The Armenian Genocide: Lobbyism, political structure and state interests

Kim Andersen June 13, 2011

Contents
1 Introduction 2 Lobbyism, auency, friends and foes, political venues and state intersts 3 Hypotheses 4 Methodology 5 Analysis of the cases 5.1 5.2 Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 7 8 8 11 15 17 18 3

6 Discussion 7 Conclusion 8 Litterature

List of Figures
1 2 Model on lobbying stregnth combined with state interests . . . . Model on lobbying stregnth combined with state interests . . . . 6 18

List of Tables
1 2 Overview of the variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Comparison between Germany and the United States . . . . . . . 6 14

Introduction

In 1915, during First World War, Muslim Ottoman troops, allied with the German Empire, committed what by many has been called a genocide against Christian Armenians. The successor of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish state, staunchly denies the genocide. They argue that not only Armenians were killed, but also Muslims as well as other Christians. Armenian allegiance with the Russian Empire, the Turks argue, made them a legitimate target (Jones, 2005). Thus making the 1915 tragedy not only Armenian. These arguments were forwarded to the Bundestag together with potential diplomatic sanctions (Cave, 2005), when the CDU / CSU proposed to recognise the genocide. Similar arguments were forwarded to the American Congress and president. While the Bundestag recognised the genocide, the Americans abstained. Thus the research question sounds Why did the German Turks not manage to defend the status quo, while the American Turks did so?. The Turkish state is recognised as an actor, but the focus of the analysis is on the ability of the diasporic lobbyists to perform lobbyism. Hence an elaborate analysis of the Turkish state as well as societal opponents of the Turks are not within the analytical scope. The research question is anwered by the employment of a series of theories and methods. In section 2 the theoretical framework is laid out, in section 4 the methodological foundation that guides the research process is built. In the following sections (5 and 6) the focus is on an analysis and a discussion of the results. Finally section 7 concludes.

Lobbyism, auency, friends and foes, political venues and state intersts

Before addressing any of the theories, it is important to dwell on the question of what a lobbyist is. Fouloy denes a lobbyist as a societal actor, who acts as a hired hand of an interest group in the promotion of a given position (Svendsen, 2008: 12). The lobbyist tries to aect legislators by using dierent tactics1 . These tactics as well as the question of rst and second best solutions, are not the focus of this analysis. Baumgartner et al. (2009: 212) put forward the question of auency, but stress that the question of auency is relative. Thus, it is not only the question of whether one lobby-group is rich. It is also the question of whether its counterpart is so. In relation to auency of the groups, Gullberg argues that
1 Tactics

is a question of ability, and it is ability that is the focus of the analysis.

the perception of a given group determines the amount of resources the group in question has to spend in order to promote its position. Lobbying friends, she argues, is easier or cheaper than lobbying foes (Gullberg, 2008: 2970). This can be explained by the diculty a group has when it attempts to locate foes (ibid.), as well as when it has located its enemies and tries to persuade them in order to change their stance towards the lobbyists. These arguments lend credence to the variables auency and perception. Olson argues that small groups are better at delivering a collective good than their larger counterpart. This is because the small group is able to deliver the good without any other incentive than the good itself (Olson, 2002: 33). This can be translated into a question of support to a policy position. Hence small groups are dened by the homogeneity on a given policy position, whereas the larger group is dened by heterogeneous policy positions. Thus, for the larger group it becomes a challenge to deliver because it is more dicult for the members of the group to agree on a position. As an example Baumgartner et al. (2009: 213) argues that eventhough the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is one of the wealthiest interest groups in the world, the diversity or heterogeneity of opinions make it very dicult for it to decide on a question. In this analysis, Olsons notions of groups are expanded in order to cover the concept of an entire diaspora or ethnic community in a host country. Thus, it is assumed that a great number of interest groups situated within the same ethnic community, provides some of the same diculties as intra-group heterogeneity. Taken together the above mentioned variables dene the starting position of the lobbyist. Auency explains the relative power one group has when compared to the auency of other lobbyists. Strength is also captured by the number of groups and legislators perception of any given position. Perception denes the number of friends and foes, and hence (partly) the need for money. Besides specifying strength and the number of foes, it does not reveal the obstacles that lie ahead. One the political structure, which can be translated into venue-power. Another obstacle is the one vested in state interests. These in turn need attention, which will be given through the variables below. The political structure of a country is of great importance for the lobbyists. As evidenced by Svendsen (2008: 90) the change from absolutism in the United Kingdom to a parliamentarian state, dispersed the power from one veto-player to many non veto-players. This made it more dicult for lobbyists to promote a policy because of the sheer number of legislators. This can be translated into a presidentialism versus parliamentarism discourse of moderne society. Tsebelis (1995: 294) argues that proponents of status quo prefer systems that produce

