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Rethinking the Origins of Federalism: Puzzle, Theory, and Evidence from NineteenthCentury Europe Author(s): Daniel Ziblatt Reviewed work(s): Source: World Politics, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Oct., 2004), pp. 70-98 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054284 . Accessed: 12/03/2012 10:32
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RETHINKING
Puzzle, Theory,

THE ORIGINS
and Evidence from

OF FEDERALISM

Nineteenth-Century

Europe

ByDANIEL ZIBLATT* I. Introduction builders and political reformers frequently seek a federally organized political system. Yet how is federalism actually achieved? STATE
Political federations. security founded, enough stituent on this has noted a paradox about question to secure such as common public goods a a moment state is at and national but the market, federal can a core be strong a dilemma How emerges. political science scholarship States are formed

a union but not be so as to overawe the con forge powerful a state? states, thereby forming unitary a new answer to this the article proposes This by examining question cases of state formation two most in nineteenth-century prominent and Italy. The aim is explain why these two similar Europe?Germany state for cases resulted in such different institutional forms: a unitary to a federal state for two cases the stand Germany. The challenge Italy and as a views which federalism ard interstate bargaining model, voluntary states that is sealed "contract" or compromise among constituent only so weak core is must grant it that when the state-building militarily to subunits. concessions The count, evidence one in this article that identifies ac an alternative supports state-society a different to federalism. The central pathway are formed determines Mann through if a state calls of a po "in a is

is that all states, including federations, argument combination of coercion and compromise. What created tential
*The

as federal federation

or

unitary high

is whether

the constituent

states

possess

levels of what Michael

at Yale University, the of the Comparative Politics Workshop author thanks the members and faculty seminars at George Washington Politics Faculty Group atHarvard University, the feed the author especially acknowledges and Brigham Young University. Additionally, University back and advice on earlier versions of this paper from Anna Grzymala Busse, Daniel Nielson, Paul Pier Will Phelan. reviewers and the research assistance and critical comments of son, and three anonymous Comparative

WorldPolitics 57 (October 2004), 70-98

RETHINKING

THE ORIGINS

OF FEDERALISM

71

frastructural capacity."1 That is, federalism is possible only if state building is carried out in a context inwhich the preexisting units of a potential federation are highly institutionalized and are deeply embed
ded both in their the core societies?and hence are

Only subunits with high levels of infrastructural capacity can deliver to

formation state and the subunits the gains that were sought from state out in the first place. If, by contrast, is carried building are in a context in which in the preexisting subunits potential weakly states not embedded in their societies, then patrimonial turn to is via solutions. It unitary only high-infrastructural can be resolved. that the basic paradox of federalism's origins

capable

of governance.

Why?

stitutionalized subunits

state builders

Absent
to absorb

such high-infrastructural
all the preexisting state. to show

subunits, the political core will seek

of a potential federation to estab

subunits

lish a unitary two cases new frastructural framework The final

The article is organized as follows. The first section introduces the

framework a the limits of existing second proposes theory. The in of subunit the causal importance that emphasizes as the source of federalism. The third applies the capacity to the two cases of and Italy. nineteenth-century Germany discusses the about implications of the argument decentralization contemporary for other efforts.

section

cases and for our thinking

An Empirical Puzzle: Nineteenth-Century Germany and Italy and the Limits of Classic Bargaining Theory This analysis begins with a puzzle in the development
nation-states in nineteenth-century institutional divergent the cases together are well

of two late
that

unifying

Germany adopted tional unification. Though have rarely been considered hypotheses century on institutional Germany

Italy and Europe: to solutions the task of na known to to historians, they test

in an effort

development?for construct federal What 1871 makes

A development. and Italy offers a promising the factors understanding

systematically of nineteenth comparison

institutions political this particular comparison monarchs

for theory opportunity that help state builders in different places and times. so promising? First, there

are some broadly intuitive similarities in context: between 1859 and

the conservative nation-states of the two states of Prussia and Pied of in

mont undertook the bold political projects of forging modern German

and Italian
1 Mann,

out of a similarly
(Cambridge:

fragmented
University

collection

The Sources of Social Power

Cambridge

Press,

1993), 2:59-61.

72 WORLD

POLITICS

Map

1 Figure of Europe,

1815

states of and foreign-ruled Until the 1860s both Europe. were a set of states and monarchical Germany Italy independent mostly with borders and boundaries that in many cases had been drawn by oth dependent after 1798 and by the Vienna Peace Congress of ers?by Napoleon an overview 1 states in 1815. Figure of the German Italian and provides context as their European 1815 and national unifi they stood between

cation in 1861 and 1867-71.

As tailed own the figure fusing demonstrates, a group together the projects of national unification with en its of independent ministates?each and institutions?into code, legal political was violent, national unification settings

monetary system, larger In both nation-states. inspired a new liberal nationalism, and shaped by the diplomatic interests of by was In both cases, moreover, national unification great powers. Europe's two undertaken in ambitious north states?Prussia and by Germany's in Piedmont north. Italian The historian Rosario Romeo has Italy's dubbed sionary German south "the Prussia of Italy."2 Indeed, Piedmont, actions provoked similar armed resistance and Italian states?chiefly the projects Bavaria of German and their similar expan on the part of other several other states in national
1959).

Germany's
2 Romeo,

south in 1866 and the Kingdom

e capitalismo (The risorgimento

of Two Sicilies in Italy's

and Italian uni
(Bari: Laterza,

in 1860. Finally,
Risorgimento

and capitalism)

rethinking
Prussian and Piedmontese

the

origins

of federalism

73

fication were inspired by a similar twofold motivation on the part of the

the nationalist first, to co-opt governments: movements with the aim of asserting monarchical control and, second, to control with the aim of securing greater fiscal re expand territorial more more and the hallmarks of sources, manpower, territory?all status "great power" A second broad in late-nineteenth-century Europe.3 as recent on nineteenth similarity, scholarship

century Germany and Italy has demonstrated, is that the ideology of federalism thrived in both cases, as political leaders in both settings
preferred form.4 This to two nation-states under a federal institutional unify the context. But it is is perhaps less surprising for the German

all too often forgotten that, as Robert Binkley has noted of the 1860s in
in Italian statecraft had been present Italy, "the idea of confederation not as an exotic for more than a generation, invention but as a political to the situation in inevitable alternative established 1815."5 seemingly One lutions important returned historian time of nineteenth-century Europe has

written of post-1815
in a manner unknown

Italy: "The political discussions and proposed so

and again to the question of unity or federalism even in the chief ar Indeed, Cavour, Germany."6

similarly

chitect of national unification in Italy, reflected the ethos of his politi cal environment and undertook his political project with deep
In his about excessive centralization. of biography ideological misgivings a Mack Smith "Cavour had been theoretical Cavour, writes, always of decentralization and local self-government."7 Likewise, champion in Pied members of the coalition governing center-right important mont of confederative principles.8 context the similar historical and the common broadly despite state Prussian for and Piedmontese federalism, ideological preference Yet were advocates

3 in both settings, the political cores (Prussia and Piedmont) were wealthier than the Additionally, states they absorbed. Recent estimates of preunification that Prus regional GDP per capita demonstrate sia was on average 1.9 times wealthier than the states it absorbed. Piedmont was 1.7 times wealthier than the states it absorbed. This finding undercuts the notion that the different institutional choice in in regional socioeconomic the two cases reflected deep underlying differences inequality. See Alfredo Journal ofEuropean Economic per Capita Income: Italy, 1861-1914," Esposto, "Estimating Regional no. 4 (1997), 589; see also Harald Frank, im deutschen Regionale Entwicklungsdisparit?ten History 26, in the German 1849-1939 industrializa disparities (Regional development Industrialisierungsprozess, tion process, 1849-1939) (M?nster: Lit Verlag, 1996), appendix 8, p. 30. 4 strands that were self-consciously federal in nineteenth There were at least three intellectual such as the priest Vicenzo Gioberti, who advocated a confederacy of century Italy: the neo-Guelphs as Carlo Cattaneo and Ferrera; and regional autono princes under the lead of the pope; liberals such mists in Italy's south. 1852-1871 (New York: Harper and Row, 1935), 197. 5Binkley, Realism and Nationalism, 6 Stuart Woolf, The Italian Risorgimento 1969), 7. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 7Denis Mack and Nicolson, Smith, Cavour (London: Weidenfeld 1985), 249. 8 1900-1914 in theMaking, William Salomone, Italy in the Giolittian Era: Italian Democracy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), 13.

