The Security Dilemma Revisited Author(s): Charles L. Glaser Source: World Politics, Vol. 50, No.

1, Fiftieth Anniversary Special Issue (Oct., 1997), pp. 171201 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054031 Accessed: 01/04/2010 20:22
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to World Politics.

http://www.jstor.org

THE SECURITY DILEMMA REVISITED

By CHARLES L. GLASER*

Jerviss
Dilemma" ROBERT

article

"Cooperation

under

the Security

re in international is among the most important works ar two lations of the past few decades. In it, Jervis develops essential is he the the key to that dilemma First, guments. security explains states in an anarchic with how international fun system understanding

damentally compatible goals still end up in competition and atwar. The

a state tries means exists when security dilemma "many of the by which to increase its the of decrease others."1 It the security security provides for what Jervis termed the "spiral model," which rational foundation describes curity on and how the interaction can fuel competition explains that the magnitude two variables: As a result, states there that are seeking only se and strain political relations.2 Second, Jervis and nature of the security dilemma depend between states balance and offense-defense across dif space

the offense-defense

ferentiation.3

time. Although that does not vary,

high level of security, and the probability of war.

ness of cooperative

anarchy can be variation in the attractive significant a or the prospects for achieving means, competitive

can vary the security dilemma exist in a condition of international

* For comments on earlier drafts Iwould like to thank Lynn Eden, Colin Elman, Matt Evangelista, and Steve Jim Fearon, Lloyd Gruber, Chaim Kaufmann, Andy Kydd, Joseph Lepgold, Jim Morrow, Walt. 1 World Politics 30 (January 1978), 169. under the Security Dilemma," Robert Jervis, "Cooperation see John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the For earlier discussions of the security dilemma, identifies the basic concept, but does not Security Dilemma," World Politics 2 (January 1950), which Relations (London: Collins, 1951). develop it extensively; and Herbert Butterfield, History and Human 2 in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Robert Jervis, Perception andMisperception Press, 1976), chap. 3, esp. 62-76; these pages provide a more thorough discussion of the basic workings For an early discussion of the security dilemma than does "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma." see J. David and the Armament-Tension of this type of interaction, Singer, "Threat-Perception Dilemma," Journal of 'Conflict Resolution 2 (March 1958); for a recent discussion, see Charles L. Glaser, and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence of Military "Political Consequences Strategy: Expanding

Politics44 (July 1992). Models," World 3

similar arguments are developed by George Quester, Offense and Defense in the International Many to 1977). See also Marion William Boggs, Attempts Define and Limit 'Ag System (New York: Wiley, of Missouri, and Strategy (Columbia: University 1941); and Marlies Ter Borg, "Re gressive" Armament of 1932," Journal of Peace Research 29, no. 2 (1992). ducing Offensive Capabilities: The Attempt

WorldPolitics 50 (October 1997), 171-201

172

WORLD POLITICS

These arguments laid the foundation for amajor debate within real ism,which iswidely considered the dominant paradigm in international
Jervis s analysis rests on the same basic assumptions?anar of goals?that structural underlie chy and fundamental compatibility relations. As re

alism, it should be viewed as part of this overall tradition. The broad

are of his argument different from the stan implications dramatically dard structural-realist since the latter does not focus analysis, however, on the a envisions dilemma and security consistently consequently more and world.4 the debate over competitive dangerous Although these formulations of of structural realism has evolved since publication to matter is be the resolved.5 Jervis's article, yet can also We and impact the importance of security appreciate dilemma have most policy, sources now and offense-defense employed these that scholars by recognizing to address many of the arguments effectively of international relations theory and security arguments of deterrence policy,7 military the severity doctrine,10 and reassurance,6 of relative gains imperial expan

important

questions

the including of moderation alliance

effectiveness in Soviet behavior,9

constraints,8

4 The major statement of the standard structural-realist analysis is Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of In ternational Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, the State 1979); also important are idem, Man, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), esp. chaps. 6,7; and idem, "Reflections on The toMy Critics," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its ory of International Politics: A Response Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). 5 as See Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation Self-Help," International Security 19 and Stephen Van Evera, Causes ofWar, vol. 1, The Structure of Power and the Roots (Winter 1994-95); (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming). ofWar 6 not framed in terms of the security dilemma, see, for Although example, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," Journal of SocialIssues 43 (Winter 1987). See also Stein, "De terrence and Reassurance," et al., Behavior, in Philip E. Tetlock Society and Nuclear War, vol. 2 (New to the se York: Oxford University Press, 1991), esp. 17; this essay gives somewhat greater prominence curity dilemma. On the more general question of resolving political rivalries, see Sean Lynn-Jones, in International Politics" (Ph.D. between Adversaries Accommodation "Rivalry and Rapprochement: in process). diss., Harvard University, 7 et al. (fn. 6), Matthew in Soviet Security Policy," inTedock "Sources of Moderation Evangelista, and Disarmament in the 1950s," World Pol esp. 290-96; and idem, "Cooperation Theory Negotiations see Deborah Welch itics 42 (July 1990). On the Soviet use of concessions, Larson, "Crisis Prevention 41 (Winter 1987). and the Austria State Treaty," International Organization 8 in International Relations Theory," American Politi Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains cal Science Review 85 (December 1991); Powell casts the argument in terms of the costs of war, not in terms of the offense-defense balance. And see Glaser (fn. 5), 79. 9 see On balancing versus bandwagoning, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Stephen M. Walt, The Origins ofAlliances see Thomas Cornell University On the tightness of alliances, Press, 1987), esp. 24-25,165-67. J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns inMul 44 tipolarity," International Organization "Perceptions and (Spring 1990); and Thomas J. Christensen, in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization is James D. Allies 51 (Winter 1997); disagreeing 47 "Arms versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security," International Morrow, Organization see Karl Mueller, "Patterns of Alliance: Align (Spring 1993). On the alliance choices of small powers, ment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe," Security Studies 5 (Autumn 1995). 10 and Germany between the World Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 236-39; Press, 1984), esp. 67, 74, 221-22, Jack Snyder, The

SECURITYDILEMMA REVISITED
sion,11 revolution and war,12 ethnic conflict,13 conventional arms nuclear and arms trol,14 U.S. policy of the escalatory conventional dangers

173
con

for peace in the prospects Europe an examination itations of space unfortunately here of the preclude are in which dilemma and offense-defense ways arguments security

control,15 nuclear proliferation,16 war,17 U.S. grand strategy,18 and and policies for preserving it.19 Lim

used in this literature.

The first sections of this article discuss work that has added Jervis's basic arguments, recapitulate to these arguments, and offer clarifications

and further extensions. Although the security dilemma is referred to quite frequendy, relatively little effort has been devoted to examining its core logic, some of which was left incomplete by Jervis himself. The
and how the security dilemma gaps concern whether important actors. in between rational I explore three ways operates Consequendy, a state's efforts a to increase its security when which security facing most dilemma can, without sirable outcomes. states suffering misperceptions, generate unde

see Scott D. Press, 1984); for disagreements, Ideology of the Offensive (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University and Instability," International Security 11 (Fall 1986); the corre Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense and Elizabeth Kier, spondence between Sagan and Snyder, International Security 11 (Winter 1986-87); "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between theWars," International Security 19 (Spring 1995). 11 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition Press, 1991), 21-26. University 12 Press, 1996), esp. 33-45, Stephen M. Walt, Revolutions and War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 334-38. 13 in Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35 (Spring Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions 1993); and

Security 20

Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals andWestern Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Options," see also International Security 12 (Spring 1988), esp. 67-71; Stephen Duane Biddle, "The Determi nants of Offensiveness in Conventional Land Warfare" and Defensiveness (Ph.D. diss., Harvard Uni the basic approach of offense-defense theory, although apparendy not direcdy versity, 1992). Following influenced by it, is the nonprovocative defense literature. See, for example, the special issue of the Bul letin of theAtomic Scientists A4 (September 1988); and Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, The Founda tions ofDefensive Defense (New York: St. Martins, 1990). 15 Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic 16 Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). 17 and NATO's Northern Flank," International Barry R. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation Security 7 (Fall 1982); and idem, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, a different N.Y.: Cornell University is Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Press, 1992). Offering explanation in World War II," International Security 18 (Spring 1994). Culture and Inadvertent Escalation 18 "The Case for Finite Containment: U.S. Grand Strategy," Interna Analyzing Stephen M. Walt, tional Security 14 (Summer 1989), esp. 22-30. 19 Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 A Demand for Behav (Winter 1990-91), esp. 11-17; Ted Hopf, "Managing Soviet Disintegration: International and Clifford A. ioral Regimes," 1992); Charles A. Kupchan Security 17 (Summer Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security 16 (Summer Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective 1991), esp. 133-37; and Charles L. Glaser, "Why NATO Is Still Best: Future Security Structures for Europe," International Security 18 (Summer 1993), esp. 26-33, 38-47.

1996). (Spring 14

174 The the following section unit-level seekers

WORLD POLITICS
argues that two additional of the some variables?the ex

tent of the adversary's greed (that is,motives beyond security) and of

adversary's security knowledge posits state s motives?influence states is a pivotal

the magnitude of the security dilemma. Thus, whether a theory posits

only and or instead greedy

choice. In the latter case, the role of the security dilemma is diminished
competitive policies on unit-level states can rely are more to avoid conflict. Whether likely can have information about others' motives

a state to be secure when it equally important enabling implications, would in some cases supports more coop otherwise be insecure, which ones. erative policies and in other cases more competitive By consider one these also the into dilemma variables, ing security integrates broader debates over international relations and theory security policy.

These variables, for example, establish the divide between the spiral model andwhat Jervis termed the "deterrencemodel," which applies to
secure states greedy The final section states, not and therefore addresses rejects the security dilemma. basic criticisms of the security dilemma are the main source of interna

and offense-defense
greedy internal

theory, including (1) the empirical claim that

dilemma,

the security

tional conflict; (2) the security dilemma does not really exist, because its
or because are over its constraints always logic is flawed, or because secu states construct whelmed other the considerations, by can choose not to; and (3) offense-defense dilemma and therefore rity I argue that the greedy-states criticism poses a serious theory is flawed. challenge but that the others are based on incomplete or flawed analysis.

The

Security Dilemma: How Does Undesirable Outcomes?

as a situation

It Lead to
in which "the means

the security dilemma Jervis defines a state tries to increase which by

its security decrease the security of not This others." definition make clear why the security by itself does states value their own is a dUemma however: if problem, security but an not the action would that makes one's adver of others, why security secure reason most less be bad? is The obvious that the sary necessarily

adversary is likely to react to having its security reduced. And by the

reaction will in turn reduce the state's secu logic the adversary's not this action-reaction But does leave the process rity. why simply state's security unchanged, since the adversary's reaction could j'ust off set the state's action? This versary section identifies three distinct ways inwhich less secure can be self-defeating, one's ad making the state worse off than same

leaving

SECURITYDILEMMA REVISITED

175

before its initial action: (1) by setting inmotion a process that reduces the state's own military capability, that is, its ability to perform military
missions; (2) by increasing the value the adversary places on expansion,

which makes it harder to deter; and (3) by simply wasting money. Al though Jervis touches on each of these possibilities, he does not fully
explain Thus, happen without misperceptions. stems from that the "heart of the dilemma" security although "the anarchic context of international relations," Jervis leaves some key to is intended discussion The arguments following underdeveloped.20 he stresses close why some states a brief discussion section ends with gaps. This cannot avoid these undesirable outcomes. sometimes of these of how the first two could

By further developing these arguments I do not mean to imply that

or not states suffer from are sig misperceptions unimportant. Whether a rational state would we need to nificant misperceptions, how analyze act ifwe are to determine of the conditions misperceptions how much it faces do occur. of a state's and how much product come when is really the insecurity worse relations be

Reducing
The

the

State's Military
could reduce

Capability
capabilities might seem self-contra

dictory, but the issue is one of terminology. I use "military capability" to

not to to the state's refer specifically ability perform military missions, an to the size of its forces or its total action-re assets.21 Thus, military action process will leave the state with more military assets, but it may its adversary. reduce its military capability vis-?-vis its when the state arms, it makes of the security dilemma, secure to defend itself. the less ability adversary's by reducing adversary arms in order to restore its The adversary then buys additional military nevertheless Because action-reaction bilities offset be to leave both countries' military process would forces would since additional each country's unchanged, the other's.23 capa simply

idea that arming

capability.22At first glance, itmight appear that the net effect of this

of this usage of "capability," see Glenn H. Snyder, "Process Variables inNeo realist Theory," Security Studies 5 (Spring 1996), 180-83. 22 the logic of the se For the sake of simplicity, I will focus on the decision to buy arms. However, to take territory and to acquire allies to increase curity dilemma ismore general, including the decision an action-reaction into part of a buffer zone process could be expansion security. Regarding territory, that leads one's adversary to expand into the remainder of the zone. 23 Jervis (fn. 2), 64, says that such an action-reaction process results in reduced security because too little ... too little be "when states seek the ability to defend themselves, they get too much and cause others, being menaced, will increase their own arms and so reduce the first state s security." How its initial ever, this explains only why the state's security is reduced relative to the situation following to the prior military status quo. buildup, but not why it should be reduced relative

20 Jervis (fn. 2), 76. 21 On the advantages

176

WORLD POLITICS

In fact, however, when the action-reaction process shifts the offense a or an in defense is the result instead decrease balance, change?a a new state crease?in If the weapons military capabilities. deploys that favors if its offensive missions and system adversary responds by

deploying this system, the country's ability to defend itself will be re

secure than before this round of leaving it less arming. MIRVed are to be this considered of offensive innovation, type usually

duced, missiles

reducing the ease with which

could meet ploys matches their

the United States and the Soviet Union

the state de its adversary in the state's capa

for deterrence. If, however, requirements an innovation that favors defensive missions and it, then the net result would be an increase

bility to defend itself and an increase in its security. The precision guided munitions (PGMs) deployed on the Central Front during the
cold war The with appear to have been such an innovation.24 can also vary to and defensive missions ability perform offensive force size.25 Thus, action-reaction in larger that result processes the state's military for defense. capability in the size of conventional ground forces For example, equal can result in an in

forces (as distinguished from different types of forces) can increase or

decrease increases

crease in a state's ability to defend, by enabling it to increase the density of forces deployed along the front. Similarly, equal increases in the size
of nuclear forces can increase both countries' thereby enhancing capabilities. reaction process increases security. of the possibility that arms Appreciation both countries' their deterrent retaliatory capabilities, In such cases, an action can reduce on the secu

military capabilities precedes In fact, the complementary observation that adversaries rity dilemma. can have a mutual arms interest in reciprocating restraint is one of the core insights of modern arms control theory, which was developed in the

competition Jervis's work

late 1950s and the early 1960s.26 Setting this insight within the broader framework of the security dilemma, however, highlights an important
issue that arms control the intrinsic goals to theory tends gloss over?the of the states involved. The security it deepens our understanding of compatibility dilemma makes this compe

explicit the possibility that both states in the competition are interested
only
24

in security,

and

of how

John J.Mearsheimer,

Conventional

Deterrence

(Ithaca, N.Y.:

Cornell

University

Press,

1983),

is discussed in Chaim Kaufmann and Charles Glaser, "What Is the Offense-De possibility fense Balance and Can We Measure It?" International (forthcoming). Security 26 See, for example, Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control(New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), esp. 1-2.

chap. 7. 25 This

SECURITYDILEMMA REVISITED
tition can arise. In addition, Jervis lays the groundwork matrices for more

177
recent

work by framing the problem of cooperation

Dilemma prospects tries' payoffs and Stag Hunt for cooperation game-theory vary with changes In more recent years, 170-83).27 (pp.

in terms of Prisoners'

and exploring how the in the relative size of coun cooperation theorists

have used game theory to establish amore rigorous foundation for the core findings of arms control theory; they frequendy use the repeated
Prisoners' Dilemma to model arms competition.28

Making One's Adversary Less Secure, Which Value It Places on Expansion

the danger of the adversary's insecurity

Increases

the

an can reduce the state's own a security in adversary's security Reducing second way?by the value the adversary places on expansion, increasing an more to deter. insecure it harder Making adversary thereby making will often increase its interest increase pansion security. For example, more desirable when it can provide more can often since expansion in expansion, a more insecure adversary will find ex secure borders, strate

gic depth, or control of resources that are valuable for building military
capabilities.29 Consequendy, net result ity, the the state will the adversary less effective enjoy even when could a state's military arming increases capabil in its security. On the one hand, be a reduction the enhanced deterrent and defense pro capabilities to deter, itmay not be deterred en by these

vided by its improved military capability. On the other hand, because

is now harder

hanced capabilities, even if itwould previously have been deterred by

military capabilities. states that can achieve Thus, military answer is no general seek them. There advantages to whether should sustainable not always

military

27 that can lead to arms competition For earlier use of game theory to explore the different motives see Thomas C. Schelling, Pro "A Framework for the Evaluation of Arms-Control and cooperation, contribution of 104 (Summer 1975). While remaining positive about the potential posals," Daedulus in "Realism, Game Theory, and Co formulations, Jervis explores their shortcomings game-theoretic World Politics 40 (April 1988). operation," 28 The Evolution Robert Axelrod, 1984). For a focus on (New York: Basic Books, of Cooperation see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph M. Siverson, "Arms questions of arming, in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy Races and Cooperation," (Princeton: Princeton Press, 1986). University 29 as se Jervis (fh. 1), 168-69. Although Jervis identifies this phenomenon being separate from the it as an integral part of the security dilemma. On the resource value of ter curity dilemma, I describe International Security 18 (Fall 1993); and idem, "The Spoils of Conquest," ritory, see Peter Liberman, Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Does of Occupied Industrial Conquest Pay? The Exploitation Press, 1996).

178
advantages crease the trade-off more that state's that

WORLD POLITICS
leave one's adversary but policy less secure will increase or de

find

security, sometimes

competitive policies. into Central for example, argue that even though expansion opponents increase it would also increase NATO's military capability, Europe would invasion of its neighbors Russian insecurity and therefore make Russian more likely.30

this that grapple with analyses to or restraint is preferable cooperation In the current debate over NATO expansion,

SECURITY: AN ADVERSARY'S ACTIONS THAT REDUCE SIGNALING OFMOTIVES

A can make state's military buildup more ways. First, and straightforward, the state's its adversary the state's less secure in two can reduce

buildup

the adversary's ability to defend itself. Even if the adversary matches

in its mil the net result could be a reduction initial buildup, as described is that It the above. also possible adversary itary capability, the state's buildup. a state's Second, military

will end up less capable of defense because it is unable to match or

counter about buildup can the adversary's beliefs that the state is in the adversary change

the state's motives, convincing more than it had previously believed. More specif dangerous herendy assessment increase the adversary's of could the state's ically, buildup reasons to it is motivated the desire for the extent to which by expand other reaction are more than security,31 which is the focus process term I will type of action greed.32 This in which countries that of the spiral model, are their motives that conclude adversary's only security than previously believed.33 Although that is, greedier, intense, Jervis, as already noted, have a ra and the spiral model

seeking

malign, more can make spirals misperceptions stresses that both the security dilemma tional
30

foundation.34

Survival 37 E. Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion," See, for example, Michael a security dilemma-based argument against nuclear superiority, see Glaser (fh. 15), (Spring 1995). For 5. chap. 31 The adversary could also become less secure if it concludes that the state places a higher value on state harder to deter. For a security or demands higher level of security, both of which could make the on the assessment of the state's greed. adversary's simplicity, I focus to 321 use the term "greedy" because states can be motivated expand for two fundamentally different more common terms are blurred and greed?which types of reasons?security by the "expansionist" and states can be defined in terms of greed and security seeking; see Glaser (fh. 2), "aggressive." Four types of 501-3. In referring to states as greedy, I do not mean to imply that they do not also seek security. 33 inAlliance Pol Jervis (fh. 2), chap. 3, esp. 62-76. See also Glenn Snyder, "The Security Dilemma can generate re itics," World Politics 36 (July 1984), 468-70; Snyder argues that firm alliance policies actions that are comparable to a spiral generated by an arms buildup. 34 In addition to the passage cited in fn. 20, see, for example, Jervis (fn. 2), 62.

SECURITYDILEMMA REVISITED Nonetheless,

a puzzle. How convince

179

the possibility of a rational spiral presents something of

could

the arms policy of a rational state that seeks only on its sound inferences, that security adversary, based logically more was state answer the is than is believed? The dangerous previously not obvious for the following reasons, the adversary will un because, not derstand that an arms buUdup may be motivated by security, greed. state not its motives, that the does know the will adversary Recognizing the state's desire for adequate defense which appreciate capabilities, could require more or armed forces. In addition, appreciating improved that forces that the the security dilemma, the adversary will understand state could reduce its own security. A requires for increased security to expect a pure secu therefore have reasons adversary will a arms to in and consequently engage threatening rity seeker buildup will not automatically conclude that such a buildup reflects greedy motives. rational then is, when does a state's military buildup signal question motives? claim is A that structural common, incorrect, greedy although about the motives of oth theories do not allow states to know anything The the possibility But this claim overlooks ers, since they are unobservable. can communicate because that certain actions valuable information they curity are not a to be taken state and a pure se by greedy equally likely a state launches a seeker. Therefore, for example, when military

a buildup that ismore likely to be taken by a greedy state than by pure

an that is making sound inferences will up security seeker, adversary date its assessment of the state's motives, that the state is concluding

more likely than previously believed to be greedy.35 Two types of military buildups could help with this kind of differen
tiation. forces: beyond a In the first state

though extra forces would provide some additional capability to defend,

interested a than would

size type, different types of states prefer different more a to add forces is than seeker security likely greedy for adequate defense of its territory. Even those required

see less value in these forces only in security would to pay for state and therefore would be less willing greedy states In different them. the second type of buildup, types of prefer a state has a choice between forces. For example, when forces that add to offensive missions and defensive ones, a roughly military equally a to choose state is more the than seeker type of security greedy likely

a state

35 On signaling, see Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: ton University Press, 1970); and James D. Fearon, "Threats to Use Force: The Role of Cosdy in International Crises" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1992).

Prince Signals

180 forces that

WORLD POLITICS

state sees both greater its offense.36 The greedy improve not in value in offense and sometimes less value others, since provoking it anticipates conflict anyway. The sound question inferences that remains nevertheless that makes is, can an adversary logically about the reach incorrect conclusions between pure security seekers would to pro be re about

duce the increasing fear and insecurity explained by a rational spiral

model, quired This the answer must be yes. Otherwise, can occur misperceptions if the states a to generate spiral. of interaction type

state's goals?37 For

the interaction

are uncertain

with a higher level, but all greedy stateswould require a higher level.A pure security seeker that builds to the higher levelwill then convince its
adversary that it is more if there likely to be greedy, since only some security re

a the size or type of forces required to maintain given level of security. case some pure se inwhich consider the simple this uncertainty, Given a lower level of forces and some be satisfied with curity seekers would

seekers but all greedy states would build to this level. Similar interac
tions can occur is uncertainty seekers result believe from an about whether is adequate.38 about the uncertainty adversary's the adversary For example, when security seekers

quire offensive capabilities and if there is uncertainty about the level of

security that security A spiral can also state's understanding

of its motives.

believes that the state believes there is only a small probability that the
that the state does not fear it, the ad is greedy and, therefore, adversary for is largely unnecessary state's that the will conclude versary buildup

security and therefore that the state is likely to be motivated by greed. If

initial estimate the adversary's is too low, then this increase teraction beliefs shows is sensitive that under to of the probability in its assessment that the state that the state is fearful is greedy adver

will be too large, resulting in a spiral. Kydd's formal analysis of this in

awide range of conditions about a rational

sarywill find the state's buildup to be provocative and that updating of

prior expectations the state's motives.39
36 is an oversimplification, This however, since a pure security seeker might want the capability to take territory for a variety of reasons. See fh. 57 below for qualifications. 37 states can Jervis identifies the types of buildups, he does not really explain how rational Although notes that states often cannot accurately infer motives from others' spiral; Jervis (fn. 1), 199-201. He to assume the worst; Jervis (fh. 2), 64-65. This would clearly military forces and therefore they tend additional information is logically flawed, since without generate increased hostility, but the judgment states should not assume the worst in the face should remain unchanged. Moreover, states' assessments since this can support policies that are too competitive/provocative. of uncertainty, 38 see Jervis (fn. 1), of related issues concerning For discussion subjective security requirements, 174-76. 39 and the Spiral Model," World Politics 49 (April 1997). Kydd notes Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory the extreme cases in which bias leads the adversary to (p. 373) that Jervis explores this dynamic for

SECURITYDILEMMA REVISITED
rection?a to reduce state can sometimes the adversary's concern use restraint about in

181
forces military A greedy state

The logic of these signaling arguments alsoworks in the opposite di

building its greediness.40

wants to mislead its adversaries into believing that it is interested only

to pursue in security, since its adversaries would then be more likely that leave them vulnerable. Given these incentives for a greedy policies state to

formation about itsmotives only by adopting a policy that would be

less cosdy cate states can try to communi they face, via three types of military their benign intentions policies.41 First, arms control that limit both countries' current or future abil agreements a lack of a communicate offensive missions greed, since perform a pure secu state sees greater value in offensive missions than does greedy a state may be able to rity seeker. Second, adopt unilateral defense, choos a even if its to protect its country with defensive doctrine, ing adversary one. When to pursue an offensive continues offense has the advantage, ity to maintaining its security via unilateral defense will require the state to are its adversary, which reinforces the message that its motives outspend a state can exercise unilateral restraint, that is, reduce its benign. Finally, and defense unilateral it not considering the effects of signaling. set in motion is primarily restraint tactical?to were One use of a process of re unilateral for it than for a greedy on the conditions Depending state.

misrepresent

its motives,

security

seeker

can communicate

in

military capability below what itwould choose for adequate deterrence

if not reciprocated, restraint.42 Even however, reciprocated straint can succeed by communicating that the state is not greedy and is to relations. Thus, the state's ability to committed although improving defend is reduced, the net effect can be an increase in its security. There the state's re the danger that the adversary will misinterpret is, however, a a in lack this case, re of lack of resolve instead straint, seeing greed; state. to the The dual straint encourages the adversary dangers challenge states re of their resolve make of military shortfalls and underestimates restraint. of unilateral luctant to pursue ambitious policies
assume ate a the state is definitely

secure. For pure security seekers, however, all that is necessary to gener some that the state is secure. See also is for the adversary to believe there is possibility spiral and David M. Rocke, Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control (Ann Arbor George W. Downs of Michigan Press, 1990), chap. 4. University 40 a formal treatment. Kydd (fn. 39) provides 41 Glaser (fh. 5), 67-70; and idem (fh. 2), 526-33; for related points, see Downs, Rocke, and Siver son (fn. 28). On reassurance more generally, see Stein (fn. 6); on the inhibiting effect of appearing in Crisis Bargaining," International with Linkage weak, see James D. Morrow, "Signaling Difficulties Studies Quarterly 36 (June 1996). 42 to This approach, often referred to as GRIT, was developed by Charles E. Osgood, An Alternative of Illinois, 1962). War or Surrender (Urbana: University

182 MISPERCEPTIONS

WORLD POLITICS

In contrast to the rational updating we have considered so far, Jervis

also discusses overly cused sources hostile to states' biases in contributing the role of psychological recent work has fo assessments of others' actions.43 More and domestic political processes dilemma reflects as alternative and there mo

on bureaucratic of bias. who

Statesmen will infer

do not understand that

the security buildup

fore do a poor job of appreciating the choices faced by their adversary tives.A state is likely tomake errors that build on each other: a key ini
tial mistake is for a state to assume that others know it is interested only incorrectly the adversary's greedy

in security; the state is then likely to assume that others will not be threatened by its buildup. Consequendy, the state is inclined to see the
adversary's the rational arms

is building in response to the state's buildup. This is a distorted form of

spiral, described when about motives; tainty cure and will competition rational flawed security dilemma. is driven entirely by uncer above, which states will be more inse this bias prevails, be more intense than is predicted by a

buildup

as a

sign of greed, when

in fact the adversary

Attribution

theory offers a psychological explanation for this type of

make of interpret the mistake reasoning.44 Leaders commonly even terms of their in countries the behavior of other ing goals/motives, they face. As face a security as acted a result, dilemma even leaders fail a to appreciate interpret security that other the actions seeker might lo of

though they understand their own behavior differendy, in terms of the

situation countries others have and therefore though provides pure

Recent of the an

greed, reflecting the same way. work on misperceptions This work

alternative

explanations,

cating these analytic flaws at the level of the state instead of at the level
individual. uses to theories dynamics political adversary's hostility.45 Militaries inten of the adversary's forces and to impute malign fensive potential are even of when the the tions, purposes ambiguous. adversary's forces and domestic of organizational behavior states often exaggerate explain why are inclined to exaggerate the of

43 in "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma" receives far less discussion (but see Misperception than in Jervis (fh. 2), 67-76. pp. 181-83) 44 On attribution theory, see Jervis (fn. 2), esp. 35-48; Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Contain ment: A and Press, 1985), esp. 34-42; (Princeton: Princeton University Psychological Explanation Press, 1996). Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 45 see For an emphasis on organizational Stephen Van Evera, "Causes ofWar" (Ph.D. perspectives, of California, Berkeley, 1984), pt. 2; and Snyder (fn. 10). Snyder (fh. 11) emphasizes diss., University domestic political dynamics.

SECURITYDILEMMA REVISITED
or

183

Powerfvd interest groups that would benefit from military competition

that exag often advance strategic arguments expansion self-serving or motives. the threat the Fur gerate posed by adversary's capabilities are states to create about the unthreatening inclined thermore, myths nature of their own behavior, which makes adversaries appear still more dangerous.46 a state's In sum, rational updating (or re military buildup through to alter its assessment of the state's mo straint) can lead an adversary on states are inclined to do cautions tives. Research that misperceptions

a poor job of updating, with a bias toward exaggerating the hostility of

others. When security states will they suffer from these biases, severe than it is. is more dilemma actually act as though the

Simply Wastes
The

Money

secure can be self third way inwhich efforts to make oneself more two cases, the is the first Unlike money. defeating by simply wasting a state would not end up less secure for having pursued policy that ini its adversary less secure. In this case, the action-reaction tially made as we have seen, not the state's military does reduce process capability; could leave the state's ability to defend itself processes a increas Nor does the action-reaction generate spiral of unchanged. views which is since of the motives, adversary's possible ingly negative not all motives. information about Neverthe military buildups provide action-reaction results less, the security dilemma no more state less prosperous, yet in self-defeating secure.47 efforts that leave the

Why Can't States Cooperate Less Desirable Outcomes?

When would under and engaging arming be self-defeating, why outcomes? as a anarchy

to Avoid
more policies generally states cooperate to avoid

in competitive cannot rational

undesirable

of international relations Jervis's formulation raises this question since Hunt cooper starkly, Stag

ation would then be the best option for both countries.48

(fn. 45), chap. 8; and idem, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation Political Sci of the American and Society" (Paper presented at the annual meeting by Government ence Association, D.C., 1988). Washington, 47 is resources; he argues (p. 462) that alliance formation Snyder (fh. 33), 461, emphasizes wasted similar to arming, in that all states would be better off remaining outside an alliance; action and reac tion nevertheless generate alliance blocks that are cosdy but fail to increase security. 48 and related games, see Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anar On Stag Hunt chy: Hypotheses and Strategies," inOye (fn. 28). 46 Van Evera

184
The about core of the answer their adversaries' that

WORLD POLITICS
lies in appreciating that states are uncertain confidence that others are pure motives, lacking means motives about that states cannot be seekers. Uncertainty are in a they Stag Hunt, the type of game can make even if they are. This uncer the state's competition/arming

security confident tainty

about

best option. Jervis takes a different view, identifying different sources of

in a and irrational be when competition Stag Hunt?misperceptions as havior and irrational behavior misperceptions (p. 168). Important can be, however, to the basic these are additions From the per story.49 on it places the implica spective of structural realism and the emphasis tions of anarchy, its understanding its motives about the adversary?both and uncertainty of one's own motives?is the fundamental ingredient This competition.50 of how uncertainty subsection about describes the adversary security a simple could re

for understanding model game-theory duce

the prospects for productive cooperation. to two It is usefid by considering why begin be in a Stag Hunt.51 the one hand, a pure On confident with ditional

security of not being attacked has no reason to expand: it controls the territory and does not see instrumental territory, because how it does not fear attack. It could

seekers might seeker that is it is satisfied value prefer in ad the ter

ritorial status quo (cc) to unopposed expansion (DC) for a variety of

reasons, because Because including expansion the state values or to govern the additional territory costly it is an norm state violates international that the values. its own territory, it could prefer fighting to pro

tect its territory (dd) to allowing its adversary to expand unopposed

seekers have these preferences and this is (CD). If two pure security are a common in then they and both countries knowledge, Stag Hunt to cooperate. choose should optimally its adversary is a hand, a state that is unsure whether a situation. seeker faces A different pure security very greedy adversary to the territorial status quo; it has will prefer expansion unopposed or Even if the state's own preference Prisoners' Dilemma preferences. its in remains of this adver light dering preferred option unchanged,52 is behavior competition. sary's expected On the other
49 see Downs, Rocke, and Siverson (fn. 28), 134-37. For discussion of their impact on a Stag Hunt, 50 In addition, a type of uncertainty that is not explored in the text is also important?uncertainty an about whether adversary will become greedier. This uncertainty cannot be eliminated because lead ers cannot bind themselves and their successors to current goals; see Jervis (fh. 1), 168. 51 can be devel over territory, a focuses on competition my discussion Although parallel analysis arms for oped competition. 52 If facing a greedy adversary, however, a pure security seeker would now see instrumental value state would in expansion, if this would increase its security. The then have Prisoners' Dilemma

SECURITYDILEMMA REVISITED

185

If the state is unsure about the type of adversary it faces, then it is uncertain about which game it is in.The state should therefore weigh its payoffs for cooperation and competition by its estimate of whether
the is greedy or a pure security seeker.53 is more adversary Competition attractive the higher is the state's estimate that the adversary greedy.

Offense-Defense

Variables: Variation Security Dilemma

in the

is his of how the Jervis's second major contribution explanation magni on two variables?the tude and nature of the security dilemma depend balance and offense-defense differentiation. offense-defense In consid ering how these variables for competition, influence state behavior, for he generates a vari

ety of hypotheses,
pressures

including most prominently hypotheses about the

the prospects international cooperation,

and the probability of war.

Jervis defines the offense-defense with the balance ease in terms of the ease of tak at of holding ing territory compared territory when tacked: the advantage of defense increases with the ease of holding a way of then proposes the relative territory measuring (p. 187). He ease of offense and defense: "Does the state have to spend more or less than one dollar on defensive forces to offset each dollar spent by the The fense has crease as the offense-de decreases severity of the security dilemma defense balance shifts toward greater defense advantage. When

other side on forces that could be used to attack?" (p. 188).

a status quo in the advantage, the forces deployed power will by more its security than they decrease the adversary's security. Both states will achieve reasonable levels of security from action and reaction and arms races will great, sufficiendy international anarchy By contrast, when impossible, (p. 187). relatively unimportant'' it is offense has the advantage, for impossible arms size to enjoy high levels of security simultaneously; because when one country adds forces, its adver peter out. When next "aggression will be the advantage to of defense thus rendering is

cycles,

races will
preferences ifwar held

states of equal be intense

In addition, the state would see a higher payoff for war, instead of Stag Hunt preferences. or of leaving the adversary relatively weaker, which some prospect of successful expansion makes competition more attractive. on the to this formulation, Some of my game-theory grounds that payoffs should colleagues object a be fixed and not vary with the type of adversary. A more adequate formulation requires multiperiod game. S3 the relative size of payoffs matters. Jervis devotes much of "Cooperation under the Consequendy, to variables are among Security Dilemma" exploring factors that influence payoffs. Offense-defense the most important and are discussed in the following section.

186
sary will Jervis have to make a

WORLD POLITICS
to restore its to defend.54 larger addition ability war more a makes for advantage likely variety

argues

that offense

of reasons. (1) War will be quick and decisive and therefore profitable, so greedy states will find war more attractive. (2) Following the basic
logic of the security dilemma, more valuable, which pansion states will makes be more war more ex insecure, making to states attractive seek

ing security. (3) The

advantage, emptive will be also which attacks still more

advantage of striking first grows with offense

the probability via pre of crises escalating wars are arms races and accidents.55 (4) Because likely, intense,

increases

their danger. Offense increasing advantage states to form alliances forcing diplomacy, during peace too to allow the effective for time, since wars will be decided quickly once mation of alliances has started.56 fighting influences The extent second to which that influences the security dilemma is the key variable are differentiated, and defense offense that is, "whether that protect the state also provide the capability

weapons

and policies

for attack" (p. 199). Offense-defense differentiation has the potential virtually to eliminate the security dilemma: if completely differentiated,
can then are usefid its deploy forces that only for protecting not to reduce its adversary's does defend itself. territory, which ability differentiation enables a country to signal its offense-defense Moreover, a to take type, since only country that wants territory will buy forces that have offensive potential.57 Pure security seekers can therefore reduce con cern about whether in turn increases they harbor greedy motives, which their own security. The differentiation of offense and defense makes pos that ban weapons sible arms control agreements that are usefid for of fensive missions,
54 For related analysis,

a country

thereby
seeMalcolm

increasing
W.

both

countries'

ability

to defend.58

Hoag,

"On Stability

in Deterrent

Races," World Politics

13

and accidents, see Schelling and On the relationship between first-strike advantages, preemption, (fn. 26), 14-16. Halperin 56 See also Quester (fh. 3), 105-6. 57 As Jervis (fh. 1) notes, this is an overstatement (pp. 201-2). A pure security seeker might buy of fense for a number of reasons: (1) if offense has a great advantage over defense; (2) if the state has ex tended deterrence commitments; (3) because offense may be necessary to regain territory lost at the can enhance deterrence. On extended a beginning of war, and (4) because the threat of counteroffense see Van W. Defense and Is Offense Best?" deterrence, Evera, "Offense, Strategy: When Stephen at the annual meeting Political Science Association, of the American (Paper presented Chicago, Sep see Samuel P. Huntington, tember 1987). On counteroffense, "Convention Deterrence and Conven in Europe," International Security 8 (Winter 1983-84); and Barry R. Posen, "Crisis tional Retaliation 120 (Winter 1991). Arms Control," Daedulus Stability and Conventional 58 is implicit in the distinction between qualitative and quantitative The concept of differentiation arms control, with the former relying on differentiation. This concept lies at the core of modern arms control theory; see, for example, Thomas C. Schelling, "What Went Wrong with Arms Control," For eign Affairs 64 (Winter 1985-86).

1961). (July 55

security
In contrast, when offense to forces try buying protect and riskier, because pure same types of forces. adds hypotheses courages increases styles on how

dilemma
and defense its territory seekers

revisited
can are not differentiated, only choose forces and greedy states will

187
a coun that re the

duce its adversary's ability to defend. Signaling becomes much harder

security buy

This stock of hypotheses has been supplemented by Van Evera, who

offense of diplomacy advantage that increase fuels preventive the probability war and en of war. Of

fense advantage heightens

incentives

the significance of shifts in power, which

to use fait for preventive war. States are more likely tactics when offense has the dis because winning accompli advantage more is is when which scarce, putes encourages security important states to overlook States negotiate less and negotiable compromises. less successfiilly, because makes offense it more advantage important more that agreements be carefiilly balanced, which makes negotiations and increases because offense the of vi difficult, advantage advantages which makes riskier. In addition, of agreements, agreements olating states more secretive, advantage makes can increase their forces military vulnerability. fense and of states' has gone interests.59 since Secrecy information about in turn increases

the probability of war by fueling miscalculations of military capabilities The deductive strength of this body of offense-defense hypotheses

but recent work has questioned the rela largely unchallenged, war. offense and the frequency of Because tionship between advantage the risks of war could be greater for the attacker when offense has the pressures that large wars,

attackers should face countervailing advantage, potential them more make when cautious, especially considering war which could sometimes make less likely.60 Van Evera hypotheses, war ismore has performed even although likely when the most these are extensive preliminary.61 (or is perceived

tests of offense-defense Focusing to have) on Europe

since 1798, he finds strong support for the theory's basic hypothesis:
offense has the advan

59 Van Evera (fn. 5), chap. 5. 60 49 (Summer forWar," International James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations Organization 1995), 402-3. And see the following papers prepared for the annual meeting of the International Stud iesAssociation, Balance andWar since 1648"; Chicago, February 1995: Fearon, "The Offense-Defense of Offense-Defense and Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "Inspecting the Foundations Theory: Can They Bear theWeight?" 61 Van Evera (fh. 5), chaps. 5,6; and idem, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International "Polarity, the Offense-De Security 9 (Summer 1984). See also Ted Hopf, Political Science Review 85 (June 1991); and Fearon (fn. 60, Febru fense Balance, andWar,"American ary 1995), who argues that the frequency of war in broad historical periods runs counter to standard offense-defense predictions.

tage. Examining

the FirstWorld War

in detail, Van Evera finds sup

188

WORLD POLITICS

port for the broad range of hypotheses about the dangers generated by offense advantage.62 Many of these findings about the FirstWorld War have been challenged by Trachtenberg, who is especially critical of as
sertions sion, about and also the role of offense casts doubt on in bringing dominance the about in fueling German expan of first-strike and importance the war.63

preventive

incentives

Offense-Defense Theory Realism Structural

structural-realist that states

and the Divide within

It is surprising that Jervis's analysis is often not considered part of the

rests on the same since his discussion of the security dilemma family, as fundamental does structural realism? assumptions an of international seek security and live under the condition

archy.64In part, this is because Jervis did not explicidy frame his analysis
in terms of realist ment,65 realism a critical theory. Nevertheless, by proposing improve a from within structural Jervis's analysis poses major challenge to in turn Waltz's widely accepted version of the theory, which the standard predictions of structural realism.66

transforms

This improvement is to shift the focus of the theory from power to military capability, specifically to the ability to carry out military mis
sions. Focusing a state's ability force effectively, on is the military missions preferable approach because on to achieve its goals depends its ability to use military that is, to accomplish the military missions that are nec

a essary to achieve security and possibly nonsecurity goals. For example, on the can deter, and if that its state's security depends forces probability to focus on mil defeat, an adversary's offensive. The decision necessary in offense-defense vari itary capabilities essentially requires bringing in combination it is these variables with power, not power ables, because a to that influence alone, country's ability perform military missions.67
in 1914," in Robert Jervis et al., See also Jack L. Snyder, "Perceptions of the Security Dilemma and Deterrence Press, 1985). (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Psychology 63 Marc Trachtenberg, Press, 1991), chap. 2, History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University (Cam esp. 64-72. See also David Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II toHitler Interest? Reflections Press, 1990), 324; and idem, "Deterrence or National bridge: Harvard University on the in "Militarization and Diplomacy Origins ofWar," Orbis 30 (Spring 1986); David Stevenson, before 1914," International Europe Security 22 (Summer 1997). 64 the similarity, since Waltz for example, assumes that states This slighdy overstates (fn. 4,1979), assumes that seek at least security but may have other goals as well (p. 126), while Jervis's formulation states are pure security seekers. This difference is not problematic, however. 65 under the Security Dilemma" Although precedes Theory of International Politics by "Cooperation a year, much ofWaltz's in Fred Green is available in "Theory of International Relations," argument stein and Nelson Polsby, eds., The Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975). Waltz (fn. 4,1979) makes only passing reference to the security dilemma (pp. 186-87). 66 and Van Evera (fn. 5). See Glaser (fn. 5), which presents additional reasons for modification; 67 vari Jervis (fn. 1) does not overlook power, he is explicit that both power and offense-defense ables matter (p. 187). 62

SECURITYDILEMMA REVISITED
looked and/or state contradicted by theories that focus on

189

Focusing on military mission capabilities identifies possibilities over

solely behavior. Most plain generally, although variation in the offense-defense variables constant, or to which states should compete the extent cooperate probability of war. There are many more specific power to ex a remains anarchy in leads to variation and in the For exam

differences.

ple, small (weak) countries may be able to defend themselves effectively balance against large (powerful) countries if the offense-defense
strongly weapons dictions As favors states. defense, If offense others as it does and defense run counter in a world of advanced states nuclear should struc are differentiable, to standard

often find that significant military cooperation is feasible. These pre

and many tural realism. power-based

more between structural realists have become disagreements the "offensive labels realists" and "defensive realists" sharply defined, have come to be used to favor the standard, distinguish analysts who from those who believe that structural realism competitive predictions predicts greater variation in countries' to focus behavior.68 or on Since At the heart of the is whether disagreement and, therefore, on offense-defense offensive realists do not address whether vantage, but on power variables. military capabilities on power, they focus an ad has generally

offense

power-based

that competitive they do conclude policies flow from their formulation of structural realism. Defensive realists are

commonly said to believe that security is plentifid, because defense has

focus have the advantage. is not a central claim of analysts who This, however, on offense-defense in its validity hinges on and the end variables, assessments of the offense-defense balance. For this reason I empirical suggested the alternative label of "contingent realism."69

Two Additional Variables: Greed and Unit-Level of Motives Knowledge In addition to the two offense-defense variables that Jervis highlights,
there are two additional dilemma: unit-level variables of the that influence security the adversary's the extent adversary's about the state's motives, of the the magnitude extent of and the greed in par

knowledge

ticular, knowledge gleaned by studying the innerworkings of the state

68 See, for example, Snyder (fn. 11), who uses "aggressive" instead of "offensive" (pp. 10-13); and Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, E. Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, "Preface," inMichael eds., The Perils ofAnarchy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), xi. 69 See Glaser (fn. 5).

190 and its leaders. These do not

WORLD POLITICS
are not play a central variables and therefore, quite in Jervis's discussion of the se these variables is also valuable it because role within still broader debates over in structural

Considering us place the security dilemma helps ternational relations theory.

appropriately, curity dilemma.

Greed
In a world basic there states, of pure security seekers, the security dilemma even when states have compatible, and conflict. In a world with one helps benign or more solve a goals,

puzzle?that is competition

the puzzle the incompatibility largely disappears: a for competition provides straightforward explanation not The does become security dilemma unimportant

greedy of states' goals and conflict.70 in aworld with

states can also be insecure.71 because states, however, greedy greedy a true state it is This also is that when knows that its adversary said, more im becomes greedy, maintaining adequate military capabilities to and sensitive the becomes less portant being adversary's insecurity the importance of the security dilemma both Furthermore, important. on how for explaining and for avoiding international conflict depends is: all else being equal, the security dilemma is of greedy one's adversary is greedier. less significance when the state's adversary The of greedy states has been importance that argues that structural realism exaggerates terms of the interaction the focus of recent work of the se the importance

curity dilemma by trying to explain international politics primarily in

Schweller explain Schweller, states between that seek only security. that this "status bias" leaves neorealism unable to argues quo to in modern "most great-power behavior history." According

its realist theory more effective requires broadening making to include at least some states that are motives states' about assumptions in nonsecurity that is, that are greedy.72 As I ex interested expansion, are conclusions somewhat because exaggerated, plain below, Schweller's he believes explanatory that greedy states rob the security dUemma of all incorrecdy in his basic point is sound: differences value. Nevertheless,

70 seekers as well as greedy states? Another basic puzzle still exists, however why states?security do not compromise instead of incurring the cost of fighting; see Fearon (fh. 60, Summer 1995). 71 For related points, see Robert Jervis, "Arms Control, Stability, and Causes ofWar," Political Science a L. Schweller argues otherwise, holding that when Quarterly 108 (Summer 1993), 244-45. Randall state exists there is no security dilemma; see Schweller, "Neorealisrr?s Status-Quo Bias: What greedy Security Dilemma?" Security Studies 5 (Spring 1996). 72 about the relative importance of greed and inse Schweller (fn. 71), quote at 106. Disagreement formulations offered by realists, see, for curity is long standing. For a comparison of the contending Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns example, Arnold Wolfers, Press, 1962), esp. 83-84. Hopkins University

SECURITYDILEMMA REVISITED
states' goals matter because can lead states to choose they sometimes choose cooperation

191

different poli a seeker will under cies; when, security a state will choose stan the same conditions, The greedy competition. dard structural-realist this point by mistakenly pre analysis obscures in that seekers will pursue competitive dicting security general policies. realism the importance of suggests By contrast, defensive/contingent a motives that under range of conditions by explaining security seekers may reflect motives competition beyond security. that the explanatory Given decreases power of the security dilemma are when adversaries the that follow from greedier, policy prescriptions in these cases

should find cooperation to be their preferred policy and, therefore, that

imagining conflict driven by the security dilemma become at best less

helpfid and at worst resolve potentially disastrous. For

will tend to be riskier because it requires forgoing the opportunity to

to this risk, unilateral In addition by competing. the state's motives becomes still designed security signal more a more to since dangerous, greedy adversary may be likely exploit its military defense instead advantages.73 Unilateral defense?building communicate restraint to of offense?is are more fensive with more likely likely to conclude to weaken deterrence, that the defender's states because greedier lack of a retaliatory of

example,

arms control

option

makes

the risks of war

Although
greedy war. When

the security dilemma becomes less important in aworld

acceptable.74

variables still play a role in states, offense-defense explaining on most the security seekers, focusing interesting security concern how offense dilemma increases mutual explanations advantage creates conflicts of interest. In contrast, when and fo insecurity thereby on are most offense-defense variables cusing greedy states, important for war. to of the the benefits At least according standard argu explaining

offense still increases that probability of war, but in ment, advantage are greater and/or be this instance because of winning the prospects cause its costs are lower, which makes states harder. deterring greedy

Unit-Level The

Knowledge
The

of the

State's Motives

second variable to be considered is the adversary's knowledge of

about whether is driven security dilemma by the adversary's secu the state is in fact motivated purely by

the state's motives. uncertainty

73 Restraint

may not be ill-advised, however, since for a greedy insecure adversary the reduction in its the net effect re insecurity could still offset the reduction in the state's military capabilities. Assessing more and a detailed model of interaction. By contrast, unilateral concessions quires specific assumptions are as described always misguided when one is facing a secure greedy state, by the deterrence modeL 74 see fn. 57. On the deterrent value of counteroffensive capabilities,

192

WORLD POLITICS

concerns. If the adversary were certain that it faced a pure security rity then the state would face a gready reduced seeker, security dilemma.75

The adversary would understand that military buildups reflected the

state's insecurity rather than its greed. And military advantages would be far less since the would know that the state did not adversary threatening, want to attack. As a result, in contrast to the of the security predictions and would dilemma, arming gaining military advantages usually increase the state's security, not reduce it, and at worst would waste money. A key assumption realism guarantees, in combination of structural with not tain about the security dilemma, others' motives. on the internal that states will theory characteristics The be at least somewhat aworld in which uncer states do posits of other

states?for rely example, or economic their type of political divine their motives. In system?to states to actions motives. their adversaries' infer their stead, interpret can from acting in The however, prevent adversaries security dilemma, above, when ways that would entirely clarify their motives. As discussed states face a security dilemma, many of the policies offense that would provide

necessary military
about their motives.

capabilities will provide ambiguous

For example, when and defense

information
are not en

tirely differentiated,

the military policies adopted by a pure security

also be taken by an adversary that was motivated seeker might partly by offense has a large advantage, seekers pure security greed; and, when to and defensive forces Under these be unable afford may strategies. states to would conditions, uncertainty require deploy forces reducing is their only option for signal since this that are militarily inadequate, are that these policies motives. States will often conclude ing benign more dangerous than alternatives states realism can on that do not sources of reduce uncertainty beyond about those

theirmotives but that do provide better military capabilities.

to reduce uncertainty they may be able The dilemma. result can be a the security thereby mitigate that democ the argument shift to more policies. Consider cooperative were are to not If this the case, have greedy motives. racies believed further and If, however, that structural rely allows, information

then amilitary buildup launched by a democracy would be less alarm

ing to its adversaries than a similar buildup launched by an authoritar

75 seem to eliminate the security dilemma, at first glance this might this need not be the Although war to increase its security; consequendy, case. A state motivated the entirely by security might choose the security dilemma would re stated insecurity should lead the adversary to fear it.Thus, eliminating not only that the state was a pure security seeker but also that the state quire that the adversary know are overstated. some did not fear it. Consequendy, points in this paragraph

security
ian

dilemma

revisited
a less could severe result

193
security in a de structural can also

a result, the faces democracy regime.76 As and interactions democracies between dilemma;77 instead mocratic intense of peace competition, create a severe conditions security dilemma. Unit-level support uncertain enables petitive more information that mitigates policies. This

even when

from a key shortcoming identified by the security dilemma; that is, they
This signal malign motives. line of argument plays that a central role in the "deterrence model,"

remains competitive of an adversary's motives but believes unit-level information to its that it is a pure security seeker. Com adversary appreciate now become more since they do not suffer desirable, policies

the security dilemma occurs when a state

do not

which rejects the security dilemma completely, albeit implicidy, by as

suming Combining the adversary knows the state is a pure security seeker.78 this with the assumption is greedy, the that the adversary

deterrence model calls for highly competitive policies andwarns against

the dangers of restraint and concessions. in For example, the describing war cold between the United States and the Soviet Union, competition the deterrence model held that the Soviets were bent on for expansion United States.

entirely greedy reasons and knew that they had nothing to fear from the
a In short, examining of key nonstructural variables high couple on certain the fact that the role of the dilemma lights security depends basic theoretical realism is built on assumptions Structural assumptions. a that guarantee central role for the security dilemma. If, however, we start from different or the sources of about states' motives assumptions information security about dilemma state's motives, can decrease. the importance and severity of the

76 In this spirit, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and In ternational Imperatives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), chap. 5. A different argument is that the openness that characterizes mature democracies results in domestic debate that cannot be manip ulated simply to deceive an adversary, and therefore provides valuable information about motives. See Andrew Kydd, "Signaling and Structural Realism" (Manuscript 1996); and Kenneth A. Schultz, "Do mestic Political Competition and Bargaining in International Crises" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1996). Schultz develops this type of argument for crisis interactions. 77 and the Escalation Arguing along these lines is James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences a of International Disputes," American Political Science Review 88 (September 1994), 587. If, however, case and it is not, then we get the kind of described democracy believes this to be the misperception above: the democracy believes that it doe not face a security dilemma and therefore does not moderate its building; its adversary, not confident that the democracy is a pure security seeker, then responds to the buildup; and the democracy then increases its estimate of the adversary's greediness because it be lieves that its adversary knew that a response was unnecessary its security. for maintaining 78 See Jervis (fn. 2), chap. 3; and Glaser (fn. 2).

194

WORLD POLITICS of the Security Dilemma Criticisms Theory Offense-Defense and

1:Greedy Critique Are the Problem

States, Not

the

Security

Dilemma,

As discussed above, the importance of the security dilemma for both

one or more and decreases when of the major explanation prediction a state. is for Critics this theo offer powers support greedy empirical war source in many of competition and retical observation?that the cases has been not have Critics key greed, insecurity. argued that the First World the cold war, certain major War, is liance behavior better explained by focusing their insecurity. criticizes as that focus al and much empires, on states' on than greed

For example, Glynn of the First World War

vantage, German insecurity, the real problem?Germany's cause was "the very nature

those analyses flawed fundamentally on the offense ad security dilemma, arms that they miss and the races, arguing com ambitions. The military hegemonic

petition could not be slowed by negotiation

of German in the same

because its underlying

and of the German

ambitions

regime."79 Gray argues the objective that generates need arms control must fail."80 This is not an isolated the very reason why view. Much of the rationale for competing with the Soviet Union dur

antagonism spirit that "the political is via arms control... for alleviation

war rested on the basic argument that Soviet greed, not in ing the cold was the root a in Jervis's description of security, point captured problem, common occurrence the deterrence that the model.81 Schweller argues of greedy states that bandwagon, the gains of expansion.82 explains is, join states in which the frequency of alliances to status quo and share the together change

Although
is obviously

resolving the empirical question raised by these criticisms

beyond the scope of this article, two general points deserve

79 Patrick Glynn focuses on Van Events arguments; see Glynn, Closing Pandoras Box: Arms Races, at 21. For Arms Control and the History of the Cold War (New York: Basic Books, 1992), chap. 1, quote a more nuanced but at least see (fn. 63), chap. 2, esp. Trachtenberg partially sympathetic discussion, 49-57. 80 Press of Kansas, 1993), 174. A Colin S. Gray, Weapons Dont Make War (Lawrence: University similar theme runs through idem, House of Cards: Arms Control Must Fail (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Why Press, 1992). University 81 see Jervis (fn. 2), chap. 3. Douglas Seay reviews the debate among Soviet specialists; Seay "What inTheir Foreign, Military, Are the Soviets' Objectives and Arms Control Policies?" in Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller, eds., Nuclear Arguments (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 82 Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing national Security 19 (Summer 1994). Press, 1989). University the Revisionist State Back In," Inter

SECURITYDILEMMA REVISITED
to be emphasized. adversaries' motives decision noted defense makers above, we

195

states may face irreducible about First, uncertainty or adversaries may have mixed motives; either way, as should strive for a robust mix of policies.83 Second, should remember to continue that security-dilemma and offense in a world with but apply greedy states, and satisfying aspects of these arguments

arguments also that the most

become

penetrating less important.

Critique the

2:The

Security

Dilemma

Does Not flawed

Exist

security

dilemma

is logically

Schweller argues that the logic of the security dilemma is internally

flawed. Given the assumption of structural realism that states are pure se no unless states are un security dilemma, curity seekers, there should be He argues that this is certain of other's motives/intentions. problematic, not real," is then the security dilemma ualways apparent, but instead the re and because conflicts of interest are then not genuine, which "violates realism's most basic tenet."84 sult of misunderstanding, are off the mark because to the criticisms These they fail appreciate because core assump role that uncertainty plays in structural realism. A states will be at least is that under most conditions tion of the theory states are uncertain about others' current motives: somewhat imagined as black boxes that no information about internal differences, provide of their international except for the observable outputs policy choices. central As above, these outputs will often not eliminate uncertainty of a motives. from the perspective the adversary's Therefore, or not is the structural theory, this uncertainty real, product of imagined a real security dilemma, As a result, the state faces misunderstanding. in the beginning sections of this article. for the reasons elaborated discussed about of uncertainty the combination formulation In the structural-realist can between and anarchy pure security seek generate incompatibility ers. States' but they reflect the incom interests are genuine, conflicting not ends.85 of means, patibility

both

BYTHE SECURITY DILEMMA AREUNINHIBITED SEEKERS SECURITY

Some relative structural realists for argue example, ers. Mearsheimer, power that security seekers are power maximiz their says that states "aim to maximize reason is simple: the greater the military

position_The

83 Jervis (fh. 2), 112-13; Glaser (fh. 2), 505-6. 84 Schweller (fn. 71), 117-20, quotes at 117 and 118. 85 Jervis (fn. 2) deals with precisely this issue (pp. 75-76).

196

WORLD POLITICS

one has over other states, the more secure it is."86 States maxi advantage mize relative power "in order to maintain the means for self-defense."87

Although Mearsheimer does not mention the security dilemma, he is arguing implicidy that it does not exist or at least that it should never
states. Recall that one of the basic arguments of the security can be is that military advantages by making self-defeating: can make one's adversary more the ad insecure, a military advantage a to net harder with the in the reduction effect deter, versary being as a state's security. States should maximize rule power general only if never occurs. interaction this self-defeating More in certain specifically, cases a to to com maximize its would have power country attempting in offensive the alternative of ac pete thereby forgoing capabilities, constrain dilemma

cepting parity in defensive capabilities. A security seekerwould usually

be more How secure are we in this parity than engaging accepting competition. to understand Mearsheimer's assertion? One possibility

is that he simply rejects the logic of the security dilemma but has not spelled out why. A second possibility is that he ismaking an unstated
states face conditions under which the coop judgment?that empirical erative possibilities identified by security-dilemma and offense-defense are too be the case when the security arguments dangerous. This might dilemma it turns out that even then arms racing is is severe, although a state's best not In any event, Mearsheimer does not option. clearly but notes only that states claim that states face such a severe condition military capability." In short, Mearsheimer nor for his claim. rationales empirical pro

some offensive "possess vides neither deductive

THE SECURITY DILEMMAISCONSTRUCTED (ORNOT) BY STATES

Wendt are not or na argues that "security dilemmas given by anarchy of intersub "is a social structure composed ture";88 a security dilemma states are so distrustfid in which that they make jective understandings worst-case each others' intentions."89 Because the about assumptions
86 "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19 John J.Mearsheimer, seeWaltz structural realists reject this position; 11-12. Other prominent (fn. 4, (Winter 1994-95), 87 "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International John J.Mearsheimer, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Security 15 (Summer 1990), 12. See also Fareed Zakaria, Essay," International Security 17 (Summer 1992), 190-96. 88 of Power Poli What States Make of Ir.The Social Construction Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is 46 (Spring 1992), quote at 407, and also 401-2; and idem, "Con tics," International Organization 1995), 77. For a very different Politics," International structing International Security 20 (Summer focuses on the offense-defense constructivist balance, instead of the security dilemma, critique, which see Kier (fn. 10). 89 73. Wendt (fn. 88,1995),

1979), 118,126,127.

SECURITYDILEMMA REVISITED
security dilemma is created by states' reassurance?that interactions, will avoid states

197
can choose

policies?for example, to realists overlook ing Wendt, dilemmas conceive because they

creating it. Accord these possibilities for avoiding security of states' interests and security in ways assume states that guarantee For example, competition. they identify act on the basis of worst with others' and should negatively security case is to Because his objective the logic of anar assumptions. clarify in terms of frames his critique structural chy, Wendt third-image

theory; thus, his disagreement with

disagreements over which

structural realists is not rooted in

ismost important.90

level of analysis

This disagreement between Wendt and realists may appear to be simply one of terminology: Wendt is using "security dilemma" to de
scribe the results of states' use he has spawned the material conditions has created More Wendt petitive realists confusion. are the significant the extent to which therefore, substantive structural to which First, disagreements. realism calls for com it leads to security interaction, whereas Jervis and the literature to refer to a situation created by "security dilemma" facing states, such as geography and prevailing

technology. By redefining well-established

important exaggerates policies

Wendt terminology, then,

and,

the extent

dilemmas, as he defines them. As discussed above, although offensive

believe the international the structural petitive policies, tance on the security that under a range of conditions problem themselves states is that system requires states to pursue com realists who place the greatest impor realists?believe dilemma?defensive/contingent states or should cooperate. Part of the are that Wendt assigns flawed. Instead to realism

logically with the security of others, negatively identifying as indifferent as to others' states as therefore and security, except egoists it directly influences their own security.91 The dilemma then security why egoists might in other increases see a interaction; positive increase states' security is, all else one's own secu that

the assumptions either controversial

of seeing realists envision

explains

being equal, s claim rity.Wendt on worst-case commonly defend it). The

states should base their believe policies is is also this position (even though wrong assumptions some to to realists and realists might attributed offensive try that realists core logic of the security dilemma makes clear that

90 72. Wendt 396; see also idem (fn. 88,1995), (fn. 88,1992), 91 This said, some realists have argued otherwise. See, for example, Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation is because they have conflated (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990). This among Nations means and ends. See Charles L. Glaser, "Correspondence: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter," International Security 21 (Spring 1997). See also Robert can Political Science Review 87 (March 1993), 127. Powell, "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy," Ameri

198
worst-case more analysis

WORLD POLITICS

can be since forces that are larger or self-defeating, can lead to reduced than necessary military threatening capabili ties and/or negative In fact, spirals in beliefs about adversaries' motives. states Wendt's how motives of about the description facing uncertainty to the realist of others should interact?his alternative prescription?is

essentially the signaling behavior envisioned by realistswho emphasize

the role of the security dilemma.92 states can in Second, change "the intersubjective arguing that constitutes the that their practices, edge system" by changing mas.93 The too knowl Wendt

implicidy rejects the existence of (standard/material) security dilem

can sometimes is that a security dilemma it make problem states to for their motives. I have (As stressed, risky signal benign on the this is not always true, since the risks however, severity depend

of the security dilemma, which varies.) Because Wendt

dilemma is the creation

believes the se

it of states, he overlooks the constraints curity can too is about the general ability impose and consequendy optimistic to avoid of states to change their practices and use signaling competi states may be able to over tive relations.94 As I have already explained, come these constraints on unit-level of others' by relying knowledge motives. is cast is not what Wendt This, however, in terms of structural/third-image is arguing, since his critique analysis.

Critique

3: Offense-Defense

Theory

Is Flawed weapons

of offensive indistinguishability undermines the theory

Critics

and defensive

cannot be and defense since argue that offense distinguished can all be used for both and offense defense. There weapons virtually cannot be measured the balance and the policy fore, they continue, of offense-defense argues, for example, cannot be Mear theory implemented.95 that determining the offense-defense bal

guidance sheimer offensive

ance is problematic because "it is very difficult to distinguish between

and defensive weapons."96
92 Wendt 404-5. (fn. 88,1992), 93 Ibid., 407. 94 turns to the existence of 406. Wendt See especially Wendt (fn. 88,1992), predatory (greedy) states a to realm (pp. 407-9). However, the weaker structural-re explain how anarchy becomes competitive in combination with a security dilemma, is sufficient. alist assumption of uncertainty about motives, 95 This section draws on Kaufmann and Glaser addresses a number of additional (fn. 25), which and Its Critics," Security Studies 4 "Offense-Defense criticisms, as does Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Theory (Summer 1995). Jack S. Levy provides some of the early criticisms; see Levy, "The Offensive/Defen sive Balance of Military Technology: 28 (June 1984). Quarterly 96 Mearsheimer (fn. 86), 23. A Theoretical and Historical Analysis," International Studies

SECURITYDILEMMA REVISITED
This line of criticism, however, reflects two fundamental misunder

199

standings. First, whether offense and defense are distinguishable does

not affect our to assess the offense-defense balance. To access the ability we start that offense-defense attacker and de balance, by assuming fender deploy the weapons that best enable them to achieve their re way, deploying a given these forces, performing net kind of the ability of the attacker's forces to assessment?analyzing defeat the defender's forces. the size of the attacker's forces to Adjusting determine how large they must be to succeed provides the information cost to that determines the ratio of offense defense.97 Second, should balance. focus For in focusing instead example, on whether on how a weapon can be used by both the spective defender missions. in the may or may not result of the same types of weapons. the balance then requires measuring This some attacker Either and

attacker and the defender, critics misunderstand distinguishability; they

the weapon influences the offense-defense concludes that "weapons may Huntington be

usefully differentiated in a variety of ways, but the offense/defense distinc

states cannot tion is not one of them."98 Consequendy, signal by forgoing arms control to certain types of weapons, and they cannot use qualitative shift the offense-defense critics are mistaken, balance. These however,

because distinguishability does not depend onwhether both attacker and defender would deploy the weapon. Distinguishability should be de
fined by comparative net assessment, that is, by comparing the offense

defense balance when both sides deploy the weapon with the balance when neither deploys it. If deploying theweapon shifts the balance to
ward offense (defense), then the weapon can be classified as offensive

(defensive), and states will be able to implement the policy prescrip tions that depend on the distinguishability of offense and defense.
PERCEPTIONS OF THE BALANCE, NOT THE BALANCE, ARE KEY Critics not the balance of the offense-defense, argue that perceptions war arms assum determine states' decisions for and itself, racing. Even states have the measure to that and skill required the of ing knowledge

or other biases balance accurately, political, psychological, can still serious the "objective" generate misperceptions. Consequendy, is not useful for balance offense-defense states' behavior.99 predicting fense-defense
97 For a different response, see also Lynn-Jones (fn. 95), 674-77. 98 Samuel P. Huntington, "U.S. Defense Strategy: The Strategic Innovations of the Reagan Years," in Joseph Kruzel, ta., American Defense Annual, 1987-1988 Books, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington 28. 1987), 36. See also Gray (fn. 80,1993), 99 See, for example, Levy (fn. 95), 222. For related discussion of this criticism, see Lynn-Jones (fn. 95), 677-82.

200 Although
fense-defense

WORLD POLITICS this criticism is valid, it does not reduce the value of of

the offense-defense theories, theory. Like all structural are mediated structure must of the effects that ory through recognize or not. Nevertheless, accurate whether offense states' perceptions, to enable us to defense predict states' behavior given theory is necessary In addition, balance. of the offense-defense their actual perception when misperceptions as a,baseline necessary do occur, the offense-defense which to assess balance the seriousness remains of the against and their consequences.

misperceptions

Research
This about article should leave dilemma little doubt

Agenda
that "Cooperation under the Se

curity Dilemma" has both established the importance of key arguments

the security impressive and offense-defense work large and literature. What a theory and spawned remains to be done? I sug

gest beginning at leastwith the following areas. Greed

From a

versus

Security
of angles, we have seen and the security dilemma when and insightful important that are at the heart of interna

and inten the frequency states In valuable. be therefore would addition, quite sity of greedy concern for theory building: about greedy states poses a basic challenge a reasonable theories that deal adequately be to develop goal would as well states' of and varying the mixture with motives?greed intensity as security.

are less arguments secure states, greedy states, greedy especially that helps determine tional conflict. Research

variety offense-defense

Empirical Given
warrants

Testing
further

of Offense-Defense

Hypotheses hypotheses

their importance, the fiill range of offense-defense

by research should

can be made contributions testing. Valuable empirical states assess their in whether (1) that examines security and (3) that systematically applies these measures

terms of power ormilitary capability, (2) that explores how the balance
be measured, cases. to specific

Caution
As further

versus Competition
empirical testing proceeds, the time is ripe to explore more the impact of offense

thoroughly the deductive strength of offense-defense hypotheses.Why

do countervailing considerations not moderate

SECURITYDILEMMA REVISITED
advantage? advantage For not example, if offense make advantage states more dangerous, so on. means that attackers and war

201 as

well as defenders could lose big in amajor war, then why does offense
sometimes cautious then why less arms races become more likely?100 If take greater risks to stop them? And do states not

Rational
The on

versus Biased

States
value suffer of the security from dilemma depends

and predictive explanatory to which states the extent

and political biases. Maybe diction that relations will states are inclined face

bureaucratic, psychological, most the pre important, theory's optimistic be cooperative when the security dilemma is

mild depends on states accurately perceiving the conditions they face. If

to the advantages of offense, ignore or to overlook others' restraint, security dilemma, then the opportunity created by objective conditions will be squan a amount dered. Although substantial of research has focused on mis that others a perceptions, important answers to critical have misperceptions remain wide open. How questions been in fueling competition and war? to exaggerate

Are states likely to be better at avoiding flawed policies in the future? Given these topics, the already large body of work that builds on
and offense-defense Jervis's security-dilemma to grow in size and continue importance. arguments is likely to

100 See fn. 60 for work

that has already raised this possibility.