Relativity, the Open Futuie,

and the Passage of Time

Olivei Pooley
: August, :o:,
Is the objective passage of time compatible with ielativistic physics: eie aie
two easy ioutes to an amimative answei: (:) piovide a defationaiy analysis
of passage compatible with the block univeise oi (:) aigue that a piivileged
global piesent is compatible with ielativity. (:) does not take passage seiiously.
(:) does not take ielativity seiiously. is papei is conceined with the viability
of views that seek to take both passage and ielativity seiiously. e investi-
gation pioceeds by consideiing how tiaditional A-theoietic conceptions of
passage might be geneialised to ielativistic spacetimes without incoipoiating
a piivileged global piesent. I aigue that the most piomising position maiiies
the idea that open possibilities foi the futuie aie settled as time passes with a
non-standaid inteipietation of the ielevant foimal models.
I
e Project. is papei is conceined with the viability of a metaphysics of time
that is both piopeily ielativistic and which vindicates the objective passage of time.
Piopeily ielativistic will be explained shoitly. Fiist, some iemaiks about what I
take the objective passage of time to involve.
Times alleged passage is notoiiously dimcult to pin down. eie is, howevei, a
iathei stiaightfoiwaid idea that, if not fully captuiing what is meant by the passing
of time, is at least centially associated with it. It fguies piominently in the wiiting of
both ciitics and fans of passage, including those of Aithui Piioi, whose account of
passage I ieview below. A peihaps moie suipiising iecent souice is the philosophei
of physics John Noiton, who wiites:
Time passes. Nothing fancy is meant by that. It is just the mundane fact
known to us all that futuie events will become piesent and then diif of

is is a diaf of a Papei to be published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Please cite
the published veision.
:
into the past. . . Time ieally passes. . . Oui sense of passage is oui laigely
passive expeiience of a fact about the way time tiuly is, objectively. e
fact of passage obtains independently of us. (Noiton :o:o, p. :)'
eie aie two things to take away fiom this quotation. e fist is that the
passage of time involves what Piioi (:o8, pp. ::) called the becoming evei moie
past of events: futuie events become piesent and then diif of into the past. e
second is that this change in the degiee of pastness of events is supposed not to
be meiely a function of oui (changing) peispective on ieality: it is a featuie of the
way time tiuly is. . . independently of us. When I wiite of real oi objective passage, I
intend to highlight the second of these featuies.
So undeistood, the passage of time conficts with ielativistic physics. Responses
to this confict aie usefully categoiised in teims of attitudes to two alleged entail-
ments. e fist of these is that ielativistic physics implies a B-theoietic oi block
univeise view of time. e second is that the B eoiy of time implies that theie is
no objective tempoial passage. In these teims, theie aie thiee options open to the
defendei of ieal passage: ieject ielativity; oi ieject one of the two alleged entailments.
is papei exploies the option of denying the fist supposed entailment, that is,
denying that accepting ielativity commits one to the block univeise. Within this
option theie is a fuithei, impoitant distinction to be diawn. By fai the most populai
way to seek to ieconcile ielativity with an A-theoietic view of time involves aiguing
that a piivileged, spatially global piesent is compatible with ielativity. My topic,
in contiast, is the possibility of a piopeily ielativistic A-theoietic view that fully
iespects the symmetiies of ielativistic spacetime. Such a view will eschew a global
Now.
Why seek afei such a view: In the next section I summaiise the B eoiy, and
endoise the second entailment; accepting the B eoiy does commit one to denying
that the becoming moie past of events is an objective featuie of ieality. is puts the
B eoiy in piima facie confict with oui oidinaiy, pie-theoietic conception of time,
accoiding to which the passage of time is a ieal, mind-independent phenomenon. I
fimly believe that the B theoiist can account foi oui mistaken belief that time ieally
passes, but I also believe that a fully satisfactoiy explanation of the iequiied type
has yet to be given.` is motivates exploiing whethei the passage of time might,
'Foi similai desciiptions by ciitics of passage, see, e.g., Smait (:, p. 8,) and Olson (:oo).
I am using the teim A-theoietic as a convenient label foi any view of time accoiding to which
theie is moie to time than is captuied by the B theoiists block univeise.
`e paiochial natuie of oui multiple, tempoially-oideied peispectives on ieality should featuie
centially in any such stoiy, as should the ielationship between the causal and tempoial stiuctuie
of the woild. Efoits by B theoiists to account foi oui sense that time passes have been many and
vaiied; see, foi example, Ginbaum (:o,); Melloi (:oo:); Falk (:oo,); Ismael (:o::); Dainton (:o::);
Paul (:o:o); Piossei (:o::); Deng (:o:,b). I side with Ismael and Deng, against Paul and Piossei, in
that I do not believe that oui mistaken view that time passes has its ioots in expeiiential illusion.
:
afei all, be compatible with ielativity.
e investigation in the iest of the papei pioceeds as follows. Afei discussion
of the B eoiy, foui sections ieview non-ielativistic views that seek to vindicate
objective tempoial passage. I stait with piesentism, foi a giasp of how this view
incoipoiates tempoial passage is key to undeistanding the claims of the Moving
Spotlight and the Giowing Block theoiies, discussed next. I then considei what
I call, following Fine (:oo,), non-standaid A eoiies, befoie tuining to views
that link the passage of time to the idea that the futuie is open. is ieasonably
extensive suivey piovides the tools needed to identify an alteinative to the B eoiy
that is piopeily ielativistic. Relativistic geneialisations of the Moving Spotlight view
and the Giowing Block view have iecently been consideied by Skow (:oo) and by
Eaiman (:oo8) iespectively. Reviewing theii efoits paves the way foi consideiation
of non-standaid ielativistic geneialisations of views that link passage to the open
futuie.
Finally, it is impoitant to distinguish foimal models fiom how these models aie
supposed to expiess the cential commitments of the defendei of ieal passage. In
these teims, geneialisation of A-theoietic views to ielativity involves two stages: (:)
identifying ielativistic analogues of the classical models; and (:) explaining how
such models aiticulate a non-B-theoietic view of time. e fist step is ielatively
stiaightfoiwaid, and geneiically involves ieplacing a stiuctuie of totally oideied
elements (intended, foi example, to iepiesent the tensed facts that hold as of some
time) with a stiuctuie whose elements aie only paitially oideied. e haidei task is
to geneialise to ielativity the kind of stoiies that can be told about the pie-ielativistic
models.
II
Time Does not Pass in the Block Universe. As I am using the label, the B eoiy of
time can be chaiacteiised via the following question:
Is an exhaustive catalogue of which events occui, and how they aie
tempoially ielated, a complete account of tempoial ieality:
I defne the B theoiist as someone who answeis this question in the amimative. e
imagined exhaustive desciiption of the tempoial ielatedness of events is assumed
to be tenseless: holding once and foi all, fiom no tempoial point of view. e
fundamental tempoial ielations in question aie those of the B seiies: ielations of
tempoial piecedence and, peihaps, tempoial distance (duiation).
e view is best elucidated via key spatial analogies. A desciiption of ieality
that includes the spatial disposition of all objects and events ielative to one anothei
Rathei, it involves a mistaken way of thinking about expeiience that is in itself veiidical.
,
(object a is fve meties fiom object b, in the diiection defned by the line joining
objects c and d etc.) leaves nothing out, spatially speaking. One does not need to
fuithei specify that object a is here, oi twenty meties to the le. Such infoimation
simply seives to locate objects spatially ielative to ouiselves, and (baiiing impiobable
symmetiies) is anyway deducible: if the view-fiom-nowheie chaiacteiisation of
ieality is ieally complete, then one can in piinciple locate oneself spatially, and
deteimine ones oiientation in the woild so desciibed.
e B theoiist likewise holds that to piovide a complete account of tempoial
ieality one does not need to specify which events aie occuiiing now. Considei, foi
example, the piesent-tensed claim that you aie ieading. is is a tiue claimyou
aie, in fact, ieading now. But it is also a fact that (as I wiite this) it is cloudy, i.e.,
cloudy here. e B theoiist claims that such facts aie stiictly analogous. eii tiuth
meiely iefects oui spatiotempoial peispective. Just as the fact that it is cloudy heie
is to be undeistood in teims of the spatially non-indexical fact that it is (on the
ielevant date) oveicast at a latitude of ,:.N and a longitude of ::,.:W, so too the
fact that you aie (now) ieading is to be undeistood in teims of the tenseless claim
that you aie (in the tenseless sense of aie) ieading at . . . on . . . (look at youi watch,
and fll in the blanks).
On this pictuie, all times aie on a pai, fundamentally speaking. Considei the
obvious spatial paiallel. Almost no one believes that any paiticulai spatial location
is metaphysically piivileged. Spatial places difei in all soits of ways. One pait of
space cuiiently contains me; anothei similaily-shaped pait is completely flled with
a poition of the Pacifc Ocean. But these difeiences do not make any paiticulai
place special in the ielevant metaphysical sense. Fundamentally speaking, they aie
all an equal pait of ieality. In paiticulai, oui immediate spatial location, the spatial
analogue of the piesent time, is not metaphysically special, whethei by viitue of the
possession of some peculiai piopeity oi otheiwise. Similaily, the B theoiist does
not iegaid the cuiient time as in any way metaphysically piivileged.
Since I am conceined with the compatibility of vaiious views with ielativistic
physics, I should note that these time/space analogies involve ielativistically suspect
notions, namely, times and spatial places. Accoiding to ielativity, at a fundamental
level theie simply aie no such things. But note that my oiiginal chaiacteiisation of
the B eoiy, via an amimative answei to the question at the stait of this section,
is not similaily pioblematic. Moieovei, the ielativistic geneialisation of the claims
of the pieceding paiagiaphs is stiaightfoiwaid. It is the thesis that, fundamentally
speaking, all iegions of spacetime aie on a pai, iegaidless of the paiticulaiities of
theii extension in spatial, tempoial and null diiections. e coie of aiguments
Spatial points might be amongst the objects in question, so this chaiacteiisation is neutial
between substantivalist and ielationalist views of space.
Eliminating time talk in oidei to piovide a ielativistically acceptable statement of the B eoiy
might be stiaightfoiwaid, but it leaves a substantive task foi the ielativistic B theoiist to addiess. Even

