Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 4

28/07/2013

Delivery | Westlaw India

Page1

*895 The King v Meade Court of Criminal Appeal 23 February 1909 [1909] 1 K.B. 895 Darling , Walton , and Pickford JJ. 1909 Feb. 23 Criminal LawMurderDrunkennessManslaughterPrisoner so affected by Drink as to be incapable of knowing that his Act is dangerousDirection to Jury. Upon the trial of an indictment for murder the question whether the jury are justified in returning a verdict of manslaughter on the ground of the voluntary drunkenness of the prisoner may be determined by the following rule: A man is taken to intend the natural consequences of his acts. This presumption may be rebutted, in the case of a man who is drunk, by shewing his mind to have been so affected by the drink he had taken that he was incapable of knowing that what he was doing was dangerous, i.e., likely to inflict serious injury. If this be proved, the presumption that he intends to do grievous bodily harm is rebutted. Upon the trial of a prisoner for murder evidence was given that he was drunk at the time of the commission of the act charged, and the judge gave the following direction to the jury: In the first place, every one is presumed to know the consequences of his acts. If he be insane, that knowledge is not presumed. Insanity is not pleaded here, but where it is part of the essence of a crime that a motive, a particular motive, shall exist in the mind of the man who does the act, the law declares thisthat if the mind at that *896 time is so obscure by drink, if the reason is dethroned and the man is incapable therefore of forming that intent, it justifies the reduction of the charge from murder to manslaughter. , that the direction was right. APPEAL by the prisoner against his conviction on grounds involving questions of law. The prisoner was tried at the Leeds winter assizes before Lord Coleridge J. and a jury for the murder of Clara Howell. At the trial it was proved that the prisoner brutally ill-treated the deceased woman during a great part of the night on which she died, he said that he would give her a good hiding, and he broke a broomstick over her. He struck her a blow on the top of the nose, and, as she fell towards him, gave her a violent blow with his fist on the lower part of the body, which ruptured an intestine, and she died during the night. Evidence was called on behalf of the prisoner to shew that at the time he caused the death of Clara Howell he was drunk, the defence being that the prisoner did not intend to cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, the dead woman, and that the jury in deciding that question ought to take into consideration the fact that he was drunk, and would, on the facts, be justified in returning a verdict of manslaughter. In the course of his summing up to the jury Lord Coleridge J. said: In the first place, every one is presumed to know the consequences of his

28/07/2013

Delivery | Westlaw India

Page2

acts. If he be insane, that knowledge is not presumed. Insanity is not pleaded here, but where it is part of the essence of a crime that a motive, a particular motive, shall exist in the mind of the man who does the act, the law declares thisthat if the mind at that time is so obscure by drink, if the reason is dethroned and the man is incapable therefore of forming that intent, it justifies the reduction of the charge from murder to manslaughter. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder. The prisoner appealed from his conviction on the ground that the direction of Lord Coleridge J. to the jury in his summing up would lead them to suppose that they must either find that the prisoner was guilty of murder, or (in order to justify them in bringing in a verdict of manslaughter) that he was incapable of *897 forming the intent to cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, the dead woman, because they must find that he was insane or in a state resembling insanity at the time, the proper alternatives to be left to them being, it was contended, murder or absence of intention in fact, and therefore manslaughter. J. Willoughby Jardine , for the prisoner. Lord Coleridge J. in his summing up misdirected the jury. The words used by him would naturally convey to the jury the meaning that in order to acquit the prisoner of murder it was necessary for them to find that he was mad through drunkenness at the time he committed the crime. The question ought to have been left to the jury whether the prisoner in fact had no intention of doing grievous bodily harm, as well as whether he was incapable of forming the intention: Reg. v. Doody . 1 Rex v. Carroll 2 is not in point. It involved the question of the effect of provocation. Rex v. Meakin 3 is in the prisoner's favour. Rex v. Grindley 4 was disapproved of by Park J. in Rex v. Carroll . 5 In Reg. v. Monkhouse 6 , Reg. v. Doherty 7 , and Rex v. Carroll 8 the instrument which was the cause of death was a deadly weapon. Bruce Williamson , for the prosecution. A person is presumed in law to intend the consequences of his act. Unless the jury could draw the inference upon the evidence that the prisoner was incapable of having the intention, the inference of law that he had the intention applies: Reg. v. Doherty . 9 Where drunkenness is relied on as a defence to a charge of murder, the jury cannot come to the conclusion that the prisoner did not intend to cause the death unless they first come to the conclusion that he was so drunk as to be incapable of having the intention: Reg. v. Monkhouse .
10

The judgment of the COURT (Darling, Walton, and Pickford JJ.)was delivered by DARLING J. In this case the question to be decided arises out of certain words used by Lord Coleridge J. in summing up to the *898 jury. Complaint is made as to certain words used by him in leaving to the jury considerations applicable to the case of a man who, being drunk at the time, has done acts which result in the death of another, with whose murder he is charged. I will deal with these words presently; but it is necessary before doing so to deal with the history of the doctrine of the effect of drunkenness upon a charge of a crime, such as murder, where the question of intent is involved. Originally the law was that although an insane person was not liable to the same consequences and ought not to be judged by the same standard as a sane one, yet, if he was suffering from dementia affectata, that is, a temporary insanity caused by the accused's own voluntary act in getting drunk, then drunkenness was no

