Modelling Conflict with Weibull Games

In Bennett J.(Ed.), 1987, Mathematical Modelling of Conflict and its Resolution, pp113-134.
Institute of Mathematics and its Applications, Heinamann Press.
Maurice Yolles, Richardson Institute, Lancaster University, Lancaster, England.

Abstract: This paper introduces a new mathematical methodology suitable for the modelling and
simulation of conflict phenomena. While methodologies already exist in this area of study, they have a
number of limitations which make them unsuitable as general formulations, particularly in explaining or
for simulating real situations. Some deal with only static phenomena - those in which time is not a factor
of consideration, others are confined to their own small fields of study, yet others do not cater adequately
for any numbers of interactive actors, or tend to be restrictive in their modelling flexibility. This approach
ultimately uses a Weibull distribution to stochastically model dynamic processes.

Keywords: Mathematical modelling, conflict, weibull distribution, stochastic dynamic processes

Introduction

Mathematical methodology can provide a powerful tool for modelling phenomena, assisted in its
development through application to observation or experimental studies: in the same way that a building
can have a superstructure to which structural components like floors and walls can be attached, a
methodological superstructure provides a guide for the creation of models which are composed of
proposed functional relationships; as with building structures, model usefulness is reality dependent.
Reality can be modelled within the superstructure by establishing a number of propositions relevant to the
events which define it; generality of the model will be determined by the applicability of its propositions
in different contexts for that class of events. In the same way, the superstructure itself will have a
generality dependent upon Its propositional base, and would best have a flexibility In the type of model It
is able to create.

In physical science, mathematical models are established from qualitative propositions, and are related to
particular phenomena by the taking of measurements: for instance, the distance in centimetres a projectile
moves during a given time with reference to a given measuring platform is quite simple to determine.
Measurements are not always so easy to take, particularly in the social sciences; one reason is because
they can often only be taken indirectly, through indicators of the phenomenon under examination, and it is
not always clear which ones are most appropriate for selection. Another is that frequently no common
agreement exists over how indicators might best be processed. Theoretically, a conflict between two or
more actors may have a starting date and a finishing date according to one measuring platform and set of
indicators, and different dates for another, and argument might occur over what actually constitutes a
suitable measuring platform or what identifies suitable indicators

If measurements of events are to be made, then it is useful to attribute units to the symbolic components
of a superstructure. This enables proposed models to respond to a unit analysis - so providing a check on
their self consistency. However, if this is to occur then the symbols must also have attributed meaning,
permitting models to be interpreted directly within the context of events.

Attempts have been made at producing methodologies which are adequate to describe situations as they
are generally perceived. Unfortunately social science is typically still at the stage of division in modelling
phenomena, and the two schools of thought which predominate may be identified as that of the empiricist,
and that of determinist. The empiricist tends to work closely to his data and analyses events by either
appropriate statistical manipulations, or by building stochastic models based upon probability estimates or

1
frequency distributions. The determinist tends to work from a propositional base established from
experience or qualitative observations, frequently modelling Ideal situations which the empiricist might*
frown upon as being too limited. Combining the two approaches could require the empiricist to create a
measuring platform to service acceptable models of the determinist.

Mathematical models of an empiricist involving probabilities are referred to as stochastic, while of a

determinist as deterministic. There are methodologies applicable to conflict studies which tend to belong
to one of these schools or the other. It is clear that in the building of models which are able to come close
to explaining reality, both approaches are valid, preferably as a symbiotic pair. Since In reality events
alter over time, it is also essential that models which are built can represent this. Consequently, only
dynamic approaches are of interest to us in this paper. While a large number of mathematical techniques
exist which can be applied to dynamic models, particularly in the field of economics, consistency in
model building can beat be achieved by building models within an environment which is able to provide
some guidance. Consequently, it is most useful to establish as that environment an overall methodology
with a superstructure and a broad propositional base. Interpretation of its components and unit
identification for meaning and for self-consistency in modelling can assist in establishing what is referred
to by Tedetchi et al (1973) as a methodological paradigm.

This very clearly identifies our position with respect to model building, and consequently the remainder
of this paper will relate only to approaches in model building connected with an appropriate methodology.
More specifically our interest lies in game theory or a dynamic nature consistent with the new
methodology which we present here.

Richardson (1961) proposed a simple growth model for arms escalation which In Its time prompted a lot
or Investigative activity. While the mathematical model was previously used In other areas or study, for
instance in population estimation, It was the first attempt at addressing the problem of arms races using
any of the more modern dynamic methods available. Its limitations lay in its assumption of dynamic
linearity, its ambiguity in developing a solution, and the fact that it was a model without a superstructure.