74

WORLD POLITICS

builders adopted starkly different institutional formulas for their na tion-states. On the one hand, in Italy in 1861 Piedmontese state
builders fused together the long-independent Italian states under a uni

tary political model that erased the political map. On the other Prussian state builders adopted
formerly independent areas of discretion wide public finance.9 states

the formerly independent states from hand, inGermany in 1867 and 1871 a federal political model inwhich the

states that maintained regional in policy, administration, and jurisdiction and became

It is this institutional disjuncture between a unitary Italy and a fed

a broader in nineteenth-century eral Germany that suggests Europe under what conditions does the relationship between central question: on and regional take federal characteristics? William governments Riker stances remains and the most influential of federalism theorist of federalism's examines his first still classic work on federalism, he since 1786," origins.10 aall the In in

of the creation

from which

he draws

the compelling conclusion that has provided the central assumptions most for instances of federal analyses of "coming together" subsequent are met. two conditions is struck, that is,when ism.11 A federal bargain on the to the bargain part of those offering a new constituent into po governments expand territory by combining litical entity in order to secure a public good such as security or a com mon market. there must be for those accepting the bargain, Second, First, there exists some a desire

the public good provided by the new federal government.12

The core next willing question to make follows: federal under what concessions conditions to the constituent is the expanding states of a

willingness

to sacrifice

political

control

in exchange

for access

to

potential federation in the process of state building? Riker identifies

core offers conces that determine whether the political are not able to do so con to sions: "Though desire by they expand, they or distaste. Hence, quest because of either military ideological incapacity must offer concessions if they are to satisfy the desire to expand, they two constraints
9 It should be noted that post-1871 German federalism, often dubbed "executive federalism," con trasts with the classic American "dual federalism," insofar as most important legislation was national See Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Der uni state-level bureaucracies. but was implemented by independent und Wandel," Discussion in Deutschland: tarische Bundesstaat Pfadabh?ngigkeit Paper 02/2 in Daniel fur Gesellschaftsforschung, 2002). See also the discussion (Cologne: Max-Planck-Institut Ziblatt, Structuring the State: The Formation of Italy and Germany and the Puzzle ofFederalism (Prince ton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming). 10 See especially Riker, Federalism: Origins, Operation, Significance (New York: Little Brown, 1964). 11 Federalism" and Barry Weingast, Ibid., 10; Rui de Figueiredo "Self-Enforcing (Manuscript, Stanford University, 2001). 12 Riker (fn. 10), 9.

RETHINKINGTHE ORIGINS OF FEDERALISM

to the rulers of constituent that units, which is the essence center will structures

75

of the federal to

bargain."13 The argument therefore the moment results

seek direct control over the periphery if that is possible. State building
in unitary governance when the political are

posits

the political

always

prefer

center ismilitarily strong enough to impose itself on the periphery at

of polity formation. By contrast, federal "concessions"

granted when the political center ismilitarily too weak to impose itself
on the of this theory are clear and logi expectations periphery.14 The center is vis-?-vis the regions, cal: the militarily the political stronger the militarily weaker the less likely is a federal structure, and conversely, the political or confederal How is here does that center is vis-?-vis the regions, the more likely are federal contexts? so It institutions. this argument fare in the Italian and German the German and Italian comparison becomes run counter to these theoretical

directly to all traditional measures of military sia, according power, could easily to these have conquered southern Germany while Piedmont, according same measures, was much weaker vis-?-vis southern Italy. Several years of the future before national Prussia possessed 57 percent unification, on 54 of all German Reich's percent public expenditures population, of the future German the military states, and 54 percent by German in the 1850s Piedmont Reich's only 6 territory. By contrast, possessed of its 29 of the future soldiers, percent percent Italy's population, only

as the cases

puzzling, Prus expectations:

and only 22 percent of its territory.15 Why

and highly powerful Prussian state, after

did the well-consolidated

defeating Austria and its

southern German allies in 1866, establish a federal system of territorial

state of Pied the less powerful and less dominant whereas governance a in 1859, established Austria after defeating mont, unitary system?
13Ibid., 12, emphasis added. 14Ibid. 15 and Prussia is established by estimating each state s con The relative military power of Piedmont as a trol over population, (before unification) proportion of the fu territory, and military expenditures ture territory of each unified nation-state in both cases) after 1871. Italy's (that is, excluding Austria are for 1861, from Vera The Economic History (Ox of Italy, 1860-1990 figures Zamagni, population ford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 14; Italy's territory figures are for 1857, from Robert Fried, The Italian Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), 54; German Prefects: A Study inAdministrative to Bismarck, are for 1865, from Thomas Germany from Napoleon Nipperdey, population figures 1800-1866 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 86; Germany's territory data are from Rolf Zollverein in theNineteenth Dumke, German Economic Unification Century: The Political Economy of the data are from of the Bundeswehr, 1994), 55; Germany's (Munich: University military expenditure Knut in Deutschland, und ?ffentliche Investitionen 1780-1850" "Staatsverbrauch (State Borchard, in Germany, of G?ttin and public investments 1780-1850) (Ph.D. diss., University Small, National Ma 183-85; military personnel data are from J. David Singer and Melvin gen,1968), terial Capabilities Data, 1816-1985 ICPSR, 1993). (Computer file) (Ann Arbor, Mich.: expenditures

76

WORLD POLITICS
and a relatively weak broadly, what does this teach system

did a strong center create a federal Why center create a more unitary system? And, us about federalism's origins?

An Alternative Model
An alternative account

Framework: An Infrastructural of Federalism's Origins

of federalism's not on the mili origins focuses states vis-?-vis each other but instead on

states of a of state-society relations inside the constituent federation. Rather than horizontal interstate potential power stressing re stresses vertical relations among states, this framework state-society as the lations within the subunits of a potential federation structuring factor can be called alternative account, which accounts of federalism, with agrees existing state formation. about the impetus behind But it departs from those ac counts in two ways. First, it argues that all federa states?including a combination tions?can be formed of coercion and through behind federalism. This an infrastructural model the key issue that determines whether federalism Second, compromise. is for a state is the degree of institutionalization and the re adopted at the moment of the subunits of sulting infrastructural capacity polity formation. An infrastructural ism's origins ought of federalism. This tive to standard specifies ments a different capacity to be more account account attentive of federal argues that theorists to the institutional prerequisites a coherent alterna theoretically a new distinct causal variabley empirical pre discussion.

tary power the nature

of the constituent

accounts

represents insofar as it identifies

causal mechanism, are out

and makes

dictions of when federalism will be created (seeTable 1).The key ele

of the argument spelled in the following

The

Impetus of State Formation

An of infrastructural model First, what gives rise to state formation? mo state accounts with that is federalism often agrees existing building and na tivated by the pursuit of public goods such as a national market to states tional seek smaller conquer security. Typically, large a common market a states to establish and neighboring larger military, on the world stage. significance thereby assuring greater geopolitical While the account I offer agrees with this assessment, classic bargain By fusing to mistake

ing accounts tend to fuse this question with

the analytically distinct

of what type of state is created after state formation. question the issues, as Gibson there is a tendency and Falleti observe,

RETHINKING THE ORIGINS OF FEDERALISM

Two Approaches Impetus of
State Formation

77

1 Table to Explaining the Formation

Causal Variable Causal Mechanism

of Federalism Empirical
Prediction

Determining Institutional Form of horizontal state

Traditional
bargaining

pursuit such as

core

and periphery core

the militarily
weaker center, the the

public goods
security and market

state relations'. of capacity states vis-?-vis each other

strike federal
bargain when lacks military capacity unitary solution

model of
federalism's

more likely
federalism

origins

to force

Infrastructural

pursuit such as

of

vertical

state relations'.

core

concedes and

the
infrastructurally more developed the constituent states, the

account of
federalism's origins

public goods
security market and

society infrastructural capacity subunit vis-?-vis own of

authority

periphery seeks
when autonomy subunits have infrastructural capacity to

states their

more likely
federalism

societies

deliver public
goods of union

the causes

of national

unification

for the causes

of federalism.16

There

fore, it is critical to ask what state formation is under way.

