The Self and The Future

Philosophical Review
The Self and the Future Author(s): Bernard Williams Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 79, No. 2 (Apr., 1970), pp. 161-180 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183946 . Accessed: 04/08/2013 19:35
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THE SELF AND THE FUTURE
A and BAcould be subjected ofwhichtheymight as a result bodies. That is to be said-question-beggingly-to have exchanged is a certain human body say-less question-beggingly-there withit, whichis such thatwhenpreviously we were confronted we were confronted with personA, certainutterances coming it wereexpressive of memories ofthepast experiences ofA, from of it partlyconstituted the actionsof A and certainmovements of thecharacter of A, and so forth; but weretaken as expressive this now, after the processis completed, utterances comingfrom ofwhatseemto be just thosememories which bodyare expressive as memories ofthepast experiences ofB, we identified previously actions itsmovements partly constitute expressive ofthecharacter ofB, and so forth; and conversely withtheother body. There are certainimportant philosophical limitations on how suchimaginary casesare to be constructed, and howthey are to be in variousways. I shall mentiontwo taken when constructed topursuethem but notin order principal limitations, further here, in order togetthem outoftheway. precisely There are certain limitations, particularly with regard to and mannerisms, to our abilityto imaginesuch cases character evenin themostrestricted senseofour beingdisposedto takethe A's as of that body which was previously later performances A and B wereextremely ofB's character; iftheprevious expressive unlikeone anotherboth physically and psychologically, and if, say,in addition, theywereofdifferent sex,theremight be grave in reading in anypossible difficulties B's dispositions performances of A's body. Let us forget this,and forthe present purpose just takeA and B as beingsufficiently alike (however alikethathas to be) forthe difficulty not to arise; after the experiment, persons familiar withA and B are just overwhelmingly struck by the B-ish of the doingsassociatedwithwhat was previously A's character
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some towhich twopersons, UPPOSE that there were process
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an exchange of Thus thefeatofimagining body,and conversely. sense.But now bodiesis supposedpossiblein the mostrestricted ifthefeatis is a further limitation whichhas to be overcome there in themostrestricted sensebut also is to possible to be notmerely to we are prepared reflection, which,on serious have an outcome as A and B havingchangedbodies-that is, an outcome describe A's body, we are with what was previously where,confronted withB. to say that we are now confronted preparedseriously It would seem a necessaryconditionof so doing that the expressive from thatbodybe takenas genuinely coming utterances is a causal notion;and as we ofmemories ofB's past.But memory conditionon x's present actually use it, it seems a necessary ofthose memory ofx's earlierexperiences constituting knowledge and the thatthecausal chainlinking theexperiences experiences shouldnot run outsidex's body. Hence if utterances knowledge ofmemofrom a givenbodyare to be takenas expressive coming ofB, thereshouldbe somesuitablecausal riesofthe experiences linkbetweenthe appropriate stateof thatbody and the original ofthoseexperiences to B. One radicalway ofsecuring happening in theimaginedexchangecase is to suppose, with thatcondition ofA and ofB are transposed. thatthebrains We may Shoemaker,' Thus supposeit werepossibleto not need so radical a condition. a man's brain and storeit in a device information from extract the information or even renewed, while his brain was repaired, thatthe to insist thenbeingreplaced:it would seemexaggerated he had before man couldnotpossibly have thememories resultant ofour own past,we Withregardto our knowledge theoperation. and between beingreminded, merely recalling, draw distinctions (roughly)to correspond learningagain, and those distinctions distinctions betweenno new input,partialnew input,and total in question; and it new input with regardto the information case just imagined seems clear that the information-parking and sufficient wouldnotcountas newinputin thesensenecessary for "learningagain." Hence we can imagine the case we are extractedinto such concernedwith in termsof information A's and B's brainsand replacedin theotherbrain; devicesfrom
1
(Ithaca, N. Y., I963), p. 23 f. Self-Knowledge andSelf-Identity

