Francisco I. Chavez, Petitioner, V. Hon. Alberto G. Romulo, In His Capacity as Executive Secretary; Director General Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr.

, In His Capacity as The Chief Of the PNP, et. al., Repondents. G.R. No. 157036, 09 June 2004, En Banc (Sandoval, J.) The right to bear arms cannot be classified as fundamental under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Evidently, possession of firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the exception, not the rule. The right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right, thus right to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right. Acting on President Arroyo directive in her speech on the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents, respondent Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence. Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the DILG to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition impleading public respondents. The Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of the petition pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and contends that (1) the PNP Chief is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines; (2) petitioner does not have a constitutional right to own and carry firearms; (3) the assailed Guidelines do not violate the due process clause of the Constitution; and (4) the assailed Guidelines do not constitute an ex post facto law. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines 2. Whether or not the citizens right to bear arms is constitutional right 3. Whether or not the revocation of petitioners PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines is a violation of his right to property 4. Whether or not the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of police power HELD: Petition Dismissed. First Issue: Both P.D. No. 1866 And R.A. No. 6975 Authorize the PNP Chief to Issue the Assailed Guidelines. The evolution of our laws on firearms shows that since the early days of our Republic, the legislatures tendency was always towards the delegation of power. Act No. 1780, delegated upon the Governor-General (now the President) the authority (1) to approve or disapprove applications of any person for a license to deal in firearms or to possess the same for personal protection, hunting and other lawful purposes; and (2) to revoke such license any time. Further, it authorized him to issue regulations which he may deem necessary for the proper enforcement of the Act. Subsequently, the Office of the Governor-General delegated this authority to the Chief of the Constabulary. Later on, several laws and executive orders were promulgated which allowed more authority to the Chief of the Constabulary. With the foregoing developments, it is accurate to say that the Chief of the Constabulary had exercised the authority for a long time. RECENT JURISPRUDENCE POLITICAL LAW By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the PNP absorbed the PC. Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and assumed the latters licensing authority. Section 24 thereof specifies, as one of PNPs powers, the issuance of licenses for the possession of firearms and explosives in accordance with law. This is in conjunction with the PNP Chiefs power to issue detailed implem enting policies and instructions on such matters as may be necessary to effectively carry out the functions,

powers and duties of the PNP. R.A. No. 8294 does not divest the Chief of the Constabulary (now the PNP Chief) of his authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective implementation of P.D. No. 1866. It merely provides for the reduction of penalties for illegal possession of firearms. Thus, the provision of P.D. No. 1866 granting to the Chief of the Constabulary the authority to issue rules and regulations regarding firearms remains effective. Correspondingly, the Implementing Rules and Regulations jointly issued by the DOJ and the DILG pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 8294 deal only with the automatic review, by the Director of the Bureau of Corrections or the Warden of a provincial or city jail, of the records of convicts for violations of P.D. No. 1866. The Rules seek to give effect to the beneficent provisions of R.A. No. 8294, thereby ensuring the early release and reintegration of the convicts into the community. Clearly, both P.D. No.1866 and R.A. No. 6975 authorize the PNP Chief to issue the assailed guidelines. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution specifies the power of control of Chief Executive over executive departments, bureaus and offices. Whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to her subordinate, she may act directly or merely direct the performance of a duty. Thus, when President Arroyo directed respondent Ebdane to suspend the issuance of PTCFOR, she was just directing a subordinate to perform an assigned duty. Such act is well within the prerogative of her office. Second and Third Issue: The Right To Bear Arms Cannot Be Classified As Fundamental Under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The right to bear arms cannot be classified as fundamental under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Evidently, possession of firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the exception, not the rule. The right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right, thus right to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right. Petitioners assertion that the revocation of his PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines deprived him of his vested property right without due process of law and in violation of the equal protection of law is unmeritorious. The test whether the statute creates a property right or interest depends largely on the extent of discretion granted to the issuing authority. In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence. Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected under our Constitution. Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation of it RECENT JURISPRUDENCE POLITICAL LAW does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. At any rate, assuming that petitioners PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of the States

police power. All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and general welfare. It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general. In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR which the Court believes to be reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend them. Fourth Issue: Reasonable Exercise Of The Police Power Notably, laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns have frequently been upheld as reasonable exercise of the police power. In State vs. Reams, it was held that the legislature may regulate the right to bear arms in a manner conducive to the public peace. With the promotion of public peace as its objective and the revocation of all PTCFOR as the means, the Court is convinced that the issuance of the assailed Guidelines constitutes a reasonable exercise of police power.

MMDA vs Garin GR No. 130230 April 15, 2005 Chico-Nazario, J.: FACTS:Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers license was confiscated for parking illegally. Garin wrote to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his license and expressed his preference for his case to be file in Court. Without an immediate reply from the chairman, Garin filed for a preliminary injunction assailing among others that Sec 5 (f) of RA 7924 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties. RTC rule in his favor, directing MMDA to return his license and for the authority to desist from confiscating drivers license without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriat e proceeding. Thus this petition. ISSUE:Whether of not Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which authorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers license in the en forcement of traffic rules and regulations constitutional? RULING: The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is not a local government unit of a public corporation endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties of without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for good and welfare of the commonwealth and for subjects of the same. There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers MMDA or its council to enact ordinance, approve resolutions and appropriate f unds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, Peoples Organizations, NGOs and private sector for the efficient and expeditious deliv ery of services. All its functions are administrative in nature. PRC vs. De Guzman

Facts: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne. For its part, the NBI found that the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions . Issue: Was the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 a valid exercise of police power Ruling: Yes, it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers FRANCISCO VS. FERNANDO G.R. No. 166501, November 16 2006 FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (petitioner), as member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and taxpayer, filed this original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition and Mandamus. Petitioner prays for the Prohibition writ to enjoin respondents Bayani F. Fernando, Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and the MMDA (respondents) from further implementing its we t flag scheme (Flag Scheme). Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal basis because the MMDAs governing body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates the Due Process Clause because it is asummary punishment for jaywalking; (3) disregards the Constitutional protection against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and (4) violates pedestrian rights as it exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition was valid. HELD: The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) a favorable action will likely redress the injury. On the other hand, a party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute. Petitioner meets none of the requirements under either category. Nor is there merit to petitioners claim that the Court should relax the standing requirement because of the transcendental importance of the issues the petition raises. As an exception to the standing requirement, the transcendental importance of the issues raised relates to the merits of the petition. Thus, the party invoking it must show, among others, the presence of a clear disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition. Petitioner has not shown such clear constitutional or statutory violation. On the Flag Schemes alleged lack of legal basis, we note that all the cities and municipalities within the MMDAs jurisdiction, except Valenzuela City, have each enacted anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic management codes with provisions for pedestrian regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for respondents implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalkingordinances and similar regulations. After all, the MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with the implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities. The absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance in Valenzuela City does not detract from this conclusion absent any proof that respondents implemented the Flag Scheme in that city. MMDA v Viron Transport G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007 J. Carpio Morales Facts: GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby creating the MMDA in 2003. Due to traffic congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system. The MMC gave a go signal for the project. Viron Transit, a bus company assailed the move. They alleged that the MMDA didnt have the power to direct operators to abandon their terminals. In doing so they asked the court to interpret the extent and scope of MMDAs power under RA 7924. They also asked if the MMDA law contravened the Public Service Act. Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the implementation in a trial court. In the Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to whether 1) the MMDAs power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly established and existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act and the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real propertieswithout due process of law should they be required to use the common bus terminals. The trial court sustained the constitutionality. Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005, reversed its Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police power"; that the authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to order the closure of Virons and Mencorps existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act. MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that there is no justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. To them, Viron and Mencorp failed to produce any letter or communication from the Executive Department apprising them of an immediate plan to close down their bus terminals. And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use government property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not between third persons. Issues: 1. Is there a justiciable controversy? 2. Is the elimination of bus terminals unconstitutional? Held: Yes to both. Petition dismissed. Ratio: 1. Requisites: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The closure of their bus terminals would mean, among other things, the loss of income from the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents claim a deprivation of their constitutional right to property without due process of law. Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they have] sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of [the E.O.s] enforcement." Consequently, the established rule that the constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied by respondents. 2. Under E.O. 125 A, the DOTC was given the objec tive of guiding government and private investment in the development of the countrys intermodal transportation and communications systems. It was also tasked to administer all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and communications. It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary

implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question. By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires. There was no grant of authority to MMDA. It was delegated only to set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering and education. In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. MMDAs move didnt satisfy police power requirements such as that (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means. As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern. The Court therein held that public welfare underlies the contested statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads. Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety." As such, measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power. Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that needs to be addressed immediately. Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly oppressive? De la Cruz v. Paras- Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all. Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act. Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC (now the ltfrb)was empowered to "impose such conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require" in approving any franchise or privilege. The law mandates the ltfrb to require any public service to establish, construct, maintain, and operate any reasonable extension of its existing facilities Didipio Earth Savers Multipurpose Association et al vs DENR Sec Elisea Gozun et al on November 22, 2010 Police Power Eminent Domain In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign companies when it comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and N. Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the passage of the law, DENR rolled out its implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to have the law and the RR to be annulled as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property. In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional, petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 9640 which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust taking of private property for private purpose in contradiction with Sect ion 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that private property shall not be taken except for public use and the corresponding payment of just compensation. They assert that public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without payment of just compensation. Traversing petitioners assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a taking provision but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. Public respondents concluded that to require compensation in all such circumstances would compel the government to regulate by purchase. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid. HELD: The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain. They are; (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) (3) (4) the entry must be for more than a momentary period. the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;

(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there is taking involved but it is not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just compensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit, Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner, occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and regulations. Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done to the property of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a consequence of the mining operations or as a result of the construction or installation of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and justly compensated. Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to exercise entry, acquisition and use of private lands.

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. VS. MUNICIPALITY (NOW CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, digested Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011 GR # 152230 August 9, 2005 (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Valid and Definite Offer) FACTS: Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision of declaring respondent municipality (now city) as having the rig ht to expropriate petitioners property for the construction of an access road. Petitioner argues that there was no valid and definite offer made before a complaint for eminent domain was filed as the law requires (Art. 35, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code). Respondent contends that a letter to purchase was offered to the previous owners and the same was not accepted. ISSUE: Whether or not a letter to purchase is sufficient enough as a definite and valid offer to expropriate. HELD: No. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite offer will result in the dismissal of the complaint. The purpose of the mandatory requirement to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court of action.

SAN ROQUE REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (through the Armed Forces of the Philippines), respondent. G.R. No. 163130, September 7, 2007 Facts: The subject parcels of land are located at Lahug, Cebu City. It was originally owned by Ismael D.Rosales, Pantaleon Cabrera and Francisco Racaza. Subject parcels of land, together withseventeen (17) others, were the subject of an expropriation proceeding initiated by the thenCommonwealth of the Philippines docketed as Civil Case No. 781. Judge Felix Martinez orderedthe initial deposit of P9,500.00 as precondition for the entry on the lands sought to beexpropriated. On 14 May 1940, a Decision was rendered condemning the parcels of land.However, the title of the subject parcel of land was not transferred to the government.Eventually, the land was subdivided and T.C.T. No. 11946 was cancelled and new titles wereissued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu. Two parcels covered by T.C.T. Nos. 128197 (Lot No.933-B-3) and 128198 (Lot No. 933-B-4) were acquired by defendant-appellee. In 1995,defendant-appellee begun construction of townhouses on the subject parcels of land.Plaintiff-appellant filed the present case (Records, pp. 1-15) alleging that it is the owner of thesubject parcels of land by virtue of the 1938 Decision in the expropriation case, thus, T.C.T. Nos.128197 and 128198 are null and void. It argued that defendant-appellee, had no right to possessthe subject properties because it was not its lawful owner.In its Answer, defendant-appellee claimed that it was a buyer in good faith. It also claimed thatthere was no valid expropriation because it was initiated by the executive branch withoutlegislative approval. It also alleged that the expropriation was never consummated because thegovernment did not actually enter the land nor were the owners paid any compensation.The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the Republic's complaint and upholding SRRDC'sownership over the subject properties as supported by SRRDC's actual possession thereof and itsunqualified title thereto. It also found that there was no valid expropriation since the records are bereft of a showing that consideration was paid for the subject properties.Aggrieved, the Republic appealed the decision to the CA insisting on its absolute ownership over the subject properties.The CA reversed the RTC Decision on the finding that the appeal from the CFI Decision in theexpropriation case was never perfected by the original owners of the subject properties, and thus,the expropriation of Lot No. 933 became final and binding on the original owners, and SRRDC,which merely stepped into the latter's shoes, is similarly bound. Issue: WON the CA erred in holding that the (a)validity of the expropriation proceedings; (b)respondent had a better right to the subject properties and (c) respondent is not guilty of laches Ruling: The CA disregarded relevant facts and ignored the evidence, noteworthy among which is thatwhen the Republic filed its complaint with the RTC, it alleged that the CFI Decision in Civil Case No. 781 had long become final and executory. However, this assertion would compound the Republics predicament, because the Republic could not adequately explain its failure t o register its ownership over the subject property or, at least, annotate its lien on the title. Trying toextricate itself from this quandary, the Republic belatedly presented a copy of an Exception and Notice of Intention to Appeal dated July 9, 1940, to show that an appeal filed by the originalowners of Lot No. 933 effectively prevented the Republic from registering its title, or even onlyannotating its lien, over the property.The CAs categorical pronouncement that the CFI Decision had become final as no appeal was perfected by SRRDCs predecessor-in-interest is, therefore, contradicted by the Republics ownallegation that an appeal had been filed by the original owners of Lot No. 933. Not only did theCA fail to resolve the issue of the Republics failure to register the property in its name, it alsodid not give any explanation as to why title and continuous possession of the property remainedwith SRRDC and its predecessors-in-interest for fifty-six years. The CA ruling that disregardsthese established facts and neglects to reconcile the contradiction mentioned above does notdeserve concurrence by this Court.In Republic v. Lim, Court emphasized that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably takenfrom an unwilling owner until compensation in paid.Without FULL PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION, there can be no transfer of title fromthe landowner to the expropriator. Thus, the Republic's failure to pay just compensation precluded the perfection of its title over the lot sought to be expropriated. In fact, we went evenfurther and recognized the right of the unpaid owner to recover the property if within 5 yearsfrom the decision of the expropriation court, the expropriator fails to effect payment of justcompensation.Time and again, we have declared that EMINENT DOMAIN cases are to be strictly construedagainst the expropriator. The payment of just compensation for private property taken for publicuse is an indispensable requisite for the exercise of the State's sovereign power of eminentdomain. Failure to observe this requirement renders the taking ineffectual, notwithstanding theavowed public purpose. To disregard this limitation on the exercise of governmental power toexpropriate is to ride roughshod over private rights.From the records of this case and our previous findings in the related case, the Republicmanifestly failed to present clear and convincing evidence of full payment of just compensationand receipt thereof by the property owners. More importantly, if the Republic had actually madefull payment of just compensation, in the ordinary course of things, it would have led to thecancellation of title, or at least, the annotation of the lien in favor of the government on thecertificate of title.The registration with the Registry of Deeds of the Republic's interest arising from the exercise of it's power or eminent domain is in consonance with the Land Registration Act. There is noshowing that the Republic complied with the aforesaid registration requirement.From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent upon the Republic to cause the registration of the subject properties in its name or record the decree of expropriation on the title. Yet, not onlydid the Republic fail to register the subject properties in its name, it failed to do so for 56 years.LACHES is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do thatwhich by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the partyentitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel or laches by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. This rule, however, admits of exceptions. One exception is when the strictapplication of the rule will defeat the effectiveness of a policy adopted to protect the public, suchas the Torrens system.Very telling of the Republic's silence and inaction, whether intentional or by sheer

negligence, isthe testimony of Infante, the Republic's witness in the proceedings before the RTC, testifying thatseveral surveys were conducted on a number of expropriated lots, which surveys showed that thesubject lot was still registered in the name of the original owners. As such, Infante recommendedin his report that legal action be taken. Yet despite aforesaid recommendation, title to subject lotremained registered in the name of the original owners, ans subsequently, its transferees. Thissilence and unexplained inaction by the Republic clearly constitute laches.The trial court correctly held that title registered under the Torrens system is notice to the wholeworld. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of itscertificate of title and the law will not oblige him to go beyond what appears on the face thereof to determine the condition of the property.An innocent purchaser for value is one who, relying on the certificate of title, bought the propertyfrom the registered owner, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before ha hasnotice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION G.R. No. 148512, 26 June 2006, Azcuna, J. (Second Division) The twenty percent (20%) discount required by law to be given to senior citizens is a tax credit, not a deduction from the gross sales of the establishment concerned. As a corollary to this, the definition of tax credit found in Section 2(1) of Revenue Regulations 2-94 is erroneous, as it refers to tax credit as the amount representing the 20% discount that shall be deducted by the said establishment from their gross sales for value added tax and other percentage tax purposes. When the law says that the cost of the discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it means that the amount, when claimed, shall be treated as a reduction from any tax liability. In the same vein, prior payment of any tax liability is not a precondition before a taxable entity can benefit from the tax credit. The credit may be availed of upon payment of the tax due, if any. Central Luzon Drug Corporation is a retailer of medicines and other pharmaceutical products. For the period January 1995 to December 1995, pursuant to the mandate of Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 7432, otherwise known as the Senior Citizens Act, it granted a twenty percent (20%) discount on the sale of medicines to qualified senior citizens amounting to P219,778.00. It then deducted the same amount from its gross income for the taxable year 1995, pursuant to Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 implementing the Senior Citizens Act, which states that the discount given to senior citizens shall be deducted by the establishment from its gross sales for value-added tax and other percentage tax purposes. For the said taxable period, Central Luzon Drug reported a net loss of P20,963.00 in its corporate income tax return, thus, it did not pay income tax for 1995. Subsequently, Central Luzon Drug filed a claim for refund in the amount of P150,193.00, claiming that according to Sec. 4(a) of the Senior Citizens Act, the amount of P219,778.00 should be applied as a tax credit. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) was not able to decide the claim on time, hence, Central Luzon Drug filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals. The latter dismissed the petition, declaring that even if the law treats the 20% discount granted to senior citizens as a tax credit, the same cannot apply when there is no tax liability or the amount of the tax credit is greater than the tax due. In the latter case, the tax credit will only be to the extent of the tax liability. Also, no refund can be granted as no tax was erroneously, illegally and actually collected. Furthermore, the law does not state that a refund can be claimed by the establishment concerned as an alternative to the tax credit.

Central Luzon Drug filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court held that the 20% discount given to senior citizens which is treated as a tax credit is considered just compensation and, as such, may be carried over to the next taxable period if there is no current tax liability. ISSUE: Whether or not the 20% discount granted by Central Luzon Drug to qualified senior citizens pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of the Senior Citizens Act may be claimed as a tax credit or as a deduction from gross sales in accordance with Sec. 2(1) of Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 HELD: The Petition is DENIED. Sec. 4(a) of the Senior Citizens Act provides: RECENT JURISPRUDENCE TAXATION LAW Sec. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to utilization of transportations services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of medicines anywhere in the country: Provided, That private establishments may claim the cost as tax credit. The above provision explicitly employed the term tax credit. Nothing in the provision suggests for it to mean a deduction from gross sales. Thus, the 20% discount required by the law to be given to senior citizens is a tax credit, not a deduction from the gross sales of the establishment concerned. As a corollary to this, the definition of tax credit found in Sect. 2(1) of Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 is erroneous as it refers to tax credit as the amount representing the 20% discount that shall be deducted by the said establishment from their gross sales for value added tax and other percentage tax purposes. When the law says that the cost of the discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it means that the amount, when claimed, shall be treated as a reduction from any tax liability. The law cannot be amended by a mere regulation. Finally, for purposes of clarity, Sec. 229 of the Tax Code does not apply to cases that fall under Sec. 4 of the Senior Citizens Act because the former provision governs exclusively all kinds of refund or credit of internal revenue taxes that were erroneously or illegally imposed and collected pursuant to the Tax Code while the latter extends the tax credit benefit to the private establishments concerned even before tax payments have been made. The tax credit that is contemplated under the Senior Citizens Act is a form of just compensation, not a remedy for taxes that were erroneously or illegally assessed and collected. In the same vein, prior payment of any tax liability is not a precondition before a taxable entity can benefit from the tax credit. The credit may be availed of upon payment of

the tax due, if any. Where there is no tax liability or where a private establishment reports a net loss for the period, the tax credit can be availed of and carried over to the next taxable year.

Agan Jr. Vs. PIATCO 402 SCRA 612 G.R. No. 155001 May 5, 2003 Facts: Some time in 1993, six business leaders, explored the possibility of investing in the new NAIA airport terminal, so they formed Asians Emerging Dragon Corp. They submitted proposals to the government for the development of NAIA Intl. Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). The NEDA approved the NAIA IPT III project. Bidders were invited, and among the proposal Peoples Air Cargo (Paircargo) was chosen. AEDC protested alleging that preference was given to Paircargo, but still the project was awarded to Paircargo. Because of that, it incorporated into, Phil. Intl. Airport Terminals Co. (PIATCO). The DOTC and PIATCO entered into a concession agreement in 1997 to franchise and operate the said terminal for 21years. In Nov. 1998 it was amended in the matters of pertaining to the definition of the obligations given to the concessionaire, development of facilities and proceeds, fees and charges, and the termination of contract. Since MIAA is charged with the maintenance and operations of NAIA terminals I and II, it has a contract with several service providers. The workers filed the petition for prohibition claiming that they would lose their job, and the service providers joined them, filed a motion for intervention. Likewise several employees of the MIAA filed a petition assailing the legality of arrangements. A group of congressmen filed similar petitions. Pres. Arroyo declared in her speech that she will not honor PIATCO contracts which the Exec. Branch's legal office concluded null and void. Issue: Whether or Not the 1997 concession agreement is void, together with its amendments for being contrary to the constitution. Held: The 1997 concession agreement is void for being contrary to public policy. The amendments have the effect of changing it into and entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon. The amendments present new terms and conditions which provide financial benefit to PIATCO which may have the altered the technical and financial parameters of other bidders had they know that such terms were available. The 1997 concession agreement, the amendments and supplements thereto are set aside for being null and void. The petitioners have local standi. They are prejudiced by the concession agreement as their livelihood is to be taken away from them. Gerochi vs. DOE

Facts: RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power IndustryReform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), which sought to impose a universalcharge on all end-users of electricity for the purpose of funding NAPOCORs projects, was enacted and took effect in 2001. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of the EPIRA, stating that the imposition of the universal charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without representation for not giving the consumers a chance to be heard and be represented. Issue: Whether or not the universal charge is a tax. Held: NO. The assailed universal charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the States police power. That public welfare is promoted may be gleaned from Sec. 2 of the EPIRA, which enumerates the policies of the State regarding electrification. Moreover, the Special Trust Fund feature of the universal charge reasonably serves and assures the attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which the universal charge is imposed (e.g. to ensure the viability of the countrys electric power industry), further boosting the position that the same is an exaction primarily in pursuit of the States police objectives If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax. The taxing power may be used as an implement of policepower. The theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and well-being of the people.

Manila International Airport Authority vs CAGR No. 155650, July 20, 2006, 495 SCRA 591Facts:Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is the operator of the Ninoy International Airportlocated at Paranaque City. The Officers of Paranaque City sent notices to MIAA due to real estate tax delinquency. MIAA then settled some of the amount. When MIAA failed to settle the entire amount, theofficers of Paranaque city t hreatened to levy and subject to auction the land and buildings of MIAA, which they did. MIAA sought for a Temporary Restraining Order from the CA but failed to do so withinthe 60 days reglementary period, so the petition was dismissed. MIAA then sought for the TRO with theSupreme Court a day before the public auction, MIAA was granted with the TRO but unfortunately theTRO was received by the Paranaque City officers 3 hours after the public auction.MIAA claims that although the charter provides that the title of the land and building are withMIAA still the ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines. MIAA also contends that it is an instrumentality of the government and as such exempted from real estate tax. That the land and buildingsof MIAA are of public dominion therefore cannot be subjected to levy and auction sale. On the other hand, the officers of Paranaque City claim that MIAA is a government owned and controlled corporationtherefore not exempted to real estate tax.Issues:Whether or not MIAA is an instrumentality of the government and not a government owned andcontrolled corporation and as such exempted from tax.Whether or not the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion and thus cannot be the subject of levy and auction sale.Ruling:Under the Local government code, government owned and controlled corporations are notexempted from real estate tax. MIAA is not a government owned and controlled corporation, for to become one MIAA should either be a stock or non stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation for its capital is not divided into shares. It is not a non stock corporation since it has no members. MIAA is aninstrumentality of the government vested with corporate powers and government functions.Under the civil code, property may either be under public dominion or private ownership. Thoseunder public dominion are owned by the State and are utilized for public use, public service and for thedevelopment of national wealth. The ports included in the public dominion pertain either to seaports or airports. When properties under public dominion cease to be for public use and service, they form part of

t h e p a t r i m o n i a l p r o p e r t y o f t h e S t a t e . The court held that the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion. Since th eairport is devoted for public use, for the domestic and international travel and transportation. Even if MIAA charge fees, this is for support of its operation and for regulation and does not change the character of the land and buildings of MIAA as part of the public dominion. As part of the public dominion the landand buildings of MIAA are outside the commerce of man. To subject them to levy and public auction iscontrary to public policy. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the airport land and buildings from public use, these properties remain to be of public dominion and are inalienable. As longas the land and buildings are for public use the ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines.