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Aquino III vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010 Post under case digests, Political Law at Tuesday, January 31, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Facts: The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared as unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District from such Reapportionment. Held: It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction between a city and a province was explained under the second sentence of Section 5 (3) of the Constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a representative, with nothing was mentioned about a population. While in cities, a minimum population of Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President Macapagal-Arroyo. Effectuating the act, it has divided the existing four districts, and apportioned districts shall form additional district where the new first district shall be composed of 176,383 population count. 250,000 must first be satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a population of 1,693,821 making the province entitled to two additional districts from the present of four. Based on the formulation of Ordinance, other than population, the results of the apportionment were valid. And lastly, other factors were mentioned during the deliberations of House Bill No. 4264. Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard with a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It was emphasized as well by the petitioners that if population is less than that provided by the Constitution, it must be stricken-down for noncompliance with the minimum population requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law. MARIANO V. COMELECFacts: Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting The Municipality of M a k a t i Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, a s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati onlyby special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congresswithin 3 years following the return of every census. Also, the addition of another legislative district in Makati isnot in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makatistands4 5 0 , 0 0 . Issue: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional Held: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of anew city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members,unless otherwise fixed by law.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null and void, or whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.

Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical effects: first, error in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of R.A. 9716.

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As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing itsmembership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done byCongress in enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makatis legislative district. Moreover, to holdthat reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislativedistricts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a newcity or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec.5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Saidsection provides that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Evengranting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still beincreased since it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities? The Auditor General countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of Pelaez argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC. HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not administrative.

Pelaez vs Auditor General

ON DECEMBER 18, 2011

Political Law Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test

From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-province, municipality, [township] municipal district or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovincesThe VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated. Pelaez argues, accordingly: If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a

Solicitor General v Metro Manila Authority

Cruz, 1991

FACTS:

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In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the SC ruled that (1) the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605; and, that (2) even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. Several complaints were filed in the SC against the confiscation by police authorities of driver's licenses and removal of license plates for alleged traffic violations. These sanctions were not among those that may be imposed under PD 1605. The Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." o The Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. There was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter. o The Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. It violated PD 1605 which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.

Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse. A committee was then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According to respondent municipal officials, petitioners warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.

ISSUE & HELD: WON Ordinance No. 11 is valid (NO) Issues:

RATIO: The problem before the Court is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question the SC must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power. o A municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC [207 SCRA 157; G.R. No. 40243; 11 Mar 1992]

(1) Whether or not petitioners warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning Article 694 of the Civil Code

(2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void.

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Held: The storage of abaca and copra in petitioners warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its decision. q u e s t i o n i s t h a t t h e y c o n t r a v e n e P . D . 1869 and the public polic y embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City.Although LGC is permissible to modify P.D. 1869, there is no sufficient indicationof an implied repeal by the former.L G U s m a y p r e v e n t a n d s u p p r e s s a l l kinds of gambling within their t e r r i t o r i e s except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. This decree has the statutes of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified bya mere ordinance. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission, now the Metropolitan Manila Authority, to impose such sanctions. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. Here, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. There is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be imposed by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.

MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTIESG.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994 FACTS :Mayor Pablo Magtajas and the city legislators denounced the establishment of PAGCOR within their city through an ordinance prohibiting the issuance of businessp e r m i t a n d c a n c e l l i n g existing business permit to any e s t a b l i s h m e n t f o r u s i n g a n d allowing to be used in its premises or portion thereof for the operation of casinos. Also,an ordinance was passed prohibiting the operation of casinos and providing penalty forits violation. PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize a n d regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within t h e territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and is the third highest revenue earner in thegovernment. I S S U E : W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e o r d i n a n c e s a r e v a l i d a s e n a c t e d b y t h e Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro CityH E L D : N O . Petition is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. TEST OF A VALID ORDINANCE: Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute Must not be unfair or oppressive Must not be partial or discriminatory Must not prohibit but may regulate trade Must not be unreasonable Must be general and consistent with public policy T h e apparent flaw in the ordinances in

NOTE: SC emphasized that the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an exception to the general authority conferred by RA 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned. Tayaban vs People

