Public Organization Review: A Global Journal 5: 55–67 (2005)

# 2005 Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. Manufactured in The Netherlands.

The Quest for Indigenous Administration:

Asian Communist, Islamic Revivalist,
and Other Models
KEITH M. HENDERSON henderkm@buffalostate.edu
State University College at Buffalo, 1300 Elmwood Avenue, Buffalo, NY 14222, USA

Key words: Comparative Administration, indigenous administration, Chinese government, Iranian

government, grass-roots movements

Abstract
This paper briefly explores instances of administrative indigenizationVdefined as native patterns
neither imposed nor copied from Euro-centric systemsVand implications for the study of
Comparative Public Administration. China and IranVas presented in the Comparative Public
Administration literature, broadly definedVare suggested as iconoclastic administrative models
which are both viable and interesting and in contrast with Western (Northern) models of study and
application. Other emerging modelsVmany of them based on grass-roots movements (not to be
confused with terrorist movements)Valso provide alternatives to the prescriptions of the New Public
Management as well as to the conventional secular, ‘‘non-political’’ hierarchies. Comparative Public
Administration needs to accommodate such alternatives on a coequal basis.

Introduction

Comparative Public AdministrationVas it moves into the Twenty-First CenturyV

faces an interdependent world of instant access and open communication
andVarguablyVincreasing distrust of Western (Northern) models of study and
application. The ‘‘Washington consensus’’Vthe package of free-market reforms
which in John Williamson’s expression encompassed conventional World Bank
and bi-lateral wisdom (Williamson, 1990)Vrevealed weaknesses in application,
and academic study analyzed the consequences of New Public Management
reforms around the globe. ‘‘Indigenous solutions for indigenous problems’’ may
become the guiding preceptVeven in American CPA circlesVand grass-roots
organizations of various persuasions may become pervasive. The degree of
disaffection with imposed, ‘‘neo-colonial’’ models of administration tied to a
single, international free-market economy dominated by a handful of nation-
states should not be underestimated.
The quest for indigenous models of administrative reformVas this article will
attempt to showVhas already taken unexpected turns including the success of
Iran’s Islamic Revivalist and China’s Asian Communist modelsVto name two
which are system-wide.
56 K. M. HENDERSON

Other efforts to recast (or at least rename) institutions, to design training and
education programs for officials without Western advice, and to develop policy
models which are not simply derivative are currently underway. Formal statements
such as the African Charter or Kampala Document andVmore recentlyVthe New
Partnership for AfricaVmay present a critical policy challenge to Western-
imposed programs. The centerpiece of the New Partnership is a peer-review
mechanism to apply pressure on corrupt or incompetent regimes. Unlike previous
plans, this one is designed to have enforcement powers. Under the New
Partnership, countries that voluntarily participate will pledge to meet standards
for clean government, democracy, and human rights and will be responsive to
peer-review panels that will help with self-assessments (Economist, 2004).
On the academic front, indigenous literaturesVsome highly polemicalVare
arising to counter the ‘‘captive mind’’ and ‘‘colonized curriculum’’ (Alatas, 1993).
Rather than a universalized, open exchange of ideas with continued Western
(Northern) dominance, this scenario suggests increasing fragmentation.
Administrative Theory has begun to address the putative inclusiveness of its
models based on assumptions of regularity and order. Models of development
often assume a linear movement from primitive to modern, underdeveloped to
developed, or non-Western to Western. As Jamil Jreisat emphasizes, we need to
‘‘break down the ethnocentric fences in order to achieveVa deeper understand-
ing of administrative problems and solutions in different contexts’’ (Jreisat, 2003,
p. 162).
This brief paper will explore two indigenous modelsVIran and ChinaVas
examples of viable (not to be confused with desirable) alternatives to imposed or
copied administration, andVfor small, decentralized instancesVwill attempt to
describe the importance of grass-roots administrative movements. Implications
for Comparative Public Administration will also be discussed.

