ELECTION LAW: MIDTERM CASES

CASE TITLE ELECTION AND SUFFRAGE

PRINCIPLES As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority." A republic then to be true to its name requires that the government rests on the consent of the people, consent freely given, intelligently arrived at, honestly recorded, and thereafter counted. Only thus can they be really looked upon as the ultimate sources of established authority. It is their undeniable right to have officials of their unfettered choice. The election law has no justification except as a means for assuring a free, honest and orderly expression of their views. It is of the essence that corruption and irregularities should not be permitted to taint the electoral process. In resolving the motion to dismiss, the allegations contained in the complaint should be hypothetically admitted. In this case, the court obviously erred in dismissing the protest. The seriousness and gravity of the imputed failure to have election conducted freely and honestly, with such irregularities alleged, give rise to doubts, rational and honest, as to who were the duly elected officials. IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE If the right of suffrage would be disregarded or frittered away, popular sovereignty becomes a myth. In the case of Moya v. Del Fierro, it was declared by Justice Laurel, (check principle in Moya)

IRINEO MOYA, petitioner, vs. AGRIPINO GA. DEL FIERO, respondent.

MARIANO LL. BADELLES, protestant-appellant, vs. CAMILO P. CABILI, protegee-appellee.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AMANTE P. PURISIMA, petitioner, vs. HON. ANGELINO C. SALANGA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GREGORIO CORDERO, respondents.

There is no more question now that the number of votes involved in said discrepancy is more than enough to alter the result. The record shows that the reason why Purisima was not able to submit to the board the COMELEC copies of returns was because the board declined to suspend the canvass and proclamation. He should not be prejudiced by such. It is the duty of canvassers to suspend in case of patent irregularity in the returns as in the present case. Interpretation of election laws should give effect to the expressed will of the electorate. The purpose of the Revised Election Code is to protect the integrity of elections and to suppress all evils that may violate its purity and defeat the will of the voters. The purity of the elections is one of the most fundamental requisites of popular government. The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its duties, the Commission must be given a considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created to promote free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with. Technicalities, which are not conducive to free, orderly and honest elections, but on the contrary may defeat the will of the sovereign people as expressed in their votes, should not be allowed to hamper the Commission on Elections in the performance of its duties. To sustain the petitioner in the present case is to deny the Commission on Elections the power to retrieve the copies of the election returns from the ballot boxes in order that the true number of votes cast for a candidate may be known and thus permit a canvass on the basis of election returns that are patently falsified. We cannot, and We must not, sanction the stand of petitioner. As We have adverted to, the Commission on Elections has the power to inquire whether there exist discrepancies among the various copies of the election returns. Of all the copies prepared by the board of inspectors the copy least susceptible to being tampered with is the one deposited in the ballot box. Where the three copies outside the ballot boxes appear to have been uniformly altered, there is no plausible reason why the copy deposited in the ballot box may not be used to determine whether discrepancies exist in the various copies. Inasmuch as the Commission on Elections has the right to determine whether said discrepancies exist, it must also have the right to consult said returns, which cannot be done unless the ballot boxes are opened. It is noteworthy that the Revised Election Code does not provide that it is the courts that have the power to order the opening of the ballot box in a situation like this. The Comelec is an independent constitutional body with a distinct and pivotal role in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its awesome functions as overseer of fair elections, administrator and lead implementor of laws relative to the conduct of elections, it should not be stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the case of an organization of lesser responsibility.[103] It should be afforded ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in devising means and initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the great objective for which it was created to promote free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections. This is as it should be for, too often, Comelec has to make decisions under difficult conditions to address unforeseen events to preserve the integrity of the election and in the process the voice of the people. Thus, in the past, the Court has steered away from interfering with the Comelecs exercise of its power which, by law and by the nature of its off ice properly pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on Comelecs part, as here, the Court should refrain from utilizing the corrective hand of certiorari to review, let 1 alone nullify, the acts of that body.

LUCAS V. CAUTON, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and PABLO SANIDAD, respondents.

