Journal of Applied Psychology Copyright 2006 by the American Psychological Association

2006, Vol. 91, No. 1, 211–220 0021-9010/06/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0021-9010.91.1.211

Placing Perceptions of Politics in the Context of the Feedback

Environment, Employee Attitudes, and Job Performance
Christopher C. Rosen, Paul E. Levy, and Rosalie J. Hall
University of Akron

The authors proposed a model suggesting that organizational environments supporting high levels of
informal supervisor and coworker feedback are associated with lower employee perceptions of organi-
zational politics. Furthermore, these lowered perceptions of politics were proposed to result in higher
employee morale (as reflected in job satisfaction and affective commitment) and, through morale, to
higher levels of task performance and organizational citizenship. The proposed mediational model was
supported with empirical results from 150 subordinate–supervisor dyads sampled across a variety of
organizations. Higher quality feedback environments were associated with lower perceptions of organi-
zational politics, and morale mediated the relationships between organizational politics and various
aspects of work performance. These findings suggest that when employees have greater access to
information regarding behaviors that are acceptable and desired at work, perceptions of politics are
reduced and work outcomes are enhanced.

Keywords: perceptions of organizational politics, feedback, feedback environment, morale, performance

Employee perceptions of organizational politics have been
linked to a variety of negative outcomes for organizations, includ-
ing low levels of job satisfaction, organizational commitment, task
performance, and organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB; Cro-
panzano, Howes, Grandey, & Toth, 1997; Ferris et al., 1996). Yet,
researchers’ knowledge of the antecedents and consequences of
organizational politics remains incomplete (Kacmar, Bozeman,
Carlson, & Anthony, 1999). Working within the frameworks of
social marketplaces (Cropanzano et al., 1997; Randall, Cropan-
zano, Bormann, & Birjulin, 1999) and expectancy theory (Valle,
Kacmar, & Zivnuska, 2003), we propose that a positive organiza-
tional feedback environment reduces employee perceptions that
organizational decisions are politically driven (and thus potentially
uncontrollable, threatening, or unfair). Furthermore, a substantial
portion of the positive effects of a supportive feedback environ-
ment on employee morale and performance are mediated through
these reduced perceptions of organizational politics.
Perceptions of Organizational Politics
Our definition of organizational politics derives from work by
Ferris, Kacmar, and colleagues (Ferris, Adams, Kolodinsky,
Hochwarter, & Ammeter, 2002; Ferris & Kacmar, 1992; Ferris,
Russ, & Fandt, 1989). It converges on aspects of political behavior
in organizations that are self-serving, not officially sanctioned by
the organization, and often have detrimental effects (Ferris et al.,
1996; Ferris & Kacmar, 1992; Randall et al., 1999). Ferris et al.
(1989) suggested the importance of considering employee percep-
tions of politics; thus, the network of variables expected to be
associated with politics typically includes individual-level beliefs,
attitudes, and behaviors. Ferris et al. (1989) developed an influen-
tial model that detailed the antecedents and consequences of such
employee perceptions. This model described organizational (e.g.,
centralization, formalization), personal (e.g., age, gender), and
environmental (e.g., feedback, interactions with others) influences
on organizational politics and detailed how perceptions of politics
influence work outcomes such as job involvement, organizational
withdrawal, and job satisfaction. Although the model has been
informative and has led to numerous empirical studies (for inte-
grative reviews, see Ferris et al., 2002; Kacmar & Baron, 1999),
Kacmar et al. (1999) suggested that organizational politics re-
search has been limited by an almost exclusive focus on variables
included in the original Ferris et al. (1989) model.
Thus, we propose a model (see Figure 1) of relationships among
the feedback environment, organizational politics, employee atti-
tudes, and performance, including two sets of mediated effects.
First, employee perceptions of politics are proposed to mediate the
relationship between the feedback environment and the general
level of morale (as reflected by job satisfaction and organizational
commitment). Second, we also propose that morale mediates the
relationships between politics and various aspects of work perfor-
mance, incorporating both discretionary OCBs and task perfor-
mance. Thus, perceptions of politics and their resulting effects on
morale are proposed to play key intervening roles in the feedback
environment–performance relationship.
The Feedback Environment

Christopher C. Rosen, Paul E. Levy, and Rosalie J. Hall, Department of
Psychology, University of Akron.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Paul E.
Levy, Department of Psychology, University of Akron, Arts & Sciences
Building, 3rd Floor, Akron, OH 44325-4301. E-mail: pelevy@uakron.edu
Feedback is a subset of the available information in the work
environment that indicates how well an individual is meeting his or
her goals. It conveys which behaviors are desired by the organi-
zation and includes an evaluation of the quality of relevant work
behaviors (London, 2003; Steelman, Levy, & Snell, 2004). In