Equations of those like Richardson's provide a dynamic extension to what was until quite recently a static
methodology: Game Theory. Dynamic Came Theory is a normative methodology in that it tends to offer
optimal solutions to problems with an explicitly defined structure and well defined conditions. Solutions
to game theoretic problems are normally the production of game outcomes, and these may vary over time.
The game itself will also have an outcome which for example in zero sum situations takes the value zero.
Came outcomes are calculated through some form of aggregation (e.g. see Aoki,1976). When the
aggregation takes equilibrium values, then no exchanges occur between the game and its environment
(i.e. the game is closed); game theoretical models usually adopt this as a condition. One very serious
question concerns how an aggregation in decided. It may occur empirically, for Instance through multiple
regression or expected utility theory, or according to some deterministic decision; but however
aggregation occurs, It normally Is independent or the proposed model itself, and the hypotheses governing
It are arbitrary dependent upon the investigator. The most common guideline which is followed is that of
the simplest aggregation (e.g. linear combination), and is adopted unless good reasons exist for one more
complex. Another problem within game theory is that it currently has an inability to economically
represent mutual outcomes for a finite number of players an aspect of what is often referred to as the
many body or n body problem.

Closely connected with this methodology is that of Differential Game Theory - which appeared in the
19601s. The two differ from each other in the way that problems are expressed, and in the techniques for
obtaining optimal solutions. Aspects of differential games operate in the same way as do aspects or
mathematical Control Theory, an approach developed independently elsewhere. Like dynamic game
theory, this tends to be used in the context of Idealised situations, where control parameters are evaluated
2
upon the basis of well defined conditions. Modelling also looks towards situations of optimisation: a
game model has a structure a part (the payoff, or in control theory the objective function, determined by
the utility function) of which is either maximised or minimised over time. When the objective function
has been optimised the game can be said to be closed. Unlike dynamic game theory, this condition in not
demonstrated through aggregation determined from hypotheses; rather it is a superstructural feature of
differential games. Distinctions between dynamic and differential game theories tend to be less clear as
both develop and use common dynamic techniques of analysis. While both methodologies deal with
closed games, it has more recently been realised that systems modelled as Fames do not in reality
frequently achieve closure, and so movements have been made towards systems theory consistent with
open games (e.g. Nicolas and Prigogne, 1977).

In this paper, a branch of differential game/control theory has been transformed into a new methodology
able to simulate open games. It uses a modelling parameter for each player which determine the nature of
the game, and which can be supposed according to hypothesis. Perhaps its most useful feature is that it
permits a game to be played either normatively or stochastically by supposing a function to which the
selections of data conform as a frequency distribution. Here a stochastic game will be presented which is
based upon the Weibull distribution. This provides a structure for the game, requiring three parameters
(one of which is a control) to be estimated for each player. The controls can be selected In order that
reality can be simulated. This approach has been designed to facilitate the playing of open games for n
players, each playing one with the other through a player potential. This enables an n player system to be
represented by n two player expressions. An attempt in this work will also be made to adopt meaning and
assign units to the components of the superstructure; this should permit a unit analysis to occur which will
assist in the Interpretation of symbolic explanations and results.

Models and Games

Mathematical models are constructed from a set of propositions expressed through a specific set of
symbolic relationships, and which operate through variables whose values indicate the state or condition
of the system that the model is trying to explain. When two or more individuals (or groups) interact over
some object of attention and have outcomes that are conjoint and uncertain, then the modelling situation
may be called a game and the individuals (or groups) its players. Let a player be represented symbolically
by RI so that in a group Ro, i=1,2 refers to the first and second players. The state variable relating to Ri is
xi; In game theoretical approaches this is often referred to as a utility: that is the subjective value of a
commodity or outcome for a particular player. If a set of utilities can be assigned to those outcomes that
can accrue to the player during an interaction, then the ordered set is a utility function which defines part
of a game structure.

Conflict models which have the appropriate ingredients may be referred to as games. One very well
known model of conflict behaviour which has frequently been adopted as a component of a game is that
of the Richardson Arms Race; it attempts to explain the way in which different nations can mutually
stimulate one another into the accumulation of armaments. For a two player system the state variable for
Ri is the arms utility xi where 1=1,2. The Richardson expression representing an arms race may be called
the kinematic equations since they express the rate of change dxi/dt of Ri's arms utility, and are given by

x i  a ij x ij  a ij x i  f i , i  1 , 2 (1)

where by postulate aij is Ri's defence coefficient, aii is the fatigue and fi the grievance. This linear system
of equations represents a process of arms race which is under control when the (stability) condition holds

a12 a21 < a11 a22 (2)

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A non-linear form of the Richardson equations was presented as

x i  a ij x ij (1  b ij ( x j  x i ))  a ii x i  f (3)

where bj is the coefficient of submissiveness from Ri to Rj. Attempts have been made (in particular
through the pages of J. Peace Science) to demonstrate the validity of these models, with limited success.
Areas of weakness in the Richardson models have been expressed by a number of authors: for instance
Rappoport (1957) and Arber (1968) have pointed out that the model is one of national behaviour which
on its own does not explain how nations come to adopt their particular reactions; according to Gillespie
and Zinnes (1975) It can be represented by a Nash cooperative game, a condition which can uniquely
specify the type of arms race situation being modelled. According to Friedman (1983), the essential
features of many theoretical games include that (a) there are two or more players, (b) each wishes to
maximise his own pay6ff, (c) each players is aware that the other player's individual actions can affect the
payoff he receives, (d) the interests of one player vies-a-vies the others are neither perfectly opposed nor
perfectly coincident. Players satisfying (b) are said to be rational, and a game satisfying (c) can be
represented across time as a dynamic system. There are different classes of game; in one of these,
cooperative games, players have the capacity to make binding agreements.