H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN, ROMEL R. BAGARES, ALLAN JONES F. LARDIZABAL, GILBERT T. ANDRES, IMMACULADA D. GARCIA, ERLINDA T. MERCADO, FRANCISCO A. ALCUAZ, MA. AZUCENA P. MACEDA, and ALVIN A. PETERS, Petitioners, - versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by HON. CHAIRMAN JOSE MELO, COMELEC SPECIAL BIDS and AWARDS COMMITTEE, represented by its CHAIRMAN HON. FERDINAND RAFANAN, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT, represented by HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, TOTAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and SMARTMATIC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Respondents. VOTERS The modern conception of the suffrage is that voting is a function of government. The right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good. In the early stages of the evolution of the representative system of government, the exercise of the right of suffrage was limited to a small portion of the inhabitants. But with the spread of democratic ideas, the enjoyment of the franchise in the modern states has come to embrace the mass of the audit classes of persons are excluded from the franchise. Among the the generally excluded classes are minors idiots, paupers, and convicts. The right of the State to deprive persons to the right of suffrage by reason of their having been convicted of crime, is beyo nd question. The manifest purpose of such restrictions upon this right is to preserve the purity of elections. The presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold office. The exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a mere disqualification, imposed for protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right. One of the qualifications required by law of a person who announces his candidacy is that he must be a duly qualified elector. The Executive Bureau has held that the term qualified when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter. To become a qualified candidate a person does not need to register as an elector. It is sufficient that he possesses all the qualifications prescribed in section 431 and none of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a candidate failed to register as an elector in the municipality does not deprive him of the right to become a candidate to be voted for. It is not at all easy to disregard the forcible argument advanced by counsel for the appellant to the effect that when the law makes use of the phrases qualified elector and qualified voter the law means what it says. It is contended that it would be an absurdity to hold o ne a qualified elector who was not eligible to vote in his municipality. At the same time, the contemporaneous construction of the law by two departments of the Government ? one the legislative branch responsible for its enactment, and the other the executive branch responsible for its enforcement ? while not controlling on the Judiciary, is entitled to our respectful consideration. For the orderly and harmonious interpretation and advancement of the law, the courts should, when possible, keep step with the other departments. MARCOS YRA, petitioner-appellant, vs. MAXIMO ABANO, respondent-appellee. But we are not without other authority. The law of Kentucky provided t hat No person shall be eligible to any office who is not at time of his election a qualified voter of the city and who has not resided therein three years preceding his election. One Wood was elected a commi ssioner of the sinking fund. His eligibility was protested upon the ground that he was not, at the time of his election, a qualified voter of the city of Louisville since he had not registered as a voter in that city. The Supreme Court of Kentucky, considering the law and the facts in the case of Meffert vs. Brown ([1909], 132 Ky., 201), speaking through its Chief Justice, held that under the Kentucky statutes requiring officers in certain cities to be qu alified voters, ones eligibility is not affected by his failure to register. It was said that The act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter. . . . One may be a qualified voter without exercising the right to vote. Registering does not confer the right; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of the right. It is but fair to say that if the question were strictly one of first impression in this jurisdiction, we would be more impressed with the potent points made by the appellant. In view, however, of the authorities herein- before mentioned, we are loath to depart from them, particularly as the language which goes to make up these authorities, on close examination, is found to rest on reason. The distinction is between a qualified elector and the respondent is such, and a registered qualified elector and the respondent is such although not in his home municipality. Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. It should not be forgotten that the people of Meycauayan have spoken and their choice to be their local chief executive is the respondent. The will of the electorate should be respected. AKBAYAN Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP,

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMADEO CORRAL, defendant-appellant.