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thisis thesort ofmodelwhich,I think notunfairly for thepresent I shallhavein mind. argument, We imaginethefollowing. The process considered above exists; two personscan entersome machine,let us say, and emerge changedin theappropriate ways.If A and B are thepersons who us let call thepersons who emerge enter, theA-body-person and the B-body-person: the A-body-person is that person (whoeverit is) withwhom I am confronted I am when,afterthe experiment, confronted withthatbodywhichpreviously was A's body-that is to say,thatpersonwho would naturally be takenforA by someone whojust saw thisperson, was familiar withA's appearance before theexperiment, and did notknowabout thehappening of the experiment.A non-question-begging descriptionof the willleaveitopenwhich(ifeither) A and experiment ofthepersons B the A-body-person is; the description of the experiment as "persons thattheA-body-perchanging bodies"ofcourseimplies sonis actually B. A and B who are goingto have theprocess We taketwopersons carried outon them.(We can suppose, thatthey rather are hazily, at all closely at thisstage willing forthisto happen; to investigate why theymightbe willingor unwilling, what theywould fear, and so forth, would anticipatesome laterissues.) We further announce thatone ofthetworesultant persons, theA-body-person and theB-body-person, is goingafter theexperiment to be given We thenask $I ooooo while the otheris goingto be tortured. each A and B to choosewhichtreatment shouldbe dealt out to whichof the persons who will emergefrom the experiment, the choicetobe made (ifit can be) on selfish grounds. shouldget the Suppose thatA choosesthattheB-body-person pleasant treatmentand the A-body-person the unpleasant treatment; and B chooses thatthey conversely (this might indicate that"changing of thought bodies"was indeeda good description the outcome).The experimenter cannotact in accordancewith both thesesets of preferences, thoseexpressed by A and those is one clear sensein whichA and B expressed by B. Hence there cannotbothgetwhatthey want:namely, thatiftheexperimenter, before to the experiment, announces to A and B thathe intends carryout the alternative (forexample),of treating the B-bodyI63
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personunpleasantly and the A-body-person pleasantly-thenA can sayrightly, "That's nottheoutcome I choseto happen,"and B can sayrightly, "That'sjusttheoutcome I chosetohappen."So, A and B before evidently, theexperiment can each cometo know either thattheoutcomehe chosewill be thatwhichwill happen, or thatthe one he chosewill not happen,and in thatsensethey can getorfailtogetwhatthey wanted. Butis italso truethatwhen the experimenter proceedsafter theexperiment to act in accordance withone of the preferences and not theother, thenone of A and B willhavegotwhathe wanted, and theother not? There seemsverygood groundforsayingso. For supposethe experimenter, havingelicited A's and B's preference, saysnothing to A and B aboutwhathe willdo; conducts and theexperiment; then,forexample,givesthe unpleasant treatment to theB-bodyperson and thepleasanttreatment to theA-body-person. Then the B-body-person willnotonlycomplain oftheunpleasant treatment as such,but will complain(sincehe has A's memories) thatthat was not the outcomehe chose,sincehe chose thatthe B-bodypersonshouldbe well treated;and sinceA made his choice in selfish spirit, he may add that he precisely chose in that way becausehe did notwant the unpleasant to happento him. things The A-body-person meanwhile willexpress satisfaction bothat the ofthe$ioo,ooo, and also at thefactthattheexperimenter receipt has chosento act in the way thathe, B, so wiselychose. These factsmake a strongcase forsayingthat the experimenter has brought it about thatB did in the outcomeget what he wanted and A did not. It is therefore a strong case forsayingthat the B-body-person really is A, and theA-body-person is B; and really therefore forsayingthat the processof the experiment reallyis thatofchanging bodies.For thesamereasons it would seemthat A and B in our examplereallydid choosewisely, and thatit was A's bad luck thatthe choice he correctly made was not carried out,B's good luckthatthechoicehe correctly made was carried out. This seems to showthatto care aboutwhathappensto me in the future is notnecessarily to care aboutwhathappens to this body (the one I now have); and thisin turnmight be takento showthatin somesenseofDescartes's obscurephrase,I and my in these body are "reallydistinct"(though,of course,nothing
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could support theidea thatI could exist without a considerations bodyat all). ifwe consider seemto be reinforced thecases These suggestions A and B makeother choices withregardto theexperiment. where should get the Suppose thatA choosesthat the A-body-person get the pain, and B chooses money, and the B-body-person conversely. Here again therecan be no outcomewhichmatches of both of them: they cannot both the expressedpreferences announces,beforethe get what theywant. The experimenter in will factget the money, that the A-body-person experiment, and theB-body-person will get the pain. So A at thisstagegets what he wants (the announcedoutcomematcheshis expressed thedistribution is carried outas preference). After theexperiment, and the B-body-person announced. Both the A-body-person is in accordance withthe willhave toagreethatwhatis happening The B-body-person will that A originally expressed. preference (sincehe hasA's memories) naturally express this acknowledgment he chose; he will recall, by sayingthat thisis the distribution thisoutcome, announcing among otherthings, theexperimenter his approving it as what he chose,and so forth.However, he doesnotlikewhatis nowhappening (theB-body-person) certainly to be receiving whattheA-bodyto him,and wouldmuchprefer will personis receiving-namely, $ioo,ooo. The A-body-person an outcome thanthisone, on theother hand recallchoosing other did notdo what butwillreckon itgoodluckthattheexperimenter he recallschoosing. It looks,then,as thoughthe A-body-person had gottenwhat he wanted,but not what he chose,while the has gotten B-body-person whathe chose,butnotwhathe wanted. B and A; So once moreit looksas though theyare, respectively, and thatin thiscase the originalchoicesof bothA and B were thatin theoriginal choiceA takesthelineofthe Suppose,lastly, first case and B ofthesecond:thatis,A choosesthattheB-bodyshouldgetthemoney and theA-body-person thepain,and person B choosesexactlythe same thing.In thiscase, the experimenter of givingboth persons would seem to be in the happysituation whatthey have chosen.In want-or at least,likeGod, whatthey this case, the B-body-person recalls likes what he is receiving,
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unwise.
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himself on the wisdomof (as he it, and congratulates choosing does not like what puts it) his choice; while the A-body-person to acknowledge it, and is forced recallschoosing he is receiving, So oncemorewe seemto that(as he putsit) hischoicewas unwise. case. from thefirst drawn tosupport thesuggestions getresults Let us now considerthe question,not of A and B choosing but of their the experiment, to take place after certainoutcomes wereinitially at all. Ifthey to engagein theexperiment willingness as "changing oftheexperiment to acceptthedescription inclined themwould be the bodies" thenone thingthatwould interest of the otherperson'sbody. In thisrespectalso what character would seem to suggest that the experiment would happen after If A oftheexperiment. bodies"was a good description "changing beingeach not displeasedwith and B agreedto the experiment, of the other person's the appearance,physique,and so forth the B-body-person mightwell be body; afterthe experiment I suchthings as: "WhenI agreedto thisexperiment, found saying but now I look at it in thatB's facewas quite attractive, thought mightsay I am not so sure"; or the A-body-person the mirror, I did notknowthatA had a "When I agreedto thisexperiment wooden leg; but now, afterit is over, I findthat I have this It is possible reversed." woodenleg, and I want the experiment thathe finds uncomfortable, thathe might thelegvery sayfurther thathe recalls shouldsay,for instance, and thattheB-body-person butone getsusedtoit: at first, uncomfortable itvery thathe found butperhaps one wouldneedtoknowmorethanat leastI do about limbsto knowwhether ofhabituation to artificial thephysiology thatbody, would findthe leg uncomfortable: theA-body-person this after all, has had theleg on it forsometime.But apartfrom from this sortofdetail,thegeneralline of theoutcomeregarded about the conclusions ourprevious pointofviewseemsto confirm experiment. is proposed(in Now let us supposethatwhen the experiment terms) A and B think rather of their non-question-begging A's thoughts turn advantagesand disadvantages. psychological to certainsortsof anxietyto whichhe is veryprone, primarily he has of past memories whileB is concerned withthe frightful him. They each hope that the which still distress experiences
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willin somewayresult in their experiment beingable to getaway fromthese things.They may even have been impressed by philosophical arguments to the effect thatbodilycontinuity is at condition of personalidentity: least a necessary A, forexample, reasonsthat,grantedthe experiment comesoff, thenthe person with him will not have this anxiety, who is bodily continuous whiletheother willno doubthave someanxiety-perhaps person in somesensehisanxiety-and at leastthatperson willnotbe he. is performed The experiment and the experimenter (to whomA and B previously revealedprivately theirseveraldifficulties and hopes) asks the A-body-person whether he has gotten rid of his This personpresumably anxiety. repliesthathe does not know what the man is talking but about; he neverhad such anxiety, he did have some very disagreeable memories,and recalls in theexperiment to getridofthem, and is disappointed engaging thathe stillhas them. to discover The B-body-person willreactin a similar about his painfulmemories, way to questions pointing out thathe stillhas hisanxiety. Theseresults still seemto confirm of the experiment as "changingbodies." further the description And all the results suggestthat the only rationalthingto do, withsuch an experiment, confronted would be to identify oneself withone'smemories, and so forth, and not withone's body.The philosophical arguments designed to showthatbodilycontinuity was at leasta necessary condition ofpersonal wouldseem identity tobejustmistaken. Let us now consider something apparently different. Someone in whose power I am tellsme that I am going to be tortured I am frightened, tomorrow. and lookforward in great to tomorrow apprehension. He adds that when the time comes,I shall not remember beingtold thatthiswas goingto happen to me, since shortly before thetorture something elsewillbe doneto me which will make me forget the announcement. This certainly will not cheerme up, sinceI knowperfectly well thatI can forget things, and that there is such a thing as indeed being tortured because I had forgotten a unexpectedly or been made to forget ofthetorture: thatwillstillbe a torture prediction so long which, as I do knowabout theprediction, I look forward to in fear.He thenadds thatmyforgetting theannouncement willbe onlypart
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comes,I shallnot oftorture whenthemoment process: ofa larger to remember. I am nowin a position anyofthethings remember sinceI can readilyconceiveof This does notcheerme up, either, ofwhichI as a result in an accident, forinstance, beinginvolved amnesiacstateand also in greatpain; wake up in a completely happentome,I shouldnotlikeit to happento thatcouldcertainly me, nor to know that it was going to happen to me. He now I shall not onlynot of torture adds thatat the moment further in a to butwill I am now remember, the position things remember from ofmypast,quitedifferent setofimpressions have a different wouldcheerme I nowhave. I do notthink thatthis thememories if not the up, either.For I can at least conceivethe possibility, perhaps mad, and thinking ofgoingcompletely reality, concrete and beingtoldthatsomething thatI am GeorgeIV or somebody; to like thatwas goingto happen to me would have no tendency thatI was goingto ofbeingtoldauthoritatively reducetheterror thehorror. Nor do I see compound butwouldmerely be tortured, in ofmindbytheperson be putintoanybetter frame whyI should ofmypastwithwhichI thattheimpressions chargeaddinglastly willexactly fitthepast of shallbe equippedon theeve oftorture and thatindeedI shall acquire these another personnow living, now in his brain by (for instance) information impressions would stillbe the proper being copied into mine. Fear, surely, reaction:and not because one did not knowwhat was goingto happen,but because in one vital respectat least one did know whichone can indeedexpect whatwas goingto happen-torture, to happen to oneself,and to be preceded by certainmental as well. derangements If this is right,the whole questionseems now to be totally is of course For what we have just been through mysterious. which ofthetransaction one side,differently represented, merely hateful it as a perfectly we considered before;and it represents it as represented prospect,while the previousconsiderations somethingone should rationally,perhaps even cheerfully, It is differently prechoose out ofthe optionstherepresented. butwhenwe lookat ofcourse, and intwonotablerespects; sented, can we really convince of presentation, these two differences thus is wrong ormisleading, thatthesecondpresentation ourselves
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versionwhich at the time leaving the road open to the first not. Surely so convincing? seemed is is thatin the secondversion the torture difference The first as goingto happentome: "you," theman represented throughout says. Thus he is not very neutral.But in charge persistently way,does his shouldhe have been neutral?Or, to put it another and rhetorical emotional use ofthesecondpersonhave a merely wouldhave on me,making me afraid whenfurther reflection effect notobviously so. shownthatI had no reasonto be? It is certainly I everystep of his predictions just is thatthrough The problem And if I reflect on seem to be able to followhim successfully. thatI shall for fearing whathe has said givesme grounds whether I could considerthat behind my fearslies some be tortured, physical pain in the such as this:thatmy undergoing principle stateI maybe in at the is notexcluded byanypsychological future exceptionof those psychological time, with the platitudinous (ifit pain,notably in themselves excludeexperiencing states which what In particular, state) unconsciousness. is a psychological on I have about the past will not have any effect impressions seemssound I undergothe pain or not. This principle whether enough. I would,as things factthatnot everything It is an important thatI shouldrationally are,regardas an evilwouldbe something thatit would happento me in fearas an evilifit werepredicted significant and also predictedthat I should undergo thefuture in themeantime. For thefactthatI regard changes psychological that happening,thingsbeing as they are, as an evil can be themselves on factors or character whichmight ofbelief dependent be modified changesin question.Thus if I by the psychological am appallingly subjectto acrophobia,and am told that I shall I shallto find in thenearfuture, on topofa steepmountain myself thatextent be afraid;but ifI am toldthatI shallbe psychologiin sucha way as to rid me ofmy callychangedin themeantime I believeit), thenI prediction, acrophobia(and as withtheother happening, or at least ofthepredicted have no reasonto be afraid a to meeting not the same reason.Again, I mightlook forward because of certainpersonagain witheitheralarm or excitement In somepart,thesememories ofour past relations. mymemories
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operatein connection withmyemotion, not onlyon thepresent for time, but protectively forward: it is to a meeting itself affected of thosememories thatI look forward. If I am by the presence convincedthat when the time comes I shall not have those memories, thenI shallnothavejust thesamereasons as before for lookingforward to that meeting with the one emotionor the other. (Spiritualism, incidentally, appears to involvethe belief that I have just the same reasonsfora given attitudetoward I am dead, as I did before: encountering people again after with theone modification thatI can be sureitwillall be very nice.) Physical pain, however,the example which for simplicity is absolutely (and not forany obsessional reason)I have taken, minimallydependenton characteror belief. No amount of change in my characteror my beliefswould seem to affect substantially thenastiness oftortures appliedto me; correspondand beliefs ingly,no degreeofpredicted changein mycharacter can unseatthefearoftorture which,together withthosechanges, is predicted for me. I am notat all suggesting thattheonly basis,or indeedtheonly is rationalbasis,forfearin the face of thesevariouspredictions how thingswill be relativeto my psychological state in the eventualoutcome.I am merelypointingout that this is one it is nottheonlyone. For certainly one willfearand component; otherwise thechanges or in very reject themselves, manycasesone would.Thus one oftheold paradoxes ofhedonistic utilitarianism; ifone had assurances thatundergoing and being certain operations attachedto a machinewould provideone forthe restof one's existencewith an unendingsequence of delicious and varied and reactwith one might wellrejecttheoption, experiences, very and thatfear fearifsomeoneproposedto applyit compulsorily; and horror in the secondcase would seemappropriate reactions theinterpretation may help to discredit (ifanyonehas thenerve to propose theoption it) thatone'sreasonfor rejecting voluntarily would be a consciousness of dutiesto others whichone in one's hedonicstate would leave undone. The prospectof contented is foundby many(not perhapsby all) madnessor vegetableness ofhowthings in wayswhichare obviously nota function appalling would thenbe forthemnot would thenbe forthem,forthings
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thesesorts of discussing, appalling.In the case we are at present thatthepredictions to makeit clearer seemmerely considerations at the of the man in chargeprovidea double groundof horror: ofthechangein character and at theprospect oftorture, prospect of thepast thatwillprecedeit. And certainly, and in impressions of the second to repeatwhathas alreadybeen said, theprospect or not fearing certainly seemsto provideno groundforrejecting ofthefirst. theprospect betweenthe I said that therewere two notable differences of our situationand the first.The first second presentation about,was thatthe whichwe havejust said something difference, verychanged a psychologically forme, thetorture man predicted "me." We have yetto finda reasonforsayingthathe shouldnot himifhe shouldbe unabletofollow or thatI really havedonethis, him onlytoo well. The second does; I seemto be able to follow is that in thispresentation he does not mentionthe difference role of being the incidental otherman, exceptin the somewhat I ofthepast end up with.He does oftheimpressions provenance who will end up withimpresnot mention himat all as someone with$ I oo,ooo me (and,incidentally, from sionsofthepastderived in theframe ofmindappropriate which, as well-a consideration makemejealous). willmerely to this version, manand whatis goingtohappen this he mention Butwhyshould is to be toldwhatis goingto happento concern to him?My selfish precededby changesofcharacter, me, and now I know:torture, in of the past.The knowlimpressions changes brainoperations, edge thatone otherperson,or none,or manywill be similarly greater me in otherways, of sympathy, may affect mistreated and so forth; but surelyit at the powerof thistyrant, horror But-someonewillsayoftorture? myexpectations cannotaffect presentawhich,as thefirst thisis to leave out exactly thefeature forit is to leave makesall thedifference: tionofthecase showed, willbe you.It showed, presentation outtheperson who,as thefirst a feature is to leave out not merely whichshouldfundamentally for whomyouare person itis toleaveoutthevery affect yourfears, So of course,the objectorwill say, this makes all the fearful. difference. seriesofcases. In each case But can it? Considerthefollowing
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to be A is,as before, whatis described, we are tosupposethatafter beforeinformed A is the person also to suppose are tortured; we willhappento by thetorture followed hand that just thesethings him: (i) A is subjectedto an operationwhich producestotal amnesia; leadsto in A, and other interference (ii) amnesiais produced in hischaracter; changes certain and at thesame are produced, (iii) changesin his character are inducedin him; beliefs illusory "memory" timecertain kindand do notfitthelifeof theseare ofa quite fictitious anyactualperson; traits (iv) the same as (iii), exceptthatboth the character to be approare designed impressions and the "memory" B; actualperson, toanother priate (v) the same as (iv), exceptthat the resultis producedby intoA from the brainofB, by a the information putting leavesB thesameas he was before; method which (vi) the same happensto A as in (v), but B is not leftthe in thereverse is conducted operation same,sincea similar direction. and thatA has reasons, I takeit thatno one is goingto dispute is ofpain whentheprospect fear for reasons, fairly straightforward reasonwhythis (i); thereseemsno conceivable thatof situation should not extendto situation(ii), and the situation(iii) can of principle-it just seems a surely introduceno difference morethanone reasonwe shouldhave grounds situation whichfor as suggested above. Situation(iv) at leastintroduces forfearing, the personB, who was the focusof the objectionwe are now himin anywaywhich Butit doesnotseemtointroduce discussing. if I can expect pain througha makes a materialdifference; it transformation which involvesnew "memory"-impressions, would seem a purelyexternalfact,relativeto that, that the had a model. Nor, in (iv), do we satisfy "memory"-impressions forthe at the beginning a causal condition which I mentioned thoughnoticethatif the actuallybeing memories; "memories"
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the I might well be able to elicitfrom job weredone thoroughly, expectaabout his previous the kindsof remarks A-body-person Bto theoriginal appropriate tionsoftheexperiment-remarks I shallhavea us in thefirst ofthestory. version whichso impressed moreover, (v),where, ofthisbeingso in situation similar assurance is available. ofthecausalcondition a plausible application First, ifwe aboutthissituation. are to be noticed Buttwothings we do notseemto have on A and theA-body-person, concentrate the pointofview of his fearsmakes whichfrom added anything just as, in the movefrom(iii) to (iv),it difference; any material thatthenew "memory"-impressions difference made no relevant whichprecedethe pain had, as it happened,a model,so in the move from(iv) to (v) all we have added is that theyhave a to see why cause: and it is stilldifficult modelwhichis also their makethedifference could possibly forward, that,to himlooking pain. To illustrate betweenexpecting pain and not expecting ifA is capable ofexpecting thatpointfrom thecase ofcharacter: pain precededby a changein his pain, he is capable ofexpecting it can make no difference, dispositions-andto thatexpectation is modeledon, or indeed whether thatchangein his dispositions ofsomeotherperson.If his caused by,thedispositions indirectly the change,it seemsa mere fearscan, as it were,reach through how the changeis in factinduced.The secondpoint trimming about situation(v) is that if the crucial questionforA's fears the is whether with regardto what befallsthe A-body-person has is or is not thepersonB,2 thenthatcondition A-body-person in situation(v): for therewe have an not yet been satisfied and certainly B in additionto the A-body-person, undisputed those twoarenotthesameperson. whathe thatis finally But in situation (vi),we seemedto think, is. But if A's originalfearscould reach throughthe expected can in (v), as they did in (iv) and (iii), thencertainly they changes A's of of in view reach through (vi). Indeed, fromthe point is lessdifference and fears, between(vi) and (v) there expectations than thereis between(v) and (iv) or between(iv) and (iii). In
2 This of coursedoes not have to be the crucial question, but it seemsone fair objection. up thepresent wayoftaking
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those there transitions, wereat leastdifferences-though we could not see thatthey werereallyrelevant differences-in thecontent and cause ofwhathappenedto him; in thepresent case thereis absolutely no difference at all in what happensto him,the only difference beingin whathappensto someoneelse. If he can fear painwhen(v) is predicted, whyshould he ceasetowhen(vi)is? I can see onlyone way ofrelevantly layinggreatweight on the transition from (v) to (vi); and this involvesa considerable Thisis to denythat, as I putit,thetransition difficulty. from (v) to (vi) involvesmerelythe addition of something happeningto it does,it will be said, is to involvethe somebody else;whatrather as the B-body-person; reintroduction of A himself, sincehe has it is forthisperson,and not forthe reappearedin this form, unfortunate A-body-person, that A will have his expectations. This is to reassert, in effect, theviewpoint in ourfirst emphasized oftheexperiment. Butthis has theconsequence presentation surely thatA shouldnothave fears fortheA-body-person who appeared in situation in the (v). Forbythepresent argument, A-body-person is. ButtheA-body-person in (v) is, (vi)is notA; theB-body-person in character, thesame as theA-bodyhistory, everything, exactly in (vi); so ifthelatter is notA, thenneither person is theformer. (It is thispoint,no doubt,thatencourages one to speak of the thatgoeswith[vi] as being,on the present difference view, the reintroduction ofA.) Butno one elsein (v) has anybetter claimto be A just does not exist.This would certainly A. So in (v), it seems, in explain why A should have no fearsforthe state of things (v)-though he mightwell have fearsforthe path to it. But it ratherlookedearlieras thoughhe could well have fearsforthe state of things in (v). Let us grant,however, that thatwas an and that A really in (v); then doesnotexist in illusion, doeshe exist ? It for seemsverydifficult to denyit (iv), (iii), (ii), or (i) (i) and todrawthelinebetween (ii); arewe perhaps (iii) and (iv)? Here someone a linewillsay: you mustnotinsist on drawing borderline cases are borderline cases,and you mustnot push our concepts beyondtheir limits. But thiswell-known piece ofadvice, as it is in manycases,seems in thepresent sensible case to involve an extraordinary It mayintellectually comfort observers difficulty. ofA's situation; butwhatis A supposed to makeofit? To be told
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is a borderline thata future situation itsbeingmyself onefor thatis hurt, thatit is conceptually undecidable whether it willbe me or it seems, I can do nothing not,is something which, with;because, in particular, it seems tohaveno comprehensible representation in and theemotions myexpectations that go withthem. If I expectthata certainsituation, S, will come about in the there is of coursea wide rangeofemotions future, and concerns, directedon S, which I may experience now in relationto my UnlessI am exceptionally it is not a condiexpectation. egoistic, tionon mybeingconcerned in relation to thisexpectation, thatI myself will be involvedin S-where my being "involved"in S in S as someone meansthatI figure doingsomething at thattime or having something done to me, or, again, that S will have me at thator somesubsequent consequences affecting time.There are some emotions, however, whichI will feelonlyif I will be involved in S, and fear is an obvious example. Now thedescription ofS underwhichit figures in myexpectationswillnecessarily and one be, in variousways,indeterminate; is that it leave open way in which it may be indeterminate I shall be involvedin S or not. Thus I may have good whether is goingto gethurt, butno reasonto expectthatone out ofus five reasonto expectit to be me ratherthan one of the others. My willbe correspondingly this present emotions affected by indeterin fear,I minacy.Thus, sticking to theegoistic concern involved shallpresumably thanifI knew itwas be somewhat morecheerful thanifI had been left lesscheerful out goingto be me,somewhat and Fear will be mixed altogether. with, qualified by,apprehenof These emotions aroundthethought revolve sion; and so forth. of of the indeterminacy; moments the eventualdetermination fearfocus on itsreally out to be me,ofhopeon its straight turning out not to be me. All the emotions are relatedto the turning comingabout ofwhatI expect:and whatI expectin sucha case aboutin one ofthewaysor just cannotcomeaboutsavebycoming another. can There are otherwaysin whichindeterminate expectations that be relatedto fear.Thus I mayexpect(perhaps neurotically) something nastyis going to happen to me, indeed expectthat but have no whenit happensit will takesomedeterminate form,
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2
BERNARD WILLIAMS
form forthe determinate range,or no closedrange,of candidates be would this from Different thought. in mypresent to rehearse fear (one radicallyindeterminate-the the fear of something had such a fear, If somebody mightsay) of a namelesshorror. determinate a perfectly one couldevensaythathe had, in a sense, willbe there comes indeed about, ifwhathe expects expectation: theeventthan to be said aboutit after moredeterminate nothing Boththesecasesofcourseare casesof was said in theexpectation. is the thatis fixedamid theindeterminacy fearbecauseone thing happen. will things the itis to metowhich that belief ofwhatit willbe ofS is thethought Centralto theexpectation like when it happens-thoughtwhich may be indeterminate, me, there When S involves and so forth. rangeoveralternatives, thought the such thought: of form a special of can be thepossibility as of projection myself of how it will be forme, the imaginative in S.3 participant me; way,whenit involves about S in this I do nothave to think possibility this that suggested be might to. (It able be I but may between in the language,in the distinction was even mirrored thatI shallbe hurt";butI tobe hurt"and "expecting "expecting about thispoint,whichis in any case of no am verydoubtful importance.) Suppose now thatthereis an S withregardto whichit is for me or not,as it involves whether undecidable reasons conceptual situationby the line we are is proposedfor the experimental of S is not indeterthattheexpectation It is important discussing. It is not considering. been have just in any ofthewayswe minate pointofthatcase was that sincethefixed horror, likethenameless it was goingto happen to the subject,and that made his state ofthe man who fear.Nor is it liketheexpectation unequivocally indeed equivocal, was his fear to be hurt; five of the expectsone was thatwhenS came and thatofthe expectation, but itsfocus, comeabout in one way or theother.In about,it wouldcertainly thatis to say,notoftheinitial case,fear(ofthetorture, thepresent nor nor inappropriate, neither appropriate, seems experiment)
and 3 For a moredetailedtreatment of issuesrelatedto this,see Imagination in P. F. Strawson(ed.), Academy (London, i966); reprinted British theSelf, I 968). (Oxford, andAction in Thought Studies 176
the subjecthas an incurable appropriately equivocal.Relatedly, about how he may thinkabout S. If he engagesin difficulty (abouthowit willbe forhim),he projective imaginative thinking question;if he unanswerable implicitly answersthe necessarily in it looksverymuch thinks thathe cannotengage suchthinking, Perhaps as ifhe also answers in theopposite direction. it, though such thinking; but is he just refraining he must just refrain from undecidablewhether he can or cannot from it, if it is incurably in it? engage can show is It may be said that all that theseconsiderations in thiscase; thatfear,at any rate,does notgetitsproperfooting but that therecould be some other,more ambivalent, formof concernwhich would indeed be appropriate to thisparticular the expectationof the conceptuallyundecidable expectation, that actually situation.There are, perhaps,analogous feelings Thus material objectsdo occasionally occurin actual situations. which leave a conceptual undergo puzzling transformations shadowovertheir attached identity. SupposeI weresentimentally to an object to whichthissortof thingthenhappened; thenit feelaboutit quiteas I did originally, might be thatI couldneither to it, but would have some otherand nor be totally indifferent towardit. Similarly, it may be said, ratherambivalent feeling sufferer ofpain,myidentity with relations towardtheprospective I can feelneither as I wouldif whomare conceptually shadowed, not,but he werecertainly me,noras I wouldifhe werecertainly somesuchambivalent concern. rather to remove themostbaffling aspectof But thisanalogydoeslittle case-an aspectwhichhas alreadyturned up in what thepresent in thinking was said about the subject'sdifficulty eitherprojecabout to regardthe or the situation. For tively non-projectively object of just like the transmogrified prospective pain-sufferer distress about his and to conceiveof my ambivalent sentiment, about some future future pain as just like ambivalentdistress damageto suchan object,is ofcourseto leave himand me clearly distinct fromone another,and thus to displace the conceptual its properplace. I have to get nearerto him than shadowfrom thatI can getto himwithout that.But is there expectanynearer is, the analogyhas notshownus it. We can inghispain? If there
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BERNARD WILLIAMS
pain; as it were,ambivalent notget nearerby expecting, certainly thereis no place at all forthat.There seemsto be an obstinate in whichit a situation in myexpectations to mirroring bafflement I occur. whether undecidable is conceptually ifwe toplainabsurdity to turn moreover, seems, The bafflement to its close friendand move fromconceptual undecidability This comesout ifwe consider decision. conventionalist neighbor, ofthe seriesofcases conventionalist, overtly description, another would This description discussion. whichoccasionedthe present that rejecta pointI reliedon in an earlierargument-namely, in (vi) is A (because the if we deny that the A-body-person in is), thenwe mustdenythattheA-body-person B-body-person (v) is A, since theyare exactlythe same. "No," it may be said, of sorts "thisis just to assumethatwe say the same in different No doubt when we have the verygood candidatefor situation. call him A; but this being A-namely, the B-body-person-we A in does not mean thatwe shouldnot call the A-body-person when we have no bettercandidatearound. that othersituation This line of descriptions." call fordifferent situations Different deciding to lawyers indeed appropriate thing is sort of talk the which has undergonesome the ownershipof some property have to decide,and in theyjust setoftransformations; bewildering on as it has gotto go to somebody, let us suppose, each situation, to a as line But law admit. and the as the facts reasonable grounds his it about ownfuture, or expectations fears deal witha person's can extendto whatwill seemsto have no senseat all. If A's fears in (v), I do notsee how theycan be happento theA-body-person similar personin the fateof the exactly from diverted rationally a (vi) by his being told thatsomeonewould have reasonin the for deciding whichhe wouldnothavein theformer situation latter A. to call another person are twopresentations there Thus, to sumup, it looksas though associatedwith it, choice and the of the imaginedexperiment and which lead to contrary each of which carriesconviction, that the situationafterthe conclusions.The idea, moreover, undecidablein the relevantrespect is conceptually experiment while thepuzzlement; to increase, but rather seemsnot to assist, thatit is convenappealed to in thesematters) theidea (so often
178
tionally decidableis evenworse. Following from all that,I am not in theleastclearwhichoptionit wouldbe wiseto takeifone were presented with thembeforethe experiment. I findthat rather disturbing. is one feature ofthearguments Whatever thepuzzlement, there which have led to it whichis worthpickingout, since it runs counterto something which is, I think,oftenrathervaguely and supposed. It is often recognized thatthere are "first-personal" "third-personal" aspects of questionsabout persons,and that betweenthem.It is also thereare difficulties about the relations that"mentalistic" considerations recognized (as we mayvaguely in call them)and considerations ofbodilycontinuity are involved questions ofpersonalidentity (whichis not to say thatthereare mentalistic and bodilycriteria ofpersonal identity). It is tempting to think thatthetwodistinctions thata runin parallel:roughly, attentionon mentalistic first-personal approach concentrates considerations, while a third-personal approach emphasizes is an of bodilycontinuity. discussion considerations The present illustration ofexactly theopposite. The first argument, whichled to the"mentalistic" conclusion thatA and B wouldchangebodies and thateach personshouldidentify himself withthedestination of his memories conand character, was an argument entirely ductedin third-personal terms. The secondargument, whichsugitself with concerned gestedthe bodilycontinuity identification, the first-personal issue of what A could expect.That thisis so seemsto me (thoughI will not discussit further here) of some I will end by suggesting one rathershakyway in whichone might approacha resolution oftheproblem, using onlythelimited materials already available. of the first The apparently decisivearguments presentation, himself withtheB-bodywhichsuggested thatA shouldidentify in satisof the situation turnedon the extreme neatness person, ifanycould,thedescription of"changing bodies." But this fying, neatness is basicallyartificial; it is theproductof thewill of the to producea situation whichwouldnaturally experimenter elicit, with minimumhesitation,that description. By the sorts of off earlier or gone he employed, he could easilyhave left methods
'79
significance.
BERNARD WILLIAMS
B as he (v),leaving He couldhave stoppedat situation on further. was; or he could have gone on and producedtwo personseach as well as one or two with and memories, withA-likecharacter If he had done eitherof those,we should B-likecharacteristics. about what to say; he just have been in yet greaterdifficulty to say. something us to find for choseto makeit as easyas possible in bodies,which persons Now if we had some model of ghostly procedures, werein somesenseactuallymovedaroundby certain experithe as effective just the neat experiment could regard we persons' the ghostly in thatreallydid result ment:theone method or whatever. dispersed, beingdestroyed, places without changing has use such a model.The experimenter But we cannotseriously a changeofbodies; he has not in thesenseof thatmodelinduced ratherproduced the one situationout of a range of equally whichwe should be mostdisposedto call a possiblesituations can thatone'sfears theprinciple changeofbodies.As againstthis, changesprecedeit psychological pain whatever extendto future indeed,itis not; butwe Perhaps, straightforward. positively seems what withit. Untilwe are shown whatis wrong need to be shown is wrongwithit, we shouldperhapsdecide thatif we were the we shouldpass the personA then,ifwe wereto decide selfishly, thatthereis room risky: be would It pain to theB-body-person. oftheproblem. a majorfeature hereis itself ofa risk for thenotion
BERNARD WILLIAMS
Cambridge College, King's
I80

The Self and The Future

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The Self and The Future

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Philosophical Review

THE SELF AND THE FUTURE

some towhich twopersons, UPPOSE that there were process

(Ithaca, N. Y., I963), p. 23 f. Self-Knowledge andSelf-Identity

THE SELF AND THE FUTURE

THE SELF AND THE FUTURE

THE SELF AND THE FUTURE

THE SELF AND THE FUTURE

THE SELF AND THE FUTURE

THE SELF AND THE FUTURE

THE SELF AND THE FUTURE

THE SELF AND THE FUTURE

THE SELF AND THE FUTURE

Cambridge College, King's

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