G.R. No. 88919 July 25, 1990 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE ENRIQUE B.

INTING, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 38, DUMAGUETE CITY, AND OIC MAYOR DOMINADOR S. REGALADO, JR., respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Fiscal now Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists? On February 6, 1988, Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law. Acting on the complaint, COMELEC directed Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, Provincial Election Supervisor of Dumaguete City: (1) to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case; (2) to prepare and file the necessary information in court; (3) to handle the prosecution if the evidence submitted shows a prima facie case and (3) to issue a resolution of prosecution or dismissal as the case may be. The directive to conduct the preliminary investigation was pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 1752 dated January 14, 1986. The resolution, in turn, is based on the constitutional mandate that the COMELEC is charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections (sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution) and on the Omnibus Election Code which implements the constitutional provision. The Resolution provides, among others: xxx xxx xxx Further, Regional Election Directors and Provincial Election Supervisors are hereby authorized to conduct preliminary investigations of election offenses committed in their respective jurisdictions, file the corresponding complaints and/or informations in court whenever warranted, and to prosecute the same pursuant to Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code. (Rollo, p. 15) After a preliminary investigation of Barba's complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, on September 26, 1988, he filed with the respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OICMayor. In an Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor. It also fixed the bail at five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as recommended by the Provincial Election Supervisor.

However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its September 30, 1988 order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The court stated that it "will give due course to the information filed in this case if the same has the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal after which the prosecution of the case shall be under the supervision and control of the latter." (at p. 23, Rollo, emphasis supplied) In another order dated November 22, 1988, the court gave Atty. Lituanas fifteen (15) days from receipt to file another information charging the same offense with the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal. Atty. Lituanas failed to comply with the order. Hence, in an order dated December 8, 1988, the trial court quashed the information. A motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition. The respondent trial court justifies its stand on the ground that the COMELEC through its Provincial Election Supervisor lacks jurisdiction to determine the existence of probable cause in an election offense which it seeks to prosecute in court because: While under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code approved on December 3, 1985 duly authorized legal officers of the Commission on Elections have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the same, it is doubtful whether said authority under the auspices of the 1973 Constitution, still subsists under the 1987 Constitution which has deleted in its Section 2, Article III, the phrase "and such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" in the equivalent section and article of the 1973 Constitution. (Rollo, p. 24) The petition is impressed with merit. We emphasize important features of the constitutional mandate that " ... no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge ... " (Article III, Section 2, Constitution) First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination. Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination. And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same

proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper-whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function of the Prosecutor. The Court made this clear in the case of Castillo v. Villaluz (171 SCRA 39 [1989]): Judges of Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance) no longer have authority to conduct preliminary investigations. That authority, at one time reposed in them under Sections 13, 14 and 16 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court of 1964, (See Sec. 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court of 1940; People v. Solon, 47 Phil. 443, cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1980 ed., Vol. 4, pp. 115-116) was removed from them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on January 1, 1985, (Promulgated on November 11, 1984) which deleted all provisions granting that power to said Judges. We had occasion to point this out in Salta v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 228, and to stress as well certain other basic propositions, namely: (1) that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is "not a judicial function ... (but) part of the prosecution's job, a function of the executive," (2) that wherever "there are enough fiscals or prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigations, courts are counseled to leave this job which is essentially executive to them," and the fact "that a certain power is granted does not necessarily mean that it should be indiscriminately exercised." The 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, declared effective on October 1, 1988, (The 1988 Amendments were published in the issue of Bulletin Today of October 29, 1988) did not restore that authority to Judges of Regional Trial Courts; said amendments did not in fact deal at all with the officers or courts having authority to conduct preliminary investigations. This is not to say, however, that somewhere along the line RTC Judges also lost the power to make apreliminary examination for the purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest (or search warrant). Such a power indeed, it is as much a duty as it is a power has been and remains vested in every judge by the provision in the Bill of Rights in the 1935, the 1973 and the present (1987) Constitutions securing the people against unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby placing it beyond the competence of mere Court rule or statute to revoke. The distinction must, therefore, be made clear while an RTC Judge may no longer conduct preliminary investigations to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for the filing of a criminal complaint or information, he retains the authority, when such a pleading is filed with his court, to determine whether there is probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It might be added that this distinction accords, rather than conflicts, with the rationale of Salta because both law and rule, in restricting to judges the authority to order arrest, recognize that function to be judicial in nature. We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or

it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. It is in this context that we address the issue raised in the instant petition so as to give meaning to the constitutional power vested in the COMELEC regarding election offenses. Article IX C Section 2 of the Constitution provides: Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions (1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. xxx xxx xxx (6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of votes, investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or omission constituting election frauds, offenses, and practices. (Emphasis supplied) In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC. The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election and the concomittant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate. From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, We perceived neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office as contradistinguished from the clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts of first instance under Sections 182 and 184, respectively, of the Election Code of 1978. An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses committed by any

person, whether private individual or public officer or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing power over the conduct of elections. (Corpus v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 [1987]) Hence, the Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the prosecution of election offenses. If the Fiscal or Prosecutor files an information charging an election offense or prosecutes a violation of election law, it is because he has been deputized by the COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole authority of his office. (People v. Basilla, et al., G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6, 1989).itc-asl In the instant case, there is no averment or allegation that the respondent Judge is bringing in the Provincial Fiscal as a deputy of COMELEC. He wants the Fiscal to "approve" the COMELEC's preliminary investigation. It is to be noted that on February 27, 1987 (when the 1987 Constitution was already in effect) the President issued Executive Order No. 134 which was the ENABLING ACT FOR ELECTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON MAY 11, 1987 AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 11 thereof provides: Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable as provided for in the preceding section, and to prosecute the same: Provided, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within two (2) months from filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the Office of the Fiscal or with the Department of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. It is only after a preliminary examination conducted by the COMELEC through its officials or its deputies that section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution comes in. This is so, because, when the application for a warrant of arrest is made and the information is filed with the court, the judge will then determine whether or not a probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparant that the respondent trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor. As indicated above what the respondent trial court should have done was to enforce its September 30, 1988 order, to wit: Pursuant to Circular No. 12 of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court dated June 30, 1987 and considering that after a personal examination of the evidence submitted by the investigating Provincial Election Supervisor III Negros Oriental (Designated Legal Officer), there is reasonable ground for this Court to rely on the certification of said Provincial Election Supervisor III in the information that a probable cause exists, let a warrant issue for the arrest of the accused filing the bail at FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS as recommended by the Provincial Election Supervisor III.

The order to get the approval of the Provincial Fiscal is not only superfluous but unwarranted. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned Orders dated October 3, 1988, November 22, 1988 and December 8, 1988 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent trial court's Order dated September 30, 1988 is REINSTATED. The respondent court is ordered to proceed hearing the case with deliberate speed until its termination. SO ORDERED.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner, vs. HON LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite,respondent. DECISION DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: In this special civil action for certiorari and mandamus, petitioner Commission on Elections (COMELEC) seeks the nullification of the orders of 16 March 2001 [1] and 9 May 2001[2] of respondent Judge Lucenito N. Tagle of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, denying petitioners motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 795900 and 7980-00 and motion for reconsideration, respectively. During the 11 May 1998 elections, Florentino A. Bautista ran for the position of mayor in the Municipality of Kawit, Cavite. On 8 July 1998, he filed with the COMELEC a complaint against then incumbent mayor Atty. Federico Poblete, Bienvenido Pobre, Reynaldo Aguinaldo, Arturo Ganibe, Leonardo Llave, Diosdado del Rosario, Manuel Ubod, Angelito Peregrino, Mario Espiritu, Salvador Olaes and Pedro Paterno, Jr., for violation of Section 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The complaint was supported by the separate affidavits of forty-four (44) witnesses attesting to the vote-buying activities of the respondents and was docketed as E.O. Case No. 98-219. On 25 February 1999, upon the recommendation of its Law Department, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution[3] directing the filing of the necessary information against the respondents in E.O. Case No. 98-219 and authorizing the Director IV of the Law Department to designate a COMELEC prosecutor to handle the prosecution of the cases and to file the appropriate motion for the preventive suspension of the respondents. The Law Department filed the corresponding information against the respondents in E.O. Case No. 98-219 before the RTC, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99. Before the trial of Criminal Case No. 7034-99 commenced, or on 2 December 1999, a complaint was filed by Innocencio Rodelas and Gerardo Macapagal with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Imus, Cavite, for violation of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code against the witnesses in the criminal case for vote-buying, who were the witnesses in E.O. Case No. 98-219. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 1-99-1080. On 10 April 2000, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor resolved to file separate informations for vote-selling in the various branches of the RTC in Imus, Cavite, against the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080. The cases were docketed as (1) Criminal Cases Nos. 7940-00 to 7949-00 and 7981-00, which were assigned to Branch 22; (2) Criminal Cases

Nos. 7973-00 to 7979-00 and 7970-00, assigned to Branch 21; (3) Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00, assigned to Branch 20; and (4) Criminal Cases Nos. 7960-00 to 7969-00, assigned to Branch 90. On 23 June 2000, the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 appealed before the COMELEC the 10 April 2000 Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor. On 6 July 2000, the COMELEC en bancdenied the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. [4] However, upon the urgent motion to set for hearing the appeal, the COMELEC en banc resolved to defer action on the appeal and refer the same to the Law Department for comment and recommendation.[5] The Law Department of the COMELEC filed motions to suspend proceedings before Branches 20, 21, 22 and 90 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite, until the COMELEC would have resolved the appeal of the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080. The Presiding Judge of Branch 22 granted the motion for the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 7940-00 to 7949-00 and 7981-00. In its Minute Resolution No. 00-2453,[6] the COMELEC en banc, upon the recommendation of its Law Department, declared null and void the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in I.S. No. 1-99-1080. It held that the respondents therein are exempt from criminal prosecution pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646,[7] otherwise known as The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which grants immunity from criminal prosecution persons who voluntarily give information and willingly testify against those liable for vote-buying or vote-selling. It further directed the Law Department to file the necessary motions to dismiss the criminal cases filed against the said respondents. Pursuant to Minute Resolution No. 00-2453, the Law Department filed a motion to dismiss[8] Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00 before Branch 20 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite, presided by herein respondent judge. The latter, however, denied the said motion and the motion for reconsideration. According to respondent judge, before one can be exempt from prosecution under the fourth paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646, it is necessary that such person has already performed the overt act of voluntarily giving information or testifying in any official investigation or proceeding for the offense to which such information or testimony was given. It was thus premature to exempt the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 from criminal prosecution, since they have not yet testified. Hence, this petition, ascribing to the respondent judge grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in peremptorily denying the prosecutions motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00. This Court referred the petition to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and required it to manifest whether it is adopting the petition. [9] In a Manifestation and Motion[10] filed with this Court, the OSG stated that it repleads the submissions contained in the petition and adopts the petition as its own. The petition is meritorious. A free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible election is indispensable in a democratic society. Without it, democracy would not flourish and would be a sham. Election offenses, such as vote-buying and vote-selling, are evils which prostitute the election process. They destroy the sanctity of the votes and abet the entry of dishonest candidates into the corridors of power where they may do more harm. As the Bible says, one who is dishonest in very small matters is dishonest in great ones. One who commits dishonesty in his entry into an elective office through the prostitution of the electoral process cannot be reasonably expected to respect and adhere to the constitutional precept that a public office is a public