In differential games a structure is composed of the objective function, defined by utility function over a
period of time, and the kinematic equations. In 1965 this approach was first outlined by Isaacs, and
expressed in terms of capture and evasion (as in missile deployment) where players would win or lose a
game. Isaacs' approach in optimising the objective function was to transform it using Taylor’s theorem,
thus producing a form which directly resembled that used within Lagrangian-Hamiltonian-Jacobi
optimisation theory. It thus became clear that Lagrangian methods could be implicitly included in this
form of game, an Idea which was later developed by such authors as Friedman (1971).

Lagrangian-Hamiltonian-Jacobi methods are central not only to game theory, but to aspects of control
theory independently developed In the USSR. They contribute to the erection of a mathematical
superstructure within which a game structure is defined, and involves its transformation into a
Hamiltonian function by the introduction of a set of auxiliary variables - called the Lagrangian multiplier
which assists in creating optimal solutions. If an objective function is created by postulate, then it
becomes a relatively simple matter to obtain a Hamiltonian function, often taken to represent the energy
in the system being modelled. For a Hamiltonian which is time invariant certain relations with the
kinematic equations can be deduced called the Hamiltonian canonical system - which can make It
relatively straightforward to optimal solutions if they exist. When the Hamiltonian is implicitly invariant
with time, the energy Is said to be conserved, and the dynamic system is conservative. Often, the use of
controls in the system enables optimality to be achieved through game adjustment as though moves of
strategy by the players. When the system or a game becomes conservative due to an appropriate selection
of player controls and for a range of player moves, the game in which they play is said to be closed. The
above description can be best expressed symbolically through a specific example: First introduce a quite
arbitrary game structure which ideally (and herein lie many critisms) is representative of a set of
phenomena to be modelled, and then use Hamiltonian-Jacobi theory to optimise it to find a solution.
Consider two players Ri, i=1,2 with similar objectives: the requirement that each wishes to minimise the
absolute difference between the armament utilities xi; that is Rj wishes to minimise (xi – bxj)2, with b the
proportion of arms of Rj required to ensure national security where i=1,2 when j=2,1. Another is that each
wishes to minimise the proliferation of armaments or total arms level of both players - i.e. to minimise (xi
+ xj).

Knowing the kinematic equation of the system, find that of Rj in terms of the parameters of the remainder
of the system for an optimal solution. The game is seen from the perspective of Rj, and xi is seen as an

4
auxiliary utility in Rj's game, and introduced as the Lagranglan multiplier. The arms balance utility
function is seen as

u = (xi - bxj)2 + c(xi + xj) (4)

and the game objective function is

t
G=  u dt (5)
t
0

during the period of time t-to, and where c Is the significance of arms for Ri and b the proportion of arms
he requires. The constraints of this game are the Richardson equations

x ij  a ij x j  a i  a jj x j  f j (6)

The Hamiltonian for the game is

H = u + xi (aij xi – ajj xj + fj) (7)

Player objectives can be achieved if the following Hamiltonian equations are satisfied:

 H/  xj = x j ,  H/  xj = x i (8)

which can be shown to mean that H is time invariant the system conservative and the game closed. With
(7) this means that the kinematic of PI should have the form
2
x i  ( a jj  2 b ) x i  2 b x j  c (9)

A similar model introducing control parameters has been considered by Gillespie and Zinnes(1975) and
may be referred to. They provide a definition of strategy for each player, given knowledge of the other
parameters of the game. Ibis approach has been extended to account for utility functions which discount
over time. This discounting is expressed as an exponential and the objective function is called a Welfare
function defined by

W=  e-rt u dt (10)

Using this formulation Brito (1972) demonstrated that the Richardson equations could be derived from a
generalised quadratic utility function representing the goals of a nation player. These goals are expressed
In terms or each party to the arms interaction attempting to allocate resources optimally between
consumption and arms. Also using the Welfare function and following similar lines to Brito and
Intriligator (1971) identified optimal control functions in the following manner: he adopted the kinematic

x i  a j  p i x i (11)

and postulated a utility function

U = aij xi2 – aij x j2+ bjj sj – bji si2 . (12)

Using the Hamiltonian canonical system for rational players the strategic controls were found to be

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ai = cii xi + cij xi + cijxj + ci (13)

and for pi > cii it follows that

x i  c ij x j  ( p i  c ii ) x i  c i x (14)

Other papers on this topic have been written by Brito and Intriligator, and some appear in the
bibliography.