Asian Communist Administration, the Chinese model

Deng stated: ‘‘Streamlining organizations constitutes a revolution’’ (jingjian

jigou shi yi chang geming). He said, seriously: ‘‘If we fail to carry out this
revolution, if we let the present overstaffed and overlapping Party and state
stay as they areVwithout clearly defined duties and with many incompetent,
irresponsible, lethargic, under-educated and inefficient staff membersVwe
ourselves will not feel satisfied and we will not have the support of the lower
cadres, much less of the people’’ (He, 2001, pp. 187Y188).

In the post-Communist world, the one major Communist system remaining is

China’s. Although sometimes similar in stated objectives, the approach to develop-
ment and administration has been primarily indigenousVin the sense of being neither
imposed nor copied from Euro-centric systemsVandVin this caseVhas been
implemented throughout the entire nation-state.
THE QUEST FOR INDIGENOUS ADMINISTRATION 57

China seems to have avoided most of the initial dislocations of ‘‘shock

therapy’’ as employed in some former Communist systems. Its ‘‘gradualist
approach’’Vwidely discussedVappears successful. Chinese reformers knew
that there would be no guidelines for reconstructing a socialist economy. The
process was necessarily open-ended, and lacking in detailed plans or blueprints
(Wong, 2003, p. 287). The concept of mozhe shitou quo he (cross the river by
feeling the stones) captures the methods used. Deng did not seem to trust
ready-made designs andVunlike Mao and his set of doctrinesVbelieved
practice was the best standard for judging truth (He, 2001, p. 287).
In China the indigenous Communist Party remains significant in supervision of
administrative activity even though some party officials have lost influence in the
process of reform and decentralization. The Party reveals its importance in anti-
corruption drives, disciplinary measures, control over recruitment and training,
indirect control through communal groups and in other ways.
Following rejection of the Russian pattern of administration along with the
expulsion of Russian advisors and, later, the shattering experience of the Cultural
Revolution under Mao, the Chinese Communist Party in late 1978 and
1979Vunder Deng XiaopingVbegan introducing policy changes and accompa-
nying administrative reforms. By any standard, it was a massive task in a
controlled economy of over one-billion people. The first target of policy change
was the agricultural sector, for which a new rural management system was
introduced. The industrial sector was then addressed, with attempts to modify
the large state-owned enterprises originally designed and operated with Russian
assistance. Generally, the command economy was decentralized and designat-
ed areas of the country were used for experiments which, if workable, were then
extended to other regions.
The reform policies of Chinese political leadership beginning in the 1980s gave
prominence to administration. Problems related to corruption, nepotism, and
procedural obstaclesValong with questions of control by the PartyVwere the
objects of reform. The ‘‘Gengshen’’ reforms attempted broad shifts in the roles of
the party, army, and government, with considerable attention given to the
separation of Party and government. In a case study of the Ministry of the
Machine Building Industry, Oliver Williams showed how the mandate to
modernize administrative management was executed. He pointed out that even
though advanced management techniques used in other countries were
studiedVincluding computerized information processingVthe Party maintained
its cells and committees to ‘‘ensure that party and state policies were effectively
implemented’’ (Williams, 1993). Official reports on the ‘‘democratic supervision’’
of government agencies through the party’s top political advisory body (the
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) emphasized that supervi-
sion is mainly through suggestions and criticisms.
There are interesting parallels between the New Public Management thinking
and the structural administrative reforms in China. However, as Lee and Lo point
out, there is no evidence that Chinese policy makers have ever consulted the
58 K. M. HENDERSON

gurus of New Public Management (Lee and Lo, 2001). Even though a younger
generation of Chinese technicians and administrators has returned from higher
education in the United States and other Western countries, its technical/
engineering/scientific training precluded contact with academic NPM.
David Shambaugh points out that some of the central government reforms
carried out by Deng were merely cosmetic, such as the merging of Ministries of
Water Conservancy and Electric Power into a single Ministry. ‘‘But Deng’s
administrative reforms (Zhao Ziyang and Zhu Rongji’s to be more precise) did
have the net effect of streamlining government organs, reducing overlapping
functions, and substantially lessening party control over a wide range of
economic and technical policy areas’’ (Shambaugh, 2000, p. 177). The more
recent reforms of central administrative structure were a serious attempt to
rationalize and downsize the hierarchy, according to Shambaugh.
Similarly, other recent types of reform have been successful without under-
mining the ultimate control of the Chinese Communist Party (see Dickson, 2003;
Dittmer, 2003). Community policing has enlisted the community including Public
Security CommitteesVelected at the local levelVin almost all communities.
These citizen organizations provide a link between policy and the people, using
mechanisms of social control found in Chinese culture (Chen, 2002).
The military enjoys a privileged position and has been able to develop a variety
of commercial activities on its own. Basically exempt from governmental
controls, at one point more than 20,000 business enterprises were developed
ranging from transport and hotels to securities firms and pharmaceutical
companies. The People’s Liberation Army exerted considerable influence, using
its power to enter into foreign business arrangements and, through front
companies, investing in Hong Kong, which became an administrative region of
China in 1997. Evidence suggests that the ties between the Party and military are
being strengthened as more officers are co-opted into the Central Committee
and the Party continues an indoctrination campaign through all ranks.
A recent definitive study of the People’s Liberation Army as Organization
(Rand, 2003) suggests that the reorganization of the PLA and the People’s Armed
Police (PAP) was driven by careful analysis of the lessons of the Tiananmen
failure. The PLA reasserted leadership over the PAP and brought about a more
loyal and disciplined corps. It also transferred some PLA units to the PAP.
According to the Rand study, issues of business involvement and logistical/
funding concerns have not been resolved (Rand, 2003, pp. 587Y633).
An important aspect of administrative reform concerns the Civil Service and
involves an intricate intermixture of Party and government. John P. Burns indicates
that the Chinese Communist Party has managed the civil service system directly. It
has appointed, transferred, and dismissed higher civil servants through the
nomenklatura lists and promulgated rules and regulations for public officials.
Traditional ideological training schools run by the Party have sought to maintain
their status by undertaking modernized management training. Curricula have been
updated in Party schools to include training in finance, real estate and securities,
THE QUEST FOR INDIGENOUS ADMINISTRATION 59

and exchange markets. A National School of Administration was authorized to

retrain mid-level officials in public finance, law, and public economics (Burns,
1993).
In 1993, the ‘‘Provisional Regulations of State Civil Servants’’ were promulgated
with the intention of finally replacing the cumbersome and monolithic cadre
system. The debate over development of this system in China reveals why and
how it differs from formal Western systems. ‘‘It would be misleading to call the
attempt to create a civil service system in China just an administrative reform’’
(Lam and Chan, 1995, pp. 1297). The role of the Communist Party and its previous
tight control over management of cadres was reformed, in a uniquely Chinese
manner. Party-state relations and state-society relations were both affected.
A new round of administrative reform began in 1998 and was adjusted to the
requirements of a socialist market economy. Jiang Zemin indicated that
‘‘Following the principles of simplification, uniformity and efficiency in the reform,
we shall establish a highly efficient, well-coordinated and standardized admin-
istrative system, with a view to improving services to the people’’ (Huque and
Yep, 2003, p. 145). Considerable success was realized with 11 of 40 ministries
and agencies of the State Council eliminated, and half of the 32,000 civil servants
in central government and nearly 1 million provincial and local officials transferred
or dismissed (Huque and Yep, 2003).
State enterprises remain a problem area. They have been granted consider-
able autonomy although they are still subject to constraints imposed by
government departments through various forms of regulation. The emergence of
a private sector over the past 10 or so years challenges the State Operated
Enterprises. Individually owned and operated small enterprises and industrial
operations with hundreds of workers are now found (Dickson, 2003). Interestingly,
at the village level, the Party itself (through the National People’s Congress)
initiated popularly elected village committees to replace the top-down leadership
resulting from decollectivization of agriculture. The hope is that elected leadership
with support from the people will be more capable of implementing central
directives (Manion, 1996). In other areas, the state has also established a large
number of economic and social organizations to help replace direct controls,
channel interest articulation, and weed out unwanted groups (Dickson, 2003, p. 4).
This helps to maintain Party control by sponsoring surrogate organizations.
Cautious observers of the Chinese administrative scene are occasionally
reminded of the differences between perception and reality and the difficulty of
drawing conclusions from casual observation. Sometimes the impression of
change belies underlying continuities.
However, the unique example of China’s incremental approach to public
administration reform suggests an important alternative to Northern/Western
patterns. Because of the size and economic growth of that country it will remain
important and has been the subject of a growing literature. Other Asian
Communist systems include Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in SE Asia and, of
course, North Korea.
60 K. M. HENDERSON

Islamic Revivalist Administration, the Iranian case

TEHRAN (IRNA)V‘‘Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Ali Khamenei

here Sunday underlined the appointment of pious officials to the administra-
tive posts.’’ ETTELA’AT (‘‘The Only International Persian Newspaper’’) May 31,
1994.

Development of new administrative patterns may proceed along the path of

sudden or gradual rejection of existing practices. Iran illustrates the contempo-
rary extreme of the former; more than in a military coup or other abrupt political
change, the entire rationale for administration was altered.
KhameneiVin the quote aboveVwas addressing a group of senior officials,
including then President Rafsanjani, on the occasion of Eid al-Ghadir, an important
religious holiday. He related the appointment of officials to the philosophy
expounded by Prophet Mohammad in naming Imam Ali as his successor.

‘‘The Islamic republic, which was established by the leaders of the revolution,
was based on the Imamate model.VStructures had to be adapted, modified,
or newly created, in a way which would equip them to fulfil Islamic functions’’
(Asaf, 1985, p. 135).

Staffing of those structuresVadministrative as well as politicalVhad to be by

men (and, peripherally, women) whose Islamic credentials were genuine,
whether they were clerical (Ulema) or laymen. ‘‘Correct’’ Islamic institutions,
under an Islamic rather than secular Constitution, would replace the ‘‘incorrect’’
and new political organizations would be created. The Universities would be
closed; Western influences would be eradicated; administrators would meet the
test of ‘‘political correctness,’’ Iranian style. In the same country that had received
a massive amount of public administrative advice and assistance since the 1950s,
little could be continued which was tainted by Western corruption in the eyes of
the religious leadership.
Under the Shah, the state bureaucracy had served as a pillar of the regime. It
grew from 12 ministries with 150,000 civil servants to 19 ministries with over
300,000 officials in the fourteen years prior to the Revolution. New ministries
included Labor and Social Services, Art and Culture, Housing and Town Planning,
Information and Tourism, Science and Higher Education, Health and Social
Welfare, and Rural Cooperatives and Village Affairs (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 438).
The number of provinces was also increased, providing additional jobs and
benefits for the population and simultaneously supplanting traditional powers of
the local mullahs and landowners. A massive bureaucracy infused every aspect
of daily life.
The role of the civil bureaucracy in the Revolution was largely passive but it was
a target of the Revolutionaries. ‘‘It was a popular expectation among the general
populace that the bureaucratic ‘machine of the regime’ would be smashed or at
THE QUEST FOR INDIGENOUS ADMINISTRATION 61

least reorganized in a way as to be accountable and responsive to the public.’’

