RTC is set aside

Complaint is reinstated

Petitioner is allowed to amend the same by specifying the amounts of damages it seeks to recover from the defendants and to pay the proper filing fees therefore as computed by the Clerk of Court

Facts:

NEA v Gonzaga

National Electrification Administration (petitioner) v Victoriano Gonzaga (respondent)

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals

Issue:

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

Whether or not the court of appeals erred in not applying section 59 of PD 269

Whether or not the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial court‘s nullification of the ECEC

Ratio:

The ECEC was issued by NEA pursuant to its rule-making authority, not its quasi-judicial function. Hence, the issue regarding the controversy over respondent‘s disqualification and the question on the ECEC‘s validity are within the inherent jurisdiction of regular courts to review.

There is no error in the appellate and trial court‘s nullification of the ECEC

o ZAMSURECO offered no proof of publication in the official gazette nor in a newspaper of general circulation. Without compliance, rules and regulations in the ECEC cannot be enforced and implemented.

Relevant Provisions:

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that ―laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided‖

Section 59 of PD 269

Ruling:

Petition is denied

Facts:

Garcillano v HR

Virgilio Garcillano (petitioner) v The House of Representatives Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety,

Information and

Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondents)

Santiago Javier Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili (petitioner) v The Senate of the Philippines (respondent)

National Defense and Security,

Issue:

Locus standi Elements of standing: (1) petitioner must have suffered injury in fact which can be legal, economic, or environmental; (2) the injury must be traceable to the governmental act being challenged; (3) the injury must be redressable by the remedy being sought by petitioner

Justiciability the exercise by the Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies

o

Actual cases existing conflicts appropriate for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion

o

Advisory opinion an advisory opinion is an opinion issued by a court that does not have the effect of adjudicating a specific legal case, but merely advises on the constitutionality or interpretation of a law

Legislative inquiry Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure

o The requisite of publication of rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process

Ratio:

Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners (Agcaoili et al) due to the transcendental and paramout importance of the issue

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

Court points out that the Senate cannot be allowed to conduct

Notes:

inquiry in aid of legislation without duly published rules of

Dissent to the Neri ruling

procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement

 

o

Neri ruling a faithful adherence to the case at bar to

 

o

Every senate is distinct from the one before it or after it

the Neri ruling would yield the conclusion that the

Neri decision not having published its Rules

o

Rules of the senate confirms it

Garci tapes investigation may be conducted even

Relevant Provisions:

 

without the published rules of procedure governing inquiries, and that only those orders and proceedings that result in the violation of the rights of the witnesses

Section 21, Article VI of he 1987 Constitution provides that ―the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure‖

may be considered null and void

of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14 th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that ―laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication

Senate of each congress, although a continuing body, acts separately and independently of the

in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided‖

 

senate of the congress before it

RA 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes

 

o

One-time publication suffices to satisfy the due process requirement to inform the public of a rule that would govern it and affect its rights

Anti-Wiretapping Law (RA 4200) penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communication by means of devices enumerated therein

 

Exception: one-time publication suffices for a law or rule to have a continuing effect is when there are circumstances or factors that interrupt this continuity

Section 123 of Rule XLIV of the Rules of Senate provides that ―all pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one Congress‖

 

o

Wiretapping may be held legal only if it was recorded with consent of the parties to the conversation or upon written court order

Ruling:

Garcillano‘s petition is dismissed

Ranada and Agcaoili‘s petition for a writ of prohibition is granted

Conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the Hello Garci tapes is not allowed

Facts:

Fuentes v Roca

Manuel Fuentes and Leticia Fuentes (petitioners) v Conrado Roca, Annabelle Joson, Rose Marie Cristobal, and Pilar Malcampo (respondents)

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

Sabina Tarroza sold a piece of land to his son Tarciano Roca who did not for the meantime have the title be transferred to his name

Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the Fuentes spouses

The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the other requirements of the sale

A new title was issued bearing the name of the spouses

Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife

the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents Conrado G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, and Rose Marie R. Cristobal, together with Tarciano‘s sister, Pilar R. Malcampo, represented by her son, John Paul M. Trinidad (collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses

the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it

RTC dismissed the case

CA reversed the RTC decision

Fuentes spouses came to this court by petition for review

Issue:

Whether or not Rosario‘s signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarciano‘s sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged

Whether or not the Rocas‘ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed

Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul that sale.

Ratio:

Signature is forged

The law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code

o Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988

In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband‘s sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse‘s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void.

Sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal

Relevant Provisions:

Article 124 of the Family Code provides that ―in the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void‖

Ruling:

Court denies the petition

Affirms the CA‘s decision

The deed of sale is declared void

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

The Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City is DIRECTED to reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title 3533 in the name of Tarciano T. Roca, married to Rosario Gabriel

Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal, and Pilar Malcampo are further ORDERED, at their option, to indemnify petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes with their expenses for introducing useful improvements on the subject land or pay the increase in value which it may have acquired by reason of those improvements, with the spouses entitled to the right of retention of the land until the indemnity is made

The RTC of Zamboanga City from which this case originated is DIRECTED to receive evidence and determine the amount of indemnity to which petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes are entitled

B. Ignorance of the Law

Art.

3.

Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance

therewith. (2)

Facts:

Kasilag v Rodriguez

Marcial Kasilag (petitioner) v Rafaela Rodriguez, Urbano Roque, Severo Mapilisan, and Ignacio del Rosario (respondent)

Petition for review on certiorari

May 16,1932 Emiliano Ambrosio (party of the 1 st part) and the petitioner executed a deed

There commenced a verbal contract between the two parties:

petitioner entered upon the possession of the land, introduced improvements, etc.

Court of Appeals held that the contract was one of absolute purchase and sale of land

Entire exhibit 1 is null and void therefore as well as the verbal contract

Error was committed in holding that the contract entered into between parties was one of absolute sale of the land and its improvement and that exhibit 1 is null and void

CA held that the petitioner acted in bad faith in taking possession of the land because he knew that the contract he made with Emiliana Ambrosio was an absolute deed of sale and that the latter could not sell the land because it is prohibited by section 116

Issue:

Whether the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in good faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated

Ratio:

Principal contract is that of (1) loan and the accessory that of (2) mortgage of the improvements upon the land acquired as a homestead

o

First is valid

o

Second converted the pact into antichresis (illegal and void)

But the clauses regarding the contract of antichresis can be eliminated thereby leaving the latter in being because it is legal and valid

Ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the rule

o

The court can‘t deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in section 116

o

Even ignorance of law may be based upon an error of fact, or ignorance of fact is possible as to the capacity to transmit and as to the intervention of certain persons,

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

o

o

o

compliance with certain formalities and appreciation of certain acts, and an error of law is possible in the interpretation of doubtful doctrines

Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis

It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he s not a lawyer

As to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith

Petitioner acted in good faith in taking possession of the land and enjoying its fruits

Relevant Provisions:

Section 443 of the Civil Code provides that ―every person who is unaware of any flaw in his title, or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated, shall be deemed a possessor in good faith… possessors aware of such flaw are deemed possessors in bad faith‖

Article 1950 of the Civil Code provides that ―good faith on the part of the possessor consists in his belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner of the same, and could transmit the title thereto‖

Ruling:

Appealed decision is reversed

Facts:

Elegado v CA

Ildefonso Elegado (petitioner) v Hon. Court of Tax Appeals and Commissioner of Internal Revenue (respondent)

Warren Graham died

Ward Graham filed an estate tax return

Commissioner of Internal revenue assessed the decedent‘s estate an estate tax (Feb. 9, 1978)

Assessment was protested (Mar. 7, 1978)

Protest was denied by the commissioner (July 7, 1978)

No further action

Ward Graham appointed Ildefonso Elegado as his attorney-in- fact for the allowance of the will in the Philippines

Will was allowed

He filed a second estate tax return with the BIR

Commissioner imposed an assessment

Protest again

Commissioner filed a motion for the allowance of the basic estate tax

Commissioner cancelled the protested assessment

The petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals challenging the assessment

The commissioner did not answer and instead cancelled the protest assessment

cancellation was notified to the Court of Tax Appeals in a motion to dismiss on the ground that the protest had become moot and academic

The motion was granted and the petition was dismissed

Petition to review the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals

Issue:

Whether the first assessment is binding

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

Whether or not the respondent Court of Tax Appeals erred in dismissing the petitioner‘s appeal on grounds of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action

Appeal from what?

Whether the shares of stocks left by the decedent should be treated as his exclusive, and not conjugal, property

Whether the said stocks should be assessed as of the time of the owner‘s death or six months thereafter

Whether the appeal filed with the respondent court should be considered moot and academic

Ratio:

Whether the shares of stocks left by the decedent should be treated as his exclusive, and not conjugal, property and whether the said stocks should be assessed as of the time of the owner‘s death or six months thereafter

o Immaterial

Whether the appeal filed with the respondent court should be considered moot and academic

o

There was really no more assessment to review

o

Petitioner cannot now raise the question of validity

Petitioner argues that second assessment cancels the first assessment and that the cancellation of the second assessment did not have the effect of reviving the first

o It is illogical to suggest that a provisional assessment can supersede an earlier assessment which had become final and executory

First assessment is not binding because it was based on a return filed by foreign lawyers who had no knowledge of our tax laws or access to the Court of Tax Appeals

o If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim a similar preference because they are not allowed to claim a like

ignorance, it stands to reason that foreigners cannot be any less bound by our own laws in our country

Relevant Provisions:

Ignorance

of

the

law

excuses

no

one

from

compliance

therewith

Ruling:

Petition is denied

Notes:

A judgment which had become final and had been executed can no longer be disturbed or modified

Facts:

Manzano v Sanchez

Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law

Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano (May 21, 1966)

However, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge (March 22, 1993)

Judge contended that he did not know that Manzano was legally married

Court administrator recommended that respondent judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law

Issue:

whether Judge Roque Sanchez is guilty of gross ignorance of the law

Ratio:

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

In the two unearthed affidavits, Manzano and Payao expressly stated that they were married to Borja and Relos

The judge ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were ―separated‖

Relevant Provisions:

Ignorance of the law excuses no one

Ruling:

Recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby adopted

RETROACTIVITY OF LAWS

NCC Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary

is provided.

TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS Art. 2252. Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Code which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation shall have no retroactive effect. For the determination of the applicable law in cases which are not specified elsewhere in this Code, the following articles shall be observed: (Pars. 1 and 2, Transitional Provisions).

Art. 2253. The Civil Code of 1889 and other previous laws shall govern rights originating, under said laws, from acts done or events which took place under their regime, even though this Code may

regulate them in a different manner, or may not recognize them. But if

a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be

effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto

may have been done or may have occurred under prior legislation,

provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin. (Rule 1)

Art. 2254. No vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the rights of others.

