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The Joint Strike Fighter Program:

Wrong Place, Wrong Time

Anthony F. Hillen
Master of Arts: Security Studies
Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University
May 2008

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Contents

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................ 3

The Joint Strike Fighter Program ................................................................................................................ 5

The F-35 Lightning II...................................................................................................................................... 9

US Strategic Policy and Asymmetric Warfare ........................................................................................ 14

A Fighter Lost in Time? ................................................................................................................................ 19

The Right Stuff: Tactical Capabilities in Unconventional Warfare ................................................ 22

Qualification ..................................................................................................................................................... 28

Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................... 30

Appendix A .......................................................................................................................................................... 33

Appendix B ........................................................................................................................................................... 34

Appendix C ........................................................................................................................................................... 35

Appendix D........................................................................................................................................................... 37

Appendix E ........................................................................................................................................................... 38

Appendix F ........................................................................................................................................................... 39

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Introduction

The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program began in the early 1990s as a result of

the restructuring and integration of a number of tactical aircraft procurement and

technology development initiatives. According to the Pentagon’s Defense

Procurement, Acquisition Policy and Strategic Sourcing (DPAP) office, the program

seeks to produce a versatile new combat aircraft with reduced life-cycle costs.1 Now

referred to as the F-35 Lightning II, the JSF has been touted as an “affordable multi-

role fighter with precision engagement capabilities and the flexibility to conduct joint

operations well into the future”.2 The F-35 is undoubtedly a highly advanced and

formidable weapons platform; however, the aircraft was designed for tactical and

strategic scenarios no longer relevant in today’s geopolitical environment.

Since September 11th 2001, the American military and political establishments

have increasingly stressed the importance of adapting to twenty-first century security

challenges. Nevertheless, instead of producing weapons that exploit the United States’

relative technological superiority and expand its tactical advantages in unconventional

warfare, the military is developing weapons systems designed to combat peer-

competitors in major theater warfare.

In light of the United States’ official strategic emphasis on non-traditional

military threats, one can only wonder why the government continues to spend billions

1
http://jsf.mil/f35/f35_background.htm - Accessed 03/21/2008
2
Ibid.
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of dollars in taxpayer’s money developing weapons systems for a bygone era. The F-

35 program is an exercise in fiscal irresponsibility masquerading as a project of great

tactical and strategic import to the United States’ national security.

This paper argues that the F-35 Lightning II was originally designed for the Cold

War and immediate post-Cold War geopolitical environment. As official policies and

strategic priorities began to shift, so did the aircraft’s ostensible purpose. The Joint

Strike Fighter Program illustrates how bureaucratic assumptions and institutional

cultures can have a more significant influence on the development of major weapons

platforms than actual tactical or strategic military requirements.

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The Joint Strike Fighter Program

The main focus of this analysis is to determine whether the F-35 is being

developed for conventional major-theater warfare, in contradiction of the United

States’ official strategic policy. A secondary point of inquiry involves determining

whether armament and avionics upgrades to existing aircraft could render the

development of a new platform with redundant tactical capabilities little more than a

needless squandering of the US defense budget.

This paper poses a number of financial, tactical, and strategically important

questions. The F-35 is designed around assumptions and general modes of thinking

dating back to the Cold War. At the behest of the platform’s corporate developers

and the DoD itself, the US military will be forced to integrate new technologies with

existing weapons systems and tactical doctrines, a concept historically anathema to the

combat effectiveness of military organizations.3

In three steps, this project aims to demonstrate that the development of the F-

35 contradicts the United States’ general strategic policy, and does not confer any

significant advantage over existing tactical combat aircraft in non-traditional warfare.

After a brief history of the aircraft’s genesis, I provide evidence that the United States’

official strategic policies emphasize the development of weapons for “asymmetric”

warfare. However, since most wars are by definition asymmetric, this paper will refer to

3
Hall, B. Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe: Gunpowder, Technology and Tactics, Johns Hopkins
University Press; New Edition (12/18/2001).
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such conflict as idiosyncratic or unconventional warfare. The second section argues that

the F-35 is designed for major-theater operations against a peer competitor, and not

to combat unconventional threats to US national security. In the final section of the

paper, I contend that existing aircraft possess capabilities similar, if not identical, to

those of the F-35.