28/07/2013

Delivery | Westlaw India

Page3

excuse for crime: 1 Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, c. 1, s. 6, where it is said, And he who is guilty of any crime whatever through his voluntary drunkenness, shall be punished for it as much as if heen had be sober. The law stood as thus expressed for many years, and, as far as we know, the point was first decided in a contrary sense in Rex v. Grindley 11 , decided in the year 1819. Since then there have been many decisions in which judges have attempted to express the doctrine that where intent is of the essence of a crime with which a person is charged, that intent may be disproved by shewing that at the time of the commission of the act charged the prisoner was in a state of drunkenness, in which state he was incapable of forming the intent. Different judges have expressed themselves differently, but not so differently as to be irreconcilable and to prevent the Court from saying that they were expressing the same doctrine. The two authorities which bear most upon the point are Reg. v. Monkhouse 12 and Reg. v. Doherty 13 , the first decided by Coleridge J. and the second by Stephen J., and no doubt identical expressions were not used in each. But it is necessary to repeat what has often been said before in this Court, namely, that when a judge sums up to a jury he must not be taken to be inditing a treatise on the law. He addresses himself to the particular facts of the case then before the jury, and no judge can affect, in those circumstances, to give *899 an exhaustive definition, or one which applies to every conceivable case. It is enough if he gives a sufficient definition, and rightly directs the attention of the jury to the facts of the case before them. That is true of the present case. I have stated what the ancient view was, and that it is not now in accordance with the law. We do not consider it any part of our duty to enlarge the rule of law or to use language wider than that used by the judges who have considered the question before, for it is not our duty to say anything which will confer an immunity greater than that which they already enjoy on persons who have voluntarily made themselves drunk. On behalf of the prisoner it was said that the words used by Lord Coleridge J. would induce the jury to suppose that unless they found the appellant insane they would not be justified in finding him guilty of manslaughter. But he had expressly told the jury that there was no plea of insanity. That was sufficient to warn the jury not to make such a mistake. The appellant brutally ill-treated the deceased woman during a great part of the night on which she died, he said that he would give her a good hiding, and he broke a broomstick over her. He struck her a blow on the top of the nose, and, as she fell towards him, gave her a violent blow with his fist on the lower part of the body, which ruptured an intestine, and she died during the night. If he did do this and she died of the injury, and he intended to inflict serious bodily injury on her, he was guilty of murder. It was contended at the trial that the presumption that the prisoner had this intent was rebutted because he, by reason of drunkenness, had no such intent. It then became the duty of Lord Coleridge J. to lay down the rule as to the nature of the drunkenness which would be sufficient to satisfy them that the prisoner had not that intent. We desire to state the rule in the following terms: A man is taken to intend the natural consequences of his acts. This presumption may be rebutted(1.) in the case of a sober man, in many ways: (2.) it may also be rebutted in the case of a man who is drunk, by shewing his mind to have been so affected by the drink he had taken that he was incapable of knowing that what he was doing was dangerous, i.e., likely to inflict serious injury. If this be *900 proved, the

28/07/2013

Delivery | Westlaw India

Page4

presumption that he intended to do grievous bodily harm is rebutted. In our opinion this doctrine was not expressed by Lord Coleridge J. in such a way as to mislead the jury into thinking that insanity must be proved. We have carefully considered the words used by him. We have been unable to trace some of them to the language used previously by judges. But a judge is not condemned to use no words which are not commonplace. It is said that some of the language used by Lord Coleridge J. is picturesque and figurative. No doubt; but it is quite easy to say in picturesque and figurative language that which is true. We cannot say that the language used by Lord Coleridge J. differs in its meaning from the rule we have just laid down. It is unnecessary to criticize the very words used. Unless we think them misleading and calculated to lead the jury to think that something equivalent to absolute insanity must be proved to entitle them to bring in a verdict of manslaughter, this appeal ought to be dismissed. After having carefully considered the authorities and the language used by Lord Coleridge J., we have come to the conclusion that there is nothing in the words used by him which is contrary to the rule we have laid down or to former decisions, and that the appeal ought therefore to be dismissed. . Appeal dismissed. (J. E. A.) ____________________________________________________________________ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1. (1854) 6 Cox , C. C. 463. 2. (1835) 7 C. & P. 145 . 3. (1836) 7 C. & P. 297 . 4. (1819) 1 Russ. on Crimes (6th ed.) 144. 5. (1835) 7 C. & P. 145 . 6. (1849) 4 Cox , C. C. 55. 7. (1887) 16 Cox , C. C. 306. 8. (1835) 7 C. & P. 145 . 9. (1887) 16 Cox , C. C. 306. 10. (1849) 4 Cox , C. C. 55. 11. 1 Russ. on Crimes (6th ed.) 144. 12. 4 Cox , C. C. 55. 13. 16 Cox , C. C. 306.

Вам также может понравиться