determines

the structure

of a state after

A Causal Variable: Infrastructural of Federalism Catalyst

An infrastructural

Capacity

as

account offers an argument from a distinct capacity classic bargaining model. To understand is possible we when federalism not to focus on the interstate relations states and constituent of ought states of a the relative "military power" of the constituent fed potential eration lations vis-?-vis of Mann each other. We states in his power" should vis-?-vis book on focus their instead on the vertical re constituent own or what societies, state formation calls the "in refers to the social or rela

Michael

frastructural

important of states. "Military

power"

ganization of physical force, deriving from the necessity of defense

against aggression. "Infrastructural power" describes state-society

L. Gibson and Tulia in Gibson, Federalism," Argentine Press, 2004). Hopkins University

16 Edward

of and the Origins Falleti, "Unity by the Stiele Regional Conflict in Latin America (Baltimore: Johns ed., Federalism and Democracy

78

WORLD POLITICS

tions in reference to (1) the degree of institutionalization of a state and (2) the capacity of a central state to penetrate its territories and logisti
I use the term, the In the sense in which decisions.17 cally implement the subunits of a potential crucial issue is not merely whether federa tion exist. Instead, the issue is the extent to which the subunits of a po institutions tential federation both that are possess parliamentary in society via a constitution embedded and well-developed administra I argue, the coercion these attributes, possess a process of will be accompanied by negoti state structures with ation and devolution of authority. Absent high lev via els of institutionalization and parliamentary constitutional If subunits inherent in state formation tive structures.

legitimacy, the subunits of a potential federation will be absorbed and

swept away via a unitary strategy of state formation.

Causal Mechanism: How High into Federalism Translates

In addition to identifying a different

Infrastructural
causal variable,

Capacity
account

my

speci

fies different mechanisms

linking state building to federalism. I argue

that high infrastructural subunits that are constitutional, parliamentary, to federal states serve as a and administratively modernized pathway reasons. can serve as two credible negotiating ism, for First, they part ners in a process of state formation. Second, they can also deliver the

benefits that state builders seek with state formation in the first place:
tax revenue, greater access to and greater manpower, greater military the infrastructural social stability. Since these subunits already possess

capacity to secure the public goods that unification is intended to bring,

a in state-building place. core will be inclined the occupants Similarly, on to some of their own and to leave the preexisting of these states will also because structures insist upon de

capacity. are federation the subunits of a potential If, by contrast, patrimonial states and rationalized systems of lacking constitutions, parliaments, the of breaks down and administration, prospects usually negotiation are state the formation after limited, way to leading self-governance these states lack basic institutions.18 When annexed, unitary political own As a result, political their societies. vis-?-vis governance capacity

holding gree of institutionalization

autonomy infrastructural

of their higher

leaders in the political center are tempted by the prospects of sweeping

17This definition of "infrastructural 18 see Reinhard On patrimonialism, 1977), 334. (fh. 1), 59-61. capacity" borrows from Mann of California Bendix, Max Weber (Berkeley: University

Press,

RETHINKINGTHE ORIGINS OF FEDERALISM

away existing units, leading the way leaders in the constituent political are willing to transfer perceive that public state.

79

all authority goods of governance states are

to greater centralization. Moreover, states, facing government collapse, to the center because they political are more and when the nature assured in a larger leaders

unitary In short, when determines

new

forming Instead,

political

seek federalism, it is not the military power of the political center that
the structure of a state. of state-society

relations inside the states is key; highly institutionalized and hence highly infrastructural states provide the crucial building blocks of fed
eralism.19 state structures do not lead to federalism But well-developed are harder to conquer. Rather, gov they simply because well-developed ernance structures to deliver the the capacity provide public goods of both to the political core and to other constituent states. By

federalism

identifying a different causal variable and a different set of mechanisms

state formation linking an distinct empirically theory. an infrastructural to federalism, account makes cases that set of that can predictions explain

simply remain puzzling from the perspective of classic bargaining

Applying

the Framework: Nineteenth-Century Germany and Italy

and Germany's features of each federalism state. But are often to assume

In retrospect, mistakenly

Italy's centralism as inevitable viewed

that the institutional form that actually carried the day in each case in
the 1860s was namics Rikerian cause made the only form institutions by which is to miss the important dy as a are created. Moreover, to assume, a state be that Piedmont achieved unitary use coercion to achieve its aims and Prussia a federal "contract" because it had to is to ever available

approach might, it could successfully concessions and sealed

In fact, political get the causal logic of federalism's origins backward. use of coercion to seal unifica leaders in both instances made strategic in both settings were tion. Moreover, leaders inclined toward political federalism. The key difference the cases is that state formation between was undertaken in the face of differing of state-society rela patterns tions inside the German and Italian constituent states.

19 "Institutionalization" refers to the degree to which a political system has acquired value and sta and proce bility, indicated by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of organizations Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University dures. See Samuel Huntington, Press, 1968), 12.

80 To summarize not

WORLD POLITICS
the argument: blocks stumbling an in Germany well-developed that constrained Prussian state struc plans to cre

tures were institutions

ate a Prussian-dominated were

relatively that combined pursue for Italy: a unification process among monarchs a coercion with compromise in of existing by leaving key constituency stitutions and actors in place. In Italy the absence of well-developed meant institutions and effective outside that a unitary of Piedmont across the entire was as necessary of unification strategy perceived peninsula. negotiating The Piedmontese, to carry partners out what like the Prussians, sought the Piedmontese monarchical themselves

these well-developed Instead, to pursue that allowed Bismarck the opportunity not low risk domestic that could Cavour but agenda sought

nation-state.

dubbed a "German" strategy of gradual or federal unification.20 Yet by 1859-60 they found themselves instead adopting a strategy of unilat
eral "conquest" in both Italy's center and south that between 1859 and

1865 gradually eroded the prospects of federalism in Italy.

in The analysis proceeds the structure of state-society in federalism while Germany relations that made two steps to demonstrate that in Italy itwas relations that stood as the main barrier to itwas a different pattern of state-society I focus on the state First,

federalism

possible.

building plans thatwere circulating in Piedmont and Prussia before na tional unification; both cases exhibited similar ideological commitment
to federalism. from was Second, I will discuss structure the actual strategies of unification in each

undertaken, demonstrating that the key factor distinguishing Germany

Italy of the preexisting the differing states. of state-society relations

The Limits of Ideology: Why Wanting Is Not Enough

Federalism

Observers of Italian and German affairs in the 1850s and 1860s would have found themselves frustrated by rapidly changing events had they
tried to use the expressed to predict which political adopted after national on intentions of Prussia's and Piedmont's or Italy unitary?would adopted there were leaders be a institutions?federal Though unification

unification.

eventually cases,

unitary political system in 1861 andGermany a federal political system

in 1871, the eve of national in both about how

deep similarities in the degree of ideological commitment to federalism

and similar the key
Documentary

levels of strategic uncertainty actors themselves. state-building

to Victor History,

to get there among

A

20"Cavour

Emanuel, Baden-Baden, July 24,1858," 1799-1999 (New York: It?lica Press, 2001),

in John Santore, Modern 164.

Naples:

RETHINKING THE ORIGINS OF FEDERALISM

First, in Germany, it was as one analyst has put self-evident utterly form."21 Despite

81

contemporaries states could only cal certainty, ternatives

and his it, "For Bismarck that a union of German this apparent ideologi over the strategic al

take a federal there was

however, great uncertainty to achieve Prussia about how national actually facing a unification. The question was asked: should federal or unitary strategy In an 1866 session in the Prussian of unification be adopted? parlia two Bismarck the choices and ment, presented expressed his preference for a federal strategy over the unitary stated: strategy used in Italy. He One [method] is the integration and complete merger with Prussia itself even in
of popular resistance?resistance, in particular, by civil servants and of

the face

ficers (officer estates) who feel duty-bound to the previous governments. The Prussian government intends to overcome the difficulties of these [groups] in a German way, through indulgence for [their/local] particularities and through gradual habituation, and not?as is customary for a Romanic [Italian] peoples
?all at once.22

The ternatives

two choices national

of "complete

merger"

or from

for Bismarck.

and from

Facing pressure liberals such as Heinrich

"indulgence" the Prussian Treitschke

were

real al

staff general to carry out a

in the wake of and military of southern Germany conquest occupation in In corre Bismarck remained ambivalent. 1866, victory military summer in France in the with the Prussian of ambassador spondence two to unifica the 1866, Bismarck again presented potential pathways one he called a "maximalist annexation tion that he was pondering: a "minimalist annexation strategy."23 Since the strategy" and the other

success of federalism in Germany

concessions tion concerns a to the southern how itwas German

in 1871 was dependent on making

strategy of "indulgence" concessions whereas Cavour The most while obvious from Cavour's becomes

states, the critical analytical ques that Bismarck was willing and able to pursue with Germany's south that generated federal and Piedmont were a not? starkly dif process of uni not correct. and corre so Bismarck's aims were gradual did not?is

answer?that that he we

ferent fication This

the architects clear when

simply preferred of Italian unity explore

the intentions,

debates,

21 im deutschen Bundesstaatsrecht: Untersuchungen zu Bun Stefan Oeter, Integration und Subsidiarit?t in German and subsidiarity federal constitutional desstaatstheorie unter dem Grundgesetz (Integration Mohr law: A study of federalism theory in the constitution) Siebeck, 1998), 29. J.C.B. (T?bingen: 22 zur des Abgeordnetenhauses Otto von Bismarck, "Rede in der Kommissionssitzung Beratung an den vom 17.8 1866," in Eberhard einer Adresse Scheler, ed., Otto von Bismarck: Werke in Konig von Auswahl Bismarck: Selected works) (Otto (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1965), 3:799. 23 to his ambassador terms come from a memo from Otto von Bismarck in Paris Ibid., 755. These on July 9,1866.

82

WORLD POLITICS
na

spondence of the chief architect of Italian unity, Cavour, in Piedmont

on the eve of his nation's unification. Indeed, only two years before

tional unification in 1858, Cavour, who himself had never even been to southern Italy before unification, frequently articulated a vision of a
confederation eration. achieved letter III of Italian Cavour's confed states, inspired in part by the German vision was even criticized the future by prime minis

ter Crispi

as the "artichoke" policy in which

off each of the resistant

unification would be

by peeling to the Piedmontese articulated

,Cavour

one a regions by one.24 In a with Napoleon king summarizing meeting his vision of confederation. Just as Bismarck as a model. Cavour wrote:

displayed a close knowledge of Italian unification, so Cavour had Ger

many's experiences in mind After a long discussion, we agreed on the following principles: the valley of the Po, the Romagna and the Legations would constitute the Kingdom of Upper Italy, under the rule of the House of Savoy. Rome and its immediate surround ings would be left to the Pope. The rest of the Papal states together with Tus canywould form the Kingdom of Central Italy. The borders of the Kingdom of Naples would be left unchanged; and the four Italian states would form a con
federation on the pattern of the German Confederation.25

As

the events

of Italian

unification

quickened

their

pace,

in the

spring of 1859, Cavour and his king, Victor Emanuel, pleaded with the new king inNaples to accept his proposal that "Italy be divided into
two

Cavour desired a federal solution for national unification. Why? For both actors, federalism represented what might be called "the path of
that is, believed the costs Both least resistance." statesmen, realpolitik reasons of a strategy of conquest far outweighed the benefits. Several a to lesser degree, Cavour fundamen stand out. First, Bismarck and, a unifi and considered distrusted rule tally "negotiated" parliamentary

powerful

states

of the North

and

the South."26

Like

Bismarck,

cation in which monarchical

route to institutional

leaders sealed unification

to be the
cases

preferred at least in part by the motivation actors were also well both Second, reservations that while annexation of Europe's those around

was change. This inspired in both to co-opt liberal nationalists.

ing of themaps in Italy and Germany. Bismarck complained to his wife

him he had to Prussia, argued for southern Germany's task of pouring "the thankless immediate water

aware of the concerns and enough a redraw to seek too dramatic "great powers"

into

24 Denis Mack Smith, Cavour and GaribalidvA Study in Political Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1954), 50-51. University 25 in Santore (fn. 20), 164. "Cavour to Victor Emanuel, Baden-Baden, July 24,1858," 26 Modern Italy (Oxford: Clarendon The Makers Press, 1931), 125-26. J. A. R Marriott, of

RETHINKING THE ORIGINS OF FEDERALISM the bubbling wine and making

rope but with three other Powers vis-?-vis who hate and envy us."27 Indeed, Bis

83

it clear that we don't live alone in Eu III provided a key impetus for
the other German states.28 Likewise,

marck's
proceeding

relations with Napoleon

conservatively

Cavour s limited territorial interest in southern Italy reflected the config uration of international power inEurope. Beginning in 1858 allCavour's
agreements with France assured a nervous Napoleon that Piedmont

would respect the existing borders of the Kingdom of Two Sicilies. In sum, both Bismarck and Cavour preferred and in fact initially
as the least unification costly and national unifica route?diplomatically, politically, financially?to tion. the two options of forced both actors considered Though "merger" or of in both local there existed gradual "indulgence" particularities, an a contexts for unification ideological preference gradual, negotiated in which monarchical leaders would remain in power. Motivated by do sought negotiated settlements to national mestic demand cation and international for federalism. there existed considerations, was in Germany But only was gradually cannot in both such a settings strategy a

adopted. In Italy, between 1859 and 1865, the strategy of federal unifi
and federal organization that actual state-building strategies clear abandoned, making the be assumed from simply

expressed intentions of state builders.Why state building diverge from each other? of State-Society The Catalyst to Federalism Relations

then did the strategies of and the Pathway

The key difference between the situation confronting Cavour in 1860 and Bismarck in 1867, the one that generated the divergence in strategywas that of the different contexts inwhich national unification
was being carried Germany, at the subunit ity cure if these a set of institutions states were states of is, in the preexisting prenational with high levels of infrastructural capac level assured that the gains of unification would be se out. That left intact. By contrast, in the preexisting states

of Italy, such institutional building blocks were decisively absent. In Italy statemakers believed that if the constituent stateswere left intact
after unification, rise to a relatively
27 Gordon

the gains desperate

of unification strategy

would at

be unitary

insecure. This unification.

gave

aimed

1955), 200.

Craig, The Politics Oncken, Napoleon

of the Prussian Army,

1640-1945

(New York: Oxford

University

Press,

28 Hermann

tics of Emperor anstalt, 1926).

ed., Die Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleon HI von 1863-1870 (The Rhineland poli IQ between 1863 and 1870) (Stuttgart, Berlin, Leipzig: Deutsche Verlags

84 In both ?to social instances,

WORLD POLITICS
secure were of national the purposes unification similar greater fiscal resources, greater military greater personnel, on the and stage. Like Prussia, Pied stability, prestige European

mont had ambitions to be a significant power in Europe. Also

Prussia, Piedmont a fiscal as much

like

faced three times debt crisis, with as to of the other Italian states.29 effort build any per capita up Any or Prussia's on the Piedmont's stage would position European require and greater fiscal resources. And the quick greater military manpower est route to these resources was national unification.30

Italy, In Italy, however, beginning in the summer of 1860, achieving

these goals via Cavour's difficult creasingly in Italy's center and south. continued pressure from the French Despite own his and the of federalism faded in inclinations, emperor prospects across states states that Piedmont the face of collapsing Italy. The were in their organiza would inherit with unification different starkly were tion and in their with the states Prussia than society relationship would inherit ten years later in Germany. monarchs once In all six of the Italian states federal preferred as a result of the nature in becoming structures of the governance solution was

outside of Piedmont, the 1848 parliaments and constitutions had been

overturned mentary from and absolutist constraints.31 the absence Additionally, again ruled without parlia in southern Italy's especially Papal of administration For example, modern the

States and the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, public administration suffered

of two classic hallmarks ization: ment concentration and differentiation. in neither

Papal States nor the Kingdom of Two Sicilies did the central govern
dent on taxation; in both cases, there were retain amonopoly indepen tax zones within the territory that in theory were controlled by the states to maintain central government.32 the ability of these Similarly, control tance over their own territory was period, of Austrian peasant troops uprisings called in to bolster over questionable; were subdued its territory.33 throughout only with and the pre the assis sporadic

unification

the arbitrary

rule of the central

government

29 e II Bilancio G. Felloni, "La Spese Effettive degli Stati Sabaudi dal 1825 al I860," inArchivio Econ?mico delVUnificazione Italiana (Archive of Economie Unification of Italy), ser. 1, vol. 9 (1959), 5. 30This argument has a long pedigree. For the German case, see Helmut B?hme, Deutschlands Weg und Witsch, Zur Grossmacht (Germany's path to great power status) (1966; Cologne: Kiepenheuer Modern Italy (New York: Co 1972); for the Italian case, see Shepard Clough, The Economic History of lumbia University Press, 1964). 31 See Lucy Riall, The Italian Risorgimento: State, Society, and National (London: Rout Unification 1994). ledge, 32 Italiana (Public finance in the Luigi Izzo, La Finanza Pubblica: Net Primo Decennio DelVUnita a Giuffre Editore, 1962), 3-4. first decade of Italian unification) (Milan: Dottore 33 For a description of these rural uprisings, see Charles, Louise, and Richard Tilly, The Contentious Press, 1975), 124. Century, 1830-1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University

RETHINKING THE ORIGINS OF FEDERALISM

As tion failed would a result of this a institutional to establish to achieve have left a federation negotiated these states any Piedmontese landscape, on two fronts. First, foundered with Italy's exists a massive central inclina

85
efforts that of offi period

settlement

states record

intact. There Cavour states Italian

correspondence diplomatic in the central cials stationed

between

and his Piedmontese during the turbulent

of 1859-61.34 We
that these were capacity. First, we

find in this correspondence two types of evidence

see repeated efforts in society with low infrastructural to es Piedmontese officials by

states not embedded

tablish a diplomatic relationship among the Italian states that might have led to aGerman model of negotiated and federal unification.35 For
example, Tuscany Tuscany autonomy in the period made multiple to evict Austria of Tuscany.36 1858-59 offers from As Cavour's diplomatic of an alliance between representative Piedmont in and

in exchange for continued the peninsula an absolutist monarch with limited contact

with the growing civic unrest in his population, the grand duke of Tus cany rejected all offers and inApril 1859 was suddenly facing the im plosion of his regime, which left an institutional vacuum filled by
Piedmontese In response government... envoy to form each Italian who feared sympathizers to calls from Piedmont's "revolution" to envoy to prevent disorder," Cavour an interim This government.38 (a pattern that was and "anarchy."37 for a "military Tuscany asked his Piedmontese de facto absorption of

Tuscany by Piedmont established a pattern that would be repeated in

state unthinkable in Germany), as the

diplomatic
partners orchestrated tral Italian with the

envoy himselfbccame

state builder.Without

negotiating

and with states.

the Piedmontese structures, government collapsing a process of unconditional annexation of each of the Cen

Similarly, repeated efforts failed to reach a negotiated

largest non-Piedmontese state of the Kingdom

settlement
of Two Si

cilies, prompting Garibaldi's

34 Editrice See Commissione Carteggi di Cavour: La Liberazione spondence: The liberation

invasion with his "Thousand" inMay

in Count Camillo di Cavour, dei Carteggi Di Camillo Cavour e del Regno d'Italie (Cavour s corre delMezzogiorno laformazione of Italy), vol. 2 and the formation of the kingdom of the mezzogiorno

1961). (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 35 see the collection of For examples of repeated efforts at negotiation, correspondence diplomatic and Rosanna Roccia, in the multivolume eds., Camillo Cavour Epistolario work, Carlo Pischedda s (Camillo Cavour letters) (Florence: Leo S. Olschki Editore, 2000). 36 seen Ibid. Evidence of these diplomatic reports between Cavour and his envoy in Florence can be 18 (p. 352); see also aA Carlo Bon in "Da Carlo Bon Compagni di Mombello," Doc. 380, March di Mombello" (p. 619). Compagni 37 are Cavour's Doc. 800 (pp. 628-29). These di Mombello," Ibid. uDa Carlo Bon Compagni words envoy's 38 Ibid. describing the situation inTuscany in his April 27,1859, report.

86

WORLD POLITICS

1860. As the underinstitutionalized absolutist monarchy of the King dom of Two Sicilies collapsed, news of Italy's south trickled in to gov ernment ministries in Piedmont. In the summer of 1860 Garibaldi,
who was in contact in rural order.39 Italy system with areas the Piedmontese governors maintain southern orderly of Sicily Piedmontese Similarly, to Turin crown, began Piedmontese requesting officials Finance on to hear from to in an troops assignment

sent word

of their difficulties

of tax collection.

Piedmontese

Ministry

maintaining officials

stationed in Italy's south in the early 1860s reported to Cavour of the

state of and the "collapse" of order and pub public finances lic safety.40 Cavour the same sentiment received frequent calls mirroring to repeat to you in the south?"Permit from his officials me, excellency, save to the need for this (Carabinieri) country from ruin!"41 policemen "exhausted"

Also, to the surprised eyes of Piedmontese officials arriving inNaples,

another basic governmental task?elementary school education?was

in desperate disrepair.The number of public school teachers employed

was lower in the as percentage of Two Si of the population Kingdom one to cilies than in any other Italian state.42 According account, aghast educa Piedmontese officials discovered that "the system of elementary to be created."43 To reassure those tion did not need reform; it needed to not in the south, officials in Piedmont only police promised provide order.44 forces but more administrative "staff" and "clerks" to maintain But who was the effort sent to maintain order was insufficient. For example, order the

Piedmontese

official (and future prime minister) Agostino Depretis

by the Piedmontese was, government to restore arrived

in Sicily in 1860 optimistic that he could single-handedly reassert con

trol over rest, lack events. He of security soon overwhelmed however, and an unsustainable forces, un by popular finance public

situation. And he announced in letters to Bertani in July 1860 and to Garibaldi in September 1860 that the only solution for managing the
fiscal and social chaos was immediate annexation by Piedmont.45 In

short, by the summer and fall of 1860 Cavour and the officials around him realized that they had inherited a set of states incapable of doing
the work of modern governance.
39 Press, 1998), 106. Lucy Riall, Sicily and the Unification of Italy (Oxford: Clarendon and Roccia (fn. 35), August ^Pischedda 16,1860, Doc. 639 (p. 94). 41 Ibid., August 2,1860, Doc. 528 (p. 8). 42 Alberto Caracciolo, Stato e societa civile (State and civil society) (Turin: Giulio Einaudi, 1960), 119. 43 at the annual meeting James Albisetti, "Julie Schwabe and the Poor of Naples" (Paper presented of Education, of the International for the History Birmingham, England, July Standing Conference 12-15,2001). "Pischedda and Roccia (fn. 35), August 17,1860, Doc. 647 (p. 99). 45 Riall (fn. 39), 84.

RETHINKING THE ORIGINS OF FEDERALISM

Table infrastructural capacity
Measure Extractive 1

87

2 regional
Measure 2 Rate: as

of

italian

states

(1850-60)a
Measure Control: Rate 3

Capacity: State Revenue per

Military

Conscription Personnel

Enrollment of Primary

Capita Piedmont Two Sicilies Papal States

Tuscany

% of Male Population
2.3 2.0 0.7 2.0 1.6 1.2 NA 1.53:1

School Age Children

93 18

14.7

32.2 lire 14.2 lire lire

19.2 lire

Modena Parma Lombardy- V?netob Ratio of Piedmont

and average remaining a Public of states

17.9 lire 22 lire NA 1.83:1

25-35 32 36 36 90
2.3:1

revenue data from Izzo (fn. 32), 123; military personnel data from Singer and Small (fn. 15); enrollment data from Zamagni (fn. 15), 14-15; population data from Singer and Small (fn. 15). b was part of the structure of the Austro-Hungarian Because Lombardy-V?neto imperial Empire, it is excluded from this analysis.

Beyond

the perceptions

of the state builders

themselves,

what

fur

ther evidence supports this impression of low infrastructural capacity in Italy outside of Piedmont? The limited extant evidence on public
revenue, conscription Piedmontese Italian tural capacity. states to make and stability also suggests that non capacity, states suffered from of infrastruc deep problems In Table 2 we can see an overview of each of the Italian

assessments in of levels of infrastructural rough capacity areas: extraction, see three defining and We education.46 conscription, states Prussia would that in comparison with the German inherit (see account Table confirms the narrative above. But, sec 3), the evidence ond, than even more

states it inherited was very high, and asTable 3 shows, much higher
the relative gap between Prussia several years later. of infrastructural three measures The the measure and the states it would inherit

importantly,

the relative gap between

Piedmont

and the

in the same capacity all point we can assess of "state revenue per capita," direction. Using the ability of each of the Italian states to extract revenue from its popu

46 to the concepts of "extraction, conscription, and control," three measures These correspond inTilly, ed., The Formation of European Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History State-Making," National States inWestern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 50.

in of

WORLD POLITICS
TABLE 3 INFRASTRUCTURAL CAPACITY OF THE GERMAN Regional
Measure Extractive Capacity: State 1

Governments

(1850-66)a
Measure 2 Measure Control: Road Density: KM Roads per 3

Rate: Conscription Personnel Military

Revenueper

as % of Male
Population 2.2 4.3 1.1 1.4 2.3 2.8 2.1 2.8

Capita
Prussia Bavaria Baden W?rttemberg Saxony Hannover Kurhessen Darmstadt Ratio of Prussia of states 1:1.04 5.5 6.1 6.2 6.0 5.4 5.2 6.0 5.2 thaler thaler thaler thaler thaler thaler thaler thaler

Square 1000 KM 66 112 136 148

228
141 143 229

to average remaining "Revenue, tary personnel

1:1.09

1:2.45 (fn. 15), 42-43, 274; mili

and road density data are drawn from Borchard population, data are from Singer and Small (fn. 15).

the measure lation.47 Using "military personnel we can assess the male population," conscription

of the percentage of each state, capacity the ability of the state to access a basic societal resource. Finally, using rate of "enrollment the measure age school children," we elementary can assess the state to penetrate and transform society capacity of the areas one for state the societal of of education, key regulation through as Table 2 shows, the leaders in the nineteenth century. Taken together, ca into the infrastructural evidence allows us a glimpse best available states in the decade before national unifi the Italian of of each pacity and constitutional the absence of parliamentary cation. Given institutions, the narrative the data not evidence: the picture confirm by suggested surprisingly Piedmont and the there was a large gap between state states. On average, Piedmont had twice as much five states, a gap that ismuch below. states, as discussed larger than that

as a

rest of the Italian

as the remaining capacity found among the German

Given both the perception and the reality of low levels of infrastruc
47 In response to the criticism that this measure and the other two might simply reflect underlying it is instructive that the correlation between socioeconomic differences, regional GDP per capita and is very weak, suggesting that institutional capacity has a conceptual weight of its each of the measures own. For GDP per capita data on the Italian states, see Esposto (fn. 3), 585-604.

RETHINKING THE ORIGINS OF FEDERALISM

of direct rule for securing the goal of unification. The

89

tural capacity, it is not surprising that Cavour shifted in 1860 toward a

unitary interim power tese strategy assemblies vacuum

shift in strategy proceeded in two steps. First, in the fall of 1859 new
inModena, in the northern an instable and Tuscany, Parma, seeing and central states, called for Piedmon to for rapid Piedmontese annexation replace

and voted legislation structures. to in in Italy s south in 1860, in response existing Similarly, were unrest civic and thousand troops stability twenty-five dispatched to the south, and the state structures were dismantled. All remaining of Sicily, immediately for ex ex

were on the island governors twenty-four replaced was constitution the Piedmontese ample. Moreover,

tended to Sicily (August 3), along with the Piedmontese monetary system (August 17), copyright laws (August 18), the system of com munal administration (August 26), the military code (August 28), and the public security law of 1859 (August 30).48Finally, by the end of the
were thousand Piedmontese year, one hundred troops occupying Italy's to requests from Piedmontese south as a police force in response offi of taxation and education cials. Similarly, the organization and the col lection capitals bitious of official to Turin. state In sum, statistics the first were shifted from the other involved states' the am step of unification institutions all existing

and state actors strategy of dislodging from their previous of authority, shutting down former gov positions ernment ministries, from their positions, leaders and replac removing new Piedmontese institutions institutions these and with ing personnel and personnel.49 The second inforced tions cials step in this unitary strategy of state formation to grow

out of the legacy of low infrastructural capacity in the Italian states (re
was the turn to institu by the first step of unification) unitary in and to a rejection of federalism debates between parliamentary

1860 and 1865. Despite

bring foundered.50 Given manpower creasingly 1860, upon shift viewed to some to

last-ditch efforts byMinistry

of decentralization of seeing access to

of Interior offi
Italy, federalism

revenue and to public was in federalism states, low-capacity, imploding as unsustainable. in the Two factors were decisive

system the prospect

failure of federalism at this stage. First, having been dismantled

the formal formal southern regional political institutional interests autonomy

in

that might have insisted were from the excluded

48Riall(fn.39),90. 49 Ibid. 50Fried(fn.l5),75

90

WORLD POLITICS officials

constitutional debates in the 1860s.51 Second, Piedmontese

feared that a return

ac to the of 1860 would disorder revolutionary a an at As institu devolution.52 result, by 1865, company any regional states were tional erased from the level, the formerly independent

political map with

nance upper the rest of Italy. The dissolution discretion, chamber. The

(1) no administrative autonomy, (2) no public fi

and

via an (3) no access to the national government was to constitution of Piedmont extended unitary

states and the creation six existing of an all a state in of centered first Turin (in apparatus encompassing unitary to the lack of and later in Rome was above all a response Piedmont) and institutionalization embeddedness and to the low infrastructural of capacity of the preexisting states of the Italian peninsula. The unevenly

distributed pattern of state building among the subunits of Italy gave

rise to a unitary that grew out of deep mis strategy of state formation on the part of the Piedmontese about the prospects of au givings states. tonomous in the preexisting Italian lesson of the self-rule The Italian barrier case to but externally strong structures in the rather domestically underinstitutionalized governance federation. subunits of a potential in Italy, the national Six years after the events unification Germany. was achieved in two steps: the creation of the North Ger of Germany for the study of federalism's is not an federalism constructing then origins is that the main center

man Confederation
1871. Like Also

in 1866-67
Prussia faced

and then of the German Reich

a

in

Piedmont, like Piedmont, Prussia III to leave these states Napoleon man tese strategy of state formation

of independent landscape international confronted pressure

states. from

strategy of dissolving was achieved a state structure. via Indeed Prussia's unification unitary of some states accompanied and the annexation by regional concessions to other states. Rather than formally accommodations pragmatic away all existing sweeping man state institutionalized to a subunit a key and institutions, set of regional monarchical elites case the new Ger leaders and

the Ger Nevertheless, independent. the with Piedmon contrasted sharply to create states across the existing peninsula

institutions, federally organized leading than the Italian case, the German Even more lenge cessions

state structure. stands as a chal con and

center will make federal to the that the political assumption the overbearing threats. That in the face of internal only state of Prussia could create a federal system despite
of these debates.

powerful

its over

51 Ibid., for a summary 52 Ibid.

RETHINKING THE ORIGINS OF FEDERALISM whelming military power vis-?-vis the other German
an unexpected sions that weak irony: strong state-building centers cannot make. sometimes of a federation is not relations Prussia the strength in the subunits centers The can make conces

91

states highlights

establishment pattern

key issue in the of the center but the federa

of state-society

of a potential

tion. With well-developed

throughout strategy could not, a strategy international pressing What weak builders Germany, of state formation

and highly institutionalized state structures

or federal a could negotiated adopt that Piedmont tried to use but ultimately to deal that was designed with simultaneously dilemmas of national concessions unification. in the face of

and domestic

state facing Piedmontese ne to in 1860, the Prussian had partners political leadership and devolve fis with could and, furthermore, easily successfully gotiate to state and political the well-developed cal, administrative, authority structures outside of Prussia the Ital after national unification. While ian states outside stitutionalized other German of Piedmont constitutional states. were ruled to varying degrees by brittle

this puzzle? Why make explains internal threats? Unlike the situation

absolutist states, Prussia in 1866 and 1871 inherited a set of highly in

Despite the 1850s, as one constitutional come to an end."53 constitutions solutism has definitely Similarly, in without that ap Germany guaranteed parliamentary everywhere no taxes raised, and no un public debt proval, "no law could be passed, some internal variation, the liberal and with dertaken."54 By no means in Germany's south (Baden, states, especially in nevertheless and Bavaria), far-reaching experienced W?rttemberg, consti time unification. of stitutional Assemblies, by the development subnational monarchical tutions, and differentiated at the subnational and concentrated level developed to the experience systems of administration in away that stood in sharp contrast of the Italian states.55 For example, in the and parliamentary monarchies era of reaction, the so-called by entering in Germany has written, "ab historian

in the absolutist

in 1861, not a single one had a constitu inherited inherited tion or parliament. the largest nine states Prussia By contrast, in 1871 all had constitutions As a result, with unifica and parliaments. six states Piedmont
1776-1866 constitutional Deutsche (German Grimm, history, Verfassungsgeschichte, 1776-1866) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988), 112. 54 und Reinhard Mussgnug,"Die rechtlichen zwischen Regierung, Beziehungen pragmatischen von Unruh, in Kurt Jeserich, Hans Pohl, and Georg-Christoph und Verwaltung," eds., Parlament, Deutsche Verwaltungsgeschichte Anstalt, (German administrative history) (Stuttgart: Deutsche-Verlags 1983), 2:96. 55 of these reforms, see Ernst Rudolf Huber, ed., Dokumente zur Deutschen Verfas For a description of German constitutional (Documents Verlag, history) (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer sungsgeschichte 1964), 2:182-223. 53 Dieter

92

WORLD

POLITICS

tion, Prussia was inheriting a set of stateswith highly institutionalized

structures governance tems, effective systems olutionary What secure in place: education sys public well-developed of public finance, and stable and largely nonrev is there outside were that the gains of unification to In addition of Prussia? simply we see in Table 3 and parliaments, of similar measures of "in

populations.56 evidence systematic states in the German

the presence of constitutions noting an overview states of the German frastructural identical that we

in terms

not used in the Italian context. Though capacity" to the Italian measures, to the data nevertheless point impor tant differences in the relative of the German and Italian capacity states, as also evidenced in the narrative accounts.

The data presented inTable 3, when compared with the data in Table 2, highlight two points. First, in terms of the absolute level of in
frastructural developed capacity, than their the German Italian states counterparts. were far more by the 1850s even and perhaps Second,

more
many, much herited three whose

importantly for the future development

the relative gap in infrastructural capacity

of federalism in Ger
between and as Prussia and it in

the states itwould

inherit in 1867 and 1871 was much lower than the

Piedmont gap between was twice Piedmont states the states developed along all states Prussia inherited

larger in 1861. Whereas dimensions than

institutional as the

were ac capacity in critical tually higher shaping and strategies of Prussian elites as they negotiated perceptions political In short, given the aim of securing greater fiscal re national unification. and greater sources, more manpower, incorporation stability, Prussia's levels of institutionalization its own. This institutional fact was

it inherited, and infrastructural

of states in 1866 and 1871 entailed bringing well-functioning

tionalized states into the German Reich was to assure that the be secure. gains would in Germany The consequence was taken, leaving states

institu
intended

that a gradual

path

of unification them unification? in 1866 into a

intact and gradually affect the process the war ending

incorporating of national of unification states.57

federal model. But how precisely did subunit institutionalization

infrastructural proceeded capacity in two steps:

and
It and

adopting in 1867 the institutional formula for aNorth German Con

federation that excluded the southern German
56 1770-1866 in James Sheehan, German History, See the description (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 439. to southern Germany in 1871 might have rep 57The extension of the North German Constitution See Karl Bosl, for further renegotiation, but instead itwas not renegotiated. resented an opportunity

RETHINKING First, unification was

THE ORIGINS achieved

OF FEDERALISM that combined

93

and compromise of federalism conquest a federal outcome.58 was a strategy of not to would It lead expect might to the Pied annexation that stands in sharp contrast plus concessions montese at entire annexation of the Italian peninsula. the end of Indeed, state of Hannover, in the 1866 war Prussia annexed the coercively its bargaining creasing But Prussia undertook the southern German states.59 power vis-?-vis a this explicit act of coercion, which eliminated states of from the map, while monarchy leaving the

via a negotiated peace in ways theorists that most

long-established south intact. Germany's was wary of After Bismarck away the state of Hannover, sweeping was acts. coercive He farther motivated undertaking by both foreign concerns concerns with further Prussia's (French expansionary policy plans) German itwould and domestic Catholic policy element concerns. Bismarck wrote to his ambassador

in France: "I believe it is impossible to incorporate the Bavarian South

create only Italy has created for that could achieve his foreign the well subunits he would states. ... the effort to [because] conquer violently for us the same element of weakness that Southern state."60 Unlike and domestic Cavour, however, Bismarck

inherit?in In contrast

as the states of the North

because policy goals precisely as Bavaria, Baden, W?rttemberg, in German Confederation?were high to the unconditional states "conquest" of

frastructural three

southern Italy in 1860, the war of 1866 inGermany was ended with
sets of treaties that left the German intact as future negoti

ating partners for national unification: (1) the Nikolsburg Preliminary Treaty of June 26, 1866; (2) the Prague Peace Treaty of August 23,
1866; and of Bavaria, states. The (3) seven bilateral agreements between Prussia and the states Baden, W?rttemberg, terms of these treaties possible and Austria's as small Hessen, Saxony, left in place as much institutional and in exchange for disbanding the Ger removing itself from the sphere of and two other

continuity personnel man confederation

Bund und die "Die Verhandlungen ?ber den Eintritt der s?ddeutschen Staaten in den Norddeutschen inTheodor 1870-71 der Reichsverfassung," Schieder, ed., Reichsgr?ndung (Founding of Entstehung the the empire, 1870-71) (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1970), 148-63. 58 The term "negotiated peace" is from Lothar Gall, Bismarck: The White Revolutionary (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 307. annexed can be explained by two factors. 59That Saxony was left intact and Hannover completely to link itswest First, Hannover was of greater strategic and geographical importance, allowing Prussia see Stewart Stehlin, more on this ern and eastern provinces, creating a "tenable For territory." point, Bismarck and the Guelph Problem, 1866-1890 1973), 34-41. The sec (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, ond reason for the contrasting fates of Saxony and Hannover was that Saxony's independence , unlike "Graf Goltz Hannover's, was insisted upon by both French and Austrian powers. See correspondence an Bismarck," no. 224, inOncken (fn. 28), 372-75. July 23,1866, 60 Otto von Bismarck, in Scheler (fn. 22), 755.

94 German level but Prussian tive actors states.61 This also

WORLD POLITICS
continued at an informal existed not only at a formal autonomy an to level. In order sent by Bismarck of 1866, he insisted that all administra

troops in the summer states be left in of the still sovereign "as little in place with as of administration terruption possible."62 Another feature of the 1866 peace settlement was the institutional ization of a diplomatic states. Between

rate Most

public the other states were important treaty at

Prussia between and the other relationship and November 18,1866, 25,1870, eight sepa August treaties between the Prussian monarch and the monarchs of to bring signed was these among committed the the German the treaty Reich signed into existence. on August 18,

1866, by the Prussian king and the kings of sixteen north German
states. The union" aimed states to a "defensive and offensive of the the "independence" and "integrity" preserving new of the North German Confederation members (Norddeutsche made the Two features that confederation critical Bund). state-building

viable were
statement

(1) the call for the creation of a parliament and (2) the
that the

to allow their troops to be all agreed sovereigns of the Prussian under the leadership crown.63 In short, we see the adop tion of a federal strategy of unification that set the terms of unification via negotiation and rather states, left them intact and the formerly than dissolving in place for future negotiation. independent

Another key step in the process of making a distinctly federal Ger many was the writing of the North German Constitution in the fall andwinter of 1866. This would prove to be a critical period because the
German Reich's 1871 made effective constitution in 1866-67. and of agreements sented a path only Prussia. because was an extension of the set merely In this phase, federalism also repre to national unification that was possible states were in place outside of

of least resistance

legitimate

a set of constitutional that Bismarck Indeed, after viewing proposals to write in the summer of officials his ministry's had commissioned

1866, Bismarck went on vacation in September of 1866 to the island of

R?gen, where he wrote two famous "dictates" that would serve as the

final theoretical and strategic justification of the constitution in 1866 and 1871. Both his proposal for a federal structure and his justification
of the federal structure in his dictates to offer are that he considered federalism revealing the "easiest" insofar route as they show to unification.

61 Huber (fn. 55), 212-20. 62 in Scheler (fn. 22), 739-40. Otto von Bismarck, 63Text of treaty is inHuber (fn. 55), 224-25.

RETHINKING THE ORIGINS OF FEDERALISM

95

was "too cen that one of his ministry's First, Bismarck writes proposals tralized for the eventual accession of the South Germans." Displaying to southern German he argues moreover that the concerns, sensitivity

"central authority" of the Reich ought to be "not a singleMinistry but a Federal Diet, a body consisting of delegates from the individual gov
ernments."64 What was Bismarck's motivation? Here we see that what change contemporary often requires rhetorical Bismarck "The more explains, the easier things will social scientists call "path-breaking" that emphasize strategies we institutional

path dependence. to the old forms, link the institutions

a remarkable for is appreciation sues of we more to he "In form shall stick continues, path dependence, in practice giving the confederation of states while it the character of a federal state with elastic, inconspicuous but far-reaching form."66 All of this was possible and desirable because the states that would retain ex be."65 Displaying clusive control over range of other policy to undermine Bismarck's cern with ation had monarchs the "easiest" to be accepted taxation, conscription, domains were effective aims route of national to national and education, states that did not hence a whole threaten the con

unification; unification.

Second, the underlying framework of theNorth German Confeder

by fifteen member states of the new confeder

ation at a summit of those states held in Berlin in February 1867. The

and their representatives of the Prussian-proposed the proposal also had to be accepted the terms tives of different the constitution left fifteen tion.67 First, member states demanded was and eventually negotiated accepted constitution. To be made official, new North German Reichs by the many revisions actors and concessions. constitution in the new finance Yet that federa

tag inApril 1867. Lengthy negotiations followed inwhich representa

eventually accepted states intact as decisive retained as a federal

the states

new autonomy, giving the only enue and over exclusive control nearly only military questions. policy admin the states retained control over their well-functioning Second, as the actors that would istrative structures, nearly all fed implement eral legislation. federal politics And

high levels of public federal level of government

and policy limited rev

a direct control over third, the states maintained in the Bundesrat. In short, their membership through

"Gall (fn. 58), 317. 65 Erich Brandenburg, und Meyer, 1923), 219. 67 For an overview

Die Reichsgr?ndung

(The founding

of the empire),

2nd ed. (Leipzig: Quelle

"Gall (fh.58), 317.

(Bismarck's of these negotiations, struggle in the shaping see Otto Becker, Bismarcks Ringen Um Deutschlands of Germany) und Meyer, 1958), (Heidelberg: Quelle

Gestaltung 290-371.

96

WORLD POLITICS

with

the creation of the new Norddeutsche Bund inApril 1867, the groundwork was laid for the creation of the federal German Reich in 1871.
state structures In sum, well-developed to be achieved with of Germany project of dissolving existing states allowed lower chances for the gradual uni of revolt, less new state struc

fication

risk of foreign intervention, and no need to undertake the financially

costly and creating

tures.As Herbert Jacob has also argued in his study of German public
the task of layering a new national government administration, (as was sense in states made done in Italy) atop already well little functioning the German context.68 By avoiding the massive fiscal costs of dissolving a new national states and from government existing constructing chief designer of political Count Otto scratch, Prussia's institutions, von Bismarck, for and federalism self-consciously opted intentionally In this unification. as, in his own terms, an "easier" route to national sense, it was the combination constituent center and well of a militarily powerful a viable federalism that made strategy of case. in the German states

developed state formation

Conclusion
To return to to our original a union question: why would but accommodating This article a center be unyielding to grant federal that the crucial

enough concessions

forge to subunits?

enough has demonstrated

is not whether issue for forming federations subunits exist, nor whether to extract federal concessions from the they have the military capacity core. Instead, the crucial issue iswhether subunits are institutionalized, state forma

socially embedded, and highly infrastructural. Can they deliver the

gains to the core and a route to a the subunits that were sought with

tion in the first place? Indeed, it is only high-infrastructural

that offer resolving the basic paradox of federalism's

subunits
origins.

Without
units

such subunits, the political corewill seek to absorb all the sub

state. unitary account two the this makes strokes, points. First, against use of coercion does not the of existing theory, the expectations preclude to federal of federations. the formation Second, creating key challenge ism is not simply constraining the power of a political center; instead, In broad of subunits to do the work of governance
since Bismarck

to establish

what is important is the task of building up the infrastructural capacity

in a federation.
Yale University

68 Jacob, German Administration

(New Haven:

Press,

1963).

RETHINKINGTHE ORIGINS OF FEDERALISM

insights point the direction we to rethink what First, might ought vide" in the development of European have long pean political development institutional in Europe. To tutional tional These for future be called noted research in two

97
areas.

the "federal-unitary di nation-states. Scholars of Euro

diversity differences, they identify formation gave rise to diverse outcomes of capitalism, and organization one area institutions. But has remained

the presence of national macroinsti the of explain origins how diverse pathways of nation-state the choice such as regime type, the na of national electoral

out of the range of scholars: the divide?the fact that state building gave rise to three federal-unitary states among seventeen federal states and fourteen the unitary largest an infrastructural states ofWestern account of federal Could Europe. ism's origins explain broader patterns nation-state of European forma tion? At untangle do first much the proposed infrastructural glance, of the diversity ofWest European framework nation-state does devel

69 opment. While
further

it is not possible within the confines of this article to

work

across a broader cases, the frame range of national testing a new identifies for along those Unes. hypothesis proceeding the results of the article may have policy relevance for con Second, decentralization best efforts beyond Europe. such It is true that my ar as the European

temporary gument

state-building explains trajectories not external or colo internal domestic actors?and experience where a of nial actors?played role in determining the structure primary we states. As recent must in has be modest demonstrated, scholarship to to export the lessons of state formation postcolo trying European or Africa.70 Where states were de nial state settings of Latin America signed internal
69 Of

to reflect

the larger colonial goals a constituencies, fundamentally

of external different

actors causal

rather logic

than

of state

the universe of seventeen cases, the only three inwhich state building gave rise to federal out Switzerland (1920), all had regional-level (1848), Germany (1871), and Austria parliaments, states at the moment in the constituent of the first mod and systems of administration constitutions, ern national constitution. In the remaining fourteen cases, state building resulted in unitary outcomes. subnational parliamentary insti Of these fourteen cases, only one case, Denmark (1849), had modern tutions at the moment In all other cases, including the Netherlands of polity formation. (1815) and were a institu Italy (1861), unitary institutions adopted in context where subnational parliamentary tions were absent. The single exception, Denmark, might be explained by the absence of a federal ide the prospects of federalism. For further systematic testing of the ology in 1849, which undermined see Daniel Ziblatt, account vis-?-vis other arguments, Divide: "The Federal-Unitary infrastructural Lessons of Seventeen European Nation-States," Center for European Studies Working Paper (Cam comes, 2005). bridge, Harvard University, 70 in the African For a discussion of the limits of the European model context, see Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power inAfrica: Comparative Lessons inAuthority and Control (Princeton: Princeton Univer a discussion of the limits of see in Latin America, sity Press, 2000). For Miguel Cen European models State in Latin America (University Park: Pennsylvania teno, Blood and Debt: War and theNation-State University Press, 2002).

98

WORLD POLITICS
since in many as regions of the

may be at work. Nevertheless, building world decentralization and federalism to a range of social are achieved ization

solutions possible of how federalism and decentral ills, the question takes on renewed urgency.71 Can my argument to contribute fills a other this argument Indeed, any insights regions? that the task of creating federalism is not about weak gap by proposing so often assumed. Rather, as is is creating federalism ening government, about the of While federal government. capacity ironically increasing as an institutional au ism is typically viewed solution that disperses thority, focused to assume that this is a prerequisite of federalism is to mistake at the

are viewed

the effectsof federalism for its origins. Indeed, insufficient attention has
"capacity" prerequisites level. The subnational central lesson of this article, relevant for any decentralization effort, is that with institutional structures the paradox of high-quality of federalism's origins. on the institutional of federalism a lesson potentially the skills, resources, to it is possible governance,

and

overcome

71 See, for example, Ugo Amoretti (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

and Nancy Bermeo, Press, 2004).

eds., Federalism

and Territorial

Cleavages