trust, and that all government officials and employees must at all times be accountable to the people and exercise their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. The provision of law alleged to have been violated by the respondents in E.O. Case No. 98-219, who are the accused in Criminal Case No. 7034-99, reads as follows: SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election offense: (a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. - (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises money or anything of value, gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or makes or offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation, entity, or community in order to induce anyone or the public in general to vote for or against any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a political party. (2) Any person, association, corporation, group or community who solicits or receives, directly or indirectly, any expenditure or promise of any office or employment, public or private, for any of the foregoing considerations. (b) Conspiracy to bribe voters. - Two or more persons whether candidates or not, who come to an agreement concerning the commission of any violation of paragraph (a) of this section and decide to commit it. One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of vote-buying and of prosecuting those committing it is the grant of immunity from criminal liability in favor of the party whose vote was bought. This grant of immunity will encourage the recipient or acceptor to come into the open and denounce the culprit-candidate, and will ensure the successful prosecution of the criminal case against the latter. Congress saw the wisdom of this proposition, and so Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646 on Prosecution of Vote-Buying and Vote-Selling concludes with this paragraph: The giver, offeror, the promisor as well as the solicitor, acceptor, recipient and conspirator referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals: Provided, That any person, otherwise guilty under said paragraphs who voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies on any violation thereof in any official investigation or proceeding shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for the offenses with reference to which his information and testimony were given: Provided, further, That nothing herein shall exempt such person from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony. However, to avoid possible fabrication of evidence against the vote-buyers, especially by the latters opponents, Congress saw it fit to warn vote-sellers who denounce the votebuying that they could be liable for perjury or false testimony should they not tell the truth. It must be stressed that the COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. [11] The Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Prosecutors, or their respective assistants are, however, given continuing authority, as deputies of the COMELEC, to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses and to prosecute the same. [12] This authority may be revoked or withdrawn by the COMELEC anytime whenever, in its judgment, such revocation or

withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the COMELEC and to promote the common good, or when it believes that the successful prosecution of the case can be done by the COMELEC.[13] In this case, when the COMELEC nullified the resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, which was the basis of the informations for vote-selling, it, in effect, withdrew the deputation granted to the prosecutor. Such withdrawal of the deputation was clearly in order, considering the circumstances obtaining in these cases where those who voluntarily executed affidavits attesting to the vote-buying incident and became witnesses against the vote-buyers now stand as accused for the same acts they had earlier denounced. What the Prosecutor did was to sabotage the prosecution of the criminal case against the vote-buyers and put in serious peril the integrity of the COMELEC, which filed the said case for vote-buying. If the Prosecutor had listened to the command of prudence and good faith, he should have brought the matter to the attention of the COMELEC. Petitioner COMELEC found that the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, who executed affidavits and turned witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99, voluntarily admitted that they were the acceptors or recipients in the vote-buying done by the accused in said case. It was precisely because of such voluntary admission and willingness to testify that the COMELEC en banc, in its Minute Resolution No. 00-2453, declared null and void the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 and held that the respondents therein are exempt from criminal prosecution pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646. Hence, it directed its Law Department to file a motion to dismiss the criminal cases which the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed in court against the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080. We agree with the petitioner and hold that the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, who are the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00, are exempt from criminal prosecution for vote-selling by virtue of the proviso in the last paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646. Respondent judge lost sight of the fact that at the time the complaint for vote-selling was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 had already executed sworn statements attesting to the corrupt practice of vote-buying in the case docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99. It cannot then be denied that they had already voluntarily given information in the vote-buying case. In fact, they willingly testified in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 per petitioners Memorandum filed with this Court.[14] In a futile attempt to justify his denial of the motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00, respondent judge averred in his comment on the petition that nothing was mentioned in the motion to dismiss that the accused in said cases had already given information or testified in any proceeding. Besides, no record of any preliminary investigation was attached to the motion to dismiss. The petitioner merely referred to the dispositive portion of Minute Resolution No. 00-2453 without mentioning any preliminary investigation conducted by the Law Department of the COMELEC. This contention is without basis. A reading of the motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00 shows that a certified true copy of COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 00-2453 was attached thereto and was made an integral part thereof. The attached resolution indicated that the accused in the cases sought to be dismissed had voluntarily given information and were willing to testify against the vote-buyers, and are therefore utilized as witnesses in the pending case for vote-buyers docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99. Clearly then, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he denied the motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00 despite

COMELECs determination that the accused therein are exempt from criminal prosecution for vote-selling pursuant to the proviso in the fourth paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated 16 March 2001 and 9 May 2001 of respondent judge in Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 798000 before Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite, are hereby SET ASIDE, and said criminal cases are ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Comelec vs. Kilosbayan Facts: A complaint was filed against private respondents, alleging that Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) were use for electioneering purposes. Kilosbayan alleges that DILG-NCR collaborated with Philippine Youth Health and Sports Development Foundation, Inc. (PYHSDFI), the former approving allotment to the latter 70M allegedly use to buy medical and sports equipment that was distributed few days before election and stopped at the day of election. Comelec investigators submitted the dismissal of the complaint for lack of evidence to prove probable cause. Kilosbayan provided news clippings, regarding alleged use of funds resulting from the said transaction of DILG-NCR and PYHSDFI and arguments to support its claims. The new paper clippings was regarded as hearsay. Kilosbayan filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that they are not responsible for the production of evidence by using public funds, it is the COMELEC who should search the evidence by using publicfunds and with the help of other agencies of the government as the constitution gave them the responsibility to prosecute election offenses. The motion was denied, thus this petition to compel COMELEC to prosecute the private respondents Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC can be compelled to produce evidence despite the complainants failure to prove probable cause. Held: NO, Insofar as the prosecution of election offenses is concerned, therefore, the COMELEC is the "public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the [Omnibus Election] Code before the competent court." The determination of probable cause in any criminal prosecution, is made indispensable by the Bill of Rights which enshrines every citizen's right to due process, the presumption that he is presumed innocent.

Petitioner KILOSBAYAN must have necessarily tendered evidence, independent of and in support of the allegations in its letter-complaint, to prove probable cause. It certainly demands more than "bare suspicion" and can never be "left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic" The task of the COMELEC as investigator and prosecutor, acting upon any election offense complaint, is not the physical searching and gathering of proof in support of a complaint for an alleged commission of an election offense. A complainant, who in effect accuses another person of having committed an act constituting an election offense, has the burden, as it is his responsibility, to follow through his accusation and prove his complainant. KILOSBAYAN, INC., FERNANDO A. SANTIAGO, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, EMILIO C. CAPULONG JR., RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, FRANKLIN DRILON, CESAR SARINO, LEONORA V. DE JESUS, TIBURCIO RELUCIO, ROLANDO V. PUNO, BENITO R. CATINDIG, MANUEL CALUPITAN III, VICENTE CARLOS, FRANCISCO CANCIO, JIMMY DURANTE, MELVYN MENDOZA, respondents. DECISION HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: Special Provision No. 1 of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under Republic Act No. 7180, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1992 allocates a specific amount of government funds for infrastructure and other priority projects and activities. In order to be valid, the use and release of said amount would have to proceed upon strict compliance with the following mandatory requirements: (1) approval by the President of the Philippines; (2) release of the amount directly to the appropriate implementing agency; and (3) list of projects and activities. In a letter, dated March 17, 1992, respondent Cesar Sarino, the then Secretary of Interior and Local Government, requested for authority to negotiate, enter into and sign Memoranda of Agreements with accredited Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in order to utilize them to projects of the CDF provided for under R.A. No. 7180. Thereafter, in an undated letter [1], respondent Franlin Drilon, the then Executive Secretary, granted the above-mentioned request of Secretary Sarino. Such an authority was extended to all the Regional Directors of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). Pursuant to the above-described authority granted him as the then Regional Director of the DILG-NCR, respondent Tiburcio Relucio, on April 24, 1992, entered in the Memorandum of Agreement[2] with an accredited NGO known as Philippine Youth Health and Sports Development Foundation, Inc. (PYHSDFI). The PYHSDFI was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on October 25, 1985 as a non-stock, non-profit foundation with principal address at AFMC Building, Amorsolo Street, Makati City. [3] Its incorporators were private respondents Benito Catindig, President; Manuel Calupitan, Vice-president; Francisco Cancio, Treasurer; Melvin Mendoza, Secretary; and Ronaldo Puno, Chairman.[4]

The PYHSDFI was organized to promote among the youth, consciousness and greater involvement and participation in sports and cultural development activities through training camps and demonstration seminars conducted by qualified experts in the field. [5] Not long after its incorporation, that is, in 1987, the PYHSDFI suspended its operations because of lack of fund donations and the migration to the United States of many of its members.[6]The foundation became active again in October, 1991.[7] In order to be eligible for financial assistance, the PYHSDFI, on December 12, 1991, applied with DILG for accreditation as NGO in Accordance with the guidelines prescribed in Memorandum Circular No. 90-07, dated January 31, 1990.[8] On March 23, 1992, the PYHSDFI approved Board Resolution No. 7, series of 1992, requesting for allocation from the governments CDF in order to implement its various sports, health, and cultural activities in specific areas in Metro Manila. [9] Hence, the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 24, 1992 was entered into by PYHSDFI President Catindig and DILG-NCR Regional Director Relucio. In compliance with accreditation requirements of the DILG, the PYHSDFI, on April 27, 1992, filed with SEC a new set of bylaws.[10] Under the said Memorandum of Agreement, it was the express responsibility of the DILG to effect the release and transfer to PYHSDFI of the amount of Seventy Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00)[11] from the aggregate allocation of the CDF for complete implementation of the foundations sports, health and cultural work program. Respondent Salvador Enriquez, as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), signed April 22, 1992 and released on April 30, 1992, Advice of Allotmet (AA) No. BC-8494-92-215 dated April 22, 1992, allocating the amount of Seventy Million Pesos from the CDF under object 200-10 to cover financial assistance for sports, health and cultural programs and other related activities in various barangays in the National Capital Region.[12] The release of Seventy Million Pesos was made in several checks:[13] Date May 5, 1992 May 5, 1992 May 6, 1992 PNB Check No. 138051 138052 138060 Amount P23,000,000.00 P23,000,000.00 P24,000,000.00