(n)

Art. 2255. The former laws shall regulate acts and contracts with a condition or period, which were executed or entered into before the effectivity of this Code, even though the condition or period may still be pending at the time this body of laws goes into effect. (n)

Art. 2256. Acts and contracts under the regime of the old laws, if they are valid in accordance therewith, shall continue to be fully operative as provided in the same, with the limitations established in these rules. But the revocation or modification of these acts and contracts after the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be subject to the provisions of this new body of laws. (Rule 2a)

Art. 2257. Provisions of this Code which attach a civil sanction or penalty or a deprivation of rights to acts or omissions which were not penalized by the former laws, are not applicable to those who, when said laws were in force, may have executed the act or incurred in the omission forbidden or condemned by this Code. If the fault is also punished by the previous legislation, the less severe sanction shall be applied. If a continuous or repeated act or omission was commenced before the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, and the same subsists or is maintained or repeated after this body of laws has become operative, the sanction or penalty prescribed in this Code shall be applied, even though the previous laws may not have provided any sanction or penalty therefor. (Rule 3a)

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

Art. 2258. Actions and rights which came into being but were not exercised before the effectivity of this Code, shall remain in full force in conformity with the old legislation; but their exercise, duration and the procedure to enforce them shall be regulated by this Code and by the Rules of Court. If the exercise of the right or of the action was commenced under the old laws, but is pending on the date this Code takes effect, and the procedure was different from that established in this new body of laws, the parties concerned may choose which method or course to pursue. (Rule 4)

Art. 2259. The capacity of a married woman to execute acts and contracts is governed by this Code, even if her marriage was celebrated under the former laws. (n)

Art. 2260. The voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws. (n)

Art. 2261. The exemption prescribed in Article 302 shall also be applicable to any support, pension or gratuity already existing or granted before this Code becomes effective. (n)

Art. 2262. Guardians of the property of minors, appointed by the courts before this Code goes into effect, shall continue to act as such, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 320. (n) Art. 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who, with or without a will, die after the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be adjudicated and distributed in accordance with this new body of laws and by the Rules of Court; but the testamentary provisions shall be carried out insofar as they may be permitted by this Code. Therefore, legitimes, betterments, legacies and bequests shall be respected; however, their amount shall

be reduced if in no other manner can every compulsory heir be given his full share according to this Code. (Rule 12a)

Art. 2264. The status and rights of natural children by legal fiction referred to in article 89 and illegitimate children mentioned in Article 287, shall also be acquired by children born before the effectivity of this Code. (n)

Art. 2265. The right of retention of real or personal property arising after this Code becomes effective, includes those things which came into the creditor's possession before said date. (n)

Art. 2266. The following shall have not only prospective but also retroactive effect:

(1) Article 315, whereby a descendant cannot be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and ascendants; (2) Articles 101 and 88, providing against collusion in cases of legal separation and annulment of marriage; (3) Articles 283, 284, and 289, concerning the proof of illegitimate filiation; (4) Article 838, authorizing the probate of a will on petition of the testator himself; (5) Articles 1359 to 1369, relative to the reformation of instruments; (6) Articles 476 to 481, regulating actions to quiet title; (7) Articles 2029 to 2031, which are designed to promote compromise. (n)

Art. 2267. The following provisions shall apply not only to future cases but also to those pending on the date this Code becomes effective:

(1) Article 29, Relative to criminal prosecutions wherein the accused is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt;

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

(2) Article 33, concerning cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries. (n) Art. 2268. Suits between members of the same family which are pending at the time this Code goes into effect shall be suspended, under such terms as the court may determine, in order that compromise may be earnestly sought, or, in case of legal separation proceedings, for the purpose of effecting, if possible, a reconciliation. (n)

Held: Frivaldo‘s repatriation is valid and it was given a retroactive effect. He is also allowed to take office for he got the popular support as is shown in the ballots.

Gregorio v. C.A. G.R. No. L 22802, Nov. 29, 1968

Art. 2269. The principles upon which the preceding transitional

Facts:

The petitioner‘s father, then the appellant, was denied to

provisions are based shall, by analogy, be applied to cases not

elevate to the CA the evidence presented in the two cases he was

specifically regulated by them. (Rule 13a)

appealing.

His counsel‘s next motion for reconsideration was then

denied.

RPC Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5

Issues: Can a procedural law have a retroactive effect? Are the resolutions made by the CA valid?

of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. FC Art. 255. If any provision of this Code is held invalid, all the other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid.

Held: The writ of certiorari is granted annulling the resolutions of CA denying the motion for reconsideration. The writ of mandamus is granted to compel CA to elevate to it the evidence presented at the trial before the Court of First Instance in Bulacan.

Frivaldo v. COMELEC G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996.

Facts: Juan G. Frivaldo unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but he was twice declared to be disqualified to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and he now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation. Issues: 1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid? (Secondary Issues) Who should be declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon? Should it be Frivaldo who is said to be an alien, Lee who got the second most number of votes or Vice- Governor Deri as the rules on political succession states?

Notes: Penal laws shall be applied retroactively if such application is favorable to the accused even if he is already serving a sentence unless he is a habitual deliveryman.

Aruego v. CA 254 SCRA 711

Facts: The late Jose M. Aruego Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian for 23 years. They had two children out of it, Antonia and Evelyn.

Issues: Can the two be called illegitimate children?

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

Held: Antonia was proclaimed an illegitimate child and Evelyn was said not to be an illegitimate child.

Cang v. CA 296 SCRA128

Facts: Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were married in ‘73 and begot 3 children. Later on Anna Marie found out that her husband had extramarital affair with Wilma Soco. Because of this, she filed for legal separation. They agreed that their children should receive a monthly support of P1,000 and that Anna Marie can enter into any contract or agreement without the written consent of her husband. After this, Mr. Cang went abroad filed a divorce case from her wife and married an American woman. (Anna Marie got custody of the children.) Eventually, they also divorced. While in the US, he remits money to his children in the Philippines. On 1987, the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie filed for adoption of the 3 children. Anna Marie consented this because she was leaving the country and her brothers and sisters have been helping her raise the children since her husband already lost his parental rights for not supporting their children. Upon learning about this, Cang went back to the Philippines and filed an opposition and a petition to reacquire custody of his children. Since the mother is already in the US, the court ruled that the custody should be passed to whom she relinquished it.

Issues: Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them?

Held: The petition for reconsideration of the father was granted and the ruling of the lower courts has been set aside. Thereby denying the adoption since the court believes that who, by law and under the facts of the case, has not abandoned them.

Francisco v. CA 299 SCRA 188

Facts: Eusebio Francisco was married to Arte Guevarra, his second wife, when they acquired a sari-sari store and two houses and lots. Eventually, Eusebio got too sick to administer these properties. During this time, his children in his first marriage were able to find a way on having him authorize Conchita, one of his children, to administer the two houses and lot.

Issues: Arte petitioned that the administration of such properties be passed to her but the lower courts denied this for the reason of lack of evidence that these properties were acquired during their marriage. The trial court ruled that the properties were exclusively owned by Eusebio.

Held: The petition is denied and the administration of the property in question is still given to the daughter of Eusebio.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

PEFTOK Integrated Services vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 124841. July 31,

1998

This is a petition for certiorari filed by PEFTOK seeking to set aside the decision of NLRC dated 26 Feb 1995 that granted claims to complainants (security guards) against PEFTOK, and two other corps.

Facts:

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

*October 13, 1989, Eduardo Abugho, Claro Mendez, and Leonardo Daluperi, to bar all claims they may have against PEFTOK before June 30, 1989. They also sought the issuance of an alias writ of execution for their entitlement to full benefits as provided in the labor arbiter‘s decision. *May 29, 1992, Eduardo Abugho, Fidel Sabellina, Leonardo Daluperi, Claro Mendez, and Reynaldo Maasin executed another quitclaim and waiver renouncing whatever claims they have against PEFTOK for the period ending March 15, 1998. However they also claimed that the waiver and quitclaim were prepared and readied by PEFTOK and were further forced to sign for fear that they will not get their salaries come payday. Or worse, their services be terminated. Furthermore, they asserted that the waivers they signed were contrary to public policy, the same being written

in English, which they do not understand, nor were the contents of said waiver explained to them. * Petitioner (PEFTOK) answers in saying that the quitclaims signed by the security guards suffer no legal infirmity. That waiver of the claim in dispute is not prohibited by law. Issue: Whether the signed waivers effectively waives the claims of the security guards against PEFTOK.

Held:

dated Feb. 26, 1995 affirmed. There is no voluntariness in the execution of the waivers in question. ―They are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar claims for the full measure

Petition is dismissed for lack of merit; decision of the NLRC

of the workers‘ legal right.‖

Valderama vs. Macalde, 470 SCRA 168

The case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48899 partially annulling the deed of sale insofar as it affects the 2/3rds of the lot being occupied by the Macaldes.

Facts:

* Before the WWII, parents of Salvacion Macalde rented a lot in Tondo, Manila, where their house occupied 2/3 portion of the

property. In 1977, Herminia Albano acquired the lot, and the Macalde siblings leased the property from Albano. On the remaining 1/3 of the land is an apartment which was being leased to the spouses Roberto and Natividad Valderama.

* 11 Jun 1978, Pres. Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1517 proclaiming specific parcels of urban lands as Urban

Land Reform Zones. Under Sec. 6, ―legitimate tenants within the urban zones who had been residing on the land for ten years or more, who have built their homes on the land, and residents who have legally occupied the lands by contract continuously for the last ten years, shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed right of first refusal to purchase the same…‖

* 14 May 1980, former Pres. Marcos issued Proclamation No.

1967, declaring the Metro Manila area as an Urban Zone. *13 April 1983, Proc. No. 2284 was issued amending Proc. No. 1967, identifying 244 sites in Metro Manila as areas for priority development, including Albano‘s property. *November 1990, Albano offered to sell the property to Salvacion Macalde and her siblings. Macalde on her behalf and in behalf of her siblings conveyed their desire to buy the property in a letter dated 9 Nov 1990. She further suggested that they discuss the price as well as other terms and conditions of the sale. Albano‘s grandchild received the letter but Albano did not respond. *14 March 1991, Albano told Macalde that she had already sold the property. In a letter dated 21 Mar 1991, Macalde complained to Albano about the sale of the land to another despite her prior offer to buy the land on Nov 1990. She also requested that Albano rescind the sale of the land insofar as the portion occupied by their house was concerned. It was later on found that the buyers of the land are the spouses Valderama. Macalde conveyed to the Valderamas in writing, her willingness to buy the portion of the

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

land her home occupies. Both Albano and Valderama rejected Macalde‘s offer. *Macalde filed a case against Albano and Valderama, to annul the sale of the land, cancellation of the title and reconveyance. The Macaldes asserted that they had the preferential right to buy the property under P.D. No. 1517. *Albano answered in saying that the property was not within the

This case was filed by DM Consunji Inc. seeking the reversal of the CA decision that affirmed the decision of the RTC of Pasig which granted Jose Juego‘s widow the right to claim damages against DM Consunji. Issue: Whether Maria Juego‘s right to claim damages was waived by her receipt of benefits under the Workmen‘s Compensation Act.