This type of problem is termed normative, for specific objectives are identified explicitly and thus
constitute an ideal rather than realistic situation. Normative models, however, are not adequate to simulate
reality since they create a whole idealised symbolic world where players play according to arbitrary
universal rules often with similar perceptions and over the same objective. In fact, in conflict situations
this very rarely happens. On the other hand one might say that it obversely provides a unique definition
for the often ill defined term rationality.

It has been said that games in which optimisation has occurred can be termed closed; circumstances may
exist, though, where optimisation is not possible and the game is open. This could for example occur in
the case of coalition formation where players may form subgroups and play with other players in different
subgroups, all within the same game. In open games the Hamiltonian system (8) cannot hold, and so an
alternative compact superstructure may be required to adequately explain the phenomenon being
modelled. In the next section such an alternative is considered.

OPEN GAME DYNAMICS

In the previous section it was explained that by the use of Lagrangian principles it is possible to create
models for dynamic games where optimality or closure is obtained. In this section we introduce a method
for modelling open games.

One requirement for creating a super-structure for open game dynamics Is that player utilities can be
aggregated in a unique way: change In the aggregation will indicate that the game Is not Isolated - that is
closed to external exchanges. This implies the existence of energy flows between the open game and its
environment - composed of either other separate or encompassing games.

A single transformation of the previous methodology permits modelling to occur for open games, at either
the structural level as previously indicated or dynamically using a set of modelling parameters. The
definition of the modelling parameters is central to the derivation of the new methodology. Under an
appropriate definition of the modelling parameters the original system can be regained. The approach has
been to permit game aggregations to become part of the superstructure which can be uniquely determined
under given conditions. In this way open games themselves can be represented as players making
exchanges with the environment. That environment might include other ouch open game players; an
example of this might be, -for instance, political parties composed of a coalition of Individuals during an
election.

In modelling certain situations, it has been found that it is useful to have an economical way of
representing player interaction, particularly when identifying paths for each player in relation to the path
of the game. A simple way of so doing is by reducing the n player game to a set of n two player games,
for in general it is easier to understand and model two player interactions than that of n players. Such an
approach was created by the introduction of a second Lagrangian multiplier defined as a player utility
potential, and implies that each player plays explicitly not with n-1 other players but a single player
potential. By creating such an approach it is possible for Instance to investigate how well a group of n

6
players can stay together effectively (a capability which comes under the concept of structural stability,
and which can be applied to open games).

The superstructure for open game dynamics permits the building of models through a modelling
parameter mi for player Ri; here i=0,n where R0 represents the game as a whole, and the remainder of I the
n players. In developing the superstructure, the player potential Pi has a utility potential xi auxiliary to Hi's
game. Here, the game structure is not explicitly defined as in the previous theory, but implicitly through
the set of modelling parameters. In consequence a game can be constructed according to a set of n models
each relating to a single player.

We propose a relationship for n arbitrary modelling parameters and a modelling parameter mo for the
game R0; for Ri then

x i m i  x i (15)

Applying this to a Lagrangian system the relationship between changes in the energy of the game with
Hi's changing utility is given by

 H/  ximi = x i (16)

for an open game with dxi/dt < 1 and xi ≥ 1, and mi a function of controls which must satisfy certain
conditions for mi, three relationships follow:

n
(  H/  x0)2mo = Σ (  H/  xi)2mi (17)
i=1

and for the utility rates of change

-2 n -2
x 0 / m 0  Σ x i / m i (18)
i=1

The game modeling parameter m0 can be determined by

n
1/m02 = Σ 1/mi2 (18a)
i=1

The modelling parameters on the right of (18a) may be chosen so as to satisfy any particular game to be
investigated. However, it is of use to express them in terms of the Hamiltonian to provide a structural
guide. We shall be dealing with not only the player utilities xi, but the paired player potential utilities Ri.
Thus we define

mi = qi {  H/  xi}/{  H/  xi}, i = 0,n (19)

where the bounded non-zero qi are control functions whose functional form may be chosen appropriately
for any game model. In particular it may be chosen such that

qi = q, (20)

say, for some known function q. This is a necessary but not sufficient condition if the game is to be
strategically closed.
7
It may be observed that mi is a ration of energy changes between player Ri and its partner. An alternative
form for (19) is possible as well. If mij is a parameter for interaction between Ri and Rj such that

mij = qj {  H/  xj}/{  H/  xj} (21)

From (18a) it is possible to express mi in terms of mij. In particular mi can be chosen such that each player
is intentionally rational. That is (20) holds and

n
mi2 = Σ mji2 (22)
i=1

Consequently the modelling parameter mi identifies a relationship between a player and his game field
which is quite equivalent to another relationship between that player and each of the others. Modelling
can occur through an appropriate selection of this modelling parameter, and choice can be made
deterministically or stochastically. The stochastic approach introduces an entropy (or uncertainty) Ui for
each player Ri. This is determined by the probability associated with a particular utility being generated.
In the section to follow a stochastic game will be introduced using the Weibull frequency distribution.

Weibull Games

In this section a method for generating stochastic games will be introduced, followed by the creation of a
specific game type using the Weibull probability.

To create stochastic games it is necessary to introduce the idea of players being intentionally rational. An
intentionally rational player will play according to criteria under his control which contribute towards a
game being closed. While a prerequisite, this does not mean that the consequence of Interaction between
n players so doing will cause the game to become closed.

The stochastic game uses the concept or entropy or uncertainty Ui associated with a player Ri. The
concept is well known In general systems theory, and has been used in the social sciences as well. For
Instance Coleman (1975) used it in his study on voting behaviour - as a measure of political uncertainty; it
has also been used by Galtung (1979) in a more theoretical context.

In general systems theory changes in entropy and energy can be considered as directed flows. It is not
difficult to demonstrate that in dynamic conservative systems the flows between participating players Pi
and Pj must satisfy the relationship

(  H/  xi)/ (  U/  xj) = (  H/  xi)/ (  H/  xj) (23)

where U is the total entropy of the game,  U/  xi the flow of entropy from Ri, and  H/  xi the
Hamiltonian flow. Adopting (23) into the modelling parameters will imply that each player is playing
rationally. In this case the Hamiltonian can be completely replaced by the entropy in the modelling
parameters. Under scenario an appropriate selection of the qi would enable hypothetical modifications by
for Instance supposing that each player perceives in a different but well defined way. Thus facility
permits a deal of flexibility in the building of models.

The entropy can be determined from the probability of an event occurring: if p is the probability chosen
then the entropy is given by its logarithm as

U = -Ln p (24)

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Because of its very flexibility, it is convenient to select the Weibull probability for p, as used previously
In conflict analysis (Petersen, 1980). This has two effective parameters one of which (h) is related to
process, the other (a) to structure. The probability distribution is not dissimilar to that of Poisson, and is
given by

p = exp(-hxa) (25)

If this distribution is used as the basis of a dynamic game, then it must imply a data base which can be
satisfactorily fitted by (25). As a model of reality, a data base relevant to the events under investigation
will be established and tested to determine its suitability for Weibull modelling. If so an eigen-utility-
value and Weibull parameters will be found for each player. If the game is to be used to simulate a
specific phenomenon, selection of these values is determined by hypothesis.

Weibull entropy flow for Ri is given by

ai -1
 H/  xi = aihixi (26)

This is substituted into the modelling parameter and an appropriate q (of eq. 19a) is selected to simplify
the game equations. It should be noted that q has been selected to simplify the system such that

n aj + c j

1/mi = (  H/  xi) π xj (27)

i=1

where cj for all j is the control parameter which has been introduced through-q, the values of which may
be chosen such that for some c, cj = c all j. The dynamic system results from the two expressions

x i  x i / m i ,  H/  xi = x / m i i (28)

Now the game will become closed under the condition that

x 0 (  H/  x0) = 0 ; (29)

a sufficient condition for this to occur can be shown to be

 H/  xi =  H/  xi+1 (29a)
which reduces to

x i  x i  1 , I = 1, n-1 (29a)

or, by replacing mi by its Weibull form in (28) to obtain dxi/dt and simplifying, we get
ai ai+1
ai hi xi = ai+1 hi+1 xi+1 (30)

If either the Weibull parameters contain controls (of strategy), then they may be chosen such that this
equation is satisfied.

Attributing Meaning

9
One disadvantage that stochastic methods have is that, contextual interpretation of its components is not
always clear. In this section an attempt will be made to provide components of the Weibull game with
meaning for conflict situations. To do this, three approaches shall be used:

 explicit usual interpretation of the Weibull parameters will be considered;

 comparison will be made with a similar existing model;
 consolidation of hypothetical interpretations will be made through unit assignment and analysis.

The Weibull has two effective parameters, one of process h and one of structure a. The structural
parameter may take positive values and can be seen as follows:

0<a<1 represents an entropy decrease

a=1 represents an entropy constant
1< a < ∞ represents an entropy increase

In terms of modelling, the meaning of such values for a will depend upon the meaning or the dynamic
system itself. For instance, if we are investigating a conflict situation between n players, each having
utilities with Weibull probability, then for a player object of peaceful settlement, a decrease In entropy Is
consistent with a reinforcement of peace, while an increase Is consistent with the likelihood of violence
breaking out.

Qualitative comparison has been made of the parameters of the Weibull game to those contained within
studies of the Sino-Indian border dispute of 1960, which shall be referred to again shortly. However,
symbolic comparison can more directly be made using explicitly defined mathematical modes such as that
of the Richardson arms race. This may be undertaken by transforming the Weibull game into a form
similar to that of Richardson's model, and comparing the coefficients. For yi a linear function of xi, under
certain conditions it can be shown that the Weibull game has a form
n
y i = ( -Σ (ai + cj) yj – (2ai + ci) yi + 1)aihi (32)
i=1

comparable to the Richardson equations. This permits us to hypothesise the following:

ai Weibull structural parameter. In a conflictual context its value can be hypothesised to relate to
policy position for Pi. It could be measured say on a scale of hawkish/dovish policy.

hi interactive position, which from the Richardson hypothesis Is weighted by ai to Influence

friendliness. It might be said that b a as a product defines threat perception for R.

c game direction connected with the structure. In Richardson's terms there may be circumstances
when -hi ai (aj + ej) is taken to represent the defence coefficient for player Ri to Rj and (2ai + ci) is
the cost of conflict to Ri. The value of ci plays a role in both forms of stability of the system.

The superstructural elements of a game may be classed as having either active or passive properties. The
former relates to explicit events or actions while the latter relates to states of internal event, as for instance
in analogy with the emotion or.-m1nd for an individual. Meanings will now be postulated for the list of
variables so far Introduced, though they will require adequate practical demonstration; the validity of
these meanings will then be further considered in the light of a unit system.

1) Active.

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xi Utility of Ri is a subjective value of a commodity or outcome. It can also be thought of as
Ri’s move In the game.
Ui The entropy of Ri and represents the player's uncertainty of an event occurring. It may be
thought of as the freedom of utility choice or play.
 U/  xi U is the entropy of the game. Its change with xi may in some way represent the
manoeuvrability or Ri In the game. Petersen (1981) would refer to it as the intensity of
the process.

2) Passive
x i The rate of change of Ri’s utility. How swiftly such change occurs will be connected to
the ability or freedom to make decisions; it will be seen that mod (1/ x i ) can represent
the freedom of decision in conflictual contexts.
H The Hamiltonian energy of the game. This may be equated with social energy and related
to power.
 H/  xi This is a directed change in game energy for Ri, and can thus be equated to player
reaction between a single player and the remaining players within the game.
ei Emotiveness of Ri, which can be measured by [(  H/  x0)2 – (  H/  xi)2] / [(  H/  x0)2
+ (  H/  xi)2]. It represents the game relative degree of non-rationality of intentionally
rational players, and may take values between +1 and -1.

It is useful at this stage to establish a unit system for the superstructure which has been created, and then
undertake an Investigation of unit applicability and consistency for the above postulated meanings.

Each utility variable is a scale measure of an event, and to ensure consistency in a study it is useful to
have a measure of the magnitude of an event. If we are able to identify m categories of event E for each
player, then we have an m-dimensional system with m measures of E. Each category of event will be
representative of a different feature of the system being modelled, and together will produce a complete
picture. For n players we will have an n by m system.

Every player has a rate of utility change dxi/dt with units of event E and period T. It has been said that this
in some way represents a measure of freedom of decision (FD): one might consider that FD is time
dependent with respect to the occurrence of events; a lengthy period during an event could give a large
FD; with brief time constraints the period relating to an event must be short. In consequence FD must
have units T/E, and mod [ l / (dxi/dt) ] is proposed as an indicator of this. As a system tends towards
equilibrium a player has infinite FD facility, while as utility change Increases the FD reduces.

The relationship between the utility and its rate of change is given by (15), and thus mi must have units of
period T; consequently the modelling parameter is a function of period or duration. Using this in (17)
suggests that change in Hamiltonian energy has units E/(T.T), which is a quality of event acceleration and
has been proposed as player reaction. This is consistent with the idea that a player reacts to changes in the
state of a system, and this will therefore be a rate of rate of change. In fact, acceleration is connected with
the concept of a force, and thus relates exactly to the idea of reaction.

Since change in energy is determined by (24), so Hamiltonian energy H has units (E.E) / (T.T). Now In
general systems theory units of the form (E.E) / T are usually considered to denote power. Hence, H may
be taken as the change in power per period, or conversely power is Hamiltonian time. A consequence of
this is that the player utility potential xi has units E/T, and could well be defined by a linear combination
such as
n

11
 xi = Σ xj /bj
j=1, j≠i

for some uninterpreted bj with units T.

The whole system of units could be redefined by replacing the units of utility E by event duration ET. In
this case Hamiltonian energy becomes power, reaction takes units of velocity, and utility potential takes
units E. Thus the interpretation of the model devised is dependent upon the context within which the
utility applies.

AN APPLICATION

In this section we provide an example of how a Weibull game may be established as a model of reality for
two nation players, China and India, who are engaged in conflict over a stretch of land each claim and one
possesses. For the Weibull game to be applicable it is necessary that each player is intentionally rational.
Optimality will occur when the conflict is resolved, the details of possible resolution to be determined
from a study of the problem. Specifically, the data base should reflect the possibility of attaining an
optimal solution.

The first step in determining a model for the system is to estimate the Weibull parameters and determine
the eigen-utility-values. The can be done using standard maximum likelihood techniques. The estimation
of values for each player Is carried out independently using a data base for each. The data are effectively
separated into groups of probable Weibull distributions each with a time duration. In effect, this
discretises the continuous dynamic system into phases of interaction, where each phase represents a
situation distinct from that of the previous one. Each phase will also have time bounds imposed upon it.
These phases must be mutually matched under player interaction, and where necessary pre-phases
introduced.

The final stage of operating the model is to determine values for the controls of the system. This cannot
be done from the Information so far given, but must be determined from some external guide. It can be
done-by observing the historical pattern of a conflict, selecting a variable such as freedom of decision or
reaction, relatively quantifying it for each phase, and then matching reality with the outcome for that
variable in the model for different choices of control. In this way appropriate controls can be selected by
trial and error. If such a method produces satisfactory results, then the model adequately simulates reality
and incidentally should also account for any implicit errors due to the original estimation of the Weibull
values from the data.

The above was carried out for the Sino-Indian border dispute of the 1960's. In fact this particular conflict
was selected because (1) it has very reliable data, every single communication between China and India
over the period or interaction published by the Indian government In order to justify their position; (2) it
has an extensive history of research work which acts as a grounding for this study; (3) the data has been
processed by Petersen (1980) using the Weibull distribution, and a stochastic study has emerged backed
up by a substantive historical analysis. Use of this material has therefore been a very attractive prospect.
In fact estimation of the controls as made from the reaction variables, using Petersen’s historical narrative
across phases. It was found that the selection of the controls was extremely sensitive for the path of the
game, and in fact only one set or values appeared satisfactory.

One assumption made for this game is that both players wish to resolve the conflict over the object of
attention. Use of the outputs from the game as described in the last section can now permit a full
explanation Including game aggregations and stability conditions. In table 1 we present both inputs and
outputs from the simulation.
12
Inputs and. outputs for the Welbull game simulation of the Sino-Indian border dispute. War occurred in
phase 4.

Table 1: Inputs/Outputs for Game, where E-n represents x10-n. {} represents a closed game/phase.

China: a = 1.30, c = -2.0683

Phase h x U  U/  x  H/  x -dx/dt e
1 0.260 16 0.956 0.777E-1 0 - 327E-4 0.229E-1 0.491
1.1 0.004 67 1.500 0.184E-1 0.847E-6 0.753E-2 0.921
2 0.004 67 0.004 0.184E-1 0.161E-6 0.32BE-2 0.599
2.1 0.004 67 0.004 0.184E-1 0.272E-5 0.135E-1 0.980
3 0.0118 10 0.0118 0.125 0.3118E-3 0.590E-1 0.607
3.1 0.250 3 0.250 0.1152 0.874E-2 0.162 0.172
4 0.250 3 0.250 0.452 0.455E-1 0.369 0.5711
4.1 0.032 13 0.032 0.89BE-1 0.817E-3 0.103 0.969
5 0.032 13 0.038 0.898E-1 0.695E-4 0.301E-1 0.537
5.1 0.006 47 0.007 0.24SE-1 0.265E-5 0.112E-1 0.915
6 0.006 47 0.006 0.248E-1 0.585E-6 0.524E-2 0.632
INDIA: a = 1.41, c = -2.0683
1 0.017 17 0.923 0.776E-1 0.33BE-4 0.240E-1 0.465
1.1 0.017 17 0.017 0.766E-1 0.374E-5 0.797E-2 0.110
2 0.003 60 0.003 0.227E-1 0.220E-6 0.363E-2 0.363
2.1 0.056 7 0.056 0.175 0.260E-4 0.135E-1 0.527
3 0.056 7 0.056 0.175 0.483E-3 0.591E-1 0.360
3.1 0.056 7 0.056 0.175 0.307E-2 0.147 0.839
4 0.333 2 0.333 0.624E-1 0.578E 0.340 0.392
4.1 0.333 2 0.335 0.6211 0.607E-2 0.110 0.6114
5 0.024 13 0.027 0.969E-1 0.809E-4 0.324E-1 0.420
5.1 0.024 13 0.241 0-969E-1 0.112E-4 0.121E-1 0.114
6 0.005 41 0.005 0.323E-1 0.869E-6 0.597E-1 0.334
Game Aggregate
1 13.90 0.559E-11 0.278E-1 0.155E-5
1.1 18.00 0.418F-5 0.866E-2 0.362E-7 {}
2 53.00 0.321E-6 0.413E-2 0.133E-8 {}
2.1 7.30 0.274E-4 0.1111E-1 0.386E-6 {}
3 6.70 0.703E-3 0.690E-1 0.485E-4
3.1 3.10 0.104E-1 0.179 0.186E-2
4 1.99 0.874E-1 0.417 0.361E-1
4.1 2.09 0.647E-2 0.116 0.751E-3
5 10.90 0.127E-3 0.372E-1 0.472E-5
5.1 13.70 0.126E-4 0.131E-1 0.165E-6 {}
6 36.60 0.123E-5 0.671E-2 0.825E-8 {}

Comment on Results

Before accepting the values in the table it is essential to check on the self consistency of the system. This
can be done by confirming that the product (  H/  x0).( dx0/dt) can be approximated by the product sum
13
n

Σ(  H/  xi).( dxi/dt)
i=1

Using only two significant figures for dxi/dt and  H/  xi, the product sum for India and China is in fact
the same as that calculated from aggregation table and presented above; error would appear to occur in
the fourth significant figure. No formal bound checks have been introduced.

The game is closed when dx/dt values for China and India are approximately equal, and it may be seen
that this occurs in phase 2.1 (i.e. prephase 3). The interpretation that an optimal solution has been
achieved by strategy, which one might surmise may not be appropriate. It would be of use to investigate
this possibility better using more than one dimension per player (here derived from the time delay
between the issue of diplomatic communiqués), and processed in aggregation through a multidimensional
Weibull distribution.

However the values of dx/dt differ for each player, the condition for the game to be closed Is that the
product of dxo/dt and (  H/  xo) are zero, and this must be the case in phase 2.1. The product of these two
in the game aggregation table for phase 2.1 gives 0.386E-6 which numerically must count as zero.
Consequently we can refer to this as the cut-off point, and all values numerically equal to or smaller than
this number will also count as zero. We conclude that phases 1.1, 2, 5.1 and 6 give closed games. Periods
of closure imply that by either circumstance or design an optimal situation has been achieved. For the
remaining phases, one may understand that exchanges have occurred with the game environment which
has aggravated any temporary settlement. More simply put, it might be said that some form of perhaps
uneasy compromise held during the closed phases (the nature of which would have to be investigated
through stability and structural stability analysis) which new developments disturbed in the open phases.

Consider now the emotiveness values e. The game was instigated by China who wanted her land returned,
and one might thus expect China to be rather emotive during much of the affair. The start of the game
would seem rather charged with both players almost equally emotive. The game also finished
unsatisfactorily for both players if we believe the emotiveness values and interpret them correctly. Pre-
war phase 3.1 India is highly emotive, and China hardly so. China's condition might be explained
historically, for India forced China's hand through her troop "forward policy" to the common border, and
such a public threat (whether or not bluff) does wonders to concentrate the mind and produce rationality.
It would appear that India has a much lower game relative emotiveness than highly emotive China at both
the equilibrium in phase 2.1, and the near equilibrium in phase 4.1 after the war; the emotiveness, values
would suggest that perhaps Indian concessions are the main cause of this condition. These emotiveness
values may well be open to different interpretation, and historical verification of this would be in order.

Finally it may be of use to include a summary of the steps necessary to simulate reality using the Weibull
game:

1) Identify representative players in mutual interaction over an object of attention, identify Indicators of
the process, and assemble time series data.
2) Process each set of player data to determine the quality of fit to the time Weibull distribution. For
suitable data, a method such as maximum likelihood can be used to determine subsidiary Weibull
distributions which identify player phases. Each phase will give udi4ue, best fit parametric values and
eigen-utility-value representative of that phase.
3) Match phases between players across time, the shortest common phase defining an interactively
mutual phase, and establish prephases or postphases to adjust for the time discrepancies.

14
4) Select values of the control parameter for each player by fitting the model reactions to a qualitative
historical description which has already been relatively quantified. It would be expected that each
control variable choice will adjust for errors due to fitting the Welbull distribution to the data.
5) The game is now a simulation of the Interaction. Scenarios can now be implemented by heuristic
choice of the parameters and eigenvalues.

Conclusion

In normative games Hamilton-Jacobi theory is not very much different from open game theory in that the
latter has at least the same number of degrees of freedom in selecting structural elements of the game to
adequately describe it as does the former. Since the latter develops from the former, this is not surprising.
However, a feature of open game theory is that aggregations appear as a consequence of the
superstructure, so that subgroups of players in a game can (in principle at least) be described as playing
with other subgroups within the game. Thus, in a game of four players say, it should be possible to
postulate a coalition of two playing with a third player, and the resulting coalition playing with the
remaining one. Alternatively, given an n player game simulating reality, it should be possible to
determine the feasibility of coalitions forming between a player subset by investigating stability
conditions.

Perhaps an as Important feature of open game theory is that it permits stochastic games to emerge. Here,
not only is the implicit structure of the game determined non-symbolically, but it is quite possible for an
Investigator to be non-mathematical in order to simulate reality with a dynamic model. The very selection
of data itself presupposes an object of attention which Implies a structure, and a meaning for an optimal
solution; given a computer package with adequate checks and safeguards, an investigator requires only to
be sure of his data, to be able to determine controls, and to be able to interpret numerical results.

The Weibull distribution is perhaps one of the more flexible available, though it will not always be
demonstrably satisfactory. However, set up within the modelling parameter the Weibull game becomes a
dynamic tool to explain reality from empirical observations.

The game operates by discretising the set of events into appropriate time components or phases. This is a
consequence of the way in which Weibull measurements are taken, and would seem to be suitable for the
investigation of social interactions. While the dynamic systems can be used generally for the simulation
and consequential explanation of real phenomena, it may well have more value in the creation of
scenarios for the anticipation of possible developments and their consequences. In scenario making of
conflictual situations it is essential to know the meaning of different values of the Weibull parameters.
Selection of their values can then be made heuristically, or by proposing some time variation treatment.
An additional requirement will be to estimate apparently sensitive player controls in order for game
pathways to be found.

References

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15
Friedman,A,1971, Differential Games. Wiley
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16