fiom ielativity to the B eoiy is that the classical A-theoietic alteinatives to the
block univeise do not geneialise in this stiaightfoiwaid way.
is sketch of the B theoiy should have made it cleai that the view implies that
theie is no objective passage of time. Relatively iecently, howevei, seveial authois
have insisted that time passes accoiding to the B eoiy, even independently of the
peispectives of subjects embedded within time. Dieks (:ooo), foi example, equates
tempoial becoming with the (non-peispectival) successive coming into being of
events. is sounds like it should be incompatible with the B eoiy, accoiding to
which all events tenselessly exist, each at theii paiticulai spatiotempoial location.
e block univeise undeigoes no change, so how can some pait of it come into
being: Doesnt that iequiie a change in the block, fiom a state in which it did not
have that event as a pait, to a state in which it does: Dieks, howevei, is not pioposing
any such thing. Instead, he holds that an events coming into being is simply its
happening (what othei coming into being could theie be:). He then notes that:
Since eveiything that happens is iecoided inthe block univeise diagiam,
coming into being is also fully iepiesented. . . is pioposal boils down
to a defationaiy analysis of becoming: becoming is nothing but the
happening of events, in theii tempoial oidei. (Dieks :ooo, pp. :,o:)
If one wishes to label the successive occuiience of events tempoial passage then,
yes, time passes accoiding to the B eoiy. John Eaiman iightly labels this a thin
and yawn-inducing sense of passage (Eaiman :oo8, p. :,). Its advocates seem
to be making heavy weathei of facts that (almost) no one has evei denied. Woise
than this, though, theii claim to have successfully identifed tempoial passage in
the block univeise iisks diveiting attention fiom the key challenge that the B theoiy
faces, namely, that of pioviding a B-theoietic explanation of why we aie inclined to
take the becoming moie past of events as an objective featuie of ieality. Fiom heie
on in, the focus is on views that seek to vindicate this sense of passage, iathei than,
as the B-theoiist must, explain it away.
those who do not take tense metaphysically seiiously need to give an account of the tiuth conditions
foi tensed language (and of oui oidinaiy talk of times) as used in a woild that, fundamentally, does
not contain times (see, e.g., Gibson and Pooley :ooo, pp. :o,,).
I have in mind, in paiticulai, Doiato (:ooo), Savitt (:oo:) and Dieks (:ooo). Because they
do not all self-identify as B theoiists, peihaps because they aie sceptical that theie is a substantive
dispute between A and B theoiists, they might not chaiacteiise theii efoits as aiguing foi the ieality
of passage on the B eoiy. I should also mention Maudlin (:oo:; :oo,, ch. ), who styles himself as
a defendei of the block univeise and yet believes in the objective passage of time in a moie iobust
sense than allowed by Dieks et al. Whethei he counts as a B-theoiist in the sense of this section is not
stiaightfoiwaid. e fact the he is a iealist (and piimitivist) about the passage of time suggests that
he should view a desciiption only of the tempoial ielatedness of all events as incomplete. Howevei,
he might also deny that it makes sense to say that one event stands in (e.g.) the eailiei than ielation
to anothei unless time passes (in his sense). I do not claim to undeistand Maudlins view.
,
III
Presentism and the Passage of Time. Piesentism is sometimes infoimally chaiac-
teiised as the view that only the piesent time exists. It is tiue that the piesentist,
unlike the B theoiist, does not believe that past and futuie times aie distant paits
of conciete ieality. But this is not because they believe in the existence of only one
of the B theoiists many times, a single ,-dimensional slice of the B theoiists block.
Accoiding to the piesentist, the mateiial woild is extended in only thiee spatial
dimensions, and not extended in a tempoial dimension. e world is not natuially
chaiacteiised as the present time. A bettei chaiacteiisation of piesentism staits with
the obseivation that, foi the piesentist, tiuth simpliciter is tensed. Tiuth simpliciter
is just what is piesently tiue. e piesent tiuth about oui thiee-dimensional woild
exhaustively chaiacteiises ieality, and this includes how it was and how it will be, as
well as how it piesently is.
Foi the piesentist, tensed facts aie not ieducible to how things tenselessly aie
at difeient paits of a tempoially extended ieality. In fact, the piesentist holds that
the opposite is tiue. How things tenselessly aie at past and futuie times is to be
analysed in teims of piesent, tensed tiuth. Times, including the piesent, aie logical
constiucts that allow foi an elegant iepiesentation of the fundamental, tensed facts.
With piesentist times so undeistood, we aie at libeity to use time talk again. It
follows that the block univeise model, supplemented with an indication of which
thiee dimensional subiegion is the piesent (togethei, peihaps, with a futuie-pointing
aiiow), exactly encodes the piesentists commitments. One need only be caieful not
to misinteipiet difeient paits of the block as coiiesponding to difeient paits of
a tenselessly existing conciete ieality. Instead they collectively iepiesent all that is
happening, has happened oi will happen.
A natuial thought at this point is that something ciucial is still missing fiom
the model. In what sense does it captuie the passage of time: Doesnt the model
need continual updating: Doesnt the iegion of the block iepiesenting the piesent
need to move up the block, in the diiection of the aiiow: Peihaps the single block
needs to be ieplaced by uncountably many copies, each with the piesent difeiently
located, each iepiesenting the difeient sets of tensed facts that hold as time passes.
Heie is how Kit Fine expiesses the woiiy:
e passage of time iequiies that the moments of time be successively
piesent and this appeais to iequiie moie than the piesentness of a
single moment of time. e [piesentist] at this point might appeal to
A populai alteinative, also in teims of existence, involves claims such as: necessaiily, it is always
tiue that only piesent objects exist (see, e.g., Maikosian :oo). e chaiacteiisation of piesentism
advocated in the main text is intended to be compatible with this claim.
A populai piesentist move identifes times with maximal piopositions of a ceitain kind. My
chaiacteiisation of piesentism is intended to be compatible with this ploy.
o
the fact that any paiticulai futuie time t
+
will be piesent and that any
paiticulai past time t

was piesent. Howevei, the futuie piesentness of

t
+
amounts to no moie than t being piesent and t
+
being latei than t. . .
We natuially iead moie into the [piesentist]s tense-logical pionounce-
ments than they actually convey. But his conception of tempoial ieality,
once it is seen foi what it is, is as static oi block-like as the [B theoiist]s,
the only difeience lying in the fact that his block has a piivileged centie.
(Fine :oo,, p. :8,)
e woiiy is misplaced, as a ieview of Piiois account of piesentist passage ieveals.
Piioi unpacks his fist-pass chaiacteiisation of the passage of time, as the be-
coming evei moie past of events, in tense-theoietic teims. Pait of his stoiy involves
an eliminativism about events. Considei the iecession into the past of Piiois falling
out of a punt. Accoiding to Piioi, to say that this event has so fai ieceded ,, yeais
into the past is to say nothing moie than that Piioi fell fiom a punt ,, yeais ago.
Oi, in semi-iegimented language using metiic tense-opeiatois, WAS
37y
(Piioi is
falling out of a punt). Piioi contends that this last sentence is not about any objects
except him and the punt fiom which he fell: theie is no ieal ieason to believe in the
existence eithei now oi [,,] yeais ago of a fuithei object called my falling out of a
punt (Piioi :o8, p. :o).
So fai we have only consideied how the Piioiian piesentist analyses appaient
talk of events and theii cuiient pastness, oi futuiity. What about the changes in
pastness and futuiity that aie constitutive of times passage: Considei, again, Piiois
fall fiom a punt. It was, just a yeai ago, only ,o yeais in the past. It is now no longei
only ,o yeais in the past. In anothei yeai, it will be the case that Piioi fell fiom a
punt ,8 yeais pieviously: the event will have ieceded a fuithei yeai into the past.
Letting P stand foi Piioi is falling out of a punt, in Piiois opeiatoi-theoietic
iegimentation, one has:
WAS
Iy
(WAS
36y
(P)) WAS
36y
(P) WAS
37y
(P) WILL
Iy
(WAS
38y
(P)). (:)
Can tense-theoietic claims like this ieally be all that the piesentist needs to
expiess the passage of time: Two iefections might help to assuage doubts. Fiist,
compaie these tensed claims to the piesentists expiession of eveiyday changes
in oidinaiy objects, foi example, my change in shape as I go fiom standing to
sitting. Foi the piesentist, this amounts to the fact that I am now sitting but that I
was, a moment ago, standing, and so not sitting. In othei woids, change involves
conjunctions of the foim PWAS
n
(P). But, with a little iedefnition, this is exactly
what we have in the fist two conjuncts in (:). e combination of the tensed facts
(i) that I was standing but (ii) that I am not now standing amounts to ieal, objective
WAS
37y
(P) is to be iead as It was the case ,, yeais ago that P etc.
,
change. Why should the same not be tiue of the combination of the tensed facts (i)
that Piiois falling was ,o yeais ago and (ii) that this falling is not now ,o yeais ago:
e second iefection is this. If this second conjunction is genuine change, what
kind of change is it: What is changing: We have seen that, foi Piioi, it is not the
event of his falling, iathei it is Piioi himself.' Now, going fiom being such that one
fell ,o yeais ago, to being such that one fell ,, yeais ago might seem to be a veiy
anaemic kind of change. But this is exactly what one wants! It is exactly the change
that is due to no moie than times passing. All iobust intiinsic change could cease
but, the defendei of ieal passage thinks, things would continue to change meiely by
becoming oldei, foi time continues to pass.
Let us ietuin to Fines chaige that piesentism is as static and block-like as the
Beoiy. One way to put the woiiy is that a block with a piivileged centie iepiesents
only a piopei sub-collection of the full set of tensed tiuths that obtain ovei time, as
time passes. We have seen, howevei, that this set of piesent tiuths expiesses genuine
change. And, while some of these tiuths (like the facts that Im now sitting but that
I was standing) concein oidinaiy change in oidinaiy objects, otheis expiess the
veiy change we aie conceined with, namely, change in what is tiue. e piesent,
tensed facts include, foi example, facts to the efect that ceitain tensed piopositions
aie not now tiue but that they were or will be true.'' One simply cannot accept all
the piesent, tensed tiuths without accepting that what is tiue undeigoes genuine
change.
Deng (:o:,a, pp. :,:) piovides a sympathetic application of Fines ciiticism
to piesentist accounts of passage of the kind consideied heie. Hei conclusion is
not that time does not pass accoiding to piesentism, but that piesentism is no
bettei at captuiing passage than the B eoiy. Howevei, what we have seen is
that piesentism vindicates, (i) events objectively becoming evei moie past, (ii) an
absolutely piivileged time and (iii) genuine change in which time is piivileged.
Togethei these coiiespond to a sense in which theie is ieal passage of a kind that is
(iightly!) missing fiom the B eoiy.
IV
e Moving Spotlight and the Growing Block. e Moving Spotlight and the Giowing
'Save foi the fact that he no longei exists. How to tieat appaiently singulai piopositions about
things that no longei exist is a well known pioblem foi piesentism, but it is not per se a pioblem foi
theii account of passage. Realistically, at any time theie will always be numeious peisisting things
then existing to which passage-ielated change can be asciibed. But even in a maximally evanescent
woild that lacks peisisting entities, one still has combinations of the foim WAS(xFx) Fx. Foi
Piioi, this quasi change (which does not iequiie a piesently existing entity that once was F but is so
no longei) is sumcient foi passage.
''See Maikosian (:oo, p. ,8) foi a Piioi-like cashing out of passage in closely ielated teims.
8
Block views agiee with the B eoiy, against piesentism, that past (and in the case of
the Moving Spotlight view, futuie) times aie as much a pait of conciete ieality as the
piesent moment. ey disagiee with the B eoiy in denying that a once-and-foi-
all desciiption of the tempoial ielatedness of all paits of this tempoially extended
ieality constitutes a complete account of time. ese similaiities justify discussing
both theoiies togethei, foi theii main pioblems stem fiom this shaied combination
of commitments. I focus piimaiily on the Moving Spotlight view; some of the
peculiaiities of the Giowing Block aie discussed at the end of the section.
In a papei conceined with its potential ielativistic geneialisation, Biad Skow
piovides this nice summaiy of the Moving Spotlight theoiy:
e theoiy combines eteinalismthe doctiine that past, piesent, and
futuie times all existwith objective becoming. e claim that theie
is objective becoming has two paits. Fiist, facts about which time
is piesent aie nonielative. at is, even if in some sense each time
is piesent ielative to itself, only one time is absolutely piesent. . . And
second, which instant is absolutely piesent keeps changing. e NOW
moves along the seiies of times fiom eailiei times to latei times. (Skow
:oo, p. ooo)
Cleaily the claim that the NOW moves along the time seiies is cential to the
views vindication of tempoial passage. What sense can be made of it: A familiai
two times objection ieais its head.' Movement is just change in location in some
space with iespect to time. But since the movement in question is that of the
NOWs position in time, it seems that one needs to postulate an additional tempoial
dimensionsupertimewith iespect to which the NOWs position in oidinaiy time
can be said to change. e smooth movement of the NOW, fiom past to futuie, is
cashed out as the fact that, fiom the peispectives of evei Latei'` supeitimes, the
NOW is located at evei latei times.
Skow thinks that the supeitime pictuie is a useful aid to giasping the content
of the theoiy iathei than a reductio of it. He also insists that supeitime is stiictly a
fction. His omcial stoiy is spelled out in teims of piimitive tense opeiatois: If it is
NOW time t, then to say that the NOW moves fiom the past to the futuie is to say
that it was the case that a time befoie t was NOW, and it will be the case that a time
afei t [will be] NOW (Skow :oo, p. oo8). Oui ieview of piesentism allows us to
see that this move indeed gives us genuine change in which time is NOW. Moieovei
it is a type of change that can be combined with theie being an absolute fact about
which time is NOW.
'See, e.g., Bioad (::,, p. o,) and, foi the classic exposition, Smait (:).
'`I follow Skows convention of distinguishing ielations that oidei supeitimes fiom those that
oidei oidinaiy times by capitalising teims foi the foimei.

