October 9, 2003

For: Bill Johnstone and John Raidt

Hi,

You may have already read the report of the Pan Am 103 Presidential
Commission, which in my opinion was excellent. In the event you have not,
I've attached a copy of Chapter 8 entitled "National Will". I believe it's
relevant to some of the points I was trying to make during our meeting.

Regards,

Pat McDonnell
Chapter 8
National Will
The free world has been lurching from ter-
rorist attack to terrorist attack, attempting to
agree on how to respond to each event. This
approach will not work.
Several facts about terrorism have been dra-
matically made clear:
—Terrorism is a deadly weapon of the
weak and the cowardly. Terrorism lever-
ages violence against innocent victims. As
Lenin put it: "The purpose of terrorism is
to terrorize."
—Terrorism is cheap, especially in terms
of the political results it may achieve. One
act of terrorism can cause changes in the
policies of major nations.
—Unchecked, terrorism creates a shift in
the balance of power toward those nations
that sanction terrorism and use it as an in-
strument of foreign policy.
—Historically, terrorism consisted of isolat-
ed acts of individuals or small groups of fa-
natics. Over recent decades, however, ter-
rorism increasingly is state-sponsored.
—Terrorism is a form of surrogate warfare.
Conventional warfare is too difficult, too
costly and, indeed, impossible for some na-
tions to conduct. Terrorism offers an alter-
native.
—Acts of state-sponsored terrorism against
a nation's citizens are acts of aggression
against that nation. In today's world, the
principal targets are the values and inter-
ests of democratic nations.
A consensus must be reached among law-
abiding nations that terrorism is an act of ag-
gression which can and must be deterred.
Those outlaw nations—properly labelled "the
league of terror" for harboring and sponsoring
terrorism—should be held accountable for their
"crime."
The Commission believes strongly that the
time is now for the United States to take a
more active leadership role in the fight against
international terrorism. The American public
must be prepared to exercise its national will
and support U.S. Government action to in-
crease dramatically the cost to terrorists and
their patrons. Elected leaders, in turn, must be
prepared to act on this national will as a foun-
dation for taking more aggressive action
against both terrorists and their state sponsors.
Once America clearly adopts this consistent,
aggressive policy, terrorist groups should
quickly get the message that terrorist, acts will
not be condoned. They must understand that if
they pursue terrorist actions against the Unfted
States, this country will act to protect its inter-
est to the fullest extent allowed by domestic
and international law.
Air travelers are particularly vulnerable to
terrorist violence. It is estimated that over one
billion passengers used commercial airlines to
travel throughout the world in 1989. Yet a
handful of terrorist groups, willing to commit
their cowardly and despicable crimes, have the
capacity to plunge the world's passengers into
a hostage-like grip of fear.
Significantly, the wave of hijackings of the
1960s and 1970s stopped when nations refused
to give refuge to hijackers. In the 1980s, terror-
ists turned to bombs to attack passenger air-
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 terms of higher fares and time spent in check-J
in procedures.
In-Flight Explosive Sabotage Even if aviation security improves dramatical-
Incidents ly, the terrorist will simply turn to other target
areas where people congregate. Securing gov-
Number Average ernment targets, like embassies, has had the
of Persons Number
Period Incidents Killed Killed ironic effect of directing terrorist attacks to
more vulnerable and more civilian targets. With
1949-1958 8 97 12 an infinite number of civilian targets, it will
never be possible to defend against all terrorist
1959-1968 11 254 23 attacks. Perhaps most importantly, no state has
taken a retaliatory action in response to an air-
1969-1978 18 624 34 craft bombing.
While the world aviation system again moves
1979-1988 12 849 70 to make this terrorist tactic more difficult,
through better detection equipment, tighter
Source: . screening, improved training practices and
Criminal Acts Against Civil A viation — 1988 better access controls, we must squarely face
the reality that even the combination of all of
these improvements cannot guarantee civil
aviation security.
lines, resulting in 1,030 deaths and 112 injuries
in the last five years alone. DEATHS AND INJURIES
The materials necessary to make bombs from Due to Explosives Onboard Aircraft
plastic explosives like semtex are readily avail- 1977-1989
able to terrorists. Czechoslovakian President 350
Vaclav Havel said recently that his country, Year
1977
Deaths
c
Injuries

under the previous regime, exported to Libya 300 1978

1979
a
D

1000 tons of semtex, an amount Havel said is 250

•983
•561
3
2
i
sufficient for the world terrorist community to 1982
1383
1984
i
;;?
0 2
make bombs for 150 years. 200 1965
!9B6
3.10
23 11

Every airport, every departure, every passen- 1986 287

ger and every suitcase, mail bag or cargo con- 150 1989 278

tainer, presents a possible opportunity for a 100

terrorist to introduce small but deadly amounts
of explosives that are effectively invisible to X-
ray and other detection equipment currently in
use at airports.
The security of U.S. civil aviation has been
increased. The Commission believes this secu-
rity will continue to improve, especially if the
recommendations of this Commission are car-
ried out. In reality, however, there will never
be 100 per cent security against every terrorist
technique.
The more security measures are imposed, the
more fundamental freedoms are restricted.
Searching bags and screening passengers con-
stitute intrusions upon privacy. Flighf delays or
cancellations for security reasons limit the free-
dom of travel. Moreover, the cost of security
procedures to the public is incalculable, both in
114
50
I L
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Year
• Incidents where the explosion aboard the
aircraft occurred during a hijacking are not Deaths Injuries
reflected in these summaries
Source: Federal Aviation Administration
There is, however, an alternative: addressing
the problem of international terrorism at its
source.
The current strategic policy of the United
States on counterterrorism consists of four ele-
ments:
First, make no concessions of any
kind to terrorists. Do not pay ransom,
 release convicted terrorists, or change
policies to accommodate terrorist de-
mands.
Second, make state sponsors of ter-
rorism pay a price for their actions.
This may entail the use of military
force as was used in 1986 in the
bombing raids of Libya. It might also
include sanctions of a political, eco-
nomic or diplomatic nature.
Third, work with friends and allies
to identify, track and apprehend, pros-
ecute and punish terrorists. This pro-
gram is designed to bring terrorists to
justice, to disrupt their operations, and
to destroy their networks.
Fourth, provide training in antiter-
rorism techniques to law enforcement
officials around the world.
The Commission recommends strongly that a
policy of "zero tolerance" towards terrorist at-
tacks be adopted through a heightened empha-
sis on the second element of U.S. counterter-
rorism policy—to make state sponsors of ter-
rorism pay a price for their actions.
Pursuing terrorists and responding swiftly
and proportionately to their acts against hu-
manity must become U.S. policy in deed as well
as in word. What is required is effective action,
not simply strong rhetoric.
To date, the United States has too often
treated terrorism only as a law enforcement
problem. The Commission recognizes that
taking a law enforcement approach to terrorist
attacks has many advantages, including: the
lawful gathering of evidence; the confrontation
of the accusers in an open court of law with all
the evidence made public; the assurance of a
defense attorney; and the opportunity to
present evidence in support of the defense. If
successful, a law enforcement approach also re-
sults in the punishment of those individuals
who were directly responsible for the acts per-
petrated.
However, a law enforcement approach is, by
its very nature, reactive. It is also an extremely
time-consuming process requiring proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It may be hin-
dered by an inability to gather evidence or by
difficulties in arresting or extraditing the ac-
cused. Most importantly, a law enforcement ap-
proach will rarely result in the prosecution of
more than a few individual members of any ter-
rorist group, and it is neither designed for, nor
can it be effectively used against the state spon-
sors of terrorism.
While a law enforcement approach must
always be a part of our response to terrorism,
this Commission finds unacceptable the idea of
holding ourselves in all cases to a criminal
standard of proof before we act. The United
States must be ready to view some terrorist at-
tacks as a matter of national security, and
indeed, in some cases should be prepared to
treat the act for what it is, as an act of aggres-
sion against the United States. It may well be
that the perpetrators of a terrorist act may be
identified quickly through intelligence oper-
ations and techniques.
A swift response could be directed against
the terrorist group responsible and/or its state
sponsor. In this context, the Commission rec-
ommends planning, training and equipping for
direct preemptive or retaliatory military actions
against known terrorist hideouts in countries
that sanction them.
Where such direct strikes are unwise or inap-
propriate, the Commission recommends use of
middle-level options, including covert oper-
ations to preempt, disrupt or respond to ter-
rorist actions. The Commission recognizes the
many reasons, historical and otherwise, why the
United States Government must proceed with
caution in the use of covert operations. Cer-
tainly such tactics must not be used to circum-
vent basic democratic values. Terrorists, how-
ever, have relied upon the adherence by others
to these values to permit them to attack thou-
sands of innocent victims with impunity.
Major steps have been taken in the last few
years by the United States and her allies to im-
prove international cooperation in the fight
against terrorism. Major democratic powers
have begun to recognize that an effective coun-
terterrorism policy requires mutual cooperation
and support. In 1978 the United States and its
fellow members of the Economic Summit
(U.K., Canada, Japan, France, Italy, and West
Germany) agreed to cut off air service to and
from a country that does not extradite or pros-
ecute a terrorist for hijacking. The Venice
Annex, agreed upon in June 1987, expanded
115
upon the Bonn Declaration to include halting / INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS
air service in cases of sabotage. ' 1980-1989, BY TYPE OF VICTIM
Despite this strong rhetoric, countries in the
past too often have chosen to act solely in their 1980
own self-interest rather than recognizing and 1981 K
acting in support of the combined interests of
the international community. However, as ter- 1982
rorism's ugly hand affects more and more
1983
countries (citizens of 21 countries were on Pan
Am 103), prospects grow for a more unified 1984
international response to terrorism.
1985
Recent events in the Soviet Union and East-
ern Europe also present new opportunities to 1986
foster wider cooperation on terrorism. Discus-
1987
sions were reportedly held with the Soviets on
the issue of terrorism at the Malta Summit in 1988
1989. The Soviets have taken a more construc-
tive approach recently by condemning specific 1989

terrorist acts, but there is still much room for
improvement. Because terrorism is not only an
assault on democratic principles but an act
against all humanity, the United States and her
allies should continue to urge the Soviet Union
to exercise its leadership to ensure that con- >
crete and effective steps are taken to minimize Recommendations
if not to eradicate the threat of terrorism
worldwide.
Many of these steps can be taken with the
help and support of our U.S. allies. Such a bi-
lateral or multilateral approach should be en-
couraged. With other like-thinking nations, the
United States should work to elevate the ac-
ceptable standards of international behavior,
and treat as outlaws states sponsoring terror-
ism. But, the United States itself must stand
ready to act.
To continue as a world leader conducting an
effective foreign policy and influencing events,
the United States must remain engaged. State-
sponsored terrorism must be faced and must
be deterred—with methods that are consistent
with the nature of the threat and the U.S.
system and values. Otherwise, terrorism will
force a change in the world balance of power
fundamentally adverse to U.S. interests.
The United States has vital interests. It needs
only the will to defend them against those few
states living outside an acceptable standard of
international behavior.
116
50 100 150 200 250 300
Number of Incidents
| Military [^ j Government ^| Business |_ | Diplomat Other I
Source: Patterns ol Global Terrorism—1989
In the view of this Commission, the United
States must:
• First, heighten emphasis on the second
element of U.S. counterterrorism policy,
that state sponsors should be made to pay
a price for their actions.
• Second, refuse to allow terrorist attacks to
alter U.S. political and economic policies.
• Third, improve human intelligence-gather-
ing on terrorism, in cooperation with other
nations.
• Fourth, work with other nations to treat as
outlaws state sponsors of terrorism—isolat-
ing them politically, economically, and
militarily.
• Fifth, develop through the Congress and
the people a clear understanding that
state-sponsored terrorism threatens U.S.
values and interests, and that active meas-
ures are needed, overt and covert, to
counter more effectively the terrorist
threat.
 Sixth, ensure now that all U.S. Govern- countries well-known to have engaged in
ment resources are prepared for active state-sponsored terrorism.
measures—preemptive or retaliatory, direct National will—and the moral courage to use
or covert—against a series of targets in it—is the ultimate means to defeat terrorism.

117