The general idea behind the Joint Strike Fighter program is to develop a

versatile and cost-effective tactical combat aircraft. The program intends to produce a

platform capable of achieving economies of commonality and scale in order to reduce

the aircraft’s per-unit cost.4 The JSF is designed to be highly flexible in terms of both

mission capabilities and future technological developments. Long-term plans for the

JSF platform include an electronic-warfare version; unmanned variants; and the

incorporation of directed-energy weapons, such as high-energy lasers capable of

intercepting ballistic missiles,5 6

In December 1994, Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, McDonnell Douglas and

Northrop Grumman were awarded Concept Definition and Design Research

(CDDR) contracts. For the duration of their fifteen-month contracts, each company

refined their Preferred Weapons System Concept (PWSC) designs and subjected them

4 Selinger, M. “F-35 Trumps F/A-22 in Latest Defense Department Budget Battle”, Aviation Week, 1/4/2005.
5
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008.
6
http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/abl/news/2001/033001.html - Accessed
5/1/2008.
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to a number of risk reduction assessments, including powered short take-off and

vertical landing (STOVL) tests, engineering analyses, and wind tunnel tests.7

All four contenders chose the F119 Pratt & Whitney (P&W) engine to power

their test aircraft. Accordingly, P&W received a $4 billion contract to develop the F-

135 propulsion system in November 1995. The JSF program’s acquisition strategy

stipulates the simultaneous development of two functionally interchangeable engine

designs. The Pratt & Whitney system was to compete with a similar propulsion system

designed by General Electric (GE). The competition was initially scheduled to begin

in 2011 and continue for the duration of the JSF program to mitigate development

risks. Nevertheless, the General Electric contract is scheduled to be terminated,

largely due to persistent budget overruns. Although P&W is undoubtedly delighted

with this turn of events, the cancellation of the GE contract is unlikely to benefit the

aircraft.

DPAP has come to the conclusion that funding an alternate engine program at

a cost of $3.5 billion to $4.5 billion is an unnecessary expenditure. However, a

competitive strategy could result in savings equal to or greater than the engine’s life

cycle costs in a sole-source scenario.

[The] GAO’s updated cost analysis suggests that a savings of 9 to 11 percent –


about 2 percent less than what GAO estimated last year – would recoup that
investment. Competition on the JSF engine program could yield savings of at
least that much. Further, non financial benefits in terms of better engine
performance and reliability, more responsive contractors, and improved

7
http://www.jsf.mil/history/his_jsf.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008.
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industrial base stability are more likely outcomes under a competitive
environment than under a sole-source strategy.8

In May 1996, the Department of Defense officially designated the JSF program

as an Acquisition Category I program (ACAT I); a defense project categorization

implying at least $355 million9 in research, development and evaluation costs.10 Prime

contractors submitted Concept Demonstration Phase (CDP) proposals a month later,

recommending potential prototype aircraft. By early 1997, Lockheed Martin and

Boeing were awarded the CDP contract, McDonnell Douglas was eliminated, and

Northrop Grumman merged its team with Lockheed Martin and British Aerospace.11

On October 26th 2001, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Edward C.

Aldridge announced the Pentagon’s decision to continue the JSF program by initiating

the next phase of its development: System Development and Demonstration (SDD).

Shortly thereafter, the Secretary of the Air Force, James Roche, declared Lockheed

Martin the winner of the fly-off competition and the $19 billion development

contract.12

8
Sullivan, M. Government Accountability Office. Joint Strike Fighter: Impact of Recent Decisions on
Program Risks, GAO-08-569T, 3/11/2008.
9
(based on fiscal year 1996 constant dollars)
10
United States Code of Law, Title 10, Subtitle A , Part IV , Chapter 144, Article 2430
11
http://www.jsf.mil/history/his_jsf.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008
12
http://www.jsf.mil/history/his_f35.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008
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The F-35 Lightning II

The Joint Strike Fighter, now known as the F-35 Lightning II, remains in the

SDD phase of development. The project is focused on developing a multi-role strike

platform, capable of meeting the operational requirements of the United States’ Air

Force, Navy and Marine Corps, while simultaneously maintaining an affordable flyaway

cost.13

There are currently three variations of the F-35, each designed to cater to the

specific needs of the individual service branches. The Air Force’s F-35A is optimized

for air-to-ground attacks; intended to replicate the close-air-support capabilities of the

A-10 Thunderbolt II and the mission profile versatility14 of the venerable F-16. The F-

35B is the Marine Corp’s short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) version of the

JSF, slated to replace the AV-8B Harrier. Finally, the Navy’s F-35C variant is

optimized for carrier-based operations and intended to replace the F/A-18 Hornet.