Facts:

coverage of the law and that the Macaldes had been notified of her intention to sell the property but that they had ignored the offer.

The Valderamas on the other hand said that the Macaldes had waived their preferential right to buy the property since they failed to exercise their right when Albano first offered the property to them. Later in the case Albano said in a testimony that she had repeatedly offered to sell the property to Salvacion Macalde and that at the end, she refused to do so due to financial constraints. She however, failed to present documentary evidence to this end.

* 22 Nov 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of DM Consunji fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower in Pasig that caused his death. *Maria, his widow, filed a complaint for damages against his employer. The decision of the case was made in favor of Maria. On appeal by DM Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. DM Consunji now seeks the reversal of the decision of the CA. *In Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company it was ruled that ―an

Issue:

Whether the Macaldes‘ right of first refusal to purchase

injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer

Held:

the land where their ancestral home stands was waived by Salvacion Macalde‘s alleged verbal refusal when Albano offered to sell the lot to the Macaldes. Petition denied. Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 48899 is

the fixed amounts set by the Workmen‘s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the torfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.‖ However, an exception was held in Floresca vs.

affirmed.

Philex Mining Corporation ―The exception is where a claimant

 

The preferential right of the Macaldes’ is deemed to not have been waived because the waiver of such right requires some note or memorandum or any private or public document for the waiver to be effective. Such verbal offer may not be sufficient basis to support the alleged waiver. In this case Albano and Valderama failed to present sufficient, competent and credible evidence that the Macaldes had waived their rights.

who has already been paid under the Workmen‘s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.‖ *Maria alleged that she only learned about the negligence of the employer after she had applied for and received the benefits under ECC. That she had committed a mistake of fact because she didn‘t know what damages could be recovered from the death or her husband or that she may also recover more from the Civil Code

DM Consunji vs. CA, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001

than from the ECC. *DM Consunji claimed that by being the complainant in a criminal case for Simple Negligence resulting to Homicide against the

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

employer, Maria couldn‘t have been ignorant of the facts. That from 2 Jan 1991, and every month thereafter, she knew of the choices of remedies available to her and yet she chose to claim and

receive the benefits from ECC. This choice resulted in a waiver of election that bars her from any action, suit or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy. In other words, the claimant, by her choice of one remedy, waived the other.

Remanded, the RTC of Pasig is to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. If so, the payments already made to the private respondent under the ECC should be deducted therefrom. There is no showing that Maria knew of the remedies before she applied for claims before the ECC. That she only learned after the prosecutor issued a resolution on 6 Feb 1991, that there may be a civil liability. This lack of knowledge or mistake of fact negates the waiver.

Held:

REPEAL OF LAWS

Mecano vs COA, G.R. No. 103982, December 11, 1992

This is a petition for certoriari, seeking to nullify the decision of the Commission of Audit embodied in its 7 th Endorsement denying his claim for reimbursement under Sec. 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, the total amount of PHP40,831. Facts:

*Petitioner, Director II of NBI, was hospitalized for cholecystitis from 26 Mar- 7 Apr, 1990, where he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses. On 11 May 1990, in a memo to NBI Director Alfredo Lim, he requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Sec 699 of the RAC. Sec. 699. ―….In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in the line of duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize the

payment of the necessary hospital fees.‖ Said claim was forwarded by Lim to relevant authorities. In a 4 th Endorsement however, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, returned the petitioner‘s claim to Lim stating that in a 5 th Endorsement by the Chairman of COA, the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. Petitioner re-submitted his claim to Lim with a copy of then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 stating that, ―the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including the particular

Sec. 699

authorities but finally in 16 Jan 1992, COA Chairman Eufemio Domingo in his 7 th endorsement, denied the claim on the ground that Sec. 699 of the RAC has been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section was not restated or re-enacted in the administrative Code of 1987. *Administrative Code or 1987 ―Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. --- All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.‖ This is an example of a general repealing provision.

Lim then forwarded the claim to the relevant

*The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. This falls under the category of an implied repeal. Issue: Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repeal Sec. 699 of the RAC.

Held:

the petitioner‘s claim for benefits. There are two kinds of implied repeal. Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when two statutes cover the same subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other. COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the

Petition granted. Respondent is ordered to give due course to

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

two codes on the matter of the claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there cannot be a conflict because the provision on Sec. 699 of RAC has not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987. On the other hand, implied repeal by the enactment of a statute revising or codifying the formal laws on the whole subject matter is only possible if the revised statute or code was intended to cover the whole subject, to be a complete and perfect system in itself. In this case, what appears clear is the intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization and procedure (Opinion No. 73, S.1991). “Repeals by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing…”

Solangon vs. Salazar, G.R.No. 125944, June 29, 2001

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA in C.A. G.R. No. 37899, affirming the decision of Malolos, Bulacan RTC Branch 16 for annulment of mortgage. This action was initiated by the plaintiffs to prevent the closure of the mortgaged property. Facts:

*22 Aug 1986, plaintiffs mortgaged a parcel of land in Sta. Maria, Bulacan in favor of the defendant to secure the payment of a PHP60,000 loan, payable within 4mos., with an interest rate of

6%/mo.

*27 May 1987 plaintiffs again mortgaged the same parcel of land in favor of the defendant to secure the payment of a PHP136,512 loan, payable within a year at the legal interest rate. *29 Dec 1990 plaintiffs again mortgaged the same parcel of land in favor of the defendant to secure the payment of a PHP230,000 loan, payable within 4mos., at the legal interest rate. *Plaintiffs contend that the CA erred in ruling that the loan obligation secured by a real estate mortgage with an interest rate of 72% per annum or 6% per month is not unconscionable. *Court of Appeals maintain that since Central Bank Circular No. 905 repealed the Usury Law, therefore rendering it legally inexistent, there is no more maximum rate of interest and the rate will just depend on the mutual agreement of the parties. Issue: Whether the 72% per annum interest rate on the loan of the petitioners be sustained, given that the Usury Law ceiling on interest rates has already been repealed or rendered ineffective by C.B. Circular No. 905.

Decision of the CA is affirmed subject to the modification that the interest rate of 72% per annum be reduced to 12% per annum. Even if C.B. Circular No. 905 repealed the Usury law, there is nothing in the circular that grants lenders the authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets. In a similar case, Medel v. CA, the SC said that, “We agree that the stipulated rate of interest at 5.5%/mo. on the P500,000 loan is excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant… we find the interest rate at 5.5%/mo. or 66%/annum, stipulated upon by the parties in the promissory note iniquitous and unconscionable, and hence contrary to morals, if not against the law. The stipulation is void….” In this case, the situation of the petitioners is much worse in that they are required to pay the stipulated interest of 72% per annum.

Held:

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

Thornton v Thornton

Richard Brian Thornton for and in behalf of the minor child Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton (petitioner) v Adelfa Francisco Thornton (respondent)

Facts:

Richard Thornton (American) and Adelfa Thornton (Filipino) were married and had a child (Sequeira). Richard Thornton admonished her wife for her irresponsibility to Sequeira. Adelfa Thornton left home with her child without notifying Richard Thornton. With such, Richard Thornton filed a petition for habeas corpus (Family Court in Makati City) which was dismissed for the reason that the child was just in Basilan. However, he did not find the child so he petitioned again for habeas corpus (Court of Appeals) which was denied due to the court‘s claimed lack of jurisdiction; thus, this petition for review of the CA‘s decision.

Issue/s:

Did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor case is concerned?

Held:

Petition is granted. The Court holds that the capacity to issue writ of habeas corpus is not exclusive to family courts. It was pointed out that the primordial consideration is the welfare of the child; thus, legal technicality (in this case, the use of the word ―exclusive‖) is not the main priority.

Lledo v Lledo

Carmelita Lledo (complainant) v Atty. Cesar Lledo (respondent)

Facts:

Atty. Cesar Lledo was dismissed due to Carmelita Lledo‘s filing of an administrative case against him. GSIS Regional Manager then explained that the request for a refund of retirement premiums is disallowed under the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Furthermore, Court‘s decision did not provide that Cesar is entitled to a refund of his retirement premiums. However, in the instant case, Cesar Jr. seeks only the return of his father‘s personal contributions to the GSIS and not the retirement benefits.

Issue/s:

Is Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 186 impliedly repealed? Were the later enactments intended to substitute the earlier ones?

Held:

None of the subsequent laws expressly repealed Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended. The inevitable conclusion then is that Section 11(d) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, continues to govern cases of employees dismissed for cause and their claims for the return of their personal contributions. Atty. Cesar‘s dismissal should not deprive him of the money that belongs to him in the first place. Also, it was mentioned that, as a general rule, repeals by implication are not favored. When statutes are in pari materia, they should be construed together. A law cannot be deemed repealed unless it is clearly manifested that the legislature so intended it

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

De Roy v CA

Felisa De Roy and Virgilio Ramos (petitioners) v CA and Luis Bernal, et al (respondents)

Facts:

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop of the respondents. Felisa De Roy and Virgilio Ramos have been warning the respondents beforehand. RTC however found the petitioners guilty of gross negligence. The decision was affirmed by CA. On the last day of 15 day period in submitting appeals, petitioners filed a motion to extend time (February 27, 1986) which was then denied by the appellate court in a resolution; thus, this special civil action for certiorari to review the resolutions of the CA

Issue/s:

Did the CA err in dismissing the petitioners‘ motion for time extension? Is the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises Inc. v Japzon be made to apply in this case considering that the decision is not published in the Official Gazette?

Held:

The Court resolved to deny the instant petition for lack of merit. SC finds that CA did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners‘ motion for extension of time. It was said that CA correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises Inc. v Japzon that 15 day for reconsideration can‘t be extended basing on a Resolution promulgated in May 30, 1986. Furthermore, there is no law requiring publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be considered binding and effective.

Pesca v Pesca

Lorna Guillen Pesca (petitioner) v Zosimo Pesca (respondent)

Facts:

CA reversed the decision of the RTC of Caloocan City which has declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the

respondent; thus, this petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

Issue/s:

Did the CA err in reversing the decision of the RTC? Do the decisions of the Court have the force of law?

Held:

The CA did not err in reversing the decision of the RTC. Psychological incapacity is already explained in Santos v CA and in Republic v CA and Molina. The interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. In Santos, psychological incapacity refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. This therefore should apply in the case. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith. Thus, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, as brought up by the petitioner to the respondent, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

PRESUMPTION AND APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOM Martinez v Van Buskirk

SD Martinez and Carmen Ong de Martinez (plaintiffs and appellees) v William Van Buskirk (defendant and appellant)

Facts:

The horses of a cochero wounded the plaintiff and her child. The court of first instance of Manila found the defendant guilty of negligence; thus, this appeal.

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

Issue/s:

Whether the cochero is guilty of negligence

Held:

The Cochero is not guilty of negligence. SC reversed the judgment on the principle that acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have been acquiesced in by society for so long time that they have ripened into a custom, cannot be held to be of themselves unreasonable or imprudent Cocheros had been in the habit of leaving the horses and assisting in unloading the merchandise. Such is the manner described by the defendant on the day of the accident.

NCC 10-12

Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. (n)

Alonzo v. Padua

Issue: How should Article 1088 be correctly interpreted and applied?

This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code:

Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.

Fact: The Padua siblings (five brothers and sisters) inherited a parcel of land from their parents. Two of them, Celestino and Eustaquia, sold their undivided share to the petitioners in 1963 and 1964. The petitioners, then, enclosed the land they bought and lived there. In 1976, however, Teclo Padua, one of the coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to the petitioners. The trial court dismissed the complaint citing that though there was no written notice, the co-heirs had actual knowledge of the sale. But the Intermediate Appellate Court Reversed the decision declaring that Article 1088 requires a written notice and no written notice has been issued; therefore, the 30 days of redemption has not yet started (citing Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. )

Held: The Court reversed the decision of the respondent court and reinstated the decision of the trial court. The Court sated ―The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.‖

LEGAL PERIODS NCC 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.

If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have.

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included. (7a)

Revised administrative code Sec. 31. Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day," to a day of twenty- four hours; and "night," from sunset to sunrise.

Rule of Court Rule 22:

COMPUTATION OF TIME

Section 1. How to compute time.

In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.

The rules above are the basis for the decisions in the following cases:

Armigos v. Court of Appeals

Issue: Did the petitioner perfected his appeal within the reglementary period?

Facts: The petitioner, Rudy Geo Armigos, received the decision on the complaint Mata filed against him on June 8, 1977. He filed for appeal

on June 9, 1977 and perfected his appeal on June 24, 1977. The reglementary period for perfecting an appeal is 15 days. In Armigos computation, his appeal is still within the reglementary period.

Held: The Court ruled against the petitioner. The rule stated in the Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that ―In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included‖ and the old Rule 28 (now Rule 22) of the Rule of Court which stated that ―In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event or default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday or a holiday.‖ In applying this rule, the Court considered the day as synonymous with the date and found no cogent reason to adopt a different view.

National Marketing Corporation (Namarco) v. Tecson

Issue: Should a year be computed as calendar year or as based on Civil Code‘s computation of a year as having 365 days?

Facts: On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment on Price Stabilization Corp. vs. Miguel Tecson and Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. The decision was served to the defendants of November 21, 1955. On December 21, 1965, Namarco (successor of Price Stabilization Corp) appealed for the revival of the judgment. Miguel Tecson moved for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. Article 1144(3) states that an action upon judgment ―must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues‖. The decision became final on December 21, 1955 (thirty days after the defendants received the judgment) and the appeal was made on December 21, 1965. The years 1960 and 1964

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

both had leap years so that 365 days in ten years would be equal to 3,650 days and this would fall on December 19, 1965.

Held: The Court denied the petitioners appeal citing Article 13 of the Civil Code.

Go v. Dizon

Issues: The petitioners Notice of Appeal should not have been dismissed since the appeal was filed within the time provided.

Facts: The petitioners filed their notice of appeal thirteen days from March 21, 1986 (the date their petition for relief was denied by Judge Baltazar Dizon). But the respondent Equitable filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and was granted. Held: The denial for Petition for Relief was Reversed and Set Aside because Section 13, Rule 41 states that an appeal can only be dismissed ―where the notice of appeal, appeal bond, or record on appeal is not filed within the period of time herein provided…‖ and the petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal within the time provided.

Section 23: Perfection of appeal. In cases where appeal is taken, the perfection of the appeal shall be upon expiration of the last day to appeal by any party.

Quiqui v. Boncaros

Issue: Did the petitioner file their Motion for Reconsideration within the 30-day reglementary period?

Facts: The petitioners filed a complaint against the respondents regarding the ownership of a parcel of land. The presiding judge of the case, Judge Alejandro Boncaros, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the case. The copy of the decision was received by the petitioner on July 17, 1979. The same filed a Motion for

Reconsideration on August 17, 1979. The motion was dismissed for it was already beyond the 30-day reglementary period. The petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal seeking relief from the Court of Appeals but were denied.

Held: The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit, upholding the decision of the lower court. Cited Article 13 of the Civil Code: ―In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.‖

Additional info: The petitioners cited De las Alas v. Court of Appeals but in this case, the last day fell on a Sunday, so the last day was moved to the first working day immediately after.

K. APPLICABILITY OF PENAL LAWS Lazaro B. Rayray (plaintiff-appellant) v Chae Kyung Lee (defendant-appellee)

Related Provisions

NCC 14 – ―Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations.‖

Nature of the Case

Appeal from a decision of the Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations

Facts

Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee who is formerly a resident of Pusan, Korea.

Summons were served by publication. Plaintiff moved that the defendant be declared in default for not filing an answer. The

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

case was heard on the merits and the decision was rendered dismissing the plaintiff‘s complaint upon the ground: (1) that the court could not nullify a marriage contracted abroad, (2) that the facts proven do not warrant the relief prayed for.

Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court.

Issues

Whether or not the court has jurisdiction

Whether or not the marriage of the plaintiff and defendant is substantially valid

Held

Decision is affirmed

Ratio

The court has jurisdiction

o

the case is on the annulment of plaintiff‘s marriage to the defendant which is within the jurisdiction of our courts

o

the court acquired jurisdiction by the plaintiff‘s submission thereto of his complaint

o

Jurisdiction depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not the place of celebration of marriage

 

Court has jurisdiction over the res, provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled in, or a national of, the forum

 

o

Plaintiff is a citizen of the Philippines, domiciled therein, making his status subject to the court‘s jurisdiction

The marriage of the plaintiff and defendant is substantially valid

o

Exhibit A is not signed and it was obtained only after the alleged wedding

o

Defendant did not say that she had been married before, but admitted to have lived with several other men

o

There is no showing of evidence that Korean laws permit bigamy or polygamy thus it is assumed that the foreign law is identical to the lex fori or in this case the Philippine Law

o

Exhibit D states that defendant had no previous marriage

o

The court can‘t believe the plaintiff‘s testimony because he lied regarding his status before in this very court

L. BINDING EFFECT

Manuela Barretto Gonzales (plaintiff and appellee) v Augusto C. Gonzales (defendant and appellant) Related Provisions

NCC 15 – ―Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.‖

NCC 17, par 3 – ―Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.‖ Nature of the Case

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila

Facts

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippines and residents of Manila

Ratio

Significant dates

Reno divorce is not recognized

o

January 19, 1919 they were married in Manila and lived together until the Spring of 1926

o

Entire conduct of the parties clearly indicates a purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands

The matrimonial domicile of the couple is in the

 

Four children were born

regarding divorce and to secure for themselves a change

They had mutual agreement to allow the plaintiff for her support and that of her children (P500 monthly subject to increase if necessary), and the title of certain properties to be put in her name

o

of status for reasons and conditions not authorized by our law

Philippines thus the residence acquired by the husband in Nevada to secure a divorce did not confer

 

o

November 28, 1927 absolute divorce is decreed as secured in Reno, Nevada by the husband

jurisdiction upon the court of that state to dissolve the bonds of matrimony in which he entered in 1919

o

November 28, 1927 husband went through the forms of marriage with another citizen of these Islands and now has three children

Pastor B. Tenchavez (plaintiff-appellant) v Vicenta F. Escańo, et al (defendants-appellees)

o

August 1928 husband went back to the Philippines

Wife requests that Philippine courts confirm and ratify the

Related Provisions

decree of divorce

NCC 15 – ―Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the

Court of First Instance found against the defendant and granted judgment as prayed for by the plaintiff and intervenors

status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.‖

Parties in this action are in dispute over financial matters, but

NCC 17, par 3 – ―Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their

Issues

they are in unity in trying to secure the courts of this jurisdiction to recognize and approve of the Reno divorce

acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign

Whether or not the Reno divorce acquired by the party is recognized in the Philippines

country.‖ Nature of the Case

Held

Direct appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu

Judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila is reversed and defendant is absolved from the demands made against him

Facts

 

Significant dates

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

o

February 24, 1948 – Vicenta Escańo (27) exchanged married vows with Pastor Tenchavez (32) without the knowledge of her parents (duly registered with the local civil register)

o

February 26, 1948 – Mamerto Escańo received a letter disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor and one Pacita Noel

o

June 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged

o

June 24, 1950 Vicenta applied for a passport

indicating in her application that she was single and that her purpose was to study and that she was domiciled in Cebu, and finally, that she intended to return after two years

o

August 22, 1950 she filed a verified complaint for divorce in the State of Nevada the ground of extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character

o

October 21, 1950 decree of divorce was rendered final and absolute

o

1951 – Escańos filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter‘s marriage to Pastor

o

September 13, 1954 Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran

o

August 8, 1958 Vicenta acquired an American citizenship

o

July 30, 1955 Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the Escańos whom he charged for dissuading their daughter from him

Falsely charged the Escańos which caused them unrest and anxiety thus entitling them to recover damages

The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, just freedom of plaintiff from

supporting his wife and acquiring properties to the exclusion of wife

Thus, this appeal

 

Issues

Whether or not Vicenta and Pastor‘s marriage is valid

Whether or not their marriage is subsisting and undissolved

Whether or not Vicenta‘s divorce and second marriage is valid

Held

Decision under appeal is hereby modified

o

Pastor is entitled to a legal separation

o

Vicenta is sentenced to pay Pastor for damages and attorneys‘ fees

o

Pastor is sentenced to pay the Escańos by way of damages and attorneys‘ fees

 

Tenchavez falsely charged which caused them unrest and anxiety thus entitling them to recover damages

Ratio

February 24, 1948 marriage is valid

o

Both parties were above the age of majority

o

Both consented to the marriage

o

Marriage was performed by a Catholic Priest in the presence of competent witnesses

o

The very act of Vicenta suing for divorce implies admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding

Their marriage is subsisting and undissolved under the Philippine law; Vicenta‘s divorce and second marriage is not valid

o The Civil Code does not admit absolute divorce

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

o Vicenta‘s marriage and cohabitation with Russell Moran entitles Techavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on the basis of adultery

Board of Commissioners, et al (petitioners) v Hon. Joselito Dela Rosa (respondents)

Related Provisions

Article 26 of the FC – ―All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited…‖

Nature of the Case

Petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the resolution/ temporary restraining order of the RTC of Manila, Branch 29

Facts

Significant dates

o

July 12, 1960 Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of

William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigraon as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana Gatchalian

Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board (CEB), Santiago testified that he has five children

o

June 27, 1961 William Gatchalian (12), sibling of Johnson, arrived in Manila with 3 other Gatchalians (Gloria and Francisco who are daughter and son of Santiago and Johnson who is the son of Francisco)

o

July 6, 1961 Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens; William was issued Identification Certificate by the immigration authorities

o

January 24, 1962 Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners (BOC) on appeal or on review motu proprio of decisions of Board of Special Inquiry

o

July 6, 1962 new BOC reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of, among others, respondent Gatchalian (final and executory)

o

1973 respondent Gatchalian filed a motion for re- hearing

o

March 14, 1973 BSI recommended to the commissioner the reversal of July 6 decision of BOC and the recall of warrants of arrest issued therein

o

March 15, 1973 commissioner reaffirmed the July 6 decision

o

June 7, 1990 acting director of NBI recommended that respondent Gatchalian along with other applicants covered by warrant of exclusion be charged with violation of Immigration Act of 1940

o

August 1, 1990 secretary of justice indorsed the recommendation of NBI to the commissioner of immigration for investigation and immediate action

o

August 15, 1990 petitioner commissioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation issued an order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian (appeared and was released upon posting cash bond

o

August 29, 1990 William Gatchalian filed Petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the resolution/ temporary restraining order of the RTC of Manila, Branch 29

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

 

o

September 4, 1990 petitioners file a motion to dismiss such allegation that the judge has no jurisdiction over

September 6, 1990 respondent Gatchalian‘s wife and

mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction…‖ (under Sec 21, par 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129)

o

the BOC or BSI

minor children filed before the RTC of Valenzuela,

The said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of Court of Appeals does not extend to all quasi-judicial agencies (under Section 9, par 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129)

 

Metro Manila for injuction with writ of preliminary

o

Only those quasi-judicial bodies under Republic Act no.

injunction; alleged that petitioners acted without or in

5434

excess of jurisdiction in the institution of deportation proceedings against William

o

There are quasi-judicial agencies whose decisions are directly appealable to this Court

 

o

September 7, 1990 Judge Dela Rosa denied the motion to dismiss

o

Bureau of Immigration is not among those agencies whose decisions aew directly appealable to the Court of

Thus, this petition ensued

Appeals

 

o

As the BOI is not of equal rank as the RTC, its

Issues

decisions may be appealable through a special civil

Whether or not RTC have jurisdiction over judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies

 

action for certiorari by the RTC (under Sec 21, par 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129)

Whether or not Court of Appeals has exclusive appellate

RTC is the competent court which could properly take

jurisdiction over all final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies, board of commissions (BOC, BSI, etc.)

cognizance of this case, not the Court of Appeals (under Sec 21, par 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129)

Which court could take cognizance of the proceedings instituted by respondent Gatchalian

o

But considering the voluminous pleadings, this court (SC) deem it proper to decide the controversy right at

Whether or not the July 6, 1962 decision is res judicata (the

this instance

thing has been decided)

Doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of

Whether or not the arrest of respondent follows as a matter of consequence based on the warrant of exclusion issued on July

citizenship; hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand

6, 1962

o

Exception to the rule (Burca v Republic): where the

Whether or not William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen

citizenship (material issue) is definitely resolved by a

Held

court or administrative agency (Solicitor General or his authorized representative) after a full-blown hearing, and the citizenship is affirmed by this Court, the

William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen

 

Ratio

decision shall constitute conclusive proof of such party‘s citizenship in any other case or proceeding

RTC have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals to issue ―writs of certiorari, prohibition,

 

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

Court finds it devoid of merit (under Section 37, par a of Immigration Act of 1940)

o Warrant of arrest issued by COI to be valid must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation, if for investigation only renders such null and void for being unconstitutional

William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen

o

Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen; as of July 20, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been declared a Filipino citizen

o

Applicants have not satisfactorily proven that they are the children and/or grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian

o

Petitioner‘s alleged cause of action and deportation against herein respondent arose in 1962; however the warrant of arrest was issued only on August 15, 1990 (28 years after)

Such could not now be validly enforced due to inaction (under Sec 39 of the Immigration Act stating that deportation proceedings should be instituted within 5 years nor after 10 years under Article 1144 par 3 of the Civil Code)

o

Significant dates

1961 – William Gatchalian‘s admission as a Filipino citizen in the Philippines

July 1, 1973 he married Ting Dee Hua

Had 4 children, became a registered voter, engaged in business in the Philippines, is a taxpayer

o

Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere (Art. 26 of the Family Code)

Santiago married Chu Gim Tee in China and Francisco Gatchalian married Ong Chiu Kiok in China

Marriages are valid even though there are no showing of any China laws because there being no proof of China law, it is presumed that Philippine laws apply

Having declared that the assailed marriages of Santiago and Francisco Gatchalian, William follows the citizenship of his father a Filipino

Germann & Co. (plaintiff-appellees) v Donaldson, Sim & Co. (defendants-appellants)

Related Provisions

NCC 17 – ―The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.‖

Nature of the Case

An incident of want of personality of the plaintiff's attorney

Facts

Both Tornow (resident of Berlin) and Kammerzell (resident of Manila) are citizens of Germany

first-named instrument was authenticated by a notary with the formalities required by the domestic laws, the other was not so authenticated

Significant dates

o

February 5, 1900 an instrument was executed in Berlin, Germany by Max Tornow conferring upon Kammerzell attorneys of powers

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

o October 27, 1900 a general power for suits was executed in Manila by virtue of a general power for suits conferred upon Kammerzell to recover a sum claimed to be due for freight under a charter party

The main object of the instrument is clearly to make Kammerzell the manager of the Manila branch of the plaintiff's business, with the same general authority with reference to its conduct which his principal would himself possess if he were personally directing it

Issues

Whether or not Fernando Kammerzell had the power of attorney for Max Leonard Tornow

Held

Yes, Fernando Kammerzell had the power of attorney

Ratio

There is no reason why the general principle that the formal validity of contracts is to be tested by the laws of the country where they are executed should not apply

The institution of the suit of this case is not considered to fall under Art. 1713 because it is not considered an act ―of strict ownership‖ but only for the administration of business.

Tomawis v. Balindong, G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010

Nature: petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 seeks to nullify the Orders dated July 13, 2005, September 6, 2005, and February 6, 2008

Facts:

- February 21, 1997, Amna A. Pumbaya, Jalilah A. Mangompia,

and Ramla A. Musor filed with the SDC an action for quieting of title of a parcel of land located in Banggolo, Marawi City, against petitioner Sultan Jerry Tomawis and Mangoda Radia. They alleged that they were the absolute owners of the lot subject of the complaint. That Tomawis assumed ownership of the said property on the claim that he bought the same from Mangoda Radia, who, in turn, claimed that he inherited it from his late father. That in 1996, they were informed that their land was leveled and the small

houses were removed without their permission upon the orders of Tomawis. That they had been unlawfully deprived of their possession of the land, and Tomawis actions had cast a cloud of doubt on their title.

- Tomawis denied the sisters‘ claim of ownership and filed a

motion for dismiss. Also it argue that a regular civil court not an SDC has the jurisdiction to hear the case. This was dismissed.

Tomawis later on filed several motions including Urgent Motion to Dismiss with Prayer to Correct the Name of Defendants to Read Sultan Yahya "Jerry" M. Tomawis & Mangoda M. Radia and Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Cancel and Reset the Continuation of Trial Until After the Resolution of the Pending Incident claiming that the SDC does not have jurisdiction for hearing the case at hand. These were also dismissed. He then appealed to the CA and filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition but was yet again dismissed. On January 29, 2008, he filed another motion to dismiss on the same grounds as his previous motions to dismiss, his motion was denied with finality!

- Petitioner asserts that Sec 19 (2), in relation to Sec 33 (3) of BP

129 removed from the SDCs jurisdiction civil actions that involve the title to, or possession of, real property granted to it by Art 143

of PD 1083. In other words, the former repealed the latter statute.

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

And that therefore, SDC no longer have jurisdiction for such kind of cases.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction.

Held: No.

BP 129 was enacted to reorganize only existing civil courts and is a law of general application to the judiciary. In contrast, PD 1083 is a special law that only applies to

Sharia courts.

special law on the same subject should be read together and

in harmony. A general law does not repeal a special law. In addition, there is no express repeal and as a general rule, implied repeals are not favored.

It is held that a general law and a

Grave abuse of discretion on the other hand, is committed when there is an arbitrary exercise of power owing from passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. Such is not the case in the lower court’s ruling for its decision is in fact well founded.

IV. PERSONS AND PERSONALITY B. COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION OF PERSONALITY 1. NATURAL PERSONS BIRTH NCC - Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. (29a)

NCC - Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a)

1987 Consti, Art. II - Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

P.D. 603 - Article 5. Commencement of Civil Personality. - The civil personality of the child shall commence from the time of his conception, for all purposes favorable to him, subject to the requirements of Article 41 of the Civil Code.

FC - Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.

Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. (55a, 258a)

RPC - Art. 256. Intentional abortion. Any person who shall intentionally cause an abortion shall suffer:

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

1. The penalty of reclusion temporal, if he shall use any violence upon

the person of the pregnant woman.

2. The penalty of prision mayor if, without using violence, he shall act

without the consent of the woman.

3. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum

periods, if the woman shall have consented.

RPC - Art. 257. Unintentional abortion. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium period shall be imposed upon any person who shall cause an abortion by violence, but unintentionally.

RPC - Art. 258. Abortion practiced by the woman herself of by her parents. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a woman who shall practice abortion upon herself or shall consent that any other person should do so. Any woman who shall commit this offense to conceal her dishonor, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. If this crime be committed by the parents of the pregnant woman or either of them, and they act with the consent of said woman for the purpose of concealing her dishonor, the offenders shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. RPC - Art. 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and dispensing of abortives. The penalties provided in Article 256 shall be imposed in its maximum period, respectively, upon any physician or midwife who, taking advantage of their scientific knowledge or skill, shall cause an abortion or assist in causing the same. Any pharmacist who, without the proper prescription from a physician, shall dispense any abortive shall suffer arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.

Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 93 S.Ct 705, 35 L.ed. 2d 147

Facts:

- Petitioner Jane Roe is contesting the constitutionality of Texas‘ state criminal abortion legislation which prohibits abortions except with respect to those procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant and that she wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe and clinical conditions. That she was unable to get abortion in Texas because her life didn‘t appear to be threatened by her continued pregnancy and that she could not afford to go to other jurisdictions that allow abortion under safe

conditions. That the Texas statutes were vague and that they abridge her right for personal privacy protected by the 1 st , 4 th , 5 th ,

9 th and 14 th Ammendments. And then something about fetus being

a person and its rights that I do not as of yet understand waaaaa I can’t understand the rest of the case yet, waaah I’ll try to send the finished version as soon as I can.

Geluz v. CA 2 SCRA 801 Nature: Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the court of first instance of Manila, ordering Geluz to pay damages and attorney‘s fees to the Villanuevas. Facts:

- Nita Villanueva had twice become pregnant by her legal husb and but that in both instances, the husband had consented to aborting the fetus. Both abortions were performed by Dr. Geluz. A third abortion was committed but this time without the consent of the husband, this now becomes the basis of the plaintiff in filing an action for damages. Court of Appeals and RTC both decide in favor of the plaintiffs. Thus Geluz filed a petition for review by certiorari. Issue: whether or not the husband of a woman who has voluntarily procured her abprtion could recover damages from the physician who caused it.

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

Held:

No. The award given by the lower courts based on Article 2206 of the Civil Code does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that does not have personality. It is also generally held in the prevailing American jurisprudence that recovery for damages cannot be had for the death of an unborn child. The damages that the parents can resort to are those that have been inflicted to them by virtue of the loss of their child. In this case, they would only be limited to moral damages, but because of the husband’s indifference to his wife’s previous abortions, it could be implied that he is unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections thus no grounds for moral damages are present. It appeared that his primary concern was in obtaining a large amount of money from the doctor as exemplified by his exaggerated claim for damages amounting to 50,000.

Quimiging v. Icao 34 SCRA 134 Nature: Appeal from an order of the court of first instance in Zamboanga dismissing a complaint for damages and another order denying amendment of the same plea. Facts:

- The parties are neighbors and had close confidential relations.

Although married, Icao succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation and that despite efforts, plaintiff became pregnant and had to stop

schooling. Hence she claimed support of P120/mo, damages and atty‘s fees.

- icao in his defense moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of

cause of action since she did not allege that a child has actually

been born. Motion was granted.

- Plaintiff moved to amend the same complaint to allege that a

baby girl has been born due to the intercourse. This was dismissed

on the grounds that the original complaint averred no cause of action. Issue: Considering that the plaintiff failed to mention in her complaint that a child has actually been born, does it mean that the child is thus not entitled to support from his/her father(respondent)? Held: No. A conceived child, although yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it. Therefore, it has the right to support from its progenitors. In addition the plaintiff is entitled to further damages as being forced to yield to a married man’s lust is a violation of her rights.

De Jesus vs. Sequia 58 Phil 866 Nature: Appeal from a judgement of the court of first instance of manila of plaintiffs from the decision that denied part of the relief they sought and defendant from the decision that required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his maintenance. Facts:

- Syquia and Antonia were engaged in an amorous relationship that resulted in the conception of a child that was later born on 17 Jun 1931. During the early months of pregnancy, defendant frequented on the plaintiffs house. On Feb 1931, the eve of his departure to China and Japan, he placed in her hands a note to a padre that read:

―The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.‖ While abroad, defendant also exchanged correspondence by way letters to the plaintiff. He also employed his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and made arrangements for the hospitalization of Antonia. Upon leaving the hospital, Antonia and her baby was taken by Syquia to a house at 551 camarines St., manila and lived there together for about a year as a regular family. When Antonia showed signs of a second pregnancy, the defendant decamped and married another woman.

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

Issue: Whether or not the note to the padre written by the defendant to the mother during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity? Held: Yes. A child upon being conceived becomes a bearer of legal rights and is capable of being dealt with as living persons. The fact that it is yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights. The words of recognition contained in the note to the padre is clear. Though in the end it was not given the name Cesar Syquia Jr. as was initially intended, its identity as the child which the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear.

Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Montaño This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the decision dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño granting bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano, grounded on the death of his unborn child.

Facts:

9 January 2006, Hortillano, employee of Continental Steel and member of Union filed for a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement concluded between Continental and Union:

ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE

x x x x

Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVEThe Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with

pay to any employee in case of death of the employee‘s legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on the

following:

2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7

days

2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days

x x x x

ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS

x x x x

Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCEThe Company shall grant death and accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner:

x x x x

4.3 DEPENDENTSEleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death certificate). [4]

Claim was based on the death of Hortillano‘s unborn child which, according to the Certificate of Fetal Death, died

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

during labor. Hortillano‘s wife, Marife, was already on her 38 th week or 9 th month

Continental granted paternity leave but not bereavement leave and other death benefits consisting of the death and accident insurance

Seeking to reverse Continental‘s denial of the bereavement and other death benefit, the Union filed a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the DOLE, NCR.

A fetus which died before delivery is not a person at all and could not be considered a dependent since it never needed support nor did it acquire a right to be supported

20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño issued a Resolution entitling Hortillano to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits amounting to P16, 489

Continental filed a Petition for Review of Certiorari with CA

9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement and other death benefits with Atty. Montaño as the chosen arbitrator.

Arguments of the two parties:

 

27 February 2008, CA affirmed Atty. Montaño‘s resolution

9 May 2008, CA denied Continental‘s MR

Issue: Can Hortillano‘s unborn child be considered dependent considering that she died before delivery and did not acquire civil personality?

o

Union the CBA did not specify that the dependent should have been born alive first so his death can be covered

Other cases in MKK Steel Corp and Mayer Steel Pipe Corp, sister companies of

Held: Petition is DENIED. The decision of CA affirming Atty. Montaño‘s Resolution is Affirmed.

Continental, gave death benefits to their employees with similar case

Invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code which states that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer

 

Continental‘s reliance on Article‘s 41-42 is misplaced since Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires

personality only when it is born, Article 41 defines when a child is considered born, and Article 42 states that civil personality is extinguished by death. These articles do not provide a definition of death.

Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC

o

Continental CBA did not specify death of unborn child, a fetus without legal personality

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11,

Relying on Arts. 41-42 of the Civil Code, Continental averred that only one with civil personality could die and the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality

 

2009

2 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009 3 (the

Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELEC‘s

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.

o

Facts:

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs)

 

2006 Ladlad filed for registration with the COMELEC.

The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the org has no substantial membership base

17 August 2009 Ladlad filed for registration again

 

o

Ladlad argued that LGBT community

o

 

1. is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged bec of their sexual orientation and gender identity

2. That LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence

3. That bec of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation

4. And that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point

guidelines enunciated by the SC in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC

 

o

Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and org supporters, and outlined its platform of governance

11 November 2009 Comelec dismissed the petition on moral grounds

o

said that definition of the LGBT sector makes it clear that Ladlad tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs and cited the Bible and Koran

o

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the

Civil Code which defines nuisance as ‗Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of

property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x

It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code:

‗The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that ‗Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy‘ are inexistent and void from the beginning.

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes ‗Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows‘ as follows:

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:

1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;

2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;

(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place,

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.

3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals.

COMELEC which will begin printing the final ballots on 25 January

6 January 2010 Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was ordered to file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC until 12:00 noon of 11 January. OSG filed for extension until 16 January. OSG filed a comment supporting Ladlad

2 February 2010 COMELEC filed its own Comment through its Law Dept.

12 January 2010 TRO was issued directing Comelec to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions

13 January Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. Opined that the denial of Ladlad‘s petition based on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

19 January Motion to Intervene granted

26 January Epifanio Salonga Jr. filed Motion to Intervene

2 February motion granted

 

o

Should the petition be granted, the youth will be exposed to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith

Issue: Is Comelec‘s decision to deny Ang Ladlad accreditation valid?

o

When Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is

Held: The Court granted the petition and set aside Comelec‘s resolutions. Comelec is also directed to grant the petitioner‘s

Ang Ladlad has complied with the requirements for the

beneficial to the nations, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.

application for party-list accreditation.

party-list system

4 January 2010 Ang Ladlad filed this petition praying the Court annul the assailed resolutions and direct Comelec to grant their application for accreditation and the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against

Government action, including ints proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage has secular purpose

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

Comelec‘s Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad

Moral disapproval is not enough to justify exclusion of homosexuals from party-list system

Comelec‘s reference to purported violations of the penal and civil law are mere allegations and need proof beyond reasonable doubt

No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior

DEATH

NCC 42: Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. (32a)

Limjoco v. Intestate of Fragrante

This is a petition for review of a judgment of the Public Service Commission.

Facts:

May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibañez, issued a certificate of public convenience to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the Intestate to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of 2 ½ tons in San Juan and to sell ice from the plant in San Juan and Mandaluyong, Rizal and QC

Background story: Pedro Fragante died before his application for certification was finalized. During the process of applying for certification, he has already incurred P35,000 in expenses, among others. Intestate Estate of Pedro Fragante is the excutor or administrator of

his estate. Petitioner is questioning the right of Intestate to acquire the certificate considering that Fragante has died.

Issue: Should the estate of Pedro O. Fragante be considered ―citizen of the Philippines‖ within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act, as amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and categorically limiting the power of the commission ton issue certificates of public convenience or certificates of public convenience and necessity ―only to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to corporations, copartnerships, associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and organied under the laws of the Philippines‖? Held: Court affirmed the decision of the Public Service Commission. The Court considered Fragante‘s estate as an extension of his person.

Within the framework of the constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise during the juridical administration thereof of those rights and fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death.

Dissenting Opinion: The question can be restated into whether or not Fragante‘s heirs are citizens of the Philippines. If they are, the decision should be affirmed. Otherwise, the same should be reversed. The citizenship of the special administrator of the estate should also be investigated.

Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc.

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.

Facts:

28 February 1962, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag, and Juana Darang to pay P3,667.03 plus interest to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. In case the defendants failed to pay before the decision becomes final, Quality Products will be authorized to foreclose the bond.

The defendants‘ failed to pay the amount and Quality Products (QP) ordered the foreclosure of the surety bond and the sale at public auction of Oria‘s land.

24 September 1962 the land was levied and sold at a public auction

20 November 1962 lower court confirmed the sale

Since Oria‘s counsel appeared for him, the court acquired jurisdiction over Oria.

Issue: Does the court have jurisdiction over Oria considering that he no longer had civil personality during the action case against him?