So fai, so good, but now considei how the omcial tense-theoietic stoiy and
the supeitime metaphoi aie ielated. Suppose, again, that it is NOW time t and let
how things aie fiom the peispective of supeitime T coiiespond to how things aie
simpliciter. What does it mean to say that WAS(a time eailiei than t is NOW): Skow
suggests that this coiiesponds to the supeitime claim that, fiom the peispective of
some supeitime T

Eailiei than T, some time t

eailiei than t is NOW.' is might

suipiise someone familiai with typical model-theoietic tieatments of tense logic.
Afei all, the meanings of tense opeiatois aie noimally ielated to what is the case at
oidinaiy times, not to what is the case at difeient points in supeitime. But Skow is
absolutely iight to set things up as he does. It is the Moving Spotlighteis points of
supeitime, not the oidinaiy times that they postulate as distinct paits of conciete
ieality, that play the iole that oidinaiy times play foi the piesentist.
is points to a deeply pioblematic featuie of the view, at least in this veision.
Foi the Moving Spotlightei, the eteinalist thesis that past and futuie times exist on
a pai with the piesent is a tensed claim. Eteinalism is theiefoie apt, foi the view
involves the eteinal peisistence, in the piesentists sense of peisistence, of all these
times. ey aie taken to (always) be conciete paits of a (peisisting) -dimensional
ieality. is ieality changes (in the piesentists sense of change), but only by viitue
of changes in which pait of conciete ieality is absolutely piesent.
Appeal to piimitive tense does not, afei all, avoid the two times pioblem. eie
are two times, it is just that one (oidinaiy time) is B-theoietic and the othei (su-
peitime) is A-theoietic. On the pictuie of ieality being ofeied, I exist (some-
how oi othei) at many tempoial locations along a thin tube-like iegion of a foui-
dimensional block and, moieovei, I always was so located and will always continue
to be so. I would like to think that I (oi some tempoial pait of me) is located in
a subiegion of the block that is absolutely piesent. I would also like to think this
piivileged location is wheie I am typing this sentence. But with what iight do I
assume eithei of these things:' e Moving Spotlight theoiy is not a plausible view.
It succeeds, like piesentism, in secuiing an absolute yet changing fact of the mattei
about which time is piesent. In this context, howevei, its commitment to the equal
ieality of past and futuie times is a faw not a featuie.
I conclude this section with a few iemaiks the Giowing Block theoiy. Piiois
becoming moie past coveis, as well movement fiom the neai past to the fai past,
movement fiom the fai futuie to the neai futuie, and fiom the neai futuie to the
piesent. Unlike the Moving Spotlightei, the Giowing Blockei tieats these tiansitions
veiy difeiently.
e cential piimitive notion of the theoiy coiiesponds to an events passage
'Such supeitime tiuth conditions foi tensed statements aie not meant as an analysis of tense.
Rathei, such claims aie supposed to explicate supeitime talk in teims of piimitive tense.
'eie is now a small liteiatuie on this how do I know that it is NOW now: objection, oiiginally
piessed by Bouine (:oo:) and Biaddon-Mitchell (:oo).
:o
fiom the futuie to the piesent. Accoiding to Bioad (::,), an events becoming
piesent is exactly its coming into existence. Befoie it comes into being, the event
simply does not exist. is means that, on the theoiy, theie is no liteial passage of
events in the fai futuie to the neaiei futuie, foi theie aie no futuie events aiound
whose degiee of futuiity can be said to be changing. What about an events passage
fiom the piesent to the past: Bioad held it to be a genuine change, but not one
involving any intiinsic change in the event, and noi any change in the ielations
that the event beais to given othei events. Rathei, the change is constituted by the
coming into existence of new events, to which the now past event theieby comes to
be ielated. In Bioads woids: Nothing has happened to the piesent by becoming
past except that fiesh slices of existence have been added to the total histoiy of the
woild. e past is thus as ieal as the piesent (Bioad ::,, p. oo).
is last quotation highlights two aspects of the pictuie that deseive emphasis.
Fiist, unlike on the Moving Spotlight view, past times aie held to be on a pai with
the piesent, ontologically and metaphysically. e piesent is distinguished only by
its being the edge of ieality: the time beyond which theie aie no fuithei times.
Second, since the sum total of ieality is foievei incieasing via becoming, the time
slices of the Giowing Block, just like the times of the Moving Spotlight view, persist.
In fact, Bioad seems to acknowledge this explicitly. He wiites: theie is no such
thing as ceasing to exist; what has become exists henceforth for ever (Bioad ::,,
p. o, second emphasis mine).
e paiallels with the Moving Spotlight theoiy aie cleai. e natuial way to
make sense of talk of the Blocks giowth in a way that avoids commitment to the
existence of the points of a second time dimension is in teims of piimitive tense.
eie is an absolute fact about the extent of the sum total of ieality, but this fact
changes. e sum total of ieality was smallei; it will be laigei. As with the Moving
Spotlight theoiy, this manoeuvie does not avoid the postulation of two times. Just
as in that case, we have one B-theoietic (tiuncated, but giowing) dimension, and
one A-theoietic dimension. And as befoie, the pictuie appeais to be guilty of
spatializing the foimei as a peisisting dimension that, on closei analysis, does not
connect diiectly with oui oidinaiy tensed talk. Spelling out the giowth of the block
in teims of piimitive tense gives iise to a coheient view, but it is one that is no moie
plausible than the Moving Spotlight view, foi piecisely paiallel ieasons.
V
Non-standard A eories. On the views so fai consideied theie aie supposed be
absolute facts of the mattei about the way the woild is. Foi the B theoiist, the
absolute facts concein how the woild is fiom no tempoial point of view. Foi the
piesentist, the absolute facts concein how the woild is piesently (undeistood to
include how it was and how it will be). Accoiding to the Moving Spotlightei, theie
::
is an absolute fact about which of the many existent times is NOW. Non-standard
A eories give up the idea that theie aie absolute facts of the mattei about the way
the woild is. e iesulting views iesemble the B eoiy in that they deny that any
one time is absolutely piivileged; they depait fiom the B eoiy in upholding the
non-ieducibility of tense.
One ioute to such a non-standaid A theoiy staits with the piesentist view
discussed above.' e piesentist takes the piesent facts to be the absolute facts.
ey postulated no othei facts, but in teims of the piesent facts, they aie able to
say what the facts have been and what they are going to be. On the coiiesponding
non-standaid view, the facts that the piesentist takes as absolute aie ieinteipieted
as holding only ielative to some paiticulai time. Fuithei, what facts hold ielative
to past and futuie times is not taken to be ieducible to what was and what will be
the case simpliciter. e woild is one way ielative to one time; it is some othei way
ielative to anothei time. eie is no tiuth simpliciter to be had. Tiuth is taken to be
essentially ielative to times. e piesent time only counts as the piesent ielative to
the tensed facts we staited with, the facts that hold ielative to it. Eveiy othei time is
equally piesent, ielative to its own special collection of tensed facts.
Do non-standaid views vindicate the passage of time: e fist, obvious, point
to make is that eveiything the piesentist said was tiue absolutely iemains tiue
ielative to a paiticulai tempoial peispective. And eveiything that the piesentist
maintained was always tiue iemains tiue ielative to eveiy tempoial peispective.
Since time passes accoiding to the piesentist, the same holds tiue, as of any time,
on the non-standaid view. One of the views many peispectives is supposed to be
oui peispective so we can tiuly say (now) that time passes.
is is to considei how things aie fiom the peispective of each time. One might
also considei how things vaiy acioss peispectives. Considei fist the analogous
vaiiation in the B eoiy, which can then seive as a useful contiast to the vaiiation
involved innon-standaid Atheoiies. Onthe Beoiy, events do not liteially become
evei moie past. But neveitheless one can considei the peispectives of a sequence
of evei latei times. In a sense, one can say of any given event that it becomes evei
moie past relative to such a sequence. But on the B eoiy, all this amounts to is
that the event is located at an evei gieatei tempoial distance fiom each time in the
sequence. is no moie coiiesponds to the ieal passage of time than the analogous
spatial tiuth that, ielative to a sequence of locations oideied continuously by theii
mutual spatial distances, the fist element of the sequence is an evei gieatei spatial
distance fiom each subsequent membei of the sequence.
Similaily, on the B eoiy theie is a sense in which each time counts as the
piesent ielative to itself. So even on the B eoiy, the piesent can be said to change
'I take the iesult to coiiespond to Fines exteinal ielativist veision of non-standaid iealism
about tense; see Fine (:oo,, pp. :,88o).
::
its position in time, ielative to time. But again, the B-theoietic sense in which a time
is piesent to itself is exactly analogous to the sense in which each spatial location
counts as heie ielative to itself. Being the centie of a peispectival iepiesentation is
not per se to be iepiesented as special by that iepiesentation. In fact, this seems to
be a plausible way to think about the spatial oiigin of oui visual iepiesentation of
space. In one sense, vision iepiesents oui location difeiently fiom the othei spatial
locations that it iepiesents.' But in anothei sense, even in visual expeiience, oui
spatial location is not iepiesented as piivileged. It is piesented visually meiely as the
spatial location at which we happen to be. We undeistand the peispectival natuie of
oui visual ielationship to othei places piecisely in teims of oui spatial ielationship
to those places. Moieovei, oui being so ielated to them is something that is itself
iepiesented in oui spatially peispectival iepiesentation.
Considei, now, the analogous vaiiations on the non-standaid view. As one
consideis evei latei tempoial peispectives, a given event does, liteially, become evei
moie past. Similaily, as one consideis evei latei peispectives, latei and latei times
aie distinguished as the piesent in a way that goes beyond the B-theoietic vaiiation
just ieviewed. e way in which the tensed facts tiue ielative to a paiticulai time
single out that time is supposed not to be ieducible to tenseless ielational facts
about, e.g., the vaiious B ielations which events stand in to that time, so a fortiori
the tensed facts cannot be facts about those ielations.
Does this vaiiation with tempoial peispective piovide us with a sense in which
the non-standaid view vindicates the passage of time: eie is an appaient pioblem
with the suggestion that it does. e vaiiation is not itself a fact about how ieality
is. Oui model of the view includes such vaiiation but, as we saw eailiei, featuies
of the model that tianscend what is tiue fiom each tempoial peispective do not
coiiespond to peispective-independent facts about ieality. eie aie meant to be
no such facts.' is issue iecuis in the context of open futuie models of passage,
so I postpone fuithei discussion until the next section.
VI
Passage and the Open Future. So fai I have assumed that vindicating the passage of
time involves outlining a metaphysics accoiding to which the becoming moie past
of events is a mind-independent, objective phenomenon. eie is, howevei, anothei
set of ideas that aie natuially associated with the belief that time ieally passes.
e basic idea is ciisply summaiised by the cosmologist Geoige Ellis:
'In some sense it is not iepiesented at all except as a limit.
'A type of suiiogate can be iecoveied in teims of time-ielative facts. As of any time, I can
considei what will be tiue fiom a sequence of evei latei peispectives. And I can iteiate this pioceduie
by consideiing, foi example, fiom the peispective of t
I
what is tiue, fiom the peispective of some
eailiei oi latei time t
2
, about tempoial peispectives evei latei than t
2
.
:,
ings could have been difeient, but second by second, one specifc
evolutionaiy histoiy out of all the possibilities is chosen, takes place,
and gets cast in stone. (Ellis :ooo, :8::,)
e viewhas two essential elements. Fiist, theie is the idea that the futuie is genuinely
open: at any instant, theie aie seveial possible ways that the woild might develop.
Second, theie is the idea that only one of these possibilities in fact happens: as time
passes, exactly one of the many possibilities becomes actuality, and the iest become
meie might-have-beens.
In oidei to pin down the view, one needs to cleai about what is meant by the
claim that the futuie is open.' Suppose that the laws of natuie aie indeteiministic
in the sense that specifcation of the woilds histoiy up to a ceitain time, togethei
with those laws, does not fx all futuie facts. To say that the futuie is open might
only be to say that the futuie is not nomologically deteimined in this sense. But
that the past and piesent, togethei with the laws, do not fx all futuie facts does not
entail that theie aie no such facts. In tenseless teims, theie can be a unique actual
continuation of the woild to the futuie of some time t, but this continuation need
