David Peter Lawrence

Aspects of Abhinavagupta's Theory of Scripture

Indian systems of thought can be widely characterized by the deeply intertwined relationship of the two phenomena that Western traditions call philosophy and religion. The Pratyabhij philosophical theology of the 10th-11th century thinker Abhinavagupta, one of the most important exponents of Kashmiri Shaivism, represents an illustrative example for the fundamental interrelation between philosophical Summary argumentation and religious revelation. Particularly relevant to this theme is his theory of the expression of supreme speech in concrete scriptural traditions. The focus of this paper will be on Abhinavagupta's discussions of scriptural tradition (gama) as means of knowledge (prama). The analysis will be concluded by some general reflections on the inter-cultural relevance of his theory of scripture. 1. Introduction 2. Scripture in its Original Metaphysical Essence and its Manifestations 3. Scriptural Traditions as Grounds of Intelligibility Content 4. The Plurality of Scriptural Traditions 5. The Hierarchy of Scriptural Traditions espaol 6. Conclusion: Scriptural Traditions, Philosophy and the Mediation of Hierarchies deutsch Notes

1. Introduction 1
The writings on monistic Trika aivism by the 10th-11th century Kashmiri thinker Abhinavagupta offer an excellent illustration of the deeply intertwined relationship of the phenomena we categorize as philosophy and religion. In earlier publications, I have examined this relationship in the Pratyabhij philosophical theology of Abhinavagupta as well as his predecessor Utpaladeva. Both attempt to make their discourse universally intelligible by rationalizing it according to the most widely accepted 1 standards for publicly assessable argument in Hinduism. These are the sixteen Nyya categories pertaining to philosophical discussion, particularly what is called the inference for the sake of others (parrthnumna). At the same time, they encompass or overcode their discourse as a gnoseologically internalized form of tantric ritual, which leads students to salvation through reenacting the monistic aiva myth. I have characterized the Pratyabhij discourse in its religio-philosophical bivalence with the designation tantric argument. 2

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akti Devi (8th century, Himachal Pradesh)

The central intellectual moment of Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's Pratyabhij system is their explanation of their cosmogonic myth of iva emanating the universe through akti as his self-recognition (ahampratyavamara). They also identify iva's self-recognition (akti) with a conception of the metaphysical essence of scripture, supreme speech (parvk), derived from the linguistic philosopher Bharthari. 3 iva emanates through fragmenting his speech or self-recognition, as discrete acts of linguistic judgment or apprehension (vimara as the essential nature of praka, awareness) which idealistically constitute all states of affairs experienced by all creatures. Further modifying and developing ideas of Bharthari regarding the linguistic nature of experience, the Pratyabhij thinkers formulate transcendental arguments to demonstrate that iva's self-recognition, through its immanent modalities, underlies and constitutes all facts of epistemology and ontology. In my earlier work, I have endeavored dialogically to reconstruct the Pratyabhij metaphysics of God's selfrecognition in its similarities with, and differences from, the Christian philosophical theology of the Word (logos). I have compared the epistemological arguments regarding vimara with the hermeneutic theory of truth as disclosure (aletheia) propounded by Martin Heidegger and elaborated in later hermeneutics, as well as transcendental arguments for interpretive realism by such philosophers as Charles Peirce, Donald Davidson and Karl-Otto Apel. It is the radically transcendental character of the aivas' philosophical inquiry which provides for its soteriological value. Through pointing out the necessity and ubiquity of iva's self-recognition, the Pratyabhij system enables the student to participate fully within it. The Pratyabhij discourse ritually reenacts the cosmogony in returning emanated diversity to God. 4 Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta elaborate the monistic aiva metaphysics of divine self-recognition and supreme speech (parvk) in a number of areas of epistemology, ontology and aesthetics. Among such elaborations that are relevant to the theme of the relation of philosophy and religion is Abhinavagupta's theory of the expression of supreme speech in more concrete scriptural traditions. This theory of scriptures is also of interest in the light of the recent upsurge of comparative research on the categories of scripture, canon and revelation. 5 This paper presents and reflects upon some of my recent research on this subject. My focus will be on Abhinavagupta's discussions of gama (scriptural tradition) 6 as a prama (means of knowledge) in his commentaries on varapratyabhij, and in his texts Tantrloka and Tantrasra. 7

2. Scripture in its Original Metaphysical Essence and its Manifestations

K.N. Dhar: Abhinavagupta the Philosopher. Glympses of Kashmiri Culture. Hindu traditions, like Near Eastern and Western monotheisms, have frequently ascribed what Miriam Levering describes as a cosmic 6 status to scripture. 8 Abhinavagupta follows orthodox-Brahmanical ideassuch as are propounded by Mms and Vykraathat scripture is without human authorship (apaurueya) and without

Article Deb Platt: The Triadic Heart of Shiva. Kaula Tantricism of Abhinavagupta in the Non-Dual Shaivism of Kashmir. Website

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beginning (andi). 9 However, he understands the cosmic status of scripture chiefly in the terms of monistic aiva myth and metaphysics. 10 Scriptural traditions for Abhinavagupta are expressions of iva's supreme speech or self-recognition. They are directly accessible as innate or a priori features of cognition. At the same time, they are manifest in their familiar cultural aspects such as oral and written canon, and the testimonies of authoritative people (ptavkya). 11 Abhinavagupta offers two basic definitions of gama, each of which comprises both innate and external-cultural aspects. First, Abhinavagupta defines scripture directly in terms of the immanent modality of iva's self-recognition in human experiencevimara, recognitive judgment or apprehension. Scripture is nothing but such judgment which is firmly believed or sure (dhya): That which is called scripture [gama] is an inner verbalization, and has the nature of very firm judgment [dhyastamavimara]. It is nothing other than an innate activity of the Lord, whose essential nature is consciousness [] Something is however it is judged [ma] to be through that [scripture]. 12 Such judgment is gama in the primary sense. An external collection of words which facilitates and generates that [judgment, is gama] in the secondary sense. 13 Such a collection of words is thereby a prama, means of knowledge. 14 Abhinavagupta's second definition of gama expresses a similar meaning of a strong belief while no longer directly adverting to the Pratyabhij theory of recognition. This definition equates gama with prasiddhi. 15 Prasiddhi literally means being well established. Focusing on its innate aspect, Rainiero Gnoli translates the term as una certezza a priori. 16 Abhinavagupta relates this aspect of prasiddhi to its metaphysical origin: Prasiddhi is a conviction [pratti], having the nature of verbalization, that arises without discrepancies. It is the essential nature of the cognizer [pramt]. When there is that [prasiddhi], the [cognizer] does not feel doubt, because [prasiddhi] arises by itself [that is, it is self-evident]. For that [prasiddhi] is the omniscient iva. 17 Another common meaning of the term prasiddhi is public knowledge. This significance is also important to Abhinavagupta. The following passage traces this external-cultural form of prasiddhi to its source: Searching for an earlier and earlier animating principle, it is evident, without doubt, that at some ancient time that [prasiddhi] belonged to a single [being] who was omniscient by Himself [that is, not requiring any extrinsic means to know things] [] He is Bhairava, the Supreme Lord, who is adorned with hundreds of prasiddhis, which cause enjoyments and liberations; and who is the essential nature of the recognitive apprehensions [vimara] which constitute those [prasiddhis]. Thus prasiddhi has divided into various aspects, and diffused as both oral lineages and written texts. As such, it engenders

the various practices of humanity. 18 In the thirty-sixth chapter of the Tantrloka, Abhinava recounts how iva as Bhairava originally bestowed scripture on akti as Bhairavi, 14 and through her to a long succession of gods, preceptors, lineages and sublineages. 19

3. Scriptural Traditions as Grounds of Intelligibility

That is called dry Abhinavagupta adduces a variety of considerations in order to reasoning which does not demonstrate that scriptural traditions are the final justificatory grasp the power of speech grounds of all cognition. These considerations may be understood as but rather is [employed] an extension of the Pratyabhij arguments about vimara, which merely according to 15 disclose iva's self-recognition and supreme speech as the reality whether things have underlying all human experience. For Abhinavagupta, truth claims common qualities or do are not made on the basis of correspondence with an objective world, not have common but rather states of affairs idealistically generated within linguistic qualities. Because that judgments. [reasoning] violates all Elsewhere, I have compared the Pratyabhij vimara arguments with gama, it is baseless. hermeneutic theories of truth as disclosure (aletheia). 20 The aivas diverge from Heidegger and the mainstream of hermeneutics in their Bharthari understanding of disclosure as generated from the subjectivity of God (Note 29) a view which aligns them more with the Christian philosophical theology of logos. 21 They likewise differ in their emphasis on a priori bases of cognition; in the West, attention to the historical 16 determinants of knowledge has largely superseded speculations about either Platonic or Kantian categories. Abhinavagupta's theory of gama per se exhibits a greater analogy with hermeneutic thought than the other vimara arguments, inasmuch as it complements metaphysical and a priori considerations with an appreciation of the role of oral and written traditions in determining foreknowledge. My current treatment of the topic seeks to augment my earlier interpretation of the vimara arguments. In the very first verse of the three chapters of the Tantrloka devoted to gama, Abhinavagupta announces its importance to human life: All practices, as inherited from the past, are based upon prasiddhi, which is explained to be gama. 22 No person learns all of his or her basic assumptions about the world through direct perception and 17 inference. Abhinavagupta argues that even those schools of Indian philosophy, such as Buddhists and materialists, which repudiate gama as a means of cognition (prama), in actual fact still rely upon it in the form of the testimonies of authoritative people (ptavkya). 23 Abhinavagupta does not wish merely to place gama on a par with the other established means of knowledge. He contends that gama is the very life (jvita) of direct perception and inference. 24 According 18 to Abhinava, perception is engendered through a diminution of the perfection (pratva) of knowledge disclosed by scripture. gama consists of the recognitive apprehension (vimara) of things in their

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21 But gama is the inner activity of the Lord, who is essentially nothing 22 else than pure consciousness It is the very life of other means of knowledge, such as direct perception. 23 Abhinavagupta (IPV 2.3.1-2) 24

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essential nature as one with the same universal, undifferentiated vimara. Direct perception is the apprehension of particular objects such as the color blue as contents of the contracted awareness which constitutes an individual subject. 25 As with the other arguments about vimara, Abhinavagupta conceives of gama as the subtle linguistic essence of perceptual experience. He adduces this conception in order to explain how ordinary language may refer to the objects of perceptual experience. Abhinava thus explains language learning in terms of gama as prasiddhi. One may learn the meanings of words through prasiddhis articulated in cultural works such as Puras and Itihsas. Or one may learn them through definitions. A definition explains the meaning of a particular word through prasiddhis regarding other words. 26 Abhinavagupta also argues for the integrality of prasiddhi to perception on the basis of subtle interpretive processes observable in the behaviors of infants, which would today normally be explained in terms of instincts. It is on the basis of prasiddhi that the infant knows that it must feed on milk. 27 Abhinavagupta again closely follows Bharthari in affirming the dependence of reasoning (tarka, nyya, anumna) upon scriptural traditions. One of the main points of both of these thinkers is the need to rely on gama in formulating reliable inductions. 28 One might roughly analogize their conception with Thomas Kuhn's theory of the paradigm, as model for research and theorization. Because Abhinava's remarks on this point are brief, I will first discuss Bharthari. Bharthari criticizes reasoning employed independently of scripture as dry (uka) reasoning: That is called dry reasoning which does not grasp the power of speech but rather is [employed] merely according to whether things have common qualities or do not have common qualities. Because that [reasoning] violates all gama, it is baseless. 29 The problem with such reasoning is that the various properties and causal relations of things change in different contexts. Sometimes water is cold and sometimes it is hot. Sometimes fire burns particular substances and sometimes it does not. 30 One relying on reasoning without gama, is like a blind man quickly rushing about on a mountain path without a guide who possesses eyes. Having comprehended a particular part of the path by touching it with his hands, he crosses over it. From confidence about that, he believes other [parts of the path] to be similar. Thus he arrives at his demise. 31 Abhinavagupta draws attention to the two types of observations which are involved in the formulation of inductionsthose of anvaya (co-presence) and vyatireka (exclusion). Take the example of the induction that wherever there is smoke there is fire: The observation of the anvaya is that fire is always present where smoke is present.

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That of the vyatireka is that smoke is absent wherever fire is absent. 32 Abhinavagupta contends that one must rely on prasiddhi to grasp the anvaya and vyatireka. Without prasiddhi, there would be no restrictions on how to associate the particulars. 33 In inductions, even those as simple as that regarding the concomitance of smoke and fire, we heavily rely on data and basic ways of organizing that data which have been received from the collective wisdom of cultural traditions. In the light of Abhinava's general explanations of prasiddhi discussed above, I think that we should also understand that he intends by the term in this context some kind of innate facility for knowing that one knows a concomitance. 34 Abhinavagupta continues to follow Bharthari in pointing to the notorious interminability of philosophical debates as evidence of the insufficiency of reasoning which does not rely on gama: [Rational argument] is strong in its own house [that is, for the one who proposes it] but, in the perspective of another argument proposed by another thinker, it is proved to be weaker. Thus even today there is no end to arguments [] which flow throughout the whole of sasra. 35 In order to illustrate the non-finality of reasoning, Abhinava summarizes a complex debate between Naiyayikas and Buddhists about causality and succession. 36 Abhinavagupta's subordination of reason along with perception to scripture should not be understood as a species of fundamentalism or irrationalism which precludes the value of philosophical discourse. 37 As observed above, the Pratyabhij philosophical theology endeavors to justify its claims following classic Nyya standards for scholastic debate such as the inference for the sake of others. It is only in Trika self-understanding that reason is overcoded by gamic soteriological categories. Within Abhinavagupta's schema of spiritual praxis, the Pratyabhij is an exercise in pure reasoning (sattarka). Sattarka gets its potency through embodying iva's pure wisdom (uddhavidy)a cosmic principle which mediates between his self-recognition or supreme speech and its fragmentation in ordinary cognition. As engendering a purification of conceptualization (vikalpasaskra) which leads the student to realize identity with iva, rigorously philosophical discourse becomes in essence identical with gama. 38

4. The Plurality of Scriptural Traditions

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Abhinavagupta's ascription of what Levering calls a cosmic status to scriptures does not preclude his having a remarkable appreciation of their polar-opposite characteristic, contingency, as well as an openness about the plurality of canon. 39 In this regard, Abhinavagupta is yet again elaborating features of Bhartrhari's theory of scripture. Bhartrhari had already endeavored to accommodate a measure of plurality within the category of gama. He explains how the Word Absolute (abdabrahman) became expressed in the numerous books and interpretive branches of the Veda, Smtis, subsidiary sciences, conflicting brahmanical philosophies, 40 and even some kind of gama by which Caalas discriminate virtue from sin. 41 From a related linguistic perspective, he explains in detail the polysemy of words, 42 and the emergence of incorrect Sanskrit as well as the corrupt languages other than Sanskrit. 43 In keeping with his legendary polymathy, Abhinavagupta articulates a much broader vision of the plurality of scriptural traditions. While basing his own theology on monistic aiva scriptures, he grants the status of gama prama to the canons of competing Hindu and even non-Hindu traditionsincluding the Veda, dualistic aiva-Siddhanta, Vaiava, stras such as Skhya, Yoga, Nyya and Vykaraa; and Buddhism and Jainism. 44 Citing the authority of the Svacchanda Tantra, he asserts that such diverse scriptural traditions have been transmitted from the five mouths of Sadivas through a group of five Brahmas. 45 Their common heritage makes them all worthy of respect: Skhya, Yoga, Pcartra and the Veda should not be reviled. For, as it has been stated in the Svacchanda Tantra, they all originated from iva. 46 As mentioned earlier, Abhinavagupta characterizes the scriptural traditions transmitted by iva with the brahmanical models of revelation as without beginning (andi) and without human authorship (apaurueya). In a fascinating discussion, Abhinava attempts to demonstrate that even the teachings of the great individuals who founded religious and philosophical schoolssuch as the Buddha and Kapila, the founder of Skhyaderive from the same eternal and authorless transmission: There is no specific person who is called the Buddha. Rather he was a person who had a firm apprehension [ddhavimara, of teachings such as] momentariness, and so on, which he obtained through the strength of his meditation [bhvna]. The guru who taught him meditation on emptiness, and so on, was the previous Buddha. Another [earlier Buddha taught meditation on the same teachings] to that one. Since in such a succession there is no specific person who propounded [the Buddhist teachings, those teachings] really consist of nothing but the recognitive apprehension [vimara] which belongs to the Supreme Lord. Kapila, who realized through meditation the twenty-four cosmic principles [tattva, one of the central teachings of Skhya], should be understood in the same way. Therefore all the gamas are without beginning [] Thus, although the Buddha

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The faith each man has, 35 Arjuna, follows his degree of lucidity; a man consists of his faith, and as his faith is, so is he. Men of lucidity sacrifice 36 to the gods; men of passion, to spirits and demons; the others, men of dark inertia, sacrifice to 37 corpses and ghosts. Bhagavad Gt (17.3-4) 38

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clearly stated his teachings, he did not create their status as a means of knowledge [pramya]. Would what he said be authoritative [pramaka] without prasiddhi? Only prasiddhi is the prama. It is due to the will of the Supreme Lord that even the Buddha, Kapila, and others have been brought into accordance with this prasiddhi. As such, they are recipients of grace and bestow it to others. 47 With such an open conception of gamas, Abhinavagupta is faced with the problem of reconciling their apparently contradictory teachings. This he attempts by adverting to cognitive perspectivalism and prescriptive situatedness. The perception of the color blue by one person does not entail its perception by another. Nor does one person's inference of fire from smoke give the same knowledge to others. Only particular people in particular contexts are eligible to attain a treasure by particular injunctions, to get to heaven by the jyotioma, and so on. 48 According to Abhinava, every scripture produces a [sure] judgment as restricted only to those who are eligible, at a particular place and time, with cooperating factors, and so on. 49 While cognitive perspectivalism and prescriptive situatedness will be readily comprehensible, Abhinavagupta's understanding of the important Hindu category of eligibility (adhikra) deserves further consideration. Abhinava recurs to his basic explanations of the nature of gama in defining eligibility as nothing other than a firm vimara, conviction (prasiddhi, nirhi, pratti), or faith (vsa, raddh): The primary defining characteristic of one who is qualified for this or that is nothing other than firm conviction. 50 That [gama] for which firm conviction arises in one's heart is his [gama]. 51 It is because a dra does not have the firm vimara of the twice-born regarding the statement enjoining the jyotioma that this statement is not a prama for him. 52 Only an gama about which a person is certain (prasiddha) is a means of knowledge for that person. An gama about which a person does not have a conviction is like the eye of one who does not have any eyes. 53 According to Abhinavagupta, the teachings of the diverse scriptural traditions, as facets of one larger tradition, diverge only by enabling their faithful to attain a variety of worldly and spiritual objectives: Only one gama has been revealed by the omniscient Lord, which pertains to the paths of both action and inaction. 54 This gama, which comes from ambhu, is the only means for [the attainment of] diverse fruits, such as duty, wealth, pleasure and liberations, which are distinguished as perfect [pra] and imperfect [apra]. 55 Because there is a diversity of situations, it produces a variety of fruits. Although it contains instructions regarding diverse means [to achieve the various fruits], it cannot contain any contradictions. 56 iva actually destines different people to achieve different kinds of liberation: A particular person is created by the Lord such that he recognitively

apprehends [vimaran] himself in union with that apprehension [vimara] which is understood to be engendered by this or that God or siddha. Another [person is created who apprehends himself in union with] another [apprehension of some other God or siddha]. 57 Among the texts which Abhinava cites to support this view is the famous verse, Bhagavad Gt 17.3: The faith each man has, Arjuna, 42 follows his degree of lucidity; a man consists of his faith, and as his faith is, so is he. 58 Abhinavagupta contends that the plethora of gamas which he mentions all have validity. Elsewhere, I have analyzed Abhinava's criteria for the evaluation of truth claims. Within this system, there is no question of correspondence with an objective reality. A truth claim is a disclosure or recognition (pratyavamara, vimara, bhsa, etc.) of some state of affairs. Each claim must be tested as to noncontradiction or coherence (abdha) in the realization of its anticipated practical value (arthakriy). 59 According to 43 Abhinavagupta, the followers of the diverse gamas do achieve their anticipated results. One person is cured of poison by the Vedic poison-removal mantra: This poison will not kill me. I am Garuda. 60 Another gets his treasure by a particular ritual. Another gets to heaven by the jyotioma. A compassionate one becomes a Buddha, and one practicing ascesis becomes a Jaina arhant. 61 Because the followers of the respective scriptural traditions each attain their wishes, there is a broad consistency of meaning (ekavkyat) among them. 62

5. The Hierarchy of Scriptural Traditions

Although Abhinavagupta grants validity to disparate scriptural traditions, he is not a relativist. To use Levering's terms again, the openness in Abhinavagupta's theory regarding scriptural canon is complemented by a boundedness. 63 To appreciate this One cognizes that which is boundedness, it is necessary to understand the philosopher's to be abandoned and that 44 conception of ignorance. For Abhinava, ignorance is not a lack of which is to be pursued, that knowledge but rather imperfect knowledge (aprakhyti). 64 The is, his essential nature. He boundedness of gamas is a matter of their hierarchical ranking. becomes one with his own Scriptural traditions are graded according to their approximation to Self, which has the essential the metacoherent perfection (prat) of iva's self-recognition nature of iva, and is the disclosed in the gamas of monistic aivism. supreme thing to be pursued; Abhinavagupta contends that the Trika or Kula comprises the and becomes liberated while essence of all other scriptures, and that the others are arranged living. below it like the higher and lower parts of the body. 65 While inferior traditions realize aspects of the reality known by the Abhinavagupta 45 superior ones, they neglect others. 66 The monistic aiva (IPV 3.2) experience of liberation is perfect (pra). This recognition of oneself as the Lord includes all of the fruits of lower salvations but not vice versa. 67 Abhinavagupta compares the followers of other traditions to those who disparage the enjoyment of a king in favor

of lesser enjoyments. 68 In various places Abhinava actually maps the realizations attained by other systems according to the principles found at different levels of the monistic aiva cosmology. For example, the Buddhists realize the buddhi tattva and the Pcartrikas realize prakti. 69 Abhinavagupta's tolerance seems to reach its limit with the gamas of the mlecchas, barbarians, mainly foreigners. He 46 acknowledges that the mlecchas have scriptures which are pramas for them. However, because of contamination by what is non-Aryan, these are only pseudo-scriptures (gambhsa). 70 Although it is not possible to consider this topic at length, I note that Abhinavagupta discusses rites of conversion from lower scriptural traditions to that of the aivas. 71 He conceives this conversion as a process of purification (saskra). Abhinava explains that just as the Veda has its rites of purification by which practitioners attain successively higher levels, so the aivas require 47 rites of purification after one has converted from another tradition. 72 However, he describes this purification as the subversion of that of the Veda. Just as the Veda may cure one of poison by the conviction of being Garudaso the monistic aiva scriptures purify one from the poisonous karman of the Veda by the conviction of being Bhairava. 73

6. Conclusion: Scriptural Traditions, Philosophy and the Mediation of Hierarchies

this particular In this essay I have emphasized aspects of Abhinavagupta's theory of kind of the strongest gama which have affinities with some of the broad trends of Western determinate thought, philosophy since Kant, particularly hermeneutic thought. Eschewing any gama, which is so notion of truth as correspondence, Abhinava conceives scriptural traditions called because it as the most basic recognitions, judgments, or convictions which give makes the object meaning to experience and provide assumptions for reasoning. Such 48 known in every way convictions may be either a priori or culturally transmitted. Particularly remarkable is Abhinavagupta's appreciation of the plurality of scriptural traditionswhich succeed without contradiction in achieving their Abhinavagupta respective practical values. All of these conceptions give us a perspective (IPV 2.3.1-2) on expressions of philosophical discourse, such as the Pratyabhij, as enterprises deeply contextualized within divergent faiths. 49 Abhinavagupta seems decidedly non-contemporary in his postulation of a metaphysical origin (i.e. God) for all scriptural traditions; and in his hierarchical arrangement of the truths embodied in these traditions. Here again aiva thought finds a closer analogue in the classic Christian philosophical theology of the logos. The analogy is evinced in Justin the Martyr's and other early apologists' theory of the logos spermatikos. This principle was conceived as inspiring partial knowledge among pagans who have not accepted the incarnation of the logos as Jesus. Such a metaphysical strategy underlies the later morphological hierarchies of religious symbols of much of formative history of religions, for example,

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While dialogue itself is bound by 54 traditions, there may nevertheless be a cognitive advance towards the disclosure of more adequate ones. 55

of thinkers such as Rudolf Otto, Gerardus van der Leeuw, and Mircea Eliade. Today such hierarchization is routinely condemned in the academy as a blatant legitimation of cultural, political and/or economic hegemony. Though it is not possible here to engage in an elaborate argument about the relation of power and culture, I will say that I do believe that the legitimation of hegemony, though extremely common, is nevertheless a contingent effect of the kind of epistemological hierarchization being considered here. There is more at issue than any possibility that Abhinavagupta's appraisals of various scriptures reflect a tantric transformation of caste ranking. Pace Michel Foucault, I believe that the very observation of the effect of power on discourse demonstrates that we may strive to base our claims on something other than power. What I wish to affirm in the present context is that some kind of hierarchization of alternative viewpoints is as unavoidableor transcendentalas the hermeneutic circle. In the effort to understand others, however much one's ideas change, one cannot avoid beginning and ending in one's own views. A historicist or relativist hierarchically subordinates non-historicist or non-relativist viewpoints. An antihierarchicist implicitly or explicitly subordinates hierarchicism. His or her distinctive understanding likewise subordinates the views of other antihierarchicists, and even his or her own thought in ongoing reinterpretations. While Abhinavagupta subordinates other scriptural traditions to the aiva, he is aware that those pursuing other goals will do the same thing in return: It is compulsory that texts which teach only aspects of oneself and [consequently] yield limited fruits be taken up by that one [who desires such fruits]. 74 Inasmuch as one has not attained identity with iva, he does not doubt such a prasiddhi as accords with his own nature [as a limited being]. He will be doubtful about other [prasiddhis] and regard [his own] as much better. 75 Abhinavagupta's description of conversion to the Trika as the opposite of the Vedic saskra likewise evinces his appreciation of widely divergent understandings of the process of purification. I believe that such insights point toward a way in which we may think with Abhinavagupta against Abhinavagupta and beyond Abhinavagupta. 76 For the assessment of divergent truth claims, Abhinava propounds nonobjectivist criteria of coherence in the attainment of practical values. It is in the Pratyabhij philosophical theology that he applies such criteria in a rigorous and systematic manner, in debate with other schools of South Asian philosophy, in order to demonstrate the greater perfection (prat) of his tradition's spiritual realization. Abhinavagupta's scholastic apologetics is much more ambitiously metaphysical than the conceptions of dialogue and conversation of Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer or Paul Ricoeur. It is this polemics which ostensibly justifies Abhinava's hierarchical morphology of imperfect (aprat) rival gamas. Regardless of whether readers agree with Abhinavagupta, what is

important is that the Pratyabhij is formulated in such a mannerin a philosophical discoursethat it is open to further questioning and dispute. Those following other prasiddhis, whether religious or secular, liberalopen or conservative-bounded, will inevitably view their judgments as the most adequate. I believe that tolerant yet critical philosophical dialogue, directly endeavoring to mediate claims in all of their metaphysical, epistemological and ethical ramifications, provides an alternative to 56 arbitrary symbolic morphologies and unreflexive historicist reductionism. 77 While dialogue itself is bound by traditions, there may nevertheless be a cognitive advance towards the disclosure of more adequate ones. I also believe that it is reasonable to follow Abhinavagupta in viewing our aspiration for such an advance as an asymptotic pursuit of greater perfection (prat), in the sense of coherence in practice. polylog. Forum for Intercultural Philosophy 4 (2003). Online: http://them.polylog.org/4/fld-en.htm ISSN 1616-2943 2003 Author & polylog e.V.

Notes
1 I am grateful to Pt. Hemendra Nath Chakravarty of Varanasi and Prof. Srinarayan Mishra of Banaras Hindu University for their help in untangling some of the difficulties in Abhinavagupta's varapratyabhijvivtivimarin during my research trip to Varanasi in June 2000. I also wish to acknowledge the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology for a Direct Allocation Grant which financed that trip. 2 See (1996) "Tantric Argument: The Transfiguration of Philosophical Discourse in the Pratyabhij System of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta". In: Philosophy East and West 46, 165204, and the more elaborate treatment in (1999) Rediscovering God with Transcendental Argument: A Contemporary Interpretation of Monistic Kashmiri aiva Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press (SUNY Series Toward a Comparative Philosophy of Religions), particularly 35-65 and 85-106. 3 Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's theories here build upon an earlier identification of akti with Supreme Speech by Utpaladeva's teacher Somananda. See Lawrence 1999, 88-89 and 210, nn. 15-16. The aivas understand parvk as the highest level of language, above Bharthari's payant, and homologous to one of the planes in their Trika cosmology. Bharthari may not have intended to indicate a para level, and usually refers to the highest level of speech as abdabrahman, the World Absolute. See Gaurinth astr (1959): The Philosophy of Word and Meaning: Some Indian Approaches with Special Reference to the Philosophy of Bharthari. Calcutta: Sanskrit College (Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series 5). 4 The Pratyabhij system articulates the very narrative syntax of monistic aiva myth and ritual. See Lawrence 1999, 133-154. 5 Miriam Levering (ed.) (1989): Rethinking Scripture: Essays from a Comparative Perspective. Albany: State University of New York Press. Levering's volume includes the seminal articles of

Wilfred Cantwell Smith: "The Study of Religion and the Study of the Bible", 18-28, and "Scripture as Form and Concept: Their Emergence for the Western World", 29-57, and Thomas B. Coburn: "'Scripture' in India: Towards a Typology of the Word in Hindu Life", 102-128. Other important studies include Jonathan Z. Smith (1982): "Sacred Persistence: Toward a Redescription of Canon". In: Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 36-52; Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty (ed.) (1979): The Critical Study of Sacred Texts. Berkeley: Graduate Theological Union; Jeffrey R. Timm (ed.) (1992): Texts in Context: Traditional Hermeneutics in South Asia. Albany: State University of New York Press; Laurie L. Patton (ed.) (1994): Authority, Anxiety, and Canon: Essays in Vedic Interpretation. Albany: State University of New York Press (SUNY Series in Hindu Studies); and David Carpenter (1995): Revelation, History, and the Dialogue of Religions: A Study of Bharthari and Bonaventure. Maryknoll New York: Orbis Books. 6 The term gama exhibits great semantic fluidity. It may signify particular works of aiva and akta scripture, any other collection of written or oral scripture, including the Veda, and even a broad conception of tradition. I often use the gloss scriptural tradition to capture the meanings of tradition of scripture and tradition as scripture. Miriam Levering, in her introduction to Rethinking Scripture (1989, 11-13), has formulated six polarities observable in the diversity of the scriptures of the world's religions: Form/Fluidity, Orality/Writtenness, Boundedness/Openness, Vectoring/Being Vectored, Cosmic Status/Contingency, and Normativity/Selection and Repetition. I think that each of these polarities are observable in the meanings of the word gama in the Hindu traditions. This is not to say that every individual intends all these polarities in using the term. Nevertheless, Abhinavagupta's understanding is remarkably broad. Of course, the specificities and scope of gama for Abhinavagupta are the subject of this paper. Other relevant categories for scripture in Hinduism include Veda, ruti, Smti, Pura and Tantra. See Thomas B. Coburn (1989): "'Scripture' in India: Towards a Tyopology of the Word in Hindu Life". In: Levering 1989, 102-128, and the other works cited above. 7 I will focus particularly on selections of varapratyabhijvimarin of Abhinavagupta. Doctrine of Divine Recognition: Sanskrit text with Bhaskari. (2 vols.) Ed. by K.A. Subramania Iyer / K.C. Pandey. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986 (Reprint), 2.3.1-2, 2:68-91; The varapratyabhijvivtivimarin by Abhinavagupta. (3 vols.) Ed. by Madhusudan Kaul Shastri. Delhi: Akay Book Corporation, 1987 (Reprint) (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies), 2.3.1-2, 3:71-107; The Tantrloka of Abhinavagupta with the Commentary of Jayaratha. (8 vols.) Ed. by Madhusudan Kaul Shastri / Mukunda Ram Shastri. (Republication, ed. by R.C. Dwivedi / Navjivan Rastogi). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987 (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies), 3537, 8:3645-3718; and The Tantrasra of Abhinavagupta. Ed. by Mukunda Ram Shastri. (Delhi: Bani Prakashan, 1982 (Reprint) (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies 17), 21, 193-197. The varapratyabhijvimarin, a commentary on Utpaladeva's varapratyabhijkrik, will henceforth be referred to as IPV. The varapratyabhijvivtivimarin, a commentary on Utpaladeva's lost varapratyabhijvivti, will be referred to as IPVV. The Tantrloka will be referred to as TA, and Jayaratha's commentary on this work, Tantrlokaviveka, will be abbreviated as TAV. The Tantrasra will be abbreviated as TS. 8 Levering 1989, 13. 9 IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:92, 97-99. 10

He also of course views the Trika or Kula gamas rather than the Veda as the prototypical expressions of scripture. Abhinavagupta's understanding of the plurality of scriptural traditions will be treated later in the paper. 11 IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:102. 12 IPV, 2.3.1-2, 2:84-85. 13 IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:84. 14 IPV, 2.3.1-2, 2:86. 15 TA, 35.1-2, 8:3645-3646. 16 Abhinavagupta: Luce delle Sacre Scritture (Tantrloka). Trad. by Raniero Gnoli. Torino: Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 1980, 35.1-2, 762. 17 TA, 35.19-20, 8:3657. 18 TA, 35.11-12, 14-15, 8:3652-3654. 19 See TA, 36, 8:3671-3680. At TA, 36.1, 8:3671, Abhinava states that he gives this account according to sources such as the Siddhayogevarmata and his gurupresumably ambuntha. 20 See the discussion of the vimara arguments in Lawrence 1999, 115-122. There I also discuss the backgrounds to these arguments in Bharthari. A useful recent study of the conception of truth as disclosure is James J. DiCenso (1990): Hermeneutics and the Disclosure of Truth: A Study in the Work of Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. Also notable are David Tracy (1975): The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism. New York: Crossroad Publishing, and (1989): "The Uneasy Alliance Reconceived: Catholic Theological Method, Modernity, and Post-Modernity". In: Theological Studies 50, 548570. Tracy interprets disclosure as manifestation, and the response to it as faith, which he equates with recognition. Somewhat analogous to Abhinavagupta's understanding of scripture in its broad cultural aspects is Tracy's conception of the classic, which may take religious and nonreligious, elite and popular forms, and even the form of exemplary persons. Cf. David Carpenter 1995, 194-199, for an alternative discussion of Bharthari and Bonaventure vis-a-vis the disclosure theory. 21 While Heidegger was aware of backgrounds to his theory in the Christian theology of logos (along with Presocratic thought and Platonism), he repudiated the metaphysical postulation, and was indeed notoriously ambivalent about the contingency versus noncontingency of disclosed being. The heirs to Heidegger within philosophical theology, from Karl Rahner through Paul Tillich, John Macquarrie and David Tracy have in sophisticated ways recovered the logos. 22 TA, 35.1-2, 8:3645-3646. 23 IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:84. 24 IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:84; IPV, 2.3.1-2, 2:84-85.

25 IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:92. This discussion is related to the Pratyabhij subversion of the Buddhist logic theory of the relation of the cognitions of universals (smnya) and particulars (svalakaa). The Buddhists hold that uninterpreted perceptions of particulars come first, and that universals are synthesised later through verbal interpretation. Developing some ideas from Vykaraa, the aivas maintain that our original perceptions are intrinsically verbal cognitions of universals, and that particulars are synthesised later as combinations of universals. The former more closely reflect the higher level of vimara. See Lawrence 1999, 119-120. Also relevant are the aivas' discussions of relation (sambandha) as a characterisation of the primitive ontological objects of recognition, ibid., 127-138. Cf. Ptajalayogadaranam. Ed. by Srinarayan Mishra. Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1981, 1.7, 28-35, and 1.49, 127-129. According to Yoga, perception knows objects as particulars (viea) whereas gama and inference know them as universals (smnya). 26 IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:104. Cf. the discussion of child language learning according to the vimara arguments in Lawrence 1999, 118. 27 TA, 35.3-11, 8:3647-3652. Abhinava makes a similar argument about an adult's attraction towards food at TA, 35.18-19, 8:3656. The Buddhist logician Dharmottara also talks about the child's recognition of the mother's breast on the basis of latent mnemonic impressions in Nyyabindu of Acharya Dharmakrti: With the Commentaries by Arya Vinitadeva and Dharmottara, and Dharmottara-Tika-Tippani. Ed. by Dwarika Das Shastri. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1985, 1.5, 27. Bharthari went so far as describing the instinctive behaviors of animals as due to the semantic intuition (pratibh) of scriptural tradition (gama). See Vkyapadya of Bharthari. Ka 2. Ed. by K.A. Subramania Iyer. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983, 2:146-151, 66-67. The Vkyapadya will henceforth be abbreviated as VP. Bharthari's own Vtti on the text will be referred to as VPV. 28 Induction is integral to Sanskritic understandings of the syllogism. Most such syllogisms involve a deductive application of a predicate (sdhya) to a subject (paka) on the basis of a reason (hetu). The standard example is the inference that there is fire on the hill for the reason that there is smoke there. The reason identifies a quality in the subjectthat is, smokewhich is known inductively to be invariably concomitant with the predicate. The induction is that wherever there is smoke there is fire. 29 Vkyapadya of Bharthari. Ka 1. Ed. by K.A. Subramania Iyer. Pune: Deccan College, 1966, 1.129, 209. 30 Cf. VP and VPV, 1.32, 88-90. At VPV 1.129, 209, Bharthari illustrates the futility of dry reasoning with a quotation from Patajali's Mahbhya. This describes a confusion about the fact that wine employed in the sacrifice will perform the unusual role of assisting in the attainment of heaven. 31 VPV, 1.42, 98-99. 32 Note that the induction being considered does not require that it be established that fire is absent where smoke is absent. In fact, in classic Indian philosophies it was generally believed that fire does occur without smoke, for example in a red hot iron ball. 33

TA und TAV, 35.2-3, 8:3646-3647. I am grateful to Dr. Navjivan Rastogi, Professor Emeritus, Lucknow University, for discussing these verses with me on the telephone. 34 This accords with the broader Pratyabhij philosophy. Within the Pratyabhij there are different ways for explaining how iva generates concomitances between the manifestations of things within his self-recognition. Such concomitances may take the form of either a relation between a cause and effect or the relation between something and its intrinsic characteristics. As such they respectively ground syllogisms invoking the reasons of origination (utpattihetu) and essential nature (svabhvahetu). According to one framework, iva generates both types of concomitance through his integral Niyati, Fixed Regularity akti. For example, see IPV, 2.3.12, 2:84, and IPV, 2.3.8, 2:108. The aivas' broader ontological framework explains the Lord's self-recognitive emanation of things and their relations as a mythico-ritual action (kriy). According to the Pratyabhij syntactic theory, the Lord's agency (kartt) contains within itself the entire action of creation as well as its effects (krya). (See Lawrence 1999, 133-154). One of the themes of the various texts of varapratyabhij 2.4 is the reduction of the svabhva hetu to the utpatti hetu and the final identification of the latter with iva's kartt. Although this takes us beyond the immediate discussion of scripture as a means of knowledge, it is nevertheless clear that gama as innate vimara/prasiddhi is ultimately a modality of the supreme speech, selfrecognition or agency which generates all concomitances. 35 IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:95. Abhinavagupta here quotes for support VP, 1.34, 90. 36 IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:95. Similarly, at VPV, 1.34, 90-92, Bharthari summarises debates about the Nyya theory that a substance is different from its qualities. On Bharthari's subordination of reasoning to tradition, see Carpenter 1995, 52-57. Note that similar arguments regarding the interminability of philosophical arguments are made by kara in The Brahmasutra kara Bhasya: With the Commentaries Bhamati, Kalpataru and Parimala. 2 vols. Ed. by K.L. Joshi. Delhi: Parimal Publications, 1987, 2.1.11, 2:448-449. On kara's indebtedness to Bharthari on this point, see Wilhelm Halbfass (1983): "Human Reason and Vedic Revelation in the Philosophy of kara". In: Studies in Kumrila and kara. Reinbek: Verlag fr Orientalistische Fachpublikationen, 41-42. 37 Nor should Bharthari's arguments for the primacy of scripture be understood in such a way. 38 See the discussion of the Pratyabhij methodology within the framework of Abhinavagupta's akta upya in Lawrence 1999, 57-65. 39 Levering 1989, 12-13. In this section and the following, I further develop aspects of the discussion of scripture in "The Plurality and Contingency of Knowledge, and its Rectification according to the Pratyabhij". In: Navjivan Rastogi / Meera Rastogi (eds.): Perspectives on Abhinavagupta. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass (forthcoming). 40 VP and VPV, 1.5-10, 22-39. 41 VP, 1.40, 97. This verse is cited by Abhinavagupta at IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:102. 42 VP, 2.134-139, 63-64. 43 VP and VPV, 1.139-147, 228-235. On the diversification of traditions of Vykaraa itself, see VP

and VPV, 1.135, 221-223. 44 The chief theme of TA, 35, 8:3645-3670, is in fact the meeting or association (melana) of the different gamas. Abhinava concludes this chapter by stating that he has explained the topic as it was taught to him by his teacher ambhuntha. See TA, 35.44, 8:3670. 45 TA, 35.26-27, 8:3660. 46 TA, 35.36, 8:3665. 47 IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:97-98. This discussion may also be understood more generally as situating ptavkya within the beginningless transmission of prasiddhi. 48 IPV, 2.3.1-2, 2:86-87, and IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:84-85. 49 IPV, 2.3.1-2, 2:88-89. 50 IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:85. 51 IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:96. 52 IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:85. 53 IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:96. 54 Jayaratha in his commentary on this verse (TAV, 35.23, 8:3659) interprets pravtta (action) as referring to karman and nivtta (inaction) as referring to jna (knowledge). 55 The perfection and imperfection of scriptural traditions and their fruits will be discussed below. 56 TA, 35.23-25, 3659-3660. 57 IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:85. 58 The Bhagavad Gt: Krishna's Council in Time of War. Trans. by Barbara Stoller Miller. New York: Bantam Books, 1986, 17.3, 137. Abhinava cites this verse at IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:85. The immediately following verse from the Bhagavad Gt is also interesting: Men of lucidity sacrifice to the gods; men of passion, to spirits and demons; the others, men of dark inertia, sacrifice to corpses and ghosts. (Ibid., 17.4, 137.) This discussion reminds me of Paul Tillich's conception of God as one's ultimate concern, as well as Schubert Ogden's conception of God as that on which one bases one's confidence in the final worth of his or her existence. 59 I give this subject a brief treatment in Lawrence 1999, 122-123; and a more complete and precise one in "The Plurality and Contingency of Knowledge, and its Rectification according to the Pratyabhij". In: Rastogi / Rastogi (forthcoming). 60 IPV, 2.3.1-2, 2:85-86. Bharthari also uses the example of the removal of poison as an illustration of the power of the words of gamas. See VP and VPV, 1.130, 210-211. 61

IPV, 2.3.1-2, 2:84-86. 62 IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:98. Ekavkyat is a term from Vedic exegesis for the principle of the consistency or uniformity of meaning in the Vedic corpus. . 63 Levering 1989, 12. Cf. the study of Vallabha's combination of fundamentalism with contextualism in Jeffrey R. Timm: "Scriptural Realism in Pure Nondualistic Vednta". In: Timm 1992, 127-146. 64 See Navjivan Rastogi (1986): "Theory of Error According to Abhinavagupta". In: Journal of Indian Philosophy 14, 1-33, and my "The Plurality and Contingency of Knowledge, and its Rectification according to the Pratyabhij". In: Rastogi / Rastogi (forthcoming). 65 TA, 35.30-31, 8:3663. 66 TA, 37.9, 8:3684. 67 IPVV, 2.3.12, 3:101. 68 TA, 4.18-19, 3:636-637; 4.22-24, 3:641-642. 69 IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:98. 70 IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:96. 71 This involves the removal of the emblems of other traditions (ligoddhra). TA, 22, 6:2970-2987. Also see IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:97, 101. 72 TA, 35.28-29, 8:3662. 73 TA, 37.10-14, 8:3685-3686. The classic study of how the monistic aivas' tantric siddhis subvert orthodox conceptions of purity is Alexis Sanderson (1985): "Purity and Power Among the Brahmans of Kashmir". In: Michael Carrithers / Steven Collins / Steven Lukes (eds.): The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 190-216. Elsewhere, Abhinavagupta does speak with some respect for the Veda. 74 TA, 37.3, 8:3682. 75 TA, 35.21-22, 8:3658. 76 I here reword Karl-Otto Apel's pithy rhetoric describing his reformulation of Wittgenstein's ideas about private language games, in order to postulate a transcendental language game which permits the understanding of all other language games. Apel describes the significance of his argument as to think with Wittgenstein against Wittgenstein and beyond Wittgenstein. See Karl-Otto Apel (1994): "The Transcendental Conception of Language-Communication and the Idea of First Philosophy". In: Karl-Otto Apel: Selected Essays. Vol. I: Towards a Transcendental Semiotics. Ed. by Eduardo Mendieta. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 102. 77 Cf. my earlier discussion of the methodology of comparative philosophy in Lawrence 1999, 1-16.

Author
David Peter Lawrence is Visiting Associate Professor of Religion at the University of Manitoba. He received his BA from George Washington University, and his MA and PhD from the University of Chicago (1992). He is most broadly concerned with developing the discipline of comparative philosophy as a mode of inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue. He specializes in Sanskrit, and Hindu and Buddhist philosophy. His research interests include comparative philosophy and philosophy of religion, problems of cross-cultural interpretation and relativism, monistic Kashmiri Shaivism, Indian linguistic theory and Buddhist logic.