REGISTRATION OF VOTERS

KOMPIL II Youth, ALYANSA, KALIPI, PATRICIA O. PICAR, MYLA GAIL Z. TAMONDONG, EMMANUEL E. OMBAO, JOHNNY ACOSTA, ARCHIE JOHN TALAUE, RYAN DAPITAN, CHRISTOPHER OARDE, JOSE MARI MODESTO, RICHARD M. VALENCIA, EDBEN TABUCOL, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. Section 8 of R.A. 8189, provides that no registration shall be conducted 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election. In the light of the foregoing the assailed resolution must be upheld. The so-called stand-by powers or residual powers of the Comelec, as raised by the petitioners is provided under the relevant provisions of Section 29 of R.A. No. 6646 and adopted verbatim in Section 28 of R.A. No. 8436, wherein the commission shall fix other periods and dates for the accomplishment of pre-election acts if it is no longer possible to observe the dates and periods prescribed by law, cannot be applied in this case. The Supreme Court held that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies for the purpose of upholding the resolution. Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes the possibility of its being exercised or availed of and not otherwise. In the case at bar the Comelec stated the operational impossibility of holding the additional two-day registration, and therefore Section 8 of R.A. 8436 may not apply. Comelec acted within the confines of the applicable law in denying the petitioners request. The Supreme Court could not compel Comelec to conduct a special registration of new voters. The right to suffrage is not absolute and must be exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the Constitution. Petitioners failed to register, thus missed their chance. However, court took judicial notice of the fact that the President issued a proclamation calling Congress to a Special Session to allow the conduct of special registration for new voters and that bills had been filed in Congress to amend Republic Act No. 8189

CANDIDATES The sole issue for our Resolution is whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude. The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner Villaber from being a candidate for Congressman, the COMELEC applied Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides: Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. As to the meaning of moral turpitude, we have consistently adopted the definition in Blacks Law Dictionary as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. In In re Vinzon,the term moral turpitude is considered as encompassing everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections that not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, and that as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine.We further pronounced therein that: in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC, the Court admitted that it canno t always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on the circumstances surrounding the case. The elements of the offense under the above provision are: 1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value; 2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and 3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.[19] The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. We held that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imports deceit and certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person.Thus, paraphrasing Blacks definition, a drawer who issues an u nfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals. To begin with, one of the qualifications of an elective official is that he must be a citizen of the Philippines. Thus, the Local Government Code provides: Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other

PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and REP. DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, respondents.

RAMON L. LABO, Jr., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROBERTO ORTEGA, respondents.

local language or dialect. (emphasis supplied) Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. As mandated by law: "An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines." The petitioners contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippin e citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, renouncing all other allegiance. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship. *** The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the votes intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered null and void. This would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. At the risk of being repetitious, the people of Baguio City opted to elect petitioner Labo bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that Labo was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of the government. Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be disqualified and cannot assume the office. Issues: 1. WON petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials. 2. WON COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after petitioner was proclaimed winner.

Held: 1. NO. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. ROMEO LONZANIDA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and EUFEMIO MULI, repondents. The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections. Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The respondents contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995 -1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under sc rutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of

the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renuncia tion of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding him disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set aside.

2. NO. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC that the proclamation or the assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits. Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that: Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. The clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed. It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation. MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., PETITIONER V. COMELEC AND ERNESTO VEGA SEE COMPLETE TEXT The Supreme Court ruled that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 provides: Article 73. Disqualifications The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position: BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ, respondents. (a) xxxx (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment. It is clear from this provision that fugitives from justice refer only to persons who has been convicted by final judgment. However, COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not private respondent is a fugitive from justice when it outrightly denied the petition for quo warranto. The Court opted to remand the case to COMELEC to resolve and proceed with the case. CASIMIRA DE LA CRUZ, PETITIONER V. COMELEC, JOHN LLOYD PACETE CAMPAIGN, ELECTION PROPAGANDA, ETC. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by its Chairman, BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SEE COMPLETE TEXT

This Court takes a contrary view. Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, or safety, and the general welfare of the people.[1] To determine the validity of a police measure, two questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of police power?

