Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
Anthony F. Hillen
Master of Arts: Security Studies
Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University
May 2008
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Contents
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................ 3
Qualification ..................................................................................................................................................... 28
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................... 30
Appendix A .......................................................................................................................................................... 33
Appendix B ........................................................................................................................................................... 34
Appendix C ........................................................................................................................................................... 35
Appendix D........................................................................................................................................................... 37
Appendix E ........................................................................................................................................................... 38
Appendix F ........................................................................................................................................................... 39
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Introduction
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program began in the early 1990s as a result of
Procurement, Acquisition Policy and Strategic Sourcing (DPAP) office, the program
seeks to produce a versatile new combat aircraft with reduced life-cycle costs.1 Now
referred to as the F-35 Lightning II, the JSF has been touted as an “affordable multi-
role fighter with precision engagement capabilities and the flexibility to conduct joint
operations well into the future”.2 The F-35 is undoubtedly a highly advanced and
formidable weapons platform; however, the aircraft was designed for tactical and
Since September 11th 2001, the American military and political establishments
challenges. Nevertheless, instead of producing weapons that exploit the United States’
military threats, one can only wonder why the government continues to spend billions
1
http://jsf.mil/f35/f35_background.htm - Accessed 03/21/2008
2
Ibid.
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of dollars in taxpayer’s money developing weapons systems for a bygone era. The F-
This paper argues that the F-35 Lightning II was originally designed for the Cold
War and immediate post-Cold War geopolitical environment. As official policies and
strategic priorities began to shift, so did the aircraft’s ostensible purpose. The Joint
cultures can have a more significant influence on the development of major weapons
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The Joint Strike Fighter Program
The main focus of this analysis is to determine whether the F-35 is being
whether armament and avionics upgrades to existing aircraft could render the
development of a new platform with redundant tactical capabilities little more than a
questions. The F-35 is designed around assumptions and general modes of thinking
dating back to the Cold War. At the behest of the platform’s corporate developers
and the DoD itself, the US military will be forced to integrate new technologies with
existing weapons systems and tactical doctrines, a concept historically anathema to the
In three steps, this project aims to demonstrate that the development of the F-
35 contradicts the United States’ general strategic policy, and does not confer any
After a brief history of the aircraft’s genesis, I provide evidence that the United States’
warfare. However, since most wars are by definition asymmetric, this paper will refer to
3
Hall, B. Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe: Gunpowder, Technology and Tactics, Johns Hopkins
University Press; New Edition (12/18/2001).
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such conflict as idiosyncratic or unconventional warfare. The second section argues that
the F-35 is designed for major-theater operations against a peer competitor, and not
paper, I contend that existing aircraft possess capabilities similar, if not identical, to
The general idea behind the Joint Strike Fighter program is to develop a
versatile and cost-effective tactical combat aircraft. The program intends to produce a
the aircraft’s per-unit cost.4 The JSF is designed to be highly flexible in terms of both
mission capabilities and future technological developments. Long-term plans for the
(CDDR) contracts. For the duration of their fifteen-month contracts, each company
refined their Preferred Weapons System Concept (PWSC) designs and subjected them
4 Selinger, M. “F-35 Trumps F/A-22 in Latest Defense Department Budget Battle”, Aviation Week, 1/4/2005.
5
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008.
6
http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/abl/news/2001/033001.html - Accessed
5/1/2008.
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to a number of risk reduction assessments, including powered short take-off and
vertical landing (STOVL) tests, engineering analyses, and wind tunnel tests.7
All four contenders chose the F119 Pratt & Whitney (P&W) engine to power
their test aircraft. Accordingly, P&W received a $4 billion contract to develop the F-
135 propulsion system in November 1995. The JSF program’s acquisition strategy
designs. The Pratt & Whitney system was to compete with a similar propulsion system
designed by General Electric (GE). The competition was initially scheduled to begin
in 2011 and continue for the duration of the JSF program to mitigate development
with this turn of events, the cancellation of the GE contract is unlikely to benefit the
aircraft.
DPAP has come to the conclusion that funding an alternate engine program at
competitive strategy could result in savings equal to or greater than the engine’s life
7
http://www.jsf.mil/history/his_jsf.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008.
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industrial base stability are more likely outcomes under a competitive
environment than under a sole-source strategy.8
In May 1996, the Department of Defense officially designated the JSF program
implying at least $355 million9 in research, development and evaluation costs.10 Prime
Boeing were awarded the CDP contract, McDonnell Douglas was eliminated, and
Northrop Grumman merged its team with Lockheed Martin and British Aerospace.11
Aldridge announced the Pentagon’s decision to continue the JSF program by initiating
the next phase of its development: System Development and Demonstration (SDD).
Shortly thereafter, the Secretary of the Air Force, James Roche, declared Lockheed
Martin the winner of the fly-off competition and the $19 billion development
contract.12
8
Sullivan, M. Government Accountability Office. Joint Strike Fighter: Impact of Recent Decisions on
Program Risks, GAO-08-569T, 3/11/2008.
9
(based on fiscal year 1996 constant dollars)
10
United States Code of Law, Title 10, Subtitle A , Part IV , Chapter 144, Article 2430
11
http://www.jsf.mil/history/his_jsf.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008
12
http://www.jsf.mil/history/his_f35.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008
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The F-35 Lightning II
The Joint Strike Fighter, now known as the F-35 Lightning II, remains in the
platform, capable of meeting the operational requirements of the United States’ Air
Force, Navy and Marine Corps, while simultaneously maintaining an affordable flyaway
cost.13
There are currently three variations of the F-35, each designed to cater to the
specific needs of the individual service branches. The Air Force’s F-35A is optimized
A-10 Thunderbolt II and the mission profile versatility14 of the venerable F-16. The F-
35B is the Marine Corp’s short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) version of the
JSF, slated to replace the AV-8B Harrier. Finally, the Navy’s F-35C variant is
optimized for carrier-based operations and intended to replace the F/A-18 Hornet.
13
With regard to aircraft procurement and acquisition, “flyaway cost” refers to a firm unit price.
14
Tthe ability to conduct a wide range of mission types.
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According to its developers, the F-35 offers numerous advantages over existing
in addition to its on-board countermeasures, the F-35’s reduced radio frequency and
sensor arrays increases the pilot’s situational awareness, and ensures the accurate
Proponents of the JSF program argue that the aircraft’s combat capabilities are
controversially suggest that the United States’ numerical strength and military force
structure can be improved by the F-35’s reduced development and procurement costs.
However, this seems highly unlikely, especially given the JSF program’s steadily
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According to detractors, the JSF program’s complications are primarily due
repeated design compromises and persistent budget overruns. The F-35’s weight has
been a constant problem over the course of its development.15 However, according to
the DoD, recent design changes have made this less of a problem than it once was.16
the DoD allege. The Joint Strike Fighter has been advertised as a template for next
generation strike aircraft, yet the F-35 does not feature cutting-edge technologies such
Despite repeated denials by the DoD and its primary contractors, recurrent
delays, cost increases, and budget overruns have plagued the JSF program since its
initiation.19 With regard to the F-35’s procurement costs and development timetable,
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has stated that the program has
repeatedly exceeded its budget and continues to remain behind schedule.20 According
to the latest GAO report on the JSF program, Lockheed Martin “has extended
manufacturing schedules several times, but test aircraft delivery dates continue to slip.
15
Butler, A. and Wall, R. “Cost and Effect”, Aviation Week and Space Technology. 4/2/2007, Vol. 166,
Issue 13.
16
“With Weight Issues Resolved, F-35 Focus Turns to Production”, Lockheed Martin, Press Release.
11/14/2004
17
http://www.jsf.mil – Accessed 5/2/2008
18
Fulghum, D. “Stealth Rules”, Aviation Week and Space Technology. 6/18/2007, Vol. 166, Issue 23.
19
“U.S. Government Report Shows Decreased Costs for F-35 Program”, Lockheed Martin, Press
Release. 4/8/2008
20
Appendix A
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The flight test program has barely begun, but faces substantial risks with reduced
assets as design and manufacturing problems continue to cause delays that further
One potential explanation for these delays is that the program’s management
reserves are being spent at a rate faster than anticipated, due to shifting design
According to the GAO’s most recent estimates (as of March 2008), the F-35’s
The JSF program’s rising cost does not only affect the United States. The F-35
is more than just a DoD procurement and acquisition initiative, it is also cooperative
international effort. Compared to other tactical combat aircraft, the F-35’s initial
21
Government Accountability Office. Joint Strike Fighter: Recent Decisions by DoD Add to Program Risks,
GAO-08-388, March 2008. (p.3)
22
Appendix F
23
Sullivan, M. Government Accountability Office. Joint Strike Fighter: Impact of Recent Decisions on
Program Risks, GAO-08-569T, 3/11/2008.
24
Sullivan, M. Government Accountability Office. Joint Strike Fighter: Impact of Recent Decisions on
Program Risks, GAO-08-569T, 3/11/2008.
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cooperation. However, due to the recurrent technical setbacks and steadily increasing
development costs, two of the United States’ principal JSF development partners, the
United Kingdom and Australia, have become remarkably reticent in terms of their
Despite being the only “Level 1” international partner associated with the
program, the UK has made it abundantly clear that its commitment to the F-35 hinges
capabilities and the source code for its supportability and avionics systems.25 This
recent shift in policy could indicate that the UK is no longer certain that the program
will be followed through to completion, opting instead to recoup the $2.5 billion it
invested in the JSF program by securing proprietary access to the aircraft’s hardware
and software.
The UK is not the only international partner having second thoughts about the
JSF program. After contributing over $144 million to the program, the Royal
Australian Air Force (RAAF) is uncertain of the F-35’s viability as a mainstay weapons
25
Barrie, D. and Butler, A. “Lightning Strikes Out”, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 10/1/2007.
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replacements for its much larger F-111 strike bombers [shows] just how nervous it is
Compared to the geopolitical climate fifty years ago “the visible distinction
between war and peace is less clear” in the 21st Century.27 The DoD has referred to
the on-going military transformation as “a process that shapes the changing nature of
capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect
against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps
Defense Review (QDR) and the Whitehouse’s National Security Strategy (NSS), the
conflicts that characterize the modern battlefield, its relevant capabilities can be more
The 2006 NSS and QDR provide ample evidence of Washington’s shift in
strategic guidance. In an attempt to enhance the United States’ national security in the
21st century, the NSS emphasizes several policy foci relevant to the F-35’s
development. First, according to the 2006 edition of the NSS, the Department of
Defense is instructed to support initiatives that “adapt and build to meet new
challenges”.29 The 2006 NSS also states that in addition to its traditional military
Asymmetric challenges include state and sub-state actors that employ terrorism
challenge. In contrast, disruptive challenges seek to undermine the United States’ relative
29
United States of America, National Security Council. National Security Strategy, 2006 (p.43).
30
Ibid. (p.44).
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military advantage by employing innovative technologies and capabilities, including
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) encourages shifting the DoD’s emphasis
deal with asymmetric challenges”.32 The 2006 QDR emphasizes the development of
long-range strike capabilities. For example, “the Air Force has set a goal of increasing
its long-range strike capabilities by 50% and the penetrating component of long-range
strike by a factor of five by 2025. Approximately 45% of the future long-range strike
increasing the United States’ “investment in unmanned aerial vehicles to provide more
flexible capabilities to identify and track moving targets in denied areas”. 35 JSF
contractors and the DoD assert that in addition to using the F-35’s advanced sensors
to collect ISR information, the F-35 can also be used to generate electronic warfare
effects “such as false targets and other misleading data [which can] be fired as a data
31
Ibid. (p.44).
32
United States of America, Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006 (p.46).
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid. (p.55).
35
Ibid. (p.57).
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stream into the radars and sensors of other aircraft, missiles and air defense arrays at
ranges of 100 miles or more”.36 However, JSF advocates often neglect to mention that
the F-35 does not provide anything resembling the stand-off capabilities, or relatively
low cost (expendability) of unmanned aerial vehicles. For example, the MQ-9 Reaper,
with a payload capacity of 3,800 pounds, the ability to loiter for fifteen hours, and a
per-unit cost of approximately $14 million, undoubtedly trumps the F-35 in terms of
cost effectiveness.37
The QDR states that “the future force will define ISR needs by sensor or type
of intelligence needed rather than the platforms that carry the sensors or the medium
electronic warfare (EW) and gathering ISR information, yet the F-35 is nevertheless
NSS, key political leaders have repeatedly opined that future military conflicts will be
unconventional in nature and that UAVs will be a primary asset in such wars. In a
speech delivered at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, defense secretary Robert
Gates stated that “lives are going to be saved” by increasing the number of UAVs in
36
Fulghum, D. “Stealth Rules”, Aviation Week and Space Technology. 6/18/2007, Vol. 166, Issue 23.
37
http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=6405&page=5 - Accessed 4/17/08
38
United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006 (p.55).
39
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/capabilities/net_centric_solutions/battlespace_awareness/index.html -
Accessed 4/17/2008
40
Defense Industry Daily, “Supersonic SIGINT: Will F-35, F-22 Also Play EW Role?”. 10/24/2005
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the United States’ arsenal. In the same speech, Secretary Gates also asserted that
“asymmetrical conflict will be the dominant battlefield for decades to come, and that
Without the necessary security clearance, one can only speculate why the Joint
Strike Fighter program remains fully funded, despite Washington’s political emphasis
that the F-35 is intended to eventually form the chassis for the Joint Unmanned
Combat Air System (J-UCAS). “In fact, the F-35 is being designed with the data links
standoff capability, expand payload and launch options, and increase naval reach and
persistence.”43
41
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1231
42
Aboulafia, R. “Fighter Makers Reassess Options”, Aviation Week, 3/1/2004.
43
United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006 (p.46).
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A Fighter Lost in Time?
fifth generation fighter aircraft, the F-35’s primary advantage over fourth generation
“legacy” platforms resides in its design characteristics, specifically its structural design,
stealth capabilities, avionics, and armament. These very traits suggest that the F-35 is
The F-35 is intended to be “four times more effective than legacy fighters in
air-to-air engagements; eight times more effective than legacy fighters in prosecuting
missions against fixed and mobile targets; three times more effective than legacy
Air Defenses (DEAD) missions; [and] about the same in procurement cost as legacy
44
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008
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Few nations or sub-state actors possess the radar or target acquisition
Nighthawk or the B-2 Spirit. Nevertheless, the F-35 has been designed to create a radar
cross section (RCS) lower than the F-117 and comparable to that of the B-2.
According to most sources, the F-35 has an RCS equivalent to a metal golf ball
(approximately 0.0015 meters squared).45 The technologies and design traits generally
responsible for the F-35’s relatively small RCS include its integrated airframe,
In designing the F-35’s airframe, specifically its wing and tail segments,
creates identical sweep angles in the leading and trailing edges of the aircraft’s wing
platforms such as the B-2 Spirit or the F-22 Raptor, Lockheed Martin would be hard-
pressed to justify the amount of time and money that has been devoted to the
Electro-Optical and Targeting System (EOTS)48; and the Helmet Mounted Display
45
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008
46
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008
47
Appendix B
48
Appendix C
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System (HMDS) 49. Although these systems generally increase the aircraft’s
survivability, the advantage they provide over existing avionics systems only present
example, the AESA radar, DAS, EOTS and HMDS systems are designed to increase
the F-35’s combat effectiveness against long-range air and ground targets such as
fighter aircraft, bombers, helicopters, and tanks. However, such weapons systems are
The F-35’s armament is best suited for use against weapons unlikely to be in
Lockheed Martin has made design compromises that sacrifice the F-35’s ability to
ground weapons, the F-35 is designed to carry AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range
Missiles (ASRAAM). 50 The F-35’s stealth characteristics rely greatly on the aircraft
carrying its weapons internally, but its two internal bays are only capable of carrying
one 2000 pound class weapon and one AMRAAM/ASRAAM per bay.51 Beyond that,
49
Appendix D
50
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008
51
Appendix E
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additional weapons must be attached to the external centerline pylon or outer
strikes, or collecting ISR data. The F-35 is often characterized as an ideal weapons
system with which to combat unconventional threats due to its supposed ISR, CAS
and air-to-ground attack capabilities.53 However, aircraft already in the United States’
52
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008
53
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008
54
(Unlike the F-35, at least 21 aircraft already exist and flyaway cost is unlikely to increase significantly)
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The F-35A is intended to conduct ground strike and close air support missions,
yet the Air Force already possesses several aircraft with those capabilities. The A-10
Thunderbolt II and MQ-9 Reaper are proven CAS platforms that can be acquired for a
fraction of the F-35’s anticipated cost. The A-10 Thunderbolt II, developed by
Fairchild-Republic during the 1970s, has repeatedly demonstrated its military value in
a number of operations since its official fielding in 1977, but truly distinguished itself
conflict in which the enemy possesses capabilities more sophisticated than Saddam
55
2005 estimate.
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Hussein’s pre-1991 military force, it stands to reason that the A-10 is sufficiently
capable of providing CAS for unconventional operations well into the 21 st century.
aerial vehicle produced by General Atomics for the Air Force and the Navy. The MQ-
loitering in place for extended periods of time. According to the Air Force,
UAVs such as the MQ-9 have an excellent track record in supporting special
Since the F-22 Raptor has effectively established itself as the world’s
uncontested air-superiority fighter, the Air Force would like to see the F-35A excel in
air-to-ground attack missions, a notable weakness of the F-22 platform. However, the
aircraft in particular stand out as viable alternatives to the F-35 in terms of their
ground attack capabilities: the F-16E/F Fighting Falcon and the B-2 Spirit.
56
http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=6405 – Accessed 4/18/2008
57
“Air Force's hunter-killer UAV now flying in Afghanistan”, United States Air Force, Press Release. 10/11/2007
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Lockheed Martin’s “Block-60” F-16E/F multi-role tactical combat aircraft is
the most sophisticated variant of the F-16 platform originally developed and fielded
by General Dynamics in 1978. The F-16E/F features upgraded avionics suits, AESA
radar capabilities and conformal fuel tanks that increase its stealth characteristics and
operational radius. Compared to the F-35, the F-16 can carry a larger weapons
ground attack platform. In addition to its remarkable stealth characteristics, the B-2’s
operational radius and payload capacity make it a formidable aircraft in just about any
type of conflict. The B-2 has a range of approximately 6,400 miles, allowing the
aircraft to be launched from the continental United States and strike targets around
the world with minimal refueling, and its two internal weapons bays allow it to carry
In addition to broader strategic objectives, the Navy and Marine Corps plan to
use the F-35B and F-35C to gain tactical advantages in ground attack and ISR
other platforms are equally capable. The Navy’s preeminent carrier-based aircraft, the
capabilities.
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The primary benefit of employing alternative platforms such as the F-16, B-2,
A-10, F/A-18, and MQ-9 in unconventional warfare is that they already exist. The
services do not need to deal with delays in procurement or acquisition and the
development costs have already been paid. Furthermore, the upgrade and
maintenance expenses have been accounted for, whereas in the F-35 such long-term
One could make the argument that legacy aircraft are out of date and need to
However, the United States continues to successfully operate weapons systems much
older than the A-10 or the F/A-18. For example, the Air Force’s B-52 Stratofortress was
introduced in 1955, while the Navy’s CVN-68 Nimitz class supercarrier was first
commissioned in 1975. The B-52 and CVN-68 remain in service due to regular
effective. Similarly upgrading platforms such as the A-10 and F/A-18 will allow them
to remain effective well into the 21st century. For example, upgrades to the A-10
include
Meanwhile, the latest iteration of the venerable F/A-18, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet,
58
http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=70 – Accessed 4/18/2008
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[…] is highly capable across the full mission spectrum: air superiority, fighter
escort, reconnaissance, aerial refueling, close air support, air defense
suppression and day/night precision strike missions. Compared to the original
F/A-18 A through D models, Super Hornet has longer range, an aerial
refueling capability, increased survivability/lethality and improved carrier
suitability.59
the F-35 are necessary in order to keep the United States’ defense industry
munitions upgrades to extant aircraft facilitate capabilities identical to the F-35. Ipso
facto, upgrading legacy aircraft provides the defense industry with technological
expertise similar to that derived from the development of fifth generation platforms
Given enough time and money, the F-35 could eventually become a valuable
different idiosyncratic conflicts around the world and aircraft presently in the United
States’ arsenal are capable of providing similar, if not identical capabilities to those of
the F-35. In light of the persistent technical concerns, budget overruns, and
production delays associated with the JSF program, alternative weapons systems
59
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1100&tid=1200&ct=1 – Accessed 4/18/2008
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Qualification
revolutionary tactical combat aircraft. The F-35 is designed for combat against a
future, especially given the 10-15 year procurement-acquisition cycles involved with
Michael Wynne, the Secretary of the Air Force, contends that the United States’
current strategic focus on unconventional warfare does not absolve the DoD of its
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conflict. Despite the F-35’s escalating development cost, Secretary Wynne’s position is
that he does not want to “leave the President bereft of a warm fifth-generation fighter
Another fact worth mentioning is that while the F-35’s stealth characteristics
may appear paltry in comparison to those of the F-2261, the F-35 is impressively
stealthy compared to the majority of tactical combat aircraft. With an RCS of about
0.0015 meters squared, the F-35 is truly remarkable; especially when one considers
60
Fulghum, D. and Butler, A. “JSF Cost Could Jump 35% If Congress Cuts Production”, Aviation
Week, 9/17/06.
61
The F-22’s RCS is between 0.0001 and 0.0002 meters squared.
62
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008
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Conclusion
dependent on high-tech weaponry instead of soldiers, and the F-35 exemplifies this
are inextricably connetcted. Only in light of a potential second war in the Middle East,
this time with Iran, has the US military establishment become cognizant of the real
does not confer any significant tactical advantage over existing weapons platforms.
Aircraft such as the A-10, F-16 and F/A-18 provide overlapping capabilities, and
remain as relevant in the current geopolitical environment as they did at the height of
the Cold War. US policy makers would do well to remember that in war, redundancy
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The F-35 is a product of the DoD’s revolution in military affairs, a misguided
effort to apply contemporary business practices (such as total quality management, velocity
Unfortunately, the practical effect of this search for efficiency is that each individual
service now provides essentially the same function: the ability to identify and destroy
targets from great distances, creating precisely the type of redundancy that the
congressional efforts to enlarge the military, bureaucratic gravitation within the DoD
and more redundant military in favor of a smaller and supposedly more efficient one.
advantages offered by overlapping weapons systems, the DoD isolated the various
tactical characteristics that brought the US military so much success in the early post-
Cold War period and attempted to combine them all into a single platform, effectively
the very notion of amalgamating a lumbering, heavily armored CAS platform and a
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highly agile dogfighter may seem highly unrealistic, it epitomizes the intended purpose
projects is severely flawed. Despite the United States’ official shift in strategic
produce weapons designed for the Cold War, and the F-35 is a patent example of this
defense industry should not be at odds. If the military and political establishment
deems the F-35 worthy of tens of billions in taxpayer dollars, it should ensure that the
United States’ grand national strategy accurately reflects the rationale behind that
decision, rather than using dubious tactical and strategic equivocations to validate the
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Appendix A
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Appendix B
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Figure 1 (Courtesy of http://www.jsf.mil/images/f35/f35_technology_das.jpg)
Appendix C
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Appendix D
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Appendix E
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Appendix F
Appendix 4
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