(Farazmand, 2001, pp. 890) In spite of this, Farazmand reports, there were no
immediate changes in the structure of the bureaucracy. This changed as grass-
roots organizations assumed various administrative functions and displaced the
traditional bureaucracy. The Reconstruction Crusade, the Economic Mobiliza-
tion, the komitehs (neighborhood committees), the Housing Foundation, and
other revolutionary organizations took over administrative tasks. Gradually,
government officials were discredited, harassed, or hounded out of office by
pressure from the top or the Islamic associations. Tasks were simply transferred
to someone in favor (Salehi, 1988, pp. 165Y166).
In 1982, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps ministry was established
following three years of activity by the Guards in numerous small Islamic militias.
Each recruit had to pass tests in the Quran and Ayatollah Khomeini’s edicts, then
undergo training at the hands of the Ulema. In addition to military-type functions,
the Guards played a major role in the war with Iraq, handling internal security,
anti-subversion, and ethnic repression.
A vast economic conglomerate which began by taking over the properties of
the Pahlavis and othersVmany of whom had been executedVgrew in the early
years after the Revolution to include over 250 companies. This Mustazafan
Foundation, with some 85,000 employees, at the time, was larger than the Iranian
Oil Company (Hiro, 1985). Currently, the Mostazafan and Janbazan Foundation
(bonyad) is still functioning after 24 years and manages about 400 companies
and factories in food and beverage, chemicals, metals, petrochemicals,
construction materials, transportation, and other areas. It seeks partners
interested in investing in Iran (www.iran-bonyad.com).
Another unique aspect of the Iranian bureaucracy outside the Ministerial
structure is the ‘‘Martyrs Foundation’’ (also a bonyad) which was designed to
assist the families of those who die for Islam. Khomeini initiated it in February 1980
for those killed in the 1977Y79 period and its task expanded enormouslyValong
with its budgetVduring and after the war with Iraq (Hiro, 1985, p. 252).
While similar in purpose to Islamic welfare organizations in other parts of the
Islamic world which are administered by political groups or associated with the
mosques, the Martyrs Foundation along with other foundations (bonyads) appear
to enjoyVby their scope and importance in relation to other organizationsVa
special place in Iranian administration (Buchta, 2000, pp. 72Y75).
Well before the death of Khomeini in June, 1989, ‘‘rebureaucratization’’ had
taken place in the regular ministries. ‘‘One of the conclusions of this study is that
not only has the Iranian bureaucracy not been abolished by the Revolution, it has
survived and prevailed. It exercises a great deal of power and is being used for
system enhancement as well as public administration under the Islamic
Republic’’ (Farazmand, 2001, p. 894).
At the top of each agency is a group of religious representatives who not only
exercise political decision-making and oversight of day-to-day operations but,
also, assist in coordination with other agencies. The Council of Guardians
62 K. M. HENDERSON

exercises ultimate control under the Ayatollah, who ‘‘answers only to God’’
(Abdo and Lyons, 2003).
The 1990s saw many administrative reforms supported by two elected
presidents, Rafsanjani and Khatami. Extensive plans were initiated for privatiza-
tion of state-run enterprises and contracting out for development projects.
Bridges, roads, schools, electrical networks and other facilities have been
extended into rural areas (Farazmand, 2001, p. 897). Pressures have been felt,
however, from donor organizations such as the World Bank, International
Monetary Fund, and European Union. Farazmand believes that responding to
such pressures is a mistake since it compromises Iran’s independence
(Farazmand, 2001, p. 896). Jahangir AmuzegarVa Finance Minister before the
RevolutionVargues, on the other hand, that responsiveness to donor organ-
izations is necessary to obtain access to foreign credit (Amuzegar, 2003).
Reopening of the universities did not return academic curricula and programs
to their previous condition. In the Islamic stateVas defined in IranVeducation
must reflect Islamic thought and be cleansed of all Western values and
influences; ‘‘spiritual purification’’ is required (Menashri, 2001, pp. 112Y113). It
is not at all clear how this can be reconciled with the need for administrative skill
and competence but some ingenious rationales have been attempted (see
Adelkah, 2004). The conflict is not limited to Iran; traditionalists and modernizers
vie for control of the agenda in a number of countries and public administration
training can be either primarily technical or essentially ideological.
The question arises as to just how viable is this new Iranian bureaucracy and
the regime as a whole. Amuzegar, among others, points to workers’ demon-
strations, teacher strikes, and student protests as signs of the growing
discontent of the generation born after the Revolution, in 1979. In his view, this
is more significant than the often-discussed schism between reformers and
religious conservatives within the government and it will eventually topple the
regime. Such predictions have been heard throughout the 25 years of the Islamic
Republic and have consistently proven wrong.

Other emerging indigenous approaches

The Chinese Communist and Iranian Revivalist models of administration are

among the most important alternatives to imposed or imitated Western (Northern)
styles but are by no means the only ones. A variety of approachesVincluding
important grass-roots movementsVmay be found in the past and the present.
Some, such as the Balinese subak organizations and the Indian Self-employed
Women’s Association have been well studied. The former involves an intricate,
traditional mixture of religion and management for agricultural irrigation (see
Barth, 1993; Lansing, 1991). The latter has some 100,000 members in Ahmedae-
bad alone and relies on Gandhian values to provide maternal, health care, and
micro-credit programs. (see Rose, 1992). Two other well-known examples are
THE QUEST FOR INDIGENOUS ADMINISTRATION 63

the Indian state of Kerala and Porto Alegre, a city in Brazil; both have
successfully experimented with participatory administration (see Fung and
Wright, 2003; Evans, 2004). Self-governing cooperative systems are found many
places and may be focused on health provision, education, housing or other
functions. Self-governing squatter communities, for example, may enjoy enough
grass-roots support to pressure governments for both resources and autonomy
(Mathey, 1997).
Of particular concern to students of Comparative Public Administration
seeking new alternatives are the spontaneous, often temporary movements
and organizations that may become institutionalized as NGOs (non-govern-
mental organizations). Lester Salamon refers to a global ‘associational
revolution.’ ‘‘From the developed countries of North America, Europe and Asia
to the developing societies of Africa, Latin America and the former Soviet bloc,
people are forming associations, foundations and similar institutions to deliver
human services, promote grass-roots economic development, prevent envi-
ronmental degradation, protect civil rights and pursue a thousand other
objectives formerly unattended or left to the state’’ (Salamon, 1994, p. 109).
Along with the larger efforts such as the ‘Village Awakening Movement’ in India
which operates in thousands of villages, the similar Sarvodaya Shramadana
movement in Sri Lanka focused on small-scale village improvement projects in
more than 8,000 villages are the Christian Base Communities found in Brazilian
rural areas. In Africa, numerous small-scale self-help projects have been initiated
by peasant farmers such as banking schemes, food storage arrangements,
barter exchanges, family planning, and traditional medicine centers (Pradervand,
1989). Traditional chiefs continue to play a governance role in many areas of
Africa (Herbst, 2000).
In the Caribbean, NGOs serve as intermediaries between the micro level of the
poorest household and the formal apparatus of the stateVa role which might
otherwise be served by political parties or trade unions. ‘‘NGOs and local
development organizations (LDOs) are widely perceived as agents for alternative
development, particularly because, as a sector, they have begun to formulate
development policy, often with a direct impact on official aid policies’’ (Lewis,
1994, p. 128). Lewis reports a massive growth of NGOs and LDOs in the
Caribbean over the last decade, including a variety of women’s groups and
environmental groups.
Other indigenous organizationsVusually on a small scaleVare found in all parts
of the world: cooperatives, associations, federations, religious and charitable
enterprises, entrepreneurial military organizations, and many others (Henderson,
1999). These may be unifunctional or multifunctional; they may be officially
sanctioned or not. SomeVsuch as Bangladesh’s well-known Grameen Bank
which supplies credit to the poor, particularly womenVhave been so successful
that they have been widely copied over a long period of time. Others have filled
gaps in unique circumstances where education, health services, or welfare was
lacking. A considerable literature of relevance to Comparative/Development
64 K. M. HENDERSON

Administration has arisen; performance and accountability of NGOs and similar

grass-roots organizations, for example, have been studied as part of a larger
concern with the development of civil society and the role of non-governmental
actors in representing needs of the poor and disenfranchised (e.g., Edwards and
Hulme, 1996). ‘‘Co-goverance’’ has been summarized with examples from India,
Brazil, Mexico and elsewhere (Ackerman, 2003). The problem of co-opting NGOs
into larger World Bank designs has also been addressed as a threat to self-
determination (Nelson, 1995).

Implications for comparative public administration

Most areas in the Developing World and former Second World seek some
degree of separation from Western administrative hegemony. The ‘one size fits
all’ administrative prescriptions associated with loans, grants, and outside
interventionsVparticularly the New Public Management versionVdo not con-
sider indigenous practices, often treating them as aberrations.
It is widely believed in the West thatVsimilar to principles of scienceVother
concepts including ‘development’ and ‘administration’ are universally applicable.
Even the term ‘development’ is an invention of the West andVas applied to the
Developing WorldVimplies linear movement, accelerating rates of change, and
removal of impediments to ‘progress.’ Dwivedi notes that simply because a
‘principle/concept’ has originated in the West, it does not automatically become
the only truth (Dwivedi, 1994, p. 12). Gandhian ‘swaraj’ like Zapata’s ‘ejidos’ offer
striking instances of evolutionary change which does not accord with Western
linear ‘development.’ Long-standing administrative practices in the Middle East
such as diwan and wasta deserve greater recognition. The notion of SHOURAV
Islamic government through consultationVand the inseparability of religion and
administration could become dominant concepts.
Willingness of the elites in developing countries (and former Communist
countries) to accept externally-inspired prescriptionsVarguing for a ‘trickle-down’
benefitVoften masks perceived opportunities for those elites to benefit. ‘‘Pushing
marketization and privatization, with a globally dominant public administration
model, will have a tendency to empower further the ruling elitesVthe big
capitalists, large landowners, big corporate powers, and regimes that are too
often corrupt, undemocratic, and repressive’’ (Farazmand, 1994, p. 81).
This paper has attempted to show how an extreme alternative to the usual
prescriptions by the World Bank/International Monetary Fund/bi-lateral
donorsVIslamic Revivalist AdministrationVis manifested in Iran and how Asian
Communist Administration reveals a second alternative. Additionally andV
arguablyVmore desirable alternatives are found in associational forms. The
importance for a global cross-national study of administration of viable alter-
natives to Western/Northern ideas andVultimatelyVbodies of supporting aca-
demic materials is considerable.
THE QUEST FOR INDIGENOUS ADMINISTRATION 65

One contrary scenario is complete fragmentation of study and practice, an

administrative ‘clash of cultures’: African administration; Islamic administration
(already a clearly defined area without the Revivalists); Asian Communist/
Confucian administration; Hindu administration; Japanese administration; Slavic
administration; Latin American administration; Native American administration,
and others. Even more specific study and application would involve individual
countries or narrowly defined regions, much as currently found in the West: U.S.
public administration; French public administration; German administration; etc.
This fragmentation would be less desirable than internationalization to global
designers, with open exchanges, but it would be without dominance by any
group of countries.
In addition to breaking down ethnocentric fences and moving beyond
teleological development models, prescriptive Comparative Public Administra-
tionVif it is to offer guidance to policy makersVneeds to recognize and explore
non-Western alternatives and to expand its theoretical horizons.
For the latter, several arenas offer promise including resource-dependency
theory which assumes organizations require resources and, hence, must
accommodate resource providers (see Jaffee, 2001). Also important are the
New Institutional Economics, Game Theory, and Chaos and Transformation
Theory. The ‘new institutionalist’ literature sees institutions as dynamic and
draws attention to the broader context in which institutions are embedded (see
Cortell and Peterson, 2001). In Transaction Cost Analysis (probably the most
prominent part of the New Institutional Economics) institutions evolve to
economize on transaction costs (see Hindmoor, 1998; Horn, 1995). Game
Theory can explain adaptation of institutions or organizations to sudden drastic
changes in the environment and breaking out of equilibrium patterns (see Kreps,
1990; Osborne, 2004). Chaos and Transformation Theory moves towards
constructing deterministic, nonlinear dynamic models that attempt to explain
irregular, unpredictable behavior (see Tsonis, 1992; Farazmand, 2003).
As one relevant application of Chaos Theory, Farazmand has shown how a
supposedly stable system in Iran under the Shah collapsed by the ‘butterfly’
effects of the Revolution, producing shock waves that pushed the system to
the edge of chaos. The emergence and rise of the new system is explained in
terms of its adaptive dynamics which not only allows for survival but stability,
power, and self-reliance in the face of foreign interference (Farazmand, 2003).
Organizational analysis, and reform strategies, need to be informed by such
theoretic perspectives and adjusted to the realities of an administrative world no
longer willing to accept Western/Northern hegemony.

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66 K. M. HENDERSON

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Keith Henderson is Professor of Public Administration, Department of Political Science, State

University College at Buffalo. He is the author of many articles and editor or co-editor of several
books in American and comparative public administration.