Held: The Court reversed and set aside the lower court‘s decision and declared its judgment in the case against Pedro Oria as void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria‘s land is, therefore, also void.

Oria has not been validly served with summons since he had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was lost through death.

Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez

These are petitions for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch

Backstory:

20.

o

23 April 1959 – Oria‘s death

o

13 June 1960 case filed

Facts:

o

QP did not know about Oria‘s death

5 October 1988 petition for certiorari and prohibition

o

24 June 1960 summons and copies of complaint

with application for restraining order/injunction seeking

served to the principal in the bond, Soliven, who

o

to enjoin Judge Velez from proceeding with the

the respondent Sheriff from enforcing and

acknowledged by signing for himself and his co- defendants.

1 March 1963 – the Dumlao‘s, testamentary heirs in Oria‘s will sued QP for the annulment of judgment against Oria

QP alleged that Oria‘s heirs knew of the suit and were

 

o

Habeas Corpus (HC) case,

implementing the writ and orders of the said judge dated 28, 29, and 30 September 1988,

and the execution against his land. The ground for

o

and to declare said writ and orders as null and void.

annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the deceased.

estopped to question the court‘s jurisdiction over Oria.

11 October 1988 Court required comment from the respondents on the petition but denied the application for TRO

Lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and other defendants because of their voluntary appearance.

Backstory:

o 28 August 1988 Vitaliana Vargas (Vitaliana) died

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

o

27 September 1988 – Vitaliana‘s brothers and sisters (Vargases), unaware of her death, filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of

28 September 1988 the court issued the writ of

 

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction

Misamis Oriental alleging that Vitaliana was

 

1.

In all civil actions in which the

o

forcibly taken from her residence and confined by the petitioner in his palacial residence

 

subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

habeas corpus, but the writ was returned unsatified.

 

5.

In all actions involving the

Petitioner refused to surrender the body reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of HC

contract of marriage and marital relations

proceedings. He said that Vitaliana died of heart

6.

In all cases not within the

failure due to toxemia of pregnancy. He claimed legal custody of the body as her common law husband

exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

o

29 and 30 September 1988 the court issued two orders directing the delivery of the corpse to a funeral parlor in CDO and its autopsy.

o

17 January 1989 the court rendered decision on its jurisdiction over the case. And proceeded to award the rightful custody of the body to the Vargases.

o

Petitioner filed to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction

Issue: Does the court have jurisdiction over a dead person?

o

Vargases were granted leave to amend their petition. They alleged that Eugenio is interferring with their legal duty to bury their sister

Held: The Court affirmed the lower court‘s decision and dismissed the petitions.

o

21 October 1988 petition to dismisss was submitted for resolution

17 November 1988 the court denied the motion to

After the Vargases learned of Vitaliana‘s death, their petition for HC was amended and not dismissed to avoid

o

multiplicity of suits.

dismiss.

 

The court did not lose jurisdiction over nature and subject matter of the case and may entertain the case thru the allegations in

Writ of HC became moot and academic due to the death of Vitaliana but the issue of custody remained

Eugenio is a common law spouse, something which the Phil Law does not recognize.

Therefore, custody over the body of Vitaliana was correctly

the body of the petition on the determination as to who is entitled to the custody of the dead as well as the burial and interment. Cited Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129:

awarded to the Vargases

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

NCC 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effects of death upon the rights and obligayions of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.

Marcos v. Manglapus Facts: The petitioners, the family of the late Pres. Marcos, filed for a motion for reconsideration regarding the denial of the court of their return to the Philippined and the return and burial of the corpse of Mr. Marcos. The President has also spoken of her disagreement with the petition of the Marcoses. Issues: Can the family of Mr. Marcos return to the Philippines, with the corpse of the late President? Do they pose a threat to the people of the Philippines? Does the President have the power to not allow a Filipino to return to his/her country? Held: The court denied the Marcos family of their motion for reconsideration. The court ruled that there is a lack of compelling reasons to reconsider the case, the President has power more than that listed in the Constitution, the threat to the government of the return of the Marcoses has not ceased, and it is the duty of the President to promote and protect the welfare of the people. Dissenting Opinions:

Cruz emphasized that the death of Marcos has not plunged the country in grief nor has it disprove the indifference of the people to the late President. Cruz also argued that the death of Marcos also signalled the death of the threat he may have with him. Paras stresses that the dead still has certain rights, the alleged threat is unproved, and reconciliation will be achieved faster if the President will allow the return of the Marcoses and the corpse. Lastly, the world would appreciate a lot the act of mercy. Padilla argues that Mr. Marcos, as a Filipino citizen, has the right to return, die and be buried in his homeland. Since the first two

eighrs have already been deprived to Mr. Marcos, the last one should be given to him. Sarmiento pointed out the change in the position of the two families and insisted that emotions should not be allowed to overpower the use of reason. Also, the President has no power to prevent the Marxoses to bury the corpse in the country.

NCC 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other. ROC Rule 131 Sec. 3 (ii): That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular person has actually conveyed it to him when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of such person or his successor in interest;

Joaquin v. Navarro Facts: Durig the battle for the liberation of Manila, Joaquin Navarro Sr. and his wife, Angela Joaquin de Navarro, aged 67, together with their children, Pilar (32 or 33 yrs.ols), Concepcion, Antiviral (the two are between 23 and 25 yrs old) and Joaquin Jr (and his wife, Adela Conde) sought refuge in the ground floor of the German Club. There were many refugees in the said building and it was set on fire. At the same time, the Japanese started shooting inside the building, especially those who are trying to escape. This time, the three daughters were killed. Joaquin Sr. and his son decided to leave the said building for safer haven but Angela was not convinced and so they left her. Joaquin Jr.,around 30 years old, was then shot. Minutes later, the German Club collapsed presumably killing the people inside. Three days later Joaquin Sr., aged 70, was also shot. The case is important for the right of succession of Ramon Joaquin, natural child of Angela and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and of Antonio Navarro, son of Joaquin Sr. in his first marriage.

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

RTC ruled that Angela died before her son while the CA ruled that it was the other way around. Francisco Lopez is the sole witness. Applicable Provisions: Rule 123, Section 69 of the Revised Rules of Court which states that when two people perish in the same calamity, and it is not (1) shown who died first, and there are no (2) particular circunstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the strength and age of the sexes, according to the following rules. Art. 43 of NCC. Issue: Who died first? Held: The Court reversed the decision and hold that the distribution of the descendents‘estates should be made in accordance with the decision of the RTC. 2. Juridical Persons NCC Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions; (2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law; (3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member. Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are governed by the laws creating or recognizing them. Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject. Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the provisions of this Code concerning partnerships. (36 and 37a) Art. 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds, as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. (38a) Art. 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations, institutions and other entities for public interest or purpose mentioned in No. 2 of Article 44,

their property and other assets shall be disposed of in pursuance of law or the charter creating them. If nothing has been specified on this point, the property and other assets shall be applied to similar purposes for the benefit of the region, province, city or municipality which during the existence of the institution derived the principal benefits from the same. Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 Sec. 2. Corporation defined. - A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence. Sec. 4. Corporations created by special laws or charters. - Corporations created by special laws or charters shall be governed primarily by the provisions of the special law or charter creating them or applicable to them, supplemented by the provisions of this Code, insofar as they are applicable. Sec. 17. Grounds when articles of incorporation or amendment may be rejected or disapproved. - The Securities and Exchange Commission may reject the articles of incorporation or disapprove any amendment thereto if the same is not in compliance with the requirements of this Code: Provided, That the Commission shall give the incorporators a reasonable time within which to correct or modify the objectionable portions of the articles or amendment. The following are grounds for such rejection or disapproval:

1. That the articles of incorporation or any amendment thereto

is not substantially in accordance with the form prescribed herein;

2. That the purpose or purposes of the corporation are patently

unconstitutional, illegal, immoral, or contrary to government rules and regulations; 3. That the Treasurer's Affidavit concerning the amount of capital stock subscribed and/or paid if false;

4. That the percentage of ownership of the capital stock to be

owned by citizens of the Philippines has not been complied with as required by existing laws or the Constitution.

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

No articles of incorporation or amendment to articles of incorporation of banks, banking and quasi-banking institutions, building and loan associations, trust companies and other financial intermediaries, insurance companies, public utilities, educational institutions, and other corporations governed by special laws shall be accepted or approved by the Commission unless accompanied by a favorable recommendation of the appropriate government agency to the effect that such articles or amendment is in accordance with law. NCC Art. 1767. By the contract of partnership two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves. Two or more persons may also form a partnership for the exercise of a profession. (1665a) Art. 1768. The partnership has a judicial personality separate and distinct from that of each of the partners, even in case of failure to comply with the requirements of Article 1772, first paragraph.

Barlin v. Ramirez Faxts: The defendant, Ramires, having been appointed by the plaintiff parish priest, took possession of the church on July 1901. He administered it as such under the orders of his superiors until November 1902. His successor, having been then appointed, the latter made a demand on this defendant for the delivery to him of the church, convent, and cemetery, and other property of the church. The defendant, by a written document, refused to make such delivery. The plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was the owner of the said properties and asks that it be restored to the possession thereof and that the defendant render an account of the property which he had received and which was retained by him, and for other relief. The answer of the defendant, in addition to the general denial of the allegations of the complaint, admitted that he was in the possession and administration of the property described therein with the authority

of the municipality of Lagonoy and of the inhabitants of the same, who were the lawful owners of the said property. Issues: Who is the real owner of the property in question? Is the Roman Catholic Church a juridical entity? Held: The court held that the property be delivered, with the costs of this instance be against the appellant. Yes, the Roman Catholic Church is a juridical entity and the defendant should not and can not be permitted to deny the plaintiff‘s right to the possession of the property.

Camid v. Office of the President Facts: Andong,a town that is not supposed to exist yet, is anyway insisted to some as actually alive and thriving. The creation of the putative municipality was declard void ab initio by the Court four decades ago, but the present petition insists that in spite of this insurmountable obstacle Andong strives on, and hence, it legal personality should be given judicial affirmation. Sec. 442 of the Local Government Code of 1991: Requisites for Creation. - (a) A municipality may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the provincial treasurer, of at least Two million five hundred thousand pesos (P=2,500,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on the 1991 constant prices; a population of at least twenty-five thousand (25,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office; and a contiguous territory of at least fifty (50) square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau:

Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population or income of the original municipality or municipalities at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the municipality proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

(c) h The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund of the municipality concerned, exclusive of special funds, transfers and non-recurring income. (d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. E.O. No. 107, which established Andong, was declared null and void ab initio in 1965 by this Court in Pelaez, along with 33 other E.O.s Issues: Is Andong a municipality and a juridical entity? Is the DILG to be blamed for this issue? Held: The case is not a fit subject for the special civic actions of certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the de novo appreciation of factual actions. Thus, the petition is dismissed. Also, the Certification issued by the DILG does not pretend to bear the authority to create or revalidate a municipality. The annulment of this will really do nothing to the recognition of Andong. Note: Even where a decision has been rendered by a Department Secretary, an alter ego of the President under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, an appeal to the President is still proper where the law expressly provide for exhaustion.

Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza Facts: Juasing Hardware, alleging to be a single proprietorship due organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money against Pilar Dolla. Dolla failed and refused to pay, despite repeated demands, the purchase prices of items, materials and merchandise which she bought from the plaintiff. Solla stated that she has no knowledge about the plaintiff‘s legal personality and capacity to sue as alleged in the complaint.

RULE 3 Revised Rules of Court Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff" may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.) party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross- defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.) party defendant. RULE 10 Revised Rules of Court S Sec. 4. Formal amendments. A defect in the designation of the parties and other clearly clerical or typographical errors may be summarily corrected by the court at any stage of the action, at its initiative or on motion, provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party. Issues: Is the Juasing Hardware a juridical entity with legal capacity to bring an action in court considering that it is a sole proprietorship, not a corporation or partnership? Did the lower court commit a grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the case and refuse the admission of the Amended Complaint filed by Juasing Hardware? Held: There is no law authorizing sole proprietorship to bring suit in court. The complaint should have been filed in the name of the owner. Also, the defect of the complaint in the instant case was merely formal and not substantial. The substitution of the plaintiff would not constitute a change in the identity of the parties. With this, the petition is granted. The lower court is ordered to admit the Amend Complaint.

C. RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL CAPACITY

1. PRESUMPTION OF CAPACITY

Catalan v. Basa This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA which affirmed the judgment of the RTC in Lingayen dismissing the

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, and damages. Facts:

October 20, 1948 Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active military service

o The Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was schizophrenic and unfit to render military service

September 28, 1949 Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo

June 16, 1951 Feliciano allegedly donated one-half of his real property in Pangasinan to his sister Mercedes Catalan

Feliciano was not of sound mind and was, therefore, not capable of giving consent

Aug. 14, 1997 Feliciano died and his heirs became the

complainants

Dec. 7, 1999 lower court found that the evidence is not enough to prove that Feliciano was not of sound mind on the time he executed the deed

o Complaint was dismissed

Petitioners went to CA

o Affirmed the lower court‘s decision

Issue: Whether or not Feliciano was capable of giving consent to the

o

BIR issued a tax certificate to Mercedes for the land

deed considering that he was not of sound mind

o

Half of the property remained with Feliciano

December 11, 1953 – People‘s Bank and Trust Co. (BPI) filed Special Proceedings No. 4563 before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to declare Feliciano incompetent

December 22, 1953 court issued its Order for Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance of Feliciano

December 23, 1953 – court appointed bank as Feliciano‘s guardian

Nov. 22, 1978 Feliciano and Corazon donated lots to their son, Eulogio

March 26, 1979 Mercedes sold the land he received from Feliciano to her children Delia and Jesus Basa (deed of sale was registered Feb. 20, 1992)

June 24, 1983 and Feb. 14, 1983 Feliciano and Corazon donated more of their land to their children

April 1, 1997 BPI filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, and damages against the Basas

o Alleged that the donation is void ab initio since Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes and even if he did, the donation will still be void since

Held: The SC affirmed the findings of the CA and the trial court

A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed capable of attending to his property rights

o A person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property

Petitioners failed to show proof that at the date of donation, Feliciano had lost total control of his mental faculties; thus, unless proved otherwise, he is presumed to have been capable of giving consent

A. MINORITY

Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11,

2009

2 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009 3 (the

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELEC‘s refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.

o

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as ‗Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x

o

It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code:

Facts:

‗The contracting parties may establish such

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,

 

stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not

bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs)

contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order

2006 Ladlad filed for registration with the COMELEC. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the org has no substantial membership base

or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that ‗Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs,

17 August 2009 Ladlad filed for registration again

public order or public policy‘ are inexistent and

 

o

Ladlad argued that LGBT community

void from the beginning.

 

5. is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged bec of their sexual orientation and gender identity

o

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes ‗Immoral doctrines, obscene publications

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene

6. That LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence

7. That bec of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation

and exhibitions and indecent shows‘ as follows:

publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a

8. And that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point

fine ranging from six thousand to twelve

guidelines enunciated by the SC in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC

thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:

 

o

Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and org supporters, and outlined its platform of governance

1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;

11 November 2009 Comelec dismissed the petition on moral grounds

o said that definition of the LGBT sector makes it clear that Ladlad tolerates immorality which offends

religious beliefs and cited the Bible and Koran

2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such literature; and the

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

owners/operators

establishment selling the same;

of

the

(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.

3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals.

4 January 2010 Ang Ladlad filed this petition praying the Court annul the assailed resolutions and direct Comelec to grant their application for accreditation and the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against COMELEC which will begin printing the final ballots on

25

January

6 January 2010 Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was ordered to file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC until 12:00 noon of 11 January. OSG filed for extension

until 16 January. OSG filed a comment supporting Ladlad

2 February 2010 COMELEC filed its own Comment through its Law Dept.

12

January 2010 TRO was issued directing Comelec to

cease and desist from implementing the Assailed

Resolutions

13

January Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a

Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. Opined that the denial of Ladlad‘s petition based on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

(UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

19

January Motion to Intervene granted

26

January Epifanio Salonga Jr. filed Motion to Intervene

2 February motion granted

o

Should the petition be granted, the youth will be exposed to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith

Issue: Is Comelec‘s decision to deny Ang Ladlad accreditation valid?

o

When Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nations, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain

Held: The Court granted the petition and set aside Comelec‘s resolutions. Comelec is also directed to grant the petitioner‘s application for party-list accreditation.

just that.

Ang Ladlad has complied with the requirements for the party-list system

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

Government action, including ints proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage has secular purpose

Comelec‘s Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad

Moral disapproval is not enough to justify exclusion of homosexuals from party-list system

Comelec‘s reference to purported violations of the penal and civil law are mere allegations and need proof beyond reasonable doubt

No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior

Mercado vs. Espiritu

37 Phil 215

Facts: This is an appel to the judgment of the Court of First Instance wherein the plaintiffs were ordered to keep perpetual silence in regard to the litigated land and to pay the costs of the trial.

April 9, 1913 - a complain was submitted by the plaintiffs, Domingo and Josefa Mercado, against Luis Espiritu( later died and so the defendant became his son, Jose)

Arguments of the plaintiffs: The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz were the children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu (sister of Luis); That Margarita died in1897, leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land which hereditary portion has been held by the plaintiffs since then through their fayjer Wenceslao; that in 1910, Luis induced and fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs to sign a deed of sale of the land; that 1/2 of the land belongs to Margarita, and one fourth of the land is to the plaintiffs while the

other hquarter is to their sisters; and that Luis has received the produce of the land since 1901 (until he died).

They hold that the contract of the sale is null and void and prayed that the defendant deliver and restore to the plaintiffs the shares of the land together with the produce thereof.

The defendant's rebuttal: He denies each and all of their argument and argues that in 1894, Margarita sold a portion of the land to Luis; that in 1901, Wenceslao sold under pacto de retro to Luis the remainder of the land; that also in the same year, the plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be of legal age (together with their sisters) executed the notarial instrument ratifying the said sale under pacto de retro of the land that had belonged to their mother.

He rendered by ordering that the plaintiffs be ordered to keep perpetual silence with respect tot the land and to pay the said inestate estate P1,000 for losses and damages and the costs of the trial be charged against them.

Ley 6, Title 19, Partidas 6:

If he who is a minor (1) deceitfully says or sets forth in an instrument that he is over 25 years old, and this assertion is believed by another person who takes him to be of about that age, (2) in an action at law he should be deemed to be of the age he asserted, and should not (3) afterwards be released from liability on the plea that he was not of said age when he assumed the obligatopn. The reason for this is that the law helps the the deceived and not the deceiver.

Issue/s: Is the notarized document ratifying the sale of the land null and void considering that the plaintiffs were said to be minors at the time when it was signed?

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

Held: It would be improper and illegal to hold that Luis had any need to to forge or simulate the notarized document. Also, the plaintiffs have absolutely no right to recover the said parcel of land as its ownership was conveyed to Luis by means of a singular title of purchase and sale; and to other portion they could have redeemed before 1910 upon the payent or the return of the sum which Wenceslao had received as a loan under the security of the pledged property; bit after the execution of the notarized document, Luis definitely acquired the ownership of said parcel of land, There is no legal ground or well- founded reason why the document should be rejected.

The document were they claimed to be of legal age and signed it is perfectly valid. The sale of real estates by minors who pretend to be of legal age is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfilment of the obligations contracted by them or to have them annulled. Lastly, there are no proofs that the plaintiffs have suffered positive and actual losses and damages in their rights and interests as a result of the execution of the document. With these, the Court ruled that the ruling of the Court of First Instance is affirmed with the costs against the appellant.

Bambalan vs Maramba and Muerong Facts: Isidro Bambalan y Calcotura was the owner of the parcel of land in question and that the plaintiff is his sole heir. A document signed by the plaintiff is presented to the court as a proof that the land has been conveyed in favor of the defendants, as payment for his mother‘s loan of P200 to the defendants. The plaintiff was also a minor at the time he signed the document.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff sold the land to the defendants.

Held:

No. The document transferring the ownership of the land from the plaintiff to the defendant is void because at the time he signed it, he was a minor and it also does not appear that he intended to sell the land. Thus the land is not bound by the

contract between the plaintiff and defendant. The plaintiff cannot be held estopped because in the first place, the defendants knew that he was a minor at the time the contract was executed. Braganza, et al (petitioners) vs De Villa Abrille (respondent) Nature of the Case

Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

Facts

From October 30, 1944 Rosario Baraganza and sons (Rodolfo and Guillermo) were required by Fernando de Villa Abrille to pay P10,000 plus 2% interest

o

Braganza et al, received, as a loan from Villa Abrille, P70,000 in Japanese war notes so they promised in writing (Exhibit A) to pay him

March 1949 Villa Abrille sued them for not paying

o

Branganza et al claimed that they only received P40,000 and that Guillermo (16) and Rodolfo (18) were minors when they signed the promissory note (Exhibit

 

A)

The court rendered judgment which the CA affirmed

o

There can be no question about the responsibility of Rosario Braganza because the minority of her consigners does not release her from liability

o

Rodolfo and Guillermo are liable

 

They did not confess in the promissory note that they were not yet of legal age

They pretended to be of legal age when in fact they‘re not