not be the only one compatible with the actual laws and the way the woild is up to
and including t.
Seveial advocates of the open futuie (e.g., Geach :,,; McCall :,o; Baines
and Cameion :o::) claim that tiue openness iequiies, not just that the futuie not
be (nomologically) determined, but that it also be not fully determinate. And one
populai way of cashing out what lack of deteiminateness means focuses on the
status of futuie possibilities. When one has meie nomological openness of the futuie,
theie aie, as of a time, many possible futuies compatible with the indeteiministic
laws, but they aie not all cieated equal. One amongst them coiiesponds to the actual
futuie. e otheis aie theiefoie ways the actual woild might have been (consistent
with its past and the laws), but not ways that it genuinely might still be. Foi example,
it cannot both be tiue that theie will not be a sea battle tomoiiow but that theie
might be one (in the ielevant, non-epistemic sense of might). e open futuie
view now undei consideiation, theiefoie, insists that, foi them all to be genuine
possibilities, none fiom amongst them is now singled out as what will take place.'
is leads natuially to bianching time models of ieality: tiee-like stiuctuies, the
nodes of which coiiespond to spatially global instants. e bianches aie intended
to iepiesent the pluiality of possibilities to the futuie of each of the nodes fiom
which they bianch.
'Foi a moie compiehensive ieview of the options, see Toiie (:o::).
e ielevant sense of deteiminism is the model-theoietic one pioneeied by Montague and
iefned and deployed by Lewis (:8,) and Eaiman (:8o).
'MacFailane (:oo,, pp. ,:,o) ofeis an aigument of this kind against views that seek to uphold
the bivalence of futuie contingents. Foi ciiticism, see Toiie (:o::, pp. ,oo-,).
:
Given such a stiuctuie, theie aie many ways to constiuct semantics foi tensed
(and modal) sentences ielative to the stiuctuies instants. e options most in accoid
with the intuitions that led us to this point aie the ones that involve a failuie of
bivalence foi futuie contingents. Suppose, that, as of now, it is an open possibility
whethei theie will be a sea battle tomoiiow: in some possible futuies such a battle
occuis, in otheis it does not. In such ciicumstances, the semantics should secuie
the tiuth of both of the following:
eie might be a sea battle tomoiiow
eie might not be a sea battle tomoiiow.
One might also ieason that, whichevei open possibility comes to pass, eithei theie
will be such a battle oi theie wont be. at is,
Eithei theie will be a sea battle tomoiiow oi theie wont be
should also come out as tiue. Howevei, since it is supposed to be genuinely unsettled,
as of now, whethei theie will be a sea battle, neithei of the following claims should
count as tiue:
eie will be a sea battle tomoiiow
eie will not be a sea battle tomoiiow.
Foi similai ieasons, it seems that neithei should count as false eithei. e fact that
it is not now settled that tomoiiow theie will not be a sea battle, foi example, can be
taken to be a ieason foi denying that theie will be a sea battle tomoiiow is plain
false. It tuins out that theie aie ielatively natuial semantics foi bianching time that
secuie exactly these iesults.
eie is a populai line of aigument against the bianching-time model of the
open futuie. e basic idea of the objection is that theie is nothing unsettled about
a bianching ieality. An omniscient being located at one of the nodes with bianching
to theii futuie, should not be unceitain about, oi think it unsettled whethei, theie
will be a sea battle. eie will be such a battle, foi theie is such a battle in at least
one of the futuie bianches. eie aie also futuie bianches in which theie wont be
such a battle. If the claim
`
the futuie contains a sea battle does not come out as tiue
(and is also not false), this is only because of a piesupposition failuie. e futuie
fails to iefei because theie aie seveial futuies (see, e.g., Lewis :8o, pp. :o,).
e objection piesupposes a B-theoietic inteipietation of bianching-time mod-
els, in which the block univeise is ieplaced by a block multiveise. Whethei such a
e most well known aie the supeivaluationist semantics fist pioposed by omason (:,o).
Foi iecent discussion, see Biogaaid (:oo8), MacFailane (:oo8), and, foi an application of such
semantics in the context of the Giowing Block view, Biiggs and Foibes (:o::).
:,
pictuie vindicates the intuition that the futuie is open is contioveisial. Many agiee
with Lewis that it does not.` e A-theoiist, howevei, need not woiiy how this
dispute is iesolved, foi, fiom theii peispective, the objection gets things back-to-
fiont. On the view we aie exploiing one starts with the intuition that, as of some
time, the futuie is open. is is taken to mean that (i) theie aie seveial ways that
thing might happen, and (ii) nothing in ieality singles out (as of that time) one of
these possibilities as the way things will actually be. On the intended inteipietation,
bianching-time stiuctuies aie intioduced as a means to iepiesent these puipoited
facts, and to see whethei a consistent foimal theoiy incoipoiating them can be
devised. Against this backgiound, one is simply not peimitted to ieinteipiet the
bianches ielative to some time as seveial equally ieal futuies, iathei than as seveial
equally ieal possible ways that the single futuie might tuin out.
It is time to confiont an issue that has been luiking in the backgiound. Recall
that the view summaiised in the quotation fiom Ellis has two components. e
open futuie was the fist. e second was the idea that, as time passes, just one of the
seveial possibilities foi each moment obtains. As of now, no futuie is distinguished
but, with the passage of time, one will come to be. Howis this idea to be incoipoiated
into bianching-time models:
At one level, what is iequiied would seem to be stiaightfoiwaid. A path thiough
a bianching-time stiuctuie coiiesponds to a single deteiminate couise of events.
Foi the open-futuie A theoiist, such a path coiiesponds to a possible view fiom the
end of time: a possible way foi the entiie histoiy of the woild to have unfolded. Pick
such a path thiough a given bianching-time stiuctuie. Its lineaily oideied instants
defne a lineaily oideied sequence of subtiees of oui oiiginal tiee, with each membei
of the sequence a piopei substiuctuie of the pieceding ones. Each instant fiom the
chosen histoiy is the piivileged node of the coiiesponding subtiee, wheie it featuies
as the fist instant of bianching. With this machineiy in place, the natuial thought is
` e block multiveise pictuie was once ioutinely associated with the Eveiettian inteipietation
of quantum mechanics (EQM). Something like the Lewis objection lies behind the aigument in
Gieaves (:oo) that theie can be no subjective unceitainty in an Eveiettian woild. Recently, theie
has been a subtle shif in the position of some advocates of subjective unceitainty in EQM. It is now
claimed that the theoiys fundamental ontology is equally consistent with a diveiging (iathei than
bianching) pictuie of quasi-classical woilds, and that this pictuie is to be piefeiied foi piecisely the
kind of ieasons alluded to above; see Saundeis (:o:o) and Wilson (:o::).
Heie aie two possible souices of confusion. Fiist, the defendei of the open futuie is likely to
insist both that (a) in ieality theie aie ieal futuie possibilities and that (b) these futuie possibilities
aie all equally ieal. As we have seen, the point of this insistence is to difeientiate the view fiom
advocacy of a meiely nomologically open futuie. Second, the models iepiesent all events in the
possible futuies as tempoially ielated to the instant fiom which they bianch. But of couise events
that might occui in the futuie aie iepiesented as tempoially ielated to the piesent: if they occui, they
will be some tempoial distance fiom the piesent. It does not follow fiom this (foi the A-theoiist)
that theie (tenselessly) is both a sea battle : houis fiom now and (in some othei iealm of ieality)
an absence of such a battle : houis fiom now.
:o
that the passage of time is to be iepiesented, not within a single bianching stiuctuie,
but by a sequence of the kind just desciibed. As time passes, successive elements of
the sequence iepiesent how ieality is. Moving along the sequence coiiesponds to
tiacing an upwaid path thiough the oiiginal tiee. Moment afei moment, one of
the many possibilities foi each successive time is chosen. But theie always iemains
bianching to the futuie. No element of the sequence coiiesponds to the view fiom
the end of time. at exists only as the ideal limit of the sequence as a whole.
Something veiy like this model of tempoial passage has been defended by Stoiis
McCall (:,o; :8; :). e pictuie is veiy suggestive, but it invites the by now
familiai two-times objection. Time seems to be doubly iepiesented, fist by the
sequence of evei shiinking tiees and then by the tempoial dimension within each
tiee. anks to oui ieviewof tiaditional Aeoiies, we aie well placed to identify the
most plausible A-theoietic iesponses, and to note some new twists that modelling
the open futuie biings.
To my mind the least plausible option, which I take to be McCalls view, is the
natuial analogue of the Moving Spotlight and Giowing Block views. As on the block
multiveise view, ieality as a whole is a bianching entity whose individual bianches
aie extended in foui dimensions. As time passes, this ieality changes. Bianch
attiition occuis as moie and moie paits of it go out of existence. As on the Moving
Spotlight view, futuie times aie as ieal as past times. As on the Giowing Block view,
the piesent time is metaphysically on a pai with othei times. It is distinguished only
in teims of its location ielative to stiuctuially defnable featuies of ieality. Rathei
than being the bleeding edge, it is the suiface at which bianching begins.
What sense can be made of bianch attiition: As on standaid veisions of the
Giowing Block and the Moving Spotlight, one can think of a single element of
the sequence as coiiesponding to how things aie absolutely. Change in bianching
is then undeistood in piimitively tensed teims: othei elements of the sequence
iepiesent how things weie, and how they will be.
is is not a ioute that the open-futuie A theoiist should take. Piioi to oui
seeking to aiticulate the view in teims of an appiopiiate model, theie seemed to
be no incompatibility between insisting that, as of now, it is unsettled, and hence
neithei tiue noi false, that theie will be a sea battle tomoiiow, but that, as time
passes, things get settled one way oi the othei. A sequence of evei smallei bianching
stiuctuies seems like an attempt to do justice to both featuies of the view. e paiity
of the bianches in each element of the sequence iespects the fist; bianch attiition
Eaiman (:oo8) makes an analogous point conceining models of the Giowing Block view.
Foi ielated ciiticisms, see Neilich (:8) and Faii (:o::).
is is to be faithful to McCalls view, and to inteipiet distinct bianches as distinct iealms of
ieality. eie is also a lineai time inteipietation involving bianching only at the level of couises of
mateiial events occuiiing within a foui-dimensional block. e piesent time is then metaphysically
distinguished, as the fiontiei between deteiminateness and indeteiminateness in ieality.
:,
iespects the second. Howevei, we should ieject the hybiid inteipietation of the
model. Conciete ieality does not bianch. e bianching stiuctuies aie simply ways
of iepiesenting the paiticulai pattein of tensed claims that the piefeiied semantics
foi such stiuctuies geneiates. e open-futuie A theoiist should take such tensed
claims as basic.
eie aie two kinds of such a view to considei: an analogue (oi veision) of
piesentism, and a non-standaid view. e piesentist vaiiant claims that just one
element of the sequence coiiesponds to a complete catalogue of the absolute facts.
Stiictly speaking, theiefoie, the othei elements of the sequence cannot be iequiied.
is miiiois oui eailiei claim that, when modelling the piesentist view in teims of
a block univeise with a piivileged centie, one does not need additional blocks in
oidei to show that the piivileged centie moves foiwaid in time. is fact is alieady
encoded in the oiiginal block. Does this iemain tiue once we have bianching:
e key thing to note is that, while futuie elements of the sequence cannot be
iead of fiom eailiei elements, that the futuie facts will coiiespond to one such
element can. Amongst the tensed facts that a bianching stiuctuie encodes is that
exactly one amongst the possibilities open at that time will occui. Heie is one way
to visualise the point: while a given bianching stiuctuie (absent a thin ied line)
does not encode a single sequence of the kind we have been consideiing, it does
encode that the futuie tensed facts that hold at latei and latei times coiiespond
to some such sequence. Given that it is not now deteimined how things will tuin
out, one might think that the lack of a piefeiied sequence is exactly as it should be.
Passage is accommodated in this model just as it is in standaid piesentism. But the
view adds the fuithei featuie that, as time passes, what once was unsettled becomes
settled: theie might be a sea battle oi theie might not, and eithei theie will be one
oi theie wont.
e model of the non-standaid vaiiant of the view does involve a paiticulai
sequence. Each element of it iepiesents the iiieducibly tensed facts that hold as
of some time. is might seem to give us a moie explicit iepiesentation of once
open possibilities being settled by the passage of time: what is indeteiminate as
of t is settled in such-and-such a way as of t

