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The Sharp Edge of Containment

By Edward J. Marolda

NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER

Herbert Hahn portrayed the scene as Marine and Army forces from a 230-ship allied armada swept ashore at Inchon on 15 September 1950, to route the invading North Korean army.

Naval History, April 2006

The U.S. willingness and ability to conduct expeditionary warfare far from American shores were major factors in the success of the containment strategy and the victory in the Cold War.

The U.S. armed forces have been practicing expeditionary warfare from the
dawn of the republic.1 With few exceptions, these operations required concentration of sizeable naval and military forces in the United States and then their deployment overseas. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown observed in 1980, "The United States has been in the rapid deployment and power projection business for a long time. If you doubt that, ask the Marines who five years ago celebrated their 200th anniversary."2 Expeditionary warfare during the Cold War, however, was different. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor convinced the U.S. security establishment that the country could no longer spend many months cobbling together forces in the United States before deploying them thousands of miles across the oceans in response to attacks on American interests or on America itself. After atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, strategists

recognized that an enemy's first shot might be the last for many U.S. cities and millions of citizens. American strategists concluded that to discourage, or if need be defeat, a Soviet nuclear attack on the country, U.S. forces had to operate on the very borders of the Soviet Union and its allies. Ironically, those powerful forces concentrated around the borders never had to engage their main foe, but they did conduct expeditionary warfare against Soviet allies. With the dawning of the ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, U.S. leaders also recognized that military power concentrated in America would have little impact on the global competition for influence. During the Cold War, U.S. expeditionary forces were routinely positioned far from the continental United States and mounted operations from forward-deployed military concentrations or shore bases in proximity to threatened populations.
Flexible Response

Despite the advent of nuclear weapons and long-range bombers, the Korean U.S. NAVY War made clear that the nation needed Aircraft from the Valley Forge (CV-45), in a quick expeditionary forces to fight its Cold War response to North Korean aggression, attacked battles. In a parlous state because of its capital, Pyongyang, on 3 July 1950, barely a week after the start of hostilities. Grumman F9F- post-World War II cutbacks, U.S. 3 Panthers of VF-52, such as this one shown on conventional forces barely prevented the board Valley Forge in July 1950, participated in enemy from conquering the entire those first strikes. Korean peninsula in 1950. As a reflection of what conventionally armed expeditionary forces could do, however, aircraft from the carrier Valley Forge (CV-45) bombed Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, just one week after the onset of hostilities. In an even more impressive demonstration, on 15 September 1950, a 230-ship allied armada deployed Marine and Army forces behind enemy lines, at Inchon, and routed the invading North Korean army. That winter, Marines and soldiers fought their way out of the mountains of North Korea and the Navy safely transported them to the south, where the battle-hardened veterans resumed their fight with the communists. With the establishment of the U.S. Sixth Task Fleet in 1948, the NATO alliance in 1949, and security arrangements with the Republic of Korea, Republic of China, and Japan in succeeding years, the parameters of U.S. global containment strategy were set. The United States would oppose attempts by the Soviet Union and its communist allies to overthrow noncommunist governments through military force or intimidation.

Despite the experience of the Korean War, the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower worked to reduce the size of the conventional military establishment. The president believed it would cost too much to retain the bulk of the recently enlarged military arm. He feared a drain of U.S. economic vitality as much as the threat of communist aggression. In its "New Look" policy, the administration stressed massive retaliation with nuclear weapons for dealing with Soviet aggression. When the impracticality of this approach became obvious, national leaders considered tactical nuclear weapons for fighting less-than-total wars involving Soviet allies such as the People"s Republic of China. But problems with this approach surfaced fairly soon. Many observers understood that crossing the nuclear threshold risked alienating world opinion against the United States and perhaps stimulating a global nuclear exchange and another world war. The development by the Soviet Union and then China of their own nuclear arsenals, moreover, ended the U.S. monopoly in the nuclear arena. The weapons simply had no utility for resolving less-than-global conflicts, including wars limited in terms of geography, the number of belligerents involved, and other factors. How would tactical nuclear weapons resolve a guerrilla war, for example? During the late 1950s, the concept of flexible response gained traction among U.S. strategists. The United States should be prepared for armed conflict that ran the gamut from global nuclear war to counterguerrilla war. Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke, and others called for the reinvigoration of America's conventional military establishment so the United States could deal with another North Korean invasion, the overthrow of a friendly government in the Middle East, or a communist insurgency in Southeast Asia.

It became a wellestablished principle among civilian warfare theorists and military strategists that powerful, mobile, and forward-deployed forces provided the optimum means for preventing the outbreak of conflicts, or failing that, preventing their U.S. NAVY escalation. Reflecting on In the late 1950s three World War II-vintage aircraft carriers- among U.S. naval operations in them USS Princeton (CV-37), shown in March 1960 converted to Lebanon and off China in LPH-5-were adapted for a new amphibious mission. 1958, Admiral Burke observed: "Crises such as Lebanon and Taiwan, occurring simultaneously and on opposite sides of the world, severely tax our limited war capabilities. We must have adequate and ready forces, in the right place at the right time and in sufficient strength to cope with what ever actions are required." 3
Force Evolution

With a wealth of experience, the Navy and Marine Corps developed concepts, organizations, ships, and aircraft for a global expeditionary warfare capability. Despite constrained shipbuilding budgets and a 30,000man decrease in Fleet Marine Force strength in the late 1950s, the naval services tested the concept of combining in one amphibious force a Marine battalion landing team and a Marine helicopter squadron. They adapted the World War II aircraft carriers Princeton (CV-37), Boxer (CV-21), and Thetis Bay (CVE-90) to the new amphibious mission. When the concept was fully developed, an amphibious ready group/special landing force (ARG/SLF) could deploy with a battalion of infantry, supporting arms, and a squadron of helicopters. The Marines would be transported ashore in landing craft that emerged from the enclosed well decks of amphibious transport docks (LPDs) and dock landing ships (LSDs) or via transport helicopters that lifted off the flight deck of an amphibious assault ship (LPH). This force embodied key attributes for expeditionary warfare in the nuclear age-fighting power, speed, mobility, and flexibility. An amphibious ready group could quickly deploy a powerful reinforced Marine force to trouble

spots in an operational theater, transport all or part of the special landing force ashore, and then just as quickly withdraw from the area. A need for U.S. expeditionary forces surfaced during international confrontations over Laos from 1959 to 1962. CinCPac Operation Plan 32(L)59, which concerned a communist military attack on Laos, provided for the early deployment there of three Marine battalion landing teams, 64 rotary and fixed-wing aircraft of a Marine aircraft group, and a Navy construction battalion. In May 1962, President John F. Kennedy, concerned that a North Vietnamese-supported offensive by Laotian communists might topple the government of Laos, ordered U.S. Task Force 116 into neighboring Thailand. Airlift and sealift units moved U.S. ground and air forces, including a Marine special landing force, to Thailand from bases all over the Pacific. Supporting the deployment were the Hancock (CVA-19) and Bennington (CVS-20) carrier groups. This forceful military step, which energized international negotiations in Geneva, helped bring about a July 1962 cease-fire in Laos.
Carrier Evolution and Sustainability

The carrier task force, a formation that revolutionized naval warfare in World War II, was another essential ingredient of expeditionary warfare in the nuclear age. This became especially true when the Navy's ballistic-missile submarine fleet put to sea in the early 1960s, relieving the carrier forces from much of the nuclear-deterrence mission. Like the ARG/SLF, carrier task forces could range far and wide in an operational theater and bring substantial naval power to bear on an opponent ashore. A carrier's air wing could execute everything from a one-plane reconnaissance mission to major 70-unit combat operations involving attack planes, fighters, command/control, aerial refueling, and other aircraft. The cruisers and destroyers of the task force not only protected the carrier from surface and submarine threats but also could conduct naval bombardments. Arming warships with surface-to-air and other missile systems was all the rage during the late 1950s, but battleship, cruiser, and destroyer guns continued to provide a vital capability. These ships could deluge enemy targets ashore with 16-, 8-, 6-, and 5-inch fire, interdict enemy coastal traffic, and protect thin-skinned amphibious vessels. Logistics was another key to the Navy's ability to mount and sustain expeditionary warfare around the world during the Cold War. In the Korean War, the Navy refined and improved the process for replenishing warships on station. The 1960s saw the development of logistic ships designed

specifically to enhance the fleet's staying power far from the United States and to facilitate operations ashore. As one example, the Sacramento (AOE1), a fast combat support ship almost as large as a battleship, in one sixmonth period in the late 1960s delivered 2,000 tons of provisions and 35 million gallons of fuel to 294 ships. Sealift and airlift were equally critical U.S. resources for sustaining expeditionary warfare during the Cold War. The Military Sea Transportation Service helped the United Nations command narrowly avert defeat in the summer of 1950 by rushing troops, planes, and ammunition from the United States and Japan to ground troops desperately fighting to hold the Pusan U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PHOTO ARCHIVE Perimeter on the Korean Crises such as that in Lebanon in 1958, when President Camille peninsula. The Military Air Chamoun requested U.S. aid against internal opposition and threats Transport Service also from Syria and the United Arab Republic, indicated to Navy leaders the need to have adequate and ready forces in the right place at the rushed critical personnel and equipment to the right time. The assault wave of the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, wade ashore from USS Rockbridge (APA-228) LCVPs at Beirut on 16 July fighting forces.
1958.

As valuable as the fleet's ability was to supply Navy and Marine units during the Cold War, expeditionary warfare could not have been sustained without the creation of substantial shore bases around the world. To support the occupation of Japan after World War II, the U.S. armed forces established logistic facilities at Yokosuka, Sasebo, Atsugi, and Okinawa. The onset of the Cold War and the three-year Korean War made it clear to U.S. leaders that these bases were critical to America's expeditionary warfare capability in the Far East.
The Vietnam Experience

The Defense Department experimented with a concept that morphed into the Maritime Prepositioning Force that we know today. In the early 1960s Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara directed the positioning at Subic

Bay in the Philippines of a floating forward depot that consisted of ships combat-loaded with ammunition, fuel, and supplies and ready for use in South Vietnam, across the South China Sea. The war's mammoth requirements consumed the cargo in these ships in short order, however, so the concept was not institutionalized. The long conflict in Vietnam required the employment of expeditionary warfare forces that mounted fast, hard-hitting, and limited-duration operations. Throughout 1964, as political turmoil and Vietcong attacks rocked South Vietnam, carrier task forces and the ARG/SLF deployed into the South China Sea and prepared to project power ashore or evacuate U.S. nationals. The fleet also mounted shows of force after the North Vietnamese reportedly attacked the destroyer Maddox (DD-731) in the Gulf of Tonkin and enemy guerrillas bombed U.S. facilities in South Vietnam, killing American servicemen. Expeditionary warfare loomed large in March 1965. American leaders became concerned that an increasingly aggressive North Vietnam might overrun U.S. air and naval forces operating from Da Nang in northern South Vietnam. President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered the fast deployment not only of the Seventh Fleet's ARG/SLF but two additional Marine battalion landing teams and a Marine aircraft group that formed the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Washington expected the Marines' movement ashore to be shortterm and related to the defensive mission, but that was not to be. The ARG/SLF, with other amphibious and gunfire-support ships, carried out major operations and raids on the coast, often with South Vietnamese and U.S. Army units. In Operation Starlite in September 1965, U.S. and South Vietnamese units virtually destroyed the 1st Vietcong Regiment. But "Charlie" learned fast and thereafter avoided serious contact. A number of the more than 60 amphibious operations executed in the war produced more Marine than enemy casualties. Booby traps, mines, and snipers took a heavy toll.

By the time of the 1968 Tet Offensive, the ARG/SLF had been reinforced to include ARG/SLFs Alpha and Bravo that served more often than not as floating reserves and as bases off the demilitarized zone where Marines could get a hot shower, a change U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PHOTO ARCHIVE of uniform, and a break The USS America (CV-66) and her escorts steam toward the from the heavy combat Mediterranean Sea in March 1986. The next month, her aircraft were ashore. among those attacking Libyan installations in the wake of a terrorist
bombing in Germany

Naval forces also developed innovative approaches to expeditionary warfare on the coasts, rivers, and canals of South Vietnam. Operation Market Time's surface ships, Swift boats, junks, and patrol aircraft severely limited the enemy's seaborne infiltration of arms and supplies. Mine countermeasure vessels and harbor-defense forces neutralized the enemy's attempts to close South Vietnam's ports to merchant traffic. The Army and the Navy teamed to form the Mobile Riverine Force, which employed heavy firepower and waterborne mobility to decimate one enemy unit after another, especially during the Tet Offensive.
Littorals and Logistics

In Operation Sealords, Vice Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., commander Naval Forces, Vietnam, spearheaded a comprehensive campaign that reduced communist infiltration into South Vietnam from Cambodia and denied enemy forces easy sanctuary in the farthest reaches of the Mekong Delta. Through an innovative use of riverine craft, rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, and connected-barge mobile bases, by the end of 1970, U.S. and Vietnamese naval forces dominated the inland waterways of South Vietnam. Navy seaair-land (SEAL) units, established for the Vietnam War, convincingly demonstrated the value of highly trained, well-equipped, and motivated commandos for gathering intelligence and destabilizing the enemy's command-and-control function. Logisticians enabled the United States to fight and sustain a multi-year expeditionary war far from the United States through the introduction of

container cargo vessels, roll-on/roll-off ships, wheeled amphibious supply vehicles, and sophisticated cargo handling and port operations. To fight and sustain the expeditionary war in Southeast Asia, however, the United States also needed sophisticated air and naval bases in the Western Pacific. Critical to support of the war in Vietnam were the massive bases at Subic Bay, Saigon, and Da Nang. The Seventh Fleet in general and Task Force 77 in particular projected devastating firepower ashore against North Vietnam from 1965 to 1973. American carrier and naval bombardment forces, however, failed to deter Hanoi from its sponsorship of the war in South Vietnam or to cut the enemy's supply lines. On the other hand, naval power provided Washington with significant means for influencing the war. In 1972, carrier squadrons joined with shore-based Air Force and South Vietnamese units to defeat the enemy's Easter Offensive. In combination with offensive mine-laying operations that closed North Vietnam's ports to military supply ships, the Seventh Fleet helped compel Hanoi to negotiate a cease-fire. The drain on resources caused by the Vietnam War had a severe impact on U.S. naval forces' capability to conduct expeditionary warfare in the Mediterranean during the 1970s. During the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the U.S. Sixth Fleet would have been hard pressed to support littoral operations, especially in the face of Soviet opposition. Successive chiefs of Naval Operations, Admiral Zumwalt and Admiral James L. Holloway III, raised concerns about the staying power of the Mediterranean forces. The U.S. military capability for expeditionary warfare was just as constrained in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. America's Cold War rival was not so constrained, however. Admiral Sergei Gorshkov's Soviet Navy established a growing presence in the Indian Ocean and contiguous waters. By the mid-1970s, four times as many Soviet warships were operating in the Indian Ocean as American. During Okean 75, a Soviet global naval exercise in April of that year, 23 naval vessels steamed in the Indian Ocean. Soviet reconnaissance planes operated from shore bases throughout the region.

In the wake of the Yom Kippur War and the subsequent oil embargo, Washington finally altered its strategic approach to the Persian Gulf and other Middle Eastern areas. In 1977, the Carter administration advocated creation of a rapid deployment force. Critics of the force, however, observed that it was "neither rapid, deployable, nor a force."4
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PHOTO ARCHIVE

In 1983, despite a number of operational failures, U.S. expeditionary forces forcibly removed Cuban contractors and military elements from Grenada in the Caribbean Sea. Marine helicopters launched from the USS Guam (LPH-9) are depicted on their predawn raid to take Pearls Airport.

The revolutionary overthrow of the shah of Iran, a U.S. ally, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 changed the equation overnight. These events spurred the government to action. By 1983, Washington had established the U.S. Central Command to direct military operations in the Arabian Sea and in the Persian Gulf area. The Pacific Command directed operations in the Indian Ocean, where each year between 1980 and 1987, one-fourth to one-half of the aircraft carriers in the U.S. Navy deployed. To better support Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf operations, the Navy leased Diego Garcia from the British and developed naval and air facilities on the island.
Expeditionary Ops in the 1980s

The military's ability to carry out expeditionary warfare in other regions of the world during these years was a mixed bag. U.S. Navy, Marine, and Army forces forcibly removed Cuban airfield constructors and military elements from the Caribbean island of Grenada in 1983, but not without commandand-control, communications, intelligence, and other operational failures. Shortly afterward, the U.S. intervention in Lebanon as part of a multinational peacekeeping effort ended badly. The battleship New Jersey's (BB-62) 16inch gunfire went astray, killing innocent villagers; a poorly planned and executed air strike against Syrian antagonists resulted in the loss of two naval aircraft and two aviators; and Lebanese extremists detonated a huge

explosive device at the Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241 Americans in October 1983. But by the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration and many U.S. citizens were increasingly supportive of overseas military interventions, especially against states sponsoring terrorist groups. At the same time, the government better prepared the U.S. armed forces to execute expeditionary warfare. Throughout the period, U.S. Sixth Fleet forces acted to deter Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi's support for Middle Eastern terrorist groups. When that failed, U.S. naval forces mounted short-term but powerful operations against him. In March 1986, after repeated Libyan-sponsored attacks on U.S. citizens and interests in Europe and the Middle East, the Sixth Fleet assembled a powerful force of aircraft carriers, Aegis cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and frigates off the coast of North Africa. When Qaddafi dispatched missile-armed gunboats against this armada, carrier aircraft sent two of them to the bottom of the Mediterranean. The following month, in retaliation for a Libyan-engineered terrorist bombing that killed Americans in Germany, aircraft from the carriers America (CV-66) and Coral Sea (CV-43), in coordination with Air Force units flying from England, attacked five Libyan military installations in Tripoli and Benghazi. After these strikes, Qaddafi continued to support terrorist activities, but he did so much

U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PHOTO ARCHIVE

The fantastic capabilities of ships such as the USS Sacramento (AOE-1), shown here refueling the USS Mars (AFS-1), top, and destroyer Walke (DD-723), provided logistical support necessary to sustain expeditionary warfare around the world.

less openly.
Enhanced Concepts and More Ships

During this period, the Reagan administration considerably strengthened the U.S. ability to sustain expeditionary warfare anywhere in the world. The Navy spent $7 billion to develop a maritime prepositioning force that

eventually consisted of 13 specially developed ships concentrated in three squadrons that were forward-based in the Azores, Guam, and Diego Garcia. Each squadron carried the equipment and 30 days of supplies for a Marine brigade of 16,500 men. The concept envisioned the movement forward of these supplies to global hot spots where the ships would be met by troops flown in by the Military Airlift Command. In addition to increasing the number and quality of its sealift force, the Reagan administration dramatically enhanced the U.S ability to execute expeditionary warfare by increasing the size of its entire fleet. In support of a new global maritime strategy, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman pressed for a 600-ship Navy. The fleet did not reach that magic number, but got close. Adding significantly to the projection power of the fleet were four Iowa-class battleships, each armed with 16-inch guns and Tomahawk landattack missiles. Equally significant, new and improved amphibious vessels joined the fleet, including Whidbey Island-class LSDs, Wasp-class LHDs, and landing craft, air cushion (LCAC) vehicles. By the end of the Cold War, the Navy had put to sea 15 carrier battle groups, 4 battleship surface action groups, 100 attack submarines, and a host of cruisers, destroyers, frigates, amphibious ships, and auxiliaries. By 1987, when the United States intervened in the long-running conflict between Iran and Iraq, the U.S. military was well prepared to execute expeditionary warfare far from home.
Protecting the Tankers

In response to a request from the government of Kuwait, and to preempt Soviet military involvement in the region, Washington agreed to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers from attack by hostile forces. That year and the next, the Navy and Marine Corps deployed powerful expeditionary forces to the Persian Gulf region-the battleship Iowa (BB-61), aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, mine countermeasure vessels, and a 400-man Marine air-ground task force. Operating from two mobile sea bases positioned in the northern Persian Gulf and from shore bases were Navy patrol boats, Marine Corps helicopters, and Army special operations forces' MH/AH-6 helicopters. Air Force airborne warning and control system aircraft, Navy P-3 Orion patrol aircraft, and Navy E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft kept watch over Iranian activities. Undeterred by the U.S. forces in the area, the Iranians laid mines in the Persian Gulf to halt oil tanker traffic. Army helicopters operating from the frigate Jarrett (FFG-33) detected the Iranian ship Iran Ajr dropping mines into the water in September 1987. Two Army helicopters shot up the vessel,

