Tanada vs tuvera FACTS: Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article

IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazatte is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. RULING: Yes. It is the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern and corollarily access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (Sec. 6 Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid and enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially informed of its contents. Important Point: It illustrates how decrees and issuances issued by one manMarcosare in fact laws of general application and provide for penalties. The constitution afforded Marcos both executive and legislative powers. The generality of law (Civil Code, Art. 14) will never work without constructive notice. The ruling of this case provides the publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice and is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse. Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime. Tanada vs tuvera Facts: Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the clause unless otherwise provided in Article 2 of the ne w civil code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette. ISSUES: Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their publication; Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation. HELD:

The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publicatio n itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication. Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical. The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible. J. Cruz: Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES CORPORATION vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OFLABOR AND EMPLOYMENTG.R. No. 103144 April 4, 2001 FACTS Philsa is a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment.Sometime in January 1985, private respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for employment inSaudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees in the amount ofP5,000.00 for private respondentRodrigo L. Mikin and P6,500.00 each for private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric P.Leyson. After the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents left for Saudi Arabia on January 29, 1985. They then began work for Al-Hejailan Consultants A/E, the foreignprincipal of petitioner. While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign asecond contract which changed some of the provisions of their original contract resulting in thereduction of some of their benefits and privileges. They were again allegedly forced by their foreignemployer to sign a third contract which increased their work hours from 48hours to60hours a week without any corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. When they refused to sign this thirdcontract, the services of private respondents were terminated by Al-Hejailan and they wererepatriated to the Philippines. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demandedfrom petitioner Philsa the return of their placement fees and for the payment of their salaries for theunexpired portion of their contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a case before the POEAagainst petitioner Philsa and its foreign principal, Al-Hejailan. On the aspects of the case involvingmoney claims arising from the employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal, the POEA rendereda decision dated August 31, 1988 ordering respondent PHILSA to pay complainants, jointly andseverally with its principal Al-Hejailan. In a decision dated July 26, 1989, the NLRC modified the appealed decision of the POEA Adjudication Office by deleting the award of salary deductions anddifferentials. The awards to private respondents were deleted by the NLRC considering that thesewere not raised in the complaint filed by private respondents. Private respondents then elevated theJuly 26, 1989 decision of the NLRC to the Supreme Court in a petition for review for certiorari whereit was docketed as G.R. No. 89089. However, in a Resolution dated October 25, 1989, the petitionwas dismissed outright for "insufficiency in form and substance, having failed to comply with theRules of Court and Circular No. 1-88 requiring submission of a certified true copy of the questionedresolution dated August 23, 1989." Almost

simultaneous with the promulgation of the August 31,1988 decision of the POEA on private respondents' money claims, the POEA issued a separate Orderdated August 29, 1988 resolving the recruitment violations aspect of private respondents' complaint.In this Order, the POEA found petitioner guilty of illegal exaction, contract substitution, and unlawfuldeduction. Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the decision of the POEA thru the LRO suspendingor canceling a license or authority to act as a recruitment agency may be appealed to the Ministry(now Department) of Labor and Employment. Accordingly, after the denial of its motion forreconsideration, petitioner appealed the August 31, 1988Order to the Secretary of Labor andEmployment. However, in an Order dated September 13, 1991, public respondent Secretary of Laborand Employment affirmed in toto the assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration butthis was likewise denied in an Order dated November 25, 1991.ISSUES1. Whether or not the petitioner can beheld liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum CircularNo. 11, Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants,is void for lack of publication.2. Whether or not the public respondent has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with graveabuse of discretion in holding petitioner liable for illegal deductions/withholding of salaries for thesupreme court itself has already absolved petitioner from this charge.HELD1. No.The administrative circular under consideration is one of those issuances which should bepublished for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant toa valid delegation. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as yetbeen published or filed with the National Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may notbe enforced. The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely privateemployment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling inTaada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres, the administrativecirculars questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namely Philippine and HongKong agencies engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled thereinthat, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or implemented. Ourpronouncement in Taada vs. T uvera is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and regulationsmust be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a validdelegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, orthose so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules andguidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. AdministrativeCircular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of these exceptions.2. Petitioner is correct in stating that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC has attained finality byreason of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari assailing the same. However, the said NLRCDecision dealt only with the money claims of private respondents arising from employer-employeerelations and illegal dismissal and as such, it is only for the payment of the said money claims thatpetitioner is absolved. The administrative sanctions, which are distinct and separate from the moneyclaims of private respondents, may still be properly imposed by the POEA. In fact, in the August 31,1988 Decision of the POEA dealing with the money claims of private respondents, the POEA Adjudication Office precisely declared that "respondent's liability for said money claims is withoutprejudice to and independent of its liabilities for the recruitment violations aspect of the case which isthe subject of a separate Order." The fact that petitioner has been absolved by final judgment for thepayment of the money claim to private respondent de Mesa does not mean that it is likewiseabsolved from the administrative sanctions which may be imposed as a result of the unlawfuldeduction or withholding of private respondents' salary. The POEA thus committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner administratively liable of one count of unlawful deduction/withholding of salary. Unciano vs ca FACTS: Some nursing students were not admitted for the second semester fororganizing a student body council which was not allowed by the school whichwas allegedly a violation of the school regulations. The school argued thatunder the ALCUAZ DOCTRINE, schools have the discretion to admit studentsfor the second semester because upon enrolment of a student in the firstsemester, the contract was for that semester only. However a new doctrinewas later on promulgated which abandoned the Alcuaz doctrine which is nowthe NON doctrine. ISSUE: Whether or not the new Non doctrine be applied retroactively to thecase. HELD:

No. The new doctrine shall be applied prospectively and should notapply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted on faith thereof. he ruling in the Non case should not be given a retroactive effect to cases that arose before its promulgation on May 20, 1990, as in this case, which was filed on April 16, 1990. If it were otherwise, it would result in oppression to petitioners and other schools similarly situated who relied on the ruling in the Alcuaz case, promulgated on May 2, 1988, which recognized the termination of contract theory. We had an opportunity to resolve a similar issue in National Service Corporation, et al. v. NLRC. 11 In this case, petitioner claimed that as a government corporation (by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the National Investment and Development Corporation, a subsidiary wholly owned by the Philippine National Bank, which in turn is a government owned corporation), the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are governed by the civil service law, rules and regulations. In support thereof, petitioner cited the ruling in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, 12 that employees of government owned or controlled corporations are governed by the civil service law, rules and regulations, we rejected this claim of petitioner and held that: "It would appear that, in the interest of justice, the holding in said case should not be given retroactive effect, that is, to cases that arose before its promulgation on 17 January 1985. To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated, because under the same 1973 Constitution but prior to the ruling in National Housing Corporation vs. Juco, this Court had recognized the applicability of the Labor Code to, and the authority of the NLRC to exercise jurisdiction over, disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in governmentowned or controlled corporations, among them, the National Service Corporation (NASECO)." 13 In addition, We reiterate Our earlier pronouncement in the case of People v. Jabinal, supra, that it is a settled rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. Cui vs arellano FACTS: Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then enrolled in its College of Law from first year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of his 4th year. During these years, he was awarded scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos University. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from Arellano University. The defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without Arellanos issuance of his TOR. On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing all heads of private schools, colleges and universities. Part of the memorandum states that the amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school. ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the scholarship grant provided by Arellano University. HELD: The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set therein was advisory and not mandatory in nature. Moreover, the stipulation in question, asking previous students to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights and hence, null and void. The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon at the legal rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of this case as well as the costs and dismissing defendants counterclaim. People vs. Jabinal FACTS: Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question. The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Courts decision in People vs. Macarandang(1959) and People vs. Lucero(1958) and not on the basis of the latest reversal and abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967). ISSUE: Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the courts rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the MAcarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa. RULING: Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable. The appellant was acquitted. Van dorn vs romillo FACTS: Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioners business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property. ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen. HELD: Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be served. Quita vs ca Fact of the Case: Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married inthe Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954.Both of them remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the respondentherewith. They were blessed with six children.

On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to whowill be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held thatthe divorce acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private respondentstressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in VanDorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized in thePhilippnes provided they are valid according to their national law. The petitioner herselfanswered that she was an American citizen since 1954. Through the hearing she alsostated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she obtained the divorce. Implying the shewas no longer a Filipino citizen. The Trial court disregarded the respondents statement. The net hereditary estatewas o rdered in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and thePadlan children moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial reconsiderationwas granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita.Private respondent was not declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared voidsince it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.Blandina and her children appeal to the Court of Appeals thatthe case was decidedwithout a hearing in violation of the Rules of Court. Issue: (1)Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo void ab initio. (2)Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as surviving spouse of Arturo. Held: No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D.Quita at the time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here sinceshe was already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in theircountrys national law. Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be the primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo. FELICITAS AMOR-CATALANVSC A & O R L A N D O C A T A L A N & MEROPE BRAGANZAFACTS: Petitioner married respondenton 1950. They migrated to the USA anda l l e g e d l y b e c a m e NATURALIZED CITIZENS.[April 1988] They divorced.[ J u n e 1 9 8 8 ] R e s p o n d e n t Orlando married respondentMeropePetitioner filed a Declar ationof Nullity of Marriage againstr e s p o n d e n t O r l a n d o a n d Merope contending that themarriage was bigamous sincer e s p o n d e n t M e r o p e h a d a prior subsisting marriage withBristol.R e s p o n d e n t s m o v e d t o dismiss on the ground of lacko f c a u s e o f a c t i o n a s petitioner is not a real party-in-interest. However, this wasdenied. ISSUE:[ 1 ] W / N P E T I T I O N E R & R E S P O N D E N T O R L A N D O H A D I N D E E D B E C O M E N A T U R A L I Z E D A M E R I C A N CITIZEN[ 2 ] W / N T H E Y H A D A C T U A L L Y O B T A I N E D A DIVORCE DECREERULING: The records sho w that therewas no competent evidenceto prove their naturalizationand divorce. Divorce m e a n s t h e l e g a l dissolution of a lawful unionf o r a c a u s e a r i s i n g a f t e r marriage.But divorces are of differenttypes. The two basic ones are:( 1 ) A b s o l u t e d i v o r c e o r a v i n c u l o m a t r i m o n i i - terminates the marriage( 2 ) L i m i t e d d i v o r c e o r a mensa et thoro - suspends ita n d l e a v e s t h e b o n d i n f u l l force.A divorce obtained abroad byan alien may be recognized inour jurisdiction, provided suchdecree is valid according tot h e n a t i o n a l l a w o f t h e foreigner.H o w e v e r , b e f o r e i t c a n b e recognized by our courts, theparty pleading it must provet h e d i v o r c e a s a f a c t a n d demonstrate its conformity tot h e f o r e i g n l a w a l l o w i n g i t , w h i c h m u s t b e p r o v e d c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t o u r c o u r t s cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Without The divorce decree and foreign law a s p a r t o f the evidence, we cannot ruleo n t h e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r petitioner has the personalityt o f i l e t h e p e t i t i o n f o r d e c l a r a t i o n o f n u l l i t y o f marr iage.A f t e r a l l , s h e m a y h a v e t h e personality to file the petitionif the divorce decree

obtainedw a s a l i m i t e d d i v o r c e o r a mensa et thoro; or the foreignlaw may restrict remarriageeven after the divorce decreebecomes absolute.In such case, the RTC wouldb e c o r r e c t t o d e c l a r e t h e marriage of the respondentsv o i d f o r b e i n g b i g a m o u s , t h e r e b e i n g a l r e a d y i n e v i d e n c e t w o e x i s t i n g marriage certificates , whichw e r e b o t h o b t a i n e d i n t h e Philippines:[ 1 ] I n M a b i n i , P a n g a s i n a n d a t e d D e c e m b e r 2 1 , 1 9 5 9 between Eusebio Bristol andrespondent Merope[ 2 ] I n C a l a s i a o , P a n g a s i n a n dated June 16, 1988 betweenthe respondents.However, if there was indeeda d i v o r c e d e c r e e o b t a i n e d a n d w h i c h , f o l l o w i n g t h e national law of Orlando, doesnot restrict remarriage, theC o u r t o f A p p e a l s w o u l d b e c o r r e c t i n r u l i n g t h a t p e t i t i o n e r h a s n o l e g a l personality to file a petition tod e c l a r e t h e n u l l i t y o f marriage, thus:F r e e d f r o m t h e i r e x i s t i n g m a r i t a l b o n d , e a c h o f t h e former spouses no longer hasany interest nor should eachh a v e t h e p e r s o n a l i t y t o inquire into the marriage thatthe other might subsequentlycontract.V i e w e d f r o m a n o t h e r perspective, Felicitas has noexisting interest in Orlandoss u b s e q u e n t m a r r i a g e s i n c e t h e v a l i d i t y , a s w e l l a s a n y d e f e c t o r i n f i r m i t y , o f t h i s subsequent marriage will notaffect the divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas.I n f i n e , p e t i t i o n e r s personality to file the petitiont o d e c l a r e t h e n u l l i t y o f m a r r i a g e c a n n o t b e ascert a i n e d b e c a u s e o f t h e absence of:[1] Divorce decree[2] Foreign lawallowing itHence, a remand of the caseto the trial court for receptiono f a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e i s n e c e s s a r y t o d e t e r m i n e whether respondent Orlandowas granted a divorce decreeand whether the foreign laww h i c h g r a n t e d t h e s a m e allows or restricts remarriage.I f i t i s p r o v e d t h a t a v a l i d divorce decree was obtaineda n d t h e s a m e d i d n o t allowr e s p o n d e n t O r l a n d o s r e m a r r i a g e , t h e n t h e t r i a l San Luis vs. San Luis Short Summary: Former Laguna governor had 1st spouse who predeceased him, then married again to an American citizen who divorced him, then remarried again. He died with his 3rd wife but his 2nd wife and the children in the 1st marriage contested the standing of the 3rd wife, claiming that the said marriage was bigamous since the 2nd marriage was still subsisting under RP law (can't apply FC retroactively). Court held that even with FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn and other jurisprudence sufficiently provides the validity to the 3rd marriage, thus recognizing divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse. However, as the 3rd marriage was not sufficiently proved, the case was remanded in order for the 3rd spouse to present further evidence on this. Facts FELICISIMO SAN LUIS contracted 3 marriages: 1. VIRGINIA SULIT: had 6 children, died before he did in 1963 2. MERRY LEE CORWIN: US citizen, had son Tobias, divorced him before Hawaiian courts which was granted in 1973 3. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS SAN LUIS: married before a Presbyterian Church in California n 1974, lived with him until he died for 18 years in their Alabang residence -when Felicisimo died, Felicidad filed for DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AND SETTLEMENT OF FELICISIMO'S ESTATE, filing for a letter of administration before RTC Makati -petition was contested (MTD) by Felicisimo's children for 2 grounds: 1. Venue improperly laid: should have filed petition in Laguna (domicile) and not in Makati (covers Alabang, decedent's residence at the time of his death) 2. No legal personality to sue: Felicidad is only a mistress - marriage to Merry Lee was still valid (Family Code provision cannot be applied retroactively as it would impair their vested rights in accordance with Article 256, FC) ---these were denied but Felicidad still filed Opposition to MTD, showing evidence of the ff: Felicisimo exercised office in Laguna, but went home in Alabang - to prove proper venue Decree of absolute divorce by Hawaii dissolving the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee - to prove capacity to sue RTC Makati: Dismissed petition CA: reversed and set aside Place of residence should be understood in as the personal, actual or physical habitation so petition was properly filed

Art26.2, FC should be given effect, allowing a Filipino to remarry under Philippine law 1. WON Venue properly laid? YES -The cases relied upon by the petitioners were election cases. -there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 2. WON Felicidad had capacity to sue? YES As the legal wife: even if FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn v. Romillo (1985) sufficiently provides the legal basis for holding valid divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse (as well as other cases which were in Ma'am's book) -it look at the legislative intent of FC provision assailed, it was based on the Van Dorn ruling which validates a divorce decree obtained by an alien spouse, thus capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry again ---In this case, as Merry Lee obtained a divorce, Felicisimo now is capacitated to marry Felicidad. However, as the marriage between Felicidad and Felicisimo was not sufficiently proven, remand the case to RTC Even if not qualified as the legal spouse, she could still petition for a letter of administration as an "INTERESTED PARTY" with Art144, CC and A148 FC both stating that she is considered a co-owner of properties owned by persons living as husband and wife but whose marriage is void. Aznar vs Garcia Facts: Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California where he resided and consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to 1913. He came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country, he had always considered himself as a citizen of California. In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the matter is returned back to the law of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased in view of successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the other hand, counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply, our courts must apply internal law of California on the matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator should dispose any property possessed by him in absolute dominion.

Issue: Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.

Held:

The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen Christensen Garcia said in effect that there be two rules in California on the matter. 1. 2. The conflict rule which should apply to Californians outside the California, and The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in califronia.

The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States that if there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the decree of its owner and is governed by the law of the domicile. Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of his domicile, the Philippines is ought to be followed. Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the lower court with instructions that partition be made as that of the Philippine law provides. Bellis vs. Bellis FACTS: Amos G. Bellis had in first wife whom he divorced five legitimate children, by his second wife: three legitimate children and finally, three illegitimate children. He was a citizen of the State of Texas and a domiciled therein at the time of his death. The decedent executed a will in the Philippines dividing his estate into his seven legitimate children.Two of the three illegitimate filed their oppositions to the said will, contending that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children. ISSUES: (1)Whether or not the Philippine law governs the decedent's estate (2)Whether or not the doctrine of renvoi arise HELD: NO.The Court ruled that the national law of the decedent (Texas law) since as provided in Art. 16 of the Civil Code "intestate and testamentary successions...shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration". Under Texas law,there are no forced heirs or legitimes so the illegitimate children are not entitled to the decedent's estate. NO. It does not apply in this case since here, the decedent is a citizen and domiciled in Texas and renvoi doctrine arises where the decedent is a national of one country and domiciled in another. It would only arise if Texas has a conflict rule providing that the law of the country where the properties are situated will govern, where the said properties involved are found in the Philippines whose law provides that the national law of the testator should govern. Testate Estate of Bohanan vs Bohanan, et al FACTS: C.O. Bohanan, the testator is a citizen of Nebraska and selected it as his domicile.On April, 23,1944, he executed his will in Manila giving large legacies to his granson, brother and a sister and small amount to his children and nothing to his wife (Magdalena C. Bohanan).On May 20, 1922, the decedent and Magdalena Bohanan were divorced and in 1925, she married Carl Aaron, subsisting at the time of the decedent's death. Arguing that they have been deprived of their legitimes, the decedent's wife and children, questioned the validity of the testamentary dispositions. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the application of the national law of the testator to his estate is valid HELD:

YES. Since the decedent died in 1944, the old Civil Code applies to this case. Article 10 of the old Civil Code (Art. 16, new Civil Code) states that the national law of the person whose succession is in question shall govern, in this case, the law of Nevada, which allows the testator to dispose of his estates by will. LLORENTE vs COURT OF APPEALS 345 SCRA 592 (November 23, 2000) FACTS: Petitioner Paula Llorente was married to a US Navy enlisted serviceman Lorenzo Llorente, in Nabua, Camarines Sur, on February 22, 1937. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the US and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua. Lorenzo became an American citizen on November 30, 1943. Upon the liberation of the Philippines (1945), Lorenzo was granted by the US Navy to visit his wife in the Philippines and found out that Paula was living in with Lorenzos brother Ceferino. In December 1945, Paula gave birth to Crisologo w ith the birth certificate saying that the child was illegitimate, and the fathers name was left blank. On February 2, 1946, Paula and Lorenzo had a written agreement, dissolving their marital union, suspending his support upon her, and waiving his authority to file a case of adultery against her. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for a divorce in 1951 which was granted in 1952. On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno, in the Philippines; afterwhich, they bore three children: Raul, Luz, and Beverly. In 1981, Lorenzo executed a will, bequeathing all his property to Alicia and three children. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died in 1985. On Sept. 4, 1985, Paula filed with the RTC of Iriga a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate, contending that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse. In 1987, the RTC granted her petition, stating that Lorenzos divorce decree was void and inapplicable in the Philippines and therefore his marriage to Alicia was void. The RTC entitled Paula to one-half of their conjugal properties, and one-third of the estate the two-thirds would be divided equally among the illegitimate children. Paula was appointed as legal administratix of the estate. ISSUE: Whether or not Paula Llorente was entitled to inherit from the estate of Lorenzo Llorente. HELD: Since Lorenzo was an American citizen, issues arising from the case are governed by foreign law. The CA and RTC called to the fore ther en voi doctrine, where the case was referred back t o the law of the decedents domicile, in this case, the Philippine law. Most US laws follow the domiciliary theory. Thus, the Philippine law applies when determinging the validity of Lorenzos will. The case was remanded to the RTC for the ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.