stability. One easy way to obtain stability is through lobbying a veto-player such as a president, who is able to block adoption of policy (Tsebelis, 1995: 305). Hence it is important to employ a political structure variable. The American president has great power (read great venue power) whereas each individual member of the Bundestag including the Chancellor has less power (read little venue power). The question of recognition of a genocide itself is a transnational one as evidenced below. In international politics state interests have greater prominence than in domestic aairs. To appreciate the interests of the state, and avoid seeing the political system as a black box, Nordlingers (1981) theory on the matter is employed. While the above mentioned variables are easier to locate, the question of state interests is ambigious. Before addressing Nordlingers methodology, it is important to dwell on the question of what state interests are. According to Nordlinger only individuals have interests (1981: 9), and these interests are vested in a state unit or body (Nordlinger, 1981: 15). As examples Nordlinger mentions city councils, committees etc. (ibid.). Nordlinger recognises that these interests can diverge as well as converge with their societal counterpart. Converged interests can become the foundation of an alliance between the state and societal actor (Nordlinger, 1981: 12). The public ocials of such a state body have interests, and it is those resources with the greatest weight that become foundational for any given state body (Nordlinger, 1981: 16). Nordlinger misses an important point in that he only focuses on actors. Rothstein argues via a historical institutionalist approach that there is a logic of appropriateness that determines what is considered acceptable and what is not (1998: 147). Thus, actors within these bodies are intertwined in a logic of appropriateness that inuences their actions. This expands the possibility of explantion, yet it does not inrm Nordlingers position. It merely puts a dening touch on his actors. These actors are, as mentioned, representatives of one state body with corresponding interests among many, thus making dissensus among these likely. Hence intra-state persuasion or lobbyism is possible. The nal question is related to the autonomy of the state. Nordlinger argues through Krasner that a state is autonomous when it is able to overcome societal preferences (1981: 22). Table 1 below provides an overview of the variables used. Tsebelis theory is, as mentioned, structural while Baumgartner et als., Gullbergs and Olsons theories are related to the private actors (Nordlingers societal dimension). Lastly, Nordlingers theory is as mentioned state centred. This leads to the model depicted below.

Name Political system Governing type

Table 1: Overview of the variables Description Parliamentarism or presidentialism Rich or poor Few or many Positive or negative Present or absent

Strength of the lobby-group Auency Number of groups Perception State centred theory State interests

Figure 1: Model on lobbying stregnth combined with state interests

Figure 1 depicts four essential components namely the lobbyist, political strucutre, state interests and the strength of the lobbying position or the outcome, which can be used to explain whether or not a group succeed. Within the question of the lobbyist, Baumgartner et als., Gullbergs and Olsons positions are situated. It is assumed that auency works through perception vis-` a-vis the number of friends and foes. Together they have a dening eect on the strength of the lobbying position. Nordlingers position is vested within the state interest. The plus indicates that state interests uctuate along the lobbyists position, whereas the minus indicates that the lobbyist is challenged by state interests. The state is not seen as a group though, but merely as an obstacle. Tsebeliss veto-player theory is depicted in the political structure variable, where the plus indicates that the political structure works in favour of the wishes of the lobbyist and the minus depicts the opposite situation. The logic behind the model as depicted in gure 1, is that ceteris paribus the lobbyist has a lobbying position. The strength of this position is aected by auency and perception vis-` a-vis legislators, and subsequently by state interests and the po-

litical system. It also means that if neither state interest nor political structure is present, the strength of the lobbying position ceteris paribus is solely dened by before mentioned variables.

Hypotheses

As mentioned in section 1 the empirical puzzle or research question is Why did the (German) Turks not manage to defend the status quo, while the (American) Turks did so?. Based on theories depicted above, a series of hypotheses can be deduced. First of all it is hypothesised that the classical theory on lobbyism (afuency, perception and degree of group homogeneity) that dene the outcome. In relation with this hypothesis, a couple of assumptions need to be mentioned. First of all, the topic of (not) recognition is of great importance to both Turks and Armenians. Hence the question of whether to lobby or not, in relation with resources, is not relevant. Secondly, it is assumed that the Turkish state is dependent on the degree of homogeneity in the signals sent by the dierent organisations. If the diaspora is in disagreement with itself on an issue, it is dicult for the legislators to at best take the diaspora and hence Turkey seriously. Secondly, yet equally important, it is also hypothesised that the political structure is intrinsic to the success or failure of any lobbyist. Finally the last hypothesis stresses that state interests can provide the necessary push or inertia to promote or demote the policy. Hence the model described in gure 1 is going to be tested. 1. H1: Positive scores on group, auency and perception determine success. 2. H2: Lobbyists ability to defend the status quo is easier in presidential systems. 3. H3: Lobbyists ability to promote a policy is enhanced if it uctuates along the state interest. Conrmation of the hypotheses will not only help answering the research question, but will, hopefully, also lend credence to a greater focus on state interests in lobbyism-research.

Methodology

The German case is one of policy change. To analyse change, the theory as used by Svendsen (2008b) in connection with a study of climate policy in the 7

European Union is employed. Svendsen investigates the possibility of lobbyism in the European Union by looking at a proposed paper and the approved equivalent. Changes are ascribed to lobbyism (Svendsen, 2008b: 19). This method assumes that the political system is a black box and disregards interests of the state itself, which is its greatest caveat. It is possible to remedy it by utilising the approach described by Nordlinger. The case-study itself is based on a method proposed by Yin (2003), who argues in favour of an experimental approach. The essentials of his approach are that explanatory theories can facilitate theory-testing by using dierent kinds of qualitative and quantitative sources (Yin, 2003: 22). The key element is complexity, because it will help make the data-collection stringent contrary to less complex cases where pattern matching would have been impossible (ibid.). As it becomes evident below, pattern matching is pivotal to this study. Gerring echoes Yins position in that he says that case-studies can be used to test invariant or deterministic relationships (2004: 346), which is the character of the causal relationships tested in this analysis.

5
5.1

Analysis of the cases

Germany

Before analysing the case it is necessary to spend time on the methodology utilised by Svendsen. The pivotal question is if any change happened in Germany. First of all, the fact that Germany approved the CDU / CSU (2005) proposal unanimously (B undnis 90 / Die Gr unen et al., 2005) is a change from no-recognising status quo. Small changes were made in the Bundestag approved document. One such change is the omission of references to the values of the European Union. The same argumentation is used though (ibid.). Thus, it is valid to argue that Germany is a case of change in status quo - a change showing very little attention to supporters of the status quo. To understand why the CDU / CSU starts the debate, the position on EU and Turkey must be seen in relation with the dention of the conditions of ascension negotiations. It is highly likely that CDU / CSU tries to instigate a debate that will make it dicult for Turkey to accede the European Union. Lobbyism is, as mentioned, an expensive activity. First of all it requires a personal surplus to be able to participate in interest articulation. Secondly, it is necessary to invest money in interest groups. Turks in Germany are not auent because they typically take blue collar work (Ogelman et al., 2003: 147). Hence it is expected that they do not have the personal surplus to invest time 8

in lobbyism let alone invest in lobbyists despite the fact that the real size of the remittances have dwindled (Akkoyunlu et al., 2008: 25). The question of perception of Turks is among other reected in the words used to describe them. In the beginning, Germans called them Gastarbeiter (guestworker) or Ausl ander (foreigner). Later the wording Migranten (migrant) and ausl andische Mitb urger (foreign cocitizens) were used, but as White notes, the wording Immigranten was and is never used because that implies that they can stay (1997: 763). Hence, the discourse surrounding the Turks reject the possibility of permanent residence. They are not perceived as a part of the German society. Ogelman et al. bring forth a similar conclusion. They say that Germans consider the Turks to have the most alien lifestyle (2003: 156). Another way to argue that German Turks are not perceived positively is to refer to the neo-corporatist interest articulation in Germany and legislators tendency to favour other minorities than the Turkish (Ogelman et al., 2003: 154). This lends some credence to the claim that Turks are not peceived positively by the German decision-makers as a whole. It is reasonable to assume that this negative perception is reected in the Bundestag especially on the right wing that proposed the recognition2 . Turkish newspapers echo this perception of the right wing in that they argue that CDU and CSU have been champion of a campaign against Turkeys membership in the European Union in Germany. They call for a privileged partnership for Turkey, rather than full membership, saying Turkey is not culturally t for entry. (Turkish Daily News, 2005). Thus, the recognition of the genocide is considered a part of a campaign against Turkey by hostile German legislators. Taken together, lobbying the Bundestag would require a considerably amount of funds because of its hostility. Ogelman et al. (2003) list a series of Turkish organisations in Germany. They sort them on whether they are an opponent or a proponent of the Turkish state. Those in opposition of the Turkish state are primarily Islamic, yet not member of the same Islamic umbrella organisation (Ogelman et al., 2003: 149). The three other alternative organisations listed are either representing the state itself or a nationalist kemalist party (Ogelman et al., 2003: 151). Besides these large organisations, Turkish organisations cover Kurds, Alawis, and other ethnic groups. The total number of organisations amount to more than 3000 (Ogelman et al., 2003: 148f). Finally it is worth mentioning that Ogelman et al. (2003: 151) register two umbrella organisations. One aligned with the right while the other is aligned with the left. Hence, to make an united front, Turkish
2 It is worth noting that in the 1980s the CDU / CSU campaigned against overforeigner sation of Germany. This contributed to an alienation of Turks in Germany (Ogelman et al., 2003: 156).

organisations would have to overcome not only ideological dierences, but also religious (cf. multiple religious umbrella organisations). In addition, it should be mentioned that German legislators tend to disregard Turks from the policy process (Ogelman et al., 2003: 154). Taken together this might be a challenge too encompassing for the German Turks3 . Germany is a parliamentarian state. As mentioned in section 4 Svendsen argues that parliamentarian states have power sharing mechanisms dierent from their presidential or monarchical counterparts, thus aecting lobbyists ability to lobby. First of all, the sheer number of members of parliament pose a challenge. To lobby more than 500 people can be expensive. The problem is not limited to the number itself, but also to the alignment of dierent MPs. It is fairly reasonable to assume that a signicant number of MPs can be considered hostile to the lobbyists position (cf. the analysis above for a parliamentarian perception of the Turks). While friends are considerably cheaper to lobby, the lobbyist might have to pay a bit more to realign the foe (Gullberg, 2008: 2966). Germany is in at least one respect a special case. It has been the driving force in two world wars. This has left them with a special mentality vis-` a-vis warcrimes. While the Germans were not executors of the Armenian genocide, they feel partly responsible. Responsibility is a key word in modern German foreign policy following Second World War. In 1973 Chancellor Willy Brand visited Israel, where he apologised to the Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir on behalf of the German people (AP, 1973). According to Barkan (2000: 29) this has become a part of German identity. This identity is transposed through time, and can also be observed if the CDU / CSU (2005: 2) proposal is read as well as the approved legislation (B undnis 90 / Die Gr unen, 2005: 4). On page two in the CDU / CSU (2005: 2) proposal, they refer to an evangelic theologist named Johannes Lepsius, who tried to persuade the Bundestag to act. This argumentation is also part of the Bundestag recognition (B undnis 90 / Die Gr unen et al., 2005: 4). The historical justication for the recognition is copied word by word (CDU / CSU, 2005: 1; B undnis 90 / Die Gr unen, 2005: 3) thus making the approved document in line with the Armenian friendly CDU / CSU. The only dierence between the two documents is the implication it has vis-` avis potential membership of the European Union (CDU / CSU, 2005: 2). The CDU / CSU document reects the position of the CDU / CSU on the question of Turkish membership, but this question is not echoed in the approved document. This might be attributed to Turkish lobbyism and perhaps discrepancy between
3 It might be worth noting that a search on VIKZ, DITIB, KRM, ZMD and Islamrat websites, all major Turkish organisations, result in no hits regarding the genocide. Only one hit contains an article, which criticises the CDU / CSU).

10

the parties in the Bundestag. However, it does not crumble with the assertion that the Germans adhere to an apologising-discourse. Thus, to lobby the German decision-makers, the Turks have to overcome a series of issues. The organisation of the German state increases the costs of lobbyism. Because of the demographic outlook of the Turkish diaspora in Germany, this is perhaps a price too high to pay especially if the perception of the Turks is negative in general, which does not give them many friends. The structure of the diaspora also poses a challenge. The number of organisations and the lack of visible and representative umbrella organisations make it signicantly more dicult to present a united front. Finally it seems that the state interest mentioned above works against the Turkish interest. Hence, any attempts to lobby decision-makers on the issue of recognition of the Armenian genocide would be expensive and perhaps outright impossible.

5.2

The United States

While the question of recognition in Germany was related to the possibility of Turkish entry into the European Union, the renewed debate in the Congress can be explained by the strength of the Armenian lobby. One of the pivotal goals of the Armenian organisations4 is the recognition of the Armenian genocide (Walt, 2005: 215). These Armenian lobbyists are considered one of the strongest diaspora interest groups in the United States (Walt, 2005: 216). Adam Schi, who originally proposed the bill on recognition of the genocide, is elected in the 27th Congressional district, which has 17.421 Armenians living there equal to 2.6 percent of the population (US Census, 2000). In comparison there is only 570 Turks equal to 0.09 percent of the population (ibid.). These numbers reveal the potential for locally unchallenged lobbyism from the Armenian side, which can explain why Adam Schi proposed the bill. Auency is also very dierent from Germany. While Turks after Second World War took mainly blue collar work, today a growing number of Turks get a better education and qualify for better paid work (Akg un, 2000: 108f). This can be evidenced by observing the number of Turkish students and professors attending American universities. According to Akg un the number of Turkish students in American universities are rising, and in 2000 there were more than 800 Turkish professors. In a study conducted between 3145 Turks approximately 16 percent had a professional or technical job while only 0.5 percent had a job in the agricultural sector. Thus it seems fairly reasonable to assume that the
4 A search on websites of ANCA, AAAINC and AGBU reveals the same approach to the genocide.

11

American Turkish diaspora is (or has the potential of being) auent contrary to the German Turkish diaspora. In many ways the Turkish community in the US is dierent from that of Germany. However, in at least one respect they have something in common. The perception of Turks is not overly good. To measure American perception of Turks, a study conducted by James Gibbon (2005) on American perception of Islam and a Pew Research Institute (2003) report on the same question are employed. Thus, the perception of Islam is used as a proxy to measure perception of Turks. Pew Research Institute conducts a longitudinal study on the perception of Islam. Their results indicate that there is an increase in the negative perception of Islam especially among Conservatives, but also other political groups (Pew Research Center, 2003: 22). These results are echoed by Gibbon, who has conducted a study among American Christians. His results show an increase in Islamophobia among American Christians (Gibbon, 2005: 24). Taken together, if Islamophobia can be used as a proxy on perception of Turks, they have popularity issues. It should be noted that the popularity issue is especially grim among voters that would be supportive of the former president George W. Bush, who sat during the 2007 debate on the Armenian issue. As in Germany the number of Turkish organisations is great. These organisations, who represent the Turkish diaspora, worked together in an attempt to prevent the recognition of the Armenian genocide. In two weeks, members of several major American Turkish organisations, visited 150 congressional oces, in an attempt to broaden and deepen the understanding of the Armenian genocide claim. At the same time they elaborated on the eects of the proposed resolution on the relationship not only between Turks and Americans but also between Turks and Armenians (ATAA, 2007). This was probably easier than in Germany, where the legislators do favour the Turks miniority. It might also be worth noting that the main Turkish organisation, ATAA or Assembly of Turkish American Assocations, has strong ties to Turkey. It can be evidenced by observing the regulations of ATAA, where article one, section two states that the sole aim of this group is to promote a balanced view of Turkey. Hence Turks from Turkey are, according to article seven, section one also eligible for membership (ATAA, 1992). This association with Turkey can also be seen in their views of the genocide, which is considered a multi-religious tragedy rather than only an Armenian tragedy (Fein, undated). Contrary to Germany the United States is a presidential system. This has a signicant impact on lobbying behaviour. As described by Svendsen above, it is easier to lobby a king than to lobby a parliament simply because a king

12

is only one person. The American president is not a king, but to an extent the institution has king-like features, the most obvious of which is the ability to veto legislation (Morris, 2010: 71). This makes the institution a veto-player (see Tsebelis and section 2). In other words, the ability of the American president to veto legislation makes him an important and interesting person to lobby. During George W. Bushs tenure, he vetoed legislation ten times (Morris, 2010: 73). In connection with state interests, Hulse et al. (2007) writes that when France declared it a felony to deny the Armenian genocide, Turkey severed military ties with France. American ocials in Iraq, General David H. Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, argued that any such resolution might harm the eorts in Iraq (ibid.). The Turkish state plays on the necessity of their contribution to the American activty in Iraq and thus tampering with an American military interest. This makes it easier for the Turks to persuade the US legislators. Hence, the Turkish state creates a situation, where American interests are in jeopardy. This clearly benets their lobbying position, but it also gives the example an idiographic odour. It is fairly reasonable to assume that interests do play a role. Incumbent president Barack Obama has been reluctant on the genocide-issue, which is a change from his presidential campaign, where he mentions the genocide as such. Several reasons can be ascribed to his change of mind. One reason seems to be the potential decline in US exports to Turkey, which is expected by the military and aerospace industries in the United States (Poirier, 2010). Thus the interest is not as much US-Turkey relations as it is lost revenue. To sum up, Turkish American lobbyists face some of the same diculties, their German counterparts. First of all the perception of Turks is negative. Secondly, while there are many umbrella organisations in the United States, they seem to pose a united front, thus making it easier to lobby. On the other hand, the American Turks are richer and better educated. They can also target a veto-player guised as the American president, as well as receive support from the American military establishment in Iraq qua state interests. Thus, promotion of Turkish interests in the United States is considerably easier than in Germany. The table below depicts the results from both cases.

13

Table 2: Comparison between Germany and the United States

Case Germany United States

Political system Parliamentarism Presidentialism

The Lobbyist Organisations Auency Many Poor Many Rich Perception Negative Negative State interests Demoting Promoting Outcome Change No change

14

Discussion

The rst hypothesis addresses the classic virtues of lobbyist theory. It argues that auency, size and cohesion of a group, as well as perception determine success. It is highly unlikely that a group that does not score positively on these variables, will have success. This proposition can be supported by creating a situation where the are no state interests and veto-players. In such a situation, it is the capabilities of an interest group vis-` a-vis other interest groups that determine success. However, this is not the case here. Hard politics such as foreign policy have typically a very dened state interest, and always involves the executive. Another argument against the importance of the classical virtues of lobbyist theory is the opaque role played by the Turkish state. The question is whether the Turkish state could have done it on its own? It is possible, however, it is important to stress that Turkish organisations at least in the USA had 1) a dened opinion; and 2) campaigned against the recognition (cf. section 5.2 and especially auency). Any mixed signals would have weakened the Turkish cause. Turkish organisations actions in Germany are not as clear as in the USA. One reason for this is that German Turks are not as auent as Americans. This lends support for hypothesis 1. However, while it is true that German Turks are not as auent as their American counterpart, the size of remittances sent to Turkey has dwindled (cf. section 5.1). Hence, perhaps the real reason for the Turkish failure in Germany lies within the notion of state interests as well as a weak political venue. And perhaps the same asserts itself vis-` a-vis the American Turks success and the interests of the military establishments. The second hypothesis states that it is easier to defend status quo in presidential systems. The basic argument in favour of such a proposition is that the lobbyist only needs to lobby one person contrary to an entire parliament. A president is, however, the commander-in-chief, and as such can be dicult to gain access to. It is fair to assume that the involvement of the Turkish state opened this door. Another argument that speaks in favour of hypothesis 2 is the presidential powers. As described section in 5.2 the American president has the right to veto legislation from the Congress. This veto-power is not present in parliamentarian systems. One could oppose the veto-power claim by arguing that not all presidents are equally prone to veto legislation. As mentioned in section 5.2 Bush vetoed legislation ten times, but his predecessor, Bill Clinton, vetoed legislation 36 times (Morris, 2010: 73). Another argument that speaks against this hypothesis is the fact that a president, while he can maintain status quo, he can also enact policy change and thus promote a new agenda. Thus it is not necessarily easier to maintain status quo in a presidential system unless 1) 15

the presidents views on a given case converge with that of the lobbyist; or 2) it is possible for the lobbyist to gain access to the president and hereafter persuade him or her. Finally, it is worth noting that to gain access to an executive, the interest group needs to be either auent, coherent and / or perceived positively. The third hypothesis argues that if state interests converge with that of the societal actor, it is easier to promote the view of the societal actor. In the analysis state interests are presented as the possibility of inertia vis-` a-vis the societal actor. In the German case, the Bundestag is biased towards an apologisingdiscourse qua Rothsteins position. Alternatively, yet equally correct, it is possible to see this bias as negative perception towards the Turkish position. In defence of the state interest position as well as the German legislators, the bias is not necessarily translateable into a negative position towards Turks, but rather a pro-apologetic position. Vis-` a-vis the American position, the state interest is represented through the military establishment, which favours the Turkish position because of the strategic importance Turkey has. Proponents of the classic lobbyist theory can argue that the American military establishment acts as a group rather than as an inertia or push. While the Bundestag is a legislator and thus is the focus of attention, the military is not, and can thus give attention to a legislator. Because of the militarys special position in a state, it has direct access to the executive. Hence, the military can be seen and read as a lobbyist, where any given interest is the kernel that keeps the group together just as it is with societal actors. This does not inrm hypothesis 3 understood in terms of Nordlingers nor Rothsteins view. Translated into lobbyist terms, the military or any non-legislative body can be seen as a potential lobbyist. This ts with Nordlingers atomist view of the state as consisting of multiple bodies with not necessarily converging positions as well as his own view on the state interest theory, which is that it is an addendum rather than a competitor to societal theory (read lobbyist theory). In this regard two questions need to be resolved. First of all, state interests can still be understood as inertia as it is in the German case. This proposition can be supported by using a counterfactual American case. Assuming that the American military would not engage in intra-state lobbyism, the Turks would experience inertia in the American Congress. Secondly, questions such as group cohesion or group size as well as perception are relevant vis-` a-vis state bodies as lobbyists.

16

Conclusion

The result is surprising. First of all, neither of the Turks managed to defend the status quo. Second, yet equally important, the status quo of the American case is only maintained because of the concerted action of the military establishment and the White House qua the American president (cf. section 5.2). German and American Turks were perceived negatively. The German Turks were relatively poorer than their American counterpart, and they were not blessed with a strong political venue guised as a veto-player as well as a state body with interests that uctuate along the lines of their own interests (cf. section 5.1). The key dierence and hence explanation lies within the question of political structure and state interests. If these explananda were not present, the American Turks were more likely able to defend the status quo than the Germans. However, such a political void does not exist. Hence, if strong state interests are at stake, it is almost superuous to lobby. The Turks and the Armenians could have abstained from lobbying simply because it is very plausible that something as sensitive as war-time strategies is of greatest importance to any government. This might be the logic behind George W. Bushs actions. Thus the answer to the research question is that the German Turks did not have a political structure and a state interest that worked in their favour. In gure 1 a version where state interests is a question of inertia rather than a group is depicted. In the revised model (cf. gure 2) the situation described above including societal actors is brought forth (see also gure 1 and the corresponding analysis). In the sections above the possibilities of the Turks in Germany and the USA are tested. This is not a valid picture of reality. However, the depiction omitting the state body as a lobbyist is neither. Hence the revised model, which helps understand situations that would otherwise be attributed opposing societal lobbyists (cf. section 2 and Nordlingers position in combination with the discussion). Future research needs to establish the importance of state interests in lobbyism in other areas than foreign policy. The result of the analysis lends credence to this proposition that it has importance. State interests are intrinsic in situations where they are strong enough to provide the dening push or pull vis-` a-vis any given policy. This leaves the game of lobbyism with more than the traditional two actors, and it makes it possible for a scholar to appreciate the political system instead of seeing it as a black box.

17

Figure 2: Model on lobbying stregnth combined with state interests

Litterature
News-Press, June 11, 1973

AP (1973). Brand Completes Peaceful Israel Visit, St. Joseph AP (2010). U.S. may vote on Armenian genocide measure, December 18, MSNBC. msnbc.msn.com, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40731876 /ns/world news-europe/ (2nd of June, 2011) Akg un, Birol (2000). The Turkish Diaspora in the United States and its Role in Promoting Turkish-American Relations, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, vol. 31, pp.99-117 ATAA (1992), Assembly of Turkish American Assocations. Bylaws, ATAA ATAA (2007). House Foreign Aairs Committee 27-21 Passes Controversial Armenian Resolution Undermining Fairness and Justice, October 11, 2007, Assembly of Turkish American Assocations. ATAA.org, http://www.ataa.org/press/prletter 1011c.html (9th of June, 2011) Akkoyunlu, Sule, Kholodilin, Konstantin (2008). A link Between Workers Remittances and Buisness Cycles in Germany and Turkey, Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, vol. 4, no. 5, pp. 23-40 Barkan, Elazar (2000). The Guilt of Nations, The John Hopkins University Press Baumgartner, Frank R., Berry, Jerey M., Hojnacki, Marie, Kimball, David C., Leech, Beth L. (2009). Lobbying and Policy Change. Who wins, who loses, and why, Chicago University Press B undnis 90 / Die Gr unen, CDU / CSU, FDP, SPD (2005), Erinnerung und Gedenken an die Vertreibungen und Massaker an den Armeniern 1915 -

18

Deutschland muss zur Vers ohnung zwischen T urken und Armeniern beitragen, Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag Cave, Gerd (2005). V olkermord an den Armeniern bleibt in der T urkei ein Tabu, March 1, 2005, K olner Stadt-Anzeiger. Ksta.de, http://www.ksta.de/html/artikel/1109243436845.shtml (11th of April, 2011). CDU / CSU (2005), Gedenken anl asslich des 90. Jahrestages des Auftakts zu Vertreibungen und Massakern an den Armeniern am 24. April 1915 Deutschland muss zur Vers ohnung zwischen T urken und Armeniern beitragen, Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag Dalton, Russel J. (2008). Politics in Germany, pp. 257-307 in Gabriel A. Almond, G. Bingham Powell Jr., Russell J. Dalton, Kaare Strm (eds.), Comparative Politics Today, Pearson Fein, Bruce (undated). So-called Armenian Genocide. An Armenian and Muslim Tragedy? Yes! Genocide? No!, undated, ATAA. ATAA, http://www.ataa.org/reference/tragedy-fein.html (5th of June, 2011) Gerring, John (2004). What Is a Cse Study and What Is It Good for?, American Political Science Review, vol. 98, no. 2, pp. 341-354 Gibbon, James (2005), Unveilling Islampophobia: American Attitudes Toward Islam, Working paper, Princeton Gullberg, Anne Therese (2008). Lobbying friends and foes in climate policy: The case of buisness and environmental interest groups in the European Union, Energy Policy, vol. 46, pp. 2964-2972 Hulse, Carl, Myers, Steven Lee (2007). House Panel Raises Furor on Armenian Genocide, October 11, 2007, Spiegel Online. spiegel.de, http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,510779,00.html (3rd of May, 2011) Jones, Gareth (2005). Historian seeks probe of Armenia genocide claims, January 15, 2005, Hurriyet Daily News. Hurriyetdailynews. com, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=historian-seeksprobe-of-armenia-genocide-claims-2005-01-15 (13th of April, 2011). Kitschelt, Herbert (2003). Accounting for Postcommunist Regime Diversity. What Counts as a Good Cause?, pp. 49-86 i Ekiert, Grzegorz, Hanson, Stephen E. (eds.), Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule, Cambridge University Press Morris, Irwin L. (2010). The American Presidency. An analytical approach, Cambridge University Press

19

Olson, Mancur (2002). The Logic of Comparative Action, Havard University Press Ogelman, Nedim, Martin, Phillip, Money, Jeanette (2002). Immigrant Cohesion and Political Access in Inuencing Foreign Policy, SAIS Review, Summer-Fall, 2002, no. 2, pp. 145-165 Pew Research Center (2003), Religion and politics: Contention and consensus, Pew Research Center Poirier, John (2010). President Barack Obama on Saturday marked the World War One-era massacre of Armenians by Turkish forces, calling it one of the worst atrocities of the 20th century, but avoiding any mention of genocide., April 24, 2010, Reuters. Reuters.com, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/24/us-armenia-turkey-usaidUSTRE63N1DX20100424 (5th of June, 2011) Rothstein, Bo (1998). Political Institutions: An overview, pp. 133-166 in Robert E. Goodin og Hans-Dieter Klingemann (red.), A New Handbook of Political Science, Oxford University Press Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard (2008). Lobbyisme i EU, Forlaget Samfundslitteratur Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard (2008b). Hvordan m ales lobbyisme i EU? CO2-kvoter som case, Politik, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 18-26 Tsebelis, George (1995). Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 25, pp. 289-325 Turkish Daily News (2005). Ankara slams German conservatives Armenian bid, February 28, 2005, Hurriyet Daily News. Hurriyetdailynews.com, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=ankara-slams-germanconservatives8217-armenian-bid-2005-02-28 (13th of April, 2011). US Census (2000). Ancestry, US Census Bureau Walt, Stephen M. (2005). Taming American Power. The Global Response to U.S. primacy, Norton White, Jenny B. (1997). Turks in New Germany, American Anthropologist, vol. 99, no. 4, pp. 754-769 Yin, Robert (2003). Applications of case study research, Sage Publications

20