and Navy SEALs boarded her, discovering more mines on deck ready for deployment. The Navy sank the ship. U.S. forces operating from a mobile base sank or shot up a number of Iranian fast-attack craft at Middle Shoals Buoy close to Farsi Island. A later attack by shore-based Iranian Silkworm missiles on a Kuwaiti oil tanker prompted the destruction by U.S. Navy destroyers of two Iranian command-and-control platforms in the gulf. When a mine almost sank the frigate Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) in April 1988, Washington launched Operation Praying Mantis in retaliation. Gunfire from two Navy warships silenced enemy forces on one platform. Then, Marines of an air-ground task force and sailors in an explosive ordnance disposal unit fast-roped U.S. MARINE CORPS (ANDY HURT) from helicopters onto the From the late 1970s, new and improved amphibious vessels as well platform and destroyed it as new aircraft types joined the fleet. Among them are landing craft, with explosives. A trio of air cushion (LCAC), background, the USS Tarawa (LHA-1), and AVNavy warships destroyed 8B Harrier vertical take-off and landing attack aircraft. a second platform with naval gunfire. When three Iranian fast-attack vessels-half of the Iranian navy-stormed out of their ports and headed for the U.S. fleet, American warships and aircraft sank two of the attackers and heavily damaged another with missiles and bombs. The U.S. expeditionary forces in the gulf during 1987 and 1988 not only maintained the flow of oil to a thirsty world economy and neutralized Iran's aggressive actions, but also demonstrated steadfast support of America's regional allies.
Impact

The Cold War provided a new strategic framework for expeditionary warfare. To enforce the containment strategy, the nation required powerful, mobile, flexible, and ready forces forward based on the periphery of the Soviet bloc. In the early years of the global confrontation with Moscow and its allies, consensus in Washington called for fencing off the communist world, but neither the funding support nor operating forces were available to accomplish that task. Throughout the late 1940s and 1950s, national leaders put their support and money behind strategic bombers and submarines,

hydrogen bombs, and tactical nuclear weapons. This occurred despite the success of expeditionary warfare forces in keeping South Korea free. In the late 1950s and 1960s, when U.S. strategists and the American people recognized the relevance of expeditionary warfare to international security requirements, they supported the buildup of specialized conventional forces. Congress funded the strengthening of the fleet with new aircraft carriers, amphibious ready groups, Marine special landing forces, and underway replenishment ships. Subic Bay; Da Nang; Yokosuka, Japan; and Rota, Spain, served as logistic anchors for America's forward-based expeditionary warfare arm. When Americans withdrew their support for overseas interventions in the wake of the Vietnam War, the fleet's expeditionary warfare capability suffered. The naval services were hard-pressed to support U.S. security interests in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, and even the Caribbean. The Reagan revolution of the 1980s that resulted in more Navy ships, the maritime prepositioning squadrons, and highly capable airlift and sealift resources bore fruit in the positive outcome of naval operations in the Persian Gulf. In a larger sense, the U.S. willingness and global capability to conduct expeditionary warfare was a major factor in the success of the containment strategy and America's victory in the Cold War. 1. I owe a debt of gratitude to the following colleagues who reviewed a draft of this paper, provided insightful comments, and saved this author from several howlers: Dr. John B. Hattendorf, Dr. Jeffrey G. Barlow, Cpt Peter N. Swartz, USN (Retired), Cpt Patrick Roth, USN (Retired), and Norman Polmar. Full citations to the sources used to support this paper are available from the author. back to article 2. Quoted in Michael A. Palmer, On Course to Desert Storm: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf (Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1992), 105. back
to article

3. Memo, [Adm Arleigh A.] Burke to All Flag Officers, 4 Mar 1959, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center. back to article 4. Michael A. Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America's Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833-1992 (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 114. back to
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Dr. Marolda is the senior historian of the Naval Historical Center. He has written or cowritten a number of books on the history of the U.S. Navy in the 20th century, including By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994) and Shield and Sword: The U.S. Navy and the Persian Gulf War (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998).
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