211
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Figure 1. Proposed theoretical model: Relationships among the feedback environment, politics, morale, and
performance. Dim’l ⫽ dimensional.
general, feedback relates to important work outcomes such as
employee learning and development, motivation, and work perfor-
mance (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996; Murphy & Cleveland, 1995).
Much of the feedback literature has focused on feedback as
measured or manipulated in a relatively narrow context. However,
London (2003) recently suggested that organizations may create
more global psychological settings—feedback-oriented cul-
tures— by enhancing the quality of feedback given in the organi-
zation, emphasizing its importance, and supporting its use by
employees. In such cultures, feedback is easily accessible, salient,
and thus likely to influence employee beliefs and behaviors on a
day-to-day basis. Similarly, expectancy theory suggests feedback
will increase employees’ performance-to-outcome expectancy be-
liefs by clarifying which behaviors must be performed to be
rewarded. Employees who receive more feedback will be more
likely to know the standards of good performance, to believe that
performing well will lead to desired rewards, and be more likely to
use feedback to improve their own performance.
Levy and his colleagues have begun to examine in detail the
extent to which the workplace encourages and supports the use of
feedback for the purposes of improving work performance (Levy,
Albright, Cawley, & Williams, 1995; Steelman et al., 2004; J. R.
Williams, Miller, Steelman, & Levy, 1999). Steelman et al. (2004)
made a theoretical argument for the utility of informal, day-to-day
provision of feedback in the work context. The underlying con-
cept—the feedback environment— closely relates to London’s
(2003) idea of a feedback culture but also explicitly integrates a
wealth of empirical findings on the characteristics of feedback that
increase its acceptability and effectiveness.
In addition to the theoretical work, an extensive measure of the
feedback environment was developed and validated (Steelman et
al., 2004). It identifies seven facets of feedback processes: source
credibility, feedback quality, feedback delivery, frequency of fa-
vorable feedback, frequency of unfavorable feedback, feedback
availability, and the support of feedback seeking. Each of these
facets relies on supervisors and coworkers as sources. Empirical
tests of the measures demonstrate that when higher levels of the
feedback environment facets are present, they are associated with
increased affective commitment, job satisfaction, and OCBs, as
well as decreased absenteeism (Norris-Watts & Levy, 2004; Steel-
man & Levy, 2001).
Relating the Feedback Environment to Perceptions of
Organizational Politics
Politics tend to flourish in ambiguous and uncertain work en-
vironments (Ferris & Kacmar, 1992; Ferris et al., 1989). Lack of
clarity regarding performance standards and reward structures can
create a system that favors politics as a means of acquiring desired
employee outcomes (Ferris et al., 1989; Randall et al., 1999). In
contrast, when standards and reward structures are clear, employ-
ees better understand the reward system, view the organization as
less political, and engage in less politicking. Because environ-
ments high in feedback tend to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity
by guiding, motivating, and reinforcing effective behaviors while
reducing ineffective behaviors (Ashford, 1986; Ashford & Cum-
mings, 1983; London, 2003), we suggest that they will also tend to
be associated with lowered levels—and thus lowered percep-
tions— of organizational politics.
Our proposed model extends understanding of the relationship
between feedback and politics by specifically focusing on the role
played by the feedback environment. Organizations that have more
favorable feedback environments are also likely to have more
effective feedback processes (London, 2003) and to communicate
more information to employees that helps guide their behavior at
work. Indeed, Steelman et al. (2004) found that the feedback
environment positively relates to satisfaction with feedback, the
frequency with which feedback is sought, and motivation to im-
prove job performance based on feedback. Thus, on the basis of an
assumption that more favorable feedback environments reduce
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ambiguity, we hypothesize that feedback environment favorability
is negatively related to perceptions of organizational politics.
Because the favorability of the feedback environment is deter-
mined both by information from supervisors and from coworkers,
an interesting and previously unaddressed question arises. Does
one of these two feedback sources have more influence on em-
ployee perceptions of politics? We suggest that the supervisor
feedback environment would be expected to have a stronger in-
fluence on politics perceptions than the coworker feedback envi-
ronment, on the basis of the specialized role that supervisors have
with respect to their subordinates (e.g., Gerstner & Day, 1997).
Supervisors have a primary responsibility for making and commu-
nicating organizational decisions to their subordinates. Thus, they
exert greater influence and power, especially in the arena of
dispensing organizational rewards and punishments. This question
of unequal influence can be empirically investigated within the
context of our model.
Relationship of Feedback Environment and Politics to
Morale and Performance
Theoretical rationale. Expectancy theory-based interpreta-
tions of the relationship of perceptions of politics to the general
positivity or negativity of employees’ work attitudes suggest that
in highly political organizations, rewards are perceived as being
distributed on the basis of factors other than merit. This results in
a high degree of ambiguity and uncertainty—which is likely to
have a detrimental effect on employee morale, as reflected in lower
satisfaction and commitment (e.g., Valle et al., 2003). Similarly,
Cropanzano’s work (Cropanzano et al., 1997; Randall et al., 1999)
argued that work settings can be viewed as social marketplaces in
which individuals seek a favorable return on their investment.
From this viewpoint, very political organizations are likely to have
employees with less favorable work attitudes because their confi-
dence that the reward system will meet their needs has been
undermined by that system’s arbitrariness and apparent unfairness.
Indeed, empirical research clearly demonstrates a negative rela-
tionship between perceptions of organizational politics and job
attitudes such as affective commitment and job satisfaction (Boze-
man, Perrewé, Hochwarter, & Brymer, 2001; Kacmar et al., 1999;
Randall et al., 1999). Employees holding negative attitudes are
likely to reduce the time and effort put into meeting organizational
objectives, and they may instead engage in political behaviors that
advance their own careers but create little of value for the orga-
nization, thus resulting in lower levels both of in-role performance
and organizational citizenship behavior.
The current study extends the politics literature in two important
ways. First, we suggest perceptions of politics are most likely to
influence employee attitudes when conceptualized at the broad
level of morale rather than at a more specific level such as would
be indicated by satisfaction facets or narrow commitment con-
structs. Second, we propose perceptions of politics play an impor-
tant mediating role in translating external events into employee
attitudes and behaviors. A substantial portion of the feedback
environment’s positive effects on employee work attitudes and
performance may be mediated through reduced perceptions of
politics. Thus, our model incorporates an extended mediational
chain: Feedback environment is expected to relate negatively to
perceptions of politics; politics, in turn, is expected to have a
213
negative effect on performance through its adverse influence on
morale.
Supportive empirical evidence. There is substantial evidence
that more negative work attitudes are associated with lower per-
formance. For example, the empirical, theoretical, and meta-
analytic work of John Meyer and his colleagues clearly demon-
strates affective commitment relates both to task performance and
OCBs (Meyer & Allen, 1997; Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001; Meyer,
Stanley, Herscovitch, & Topolnytsky, 2002; Riketta, 2002). Sim-
ilarly, a recent review of the job satisfaction–job performance
relationship (Judge, Bono, Thoreson, & Patton, 2001) estimated
the correlation to be .30 between overall job satisfaction and job
performance. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, and Bachrach (2000)
suggested that employee satisfaction and organizational commit-
ment are among the strongest determinants of OCBs, with rela-
tionships that range from .23 to .31. In addition, they proposed that
affective commitment and job satisfaction operate as part of a
general morale factor that positively relates to OCBs. Thus, our
initial model incorporates proposed positive relationships of mo-
rale to a performance construct that captures both in-role and
extra-role performance, negative relationships of perceptions of
politics with performance (mediated through morale), and positive
relationships of feedback environment to performance by a three-
path mediational chain through politics and work attitudes (see
Figure 1).
Method
Participants
Two hundred sixty-seven employed undergraduate students at an urban,
midwestern university provided the subordinate responses. The partici-
pants were all working at least part time and gave us permission to contact
their supervisors. One hundred fifty supervisors from a wide variety of
organizations returned the survey, for a supervisor response rate of 56%.
The average age of the subordinates was 24 years. Women made up
67.5% of the sample. Approximately 77.3% were Caucasian. Their average
job tenure was 30.1 months, with an average of 30 hr worked per week.
Approximately 42% of the subordinate participants worked at least 35 hr
per week. Subordinate jobs included both nonmanagerial and managerial
positions that spanned multiple U.S. Department of Labor occupational
categories. The average age of supervisors was 38.3 years. Approximately
55% of the supervisors were female, and 79.9% were Caucasian. They had
supervised the target employee for an average of 29.3 months, whereas the
average tenure in their own current managerial position was about 8.6
years.
Procedure
Subordinate participants, who received extra credit for taking part in the
research project, completed measures designed to assess their perceptions
of the feedback environment at work, their perceptions of politics in their
organizations, and their work attitudes (affective commitment and job
satisfaction). After completing the surveys, participants completed a con-
sent form allowing their supervisors to be contacted regarding their work
performance, and they then gave a survey to their supervisors. The super-
visor survey assessed employee performance as well as supervisor demo-
graphic information. Supervisors mailed completed surveys directly to the
researchers.
Measures
The paper-and-pencil measures used a 7-point Likert-type response scale
with anchors ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
214 RESEARCH REPORTS
Subordinate measures. Kacmar and Carlson’s (1997) revised 15-item
Perceptions of Organizational Politics Scale was used to measure the extent
to which employees viewed their work environment as political (e.g.,
“Promotions around here are not valued much because how they are
determined is so political”). This measure has three subscales: (a) General
Political Behavior, (b) Going Along to Get Ahead, and (c) Pay and
Promotion. The 63-item Feedback Environment Scale (FES; Steelman et
al., 2004) was used to assess subordinates’ perceptions of their feedback-
related interactions with supervisors and coworkers. The FES is divided
into supervisor and coworker source factors, each of which has seven facets
(see the Appendix).
Organizational commitment of subordinates was measured using Allen
and Meyer’s (1990) eight-item Affective Commitment Scale. A sample
item is “This organization has a great deal of personal meaning to me.” Job
satisfaction was measured using three items developed by Cammann,
Fichman, Jenkins, and Klesh (1979). A sample item is “All in all, I am
satisfied with my job.” Demographic information including age, race,
weekly hours worked, type of job, and job tenure was also collected at this
time.
Supervisor measures. Supervisors rated the in-role and extra-role (i.e.,
citizenship) performance of their employees using the Organizational Cit-
izenship Behavior—Individual measure (OCBI; seven items) and Organi-
zational Citizenship Behavior—Organization measure (OCBO; six items)
developed by L. J. Williams and Anderson (1991). OCBIs tap those
behaviors that benefit specific individuals in the organization (e.g., “Helps
others who have been absent”), whereas OCBOs tap those behaviors that
benefit the organization as a whole (e.g., “Adheres to informal rules
devised to maintain order”). In-role performance data were collected using
L. J. Williams and Anderson’s (1991) seven-item measure of in-role
behavior, shown by them to be independent of the OCBs (e.g., “Meets
formal performance requirements of the job”).
Analytic Procedures
Our focal analyses involved tests of the relationships among latent
constructs, estimated using the structural equation modeling software
Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 1998 –2004). Maximum-likelihood estimation
was used. We used Hu and Bentler’s (1999) fit criteria, which recommend
the following cutoff values when evaluating model fit: .09 (or below) for
the standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR) and .95 (or above) for
the comparative fit index (CFI). Additionally, the root-mean-square error
of approximation (RMSEA) is ideally less than .06.
As shown in Figure 2, we used multiple-item composites as indicators.
Specifically, indicators for the supervisor and coworker feedback environ-
ment constructs consisted of the seven relevant FES subscale scores.
Indicators for the politics construct consisted of the three relevant Percep-
tions of Organizational Politics subscale scores. The morale factor was
modeled using the job satisfaction and affective commitment scales as
indicators. Finally, the multidimensional performance construct had three
indicators, consisting of the scale scores for in-role performance, OCBI,
and OCBO.
Results
Table 1 lists means, standard deviations, and coefficient alphas
for the raw score variables as well as latent intercorrelations.1
Test of the Measurement Model
The measurement model included five latent constructs repre-
senting the supervisor and coworker feedback environments, per-
ceptions of organizational politics, morale, and performance.
These were all allowed to freely intercorrelate so that model fit
indices reflected the adequacy of the proposed relationships be-
tween the constructs and their indicators. The model also included
a small number of covariances among FES subscale residuals,
which were suggested by modification indices and also made
conceptual sense.2 This model fit the data well, ␹2(193, N ⫽
150) ⫽ 230.38, p ⫽ .034, SRMR ⫽ .051, CFI ⫽ .980, RMSEA ⫽
.036. All loadings of the measured variables on their respective
constructs were statistically significant (see Figure 2).
Table 1 presents the correlations among the latent constructs
from the final measurement model. Although they do not alone
provide a full test of the hypothesized relationships, they are
generally consistent with the expected pattern of results (all are
significant at p ⬍ .05 unless otherwise noted). Politics showed the
proposed significant, negative relationships with the feedback en-
vironment constructs (supervisor, r ⫽ ⫺.61; coworker, r ⫽ ⫺.30)
and with morale (r ⫽ ⫺.61). As expected, both of the feedback
environment constructs related positively and significantly with
morale (supervisor, r ⫽ .46; coworker, r ⫽ .34). The relationships
of both feedback environment constructs to the multidimensional
performance construct were also positive as expected. The super-
visor feedback environment relationship with performance was
statistically significant (r ⫽ .19), however, the coworker feedback
environment relationship with performance was not (r ⫽ .13).
These smaller relationships are not surprising given the extended
mediational chain proposed to link feedback environment with
performance. Shrout and Bolger (2002) discussed issues of prox-
imal versus distal mediation and noted that it is not unusual to find
small and nonsignificant relationships between the initial and final
variables in an extended mediational chain such as that linking
feedback environment with performance.
The weak and nonsignificant correlation of politics with perfor-
mance (r ⫽ .02) shown in Table 1 might raise some concerns about
the potential for finding mediation of this relationship by the
morale factor—the Baron and Kenny (1986) guidelines for estab-
lishing mediation suggest that typically the independent and out-
come variables will be significantly related. However, in some
contexts not all of the Baron and Kenny criteria apply. For exam-
ple, the observed correlation between the independent and out-
come variables may be nonsignificant and close to zero in partial
mediation contexts in which there are direct and indirect paths of
similar magnitude but opposite signs (see Kenny, Kashy, &
Bolger, 1998; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Thus, it seemed reasonable
to continue testing the proposed mediational model given the
presence of longer mediational chains and the potential for partial
mediation.
1
The raw score correlations are available from Christopher C. Rosen on
request.
2
More specifically, three sets of covarying residuals were added for
both the supervisor and the coworker subscales: (a) Feedback Quality with
Source Credibility, (b) Support of Feedback Seeking with Feedback Avail-
ability, and (c) Frequency of Unfavorable Feedback with Feedback Deliv-
ery. Parallel covariances were constrained equal in the two feedback
environment subscales (e.g., the covariance of Supervisor Feedback Qual-
ity with Supervisor Source Credibility was fixed equal to the covariance of
Coworker Feedback Quality with Coworker Source Credibility). Also,
three covariances between the residuals of parallel supervisor and co-
worker feedback environment scales were added: (a) Frequency of Unfa-
vorable Feedback, (B) Feedback Quality, and (C) Availability of Feedback.
 RESEARCH REPORTS 215

Figure 2. Measurement model showing factor loadings. All loadings are statistically significant at p ⬍ .05.
FB ⫽ feedback; Freq ⫽ Frequency; Favor ⫽ Favorable; Unfavor ⫽ Unfavorable; Dim’l ⫽ dimensional;
General ⫽ General Political Behavior; Get Ahead ⫽ Going Along to Get Ahead; Pay/Promo ⫽ Pay and
Promotion; JobSat ⫽ job satisfaction; AffCom ⫽ affective commitment; InRole ⫽ in role; OCBI ⫽ Organi-
zational Citizenship Behavior—Individual measure; OCBO ⫽ Organizational Citizenship Behavior—Organi-
zation measure.

Tests of Structural Models
We first tested a model that included not only the hypothesized
mediating (i.e., indirect) paths but also all possible additional
direct paths (going from left to right in the model). The purpose of
this estimation was to determine whether additional direct paths
should be included in our proposed model in order to capture
possible partial mediation effects. However, all of these paths were
nonsignificant and, therefore, none of them were retained in the
model.
There was still the puzzling issue of the essentially zero corre-
lation between politics and performance but evidence of a potential
mediational chain leading from politics to morale to performance.
Thus, we turned to the literature on nonstandard mediation (see,
e.g., James & Brett, 1984), which suggested to us the potential for
a nonrecursive relationship. More specifically, it seemed both
theoretically and empirically plausible that perceptions of politics
not only indirectly affected by job performance but also that
remaining unexplained variability in the level of job performance
might influence the extent of politics perceptions. Thus, we tested
a nonrecursive form of a partial mediation model that included an
additional direct path from performance to politics. This path was
statistically significant and thus retained. (Additional analyses with
an augmented data set and incorporating instrumental variables
also supported the plausibility of this nonrecursive path; see
Rosen, Levy, & Hall, 2004, for details.)
The final structural model and its resulting standardized param-
eter estimates are shown in Figure 3. The path indicated with a
dotted line is the nonrecursive direct effect described in the pre-
vious paragraph. Fit indices resulting for this model suggest that it
fits the data quite well, ␹2(197, N ⫽ 150) ⫽ 233.05, p ⫽ .040,
SRMR ⫽ .053, CFI ⫽ .981, RMSEA ⫽ .035. All hypothesized
paths were statistically significant. Quality of the supervisor and
coworker feedback environments were negatively related to per-
ceptions of organizational politics (supervisor, ␤ ⫽ ⫺.65; co-
216 RESEARCH REPORTS

Table 1
Intercorrelations Among Latent Constructs in Measurement Model and Scale Score Descriptive Statistics

Scale score statistics

Variable 1 2 3 4 5 M SD ␣

From subordinate responses

1. Supervisor FES — .20* ⫺.61* .46* .19* 5.33 0.96 .95

2. Coworker FES — ⫺.30* .34* .13 4.77 1.04 .94
3. Politics perceptions — ⫺.61* .02 3.47 0.93 .76
4. Morale — .23*
Job satisfaction 5.44 1.58 .94
Affective commitment 4.14 1.22 .84

From supervisor ratings

5. Performance —
OCBI 5.63 0.98 .90
OCBO 5.93 0.95 .81
In role 6.21 0.72 .81

Note. Latent and raw scores. N ⫽ 150 subordinate and 150 supervisor responses. FES ⫽ Feedback Environment Scale; OCBI ⫽ Organizational
Citizenship Behavior—Individual measure; OCBO ⫽ Organizational Citizenship Behavior—Organization measure.
* p ⬍ .05.

worker, ␤ ⫽ ⫺.26). Politics in turn was negatively related to
morale (␤ ⫽ ⫺.73). Morale was positively related to performance
outcomes (␤ ⫽ .45). The indirect effect of politics on performance
had an opposite sign from the direct effect of the performance
residual on politics, thus suggesting that politics need not show a
significant bivariate relationship with performance in order to infer
mediation. More specifically, there was a negative indirect effect
of politics on performance (–.73 ⫻ .45 ⫽ ⫺.33) and a positive
direct effect (.34). As would be expected if the model were
consistent with the observed data, the sum of these two effects
(.01) was very close to the observed correlation between politics
and performance (.02). Overall, the model explained slightly under
half of the observed variance in the politics (R2 ⫽ .45) and morale
(R2 ⫽ .41) and about one fifth of the variance in performance
(R2 ⫽ .22).
Further Assessment of the Evidence for Mediation
A variety of guidelines might be used to determine whether the
data supported our proposed mediational chains. First, we note that
all of the hypothesized paths making up the proposed mediational
chains had significant coefficients ( p ⬍ .05). Furthermore, all of

Figure 3. Partial mediation model including standardized path estimates. The dotted line indicates nonrecur-
sive effect added on the basis of supplementary analyses. Dim’l ⫽ dimensional.
 RESEARCH REPORTS
these paths had the expected positive or negative sign. Second, all
except one of the proposed mediator relationships met the guide-
lines suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986) or as amended by
Kenny et al. (1998) for the case of partial mediation with opposing
signs. The sole exception to this was the bivariate correlation of
coworker feedback environment with performance. We suggest
that this is likely an issue of statistical power, in which the indirect
effect associated with an extended mediational chain is relatively
low in magnitude and thus difficult to detect (see Shrout & Bolger,
2002).
Third and finally, to supplement the structural equation model-
ing, we calculated Goodman I statistics to test the statistical
significance of the hypothesized indirect effects on the morale and
performance variables. In this procedure, the magnitude of the
unstandardized indirect effect and its accompanying standard error
are calculated, using procedures based on the work of Sobel (1982)
and Goodman (1960). The ratio of the indirect effect over its
standard error is compared with a z distribution to determine
statistical significance. The interactive Web page developed by
Preacher and Leonardelli (2001) was used for these calculations.
Table 2 summarizes the results of these tests as well as the
points made in the previous paragraph. All three of the shorter,
three-variable mediational chains had a statistically significant
result ( p ⬍ .05) for this test of the indirect effects. (As far as we
have been able to determine, there is no accepted analogous test
available for the two more extended mediational chains in our
model, which lead from the two feedback environment constructs
to performance.) In sum, the pattern of results suggests strong
evidence for four of our five hypothesized mediational relation-
ships, with standardized indirect effect sizes ranging in magnitude
from .19 to .47. In addition, there was suggestive evidence for a
fifth indirect effect, from coworker feedback environment to per-
formance, although this is likely a small magnitude effect.
Discussion
The present study had dual objectives. First, we wished to
replicate observed relationships between the feedback environ-
ment and both employee attitudinal and performance outcomes
(e.g., Norris-Watts & Levy, 2004; Steelman & Levy, 2001) while
also extending our understanding of the mechanisms of this influ-
ence. Second, we wanted to broaden our knowledge of the ante-
cedents and consequences of organizational politics in response to
a call by Kacmar et al. (1999). On the basis of arguments grounded
Table 2
Summary of Empirical Evidence for Mediation
Description of indirect path ␣␤
Supervisor feedback environment 3 politics 3 morale .47
Coworker feedback environment 3 politics 3 morale .19
Supervisor feedback environment 3 politics 3 morale
3 multidimensional performance .21
Coworker feedback environment 3 politics 3 morale
3 multidimensional performance .09
Politics 3 morale 3 multidimensional performance ⫺.33
Note. ␣␤ is the standardized value of the indirect effect.
** p ⬍ .01.
217
in expectancy (Valle et al., 2003) and social marketplace (Cropan-
zano et al., 1997; Randall et al., 1999) theories, we proposed and
tested an integrative mediational model. The tests of the key
mediational paths in the model were all supported, and exploratory
analysis identified a nonrecursive path that also helps to explain
the relationships among these variables.
The value of the newly developed FES was demonstrated in this
study. We found that, consistent with Steelman et al. (2004),
quality of the supervisor and coworker sources of feedback were
positively related, but this relationship was not especially strong
(r ⫽ .22, p ⬍ .05). This result suggests that employees do indeed
discriminate between the coworker and supervisor dimensions of
the feedback environment. The results also clearly support the idea
of a negative relationship between the feedback environment and
perceptions of organizational politics. Both the supervisor (␤ ⫽
⫺.69, p ⬍ .05) and coworker (␤ ⫽ ⫺.20, p ⬍ .05) feedback
environments contributed uniquely to perceptions of politics. As
expected, supervisors appeared to have the more influential effect.
This may reflect both the fact that supervisors have greater control
over the allocation of rewards and also that their hierarchical role
means that they are expected to resolve uncertain or ambiguous
issues in the workplace. In other words, when one’s supervisor
gives inadequate or unclear feedback about performance expecta-
tions and level, decisions may appear much more politically driven
than when coworkers are reticent.
Replicating previous work (Bozeman et al., 2001; Cropanzano
et al., 1997; Kacmar et al., 1999; Randall et al., 1999), perceptions
of politics were negatively related to employee morale (␤ ⫽ ⫺.69,
p ⬍ .05), as indicated by lower levels of job satisfaction and
affective commitment when perceptions of politics were high.
Furthermore, our results are consistent with prior theoretical and
empirical work arguing that political environments create ambigu-
ity and uncertainty regarding reward structures, leading employees
to view rewards as related more to politics than to effort and/or
performance (Ferris & Kacmar, 1992; Ferris et al., 1989). How-
ever, more direct tests of these proposed relationships regarding
uncertainty may be useful.
An inspection of the mediated effects of feedback environment
on morale suggests the following conclusions. The positive effects
of coworker feedback environment on morale are substantially
weaker than those of the supervisor feedback environment. How-
ever, both effects appear to be mediated through perceptions of
politics. Although not measured directly in the current study, our
All component All relevant Baron and Goodman I
paths significant? Kenny (1986) criteria met? statistic
Yes Yes 4.30**
Yes Yes 2.63**
Yes Yes
Yes No
Yes Yes 2.82**
218 RESEARCH REPORTS
results are consistent with a theoretical explanation that the favor-
ability of the feedback environment relates to the effectiveness of
feedback processes in organizations and that organizations with
more effective feedback processes have reduced ambiguity (Lon-
don, 2003; Steelman et al., 2004). Although the results of our study
strongly support politics as a mediator of feedback environment
effects on morale, we also suggest the usefulness of further explo-
ration of the psychological mechanisms underlying the effects of
the feedback environment on morale.
The model also proposed that lower morale may result in
employees decreasing the amount of time and effort that they put
into their jobs, which prior research has suggested can result in
lower levels of task performance and OCBs (Cropanzano et al.,
1997; Randall et al., 1999). Indeed, our results are consistent with
this prior research and further support the proposed mediational
paths from politics and feedback environment to performance.
This multidimensional performance construct showed both the
proposed negative indirect effect of politics and an unexpected,
nonrecursive positive direct effect from performance to politics.
One possible explanation for this unexpected finding is that good
performers are good, in part, because they recognize the politics
inherent in their organization and work proactively within that
context. Thus, they report higher levels of politics than do their
low performing counterparts.
Implications, Limitations, and Future Directions
Our results provide an initial demonstration of important rela-
tionships among the feedback environment, politics, work atti-
tudes, and behaviors. Our proposed model did not completely
capture relationships with the performance variables, although it fit
the data well. We modified the model with a nonrecursive path
from the performance residual to politics and, thus, future studies
should focus on replicating it, including designs that can explore
additional potential mediating variables such as measures of sub-
ordinate experiences of ambiguity, uncertainty, and expectancies.
The additional information provided by including these variables
would also help to validate our proposed theoretical explanations
in terms of social marketplace and expectancy theories.
Our findings suggest organizations may be able to deliberately
control ambiguity and thus lower perceptions of politics by creat-
ing environments in which employees have access to information
regarding which behaviors are acceptable and desired at work.
Future studies should explore the feedback environment as the
target of organizational interventions. By integrating the feedback
environment into coaching and training programs, the organization
could create a feedback-oriented culture in which employees are
encouraged to actively seek and utilize feedback to improve per-
formance (London, 2003; Steelman et al., 2004). The results of the
present study suggest that a by-product of creating a feedback-
oriented culture may be to lower employees’ perceptions of poli-
tics, improve work attitudes, and raise performance.
A limit of the present study was the relatively small sample size
(although it was adequate to test model fit and determine signifi-
cance of the path coefficients). The reliance on a younger sample
of subordinates, of modest job tenure, may also place some bound-
ary conditions on the generalizability of the study. Replication
using a more varied sample of subordinates would further extend
researchers’ knowledge of feedback environment effects on poli-
tics. However, the collection of data from subordinates from
different organizations (and thus differing organizational feedback
environments) does work to increase the generalizability of the
findings. A second limitation is that we have captured a cross-
sectional snapshot of the relationships among these variables.
Although the results are quite strong and consistent, there are
certainly other variables beyond the feedback environment that
may have as large or potentially a larger effect on perceptions of
politics. Furthermore, the post hoc addition of the nonrecursive
relationship from performance to politics perceptions especially
needs replication. In fact, given our demonstration of potential
mediating and nonrecursive effects in a cross-sectional design, the
next step is a longitudinal study to strengthen researchers’ ability
to make causal inferences. We will leave that for future research
and can only conclude from this study that the evidence so far is
that feedback environment plays an important part in predicting
perceptions of politics.
Conclusion
The current study makes three specific contributions to the
literature. First, empirical evidence was found supporting the im-
portance of the feedback environment as an antecedent of percep-
tions of organizational politics, thus expanding the focus of both
the feedback environment and antecedents of politics perceptions.
Second, perceptions of organizational politics were both indirectly
and directly linked to supervisor ratings of performance. It is
important to note that performance was multidimensionally opera-
tionalized, using measures of OCBIs, OCBOs, and in-role perfor-
mance. The results suggest the potential for politics to play a key
role in critical organizational outcomes. Finally, employee morale,
as indicated by measures of job satisfaction and affective commit-
ment, was identified as a mediator of the relationship between
perceptions of politics and performance, thus illuminating the
underlying mechanisms relating organizational politics to work
behaviors.
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220 RESEARCH REPORTS
Appendix
Feedback Environment Scale (FES)
Dimension Supervisor source
Source Credibility 1. My supervisor is generally familiar with my performance
on the job.
2. In general, I respect my supervisor’s opinions about my
job performance.
3. With respect to job performance feedback, I usually do
not trust my supervisor.
4. My supervisor is fair when evaluating my job perfor-
mance.
5. I have confidence in the feedback my supervisor gives
me.
Feedback Quality 1. My supervisor gives me useful feedback about my job
performance.
2. The performance feedback I receive from my supervisor
is helpful.
3. I value the feedback I receive from my supervisor.
4. The feedback I receive from my supervisor helps me do
my job.
5. The performance information I receive from my
supervisor is generally not very meaningful.
Feedback Delivery 1. My supervisor is supportive when giving me feedback
about my job performance.
2. When my supervisor gives me performance feedback, he
or she is considerate of my feelings.
3. My supervisor generally provides feedback in a
thoughtless manner.
4. My supervisor does not treat people very well when
providing performance feedback.
5. My supervisor is tactful when giving me performance
feedback.
Favorable Feedback 1. When I do a good job at work my supervisor praises my
performance.
2. I seldom receive praise from my supervisor.
3. My supervisor generally lets me know when I do a good
job at work.
4. I frequently receive positive feedback from my
supervisor.
Unfavorable Feedback 1. When I don’t meet deadlines, my supervisor lets me
know.
2. My supervisor tells me when my work performance does
not meet organizational standards.
3. On those occasions when my job performance falls
below what is expected, my supervisor lets me know.
4. On those occasions when I make a mistake at work, my
supervisor tells me.
Feedback Availability 1. My supervisor is usually available when I want perfor-
mance information.
2. My supervisor is too busy to give me feedback.
3. I have little contact with my supervisor.
4. I interact with my supervisor on a daily basis.
5. The only time I receive performance feedback from my
supervisor is during my performance review.
Promotes Feedback 1. My supervisor is often annoyed when I directly ask for
Seeking performance feedback.
2. When I ask for performance feedback, my supervisor
generally does not give me the information right away.
3. I feel comfortable asking my supervisor for feedback
about my work performance.
4. My supervisor encourages me to ask for feedback
whenever I am uncertain about my job performance.
Note. From “The Feedback Environment Scale (FES): Construct Definition, Measurement and Validation,” by L. A. Steelman, P. E. Levy, and A. F. Snell,
2004, Educational and Psychological Measurement, 64, pp. 165–184. Copyright 2004 by Sage. Reprinted with permission.
Coworker source
1. My co-workers are generally familiar with my performance
on the job.
2. In general, I respect my co-workers’ opinions about my job
performance.
3. With respect to job performance feedback, I usually do not
trust my co-workers.
4. My co-workers are fair when evaluating my job perfor-
mance.
5. I have confidence in the feedback my co-workers give me.
1. My co-workers give me useful feedback about my job per-
formance.
2. The performance feedback I receive from my co-workers is
helpful.
3. I value the feedback I receive from my co-workers.
4. The feedback I receive from my co-workers helps me do
my job.
5. The performance information I receive from my co-
workers is generally not very meaningful.
1. My co-workers are supportive when giving me feedback
about my job performance.
2. When my co-workers give me performance feedback, they
are usually considerate of my feelings.
3. My co-workers generally provide feedback in a thoughtless
manner.
4. In general, my co-workers do not treat people very well
when providing performance feedback.
5. In general, my co-workers are tactful when giving me per-
formance feedback.
1. When I do a good job at work my co-workers praise my
performance.
2. I seldom receive praise from my co-workers.
3. My co-workers generally let me know when I do a good
job at work.
4. I frequently receive positive feedback from my co-workers.
1. When I don’t meet deadlines, my co-workers let me know.
2. My co-workers tell me when my work performance does
not meet organizational standards.
3. On those occasions when my job performance falls below
what is expected, my co-workers let me know.
4. On those occasions when I make a mistake at work, my
co-workers tell me.
1. My co-workers are usually available when I want perfor-
mance information.
2. My co-workers are too busy to give me feedback.
3. I have little contact with my co-workers.
4. I interact with my co-workers on a daily basis.
1. My co-workers are often annoyed when I directly ask them
for performance feedback.
2. When I ask for performance feedback, my co-workers
generally do not give me the information right away.
3. I feel comfortable asking my co-workers for feedback
about my work performance.
4. My co-workers encourage me to ask for feedback
whenever I am uncertain about my job performance.
Received August 20, 2003
Revision received October 7, 2004
Accepted October 14, 2004 䡲