13
With regard to aircraft procurement and acquisition, “flyaway cost” refers to a firm unit price.
14
Tthe ability to conduct a wide range of mission types.
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According to its developers, the F-35 offers numerous advantages over existing

platforms. These advantages generally fall under the categories of increased

survivability, lethality, supportability, and affordability. Lockheed Martin asserts that

in addition to its on-board countermeasures, the F-35’s reduced radio frequency and

infrared signature greatly enhance its survivability. The integration of sophisticated

sensor arrays increases the pilot’s situational awareness, and ensures the accurate

delivery of munitions, thus contributing to the platform’s general lethality.

Proponents of the JSF program argue that the aircraft’s combat capabilities are

enhanced by its supportability characteristics; primarily it’s reduced “logistics

footprint” and increased sortie generation rate. Finally, advocates somewhat

controversially suggest that the United States’ numerical strength and military force

structure can be improved by the F-35’s reduced development and procurement costs.

However, this seems highly unlikely, especially given the JSF program’s steadily

increasing funding requirements.

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According to detractors, the JSF program’s complications are primarily due

repeated design compromises and persistent budget overruns. The F-35’s weight has

been a constant problem over the course of its development.15 However, according to

the DoD, recent design changes have made this less of a problem than it once was.16

Furthermore, the F-35 is not as technologically sophisticated as Lockheed Martin and

the DoD allege. The Joint Strike Fighter has been advertised as a template for next

generation strike aircraft, yet the F-35 does not feature cutting-edge technologies such

as supercruise or thrust vectoring, nor does it possess stealth characteristics even

remotely comparable to the F-22. 17 18

Despite repeated denials by the DoD and its primary contractors, recurrent

delays, cost increases, and budget overruns have plagued the JSF program since its

initiation.19 With regard to the F-35’s procurement costs and development timetable,

the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has stated that the program has

repeatedly exceeded its budget and continues to remain behind schedule.20 According

to the latest GAO report on the JSF program, Lockheed Martin “has extended

manufacturing schedules several times, but test aircraft delivery dates continue to slip.

15
Butler, A. and Wall, R. “Cost and Effect”, Aviation Week and Space Technology. 4/2/2007, Vol. 166,
Issue 13.
16
“With Weight Issues Resolved, F-35 Focus Turns to Production”, Lockheed Martin, Press Release.
11/14/2004
17
http://www.jsf.mil – Accessed 5/2/2008
18
Fulghum, D. “Stealth Rules”, Aviation Week and Space Technology. 6/18/2007, Vol. 166, Issue 23.
19
“U.S. Government Report Shows Decreased Costs for F-35 Program”, Lockheed Martin, Press
Release. 4/8/2008
20
Appendix A
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The flight test program has barely begun, but faces substantial risks with reduced

assets as design and manufacturing problems continue to cause delays that further

compress the time available to complete development."21

One potential explanation for these delays is that the program’s management

reserves are being spent at a rate faster than anticipated, due to shifting design

requirements and inefficient prototype manufacturing.22

To replenish this reserve, DOD officials decided not to request additional


funding and time for development at this time, but opted instead to reduce test
resources… While DOD reports that total acquisition costs have increased by
$55 billion since a major restructuring in 2004, GAO and others in DOD
believe that the cost estimates are not reliable and that total costs will be much
higher than currently advertised. Another restructuring appears likely – GAO
expects DOD will need more money and time to complete development and
operational testing, which will delay the full-rate production decision and the
fielding of capabilities to the warfighter. 23

According to the GAO’s most recent estimates (as of March 2008), the F-35’s

procurement and acquisition costs are nearing $1 trillion.24

The JSF program’s rising cost does not only affect the United States. The F-35

is more than just a DoD procurement and acquisition initiative, it is also cooperative

international effort. Compared to other tactical combat aircraft, the F-35’s initial

development phase has been characterized by an unprecedented level of international

21
Government Accountability Office. Joint Strike Fighter: Recent Decisions by DoD Add to Program Risks,
GAO-08-388, March 2008. (p.3)
22
Appendix F
23
Sullivan, M. Government Accountability Office. Joint Strike Fighter: Impact of Recent Decisions on
Program Risks, GAO-08-569T, 3/11/2008.
24
Sullivan, M. Government Accountability Office. Joint Strike Fighter: Impact of Recent Decisions on
Program Risks, GAO-08-569T, 3/11/2008.
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cooperation. However, due to the recurrent technical setbacks and steadily increasing

development costs, two of the United States’ principal JSF development partners, the

United Kingdom and Australia, have become remarkably reticent in terms of their

commitment to the F-35.

Despite being the only “Level 1” international partner associated with the

program, the UK has made it abundantly clear that its commitment to the F-35 hinges

on the United States’ acquiescence to a number requests. Most importantly, the UK

wants assured access to sensitive JSF-related technologies, specifically its stealth

capabilities and the source code for its supportability and avionics systems.25 This

recent shift in policy could indicate that the UK is no longer certain that the program

will be followed through to completion, opting instead to recoup the $2.5 billion it

invested in the JSF program by securing proprietary access to the aircraft’s hardware

and software.

The UK is not the only international partner having second thoughts about the

JSF program. After contributing over $144 million to the program, the Royal

Australian Air Force (RAAF) is uncertain of the F-35’s viability as a mainstay weapons

platform. Australia’s decision to purchase “F/A-18 Super Hornets as interim

25
Barrie, D. and Butler, A. “Lightning Strikes Out”, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 10/1/2007.
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replacements for its much larger F-111 strike bombers [shows] just how nervous it is

about Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.”26

US Strategic Policy and Asymmetric Warfare

Compared to the geopolitical climate fifty years ago “the visible distinction

between war and peace is less clear” in the 21st Century.27 The DoD has referred to

the on-going military transformation as “a process that shapes the changing nature of

military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts,

capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect

against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps

underpin peace and stability in the world.” 28

According to official policy documents such as the Pentagon’s Quadrennial

Defense Review (QDR) and the Whitehouse’s National Security Strategy (NSS), the

US has been increasingly focused on unconventional warfare. The Bush

administration’s post-9/11 focus on asymmetric threats merits a thorough


26
Perrett, B. “RAAF Hedges JSF Bet with Super Hornet”, Aviation Week and Space Technology,
1/2/2007.
27
United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006 (p.75).
28
“Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach,” U.S. Dept. of Defense,
http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_297_MT_StrategyDoc1.pdf
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examination of the F-35’s pertinence to the United States’ contemporary strategic

orientation. Furthermore, by delineating the F-35’s intended role in the idiosyncratic

conflicts that characterize the modern battlefield, its relevant capabilities can be more

easily compared to existing tactical combat aircraft.

The 2006 NSS and QDR provide ample evidence of Washington’s shift in

strategic guidance. In an attempt to enhance the United States’ national security in the

21st century, the NSS emphasizes several policy foci relevant to the F-35’s

development. First, according to the 2006 edition of the NSS, the Department of

Defense is instructed to support initiatives that “adapt and build to meet new

challenges”.29 The 2006 NSS also states that in addition to its traditional military

orientation, the DoD’s contemporary transformational efforts should focus on

addressing asymmetric, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges.30

Asymmetric challenges include state and sub-state actors that employ terrorism

as a means of countering the United States’ relative conventional military advantages.

In addition to terrorism and insurgency, asymmetric threats to regional security

include transnational organized crime, maritime piracy and international drug

trafficking. According to the NSS, the acquisition or employment of chemical,

biological or nuclear weapons by state or sub-state actors constitute a catastrophic

challenge. In contrast, disruptive challenges seek to undermine the United States’ relative

29
United States of America, National Security Council. National Security Strategy, 2006 (p.43).
30
Ibid. (p.44).
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military advantage by employing innovative technologies and capabilities, including

cyber-warfare and biotechnology, or directed energy weapons such as electromagnetic

pulse (EMP) and high-power microwave (HPM) devices.31

Rather than concentrating on traditional combat operations, the Pentagon’s

2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) encourages shifting the DoD’s emphasis

“from focusing primarily on traditional combat operations toward greater capability to

deal with asymmetric challenges”.32 The 2006 QDR emphasizes the development of

long-range strike capabilities. For example, “the Air Force has set a goal of increasing

its long-range strike capabilities by 50% and the penetrating component of long-range

strike by a factor of five by 2025. Approximately 45% of the future long-range strike

force will be unmanned.”33

According to the QDR, the DoD should be focused on developing intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) technologies.34 The report specifically mentions

increasing the United States’ “investment in unmanned aerial vehicles to provide more

flexible capabilities to identify and track moving targets in denied areas”. 35 JSF

contractors and the DoD assert that in addition to using the F-35’s advanced sensors

to collect ISR information, the F-35 can also be used to generate electronic warfare

effects “such as false targets and other misleading data [which can] be fired as a data

31
Ibid. (p.44).
32
United States of America, Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006 (p.46).
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid. (p.55).
35
Ibid. (p.57).
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stream into the radars and sensors of other aircraft, missiles and air defense arrays at

ranges of 100 miles or more”.36 However, JSF advocates often neglect to mention that

the F-35 does not provide anything resembling the stand-off capabilities, or relatively

low cost (expendability) of unmanned aerial vehicles. For example, the MQ-9 Reaper,

with a payload capacity of 3,800 pounds, the ability to loiter for fifteen hours, and a

per-unit cost of approximately $14 million, undoubtedly trumps the F-35 in terms of

cost effectiveness.37

The QDR states that “the future force will define ISR needs by sensor or type

of intelligence needed rather than the platforms that carry the sensors or the medium

in which they operate”.38 Compared to manned fixed-wing aircraft, unmanned aerial

vehicles (UAVs) represent a more dynamic and cost-effective method of conducting

electronic warfare (EW) and gathering ISR information, yet the F-35 is nevertheless

being developed as an alternative to the capabilities provided by UAVs.39 40

In addition to official statements in policy documents such as the QDR and

NSS, key political leaders have repeatedly opined that future military conflicts will be

unconventional in nature and that UAVs will be a primary asset in such wars. In a

speech delivered at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, defense secretary Robert

Gates stated that “lives are going to be saved” by increasing the number of UAVs in
36
Fulghum, D. “Stealth Rules”, Aviation Week and Space Technology. 6/18/2007, Vol. 166, Issue 23.
37
http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=6405&page=5 - Accessed 4/17/08
38
United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006 (p.55).
39
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/capabilities/net_centric_solutions/battlespace_awareness/index.html -
Accessed 4/17/2008
40
Defense Industry Daily, “Supersonic SIGINT: Will F-35, F-22 Also Play EW Role?”. 10/24/2005
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the United States’ arsenal. In the same speech, Secretary Gates also asserted that

“asymmetrical conflict will be the dominant battlefield for decades to come, and that

procurement [policies] have to focus on that reality”.41

Without the necessary security clearance, one can only speculate why the Joint

Strike Fighter program remains fully funded, despite Washington’s political emphasis

on developing long-range, unmanned strike capabilities. One potential explanation is

that the F-35 is intended to eventually form the chassis for the Joint Unmanned

Combat Air System (J-UCAS). “In fact, the F-35 is being designed with the data links

necessary for this role”.42 The J-UCAS platform is intended to be an “unmanned

long-range carrier-based aircraft capable of being air-refueled to provide a greater

standoff capability, expand payload and launch options, and increase naval reach and

persistence.”43

41
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1231
42
Aboulafia, R. “Fighter Makers Reassess Options”, Aviation Week, 3/1/2004.
43
United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006 (p.46).
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A Fighter Lost in Time?

The F-35 is designed for conventional combat against a peer-competitor. As a

fifth generation fighter aircraft, the F-35’s primary advantage over fourth generation

“legacy” platforms resides in its design characteristics, specifically its structural design,

stealth capabilities, avionics, and armament. These very traits suggest that the F-35 is

intended to fight an enemy possessing a level of technical sophistication relatively

comparable to that of the United States.

The F-35 is intended to be “four times more effective than legacy fighters in

air-to-air engagements; eight times more effective than legacy fighters in prosecuting

missions against fixed and mobile targets; three times more effective than legacy

fighters...in Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) and Destruction of Enemy

Air Defenses (DEAD) missions; [and] about the same in procurement cost as legacy

aircraft.”44 However, for the purpose of addressing unconventional challenges, this

increase in technical sophistication is largely unnecessary.

44
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008
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Few nations or sub-state actors possess the radar or target acquisition

technologies necessary to reliably counter the stealth capabilities of the F-117

Nighthawk or the B-2 Spirit. Nevertheless, the F-35 has been designed to create a radar

cross section (RCS) lower than the F-117 and comparable to that of the B-2.

According to most sources, the F-35 has an RCS equivalent to a metal golf ball

(approximately 0.0015 meters squared).45 The technologies and design traits generally

responsible for the F-35’s relatively small RCS include its integrated airframe,

advanced component materials, axisymmetric nozzle, and internal weapons bay.

In designing the F-35’s airframe, specifically its wing and tail segments,

Lockheed Martin used “planform alignment”, a stealth-enhancing technique that

creates identical sweep angles in the leading and trailing edges of the aircraft’s wing

and tail surfaces.46 Nevertheless, compared to the impressive stealth characteristics of

platforms such as the B-2 Spirit or the F-22 Raptor, Lockheed Martin would be hard-

pressed to justify the amount of time and money that has been devoted to the

development of the F-35’s stealth characteristics.

The F-35’s sophisticated avionics suite includes multi-mission Active

Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar; Distributed Aperture System (DAS)47;

Electro-Optical and Targeting System (EOTS)48; and the Helmet Mounted Display

45
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008
46
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008
47
Appendix B
48
Appendix C
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System (HMDS) 49. Although these systems generally increase the aircraft’s

survivability, the advantage they provide over existing avionics systems only present

themselves when pitted against relatively technologically advanced adversaries. For

example, the AESA radar, DAS, EOTS and HMDS systems are designed to increase

the F-35’s combat effectiveness against long-range air and ground targets such as

fighter aircraft, bombers, helicopters, and tanks. However, such weapons systems are

unlikely to be available to less-developed states and sub-state actors such as terrorists

and militant insurgents.

The F-35’s armament is best suited for use against weapons unlikely to be in

the possession of sub-state actors, specifically advanced tactical combat aircraft.

Lockheed Martin has made design compromises that sacrifice the F-35’s ability to

attack ground targets in favor of air-to-air capabilities. In addition to assorted air-to-

ground weapons, the F-35 is designed to carry AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range

Anti-Aircraft Missiles (AMRAAM) and AIM-132 Advanced Short Range Anti-Aircraft

Missiles (ASRAAM). 50 The F-35’s stealth characteristics rely greatly on the aircraft

carrying its weapons internally, but its two internal bays are only capable of carrying

one 2000 pound class weapon and one AMRAAM/ASRAAM per bay.51 Beyond that,

49
Appendix D
50
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008
51
Appendix E
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additional weapons must be attached to the external centerline pylon or outer

hardpoints; diminishing the aircraft’s stealth characteristics.52

Tactical Capabilities in Unconventional Warfare

Idiosyncratic, or unconventional, conflict typically involves sub-state actors in

localized theaters of operation. A successful unconventional warfare platform should

be adept at providing close air support (CAS), conducting precision air-to-ground

strikes, or collecting ISR data. The F-35 is often characterized as an ideal weapons

system with which to combat unconventional threats due to its supposed ISR, CAS

and air-to-ground attack capabilities.53 However, aircraft already in the United States’

arsenal are equally, if not more, capable of providing such functions.

A-10 F/A-18 E/F F-16 E/F MQ-9 B-2 F-35

Function Close Air Multirole Multirole Unmanned Multirole Multirole


Support Fighter Fighter Hunter/Killer Heavy Bomber Fighter
Payload 16,000 lbs 17,750 lbs 20,000+ lbs 3,800 lbs 40,000 lbs 15,000 lbs
Range 800 miles 1,600+ miles 2,400+ miles 3,700 miles 6,400 miles 1,600 miles
Cost $13 million $57 million $30+ million $14 million $1 billion54 $100 million55

52
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008
53
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008
54
(Unlike the F-35, at least 21 aircraft already exist and flyaway cost is unlikely to increase significantly)

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The F-35A is intended to conduct ground strike and close air support missions,

yet the Air Force already possesses several aircraft with those capabilities. The A-10

Thunderbolt II and MQ-9 Reaper are proven CAS platforms that can be acquired for a

fraction of the F-35’s anticipated cost. The A-10 Thunderbolt II, developed by

Fairchild-Republic during the 1970s, has repeatedly demonstrated its military value in

a number of operations since its official fielding in 1977, but truly distinguished itself

as a CAS platform during the first Gulf War.

A-10 Targets During “Operation Desert Storm” Confirmed Kills


Tanks 987
Artillery 926
APCs 501
Trucks 1,106
Command Vehicles 249
Military Structures 112
Radars 96
Helicopters (Air to Air) 2
Bunkers 72
Scud Missiles 51
Anti-Aircraft Artillery 50
Command Post 28
Frog Missiles 11
SAMs 9
Fuel Tanks 8
Fighters (Air to Ground) 10
Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/a-10-history.htm

Since the United States is unlikely to become involved in an unconventional

conflict in which the enemy possesses capabilities more sophisticated than Saddam

55
2005 estimate.

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Hussein’s pre-1991 military force, it stands to reason that the A-10 is sufficiently

capable of providing CAS for unconventional operations well into the 21 st century.

The MQ-9 Reaper (formerly known as the RQ-9 Predator-B) is an unmanned

aerial vehicle produced by General Atomics for the Air Force and the Navy. The MQ-

9 is a tactically flexible, remotely piloted medium to high altitude aircraft capable of

loitering in place for extended periods of time. According to the Air Force,

[t]he MQ-9's primary mission is as a persistent hunter-killer against emerging


targets to achieve joint force commander objectives. The MQ-9's alternate
mission is to act as an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance asset,
employing sensors to provide real-time data to commanders and intelligence
specialists at all levels.56

UAVs such as the MQ-9 have an excellent track record in supporting special

operations and performing a wide variety of tasks applicable to unconventional

operations; from conducting air-to-ground attacks to collecting ISR data.57

Since the F-22 Raptor has effectively established itself as the world’s

uncontested air-superiority fighter, the Air Force would like to see the F-35A excel in

air-to-ground attack missions, a notable weakness of the F-22 platform. However, the

JSF program’s repeated delays and continuously escalating development costs

predicate a reassessment of the F-35’s relative value in idiosyncratic warfare. Two

aircraft in particular stand out as viable alternatives to the F-35 in terms of their

ground attack capabilities: the F-16E/F Fighting Falcon and the B-2 Spirit.

56
http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=6405 – Accessed 4/18/2008
57
“Air Force's hunter-killer UAV now flying in Afghanistan”, United States Air Force, Press Release. 10/11/2007

-24-
Lockheed Martin’s “Block-60” F-16E/F multi-role tactical combat aircraft is

the most sophisticated variant of the F-16 platform originally developed and fielded

by General Dynamics in 1978. The F-16E/F features upgraded avionics suits, AESA

radar capabilities and conformal fuel tanks that increase its stealth characteristics and

operational radius. Compared to the F-35, the F-16 can carry a larger weapons

payload and can be fitted with a greater variety of ordinance.

Northrop Grumman’s B-2A Spirit stealth bomber is a highly capable air-to-

ground attack platform. In addition to its remarkable stealth characteristics, the B-2’s

operational radius and payload capacity make it a formidable aircraft in just about any

type of conflict. The B-2 has a range of approximately 6,400 miles, allowing the

aircraft to be launched from the continental United States and strike targets around

the world with minimal refueling, and its two internal weapons bays allow it to carry

50,000 pounds of ordinance.

In addition to broader strategic objectives, the Navy and Marine Corps plan to

use the F-35B and F-35C to gain tactical advantages in ground attack and ISR

missions. However, with respect to conducting unconventional warfare operations,

other platforms are equally capable. The Navy’s preeminent carrier-based aircraft, the

F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, would provide virtually identical advantages in

unconventional warfare as the F-35C, including CAS, SEAD/DEAD, and ISR

capabilities.

-25-
The primary benefit of employing alternative platforms such as the F-16, B-2,

A-10, F/A-18, and MQ-9 in unconventional warfare is that they already exist. The

services do not need to deal with delays in procurement or acquisition and the

development costs have already been paid. Furthermore, the upgrade and

maintenance expenses have been accounted for, whereas in the F-35 such long-term

costs have yet to be precisely determined.

One could make the argument that legacy aircraft are out of date and need to

be replaced by newer systems in order to stay ahead of potential peer-competitors.

However, the United States continues to successfully operate weapons systems much

older than the A-10 or the F/A-18. For example, the Air Force’s B-52 Stratofortress was

introduced in 1955, while the Navy’s CVN-68 Nimitz class supercarrier was first

commissioned in 1975. The B-52 and CVN-68 remain in service due to regular

upgrades to critical systems, modifications which allow them to remain militarily

effective. Similarly upgrading platforms such as the A-10 and F/A-18 will allow them

to remain effective well into the 21st century. For example, upgrades to the A-10

include

[…] precision engagement modification, which adds upgraded cockpit displays,


moving map, hands on throttle and stick, digital stores management,
LITENING and Sniper advanced targeting pod integration, situational
awareness data link or SADL, GPS-guided weapons, and upgraded DC power.
Precision engagement modified aircraft are designated as the A-10C.58

Meanwhile, the latest iteration of the venerable F/A-18, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet,

58
http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=70 – Accessed 4/18/2008

-26-
[…] is highly capable across the full mission spectrum: air superiority, fighter
escort, reconnaissance, aerial refueling, close air support, air defense
suppression and day/night precision strike missions. Compared to the original
F/A-18 A through D models, Super Hornet has longer range, an aerial
refueling capability, increased survivability/lethality and improved carrier
suitability.59

Another common argument is that high-budget development programs such as

the F-35 are necessary in order to keep the United States’ defense industry

technologically competitive and up to date, vis-à-vis potential peer-competitors. This

is an incredibly weak argument, primarily because the aforementioned avionics and

munitions upgrades to extant aircraft facilitate capabilities identical to the F-35. Ipso

facto, upgrading legacy aircraft provides the defense industry with technological

expertise similar to that derived from the development of fifth generation platforms

such as the Joint Strike Fighter.

Given enough time and money, the F-35 could eventually become a valuable

asset in unconventional warfare. However, the US is currently involved in several

different idiosyncratic conflicts around the world and aircraft presently in the United

States’ arsenal are capable of providing similar, if not identical capabilities to those of

the F-35. In light of the persistent technical concerns, budget overruns, and

production delays associated with the JSF program, alternative weapons systems

deserve serious consideration.

59
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1100&tid=1200&ct=1 – Accessed 4/18/2008

-27-
Qualification

Despite its many flaws, the F-35 should not be underestimated as a

revolutionary tactical combat aircraft. The F-35 is designed for combat against a

relatively technologically sophisticated enemy; a highly improbable scenario in the

contemporary geopolitical environment. However, it would be strategically imprudent

to categorically dismiss the possible resurgence of a hostile peer competitor in the

future, especially given the 10-15 year procurement-acquisition cycles involved with

purchasing new tactical combat aircraft.

Michael Wynne, the Secretary of the Air Force, contends that the United States’

current strategic focus on unconventional warfare does not absolve the DoD of its

obligation to prepare for geopolitical environments characterized by other types of

-28-
conflict. Despite the F-35’s escalating development cost, Secretary Wynne’s position is

that he does not want to “leave the President bereft of a warm fifth-generation fighter

line if the world should go in a different direction"60

Another fact worth mentioning is that while the F-35’s stealth characteristics

may appear paltry in comparison to those of the F-2261, the F-35 is impressively

stealthy compared to the majority of tactical combat aircraft. With an RCS of about

0.0015 meters squared, the F-35 is truly remarkable; especially when one considers

that the RCS of a Russian MiG-29 is approximately five meters squared.62

60
Fulghum, D. and Butler, A. “JSF Cost Could Jump 35% If Congress Cuts Production”, Aviation
Week, 9/17/06.
61
The F-22’s RCS is between 0.0001 and 0.0002 meters squared.
62
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008
-29-
Conclusion

The United States’ current vision of military transformation is utterly

dependent on high-tech weaponry instead of soldiers, and the F-35 exemplifies this

mode of thinking. Arguably, the concepts of military transformation and overstretch

are inextricably connetcted. Only in light of a potential second war in the Middle East,

this time with Iran, has the US military establishment become cognizant of the real

dangers associated with eliminating redundancy in favor of specialization. The F-35

does not confer any significant tactical advantage over existing weapons platforms.

Aircraft such as the A-10, F-16 and F/A-18 provide overlapping capabilities, and

remain as relevant in the current geopolitical environment as they did at the height of

the Cold War. US policy makers would do well to remember that in war, redundancy

is an inherently valuable trait.

-30-
The F-35 is a product of the DoD’s revolution in military affairs, a misguided

effort to apply contemporary business practices (such as total quality management, velocity

management and just-in-time logistics) to warfare in pursuit of cost efficiency.

Unfortunately, the practical effect of this search for efficiency is that each individual

service now provides essentially the same function: the ability to identify and destroy

targets from great distances, creating precisely the type of redundancy that the

Pentagon’s procurement and acquisition policies sought to avoid. Despite

congressional efforts to enlarge the military, bureaucratic gravitation within the DoD

toward Rumsfeld’s vision of transformation was overwhelming, eschewing a larger

and more redundant military in favor of a smaller and supposedly more efficient one.

Instead of producing weapons that exploit the United States’ relative

technological superiority and expand its tactical and strategic advantage in

unconventional warfare, the military is developing weapons designed to combat a

peer-competitor in major theater warfare. Rather than embracing the tactical

advantages offered by overlapping weapons systems, the DoD isolated the various

tactical characteristics that brought the US military so much success in the early post-

Cold War period and attempted to combine them all into a single platform, effectively

nullifying the battlefield advantages provided by redundant capabilities, while

simultaneously creating unrealistic operational requirements. For example, although

the very notion of amalgamating a lumbering, heavily armored CAS platform and a

-31-
highly agile dogfighter may seem highly unrealistic, it epitomizes the intended purpose

of the Joint Strike Fighter.

The authorization process associated with procurement and acquisition

projects is severely flawed. Despite the United States’ official shift in strategic

emphasis toward unconventional conflict, the military-industrial complex continues to

produce weapons designed for the Cold War, and the F-35 is a patent example of this

mentality. American strategic prerogatives and the development initiatives of the

defense industry should not be at odds. If the military and political establishment

deems the F-35 worthy of tens of billions in taxpayer dollars, it should ensure that the

United States’ grand national strategy accurately reflects the rationale behind that

decision, rather than using dubious tactical and strategic equivocations to validate the

development of major weapons systems post-hoc.

-32-
Appendix A

-33-
Appendix B

-34-
Figure 1 (Courtesy of http://www.jsf.mil/images/f35/f35_technology_das.jpg)

Appendix C

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-36-
Appendix D

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Appendix E

-38-
Appendix F

Appendix 4

-39-

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