ESMERALDA AMORA-LADRA, in her capacity as Acting Director IV, National Capital Judicial Region, Commission on Elections, and the SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.

and (2) Are the means employed reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals? A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. The latter is a valid reason for the exercise of police power as held in National Press Club v. COMELEC,[2] wherein the petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, which prohibited the sale or donation of print space and air time for campaigning or other political purposes, except to the COMELEC. The obvious intention of this provision is to equalize, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign war chests. This Court ruled therein that this objective is of special importance and urgency in a country which, like ours, is characterized by extreme disparity in income distribution between the economic elite and the rest of society, and by the prevalence of poverty, with so many of our population falling below the poverty line. petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product endorsements and do not announce nor solicit any support for his candidacy. Under the Omnibus Election Code, election campaign or partisan political activity is defined as an act designed to promot e the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office. Activities included under this definition are: (1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate (2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate; (3) (4) (5) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any candidate for public office; Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate; or Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.[3] (underscoring ours)

It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to these products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of the subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates for public office whose name and image are used to advertise commercial products would have more opportunity to make themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same chance of lending their faces and names to endorse popular commercial products as image models. Similarly, an individual intending to run for public office within the next few months, could pay private corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his name and image even before the start of the campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against premature campaigning: Sec. 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period. x x x [4] Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution provides: Sec. 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. It is enough that Congress stated that any unlawful act or omis sion applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period. So, it is lawful if done before the start of the campaign period. This plain language of the law need not be construed further. Moreover, on the day of the motorcade, she was not yet a candidate for. As what was decided in the Lanot Case which says that prior to the campaign

ROSALINDA A. PENERA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T. ANDANAR, Respondents.

SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, doing business as MANILA STANDARD, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. POLITICAL PARTY; PARTY-LIST ORGANIZATION

period, even if the candidate has filed his/her certificate of candidacy, he/she is not yet considered as a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Hence, she cannot be guilty of premature campaigning for in the first place there is no candidate to talk about. What she did was an exercise of her freedom of expression. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. The Courts Ruling The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats. First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory The pertinent provision[15] of the Constitution on the composition of the House of Representatives reads as follows: Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and LUZON FARMERS PARTY, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL. respondents.

Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows: No. of district representatives ---------------------------------- x .20 = No. of party-list .80 representatives Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. F urthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party -list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalit ion shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress. Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation The Two Percent Threshold In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them.[21] But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"[22] to ensure meaningful local representation. All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation or circumvention.[23] The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not seriously challenged in these consolidated cases. Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties") according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law. One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion of the votes obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the first seat.[25] Translated in figures, a party that wins at least six percent of the total votes cast will be entitled to three seats; another party that gets four percent will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two percent will be entitled to one seat only. This proposal has the advantage of simplicity and ease of comprehension. Problems arise, however, when the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for example, when Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6 percent. Under the method just described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5 seats and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties will each uniformly have three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of a party garnering two or more times the number of votes obtained by another, yet getting the same number of seats as the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect, proportional representation will be contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court discarded it. The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands an equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the parameters of the

Filipino party-list system. As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows: First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list. Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives; Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats. Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes. The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate proportional representation into a mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned parameters. After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step. Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the first party. Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes. For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party. Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats has already been predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first one is entitled. The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary because the present set of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention. The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales[27] that a fractional membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x. In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the legislature. Since Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither will this Court. The Supreme Court does not make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of facts.

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner, vs.

a. b.

Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.

Held: The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the COMELEC which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. respondents. ATONG PAGLAUM Petitioner, - versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR., Petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M. REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN, ANTONIO FLORES and JOSELITO USTAREZ, Respondents. AUTOMATED ELECTIONS ROQUE V. COMELEC ARCHBISHOP FERNANDO R. CAPALLA, OMAR SOLITARIO ALI and MARY ANNE L. SUSANO, Petitioners, - versus THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

RA 7941. The resolution of this Court directed the COMELEC to refrain proclaiming any winner during the last party -list election, shall remain in force until after the COMELEC have compiled and reported its compliance. a. Yes b. No. Rationale: a. Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list elections. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system. For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." b. That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. The provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted.

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