During the hearing of the Senate Committee on Finance on November 22, 1993, DILG Budget Officer Rafael Barata confirmed the above allotment as part of the amount of Three Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P330,000,000.00) that was released by DBM from the 1992 CDF. The exact amount released to DILG-NCR was P76,099,393.00 while the amounts released to the other regions are as follows: Region I Region II Region III P14,192,834.00 108,000.00 19,115,000.00

Region IV Region V Region VI Region VII Region VIII Region IX Region X Region XII CAR

74,131,150.00 25,047,991.00 5,545,000.00 20,159,500.00 23,006,600.00 19,900,900,00 25,356,012.00 9,549,000.00 10,300,000.00

The total amount disbursed under the CDF was P330,470,688.00. On December 14, 1993, public respondent Commission on Election (Comelec) received from petitioner Kilosbayan a letter informing of two x x x serious violations of election laws[14], thus: 1. The documented admission of Secretary of Budget Salvador Enriquez, in the October 5, 1993 hearing of the Commission on Appointments, that the amount of P70 million was released by his department, shortly before the elections of May 11, 1992, in favor of a private entity, the so-called Philippine Youth, Health and Sports Development Foundation, headed by Mr. Rolando Puno, who had been repeatedly identified by columnist Teodoro Benigno as a key member of the Sulu Hotel Operation (SHO), which had reportedly engaged in dirty election tricks and practices in said election. x x x 2. The illegal diversion of P330 million by Malacaang from the Countryside Development Fund to Department of Interior and Local Government which disbursed this huge amount shortly before the May 11, 1992 election, as revealed by DILG Budget Officer Barata, in a hearing of Senate Finance Committee, chaired by Sen. Vicente Sotto III, held last November 22, 1993.[15] and request[ing] that x x x these offenses and malpractices be investigated promptly, thoroughly, impartially, without fear or favor, so that public confidence in the integrity and purity of the electoral process may be immediately restored for the sake of our newlyregained democracy[16] On December 14, 1993, then Comelec Chairman Christian Monsod called a meeting of the Comelec En Banc which resolved to refer petitioner Kilosbayans letter-complaint to Law Department for comment and/or reccomendation. [17] Said letter compliant was docketed as E.O. No. 93-193. The evidence proffered by Kilosbayan in support of its letter-complaint consisted of the published writings of Teodoro Benigno [18] in his column in the Philippine Star newspaper imputing to the so-called Sulo Hotel Operation (SHO) headed by PYHSDFIs chairman, Ronaldo Puno, the commission of illegal election activities during the May 11, 1992

elections, including the obtention of government funds for electioneering purposes; the transcripts of record of the testimony of Secretary Enriquez before the Commission on Appointments during the hearing on October 5, 1993 and of the testimony of DILG Budget Officer Rafael Barata before Senate Finance Committee during a hearing on November 22, 1993; and an Affidavit executed by Norberto Gonzales, a congressional candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections, who alleged therein that at Makati Headquarters of the Lakas-NUCD, in February, 1992, he overheard respondents Franklin Drilon and Leonora de Jesus discussing party plans to use the funds of various government offices to finance the partys election campaign and that ten (10) days or so before May 11, 1992, he obtained his election propaganda materials, following instructions from the partys National Headquarters, from the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. In Memorandum dated March 28, 1994, Comelec Commissioner Regalado Maambong informed Chairman Christian Monsod that petitioner Kilosbayan [has already] presented their affidavits and supporting documents and [that] it is now time for the respondents to be subpoenaed and for them to present their counter-affidavits and supporting documents, if any, relative to the complaint of the Kilosbayan for illegal disbursement of public funds in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections[19] On March 29, 1994, the Comelec En Banc, during its regular meeting, directed Atty Jose P. Balbuena, Director of Law Department, to issue the proper subpoenas and subpoena duces tecum in connection with the hearing of the Kilosbayan letter-complaint; to proceed in accordance with the Comelec Rules and Procedure relative to the investigation of cases involving election offenses; and submit a complete report within ten (10) days from the termination of the investigation.[20] Director Balbuena issued a subpoena dated April 17, 1994 [21] addressed to respondents Salvador Enriquez, Ronaldo Puno, Francisco Cancio, Vicente Carlos, Jimmy Durante, Melvin Mendoza and Other John Does requiring them to appear at the Office of the Director on April 28, 1994 and to submit their respective counter-affidavits and other supporting documents, if any, in connection with petitioner Kilosbayans letter-complaint against them. On May 10, 1994, respondents Melvin Mendoza and Salvador Enriquez filed their respective counter-affidavits[22] specifically denying all the accusatory allegations in petitioner Kilosbayans letter-complaint. On May 25, 1994, respondent Vicente Carlos submitted his counter-affidavit. [23] For his part, respondent Francisco Cancio filed a Manifestation [24] dated May 24, 1994 that he cannot submit his counter-affidavit due to lack of material time. Thereafter, petitioner Kilosbayan manifested that it will file a consolidated reply to Counter-Affidavits of respondents Mendoza, Enriquez and Carlos. In order to give petitioner Kilosbayan sufficient time to prepare its consolidated reply, the hearing was set on June 6, 1994. When June 6, 1994 came, however, petitioner Kilosbayan filed, not a consolidated reply, but a pleading denominated as Interrogatives [25] dated May 20, 1994. Said pleading contained a list of questions sought to be propounded to respondents Enriquez, Carlos and Mendoza in an attempt to elicit from them confirmation regarding the questioned CDF allotment, specifically the cash allocation received by PYHSDFI, and the consumption thereof by PYHSDFI chairman Ronaldo Punos SHO for its reported illegal election campaign activities during the May 11, 1992 election. Amidst opposition forged by respondents Enriquez and Mendoza, the Comelec Law Department, through Director Balbuena, scheduled the clarificatory questioning on July 9, 1994.[26]

Through a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 5, 1994, respondent Enriquez persisted to question the legality of the scheduled clarificatory questioning on the ground that the same is in violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Said motion, however, was denied by the Comelec Law Department through Director Balbuena. Thus, respondents Enriquez and Mendoza filed separate Petition for Certiorari the Comelec En Banc assailing the afore-mentioned orders of Director Balbuena.
[27]

before

The Comelec En Banc treated said petitions as motions for reconsideration or petitions for review, of the orders of Director Balbuena giving due course to petitioner Kilosbayans Interrogatories and scheduling the same for hearing. Ultimately, it ruled in favor of respondents Enriquez and Mendoza and held that the questions sought by petitioner Kilosbayan to be propounded by Director Balbuena to said respondents, are being raised in a preliminary investigation during which any person being accused of an offense, has the right to remain silent, among others.[28] On February 9, 1995, the Comelec En Banc, during its regular meeting, promulgated Minute Resolution No. 95-0713 approving, with modification, the recommendations of Law Department, as follows: 1. To dismiss the complaint against Secretary Salvador Enriquez, Jr. for insufficiency of evidence to establish a probable cause; 2. To hold in abeyance the case aginst Ronaldo Puno, Vicente Carlos, Melvin Mendoza, Francisco Cancio and Jimmy Durante, and to direct the Commission on Audit (COA) to conduct further rigid and extensive investigation on the alleged irregularities or anomalies stated in its report dated November 15, 1993 and to submit its report on such investigation including pertinent papers thereof, which shall be included in the re-evaluation of the existing documents pertaining to the PYHSDFI before the case of the above respondents be re-submitted to this Commission for resolution; 3. To order the Law Department to summon Atty. Tiburcio A. Relucio, former Regional NCRDILG Director to shed light on the Kilosbayan complaint or the P70 million which were allotted by his office to the PYHSDFI shortly before the May 11, 1992 synchronized national and local elections: 4. To direct the Law Department to send a letter to former DILG Secretary Cesar Sarino to explain allotments and sub-allotments per evaluation report of the Law Department x x x; [and] 5. To direct the Kilosbayan to identify, under oath, the John Does in their complaint. [29] Dismissing the case against respondent Enriquez, whose evidence of strict compliance with the requirements of R.A. No. 7180 prior to the release of the Seventy Million Pesos to PYHSDFI, was significantly left unrebutted by petitioner Kilosbayan, the Comelec En Banc reserved the disposition of the case against Ronaldo Puno and other PYHSDFI officers until after submission by the COA of a more detailed report of the nature and extent of the anomalous practices of the PYHSDFI in the utilization of the CDF money allocated thereto. Easily understandable is the need for further investigation by the COA, considering that nothing on the Special Audit Report on PYHSDFIs CDF allocation imputed the use thereof for electioneering activities. In response, however, to the letter of the Comelec Law Department dated August 20, 1995 requesting the COA to conduct a more rigid and extensive investigation, COA

Chairman Celso Gangan wrote Director Balbuena on September 12, 1995 that the facts stated in our report dated November 15, 1993 are already complete; that the report does not make mention of irregularities or anomalies, rather deficiencies like lack of supporting documents to fully substantiate the disbursement x x x although the distribution of funds by the Foundation is supported by the a list x x x[30] On the same day, August 20, 1995, a letter was also sent to respondent Cesar Sarino, former DILG Secretary, requesting him to submit a verified explanation regarding the suballotments issued by his office on several dates in February and March, 1992, as well as some various sub-allotments issued by respondent Leonora de Jesus, then Undersecretary of the DILG. In the meantime, in a letter dated August18, 1995, Director Balbuena asked petitioner Kilosbayan to identify, under oath, the John Does in their complaint Responding through a letter,[31]petitioner Kilosbayan, through its Acting President, Cirilo A. Rigos, gave the following names: Cesar Sarino Leonora de Jesus Jose Almonte Franklin Drilon The above-named respondents were duly subpoenaed. Thereafter, they filed their respective Comments and/or Answers. On November 13, 1995, respondent Cesar Sarino Submitted his Sworn Explanation/Comment remonstrating that the questioned sub-allocations were approved only after a strict compliance with the proscribed time frame under the law which was March 27, 1992 until May 2, 1992 and prohibition against public work expenditures. Respondent Gabriel Claudio filed his Comment/Answer on December 12, 1995 contending that he had not yet joined government at any time before the May 11, 1992 elections. Respondents Franklin Drilon filed his Comment on January 29, 1996 denouncing as hearsay the sole evidence against him consisting of Teodoro Benignos newspaper articles implicating him in the SHO. Dionisio de la Serna, Victor Sumulong and Jose Almonte, who were additionally named as respondents by petitioner Kilosbayan, denied any knowledge or participation in the election offenses subject of the letter-complaint and objected thereto for failure to state, with particularity, the acts that they had supposedly committed in the violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Likewise, they pointed out that Teodoro Benigno newspaper articles constituted hearsay evidence bereft of any probative value. Insofar as respondent, then DILG-NCR Regional Directior, Tiburcio Relucio was concerned, the Law Department was unable to subpoena him because he was abroad. No rebuttal evidence was tendered by petitioner Kilosbayan to dispute the counterallegations of herein respondents. Notably, too, petitioner Kilosbayan did not offer any additional evidence, in the place of Teddy Benignos published newspaper articles implicating PYHSDFIs Ronaldo Puno and the SHOs electioneering activities during the 1992 Victor Sululong Dionisio de la Serna Gabriel Claudio