. But caie is needed: the sequence of

tiees does not iepiesent how ieality is absolutely, as conceived fiom no paiticulai
tempoial point of view.
Just as the tensed facts that hold as of some time aie not ieducible to tenseless
facts, theie is no need foi them to be deducible fiom the tensed facts that hold as of
othei times. As of t, it is neithei tiue noi false that theie will be a sea battle at t

. As
of t

, it is tiue that a sea battle is iaging. is seems to be exactly what one needs
if one is to captuie the motivating idea with which we began this section. In fact,
foi exactly this ieason, it might seem that this open-futuie veision of non-standaid
A theoiy bettei captuies the passage of time than a veision in which the tensed facts
as of one time can be iead of fiom those that hold at anothei. In the lattei case,
:8
it is haid to see what the insistence that such facts aie not ieducible comes to, foi
theie is a unique iepiesentation of iealitythe block univeisefiom which the
peispectival facts can be deiived. is is no longei tiue of the open-futuie model.
e piimoidial bianching-stiuctuie captuies only how things might tuin out, not
how they will tuin out. e block univeise histoiy that constitutes the ideal limit of
the sequence of the models bianching stiuctuies not only does not coiiespond to
the facts as of any time (the end of time is nevei ieached), it also, when inteipieted
as iepiesenting the absolute facts, misiepiesents as deteiminate futuie facts that aie
genuinely unsettled.
I theiefoie take the combinationof objective tempoial passage and the bianching-
time conception of the open futuie to be a way that the A theoiist can diive a wedge
between theii view and the B eoiy. Of the vaiious A-theoietic view suiveyed up
to this point, I take piesentism, and some vaiiant of non-standaid A eoiy to be
the most attiactive vehicles foi this combination. In the face of ielativity, only one
of these views iemains a going concein.
VII
Against a Preferred Now. Global instants play a fundamental iole in the A eoiies
ieviewed so fai. Piesentism takes the woild to be extended in only thiee, spatial
dimensions. In oidei to inteipiet a spacetime model as a iepiesentation of piesentist
ieality, one needs to foliate it by a family of 3-dimensional instants and indicate
which coiiesponds to the cuiient time. e Moving Spotlight view embiaces a
4-dimensional ieality, but singles out a 3-dimensional subiegion as metaphysically
piivileged. e Giowing Block views 4-dimensional ieality is tiuncated to the
futuie, bounded by a 3-dimensional, spatially extended suiface. e nodes of the
bianching-time models iepiesent 3-dimensional, spatially extended global instants.
Minkowski spacetime, the spacetime of special ielativity, lacks such stiuctuie.
While some models of geneial ielativity come with physically piefeiied foliations
by sequences of 3-dimensional spacelike hypeisuifaces, the physical chaiacteiistics
of such suifaces do not maik them out as obvious candidates foi the piivileged
suifaces of a classical pictuie of tempoial passage. Moieovei, the local physics
(which, piesumably, is the physics in teims of which we should seek to undeistand
oui tempoial expeiience of the woild) is as blind to these piivileged suifaces as it is
in special ielativity. In fact, the local physics just is the physics of special ielativity.
In the face of these facts, theie would seem to be thiee distinct ioutes by which
the passage of time might be ieconciled with ielativistic physics. e fist, advocated,
foi example, by Dieks (:ooo) and Savitt (:oo), is to ofei a defationaiy analysis of
Foi a iecent ieview of some of the obstacles to inteipieting such foliations in piesentist teims,
see Wthiich (:o:,, ,).
:
passage. As discussed in Section II, this simply ignoies, iathei than solves, the main
explanatoiy challenge faced by the B eoiy.
e second option is to aigue that a model of passage that iequiies a piefeiied set
of global Nows is compatible with ielativity when the lattei is coiiectly undeistood.
Heie is not the place to ieview the sizeable liteiatuie on this possibility, but I want to
highlight one cost of this ioute. Its advocates face a dilemma: eithei they inteipiet
the spatiotempoial stiuctuie of ielativistic spacetime at face value, oi they aie
committed to spatiotempoial facts that go beyond this stiuctuie. Neithei choice
looks attiactive.
Accoiding to typical veisions of the second choice, the spacetime metiic system-
atically misiepiesents the tiue spatial and tempoial distances between events. But
it is the spatial and tempoial distances of the spacetime metiic that coiiespond to
the measuiements of physical iods and clocks. One vaiiant of the second choice,
foi example, is the neo-Loientzian inteipietation of special ielativity. One can
iepiesent the commitments of this view in two stages. One fist ie-inteipiets the
standaid spacetime models of some special ielativistic physics inteims of Newtonian
spacetime stiuctuie. One then inteipiets the Newtonian stiuctuie in teims of ones
favouiite classical A-theoietic metaphysics.` On this pictuie, the Minkowski metiic
systematically misiepiesents the spatial and tempoial distances between events.
Foi example, it might iepiesent as some spatial distance apait and as standing in
no tempoial ielation two events that aie, fiom the point of view of the postulated
Newtonian stiuctuie, some fnite tempoial distance apait and some othei (deiiva-
tive) spatial distance apait. It is, of couise, the spatial and tempoial distances of the
Minkowski metiic, not those of the hidden Newtonian stiuctuie, that coiiespond
to the measuiements of physical iods and clocks. Given this, it might seem piefei-
able to adopt a liteialistic attitude to the spacetime metiic and simple supeiadd a
metaphysically piefeiied foliation in teims of which passage is to be undeistood.
But this choice also has its costs.
Suppose, foi example, that some momentaiy event e is piesently occuiiing and
that some othei event e

will occui. Suppose that the Minkowski metiic iepiesents

the spatiotempoial distance between e and e

as being, say, two minutes. Now

considei the set of events that will co-occui with e

accoiding to the supeiadded

Foi a systematic defence of this option, see Zimmeiman (:o::, ).
`It is peihaps woith emphasising that this does not iequiie ievisionaiy physics. e standaid
geometiical machineiy used to iepiesent a Newtonian spacetime is an n-tuple (M, h
ab
, t
a
,
a
, ).
h
ab
is a tensoi feld that defnes the Euclidean spatial metiic on simultaneity suifaces. t
a
is a one-foim
feld that defnes these suifaces and the tempoial distances between them.
a
is a time-like vectoi
feld whose integial cuives iepiesent the woildlines of the points of absolute space. In teims of
these objects one can defne an efective (inveise) Minkowski metiic g
ab
=
a

b
h
ab
, which is
compatible with the deiivative opeiatoi . e Newtonian iepiesentation of standaid ielativistic
physics then simply couples mattei felds (such as the electiomagnetic feld) to this object in the
standaid way (see, e.g., Tiautman :oo, pp. :::).
:o
foliation. Most of these will not occui two minutes afei e accoiding to the spacetime
metiic. Many will occui a much shoitei tempoial distance afei e, foi example, some
small fiaction of a second. at might seem stiange, but it is peihaps a consequence
that the A theoiist can live with. Tempoial distance, as measuied by clocks and as
encoded by the metiic, is no longei a measuie of a single distance between successive
sets of co-occuiiing events. In shoit, it is no longei a measuie of the passage of
time. e situation, howevei, is woise than this. Not all events co-occuiiing with e

happen some tempoial distance afei e. eie will be many events co-occuiiing
with e

, much fuithei fiom it spatially, that, accoiding to the metiic, occui some
spatial distance fiom e. at is, they happen afei e (accoiding to the A theoiists
conception of passage) but they lie at no tempoial distance fiom e (including the
zeio distance). e iesulting view may not be incoheient, but it is veiy stiange
indeed. We have seen enough to motivate consideiation of the thiid and fnal option:
is it possible to geneialise the models of the pievious sections in oidei to obtain a
genuinely A-theoietic view that does without global nows:
Something like this task has been undeitaken iecently by Eaiman (:oo8), foi
the Giowing Block, and Skow (:oo), foi the Moving Spotlight. ese weie the
views that looked least attiactive in oui ieview of classical models of passage, and
theii shoitcomings caiiy ovei to the ielativistic domain. Nonetheless, it is woith
ieviewing Eaimans and Skows efoits, foi they can seive as a template foi the
geneialisation of the bianching-time models.
VIII
e Relativistic Growing Block. In oidei to appieciate Eaimans geneialisation of
Giowing Block models to ielativistic physics one fist needs to quickly ieheaise his
defnition of classical models. He defnes these as follows. Let = M, G
I
, G
2
, . . . ,
P
I
, P
2
, . . . be a spacetime model of some Newtoniantheoiy. M is a foui-dimensional
manifold iepiesenting spacetime. G
I
, G
2
, . . . aie felds defned on it iepiesenting
the standaid spatiotempoial stiuctuies of Galilean spacetime. P
I
, P
2
, . . . aie felds
iepiesenting the mateiial content of the model. One can defne a time function
T M Rthat encodes the simultaneity stiuctuie and tempoial metiic of the model.
In teims of , Eaiman defnes future-truncated models,
T
, by deleting fiom the
spacetime manifold of all the points p such that T(p) > , < < +, and
then iestiicting the geometiic and mattei felds G
i
and P
j
of to the tiuncated
manifold (Eaiman :oo8, p. :,). One can then chaiacteiise a model of the Giowing
Block view as a paii = N, . Nis a set such that, foi some , each element is
isomoiphic to
T
foi some . e ielation is defned via the condition that
foi any n, n

N, n n

if n can be isomoiphically embedded as a submodel of n

.
Foi to be an allowed model, should be a total oidei. It is to be inteipieted as
contains at least as much existence as.
::
N, oideied by , thus piovides us with a sequence of the kind familiai fiom oui
eailiei discussion. In piinciple, theie aie two ways of inteipieting it as iepiesenting
an A-theoietic ieality. e standaid way inteipiets one of the elements of N as
coiiesponding to how ieality is, absolutely speaking. Eailiei and latei elements of
the sequence then iepiesent how ieality was and how it will be. e non-standaid
way seeks to inteipiet each element as a iepiesentation of how ieality is as of some
time, wheie the time-ielative facts aie held to be not fuithei ieducible to facts that
hold absolutely.
So much foi the Newtonian case. At some level of abstiaction, the possible
geneialisations to ielativistic physics aie stiaightfoiwaid. One ieplaces with
a (non-extendible, oiientable) spacetime model = M, g
ab
, P
I
, P
2
, . . . of some
ielativistic theoiy. Eaiman then consideis two options, which he labels hypersurface
becoming and worldline becoming.
Hypeisuiface becoming iequiies that admit a global time function; a function
t M R such that foi any p, q M wheie p is in the chionological past of q
accoiding to the spacetime metiic g
ab
, t(p) < t(q). e constiuction of a model of
hypeisuiface becoming then paiallels the Newtonian case. One consideis paiis of
the foim(, t) = {
t
l < < u}, . As befoie,
t
is the futuie-tiuncated
model one obtains fiombe deleting all points p of M such that t(p) > and then
iestiicting the felds of to iesult. l and u aie the lowei and uppei bounds of the
iange of t. e ielation is defned via the condition:
t

t
if

.
So fai the constiuction paiallels the Newtonian case too closely. e elements
of {
t
l < < u} aie totally oideied by the ielation . As a iesult, the A theoiist
can apply whichevei was theii piefeiied inteipietation of the classical giowing block
model diiectly to the ielativistic model, but they face the thoiny issue of which of the
uncountably many time functions compatible with a given spacetime coiiesponds
to the suifaces of ieal becoming. is is a vaiiant of the (disavowed) second ioute
to ieconciling passage with ielativity. We need, instead, to geneialise the model to
one that does not single out a piefeiied family of global Nows. e natuial move is
to considei the set Rof all possible futuie-tiuncations of associated with eveiy
possible time function on . We can then defne a ielation on this set in an
obvious way. e iequiied conditions is that, foi all r, r

R, r r

if theie is some
time function t on such that r is isomoiphic to
t
, r

is isomoiphic to
t
,
and

.`'
We now confiont an instance of the defning featuie of the type of ielativistic
models to be consideied in the iemaindei of this papei. e ielation is a partial
order, not a total oidei. How does this key difeience with the pie-ielativistic case
afect the type of inteipietation that the A theoiist is able to give of the model:
`'e iesult is similai (but not identical) to what Eaiman calls a supei Bioad hypeisuiface
Becoming model (Eaiman :oo8, p. :,o).
::
In the pie-ielativistic context theie weie two options. e standaid option takes
a single element of the ielevant set as a iepiesentation of how ieality is absolutely
speaking; the non-standaid option tieats eveiy element of the set as on a pai, each
coiiesponding to a iepiesentation of how ieality is ielative to some time.
e fist of these looks like a non-staitei. Suppose one took an element r R
isomoiphic to
t
, foi some value of some time function t, as coiiesponding
to how ieality is absolutely.` is might seem alieady to give up on oui aim of an
A-theoietic view without global Nows. But, so fai we only have one global Now, not
a whole sequence, so let us biacket this objection and move on. With this choice of
r as iepiesenting the absolute facts, it might seem as if one can stiaightfoiwaidly
inteipiet any r

r as coiiesponding to how ieality will be. But even this much is

not stiaightfoiwaid, foi we have to decide what to say about two elements r
I
and
r
2
of Rthat both coiiespond to extensions of r but which aie not compaiable by
. Can one maintain that ieality will be both as r
I
iepiesents it as being and as r
2
iepiesents it as being: Essentially the same pioblem becomes fai moie acute when
one consideis elements of Rthat aie incompaiable (accoiding to ) with r itself.
Let r

be such an element that does not include the heie and now (which, I assume,
is pait of the futuiemost boundaiy of r). r

cannot iepiesent how things will be

unless the existence of what is happening iight heie and now can come to cease to
be. But noi can it iepiesent how things weie unless something that had come to be
has now come to cease to be.
e moial is that, if one maintains that a unique element of Rcoiiesponds to
how things aie absolutely, theie does not seem to be an appiopiiate way to tieat all
the othei elements of the set. Can non-standaid A theoiy do any bettei: On such a
view, the pioblem of what to make of two incompaiable elements of the Rfiom the
peispective of a thiid does not aiise (at least omcially), foi, on the non-standaid
view, one does not look to othei elements of the model in oidei to deduce the tensed
facts that hold ielative to a given element. Such facts aie supposed to be iepiesented
by the element itself. Even so, the piospects foi the view aie not much bettei. One
pioblem conceins the natuie of the peispective ielative to which the iiieducibly
peispectival facts aie supposed to obtain. Spacelike hypeisuifaces of ielativistic
spacetimes simply aie not natuially inteipieted as things with iespect to which
ieality might be a ceitain way. Oui heie and now is a subiegion of uncountably
many such suifaces if it is a subiegion of any. We enjoy a paiticulai spatiotempoial
peispective on ieality, but it is not a peispective that natuially extends to any one of
the encompassing hypeisuifaces.``
`Piesumably one would like the heie and now (i.e., youi ieading this sentence) to be located in a
iegion of spacetime somewheie on the suiface t = .
``One of Fines own ieasons foi advocating a veision of non-standaid A theoiy is that he believes
that, unlike standaid A-theoietic views, it does not need a piivileged spacetime foliation (Fine :oo,,
,o,,). Howevei, his piefeiied fiame-theoietic non-standaid view still conceives of tense in teims
:,
A desiie to do bettei justice to the local natuie of oui spatiotempoial peispective
can be used to motivate the second of Eaimans two options: woildline becoming.
One staits again with an inextentible ielativistic spacetime model .` One then
consideis a past and futuie endless timelike cuive in . In now familiai notation,
one can iepiesent a coiiesponding Giowing Block model based on this cuive as
(, ) = {
J

(p)
p }, .
J

(p)
is obtained by deleting all the points of
not in the causal past of the point p and iestiicting the felds of to the iesult.
e ielation is defned via the condition:
J

(p)

J

(r)
if J

(p) J

(r). Once
again, the elements of {
J

(p)
p } aie totally oideied by the ielation . e
piopeily ielativistic model we desiie consideis all possible woildlines oi, moie
simply, all points of . e iesulting model is B() = {
J

(p)
p M}, ,
with still defned via
J

(p)

J

(r)
if J

(p) J

(r).` It is a paitial oidei on

{
J

(p)
p M}.
As befoie, one can considei standaid and non-standaid A-theoietic inteipieta-
tions of this model. e standaid vaiiant sufeis fiom the pioblems that amicted the
standaid inteipietation of the hypeisuiface-based model. In addition, it displays a
fuithei peculiaiity that looks decisively pioblematic. Suppose one takes
J

(p)
as
iepiesentative of how ieality is absolutely. Whats so special about p: Piesumably
you hope that p is (ioughly speaking) the (i.e., youi) heie and now. Whats so
special about you: We theiefoie do bettei to considei the viability of a non-standaid
A-theoietic inteipietation. Heie we face the geneial unsuitability of the Giowing
Block model as something that might undeipin a non-standaid view.
J

(p)
looks
adequate to iepiesenting iiieducible past-tensed facts that hold as of spacetime
point p, but what do we want to say about tensed claims, made as of p conceining
the futuie, oi the elsewheie:` It is haid to avoid looking to othei elements of the
model as encoding these, but that way lies many of the pioblems that plague the
standaid inteipietation.
IX
e Relativistic Moving Spotlight. Piopeily ielativistic Giowing Block models aie
not piomising mateiials foi the would-be A theoiist. Let us tuin, instead, to Skows
suggested geneialisation of the Moving Spotlight view. Skow motivates his pioposal
of global spacelike suifaces. e ciiticisms of this paiagiaph thus apply to it. Fiame-theoietic views
also do not geneialise natuially to the vaiiably cuived spacetimes of geneial ielativity, which lack
the ielevant (global) fiames.
`One no longei iequiies that admit a time function. It is enough foi the constiuction to woik
that be causal-past distinguishing. See Eaiman (:oo8, pp. :,:-:) foi the ielevant defnitions.
`e model is closely ielated (though not identical) to what Eaiman calls a supei woildline
becoming model (Eaiman :oo8, p. :,:).
`e elsewhere of a point in a ielativistic spacetime is the set of points spacelike ielated to it. I.e.,
the set of points neithei in noi on eithei its past oi futuie lightcones.
:
via the supeitime iepiesentation of the pie-ielativistic view. e following is a
natuial constiaint law desciibing howsupeitime inteivals and time inteivals should
mesh:
If p and q aie points in supeitime, and p is r units Latei than q, then
the time that is NOW fiom the peispective of p is r units latei than the
time that is NOW fiom the peispective of q. (Skow :oo, pp. o,::)
Skow asks how this should be geneialised when one ieplaces Galilean spacetime,
with its unique family of global instants, with Minkowski spacetime. With supeitime
still in place, one is afei something of the foim:
If p and q aie points in supeitime, and p is r units Latei than q, then
the BLANK-: fiom the peispective of p is BLANK-: than the BLANK-:
fiom the peispective of q.
Wheie BLANK-: holds the place foi the kind of iegion that is lit up fiom peispec-
tives in supeitime, and BLANK-: holds the place foi the ielation that those iegions
stand in (Skow :oo, p. o,:). As Skow notes, the stiuctuie of ielativistic spacetimes
piovide us with no natuial way to fll in these blanks. His solution is to ieplace
the peispectives of the points of supeitime with those of the points of Minkowski
supeispacetime. Fiom each such peispective, just one point of oidinaiy spacetime
is lit up as PRESENT. One can then state natuial constiaint laws, including, foi
example:
If p and q aie points in supeispacetime that aie Timelike ielated, and p
is to the Futuie of q (that is, lies in the Futuie Light Cone of q), then
the point that is PRESENT fiom the peispective of p is timelike ielated
to and to the futuie of the point that is PRESENT fiom the peispective
of q. (Skow :oo, p. o,,)
Skowclaims that this ielativistic model vindicates passage, foi the ielativistic PRESENT
can be said to move just as much as the NOW of the pie-ielativistic theoiy:
Just as, as one moved fiom Eailiei to Latei points in supeitime, one
saw the NOW move fiom eailiei to latei times, so as one moves fiom
Eailiei to Latei points along any Timelike cuive in supeispacetime,
one will see the PRESENT move fiom eailiei to latei points along a
coiiesponding timelike cuive in spacetime. (Skow :oo, p. o,,)
At this point, the ieadei is likely to iecall Skows insistence, when discussing
the pie-ielativistic model, that supeitime was just a metaphoi. Accoiding to the
omcial theoiy, the peispective of exactly one point in supeitime coiiesponds to the
absolute facts. e peispectives of othei points in supeitime aie iepiesentations
:,
of facts omcially spelled out in teims of piimitive tense opeiatois. It is ieally these
tensed facts, undeistood as absolute facts, that secuie the movement of the NOW.
One theiefoie wants to know: what is the omcial stoiy foi which Minkowski supei-
spacetime piovides a metaphoi: Skow declines to answei. Afei speculating that it
might be possible to spell it out in teims of piimitive tense-like opeiatois that aie
adapted to the stiuctuie of ielativistic spacetime, he excuses himself fiom doing so
by suggesting that the iesult would not be woith the efoit because the piesentation
of the theoiy using supeispacetime is easiei to undeistand (Skow :oo, o,,).
is does not seemadequate. e issue is not whethei a stoiy in teims of ielativis-
tic tense opeiatois might be moie peispicuous than the supeispacetime metaphoi.
e issue is whethei a coheient stoiy in teims of ielativistic tense opeiatois can
even be told. Can we maintain that the facts associated with a paiticulai peispective
in supeispacetime (howevei these aie to be iendeied in teims of ielativistic tense
opeiatois) coiiespond to the absolute facts: e absolute piivileging of (not just the
now but) the heie and now that this involves seems unacceptable. While it might
be natuial to think of ouiselves as (momentaiily) metaphysically special compaied
to the contents of past iegions of spacetime, we do not think of ouiselves as meta-
physically special compaied to, say, the inhabitants of the othei side of the Eaith.
e non-ielativistic A theoiist can fuithei play down the lack of egalitaiianism by
insisting that past times have been NOW and futuie times will be NOW. On the
most obvious ways of ieconciling tensed claims with ielativistic spacetime stiuctuie,
the ielativistic Moving Spotlightei cannot even claim this of spacetime iegions in
oui elsewheie. ese never have been and never will be PRESENT. e best one can
say of them is that it will be the case that they have been PRESENT (cf. Putnam
:o,, p. :o).`
e supeitime metaphoi and (piesumably) the supeispacetime metaphoi aie
supposed to explicate veisions of the Moving Spotlight view conceived of as vaiiants
of standaid A eoiies that involve absolute (tensed) facts. e dimculties just
ieviewed suggest that embiacing the non-standaid ioute is the ielativistic Atheoiists
best option.` Rathei than exploie the consequences of this move in the unattiactive
fiamewoik of the Moving Spotlight, I wish to intioduce the natuial ielativistic
geneialisations of the classical bianching-time models of passage.
X
Branching Spacetimes and the Passage of Time. Recall the distinction, cential to
difeientiating a meiely nomologically open futuie fiom the notion modelled by
`Piimitive spatial tenses would piovide extia iesouices to desciibe the elsewheie, but only at
the iisk of intioducing an unwanted moving HERE, and the passage space.
`In moie iecent woik, this is also Skows view.
:o
bianching-time stiuctuies, between facts being undetermined and theii being inde-
terminate. is contiast has featuied in discussion of the compatibility of becoming
and ielativistic physics. Nicholas Maxwell distinguishes what he calls piedicative
piobabilism fiom ontological piobabilism. e foimei is essentially the Montague
LewisEaiman notion of indeteiminism, combined with a unique actual histoiy.
e lattei asseits that the basic laws aie piobabilistic and that the future is now in
reality open with many ontologically real alternative possibilities (Maxwell :8,, :,,
oiiginal emphasis). It theiefoie involves a commitment to the open futuie in the
sense of Section VI. Maxwells cential contention is that ielativity and ontological
piobabilism aie incompatible. His aiguments aie the main taiget of a well-known
papei by Howaid Stein (Stein ::), which defends the viability of a notion of becom-
ing that Stein fist aiticulated in iesponse to Putnams and Rietdijks ielativity-based
aiguments foi the block univeise (Rietdijk :oo; Putnam :o,; Stein :o8).
In a nutshell, Steins ielativistic notion of becoming is this: all and only those
events on oi in the past lightcone of a spacetime point p have become deteiminate as
of p (see, e.g., Stein :o8, p. :). It is might not be evident fiom this chaiacteiisation
alone that Stein is ofeiing something that goes beyond a Dieks-style defationaiy
notion of becoming.` Howevei, it is cleai elsewheie that Stein takes himself to
be outlining a position that is distinct fiom the block univeise view. Foi example,
delibeiately quoting Maxwells teiminology, he claims to have aigued that special
ielativity is peifectly compatible (in geneial) with ontological piobabilism (Stein
::, :o). How does the idea that an event has become as of p if and only if it is in
the past lightcone of p achieve this:
On the open-futuie view of passage of Section VI, to say that an event has
become deteiminate is to say that it is no longei one of seveial equally ieal alteinative
possibilities. So, to say that all and only events in the past lightcone have become,
as of some spacetime point p, is to say that, while theie is a unique mattei of fact
conceining what has occuiied in all iegions to the past of p, theie aie (as of p) a
pluiality of possibilities open foi iegions of spacetime to the absolute futuie of p
and in its elsewhere. is suggests that a fist step towaids a ielativistic veision of the
open-futuie viewof passage should be a ielativistic geneialisation of bianching-time
models to stiuctuies that encodes this pattein of ielational indeteiminacy.
One type of geneialisation of bianching-time stiuctuies has been pioneeied
by Nuel Belnap, who calls the iesult branching space-times. Bianching-time (BT)
`Foi example, Stein claims that the leading piinciple that justifes the use of becoming in a
ielativistic setting is: At a space-time point a theie can be cognizance ofoi infoimation oi infuence
piopagated fiomonly such events as occui at points in the past of a (Stein :o8, :o). is piinciple
is one that B theoiists can easily accept.
e seminal woik is Belnap (::), which, incidentally, cites Stein (::) in its opening iemaiks.
It exists in a slightly updated foim as Belnap (:oo,). Belnap (:o::) contains concise iefeiences to
moie iecent liteiatuie.
:,
models involve a set of global instants (oi, bettei, spatially global, instantaneous
possibilities) paitially oideied by a ielation <, which one can iead as is in the causal
past of. Belnaps geneialisation involves ieplacing global instantaneous possibilities
with possible point events. A bianching space-times (BST) model is a set OW
of such possible point events paitially oideied by a ielation <, which ietains the
meaning is in the causal past of. (OW stands foi Oui Woild.)
In a classical BT model, histoiies aie simply maximal totally oideied subsets
of the model. In contiast, maximal totally oideied subsets of OW aie something
like inextendible woidlines: maximal chains of causally-ielated point events lying
within histoiies. Since histoiies can be equated with maximal sets of compatible
events, the key to identifying the histoiies of a BST model is isolating the ielevant
notion of compatibility. In the case of BT models, two events aie compatible if they
aie pait of the same global instant, oi aie paits of causally ielated instants. With the
geneialisation fiom instants to point events, we need to allow that distinct events
can be compatible even though they aie not compaiable by the ielation <. Belnaps
solution is to classify two events as compatible if theie is some event which includes
both of them in its past.' One theiefoie has a distinction amongst paiis of events
incompaiable by < between those that aie spacelike ielated (jointly occui in some
histoiies) and those that aie incompatible (jointly occui in no histoiy). e histoiies
of OW can then be defned as maximal directed subsets of OW. (A subset E of OW
is diiected if, foi any elements e
I
, e
2
E, theie is some element e
3
of E such that
e
I
e
3
and e
2
e
3
.) One can theiefoie think of both BT and BST models as ceitain
kinds of sets of oveilapping histoiies. ey difei in teims of the pattein of oveilap.
In the foimei, histoiies bianch at global instants. In the lattei, histoiies bianch at
one oi moie space-like ielated point events.
In oidei to make contact with Steins constiaint on ielativistic becoming, we
need to be able to say when two incompatible possible events count as difeient
possibilities foi one and the same location in spacetime. Whethei two incompatible
events aie collocated is not, in geneial, defned in Belnaps BST fiamewoik, but it
is something that can be defned foi specifc classes of models. Fiom heie on, my
discussion is implicitly iestiicted to BST models of this type. In paiticulai, Placek
and Belnap (:o::) have iecently desciibed a class of BST models the histoiies of
which aie isomoiphic to Minkowski spacetime, foi which a colocation ielation
is easily defned. If one consideis an element of such a model, i.e., a possible
event e, occuiiing at some paiticulai spacetime point p, then all the histoiies in
which e occuis oveilap in the past of p. Howevei, foi spacetime locations q to the
futuie oi in the elsewheie of p, one will, in geneial, have two oi moie incompatible
'is move only woiks because bianching spacetimes theoiy iules out the possibility of backwaid
bianching by fat.
Othei examples of Minkowskian Bianching Stiuctuies had pieviously been constiucted by
Mllei (:oo:) and by Wioski and Placek (:oo).
:8
events located at q that shaie a histoiy with e. In othei woids, amongst the models
of Belnaps BST theoiy, theie aie stiuctuies that would appeai to give a piecise
expiession to the kind of ielativistic ontological piobabilism that Stein seems to
have had in mind.
Relativistic ontological piobabilism, howevei, does not by itself constitute a
ielativistic theoiy of becoming. Recall that the view discussed in Section VI had
two elements: (i) genuine openness that (ii) was settled with the passage of time. So
fai we have consideied only the ielativistic geneialisation of (i). Just as classical BT
models have a natuial block multiveise inteipietation, so do BST models. In fact,
it is because of the possibility of such a ielativistic block multiveise that Eveiettian
quantum mechanics can evade the tioubles that plague othei iealist inteipietations
of quantum theoiy (such as collapse theoiies oi Bohmian mechanics), and secuie a
stiaightfoiwaid ieconciliation between quantum mechanics and ielativity. Whethei
oi not this essentially B-theoietic inteipietation of BST models can undeiwiite
genuine ielational indeteiminateness, it no moie involves the objective passage of
time than its pie-ielativistic analogue. In oidei to vindicate ieal tempoial passage,
one needs to piovide an A-theoietic inteipietation of the model accoiding to which,
as time passes, what was indeteiminate becomes deteiminate.
In the classical case, this was achieved by consideiing the sequence of evei
smallei bianching stiuctuies that one obtains fiom a given BT stiuctuie, W, by
selecting fiomit a single histoiy, h. One obtains a unique set of sets of histoiies in W,
namely, {H
(m)
m h}, that aie totally oideied by the ielationof subsethood. (H
(m)
labels the set of histoiies in W that contain instant m.)` One can do the exactly
paiallel thing to a BST model OW, <, i.e., one can considei the set {H
(e)
e h}
defned by some histoiy h in OW. As the pievious discussion might have led one
to expect, is only a paitial oidei on this set. Its elements aie natuial ielativistic
analogues of the elements of a classical bianching-time model of passage. Adapting
Eaimans notation, one might wiite (OW, h) = {H
(e)
e h}, , wheie is
now defned via: H
(e)
H
(e

)
if H
(e

)
H
(e)
.
`is set of histoiies is not, stiictly, a substiuctuie of the oiiginal. at is obtained by consideiing
the union of such a set of histoiies, stiuctuied by the iestiiction of the oiiginal <.
eie has been suipiisingly little discussion of this kind of constiuction in the context of
bianching spacetimes. As fai as I am awaie, something similai has only been consideied by Placek
(:oo:).

Svain (:o::), foi example, in consideiing whethei the fow of time can be accommodated
in a iange of bianching models, including BST models, does not seek to incoipoiate bianch attiition.
I theiefoie take his appioach to be a vaiiant of the defationaiy account iejected in Section II.
McCall intended his bianch-attiition model of tempoial passage to be compatible with ielativity
and, in Appendix : to McCall (:), he piovides a fiame-invaiiant chaiacteiisation of a ielativistic
bianching stiuctuie in a mannei that owes much to Belnaps. Howevei, his chaiacteiisation of
bianch attiition is always in fiame-ielative teims. How distinct fiame-ielative desciiptions might
be undeistood as difeient desciiptions of a single undeilying objective piocess is not explicitly
addiessed.
:
Note that vaiiant models can be constiucted by choosing difeient types of
subiegions in h. e set {H
(e)
e h} embodies the choice of individual spacetime
points as the ielativistic heiis to the piesent. e model is theiefoie the BSTanalogue
of (the geneialisation of) Eaimans woildline becoming models, and of Skows
ielativistic moving spotlight. One could, instead, focus on slices of h: maximal
sets of spacelike ielated events in h. e iesulting set of subsets of OW is {H
(E)

E is a slice of h}. It too will be paitially oideied by the ielation of subsethood. It
is a natuial analogue of (the geneialisation) of Eaimans hypeisuiface becoming
models.
We can now considei whethei such models admit of a plausible A-theoietic
inteipietation, and theieby allow foi the possibility of times ieally passing in a
ielativistic woild without global Nows. As befoie we have two options to considei:
the analogues of the standaid and non-standaid classical views. e foimei takes
exactly one element of the modela set of histoiies defned in teims of theii inclu-
sion of some paiticulai event eas iepiesentative of the absolute facts. In othei
woids, the facts as of some paiticulai event e aie taken as the absolute facts.
e non-ielativistic analogue of the view ielied on a vaiiant of the piesentist
account of passage. In spelling this out, we had to deal with a delicate issue: futuie
indeteiminacy meant that what the absolute facts weie going to be could not be
iead-of fiom the (cuiient) absolute facts. eiefoie a paiticulai choice of futuie
elements in the oiiginal model was not justifed. Ultimately this was not pioblematic,
because amongst the cuiient facts weie facts to the efect that futuie indeteiminacy
was latei going to be iesolved (one way oi anothei). One can do justice to the idea
that, as time passes, open possibilities aie going to be settled without a model that
includes how they aie going to be settled.
In oidei foi a similai stoiy to be viable in the context of the ielativistic model,
at least two things aie iequiied. Fiist, the tensed facts as of a spacetime point, intei-
pieted as absolute facts, should undeiwiite a ielativistic analogue of the piesentists
account of passage. Second, these tensed facts must include facts to the efect that
as time passes the cuiient openness conceining the futuie (and the elsewheie) will
be (oi will have been) settled one way oi the othei.
I piopose to leave uniesolved these intiiguing issues because, even if successful
on this fiont, the view is untenable, foi the same ieason that the coiiesponding
inteipietations of Eaimans and Skows models foundei. It is simply not plausible
to take as absolute, facts that coiiespond to the peispective of a spacetime iegion
that is both spatially as well as tempoially local. I theiefoie take a non-standard
A-theoietic inteipietation of oui BST-based models to be the most piomising way
to ieconcile becoming with ielativity. I fnish by outlining such a view.
Considei the model (OW, h) = {H
(e)
e h}, . Accoiding to a non-
standaid A-theoietic inteipietation of this model each element of {H
(e)
e h}
iepiesents the facts that hold as of some spacetime point. H
(e)
, foi example, encodes
,o
the facts that hold as of the spacetime location of the event e. Even though such
facts aie the facts that hold as of some spacetime point, they aie not supposed to
be ieducible to fuithei facts that hold absolutely. ese facts display a paiticulai
pattein of indeteiminacy. As of some point p, what happens outside of ps casual
past is indeteiminate. But, as of eveiy point, including all points outside of ps causal
past, what happens at that point is deteiminate. Despite not being intei-deducible,
the sets of peispectival facts in this netwoik mesh in the obvious ways. What is
happening at q, as of q, will be among the things that might happen (oi might latei
have happened) as of points not in the causal futuie of q.
e model is inequivalent to a single BST model. Facts that aie indeteiminate
as of eailiei points in spacetime aie settled as of latei points. e model is also
inequivalent to the piefeiied histoiy it encodes, oi to a BST model that includes a
thin ied line, at least as the lattei is noimally undeistood. In both of these models,
non-past indeteiminate facts aie misiepiesented as deteiminate. e paiticulai
pattein of peispective-ielative facts that the model encodes cannot be undeistood as
ieducible to a B-theoietic ieality coiiesponding to eithei a block univeise oi a block
multiveise. e model theiefoie constitutes an appaiently coheient, thoioughly
ielativistic A-theoietic alteinative to the B eoiy.
Does this mean that it vindicates the objective passage of time: In the classical
analogue of the model, one could tiace thiough a unique, totally oideied sequence of
tempoial peispectives, and see facts once open become settled. e spatiotempoial
peispectives of the ielativistic model aie only paitially oideied. One can considei a
maximal totally oideied subset of them, coiiesponding to a maximal chain of events
in the models piefeiied histoiy. Accoiding to such a sequence, the tide of becoming
has the shape of a past lightcone that moves up the piivileged woildline. Does some
aspect of such woildline-dependent becoming coiiespond to something objective:
Can one see difeient such sequences obtained fiom one and the same model as
gauge equivalent: Aie they just difeient ways of iepiesenting the same undeilying
passage of time:
It is standaid in cases wheie gauge equivalence is postulated to demand some
kind of chaiacteiisation of the gauge-invaiiant ieality that gauge-ielated desciiptions
difeiently iepiesent. e piospects foi pioviding something of this soit look bettei
if we change the model, fiom one based on spacetime points, to one based on slices
thiough oui piefeiied histoiy. Iionically, it is a model involving the analogue of
global spacelike hypeisuifaces that best iepiesents local becoming, conceived of as
transition from the indeterminate to the determinate. e ieason is that, as one shifs
fiom peispective to peispective along some maximal totally oideied sequence
of elements fiom the set {H
(E)
E is a slice of h}, the iesulting change in what is
deteiminate is not spiead out ovei a past lightcone, but is spatiotempoially local.
Foi those familiai with them, models of causal set dynamics (see Rideout and Soikin :) might
,:
Let S
I
and S
2
be two aibitiaiy, maximal totally oideied subsets of {H
(E)

E is a slice of h}. One might seek to chaiacteiise theii gauge-invaiiant content
as follows. Veiy ciudely, maximality ensuies that foi any event e in h, one can fnd
shoit enough stages of both sequences S
I
and S
2
wheie pietty much all that happens
is a tiansition fiom es potentiality to its actuality. Tiansitions like this aie obvious
candidates foi the objective local becoming that both sequences iepiesent. Such
sequences can difei ovei whethei this tiansition (which is just the occuiience of e)
is befoie oi afei the becoming defnite of some othei event spacelike ielated to e.
But since the events aie spacelike ielated, theie is no fact of the mattei conceining
which occuiied fist.
Oriel College
Oriel Square
Oxford OX EW
UK
oliver.pooley@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
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Related mateiial was pieviously piesented in St Andiews, Chicago, London (England), London
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Geneva and San Diego. I am giateful to numeious membeis of those audiences foi useful comments.
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