14.

DIMAYACYAC v CA IN RE: Double Jeopardy Facts: Petitioner (Dimayacyac) was charged of crimes of FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT (under Article 172, first and last paragraph in relation to Article 171 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code) contained in one Information. Before his arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the information on two (2) grounds. First, that the officer who filed the information had no legal authority to do so, and second, that more than one offense was charged in the information. Pending resolution of the motion to quash, petitioner was arraigned. The Motion was granted based on the second ground. Accordingly, the Information was quashed. More than two (2) years after the quashal of the information, Quezon City Prosecutor filed against the same accused including petitioner two (2) informations for falsification of public documents which arose from the questioned acts of falsification subject of the earlier quashed information. Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for the quashal thereof on the ground of double jeopardy, citing Section 3(h) of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner argued that he would be placed in double jeopardy as he was indicted before for the same offenses and the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. The RTC denied the said Motion and the CA affirmed on certiorari. Hence, this Petition. ISSUE: Whether or not there was double jeopardy RULING: NO. Not all the elements for double jeopardy exist in the case at bench. To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.

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Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. In the present case, although there was a valid indictment before a competent court and petitioner, as the accused, had already been arraigned therein, entering a valid plea of not guilty, the last requisite that the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, is not present. In this case, considering that since the dismissal of the previous criminal case against petitioner was by reason of his motion for the quashal of the information, petitioner is thus deemed to have expressly given his consent to such dismissal. There could then be no double jeopardy in this case since one of the requisites therefore, i.e., that the dismissal be without accuseds express consent, is not present. 15. LOS BANOS v. PEDRO IN RE: PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL The Boac, Marinduque election officer filed a criminal complaint against Joel Pedro for violating the election gun ban, i.e., for carrying a firearm outside of his residence or place of business without any authority from the Comelec, a day before the election. After an inquest, the Marinduque provincial prosecutor filed the above Information against Pedro with the Marinduque Regional Trial Court ( RTC) for violation of the Codes Article XXII, Section 261 (q), [5]in relation to Section 264. Pedro filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the RTC granted. The preliminary investigation, however, did not materialize. Instead, Pedro filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash, arguing that the Information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification [8] and/or that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.[9] Pedro attached to his motion a Comelec Certification dated September 24, 2001 that he was exempted from the gun ban. The provincial prosecutor opposed the motion. The RTC quashed the Information and ordered the police and the prosecutors to return the seized articles to Pedro. [10]
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After about a year, the petitioner, private prosecutor Ariel Los Baos ( Los Baos), representing the checkpoint team, moved to reopen the case alleging that Pedros Comelec Certification was a falsification, and the prosecution was deprived of due process when the judge quashed the information without a hearing. The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings, as Pedro did not object to Los Baos motion. Pedro moved for the reconsideration of the RTCs order primarily based on Section 8 of Rule 117, arguing that the dismissal had become permanent. (Provisional dismissal/ Time-bar ) He likewise cited the public prosecutors lack of express approval of the motion to reopen the case. The public prosecutor, however, manifested his express conformity with the motion to reopen the case. The trial court, for its part, rejected the position that Section 8, Rule 117 applies, and explained that this provision refers to situations where both the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, or where the prosecution or the offended party failed to object to the dismissal of the case, and not to a situation where the information was quashed upon motion of the accused and over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedros arraignment date. Consequently, Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTCs mandated reopening. He argued that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that the dismissal contemplated under Section 8, Rule 117 refers to situations where either the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to, or where the prosecution alone moved for, the provisional dismissal of the case and, in setting the case for arraignment and pre-trial conference, despite being barred under Section 8 of Rule 117 (* Note: Since Pedro was charged with an election offense
punishable with imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years and since there has already been a lapse of one year after dismissal based on the MTQ .. See Sec. 8 Rule 117).

Initially,

the CA denied Pedros petition and ordered the remand to RTC. However, upon Motion for Reconsideration, it was partially granted by the same stating that Pedro was able to prove that the motion to reopen the case was filed after the lapse of more than one year from the time the public prosecutor was served the notice of dismissal. Therefore, the state is barred from reopening the case. Hence, this Petition.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to the case, as

the CA found. If it applies, then the CA ruling effectively lays the matter to rest. If it does not, then the revised RTC decision reopening the case should prevail. RULING: trial. Section 8, Rule 117 that is at the center of the dispute states that: SEC.8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. A case is provisionally dismissed if the following requirements concur: 1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves for a provisional dismissal ( sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for its provisional dismissal; 2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; NO. Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable in this case. The petition

is meritorious and the case should be remanded to the trial court for arraignment and

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3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and 4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.[20] Rather than going into specifics, Section 8 simply states when a provisional dismissal can be made, i.e., when the accused expressly consents and the offended party is given notice. The consent of the accused to a dismissal relates directly to what Section 3(i) and Section 7 provide, i.e., the conditions for dismissals that lead to double jeopardy. This immediately suggests that a dismissal under Section 8 i.e., one with the express consent of the accused is not intended to lead to double jeopardy as provided under Section 7, but nevertheless creates a bar to further prosecution under the special terms of Section 8. This feature must be read with Section 6, Rule 117 which provides for the effects of sustaining a motion to quash the dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the basis for the dismissal is the extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy. These unique terms, read in relation with Sections 3(i) and 7and compared with the consequences of Section 8, carry unavoidable implications that cannot but lead to distinctions between a quashal and a provisional dismissal under Section 8. They stress in no uncertain terms that, save only for what has been provided under Sections 4 and 5, the governing rule when a motion to quash is meritorious are the terms of Section 6. The failure of the Rules to state under Section 6 that a Section 8 provisional dismissal is a bar to further prosecution shows that the framers did not intend a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal to be confused with one another; Section 8 operates in a world of its own separate from motion to quash, and merely provides a time-bar that uniquely applies to dismissals other than those grounded on Section 3 . Conversely, when a dismissal is pursuant to a motion to quash under Section 3, Section 8 and its time-bar does not apply.

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*My Note: I supplied the emphasis to the points which I consider most important.. (This is such a very long case.) The Court made a long discussion about the distinctions of Motion to Quash from Provisional Dismissal but in sum, it said: To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are different concepts whose respective rules refer to different situations that should not be confused with one another. If the problem relates to an intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or information, as shown on its face, the remedy is a motion to quash under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All other reasons for seeking the dismissal of the complaint or information, before arraignment and under the circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall under provisional dismissal. * My Note: To simply put, since dismissal was predicated on a Motion to Quash, there can be no provisional dismissal. And since the ground for the Motion to Quash of Pedro (contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification and/or that the facts charged do not constitute an offense) does not fall under the exceptions mentioned in Section 6, it is a dismissal without prejudice and hence, may be re-filed.

16. FELICIANO v PASICOLAN IN RE: BAIL FACTS: Petitioner upon learning that amended information charging him and seventeen others with the crime of kidnapping with murder had been filed, and that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, immediately went into hiding and went at large. Without surrendering himself, he filed the motion in which he asks that the court fix the amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial. Respondent Judge dismissed petitioners motion, on the ground that pending his arrest or surrender, Pablo Feliciano has not the right to ask this court to admit him to bail. It is contended that as, under the Constitution, all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, Article III,
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Section 1 paragraph (16), Constitution of the Philippines, and that the words all persons used in said constitutional provision have been interpreted to mean all persons, without distinction, whether formally charged or not yet so charged with any criminal offense. Hence the petitioner contends that respondent Judge has failed to comply with a duty imposed by law in refusing to decide on the merits petitioners motion for admission to bail. Consequently, he filed this petition for mandamus to compel said respondent to do so.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioners the petition should be granted and his motion

for admission to bail be given due course RULING. NO. We fail to find merits in petitioners contention. The petition at bar is

in effect a petition for admission to bail. And the rule on the subject in this jurisdiction is well settled. There is no question as to the soundness of the rule invoked by petitioner. Such is the law in this jurisdiction. But, the rule is subject to the limitation that the person applying for admission to bail should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty . Bail is defined under the Rules of Court as security required and given for the release of a person who is in custody of the law, Rule 110, sec. 1, Rules of Court. In the case of Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634, this Court held: This constitutional mandate refers to all persons, not only to persons against whom a complaint or information has already been formally filed. It lays down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. According to this provision, the general rule is that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of course, only those persons who have been either arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek the benefits of said provision. But in order that a person can invoke the constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a formal complaint or information is filed against him. From the moment he is
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placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is charged with a capital offense and evidence of his guilt is strong.

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