elections, in order to show even some semblance of a connection between the PYHSDFIs CDF allotment and SHOs electioneering activities. On April 3, 1996, the Comelec Law Department issued the following finding and recommendations: SYNOPSIS OF CASE [1] TITLE: 'KILOSBAYAN VS. SECRETARY SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., ET AL. [2] DOCKET NUMBER: E.O Case No. 93-193 [3] LAW ALLEGEDLY VIOLATED: Section 261 (o), (v) and (w) of the Omnibus Election Code. (Use of public funds, money deposited trust, x x x, for an election campaign; Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds for any and all kinds of public works; and Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices). [4] FINDINGS: The Law Department finds that there is insufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that respondents Ronaldo Puno, Secretary Vicente Carlos, Melvin Mendoza, Francisco Cancio, Jimmy Durante, Hon. Cesar N. Sarino, Leonora V. de Jesus, Jose Almonte, Dionisio de la Serna, Victor Sumulong, Franklin Drilon and Gabriel (Gabby) Claudio have committed the acts being complained of and probably guilty thereof and should be held for further proceedings (trial) considering that the allegations in the complaint are plain conjectures, speculations and based on hearsay evidence. The other set of evidence which was obtained through coercive processes of the Commission did not show that the acts as reflected therein come within the proscription of Section 261 (o), (v) and (w) of the Omnibus Election Code. [5] RECOMMENDATION: To dismiss the complaint of Kilosbayan against all the respondents. x x x[32] The details of the investigation and a complete discussion of the evidence submitted by the contending parties are laid out in the 16-page Study [33] attached to the aforecited Synopsis of the Case. Essentially, the Law Department evaluated the evidence in this wise: The provision of the Omnibus Election Code that may have been possibly violated by the respondents in the KILOSBAYAN complaint, are as follows: SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts following shall be guilty of an election offense:

xxx

xxx

xxx

(o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust, equipment, facilities owned or controlled by the government for an election campaign. Any person who uses under any guise whatsoever, directly or indirectly, (1) public funds or money deposited with, or held in trust by, public financing institutions or by government offices, banks, or agencies; x x x x for any election campaign or for any partisan political activity. (v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds Any public official or employee including barangay officials and those of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before special election, releases, disburses or expends any public funds for: (1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following: xxx xxx xxx

(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices during the period of forty-five days preceding a regular election and thirty days before a special election, any person who (a) undertakes the construction of any public works, except for projects or works exempted in the preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable against public funds. The Commission on Audit, thru its Chairman, pointed out, in its letter dated September 12, 1995, that the facts stated in their report dated November 15, 1993 are already complete and that the report does not make mention of irregularities or anomalies, rather deficiencies like lack of supporting documents to fully substantiate the disbursements, such that although the distribution of funds by the Foundation is supported by a list, this does not show the acknowledgment by supposed recipients. Although the report of the COA dated November 15, 1993 mentioned that upon the start of the audit, it was disclosed that PYHSDFI did not keep book of accounts, wherein to record its transactions, which constitute(s) a basic requirement in the accounting for funds and all it had to evidence its disbursements are vouchers, many of which are not supported by receipts or other documents, it does not show that the public funds released to it by the DILG was used for any election campaign or for any partisan political activity. The report says: (2) The inadequate financial reports, book of accounts and other supporting documents rendered verification of total disbursement of P70M difficult, This consist of the following: a) Meals./snacks b) Prof. fees/allowances travel expenses P17,881,500 P14,465,000

c) Rental site/facilities d) Purchases of supplies and materials

P 3,441,480 P34,221,020 P70,000,000

This particular part of the report of the COA also clearly showed that the public funds in the hands of the PYHSDFI were not used for any and all kinds of public works. Further it says: 3.A In most of the transactions undertaken, cash payments [were] used in paying their obligations, since it would have been significantly expensive it in overhead cost to maintain a pool of administrative staff and besides no allocation of such expenses [was] programmed. Moreover, most [the] expenses were in the category of payrolls which [had] to be paid in cash. [L]likewise suppliers asked for cash-ondelivery (COD) basis since the prices given were the lowest obtainable commercial rates. This showed that not all obligations of the PYHSDFI were paid in cash, in other words, the other obligations were paid in forms which may be checks or any other device undertaking future delivery of money. However, no single piece of evidence was presented by Kilosbayan to prove its complaint to determine whether they (checks) have been issued within the prohibited period. In the light of the foregoing, the Law Department reiterates its former findings in its Study for Agenda dated February 8, 1995 that in the case of respondents Ronald Puno, Secretary Vicente Carlos, Melvin Mendoza, Francisco Cancio and Jimmy Durante, based on the existing documents appearing on the records, no probable cause exists against them for violation of the election law. It is well-settled that the complainant must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the respondent[s]. In the case of Hon. Cesar N. Sarino, he alleged that his approvals of the sub-allocations reflect a strict compliance with the law and do not violate Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code as their approval [was] not within the proscribed time frame as designated by the Commission on Elections, and Advice of Sub-allotment No. DILG-92-2-128 covers a type of expenditure which is not public works expenditure, hence, not violative of said provision of law. xxx xxx xxx

x x x [A]n incisive, careful, meticulous and rigid review and re-evaluation of the abovelisted sub-allotments revealed, that the nine (9) sub-allotments approved by former DILG Secretary Cesar Sarino which appeared to be for construction of public works are actually nine (9) pages of five (5) sub-allotments x x x and the one (1) sub-allotment issued by Undersecretary Leonora V. de Jesus which appeared to be for construction of public works is actually: (b) Sub-allotment No. 1] 92-1-90 Date of Approval March 19, 1992 Page No. 1

To be liable for violation of Section 261 (v), supra, four (4) essential elements must concur and they are: 1) A public official or employee releases, disburses, or expends any public funds; 2) The release, disbursement or expenditure of such public funds must be within forty-five days before regular election (March 27, 1992 until May 11, 1992, Section 1, Comelec Resolution No. 2332, Jan. 02, 1992); 3) The release, disbursement or expenditure of said public funds is for any and all kinds of public works; and 4) The release, disbursement or expenditure of the public funds should not cover any exceptions of Section 261 (v). Except for Sub-allotment No. 92-1-94 and Sub-allotment No. 92-2-128 approved on March 27, 1992 and April 22, 1992, respectively, by former DILG Secretary Cesar Sarino, not one of the sub-allotments listed above does fall within the proscribed period. Sub-allotment No. 92-1-98 was approved to cover the improvement/rehabilitation of Cabucgayan Waterworks System of Cabucgayan, Leyte. This falls within exception (maintenance of existing and/or completed public works projects) of the proscription being merely a rehabilitation of an existing public works project. Sub-allotment No. 92-2-128 was not for any and all kinds of public works. It was approved to cover the purchase of reference and instructional materials for distribution to all local executives of the 2nd District of Surigao del Norte in support of the Educational Upliftment Program of the DILG, hence, it could not also fall within the proscription. The sub-allotment approved by undersecretary Leonora V. de Jesus, which appreared to be for the construction of public works, having been approved on March 19, 1992 does not fall within the proscriptive period, hence, it could not also fall within the proscription. xxx xxx xxx

Prescinding from the foregoing documents appearing on [the] records, there exist no sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that former DILG Secretary Cesar Sarino and Undersecretary Leonora V. de Jesus have violated Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code. The Law Department must stress here that the allegations appearing in the columns of Teodoro Benigno in the Philippine Star on several dates imputing dirty election tricks and practices (as worded by Kilosbayan) against respondent Jose Almonte, Dionisio de la Serna, Victor Sumulong, Franklin Drilon and Gabriel (Gabby) Claudio cannot be admitted as gospel truth because they are purely speculative and conjectural. Suffice it to say, that, they are mear hearsayevidence. Well-settled is the rule that Newspaper clippings are hearsay and of no evidentiary value. (People vs. Jovito Aguel, et al., 97 SCRA 795]. Moreover, former Executive Secretary, now Senator, Franklin Drilons undated letter, where he approved the request for authority dated March 17, 1992 of then former DILG Secretary Cesar N. Sarino to negotiate, enter into and sign Memoranda of Agreements with and to utilize the accredited Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), in accordance with the directive of then former President Corazon Aquino dated March 13, 1992, regarding the implementation of projects under the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) provided under

R.A. 7180, does not refer to any release, disbursement, or expenditure of public funds for construction of public works. Consequently, there also exist no sufficient evidence to engender a well-grounded belief that respondents Jose Almonte, Dionisio de la Serna, Victor Sumulong, franklin Drilon and Gabriel (Gabby) Claudio have violated Section 261 (o) and (v) of the Omnibus Election code. It would not be amissed to state here in passing that well-enshrined is the rule that the complainant must submit evidence to prove his case. IN THE INSTANT CASE, COMPLAINANT KILOSBAYAN DID NOT SUBMIT EVIDENCE TO PROVE ITS CASE. IT POSTULATES THE THEORY THAT SINCE IT IS THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE COMMISSION TO ENFORCE AND ADMINISTER ALL LAWS AND REGULATIONS RELATIVE TO THE CONDUCT OF ELECTION, IT IS INCUMBENT TO USE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO SECURE THE NEEDED EVIDENCE. THIS POSITION OF THE KILOSBAYAN IS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS AS IT IS NOT ONLY ITS LEGAL OBLIGATION BUT ALSO ITS MORAL DUTY TO SUBMIT ITS EVIDENCE TO PROVE ITS COMPLAINT. x x x[34] Adopting the foregoing findings and conclusions of the Law Department, the Comelec En Banc promulgated Minute Resolution No. 96-1037 dismissing the charges against the following: respondents Ronaldo Puno, Vicente Carlos, Melvin Mendoza, Francisco Cancio and Jimmy Durante for violation of Section 261 (o), (v) and (w) of the Omnibus Election Code; respondents Cesar Sarino and Leonora de Jesus for violation of Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code; and respondent Franklin Drilon and others also charged in petitioners complaint, namely, Jose Almonte, Dionisio de la Serna, Victor Sumulong and Gabriel Claudio, for violation of Section 261 (o) and (v) of the Omnibus Election Code, all on ground of insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause. Petitioner Kilosbayan, however brushed off responsibility for adducing evidence of herein respondents culpability, and adamantly demanded that the Comelec perform its constitutional duty of prosecuting election offenses upon any, even meager, information of alleged commission of election offenses. Its complaint having been dismissed in the aforementioned Resolutions dated February 9, 1995 and April 11, 1996, respectively, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated May 16, 1997 and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 1996 seeking the nullification of the said Resolutions and praying for the filing of corresponding criminal complaints and/or informations against herein respondents. Reiterating the dismissal of E.O. Case No. 93-193, however, the Comelec denied the motions in the Resolution dated October 30, 1996.[35] The Comelec Resolution dated January 20, 1997 contained the detailed basis for the final dismissal of E.O. Case No. 93-193. Discussing point by point the arguments raised by petitioner in its Motion for Reconsidiration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, the Comelec En Banc unanimously held, thus: Movant complains: The Law Department makes it appear that the KILOSBAYAN has greater responsibility in the enforcement of election laws than the COMELEC to make it its moral and legal duty to spend its time and private funds to gather evidence from public offices to convince the COMELEC that there is sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the respondents.

xxx It may do well to remember that the Constitution charged the COMELEC with the responsibility to x x x xxx (6) x x x where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. (emphasis theirs) The Commission has no quarrel with Complainant that indeed the Constitution tasked this Body with the prosecution of election offenses. But the constitutional provision made it clear that prosecution should be made only where it is appropriate. It is appropriate when it is established in the preliminary investigation that probable cause exist to justify the filing of the necessary information against the accused. Lest the Complainant forgets, it initiated the complaint. Thus, on it rests the burden of supporting its charges with affidavits and/any evidence, for it is upon the evidence thus adduced, that the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial. This is so provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure x x x. Nonetheless, even with Complainants failure to submit substantial enough to justify findings of probable cause, the Commission, through its Law Department undertook an investigation of the case. The Law Department summoned the parties, took testimonies of witnesses, secured documents, and conducted hearings. The result of the preliminary investigation was certainly on the basis of the evidences adduced by complainant and the facts gathered by the Department on its own initiative. xxx No other evidence except Mr. Benignos articles were submitted [by petitioner] to prove the existence of the so called Sulo-Hotel Operations. Newspaper clippings are hearsay and of no evidentiary value. (People v. Aquel, et al., 97 SCRA 795). x x x [Further] x x x [petitioner] wants the Commission to derive from [the Commission on Audit] report the conclusion that because there were discrepancies, to wit: 1. No books of account [were] maintained by the NGO [i.e., PHYSDFI]; and 2. Cash payments were made regardless of amount, then the allocation to PHYSDFI were made for electioneering purposes. Indeed, there could have been, as alleged by Complainant, irregularities in the allocation, but it must be shown by the quantum of evidence required to establish probable cause that such irregularities constituted election offense. This, Compalinants evidences failed to show. xxx It was established that the PHYSDFI received from DILG-NCR an allocation of P70 million. To Complainant the nature of the allocation and the amount of the expenditures made by PHYSDFI within a short period of time, i.e., immediately before the elections and in the light of the fact that it stopped all its operations shortly after the elections established beyond reasonable doubt that the foundation was engaged in partisan political

activity. Complainant further averred that the flight of the heads of the foundation (Puno and Catindig) and Regional Director Tiburcio A. Relucio who went into hiding after the series of exposes by columnist Teodoro Benigno constitutes an implied admission of guilt. x x x It is the Law Departments findings and so is Ours, that the nature and amount of expenditure within a short period of time are not sufficient to meet the quantum proof required to establish that said contributions were made for partisan political activity. It must be emphasized that the burden is on Kilosbayan to prove its allegations. He who alleges must prove his allegation. Unfortunately for Complainant, it was not able to produce evidence showing that the contribution was used for partisan political activity. xxx Complainant posits the view that respondents are liable x x x because the sports and medical kits were unlawful election propaganda, having been purchased and distributed a few days before election and the stopped after the election. At most, this is speculative and presumptive. In the absence of proof amply showing that the purchase and distribution of gadgets and kits were made to advertise or to further the chances of victory of candidate or candidates, the Commission cannot justify the conclusion that probable cause exist to charge respondents x x x. xxx While it was established by documents thus presented x x x that there was a release of public funds by DILG/DILG-NCR, within the prohibited period, the same could not be considered as a violation x x x because one, the expenditure was not for public works; and two, the Department of Interior and Local Government can not be considered as an office of other ministries (departments) performing functions similar to the Ministry of Social Services and Development or Ministry of Human Settlements. Kilosbayans complaints were heard. They were investigated. Complainant was given full opportunity to argue its case and prove its charges. It presented arguments but not evidences. It thesis is more on speculations, conjectures and suspicious. It expects the Commission to find as circumstantial evidence the chain of circumstances which [it] presented, forgetting that: The rule on circumstantial evidence necessarily requires that each circumstance must be positively established with the requisite quantum of evidence, in the same manner that the catena that binds the together and conduces to a conclusion of guilt must survive the test of reason and satisfy the required evidentiary weight.' (People vs. Adofina, 239 SCRA 67) Unfortunately, Complainant failed to sustantiate with sufficient evidence the circumstances on which it based the liability of respodents for offenses charged by way of its Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. x x x[36] Its Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration having been finally denied by the Comelec En Banc, petitioner Kilosbayan has come before us ascribing grave abuse of discretion to public respondent Comelec for: (1) refusing and/or neglecting to gather more evidence of respondents culpability, pursuant to its constitutional duty to prosecute election offenses, through oral arguments upon petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration as well as from respondents

Rolando Puno and Tiburcio Relucio who, petitioner claims, have not gone abroad but are actually in the country; and (2) for issuing a blanket exoneration of all respondents despite the prima facie evidence already in the hands of Comelec. The Comelec did not commit any act constituting grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner Kilosbayans letter-complaint against herein respondents, the former having failed to prove its case against the latter. As such, this petition must be dismissed. Section 2 (7) of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Comelec shall exercise the power to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. Discerning the rationale for this grant of prosecutorial powers to the Comelec, we already had occasion to rule, thus: The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to conduct of election and the concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote.[37] This constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec finds statutory expression under Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, to wit: SEC. 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted. Insofar as the prosecution of election offenses is concerned, therefore, the Comelec is the public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the [Omnibus Election] Code before the competent court. [38] This constitutional and statutory mandate for Comelec to investigate and prosecute cases of violation of election law translates, in effect, to the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the twin purpose of filing an information in court and helping the Judge determine, in the course of preliminary inquiry, whether or not a warrant of arrest should be issued. [39] For the effective investigation and prosecution of cases of election offenses and in the exercise by the Comelec of its quasi-legislative power under Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, the Comelec Rules of Procedure were promulgated, providing, among others, the guidelines pertinent to election offenses. They are as follows: Rule 34 Prosecution of Election Offenses SECTION 1. Authority of the Commission to Prosecute Election Offenses . The Commission shall have exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses

punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. SEC. 2. Continuing Delegation of Authority to Other Prosecution Arms of the Government. - The Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their respective assistants are hereby given continuing authority, as deputies of the Commission, to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under the election laws which may be filed directly with them, or which may be indorsed to them by the commission or its duly authorized representatives and to prosecute the same. Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn any time by the Commission whenever in its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the Commission, promote the common good, or when it believes the successful prosecution of the case can be done by the Commission. SEC. 3. Initiation of Complaint. Initiation of complaint for election offenses may be done motu proprio by the Commission, or upon written complaint by any citizen of the Philippines, candidate, registered political party, coalition of political parties or organizations under the party-list system or any accredited citizen arms of the Commission. SEC. 4. Form of Complaint and Where to File.- (a) When not initiated motu proprio by the Commission, the complaint must be verified and supported by affidavits and/or any other evidence. Motu proprio complaints may be signed by the Chairman of the Commission, or the Director of the Law Department upon direction of the chairman, and need not be verified. (b) The complaint shall be filed with the Law Department of the Commission; or with the offices of the Election Registrars x x x xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 5. Referral for Preliminary Investigation. If the complaint is initiated motu proprio by the Commission, or is filed with the Commission by any aggrieved party, it shall be referred to the Law Department for investigation. Upon direction of the Chairman of the Commission, the preliminary investigation may be delegated to any lawyer of said Department, or any of the Regional Election Directors or Provincial Election Supervisors, or any lawyer of the Commission. SEC. 6. Conduct of Preliminary Investigation. (a)If on the basis of the complaint, affidavits and the supporting evidence, the investigating officer finds no ground to continue with the inquiry, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint and shall follow the procedure prescribed in Section 8 (c) of this Rule. Otherwise, he shall issue a subpoena to the respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents giving said respondent ten (10) days from receipt within which to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents. The respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant. (b) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the respondent shall be furnished by him to the complainant.

(c) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten-day period, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant. (d) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit questions to the investigating officer which the latter may propound to the parties or witnesses concerned. (e) Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus adduced, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial. SEC. 7 Presumption of Existence of Probable Cause. A complaint initiated motu proprio by the Commission is presumed to be based on sufficient probable cause and the investigating officer must forthwith issue the subpoena mentioned in the immediately preceding section. SEC. 8. Duty of Investigating Officer. - The preliminary investigation must be terminated within twenty (20) days after receipt of the counter-affidavits and other evidence of the respondents, and resolution thereof shall be made within five (5) days thereafter. (a) If the investigating officer finds no cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall recommend dismissal of the complaint. (b) If the investigating officer finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution, and the corresponding information wherein he shall certify under oath that he has examined the complainant and his witnesses, that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. (c) In either case, the investigating officer shall, within five(5) days from the rendition of his recommendation, forward the records of the case to 1) The director of the Law Department of the Commission in cases investigated by any of the Commission lawyers or field personnel and 2) The State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal, as the case may be, pursuant to the continuing authority provided for in Section 2 of this Rule. SEC. 9. Duty of the Law Department, State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal Upon Receipt of Records. - (a) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the records stated in paragraph (c) of the immediately preceding section, the State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal shall take appropriate action thereon, immediately informing the parties of said action. (b) In case investigated by the lawyers or the field personnel of the Commission, the director of the Law Department shall review and evaluate the recommendation of the said legal officer, prepare a report and make a recommendation to the Commission affirming,

modifying or reversing the same which shall be included in the agenda of the succeeding meeting en banc of the Commission. If the Commission approves the filing of an information in court against the respondent/s, the Director of the Law Department shall prepare and sign the information for immediate filing with appropriate court. (c) In all other cases, if the recommendation to dismiss or the resolution to file the case in court is approved by State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal, they shall likewise approve the Information prepared and immediately cause its filing with the proper court. (d) If the recommendation to dismiss is reversed on the ground that a probable cause exists, the State Prosecutor, or the Provincial or City Fiscal, may, by himself prepare and file the corresponding information against the respondent or direct any of his assistants to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation. xxx xxx x x x [Emphasis ours].

The Comelec, whenever any election offense charge is filed before it, must have first, before dismissing the same or filing the corresponding information, conducted the preliminary investigation proper of the case. At this initial stage of criminal prosecution, the primordial task of the Comelec is the determination of probable cause, i.e., whether or not there is reason to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial[40] or as the Comelec Rules of the Procedure phrase it, whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed" [41] The determination of probable cause in any criminal prosecution, is made indispensable by the Bill of Rights which enshrines every citizens right to due process, the presumption that he is presumed innocent, and the inadmissibility against him of any damaging evidence obtained in violation of his right against self-incrimination. As Justice Reynanto S. Puno has pointed out, probable cause is neither an opaque concept in our jurisdiction [42] or a high level legal abstraction to be the subject of warring thoughts [43] It constitutes those facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed[44] by the person sought to be judicially indicted. In determining probable cause, however, the public prosecutor must have been apprised by the complainant of his evidence in support of his accusatory allegations. In other words, determining probable cause is an intellectual activity premised on the prior physical presentation or submission of documentary or testimonial proofs either confirming, negating or qualifying the allegations in the complaint. It follows, therefore, that in the instant case, petitioner Kilosbayan must have necessarily tendered evidence, independent of and in support of the allegations in its lettercomplaint, of such quality as to engender belief in an ordinarily prudent and cautious man that the offense charged therein has been committed by herein respondents. Indeed probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt[45], but it certainly demands more than bare suspicion[46] and can never be left to presupposition, conjuncture, or even convincing logic.[47] The effort of petitioner Kilosbayan, thus, in order to successfully lead to the judicial indictment of respondents, should have gone beyond a largely declamatory condemnation of respondents and diligently focused on its two-fold obligation of not only substantiating its charges against respondents but also proffering before the Comelec substantial evidence of respondents utilization, through conspiratorial, cooperative and/or interrelated acts, of

Seventy Million Pesos from CDF for electioneering activities in violation of its pertinent provision on election offenses as enumerated in the Omnibus Election Code. In the dispensation of this obligation, however Kilosbayan utterly failed. The encompassing narration of the pertinent facts and circumstances of this case in the early part of this ponenciaindubitably shows the complacency, at the least, and the gross and deliberate negligence, at most, of petitioner Kilosbayan in presenting sufficient evidence in support of its letter-complaint. To salvage its position, however, petitioner Kilosbayan denies the existence, under the 1987 Constitution, of any obligation on its part to present any evidence of its accusations against respondents in its letter-complaint. Petitioner Kilosbayan asserts that it is the obligation of the Comelec to search for the evidence needed to judicially indict respondents because it is the agency empowered to investigate and prosecute cases involving election offenses; that E.O. Case No. 93-193 should, at any rate, be deemed one filed by the Comelec motu proprio, thus needing no evidence since probable cause is such a case is presumed, petitioner Kilosbayan having only requested for an investigation and the Comelec having proceeded to in fact hold the investigation, as requested by petitioner Kilosbayan; and that the Comelec should already be grateful to petitioner Kilosbayan for the latters private efforts at exposing respondents illegal election activities. Kilosbayans position is not tenable. Indeed, Kilosbayan truly deserves commendation for its continued vigilance against any and all forms of government corruption that cost this country not only the funds gravely needed to afford each Filipino a decent and honorable life, but also the moral resolve to unite with each other and resist and eradicate the growing culture of greed, abuse of power and blatant disregard for basic human dignity and social responsibility. But it must guard against arrogance in trumpeting its causes, if not recklessness in its advocacy. The claim of petitioner Kilosbayan that it is merely the informant and not the private complainant with the burden to prove probable cause, borders on the ridiculous. Kilosbayan filed before the Comelec a letter-complaint dated December 14, 1993 in support of which documentary evidences like copies of Teodoro Benignos newspaper articles on the SHOs use of PYHSDFI-obtained CDF, of respondent Enriquezs testimony before the Commission on Appointments, of DILG Budget Officer Baratas testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, and of Norberto Gonzales affidavit, were likewise submitted by petitioner. The letter-complaint not being verified, it is not disputed that petitioner Kilosbayan subsequently caused its verification; when later asked to give the names of the other John Does in its letter-complaint, petitioner Kilosbayan obliged with a list, under oath, of additional respondents. Petitioner Kilosbayan initiated the complaint against herein respondents, hence the docketing thereof as E.O. Case No. 93193; it filed numerous pleadings before the Comelec as a private complainant in E.O. Case No. 93-193; its proceeded in the case in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure pertinent to the prosecution of cases of election offenses. After all, the Kilosbayan should have presented evidence and not proceeded and relied on mere conjecture and hearsay evidence. The contention of petitioner Kilosbayan that it is the Comelec that is duty-bound to search for evidence to prove its letter-complaint is downright erroneous. The task of the Comelec as investigator and prosecutor, acting upon any election offenses complaint, is not the physical searching and gathering of proof in support of a complaint for an alleged commission of an election offense. A complainant, who in effect accuses another person of having committed an act constituting an election offense, has the burden, as it is his responsibility, to follow through his accusation and prove his complaint. If the complainant fails to proffer the necessary evidence to show probable cause, notwithstanding the lack of

denial or any evidence in controversion, of the accusation, the complaint must be dismissed, since any person accused of a crime is presumed innocent and does not at all have to make a response or reaction to charges against him. The Comelec, is acting upon an election offense complaint in the course of preliminary investigation, initially facilitates the confrontation process between the complainant and the respondents by requiring the submission of and interfacing, their respective evidences. Ultimately, the Comelec passes upon the contending parties' respective submissions and proof and weighs the fact and circumstances established therefrom. Contrary to the asseveration of petitioner Kilosbayan, the preliminary investigation is not an occasion for Comelec to, as a duty, spoonfeed the complainant with evidence needed to prove its case. Finally, we cannot avoid the point out that no novel legal theory can distract even an ordinary layman from the plain dearth of evidence of respondents culpability on the record. There is no proof of the electioneering activities alleged by petitioner Kilosbayan to have been perpetrated by PYHSDFI during the May 11,1992 elections. Petitioner claims the PYHSDFI distributed medical kits and sports equipment to several youth groups in certain Metro Manila barangays for purposes of influencing their vote during the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner, however, vaguely states the places where, the dates when, the particular candidate for whose cause, and the general description of the people for whose consumption, the distribution of election propaganda materials was undertaken. In fact, there is no proof that the medical kits and sports equipment were election propaganda materials. This is not surprising for there is the barest evidence that this distribution had taken place at all. There is no proof that PYHSDFI used its cash allocations as an accredited nongovernmental organization in order to undertake electioneering activities. Petitioner likewise did not present proof that said distribution of medical kits and sports equipment was for purposes of influencing the votes of certain groups of people during the May 11, 1992 elections. Brushing aside these fatal evidentiary lapses, petitioner insists that PYHSDFI is guilty of using public funds for electioneering purposes simply because it received its CDF allocation within a time frame suspiciously so near the May 11, 1992 elections. This CDF allocation, however, has been convincingly shown to be a legal disbursement of public funds. Significantly, PYHSDFI neither presented rebuttal evidence nor even attempted to argue against the presumption of regular performance of official duty on the part of respondents like Franklin Drilon, Cesar Sarino, and Salvador Enriquez who were then acting in their official capacity as heads of their respective departments. It may even be conceded that petitioner tells a credible story, it being too much of coincidence for there to be, on the one hand, rumors of electioneering activities on the part of PYHSDFI and on the other, genuine cash allotments showing disbursement of public funds to the latter so coincidentally close to the May, 1992 elections. However, no matter how believable a story may be, no matter how possible it could really have been that PYHSDFI was financial conduit for criminal elements working for the interest of a particular candidate in the 1992 elections, criminal charges cannot ever be sanctioned by mere possibilities or coffee shop rumors. In other words, said cash allocations appear to be evidence of perhaps, a thousand hypothetical, though, possible scenarios. But, they are evidence of only one fact: that a certain amount of public money was made available to PYHSDFI as it is rightfully entitled thereto as an accredited non-governmental organization at around the same time that the synchronized elections of 1992 were to be held. But this one fact is certainly no justification to indict herein respondents for election offenses imputed to them.

Lastly, there is no proof that respondents conspired to have PYHSDFI accredited as non-government organization in order to avail itself of public funds to spend for electioneering purposes. In order for there to be reasonable ground to believe that a conspiracy exists among (1) the government officials who set up the mechanism for the accrediting NGOs to implement the project under the CDF and to qualify the latter to receive CDF allocations; (2) the incorporators and officers of the PYHSDFI; and (3) the SHO implicated by Teodoro Benigno in his newspaper articles in alleged electioneering activities during the May 11, 1992 elections, there must be a semblance of evidence linking them to each other. There is none, however, except for hearsay evidence consisting of the aforementioned newspaper articles. Suffice it is say that although only a low quantum and quanlity of evidence is needed to support a finding of probable cause [48], the same cannot be justified upon hearsay evidence that is never given any evidentiary or probative value in this jurisdiction. Incidentally, we note that although made party respondents in this case, Benito Catindig and Manuel Calupitan III were not officially made respondents in E.O. Case No. 93193 and accordingly not served with subpoena at any time during the pendency of said case before the Comelec. There is no ground, therefore, to implead Benito Catindig and Manuel Calupitan III in the instant case. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED, without any pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Election Laws KILOSBAYAN vs. COMELEC ( G.R. No. 128054, Oct. 16, 1997 ) Election Offense, B. Jurisdiction Over Election OffensesFacts: Special Provision No. 1 of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under R e p u b l i c A c t N o . 7 1 8 0 , a l l o c a t e s a s p e c i f i c a m o u n t o f g o v e r n m e n t f u n d s f o r infrastructure and other priority projects and activities. In order to be valid, the useand release of said amount should have the following mandatory requirements: (1)Approval by the President of the Philippines; (2) Release of the amount directly to thea p p r o p r i a t e i m p l e m e n t i n g a g e n c y ; a n d ( 3 ) L i s t o f p r o j e c t s a n d a c t i v i t i e s . Respondent Cesar Sarino, the then DILG Secretary, requested for authority ton e g o t i a t e , e n t e r i n t o , s i g n M e m o r a n d a o f A g r e e m e n t s w i t h a c c r e d i t e d N o n - Governmental O r g a n i z a t i o n s ( N G O s ) i n o r d e r t o u t i l i z e t h e m t o i m p l e m e n t t h e projects of the CDF provided for under R.A. No. 7180. Respondent Franklin Drilon,the then Executive Secretary, granted the abovementioned request of Secretary Sarino. Such an authority was extended to all the Regional Directors of the DILG.Pursuant to the abovedescribed authority granted him, respondent Tiburcio Relucio,on April 24, 1992, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with an accredited NGO known as the Philippine Youth Health and Sports Development Foundation,Inc. (PYHSDFI). COMELEC received from petitioner Kilosbayan a letter informingthe former of two serious violations of election laws, among them that the amount of P70 million was released by the Budget Department, shortly before the elections of May 11, 1992, in favor of PYHSDFI a private entity, which had reportedly engagedin dirty election tricks and practices in said elections and requesting that theseoffenses and malpractices be investigated promptly, thoroughly, impartially, withoutfear of

favor.I s s u e : B a s e d o n r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s b y t h e C o m e l e c L a w D e p a r t m e n t , t h e Commission en banc dismissed the letter-complaint for lack of evidence. Held The constitutional and statutory mandate for the Comelec to investigate andprosecute cases of violation of election laws translates, in effect, to the exclusivepower to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the twin purpose of filing an information in court and helping the Judge determine, inthe course of preliminary inquiry, whether or not a warrant of arrest should be issued.Although only a low quantum and quality of evidence is needed to support a findingof probable cause, the same cannot be justified upon hearsay evidence that is never given any evidentiary or probative value in this jurisdiction.

Baytan vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 153945 February 4, 2003 CARPIO, J.: FACTS: Petitioners, Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian Baytan were on their way to register for the May 1998 elections when they met the newly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio, in Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite City, who led them to register in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18. Upon realizing that their residence is situated within the jurisdiction of Barangay 28 not Barangay 18, petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and registered anew. Subsequently, petitioners sent a letter to former COMELEC Assistant Executive Director Jose Pio O. Joson requesting for advice on how to cancel their previous registration. Petitioners Voters Registration Records were forwarded to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Juanito V. Ravanzo, for evaluation, who, subsequently, recommended filing an information for double registration against petitioners. The COMELEC affirmed Ravanzos resolution. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which, was denied by COMELEC en banc. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it recommended the prosecution of petitioners for double registration despite lack of intent and substantial compliance with the requirement of cancellation of previous registration. HELD: No. There is no question that petitioners registered twice on different days and in different precincts without canceling their previous registration. Since "double registration" is malum prohibitum, petitioners claim of lack of intent to violate the law is inconsequential. Neither is the letter to Joson an application to cancel their previous registration. This letter was sent after their second registration was accomplished and after the election officer of Cavite City had already reported their act of double registration to a higher official. Moreover, petitioners claims of honest mistake, good faith and substantial compliance with the Election Codes requirement of cancellation of previous registration are matters of

defense best ventilated in the trial proper rather than at the preliminary investigation.The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof.

REYNATO BAYTAN, REYNALDO BAYTAN and ADRIAN BAYTAN, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.:

The Case Challenged in this petition for certiorari [1] with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is the Resolution dated June 3, 2002 [2] of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC for brevity) en banc in E.O. Case No. 97-503. In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC en banc denied the motion to reconsider Minute Resolution No. 00-2281 dated November 9, 2000 [3] ordering the Law Department to file criminal cases for double registration against petitioners Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian Baytan (petitioners for brevity).

The Antecedents On June 15, 1997, petitioners were on their way to register for the May 1998 elections when they met the newly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio (Ignacio for brevity), in Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite City. Ignacio led petitioners to register in Precinct No. 83A of Barangay 18. Petitioners registered in this precinct as evidenced by Voters Registration Records Nos. 41762473, 41762472 and 41762470. When petitioners returned home, they wondered why the registrants in this precinct looked unfamiliar to them. This prompted petitioners to return to the registration center to study the precinct map of Barangay 18. They then realized that their residence is situated within the jurisdiction of Barangay 28. Thus, petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and registered anew on June 22, 1997 as evidenced by Voters Registration Records Nos. 42662969, 42662968 and 42662917. Subsequently, petitioners sent a letter dated August 21, 1997 to former COMELEC Assistant Executive Director Jose Pio O. Joson and furnished a copy thereof to COMELEC Registrar Francisco Trias. In this letter, petitioners requested for advice on how to cancel their previous registration. They also explained the reason and circumstances of their second registration and expressed their intention to redress the error.

On September 16, 1997, the Election Officer of Cavite City forwarded copies of petitioners Voters Registration Records to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Juanito V. Ravanzo (Ravanzo for brevity), for evaluation. Ravanzo endorsed the matter to the Regional Director for prosecution. Eventually, the Law Department endorsed the case to Ravanzo for resolution. On January 10, 1998, Ravanzo recommended filing an information for double registration against petitioners. In an en banc meeting held on November 09, 2000, the COMELEC in its Minute Resolution No. 00-2281 affirmed the recommendation of Ravanzo. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The COMELEC en banc denied the motion and disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the En Banc resolution dated November 9, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. The Law Department is hereby directed to file the proper information against respondents for violation of Art. XXII, Sec. 261, par. (y) sub-par. (5) of the Omnibus Election Code. Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues Petitioners contend that the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in 1. Recommending the prosecution of petitioners for double registration despite clear and convincing evidence on record that they had no intention of committing said election offense; 2. Not considering the letter dated August 21, 1997 addressed to the COMELEC Assistant Director of Cavite City as substantial compliance with the requirement of the law for cancellation of previous registration; and 3. Taking cognizance of the case in the first instance in violation of Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution. In sum, petitioners insist they are innocent of any wrongdoing in their act of registering twice on different days in two different precincts. Petitioners argue that they did not intend to perpetrate the act prohibited, and therefore they should be exculpated. They claim honest mistake and good faith in registering twice. Petitioners claim they made the first registration because of the intervention and instigation of Ignacio. Petitioners theorize that their August 21, 1997 letter to the election registrar of Cavite City informing him of the lapse and asking how to rectify the same constitutes substantial compliance with the Omnibus Election Codes requirement of cancellation of prior registration. They further implore a liberal construction of the laws on election offenses since almost five years had lapsed from the date of the commission of the offense on June 15, 1997. They claim the case is about to prescribe under the Election Code. Lastly, petitioners fault the COMELEC en banc for assuming original jurisdiction over the case in contravention of Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution. Petitioners argue that this constitutional provision requires that election cases must first be heard and decided by a Division before assumption of jurisdiction by the COMELEC en banc.

The Courts Ruling The petition is bereft of merit. First and Second Issues: Whether the criminal cases should be dismissed on the ground of lack of intent and substantial compliance with the requirement of cancellation of previous registration. In Minute Resolution No. 00-2281 dated November 9, 2000, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the recommendation of the investigating officer. The COMELEC thus directed its Law Department to file the necessary information against petitioners for violation of Article XXII, SEC. 261 (y) (5) of the Election Code which reads: SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense: (y) On Registration of Voters: (5) Any person who, being a registered voter, registers anew without filing an application for cancellation of his previous registration. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration to which the COMELEC en banc issued the assailed Resolution dated June 3, 2002 affirming the Minute Resolution. The grant by the Constitution to the COMELEC of the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses is intended to enable the COMELEC to assure the people of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. This grant is an adjunct to the COMELECs constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws. Failure by the COMELEC to exercise this power could result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make an idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. [4] Petitioners lose sight of the fact that the assailed resolutions were issued in the preliminary investigation stage. A preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial and is only the means to discover who may be charged with a crime, its function being merely to determine probable cause.[5] All that is required in the preliminary investigation is the determination of probable cause to justify the holding of petitioners for trial. By definition, probable cause is x x x a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded x x x such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean `actual or positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.[6] There is no question that petitioners registered twice on different days and in different precincts without canceling their previous registration. Aside from this, the COMELEC found certain circumstances prevailing in the case sufficient to warrant the finding of probable cause. The COMELEC noted that petitioners wrote down their address in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18 as No. 709 T. Gomez Extension St., Barangay 18-Maya, Cavite

City. However, in Precinct No. 129-A of Barangay 28, petitioners registered as residents of No. 709 Magcawas St., Barangay 28-Taurus, Caridad, Cavite City. The COMELEC noted further that the affidavits submitted by petitioners contained glaring inconsistencies. Petitioners claimed that Ignacio led them to the wrong precinct to register. However, Ignacios affidavit stated that while he led them to the voting precinct of Barangay 18, he immediately left the area not knowing that petitioners registered in the wrong barangay. Contrary to petitioners sworn statements, Aurora Baytan, mother of petitioners, had another version. She claimed in her affidavit that on June 15, 1997, Ignacio went to their house to inform them about the redefinition of their barangays territorial jurisdiction. Right then and there, Ignacio brought her sons to Barangay 18 to register. The COMELEC also pointed out that since double registration is malum prohibitum, petitioners claim of lack of intent to violate the law is inconsequential. Neither did the COMELEC consider petitioners letter dated August 22, 1997 as an application to cancel their previous registration. The COMELEC explained that this letter was sent after their second registration was accomplished and after the election officer of Cavite City had already reported their act of double registration to a higher official. All told, a reasonably prudent man would readily conclude that there exists probable cause to hold petitioners for trial for the offense of double registration. Moreover, petitioners claims of honest mistake, good faith and substantial compliance with the Election Codes requirement of cancellation of previous registration are matters of defense best ventilated in the trial proper rather than at the preliminary investigation. [7] The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof.[8] It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests in the COMELECs sound discretion. The COMELEC exercises the constitutional authority to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices.[9] Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the COMELECs exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law.[10] We also cannot accept petitioners plea for a liberal construction of the laws on the ground of prescription. Prescription of the crime or offense is the forfeiture or loss of the right of the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time. [11] Section 267 of the Election Code provides that election offenses shall prescribe after five years from the date of their commission . In this case, the offense of double registration allegedly occurred on June 22, 1997 when petitioners registered for a second time in a different precinct without canceling their previous registration. At this point, the period of prescription for the alleged offense started to run. However, prescription is interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the offender. Specifically, the period of prescription is interrupted by the filing of the complaint even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation. [12] The COMELEC initiated the complaint for double registration against petitioners motu proprio under Sections 3,[13] 4[14] and 5,[15] Rule 34 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of

Procedure. On September 16, 1997, the Election Officer of Cavite City forwarded copies of petitioners Voters Registration Records for evaluation to Atty. Juanito V. Ravanzo, Provincial Election Supervisor of Cavite City, who was also tasked to investigate the case. Ravanzo endorsed the matter to the Regional Director for prosecution. The Regional Director forwarded the case to the Law Department and the latter re-endorsed the same to the office of Ravanzo for resolution. A preliminary investigation hearing was conducted on January 19, 1998 where petitioners were instructed to submit their counter-affidavits. After the preliminary investigation and based on the affidavits and other evidence submitted in the case, Ravanzo recommended the prosecution of petitioners for the offense of double registration. Ineluctably, the prescriptive period of the offense was interrupted upon the COMELECs initiation of proceedings against petitioners and remains tolled pending the termination of the case. The liberal construction of punitive laws in relation to the prescription of offenses cannot be invoked to prejudice the interest of the State to prosecute election offenses, especially those which the COMELEC described as ruffling the electoral system. [16] Third Issue: Whether the COMELEC en bancs assumption of original jurisdiction over the case violated the Constitution. Petitioners rely on Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution which states: Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. Petitioners assert that this constitutional provision serves as basis to nullify the proceedings conducted and orders issued by the COMELEC en banc in E.O. Case No. 97503. Petitioners cite Sarmiento v. Comelec[17] and Zarate v. Comelec[18] to support their stand that the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it assumed original jurisdiction over the case without first referring the same to any of its divisions. In Sarmiento and Zarate, the Court similarly held that election cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the Commission, and that the Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance. In its Comment for the COMELEC, the Solicitor General points out that the rulings in Sarmiento and Zarate were clarified in Canicosa v. COMELEC[19] to mean that [I]t is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi judicial powers that the COMELEC is mandated to hear and decide cases first by division and then, upon motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. This is when it is jurisdictional. The Solicitor General contends that the conduct of a preliminary investigation before the filing of an information in court does not in any way adjudicate with finality the rights and liabilities of the parties investigated. A preliminary investigation does not make any pronouncement as to the guilt or innocence of the party involved. Hence, a preliminary investigation cannot be considered a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding required to be heard by the Division in the first instance.

On the other hand, petitioners countered that in Cruz v. People,[20] the Court held that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding since there is opportunity to be heard and for the production and weighing of evidence and a decision is rendered thereon. Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELECs administrative powers are found in Section 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) of Article IX-C. [21] The 1987 Constitution does not prescribe how the COMELEC should exercise its administrative powers, whether en banc or in division. The Constitution merely vests the COMELECs administrative powers in the Commission on Elections, while providing that the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions. Clearly, the COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. Indeed, this has been the practice of the COMELEC both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.[22] On the other hand, the COMELECs quasi-judicial powers are found in Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C, to wit: Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: xxx (2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable. The COMELECs exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Section 3 of Article IXC which expressly requires that all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC in division, and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc. It follows, as held by the Court in Canicosa,[23] that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division, and then upon motion for reconsideration en banc, only when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC is empowered in Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution to prosecute cases of violations of election laws. The prosecution of election law violators involves the exercise of the COMELECs administrative powers. Thus, the COMELEC en banc can directly approve the recommendation of its Law Department to file the criminal information for double registration against petitioners in the instant case. There is no constitutional requirement that the filing of the criminal information be first decided by any of the divisions of the COMELEC. In sum, the second sentence of Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable in administrative cases, like the instant case where the COMELEC is determining whether probable cause exists to charge petitioners for violation of the provision of the Election Code prohibiting double registration. Indeed, the COMELEC acted in accordance with Section 9(b), Rule 34 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure governing the prosecution of election offenses in meeting en

banc in the first instance and acting on the recommendation of Investigating Officer Ravanzo to file charges against petitioners. The rule reads: SEC. 9. Duty of the Law Department, State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal Upon Receipt of Records. x x x (b). In cases investigated by the lawyers or the field personnel of the Commission, the Director of the Law Department shall review and evaluate the recommendation of said legal officer, prepare a report and make a recommendation to the Commission affirming, modifying or reversing the same which shall be included in the agenda of the succeeding meeting en banc of the Commission. If the Commission approves the filing of an information against the respondent/s, the Director of the Law Department shall prepare and sign the information for immediate filing with the appropriate court. (Emphasis supplied) Minute Resolution No. 00-2281 was issued during the en banc meeting held on November 9, 2000 to resolve the recommendation of Ravanzo in the case. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

People vs. Basilla G.R. Nos. 83938-40 November 6, 1989 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. HENRY B. BASILLA, SALVACION COLAMBOT, SPOUSES JAIME AND ADORACION TAYONG and MELCHOR YANSON, respondents. The Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner. Ruben A. Songco for respondents.

FELICIANO, J.: As an aftermath of the May 1987 congressional elections in Masbate, complaints for violations of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881) were filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate against the private respondents as follows: 1) by Jolly Fernandez, then Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Governor, against the spouses Jaime and Adoracion Tayong for violation of Section 261, paragraph a-1, for vote-buying; 2) by Ladislao Bataliran against Salvacion Colambot for violation of Section 261, paragraph a-1, also for vote buying; and

3) by PC/Sgt Arturo Rebaya against Melchor Yanson for violation of Section 261, paragraph p, for carrying of deadly weapon. After preliminary investigation of the foregoing complaints, the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Cataingan, Masbate,. the following criminal complaints: (1,) Criminal Case No. 324 against the spouses Tayong; (2) Criminal Case No. 326 against Salvacion Colambot and (3) Criminal Case No. 375 against Melchor Yanson. In three (3) separate orders, all dated 6 October 1987, and Identical in tenor save for the names of the accused respondent Judge Henry Basilla motu proprio dismissed the three (3) informations filed by the Provincial Fiscal, giving the following justification: xxx xxx xxx The record shows that the complainant filed the complaint with the fiscal and not with the COMELEC. The COMELEC did not investigate the case. The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines says: "Sec. 2(6) of Art. IX (C) The Commission on Election shall exercise the following powers and functions: xxx xxx xxx ... ; investigate and, when appropriate prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or omissions, constituting election frauds offenses, malpractices." The Omnibus Election Election Code of the Philippines (BP Blg, 881) says: Sec. 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government; Provided, however, that in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complaint may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice. for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted. (Sec. 182, 1978, EC; and Sec. 66. BP 697) In the landmark case of De Jesus vs. People, L-60998, February 120 SCRA 760, the the Supreme Court ruled: The grant to the COMELEC of the power. among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election and the concomitant authority to investigate andprosecute election offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to ensure the free, and

honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result i ii the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere Idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate. Consistently, and lately, in Corpu[s], et al. vs. Tanodbayan of the Philippines', et al., L-62075, April 15, 1987, our Supreme Court rules: An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigateand prosecute election offenses committed by any person, whether private individual or public officer or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all embracing power over the conduct of election. IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, inasmuch as the election offense was not investigated and prosecuted by the COMELEC. the case is motu proprio dismissed. 1 The People moved for reconsideration of respondent Judge's orders, without success. The instant Petition for Review assails the three (3) orders dismissing the three (3 ) criminal informations against the private respondents, as constituting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Petition argues principally that the Commission on Elections ("Comelec") has authority to deputize the chief state prosecutors, provincial and city fiscals and their assistants, under Sections 2 (4) and (8 ), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, and that the Comelec did deputize such prosecution officers to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints for alleged violation of election laws and to institute criminal informations therefor. The Petition must be granted. There is no dispute that the Comelec is vested with power and authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code and to prosecute such offenses in court. Section 265 of this Code reads as follows: See. 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the

Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted. (Sec. 182, 1973 EC; and Sec. 66, BP 697) (Emphasis supplied) We note that while Section 265 of the Code vests "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary investigation of election offenses and to prosecute the same upon the Comelec, it at the same time authorizes the Comelec to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the Government. Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1 987 Constitution clearly envisage that the Comelec would not be compelled to carry out all its functions directly and by itself alone: Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: (1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. xxx xxx xxx (4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcementi agencies and instrumantalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. xxx xxx xxx (6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. xxx xxx xxx (8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied) The concurrence of the President with the deputation by Comelec of the prosecuting arms of the Government, was expressed in general terms and in advance in Executive Order No. 134. dated 27 February 1987, entitled "Enabling Act for the Elections for members of Congress on May 11, 1987, and for other purposes." Executive Order No. 134 provided in pertinent portion as follows: xxx xxx xxx See. 11. Prosecution. Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable as provided for in the preceding section, and to

prosecute the same: Provided, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within two (2) months from filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the Office the Fiscal or with the Department for Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. (Emphasis supplied) On 9 March 1987, the Comelec enacted its Resolution No. 1862. The pertinant operative portions of this resolution are the following: xxx xxx xxx NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution of the Republic of the, Philippines, the Omnibus Election Code and Executive Orders Nos. 50, 94, 134 and 144, has RESOLVED to designate, as it hereby designates the Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscalss and their respective Assistants as its deputies in connection with the elections for Members of Congress on May 11, 1987, to perform the following duties and functions: 1. Conduct prelimiry investigation of complaints involving election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code which may be filed directly with them, or which may be endorsed to them by the Commission or its authorized representatives; and 2. Whenever a prima facie case exists, file the proper information in court and prosecute the same. Preliminary investigation of cases filed directly with, or endorsed to, Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their respective Assistants shall be conducted immediately and shall be finished within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof and, for this purpose, they are enjoined to hold office on a twentyfour (24) hour basis during the registration of voters on April 11 and 12, 1987, on Election Day on May 11, 1987, and until midnight on Revision Day on May 2, 1987. Provincial and City Fiscals and their respective Assistants shall submit to the Commission a report on every case directly filed with them and thereafter, monthly progress reports on the status of the cases handled by them, including those endorsed by the Commission or its authorized representatives. This Resolution shall take effect immediately.
2

(Emphasis supplied)

The contention of private respondents that the deputation by the Comelec of the prosecuting arms of the Government would be warranted only before the elections and only to ensure tree, honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections, that is, to perform the peace-keeping functions of policemen, lack substance. There is nothing in Section 2 (4) of

Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires such a pinched niggardly interpretation of the authority of the Comelec to appoint as its deputies, officials or employees of other agencies and instrumentalities of the government. The prompt investigation and prosecution and disposition of election offenses constitute an indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. The investigation and prosecution of election offenses are, in an important sense, more important than the maintenance of physical order in election precinct. 'without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals and their assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide elections would simply not be possible, unless, perhaps, the Comelec had a bureaucracy many times larger than what it actually has. Moreover, the prosecution officers designated by the Comelec become deputies or agents of the Comelec and pro tantosubject to the authority, control and supervision of the Comelec in respect of the particular functions covered by such deputation. The acts of such deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated authority are, in legal contemplation, the acts of the Comelec itself. The only limitation the Constitution itself places upon the Comelec's authority over its deputies relates to the enforcement of such authority through administrative sanctions. Such sanctions-e.g., suspension or removal-may be recommended by the Comelec to the President (Sec. 2 [8], Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution) rather than directly imposed by the Comelec, evidently, to pre-empt and avoid potential difficulties with the executive department of the Government where the prosecution and other officers deputized are ordinarily located. All this the respondent Judge disregarded when he motu proprio dismissed the criminal informations filed in this case. The cases he cited in his identical orders De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760 (1983) and Corpus, et al. v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 (1987) can offer him no comfort at all; for these cases do not relate to the authority of the Comelec to deputize the regular prosecution arms of the Government for the investigation and prosecution of election offenses and those cases are not in conflict with our ruling here. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED due course and the Orders of the trial court all dated October 6, 1987 in Criminal Cases Nos. 324, 326 and 375 and the Order dated December 7, 1987 in the same cases denying the People's Motion for Reconsideration, are hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED. The trial court is ORDERED to proceed forthwith with the continuation of Criminal Cases Nos. 324, 326 and 375 and until termination thereof. Costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED.