Page 1 of2

Mike Hurley

From: Jonathan Stull

Sent: Tuesday, April 06, 2004 6:06 PM
To: staff
Subject: U.S. Networks to Air Rice Testimony Live Thursday

FYI...

U.S. Networks to Air Rice Testimony Live Thursday

LOS ANGELES (Reuters) - The three major U.S. broadcast networks said on Tuesday they will broadcast live
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice's testimony before the commission investigating the Sept. 11 2001
attacks.

ABC, NBC and CBS said they would go live at 9 a.m. EOT on Thursday to broadcast the appearance, which
comes amid controversy over whether she failed to focus on the threat posed by al Qaeda in the weeks before
the Sept. 11 2001 attacks on the world Trade Center and the Pentagon.

A Fox News spokesman said they would offer their coverage to affiliates to air at their discretion.

A spokeswoman for NBC news said Tom Brokaw and Tim Russert would anchor the network's coverage; CBS
said Dan Rather would handle its coverage; and ABC said Peter Jennings and a senior team of correspondents
would cover the event.

Rice, who initially declined to testify, is scheduled to appear before the commission for 2-1/2 hours, and the
networks said they would stay with her appearance as events warranted.

The White House had initially insisted that Rice's testimony be private before bowing to political pressure from
both Republicans and Democrats that she speak publicly.

She is expected to address claims by former U.S. counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke that she and President
Bush ignored the threat of al Qaeda before the 9/11 attacks.

While it is not uncommon for networks to interrupt regular daytime programing for breaking news, lengthy
scheduled preemptions during the day for news events are far less frequent. NBC said the last time it aired
daytime gavel-to-gavel coverage of a live address was the one given by Secretary of State Colin Powell at the
United Nations in February 2003.

CBS is a unit of Viacom Inc., ABC is a unit of the Walt Disney Co., NBC is a unit of General Electric Co., and
Fox is a unit of News Corp. Ltd.. (With additional reporting by David Morgan and Steve Holland in Washington)

Jonathan Stull
Communications Assistant
9-11 Commission

202-401-1627 (office)
202-494-3538 (cell)
202-358-3124 (fax)
jstull@9-11commission.gov
www,9-11CQmmission.gov

4/6/2004
The New York Times on the Web Page 1 of 1

A Stream of Threats, an Emerging Strategy and an Unseen Plot

As terrorist threat warn ings swelled in the summerof 2001, the Bush administrations response reached its peak on*

Some threats reported to the Bush administration Between May and June, at least 33 intercepted messages suggc

MAY Reports of Osama bin Laden's JUNE Reports of Bin Laden operatives JUIY The C.I.A. con
associates entering the United States; disappearing and of Al Qaeda's expectation Laden will launch a
departing for Britain, Canada and the U.S. of nearing attacks with major casualties. U.S. or Israeli intere:

Some actions on the Qaeda threat

taken by the Bush administration
END OF «AY
Condoteezza Rice,
national security
adviser, and
George J. Tenet,
C.I.A. director,
meet. Richard A.
Clarke, the White
House counter-
terrorism chief, is
asked to draft a
policy to eliminate
Al Qaeda.
JUNE? JUNE 22 JUNE 23 JUNE 25
Mr. Clarke's staff The Defense The State Intelligence
circulates a draft of Department raises Department agencies warn p
a phased plan to the security level for issues a warning a high probability
eliminate Al Qaeda forces in the Persian to all embassies of a "spectaculai
over a period of Gulf region. Some and diplomatic attack against
three to five years. ships of the Fifth posts, directing American interes
The policies are Reel leave port in them to convene abroad by group
developed in four Bahrain, and a their emergency associated with >
subsequent Marine Corps committees and Qaeda.
meetings at the exercise in Jordan take action to
deputy level. is canceled and the heighten security.
troops withdrawn.

Activities of the 19 hijackers

JUNE .;*». •'•,-..••:

Six of the hijackers, including the four
pilots, have been in the United States since
; at least 2000, although one, Khali d al-
Midnar, left the country in June 2000 after
flight training in San Diego.
The last of the 13 hijackers whose job is to Mr. Midhar returns to
serve as the "nruscie" on the fly-its —
overcoming the pilots and restraining the to Madrid via Zurich,
passengers — arrive in the United States. United States on Jul\f ,ifl trip: IJ ntoc

&30fces- ftesport of IhajoirtCcngreaaansHntiuiy into tfts Sept. f! attacks staff statements and transcripts of fheSepf. f t cctTKWsaon feaamgs1

| Close Window

http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2004/04/04/politics/20040404_SUMM_GRAPH.html 4/5/2004
Mike Hurley
From: Warren Bass
Sent: Friday, April 02, 2004 1:22 PM
To: Team 3
Subject: WP: Rice contradictions

Original Message
From: LexisNexis(TM) Print Delivery [mailto:lexisnexis@prod.lexisnexis.com]
Sent: Friday, April 02, 2004 1:10 PM
To: Warren Bass
Subject: LexisNexis(TM) Email Request (1862:0:11529743)

16 of 17 DOCUMENTS

Copyright 2004 The Washington Post

The Washington Post

March 26, 2004 Friday

Final Edition

SECTION: A Section; A08

LENGTH: 1148 words

HEADLINE: Neither Silent Nor a Public Witness;

Presidential Adviser Rice Becomes a 9/11 Focal Point as Contradictions Appear

BYLINE: Walter Pincus and Dana Milbank, Washington Post Staff Writers

BODY:

This week's testimony and media blitz by former White House counterterrorism
chief Richard A. Clarke has returned unwanted attention to his former boss,
national security adviser Condoleezza Rice.

The refusal by President Bush's top security aide to testify publicly before
the commission investigating the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks elicited rebukes by
commission members as they held public hearings without her this week. Thomas H.
Kean (R), the former New Jersey governor Bush named to be chairman of the
commission, observed: "I think this administration shot itself in the foot by
not letting her testify in public."

At the same time, some of Rice's rebuttals of Clarke's broadside against

Bush, which she delivered in a flurry of media interviews and statements rather
i
WH 0300615
Interview of the President by Bob Woodward and Dan Bah of The Washington Post,
December 20, 2001. (2 hours)

(000242)
• President Bush says he'd asked the CIA (& NSC?) "to start thinking about how to get
"them"" in June, 2001, starting w/ UBL and al-Q. Says "I hadn't seen a report yet,
interesting enough," but that they'd been getting "some intelligence hits" throughout the
summer, mainly focused on overseas.
• Implies that at least one of the reasons he kept Tenet on as DCI was that he brought a lot of
knowledge on terrorism and on UBL and al-Q to the administration.

(000244)
• "I know there was a plan in the works" before 9-11, though doesn't cite when it was to be
presented (interviewers suggest 9-10), and "I don't know how mature the plan was."
Mentions how impressed he was with Tenet's local knowledge presented immediately after
9-11, however, ie. "My point is that they had in their mind a plan. There's no question about
it."
• Re. Question on whether Bush wanted to have UBL killed before 9-11: "Well, I hadn't seen a
plan to do that. I knew that we needed to—I think the appropriate word is bring him to
justice." States that there was a significant difference in his attitude before & after 9-11. Pre-
9-11, "I knew he was a problem.. .1 knew he was responsible [for the East Africa bombings
and others]. And I was prepared to look at a plan that would be a thoughtful plan that would
bring him to justice, and would have given the order to do that." But didn't feel the same
sense of urgency, anger as post-9-11.

(000248)
• Immediately after the 9-11 attacks, looking toward a response: "I remember watching in
frustration as American tried to wage a conventional war against a guerilla force in Vietnam.
And I.. .just instinctively knew that we were going to have to think differently about how
we're going to fight."
• "The military strategy was going to take a while to unfold. I became frustrated—and let me
say this on this point. Early on, the history will show that I asked for all options on the table,
and knew that we were going to have to have what they call boots on the ground, knew we
were going to have to have troops deployed.. .[But] it took a lot longer for us to get the
appropriate air and rescue mission in place and the appropriate boots on the ground."
• Confirms that at the Camp David meetings immediately after 9-11, Rumsfeld really didn't
have any good instant options: "The whole focus was on the fact that there was limited—it
was not a target-rich environment.. .1 took from that discussion that we were not going to be
able to bomb our way to victory. That we were going to have to wage a different kind of war,
which included—I wanted all options discussed. We discussed Cruise missiles only; Cruise
missiles and bombers; Cruise missiles, bombers being B-2s, B-ls and B-52s; as well as
Special Forces troops.

Page 1 of4
Created by A. Albion
June 23, 2003
The following is a partial transcript of Rice's live interview on Good Morning America on Monday, March 22,
2004

GIBSON: Madam Rice, nice to have you with us.

RICE: Nice to be with you, Charlie.

GIBSON: Let me give you a chance to respond to what Dick Clarke said.

RICE: Dick Clarke was the counterterrorism czar for a long time for this government. He was the
counterterrorism Czar when the al Qaeda was strengthening in the '90s and the counterterrorism czar when
they attacked our embassies in 1998. He was the czar when they attacked the [USS] Cole in 2000. He was
the counterterrorism czar it is a plot was being hatched for that — ended up in Sept. 11. It is really
interesting to speak in the third person here, the Clinton administration, the Bush administration. This was in
fact Dick Clarke's area of responsibility and when I asked him shortly after coming to the White House to
give us a strategy for dealing with al Qaeda, because he made a very persuasive brief being the dangers of
al Qaeda, what I got was a laundry list of ideas, many of which had been rejected in the Clinton
administration in 1998. Since 1998, we did many of those, Charlie. We increased counterterrorism funding
&133; We didn't have a strategy. Those years of dealing with al Qaeda and trying to roll it back, that was not
acceptable to the president. He asked Dick Clarke for a strategy to eliminate al Qaeda and indeed we did
get a strategy over the next several months to eliminate al Qaeda. We were in office eight months. Dick
Clarke had been here a good deal longer.

GIBSON: He said he never had a chance until very late to brief you fully what the problems were with al
Qaeda, nor did the president — basically all through the period up to Sept. 11 that this administration
underestimated al Qaeda.

RICE: The president re-established the practice of being briefed every morning by his direct central
intelligence. I can tell you that a high percentage of the conversations we had were about the al Qaeda
threat... the president saying when are we getting a strategy? ... •
 Rice Testimony Nears, Tone Remains a Question Page 1 of 2

;NVu> jjork eimcs • RIEM:.Y

EFCSSCRE3 E"

AprU 7, 2004

As Rice Testimony Nears, Tone Remains a Question

By DAVID E. SANGER and PHILIP SHENON

W ASHINGTON, April 6 — With little more than a day until Condoleezza Rice testifies before
the Sept. 11 commission, the White House is still deciding what kind of tone she should strike
as she explains the intelligence lapses leading up to the attacks, officials involved in the internal debate
said Tuesday.

In conference calls and other discussions preparing Ms. Rice for two-and-a-half hours of testimony on
Thursday morning, she and her White House colleagues have prepared an opening statement that one
official described as "a detailed, almost day-by-day overview" of what the administration was doing in
the months before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

But the statement, which will last about 20 minutes, is also an effort to counter the contention of the
panel's leaders, Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, that the attacks were probably preventable
based on the intelligence available in the summer of 2001.

Ms. Rice has ruled out issuing the kind of apology made by her former counterterrorism chief, Richard
A. Clarke, who said in testimony two weeks ago that he and the government had failed the country.
That statement was immediately denounced as grandstanding by the Senate majority leader, Bill Frist,
and one administration official said, "Condi's not going there."

The decision not to make a similar apology, one longtime colleague of Ms. Rice's said, came after a
discussion of the risks of appearing to appease the administration's critics. An apology "promotes the
notion that we were at fault, we fixed it and it will never happen again," the colleague said. "You can't
make those kind of guarantees."

Ms. Rice's spokesman, Sean McCormack, denied that the White House was still arguing over how
aggressive a tone Ms. Rice should take. "There is no debate about what Dr. Rice will say to the
commission on Thursday," said Mr. McCormack, who declined to talk about the details of her
presentation.

In her opening statement, Ms. Rice is expected to speak directly to the survivors of those killed in the
Sept. 11 attacks, some of whom will be in the audience in a Senate hearing room. Those survivors were
angry that the White House had barred Ms. Rice from testifying in public, and it was their pressure, in
part, that forced President Bush to waive claims of executive privilege that were preventing her
testimony.

Members of the panel were scheduled to meet Wednesday to discuss how to question Ms. Rice. Some
members of the panel, speaking on condition of anonymity, said they opposed an early proposal from
the commission's leaders to allow each member of the panel 10 minutes to question her.

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/07/politics/07P ANE.html?pagewanted=print&position= 4/7/2004

lew to the Job, Rice Focused on More Traditional Fears Page 1 of 4

PR(NIER-?Ri£NSl» FORMAT
SPOMSORE9 B-l

April 5, 2004

New to the Job, Rice Focused on More Traditional Fears

By DOUGLAS JEHL and DAVID E. SANGER

W ASHINGTON, April 4 — Condoleezza Rice was, perhaps, in the best position to galvanize the
government to prevent terrorist attacks before Sept. 11, 2001. As national security adviser she
sat at the nexus of the intelligence, foreign policy, defense and law enforcement agencies who shared
responsibility for counterterrorism.

That is why, as the White House scrambles to defend against charges that President Bush and his
advisers paid too little heed before Sept. 11 to potential for terror attacks on American soil, Ms. Rice
finds herself at the center of the storm.

On Thursday, testifying publicly in front of the commission examining the attacks, she will be pressed
to square her account of events — one of heightened alerts and the development of new policies to oust
Al Qaeda and the Taliban — with accusations by Richard A. Clarke, who served under her as
counterterrorism adviser, that the new administration paid far less attention to these threats than
President Clinton's did. Her task seemed to become even more difficult on Sunday, when the leaders of
the commission said that it was likely to conclude that the Sept. 11 attacks were preventable.

Senior White House aides concede that Mr. Bush has a huge amount riding on how Ms. Rice does.
"She's the one who can make our most forceful case," one close colleague of Ms. Rice said this
weekend. "They don't call her the Warrior Princess for nothing," a reference to the moniker her staff
gave her after the Sept. 11 attacks.

But a review of the record, from testimony and interviews, suggests that Ms. Rice faces a daunting
challenge because her own focus until Sept. 11 was usually fixed on matters other than terrorism, for
reasons that had to do with her own background, her management style and the unusually close,
personal nature of her relationship with Mr. Bush.

Coit Blacker, a longtime friend and colleague of Ms. Rice at Stanford who is now director of that
university's Institute for International Studies, said any blind spots she had upon taking office in January
2001 might have been rooted in the fact that she emerged from a generation of scholars trained to focus
on great-power politics, with terrorism seen as a troubling but subordinate element.

"It wasn't until after Sept. 11 that most of us realized that for the first time in human history," Mr.
Blacker said, "a nonstate actor, a group of religious extremists at the very bottom of the international
system, had the capability to inflict devastating damage on the very pinnacle of the international
system."

Ms. Rice, who is 49, is widely recognized as one of the most poised and effective public advocates of
the administration, and she won praise from Democrats and Republicans for her private testimony
before the commission. Even so, as she prepares for her public testimony this week, friends have been

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/05/politics/05COND.html?pagewanted=print&position- 4/7/2004
«* leaders of 9/11 Panel Say Attacks Were Probably Preventable Page 1 of 3

P8INTSR-IRI5NSH.V FORMAT

AprU 5, 2004

Leaders of 9/11 Panel Say Attacks Were Probably Preventable

By PHILIP SHENON

W ASHINGTON, April 4 — The leaders of the independent commission investigating the Sept.
11 terrorist attacks agreed Sunday that evidence gathered by their panel showed the attacks
could probably have been prevented.

Their remarks drew sharp disagreement from one of President Bush's closest political advisers, who
insisted that the Bush and Clinton administrations had no opportunity to disrupt the Sept. 11 plot. They
also offered a preview of the difficult questions likely to confront Condoleezza Rice when she testifies
before the panel at a long-awaited public hearing this week.

In a joint television interview, the commission's chairman, Thomas H. Kean, a former Republican
governor of New Jersey, and its vice chairman, Lee H. Hamilton, a former Democratic House member
from Indiana, indicated that their final report this summer would find that the Sept. 11 attacks were
preventable.

They also suggested that Ms. Rice, Mr. Bush's national security adviser, would be questioned
aggressively on Thursday about why the administration had not taken more action against Al Qaeda
before Sept. 11, and about discrepancies between her public statements and those of Richard A. Clarke,
the president's former counterterrorism chief, who has accused the administration of largely ignoring
terrorist threats in 2001.

"The whole story might have been different," Mr. Kean said on the NBC News program "Meet the
Press," outlining a series of intelligence and law enforcement blunders in the months and years before
the attacks.

"There are so many threads and so many things, individual things, that happened," he said. "If we had
been able to put those people on the watch list of the airlines, the two who were in the country; again, if
we'd stopped some of these people at the borders; if we had acted earlier on Al Qaeda when Al Qaeda
was smaller and just getting started."

Mr. Kean also cited the "lack of coordination within the F.B.I." and the bureau's failures to grapple with
the implications of the August 2001 arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen who was arrested
while in flight school and was later linked to the terrorist cell that carried out the attacks.

Commission officials say current and former officials of the F.B.I., especially the former director Louis
J. Freeh, and Attorney General John Ashcroft are expected to be harshly questioned by the 10-member
panel at a hearing later this month about the Moussaoui case and other law enforcement failures before
Sept. 11.

Mr. Hamilton, a former chairman of the House Intelligence and International Relations committees,

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/05/politics/05PANE.html?pagewanted=print&position= 4/7/2004
JI3ATODAY.com - Tough questions teed up for Rice testimony Page 1 of 3

(Sr^PRINTTHIS
Powered by

Tough questions teed up for Rice testimony

By Mimi Hall and Judy Keen, USA TODAY
WASHINGTON — When national security adviser Condoleezza Rice testifies to the
commission investigating Sept. 11, she will face questions that have intensified in
the 30 months since the attacks.

She will be asked to clarify apparent contradictions between how the administration explains its policies and
actions and the way Richard Clarke, the former White House anti-terrorism chief, describes them.

Commission Chairman Thomas Kean, a Republican former governor of New Jersey, said Tuesday that the
panel also plans to examine possible contradictions between earlier private testimony Rice gave to the
commission and statements she has made to the news media.

Rice was interviewed by the commission in private for four hours on Feb. 7. Other officials, including Secretary
of State Colin Powell, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and CIA Director George Tenet have testified
publicly, but Rice's relationship with Bush is closer than any of theirs. Her public testimony, agreed to by the
White House late Monday after weeks of negotiations, is important to commissioners and relatives of victims of
the attacks because she had the most influence on Bush and the most intimate insider's view. Administration
officials said it was likely that Rice's appearance would come at the end of next week.

"There are millions of questions that need to be answered," said Monica Gabrielle, a member of the Family
Steering Committee, a 9/11 relatives group working with the commission. "She's sitting in the hot seat.... All
information is funneled through her, and she needs to explain why things weren't handled differently."
Gabrielle's husband, Richard, died at the World Trade Center.

Based on interviews with commission members and a review of previous testimony and public statements by
key officials, here's a preview of the questions commissioners are likely to ask Rice:

What specific warnings about potential terrorist attacks and targets did the Bush administration
receive before Sept. 11?

During hearings last week, commission member Jamie Gorelick referred to classified threat intelligence before
Sept. 11 that "would set your hair on fire, and not just George Tenet's hair on fire."

She said there had been an "extraordinary spike" in warnings of al-Qaeda attacks during the summer of 2001
— intelligence reported in Bush's daily briefings.

Bush has said repeatedly that if the administration had been given any indication that terrorists planned to
attack, he would have ordered steps to try to stop it.

Rice will be questioned closely about how seriously Bush and his top aides took the threat reports.

On Aug. 6,2001, Bush's daily intelligence briefing said al-Qaeda might hijack airplanes. Did the White
House consider the possibility that planes would be used as weapons?

http://usatoday.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&title=USATODAY.com+-+Tou... 4/5/2004
 lrashingtonpost.com: Neither Silent Nor a Public Witness Page 1 of3

washingtonpost.com T*0yt«fism6

Residency
Neither Silent Nor a Public Witness
Presidential Adviser Rice Becomes a 9/11 Focal Point as Contradictions
Appear

By Walter Pincus and Dana Milbank

Washington Post Staff Writers
Friday, March 26, 2004; Page A08

This week's testimony and media blitz by former White House

counterterrorism chief Richard A. Clarke has returned unwanted attention to
his former boss, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice.

The refusal by President Bush's top security aide to testify publicly before the
commission investigating the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks elicited rebukes by
commission members as they held public hearings without her this week.
Thomas H. Kean (R), the former New Jersey governor Bush named to be
chairman of the commission, observed: "I think this administration shot itself
in the foot by not letting her testify in public."

At the same time, some of Rice's rebuttals of Clarke's broadside against Bush,
which she delivered in a flurry of media interviews and statements rather than MAKE YOURSELF AT HOME,
in testimony, contradicted other administration officials and her own previous
statements.

Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage contradicted Rice's claim that

the White House had a strategy before 9/11 for military operations against al
Qaeda and the Taliban [Testimony to 9/1,1 Commission, March 24]; the CIA
contradicted Rice's earlier assertion that Bush had requested a CIA briefing in
the summer of 2001 because of elevated terrorist threats; and Rice's assertion
this week that Bush told her on Sept. 16, 2001, that "Iraq is to the side" [CNN
Transcript, March 22] appeared to be contradicted by an order signed by Bush
on Sept. 17 directing the Pentagon to begin planning military options for an j
invasion of Iraq.

Rice, in turn, has contradicted Vice President Cheney's assertion that Clarke was "out of the loop" and
his intimation that Clarke had been demoted [Interview'bya roundtableLof wire and print joumalists,
March 24]. Rice has also given various conflicting accounts. She criticized Clarke for being the architect
of failed Clinton administration policies, but also said she retained Clarke so the Bush administration
could continue to pursue Clinton's terrorism policies.

National Security Council spokesman Sean McCormack defended many of Rice's assertions, saying that
she has been more consistent than Clarke.

This is not the first time in her tenure that Rice has been questioned over disputed national security
claims by the administration. Making the case about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction in
September 2002, she said that aluminum tubes the United States intercepted on their way to Iraq were
"only suited for nuclear weapons programs." But at the time, the U.S. intelligence community was split
over the use of the tubes, and today the majority view is that the tubes were for antiaircraft rockets.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A25177-2004Mar25?language=printer 4/2/2004
 shingtonpost.com: 9/11: For The Record Page 1 of3

washingtonpost.com v*o««im$i*G

9/11: For The Record COL'KIYAKU

By Condoleezza Rice

Monday, March 22,2004; Page A21

The al Qaeda terrorist network posed a threat to the United States for almost a
decade before the attacks of Sept. 11,2001. Throughout that period -- during
the eight years of the Clinton administration and the first eight months of the
Bush administration prior to Sept. 11 - the U.S. government worked hard to
counter the al Qaeda threat.

During the transition, President-elect Bush's national security team was

briefed on the Clinton administration's efforts to deal with al Qaeda. The
seriousness of the threat was well understood by the president and his national
security principals. In response to my request for a presidential initiative, the
counterterrorism team, which we had held over from the Clinton
administration, suggested several ideas, some of which had been around since
1998 but had not been adopted. No al Qaeda plan was turned over to the new
administration.

We adopted several of these ideas. We committed more funding to UPLOAD. DOWNLOAD.

counterterrorism and intelligence efforts. We increased efforts to go after al
Qaeda's finances. We increased American support for anti-terror activities in
Uzbekistan.

We pushed hard to arm the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle so we could ;

target terrorists with greater precision. But the Predator was designed to ;
conduct surveillance, not carry weapons. Arming it presented many technical i
challenges and required extensive testing. Military and intelligence officials
agreed that the armed Predator was simply not ready for deployment before
the fall of 2001. In any case, the Predator was not a silver bullet that could
have destroyed al Qaeda or stopped Sept. 11.

We also considered a modest spring 2001 increase in funding for the Northern Alliance. At that time, the
Northern Alliance was clearly not going to sweep across Afghanistan and dispose of al Qaeda. It had
been battered by defeat and held less than 10 percent of the country. Only the addition of American air
power, with U.S. special forces and intelligence officers on the ground, allowed the Northern Alliance
its historic military advances in late 2001. We folded this idea into our broader strategy of arming tribes
throughout Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban.

Let us be clear. Even their most ardent advocates did not contend that these ideas, even taken together,
would have destroyed al Qaeda. We judged that the collection of ideas presented to us were insufficient
for the strategy President Bush sought. The president wanted more than a laundry list of ideas simply to
contain al Qaeda or "roll back" the threat. Once in office, we quickly began crafting a comprehensive
new strategy to "eliminate" the al Qaeda network. The president wanted more than occasional,
retaliatory cruise missile strikes. He told me he was "tired of swatting flies."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/Al 3 881 -2004Mar21 ?language=printer 4/2/2004

Mike Hurley
From: Warren Bass
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2004 12:27 PM
To: Team 3
Subject: Rice in FA

Copyright 2000 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

Foreign Affairs

January, 2000 / February, 2000

SECTION: EDITORS NOTE; Campaign 2000; Pg. 45

LENGTH: 6922 words

HEADLINE: Promoting the National Interest

BYLINE: Condoleezza Rice; CONDOLEEZZA RICE is Senior Fellow at the Hoover

Institution and Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. She is
also foreign policy adviser to Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush.

BODY:
LIFE AFTER THE COLD WAR

THE UNITED STATES has found it exceedingly difficult to define its "national
interest" in the absence of Soviet power. That we do not know how to think
about what follows the U.S.-Soviet confrontation is clear from the continued
references to the "post ~ Cold War period." Yet such periods of transition are
important, because they offer strategic opportunities. During these fluid
times, one can affect the shape of the world to come.

The enormity of the moment is obvious. The Soviet Union was more than just a
traditional global competitor; it strove to lead a universal socialist
alternative to markets and democracy. The Soviet Union quarantined itself and
many often-unwitting captives and clients from the rigors of international
capitalism. In the end, it sowed the seeds of its own destruction, becoming in
isolation an economic and technological dinosaur.

But this is only part of the story. The Soviet Union's collapse coincided
with another great revolution. Dramatic changes in information technology and
the growth of "knowledge-based" industries altered the very basis of economic
dynamism, accelerating already noticeable trends in economic interaction that
often circumvented and ignored state boundaries. As competition for capital
investment has intensified, states have faced difficult choices about their
internal economic, political, and social structures. As the prototype of this
"new economy," the United States has seen its economic influence grow ~ and
with it, its diplomatic influence. America has emerged as both the principal
benefactor of these simultaneous revolutions and their beneficiary.
White House Said to Agree to Let Rice Testify Publicly Page 1 of 2

QIC $fay ||0rk eimcs PWNTSR.FKIINSH.Y FOflMW

March 30,2004

White House Said to Agree to Let Rice Testify Publicly

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Filed at 10:50 a.m. ET

WASHINGTON (AP) — In a reversal, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice will testify in
public under oath before the commission investigating the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks as long as the panel
seeks no further public testimony from White House officials, the administration said Tuesday.

In addition, President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney have agreed to a single joint private
session with all 10 commissioners, with one commission staff member present to take notes of the
session, said Gonzales's letter.

White House press secretary Scott McClellan, on Air Force One with President Bush, said the
commission had unanimously agreed to the administration's conditions for the testimony.

The decision was conditioned on the Bush administration receiving assurances in writing from the
commission that such a step does not set a precedent and that the commission does not request
"additional public testimony from any White House official, including Dr. Rice," White House counsel
Alberto Gonzales said in a letter to the panel.

Subject to the conditions, the president will agree "to the commission's request for Dr. Rice to testify
publicly regarding matters within the commission's statutory mandate," Gonzales's letter stated.

"The president recognizes the truly unique and extraordinary circumstances underlying the
commission's responsibility to prepare a detailed report on the facts," Gonzales added.

Congressional leaders, Gonzales noted, have already stated that this would not be a new precedent.

The decision to have Rice testify is made in the wake of the publication of former White House
counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke's book, in which he charges that the Bush administration was
slow to act against the threat of al-Qaida.

Rice offered a rebuttal on Sunday to criticism by Clarke that President Clinton "did something, and
President Bush did nothing" before Sept. 11 and that both "deserve a failing grade."

Rice responded: "I don't know what a sense of urgency ~ any greater than the one that we had -- would
have caused us to do differently."

Clarke testified before the commission last week.

http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-Sept-ll-Commission.html?pagewanted=pri... 3/30/2004
washingtonpost.com: Rice to Give Sworn Public Testimony Page 1 of2

washingtonpost.com

Rice to Give Sworn Public Testimony

The Associated Press
Tuesday, March 30, 2004; 10:38 AM

In a reversal, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice will testify in

public under oath before the commission investigating the Sept. 1 1 terrorist
attacks as long as the panel seeks no further public testimony from White
House officials, the administration said Tuesday.

White House press secretary Scott McClellan, on Air Force One with
President Bush, said the commission had unanimously agreed to the
conditions.

The decision was conditioned on the Bush administration receiving assurances

in writing from the commission that such a step does not set a precedent and
that the commission does not request "additional public testimony from any
White House official, including Dr. Rice," White House counsel Alberto
Gonzales said in a letter to the panel.

Subject to the conditions, the president will agree "to the commission's request
for Dr. Rice to testify publicly regarding matters within the commission's
statutory mandate," Gonzales's letter stated.

"The president recognizes the truly unique and extraordinary circumstances

underlying the commission's responsibility to prepare a detailed report on the
facts," Gonzales added.

Congressional leaders, Gonzales noted, have already stated that this would not
be a new precedent.

The decision to have Rice testify is made in the wake of the publication of
former White House counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke's book, in which he charges that the Bush
administration was slow to act against the threat of al-Qaida.

Rice offered a rebuttal on Sunday to criticism by Clarke that President Clinton "did something, and
President Bush did nothing" before Sept. 1 1 and that both "deserve a failing grade."

Rice responded: "I don't know what a sense of urgency -- any greater than the one that we had -- would
have caused us to do differently."

Clarke testified before the commission last week.

© 2004 The Associated Press

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A35674-2004Mar30?language=printer 3/30/2004
_^-*r'ashingtonpost.com: President to Let Rice Testify About 9/11 Page 1 of3

washingtonpost.com v»»mtismG

President to Let Rice Testify About 9/11

Bush Will Submit to Session With Entire Panel

By Mike Allen and Dan Eggen

Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, March 31,2004; Page A01

President Bush reversed himself yesterday and agreed to permit his national
security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, to testify in public and under oath before
an independent commission investigating the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

Capitulating on a second point, Bush said he will submit to questions in a

private session with all 10 commissioners, backing off his previous demand to
meet only with Chairman Thomas H. Kean and Vice Chairman Lee H.
Hamilton. Bush added a new restriction by saying he will appear only with
Vice President Cheney at his side.

Rice and other Bush aides had said repeatedly, and as recently as Monday,
that her refusal to provide formal testimony was a matter of constitutional
principle and that to do so could erode the separation of powers between the
executive branch and Congress, which created the commission.

Bush said yesterday that he was willing to make the concession because he
had received written assurances by the commission and congressional leaders
that he will not be setting a precedent for future inquiries. He told reporters he
had "ordered this level of cooperation because I consider it necessary to
gaining a complete picture of the months and years that preceded the murder
of our fellow citizens on September the 11th, 2001."

The decision represented an effort to quiet a controversy that threatened to

undercut Bush's credibility on his handling of terrorism, a credential that is
vital to his reelection strategy. It also resulted from his aides' conclusion that
the showdown with the commission was drowning out White House messages
on other issues. A top Bush political adviser called the controversy "a thick layer of smoke that you
couldn't pierce with any other messages."

The standoff between the White House and the commission had been going on for weeks, but public
attention increased greatly after last week's testimony by Richard A. Clarke, Bush's former
counterterrorism director, that the administration failed to respond quickly enough to warnings about al
Qaeda in the months before the Sept. 11 attacks.

Commission members, who questioned Rice in private for four hours in February, have said they are
anxious to get her public testimony regarding discrepancies between White House statements and
Clarke's assertions.

As Bush left the White House press room after reading a four-minute statement, he ignored questions
about why he had changed his mind and why he did not do so sooner.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A37465-2004Mar30?language=printer 3/31/2004
 ishingtonpost.com: Media Notes Extra Pagel of 19

Hello mhurley Edit Profile | Sign out

wadiingtonpost.com PRINT EDITION | Subscribe tolHjf 40ft!

NEWS | OPINION j SPORTS | ARTS & LIVING | ENTERTAINMENT Discussions | Photos & Video • JOBS 1 CARS |

SEARCH: (») News Q Web by Google Top 20 E-mailed Articl

Ad-e-tiseroe-r

NATION Media Notes Extra

NEWS washingtonpost.com > Nation Adv
Politics
NATION
National Security
Science
Courts
Search the States
Special Reports
Kurtz
Photo Galleries
Live Discussions Behind the About-Face Live Online
Nation Index
World
Wednesday, Mar 31 , 2004; 9:46 AM • Media Backtalk (Live Online, 3/29/04)
Metro • Media Backtalk (Live Online, 3/22/04)
Style • Mediai Backtalk (Live Online, 3/15/04)
Business
Why did Condi and company
• More Discussions
Technology cave?
Health Kurtz in The Post
Education
Real Estate Simple: Whatever damage might • Media Notes appears in The
Obituaries Washington Post each Monday.
Corrections
be done by her testifying in public • That's Incredible (The Washington Post,
Archives before the 9/1 1 commission was 3/29/04)
greatly outweighed by the media • Bush and Kerry, a Running Qag on Late
hammering the White House was Night (The Washington Post, 3/22/04)
• When Left Is Right and Right Is Wrong
taking for keeping her under (The Washington Post, 3/1/04)
wraps.
washingtonpostoarn-
Well, not exactly under wraps. Add Media Notes to your personal
home page.
She was on every program this
side of "The Daily Show" (and
Richard Clarke beat her to that august forum last night). As even many
Republicans pointed out, this greatly undercut the administration's
ability to argue that Condoleezza Rice shouldn't have to talk about the
most important event of the Bush presidency in an official forum when
she was talking about it everywhere else.

In retrospect, even the president and his allies are having trouble
understanding why the White House didn't stop the bleeding earlier. MRP

Maybe administration officials fervently believed in the separation-of- <

powers principle they were citing, but of course they were willing to
throw that overboard when the temperature got too hot.

After all, Rice's testimony is not likely to be much of a surprise. (Can

Bob Kerrey be that fearsome?) Such big guns as Colin Powell and Don

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/nation/columns/kurtzhoward/ 3/31/2004