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ON JUNE 23, 2011 Municipal Corporation Police Power of LGUs In 1988, Tayaban was the mayor of Tinoc, Ifugao. He intimated a project proposal with the Governor for a public market to be erected. The same was approved and it was funded by the Cordillera Executive Board. The project bidding was subsequently won by Lopez Pugong. Pugong began erecting the market but in 1989, Tayaban and Tinocs councilors enforced a resolution to demolish the structure being built on the ground that the structure is not being erected in the proper area as specified by Tayaban and that the structure is a public nuisance and by virtue of police power to protect general welfare. Tayaban and some councilors then went to the site and demolished the structure. Pugong sued Tayaban et al for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti Graft Act). Pugong also averred that the resolution reviewing the said local public development project (market) that the council passed in 1989 was not posted in a conspicuous place as required by Sections 56 and 59(a) of the 1991 LGC (R.A. No. 7160). Tayaban lost and he appealed contending that he demolished the structure by virtue of PD 1096 (National Building Code) and LOI 19 (removal of illegal structures). ISSUE: Whether or not Tayabans demolition of the structure is a valid exercise of police power by a LGU officer. HELD: No. The SC is not impressed with Tayabans contention that the subject demolition is a valid exercise of police power. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of a common right. In the present case, the acts of Tayaban have been established as a violation of law, particularly of the provisions of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. On the other hand though, as held by the OSG, Sec 56 and 59 of the LGC of 1991 is not applicable as said law Facts: Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advise, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioners gasoline station. In Resolution No. 50, it declared that the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation and disregard of existing law. According to the Resolution, 1) the gasoline filling station is in violation of The Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44, the nearest school building which is San Miguel Elementary School and church, the distances are less than 100 meters. (No neighbors were called as witnesses when actual measurements were done by HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22 June 1989); 2) it remains in thickly populated area with commercial/residential buildings, houses closed (sic) to each other which still endangers the lives and safety of the people in case of fire; 3) residents of our barangay always complain of the irritating smell of gasoline most of the time especially during gas filling which tend to expose residents to illness, and 4) It hampers the flow of traffic. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but was denied by the SB. Hence she filed a case before the RTC claiming that the gasoline filling station was not covered under Sec 44 of the mentioned law but is under Sec 21. Case was denied by the court and by the CA. Hence this appeal. Subject: Public Corporation Doctrine: Police power Posted in Digest: PubCor, Lawschool Tagged digest, law school, pubcor Leave a comment Parayno vs Jovellanos G.R. No. 148408 was not yet passed in 1989 hence there was no need for Tayaban to post the 89 resolution in a conspicu ous place. Also, Tayabans defense that he acted by virtue of LOI 19 and PD 1096 is a mere afterthought, nowhere in the resolution was it said that they are going to demolish because of these two laws but rather only on the ground that the market being built is in the wrong place. Further, Tayaban actually never specified as to where he intended the market to be built.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was an invalid exercise of the latters police powers HELD: The respondent is barred from denying their previous claim that the gasoline filling station is not under Sec 44. The Counsel in fact admitted that : That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline filling station as defined in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and not as a service station as differently defined under Article 42 of the said official zoning code; The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the municipality, the party making them. hence, because of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning ordinance, respondents could not insist that gasoline service station under Section 44 necessarily included gasoline filling station under Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in a gas service station did not automatically embrace those in a gas filling station. As for the main issue, the court held that the respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the closure/transfer of petitioners gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160, the power to take actions and enact measures to promote the health and general welfare of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the law and the rights of petitioner. A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution. Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50. While it maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from the nearest public school and church, the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of Section 44. The different local offices that respondent municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such measurement either. Moreover, petitioners business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property, hence, it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location. On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and properties of the people of Calasiao, we again note: Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project being hazardous to life and property is more perceived than factual. For, after all, even the Fire Station Commander.. recommended to build such buildings after conform (sic) all the requirements of PP 1185. It is further alleged by the complainants that the proposed location is in the heart of the thickly populated residential area of Calasiao. Again, findings of the [HLURB] staff negate the allegations as the same is within a designated Business/Commercial Zone per the Zoning Ordinance. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and desist from enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station to another location. [G.R. No. 150763. July 2, 2004] RURAL BANK OF MAKATI, INC., ESTEBAN S. SILVA and MAGDALENA V. LANDICHO, petitioners, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI and ATTY. VICTOR A. L. VALERO, respondents. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: In its decision1 dated July 17, 2001, in CA-G.R. CV No. 58214, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision2 dated October 22, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134, in Civil Case No. 91-2866 dismissing petitioners complaint for recovery of a sum of money and damages. Petitioners now assail said CA decision as well as the Resolution3 dated November 9, 2001, which denied their Motion for Reconsideration. The facts are as follows:

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Sometime in August 1990, Atty. Victor A.L. Valero, then the municipal attorney of the Municipality of Makati, upon request of the municipal treasurer, went to the Rural Bank of Makati to inquire about the banks payments of taxes and fees to the municipality. He was informed, however, by petitioner Magdalena V. Landicho, corporate secretary of the bank, that the bank was exempt from paying taxes under Republic Act No. 720, as amended.4 On November 19, 1990, the municipality lodged a complaint with the Prosecutors Office, charging petitioners Esteban S. Silva, president and general manager of the bank and Magdalena V. Landicho for violation of Section 21(a), Chapter II, Article 3 in relation to Sections 105 and 169 of the Metropolitan Tax Code. On April 5, 1991, an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 140208, for violation of Municipal Ordinance Nos. 122 and 39 for non-payment of the mayors permit fee, was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati against petitioners. Another Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 140209, for nonpayment of annual business tax, in violation of Metro Manila Commission Ordinance No. 82-03, Section 21(a), Chapter II, Article 3, was likewise filed with the MeTC. While said cases were pending with the municipal court, respondent municipality ordered the closure of the bank. This prompted petitioners to pay, under protest, the mayors permit fee and the annual fixed tax in the amount of P82,408.66. On October 18, 1991, petitioners filed with the RTC of Makati a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 91-2866. Petitioners alleged that they were constrained to pay the amount of P82,408.66 because of the closure order, issued despite the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 140208-09 and the lack of any notice or assessment of the fees to be paid. They averred that the collection of the taxes/fees was oppressive, arbitrary, unjust and illegal. Additionally, they alleged that respondent Atty. Valero had no power to enforce laws and ordinances, thus his action in enforcing the collection of the permit fees and business taxes was ultra vires. Petitioners claimed that the bank lost expected earnings in the amount of P19,778. Petitioners then assailed the municipal ordinances of Makati as invalid for want of the requisite publication. In its Answer, respondent municipality asserted that petitioners payment of P82,408.66 was for a legal obligation because the payment of the mayors permit fee as well as the municipal business license was required of all business concerns. According to respondent, said requirement was in furtherance of the police power of the municipality to regulate businesses. For his part, Atty. Valero filed an Answer claiming that there was no coercion committed by the municipality, that payment was a legal obligation of the bank, and that its claim of exemption had no legal basis. He further alleged that petitioners action was clearly intended to harass and humiliate him and as counterclaim, he asked for moral and other damages. On October 22, 1996, the RTC decided Civil Case No. 91-2866 as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint. On the counterclaim, the plaintiffs are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay to defendant Victor Valero the sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees. The counterclaim of defendant Municipality is dismissed. Cost against the plaintiffs. SO ORDERED.5 In finding for respondents, the RTC ruled that the bank was engaged in business as a rural bank. Hence, it should secure the necessary permit and business license, as well as pay the corresponding charges and fees. It found that the municipality had authority to impose licenses and permit fees on persons engaging in business, under its police power embodied under the general welfare clause. Also, the RTC declared unmeritorious petitioners claim for exemption under Rep. Act No. 720 since said exemption had been withdrawn by Executive Order No. 936 and the Rural Bank Act of 1992.7 These statutes no longer exempted rural banks from paying corporate income taxes and local taxes, fees and charges. It also found petitioners

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claim of lack of publication of MMC Ordinance Nos. 8203 and Municipal Ordinance No. 122 to be mere allegations unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. In awarding damages to Atty. Valero, the RTC found that he had been maliciously impleaded as defendant. It noted that Atty. Valero, as a municipal legal officer, was tasked to enforce municipal ordinances. In short, he was merely an agent of the local chief executive and should not be faulted for performing his assigned task. Petitioners seasonably moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the RTC in its Order dated January 10, 1997.8 Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58214. The appellate court sustained the lower court in this wise: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.9 The Court of Appeals found the order of closure of the bank valid and justified since the bank was operating without any permit and without having paid the requisite permit fee. Thus, declared the Court of Appeals, it is not merely a matter of enforcement and collection of fees, as the appellants would have it, but a violation of the municipalitys authority to regulate the businesses operating within its territory.10 The appellate court also brushed aside petitioners claim that the general welfare clause is limited only to legislative action. It declared that the exercise of police power by the municipality was mandated by the general welfare clause, which authorizes the local government units to enact ordinances, not only to carry into effect and discharge such duties as are conferred upon them by law, but also those for the good of the municipality and its inhabitants. This mandate includes the regulation of useful occupations and enterprises. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its Resolution11 of November 9, 2001 denied the same. Hence, this instant petition alleging that the Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred in: 1) .HOLDING THAT THE CLOSURE BY THE APPELLEE, VICTOR VALERO, OF THE APPELLANT BANK WAS A LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER BY THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI; 2) .NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT MAKATI ORDINANCE 122 REQUIRING MAYORS PERMIT FOR OPERATION OF AN ESTABLISHMENT AND MMC ORDINANCE NO. 82-03 WERE ADMITTED AS NOT PUBLISHED AS REQUIRED IN TAADA, ET AL., vs. TUVERA, NO. L-63915, DECEMBER 29, 1986 AND THAT NO TAX ASSESSMENT WAS PRESENTED TO THE BANK; 3) .AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES TO APPELLEE VICTOR VALERO IN THE AMOUNT OF P200,000.00 AND ATTORNEYS FEES IN THE SUM OF P50,000.00; 4) .NOT AWARDING TO THE APPELLANT BANK, THE AMOUNT OF P57,854.00 REPRESENTING THE AMOUNT UNJUSTLY AND ILLEGALLY COLLECTED FROM THE APPELLANT BANK; 5) .NOT AWARDING THE AMOUNT OF P10,413.75 YEARLY REPRESENTING THE UNREALIZED PROFIT WHICH THE APPELLANT BANK IS BEING DEPRIVED OF IN THE USE OF THE AFORESAID AMOUNT PLUS LEGAL INTEREST ALLOWED IN JUDGMENT FROM THE TIME OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL DEMAND. (DEMAND LETTER, DATED OCTOBER 4, 1991, EXHIBIT O FOR THE APPELLANTS); 6) .NOT GRANTING TO APPELLANTS ESTEBAN S. SILVA AND MAGDALENA LANDICHO MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P15,000.00;

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7) .NOT AWARDING TO APPELLANTS, P1,000,000.00 EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; 25% OF THE APPELLANTS CLAIM AS AND FOR ATTORNEYS FEE AND COSTS OF SUIT.12 Essentially, the following are the relevant issues for our resolution: 1. Whether or not petitioner bank is liable to pay the business taxes and mayors permit fees imposed by respondent; 2. valid; Whether or not the closure of petitioner bank is However, on December 17, 1986, Executive Order No. 93 was issued by then President Corazon Aquino, withdrawing all tax and duty incentives with certain exceptions. Notably, not included among the exceptions were those granted to rural banks under Rep. Act No. 720. With the passage of said law, petitioner could no longer claim any exemption from payment of business taxes and permit fees. Now, as to the refund of P57,854 claimed by petitioners allegedly because of overpayment of taxes and fees, we note that petitioners have not adequately substantiated their claim. As found by the Court of Appeals: As to the computation of the payable fees, the plaintiffsappellants claim an overpayment and pray for a refund. It is not clearly shown from their argument that such overpayment exists. And from their initial complaint, they even asked for the refund of the whole P82,408.66 paid, which complaint was instituted in 1991. They claim having paid the fees and charges due since 1991, which is irrelevant, since the P82,408.66 was paid for the period before 1991, and thus no deduction can be made for payments after that period. It is not clear where their computation of P57,854.00 owed them came from, and lacking solid support, their prayer for a partial refund must fail. Plaintiffs-appellants have failed to show that the payment of fees and charges even covered the period before their exemption was withdrawn.15 Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, which are supported on record, are binding and conclusive upon this Court. As repeatedly held, such findings will not be disturbed unless they are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of facts.16 Moreover, in a petition for review, only questions of law are properly raised. On this score, the refund sought by petitioners could not be entertained much less granted. Anent the second issue, petitioner bank claims that the closure of respondent bank was an improper exercise of police power because a municipal corporation has no inherent but only delegated police power, which must be exercised not by the municipal mayor but by the municipal council through the enactment of ordinances. It also assailed the Court of Appeals for invoking the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 1617 of

3. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to an award of unrealized profit and damages; 4. Whether or not respondent Atty. Victor Valero is entitled to damages. On the first issue, petitioner bank claims that of the P82,408.66 it paid under protest, it is actually liable only for the amount of P24,154, representing taxes, fees and charges due beginning 1987, or after the issuance of E.O. No. 93. Prior to said year, it was exempt from paying any taxes, fees, and charges by virtue of Rep. Act No. 720. We find the banks claim for refund untenable now. Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 720, as amended by Republic Act No. 4106,13 approved on July 19, 1964, had exempted rural banks with net assets not exceeding one million pesos (P1,000,000) from the payment of all taxes, charges and fees. The records show that as of December 29, 1986, petitioner banks net assets amounted only to P745,432.2914 or below the one million ceiling provided for in Section 14 of the old Rural Banking Act. Hence, under Rep. Act No. 720, petitioner bank could claim to be exempt from payment of all taxes, charges and fees under the aforementioned provision.

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the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect in 1992,18 when the closure of the bank was actually done on July 31, 1991. Indeed the Local Government Code of 1991 was not yet in effect when the municipality ordered petitioner banks closure on July 31, 1991. However, the general welfare clause invoked by the Court of Appeals is not found on the provisions of said law alone. Even under the old Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337)19 which was then in effect, a general welfare clause was provided for in Section 7 thereof. Municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.20 The authority of a local government unit to exercise police power under a general welfare clause is not a recent development. This was already provided for as early as the Administrative Code of 1917.21 Since then it has been reenacted and implemented by new statutes on the matter. Thus, the closure of the bank was a valid exercise of police power pursuant to the general welfare clause contained in and restated by B.P. Blg. 337, which was then the law governing local government units. No reversible error arises in this instance insofar as the validity of respondent municipalitys exercise of police power for the general welfare is concerned. The general welfare clause has two branches. The first, known as the general legislative power, authorizes the municipal council to enact ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. The second, known as the police power proper, authorizes the municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of their property.22 In the present case, the ordinances imposing licenses and requiring permits for any business establishment, for purposes of regulation enacted by the municipal council of Makati, fall within the purview of the first branch of the general welfare clause. Moreover, the ordinance of the municipality imposing the annual business tax is part of the power of taxation vested upon local governments as provided for under Section 8 of B.P. Blg. 337,23 to wit: Sec. 8. Authority to Create Sources of Revenue. (1) Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. ... Implementation of these ordinances is vested in the municipal mayor, who is the chief executive of the municipality as provided for under the Local Government Code, to wit: Sec. 141. Powers and Duties. (1) The mayor shall be the chief executive of the municipal government and shall exercise such powers, duties and functions as provided in this Code and other laws. (2) He shall: ... (k) Grant licenses and permits in accordance with existing laws or municipal ordinances and revoke them for violation of the conditions upon which they have been granted; ... (o) Enforce laws, municipal ordinances and resolutions and issue necessary orders for their faithful and proper enforcement and execution;

11pubcor cases
(p) Ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the municipality are collected, and that municipal funds are spent in accordance with law, ordinances and regulations; ... (t) Cause to be instituted judicial proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances, for the collection of taxes, fees and charges, and for the recovery of property and funds of the municipality, and otherwise to protect the interest of the municipality; 24 (Emphasis supplied) ... Consequently, the municipal mayor, as chief executive, was clothed with authority to create a Special Task Force headed by respondent Atty. Victor A.L. Valero to enforce and implement said ordinances and resolutions and to file appropriate charges and prosecute violators.25 Respondent Valero could hardly be faulted for performing his official duties under the cited circumstances. Petitioners contend that MMC Ordinance No. 82-03 and Municipal Ordinance No. 122 are void for lack of publication. This again raises a factual issue, which this Court may not look into. As repeatedly held, this Court is not a trier of facts.26 Besides, both the Court of Appeals and the trial court found lack of sufficient evidence on this point to support petitioners claim, thus: And finally the matter of the lack of publication is once again alleged by the plaintiffs-appellants, claiming that the matter was skirted by the trial court. This argument must fail, in the light of the trial courts squarely finding lack of evidence to support the allegation of the plaintiffsappellants. We quote from the trial courts decision: The contention that MMC Ordinance No. 82-03 and Municipal Ordinance No. 122 of Makati are void as they were not publishced (sic) is untenable. The mere allegation of the plaintiff is not sufficient to declare said ordinances void. The plaintiffs failed to adduce clear, convincing and competent evidence to prove said Ordinances void. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, an ordinance is presumed to be valid unless declared otherwise by a Court in an appropriate proceeding where the validity of the ordinance is directly put in issue.27 On the issue of the closure of the bank, we find that the bank was not engaged in any illegal or immoral activities to warrant its outright closure. The appropriate remedies to enforce payment of delinquent taxes or fees are provided for in Section 62 of the Local Tax Code, to wit: SEC. 62. Civil Remedies. The civil remedies available to enforce payment of delinquent taxes shall be by distraint of personal property, and by legal action. Either of these remedies or both simultaneously may be pursued at the discretion of the proper authority. The payment of other revenues accruing to local governments shall be enforced by legal action.28 Said Section 62 did not provide for closure. Moreover, the order of closure violated petitioners right to due process, considering that the records show that the bank exercised good faith and presented what it thought was a valid and legal justification for not paying the required taxes and fees. The violation of a municipal ordinance does not empower a municipal mayor to avail of extrajudicial remedies.29 It should have observed due process before ordering the banks closure. Finally, on the issue of damages, we agree with both the trial and the appellate courts that the bank is not entitled to any damages. The award of moral damages cannot be granted to a corporation, it being an artificial person that exists only in legal contemplation and cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which can be experienced only by one having a nervous system.30 There is also no sufficient basis for

12pubcor cases
the award of exemplary damages. There being no moral damages, exemplary damages could not be awarded also. As to attorneys fees, aside from lack of adequate support and proof on the matter, these fees are not recoverable as a matter of right but depend on the sound discretion of the courts.31 Under the circumstances of this case, the award of damages to Atty. Valero is also baseless. We cannot ascribe any illegal motive or malice to the bank for impleading Atty. Valero as an officer of respondent municipality. The bank filed the case against respondent municipality in the honest belief that it is exempt from paying taxes and fees. Since Atty. Valero was the official charged with the implementation of the ordinances of respondent municipality, he was rightly impleaded as a necessary party in the case. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated July 17, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58214 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, so that (1) the order denying any claim for refunds and fees allegedly overpaid by the bank, as well as the denial of any award for damages and unrealized profits, is hereby SUSTAINED; (2) the order decreeing the closure of petitioner bank is SET ASIDE; and (3) the award of moral damages and attorneys fees to Atty. Victor A.L. Valero is DELETED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Batangas Power Corporation vs. Batangas City, G.R. No. 152675, April 28, 2004 Facts: -12 hours daily and power generation was badly needed. Thegovernment, through the National Power Corporation (NPC), sought to attract investors in power plant operations byproviding them with incentives, one of which was through the in the BuildOperate and Transfer (BOT) Agreement.On June 29, 1992, Enron Power Development Corporation (Enron) and petitioner NPC entered into a Fast Track BOTProject. Enron agreed to supply a power station to NPC and transfer its plant to the latter after ten (10) years of operation.Section 11.02 of the BOT Agreement provided that NPC shall be responsible for the payment of all taxes that may beimposed on the power station, except income taxes and permit fees . Subsequently, Enron assigned its obligation under the BOT Agreement to petitioner Batangas Power Corporation (BPC). On September 23, 1992, the BOI issued a certificate of registration to BPC as a pioneer enterprise entitled to a taxholiday for a period of six (6) years . On October 12, 1998, Batangas City sent a letter to BPC demanding payment of business taxes and penalties, commencing from the year 1994, BPC refused to pay, citing its tax-exempt status as apioneer enterprise for six (6) years under Section 133 (g) of the Local Government Code (LGC). The from BPC only for the years 1998-1999. BPC still refused to paythe tax. It insisted that its 6-year tax holiday commenced from the date of its commercial operation on July 16,1993 , not from the date of its BOI registration in September 1992.In the alternative, BPC asserted that the city should collect the tax from the NPC as the latter assumed responsibilityfor its payment under their BOT Agreement . On August 26, 1999, the NPC intervened. While admitting assumption of under their BOT Agreement, NPC refused to pay edly constituted anindirect tax on NPC which is a tax-exempt corporation under its Charter .BPC filed a petition for declaratory relief12 with the Makati RTC against Batangas City and NPC. It alleged that under theBOT Agreement, NPC is responsible for the payment of such taxes but as NPC is exempt from taxes, both the BPCand NPC are not liable for its payment .Makati RTC dismissed the petition and held that: (1) BPC is liable to pay business taxes to the city; (2) was withdrawn with the passage of R.A. No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) ; and, (3) the 6-year taxholiday granted to pioneer business enterprises starts on the date of registration with the BOI as provided in Section 133(g) of R.A. No. 7160, and not on the date of its actual business operations. Issue: withdrawn by Section 193 of the LocalGovernment Code (LGC). Held: Yes. The effect of the LGC on the tax exemption privileges of the NPC has already been extensively discussed andsettled in the recent case of National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan. In said case, this Court recognized the removal of the blanket exclusion of government instrumentalities from local taxation as one of themost significant provisions of the 1991 LGC. Specifically, we stressed that Section 193 of the LGC, an express andgeneral repeal of all statutes granting exemptions from local taxes, withdrew the sweeping tax privileges previouslyenjoyed by the NPC under its Charter. The power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority tolevy taxes, fees and other charges pursuant to Article X, section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. The LGC is considered as themost revolutionary piece of legislation on local

13pubcor cases
autonomy, the LGC effectively deals with the fiscal constraints faced byLGUs. It widens the tax base of LGUs to include taxes which were prohibited by previous laws.Neither can the NPC successfully rely on the Basco case as this was decided prior to the effectivity of the LGC , whenthere was still no law empowering local government units to tax instrumentalities of the national government. Thus, while BPC remains to be the entity doing business in said city, it is the NPC that is ultimately liable to pay saidtaxes under the provisions of both the 1992 BOT Agreement and the 1991 Local Government Code. Other Issue: -year tax holiday commenced on the date of its BOI registration as a pioneer enterprise oron the date of its actual commercial operation as certified by the BOI. Sec. 133 (g) of the LGC, which proscribes local government units (LGUs) from levying taxes on BOI-certified pioneer enterprises for a period of six years from the date of registration, applies specifically to taxes imposed by the local government, like the business tax imposed by Batangas City on BPC in the case at bar. The 6-year tax exemption of BPC should thus commence from the date of stration with the BOI. TANO v. SOCRATESFacts: The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of:(1) Ordinance No. 15 -92 entitled: " AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVEFISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF"(2) Office Order No. 23, requiring any person engaged or intending to engage in any business,trade, occupation, calling or profession or having in his possession any of the articles for which a permit isrequired to be had, to obtain first a Mayors and authorizing and directing to check or conduct necessaryinspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from Puerto Princesa and,( 3 ) R e s o l u t i o n N o . 3 3 , Ordinance No. 2 entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING T H E CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMST h e petitioners contend that the said Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, t h e i r livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XIIand Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and that the Mayor had the absolute authorityto determine whether or not to issue the permit.They also claim that it took away their right to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar asthe Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocationand entering "into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusionPublic respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the ProvincialGovernment's power under the general welfare clause; they likewise maintained that there was noviolation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the Ordinances in question are unconstitutional Held: NORatio: In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and thepowers granted therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), andunder Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve theexercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.***Sec. 16. General Welfare . Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for itsefficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, amongother things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology , encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliantscientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve thecomfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (emphasis supplied).It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) toestablish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of fiveyears; and (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities. It imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniangpanlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penaltiesf o r a c t s w h i c h e n d a n g e r t h e environment such as dynamite fishing and o t h e r f o r m s o f d e s t r u c t i v e fishing . . . and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers andlakes or of ecological imbalance." The petition is dismissed. G.R. No. 115044 January 27, 1995 HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, and the City of Manila, petitioners,vs. HON. FELIPE G. PACQUING, as Judge, branch 40, Regional Trial Court of Manilaand ASSOCIATED CORPORATION, respondents.

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Facts: The petition was dismissed by the First Division of this Court on 01 September 1994based on a finding that there was "no abuse of discretion, muchless lack of or excessof jurisdiction, on the part of respondent judge [Pacquing]", in issuing the questionedorders. Judge Pacquinghad earlier issued in Civil Case No. 88-45660, RTC of Manila,Branch40,the following orders whichwere assailed by theMayor of the City of Manila,Hon. Alfredo S. Lim:(1) order directing Manila mayor Alfredo S. Lim to issue thepermit/licenseto operateth e jai-alai in favor of Associated Development Corporation (ADC).(2) order directing mayor Lim to explain whyhe should not be cited for contempt for non-compliance withthe order dated 28 March1994.(3)order dated 20 April 1994 reiterating the previous order directing Mayor Lim toimmediately issue thepermit/licenseto Associated Development Corporation (ADC). The order dated 28 march1994 was in turn issued upon motion by ADC for execution of a final judgment rendered on 9 September 1988 whichordered th e Manila Mayor toimmediately issue to ADC thepermit/licenseto operate the jai-alai in Manila, under Manila Ordinance No. 7065.Subsequently, also in G.R. No. 115044, the Republic of thePhilippines, throughtheGames and Amusements Board, filed a "Motion for Intervention; forLeave to File aMotion for reconsideration in Intervention; and to Refer the case to the CourtEn Banc "and later a "Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration-inIntervention and to Admit Attached Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention". ISSUE:Whether or not the Associated Development Corporationhas avalid and subsistingfranchise to maintain and operate the jai-alai; HELD: No. Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CADate: December 7, 1995Petitioner: Laguna Lake Development AuthorityRespondents: CA, Hon. Judge Herculano Tech, Fleet Development Inc and Carlito ArroyoPonente: Hermosisima JrFacts: RA 4850 was enacted creating the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This agency wassupposed to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and thesurrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act, within the context of the national and regional plansand policies for social and economic development.PD 813 amended certain sections RA 4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with current andprospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like. To effectively perform the role of the Authority under RA 4850, the Chief Executive issued EO 927further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated thetowns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region". Also, pertinent to theissues in this case are the following provisions of EO 927 which include in particular the sharing of fees: Sec 2: xxx the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting thesaid region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.SEC. 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to collect fees for the use of the lake water and its tributaries for all beneficial purposesincluding but not limited to fisheries, recreation, municipal, industrial, agricultural, navigation, irrigation, and waste disposal purpose; Provided, that therates of the fees to be collected, and the sharing with other government agencies and political subdivisions, if necessary, shall be subject to the approvalof the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's Board, except fishpen fee, which will be shared in the following manner: 20percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent shall go to the Project Development Fund which shall be administered by aCouncil and the remaining 75 percent shall constitute the share of LLDA. However, after the implementation within the threeyear period of the LagunaLake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan the sharing will be modified as follows: 35 percent of the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent goes to the Project Development Fund and the remaining 60 percent shall be retained by LLDA; Provided, however, that theshare of LLDA shall form part of its corporate funds and shall not be remitted to the National Treasury as an exception to the provisions of PresidentialDecree No. 1234. Then came Republic Act No. 7160. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted theprovisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because R.A. 7160 provides: "Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals; Fees and Charges (a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters andimpose rental fees or charges therefor in accordance with the provisions of this Section. Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpenpermits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to theconsternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages occupied almost one-third the entirelake water surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 ha in 1990 to almost 21,000 hain 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of thepolicies adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity. In view of theforegoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general public that: 1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay Region, which were not registered or to which no application forregistration and/or permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March 31, 1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal.2. All fishpens; fishcages and other aqua-culture structures so declared as illegal shall be subject to demolition which shall be undertaken by thePresidential Task Force for illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing.3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal shall, without prejudice to demolition of their structures becriminally charged in accordance with Section 39-A of Republic Act 4850 as amended by P.D. 813 for violation of the same laws. Violations of these lawscarries a penalty of imprisonment of not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or both at the discretion of the court.All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture

15pubcor cases
structures declared as illegal in accordance with the foregoing Notice shall have one (1)month on or before 27 October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA why their said fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures should not bedemolished/dismantled." One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the illegallyconstructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle theirrespective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected. The fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the LLDA. The LLDA filed motions to dismiss thecases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were denied. Meanwhile, TRO/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were issued enjoining the LLDA from demolishing the fishpens andsimilar structures in question. Hence, the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. The CAdismissed the LLDAs consolidated petitions. It ruled that (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicialagencies of government appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA withquasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar asfishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits devolved to respective localgovernment units concerned.Issue:Which agency of the Government - the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the regionshould exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits forfishery privileges is concerned? statute,general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, althoughthe terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." Wherethere is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since itevinces the legislative intent more clearly that the general statute. The special law is to be taken as anexception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This isbecause implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, given to all enactments of thelegislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mereimplication.Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are enviromentalprotection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislativeintent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission.We are on all fours with the manifestation of LLDA that "Laguna de Bay, like any other single bodyof water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km lake surface water, the 8 major rivertributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km2 basin or watershedtranscending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, constitute one integrated delicate naturalecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable development. This is an exhaustible natural resource-a very limited one-whichrequires judicious management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its ecologicalintegrity and balance. Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policygeared towards the protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable development of the regionwith due regard to the inter-generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law-the special lawdesigned to govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources. Laguna de Bay thereforecannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management policies where lakeshore local governmentunits exercise exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The implementation of acohesive and integrated lake water resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve,protect and sustainably develop Laguna de Bay." The power of the LGUs to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This isevident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering local governmentsto issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading,"Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power of LGUs.On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and otheraqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Lagunade Bay region and for lake quality control and management. 6 It does partake of the nature of policepower which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powersincluding the power of taxation. Accordingly the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exerciseof police power should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna

H e l d : L L D A Ratio: Section 4 (k) of RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813, and Section 2 of EO 927, specifically provide thatthe LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use or all surface water for any projectsor activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens,fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities theexclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grantfishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within adefinite zone of the municipal waters. The provisions of RA7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting thelatter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categoricallyexpressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be madeclear and expressed.It has to be conceded that the charter of the LLDA constitutes a special law. RA 7160 is a generallaw. It is basic is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a generallaw cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "aspecial statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent

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deBay. There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culturestructures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharingof fees collected. In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial agency or not, it is ourholding that, considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4850 and Section 4 of ExecutiveOrder No. 927, series of 1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Courtof Appeals, there is no question that the Authority has express powers as a regulatory a quasi-judicial bodyin respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease a desist order" and on matters affecting theconstruction of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. TheAuthority's pretense, however, that it is co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against itmay only be instituted before the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating theresolution of legal questions affecting the powers of the Authority as provided for in its charter, theRegional Trial Courts have jurisdiction.In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the LocalGovernment Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, Republic Act No.4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority toexercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it. Binay vs Domingo Date: September 11, 1991 Petitioners: Jejomar Binay and Municipality of Makati Respondents: Eufemio Domingo and commission on Audit Ponente: Paras Facts: On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 (A resolution to confirm and/or ratify the ongoing burial assistance program extending P500 to a bereaved family, funds to be taken out of unappropriated available funds existing in the municipal treasury.) Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement fired of P400,000 for the implementation of the program. However, COA disapproved Resolution 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds. COA denied the petitioners reconsideration as Resolution 60 has no connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc of the inhabitant of Makati. Also, the Resolution will only benefit a few individuals. Public funds should only be used for public purposes. Issue:WON Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause\ Held:Yes Ratio: The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein." Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to

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frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official gosignal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise. SALVADOR VILLACORTA vs. GREGORIO BERNARDOFACTS: Ordinance 22 entitled AN ORDINANCE REGULATING SUBDIVISION PLAN S OVER PARCELS OF LAND IN THE CITY OFDAGUPAN was enacted by the municipal board of Dagupan City. The said ordinance was imposing additional requirements to that of the national law Act 496. Ordinance 22 was annulled by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals whosedecision reads as follows:Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not require subdivision plans to be submitted to the City Engineer before the same is submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land Registration Office or by theDirector of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the latter being silent on a service fee of PO.03 per square meter of every lot subject of such subdivision application; Section 3 of theordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not mention of a certification to be made by the CityEngineer before the Register of Deeds allows registration of the subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance imposes a penalty for its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivisionowner additional conditions. ISSUE : Were the decisions of the CFI and CA to annul the said ordinance was correct? HELD: Yes. To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guiseof implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to preventbigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnaping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of passports, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on.This advice is especially addressed to the local governments which exercise the police po wer only by virtue of a valid delegation from the national legislature under the general welfare clause. In the instant case, Ordinance No. 22 suffers from the additional defect of violating thisauthority for legislation in contravention of the national law by adding to its requirements.

City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilipino ON NOVEMBER 23, 2010

Police Power Not Validly Exercised

Quezon City enacted REGULATING AND an ordinance THE OF entitled PRIVATE

ORDINANCE MAINTENANCE

ESTABLISHMENT,

OPERATION

MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid. HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between

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the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

VELASCO v. VILLEGASFacts: The petitioners filed a declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No.4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of their meansof livelihood without due process of law.The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shopto conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of saidbarber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as longas the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person."The lower court ruled in favor of the constitutionality of the assailed ordinance. Hence, the appeal. Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4964 is unconstitutional Held: NO Ratio: It is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able to imposepayment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 asamended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers."The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clausebecause it "delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality; this clause has been given wideapplication by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case beenliberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence."The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.