HOW TO RULE INDIA

Papers related to British policies towards Punjab

Edited b.v
AHMED SALEEM
Pu njab Adbi Markaz Lahore
All Rights Reserved
First Edition March 1978
Published by
Punjab Adbi Markaz
Sanam building, Mozang Chungi;
Lahore.
Printed at
Pakistan Printing Works
1, Abbot Road Lahore.
Price Rs. 25.00
Export Price : $ 5.00
lEDICA'ION
To my younger sister
SHAHN AZ AFSAR
Co nte nts
Editor's Note
The political relations between the British Government
and the Punjab States and Chief's as they stood in
1843.
9
Andrew D'Cruz 13
Notes on the state of our relations with the Punjab and
the best mode of their settlement.
Lt. Col. Sir C. M. Wade C.B. 29
What are we to do with the Punjab.
Major Geueral John Briggs 40
How to Rule India : Two documents on the I.C.S. and
the Politics of Administration.
N. Gerald Brrrier 59
Index
81
EDITORS', NQTE;
An 8ulhuBl1, Coppt0h0B8V0 history of lh6 Punjab .remains
yet to be writtei>Junjabi University, Patiala, East Punj\b, some
lm0 Dd0K, launched a project fr the QtOdu0lon of 9n 0h! VU-
u1nes hIslory ul1hC Punj8be So t, however, only one olume,
volume III- Sultanal0 0tou~ 8 Kn0Wn to h8V0 D00n puDl8hed
under this
.
proj00lg h0 rest of lh0 unV0t8\108 B East Punjab
and 80V0Iaother private institutions too in thall0l0,are r0ported
to D0 fV0rishly directing their 1ttention to lh0 ubject, but have
so far,produced lardly anything worth notice in lh0 feld. Indivi
duascholars in Lahor0 have some work on th0
subject to their
cr0dt, but fr any erio:s study of lhe history of 1hc 8nU, this
could not be 8ufci entv During. th0 !88lfew y08IS, 8 number of
books on the Punjab left by lh 08Iy |ng8h visitors, army H0D
8Wd
80mnl8I0lo18, h8V0 also be0n re-published n18l8n, bul
lh080 too, for reason of mu08ub|06lVly and mQ0t81I8l0 ll
n lD0m, 0ouIu D0 oI ll0 valu0 fr 8n] oD]00IV0 8BCfruitful
research on lh0 if and culture of a people 88 8n00nl, 88 numc-
IoV8 80 88 dynmic as !hc 0oQ0 of lh0 u1jab.
l could
Y
0\ be asked 88 lo why lhctc h88 be0n such a 8c8nty
progress i lh0 feld so fr, 0Bd 8 number of CIm6ulc8 and prob
les th8l stand n the W8y C0n bc enume1at0d as an 0xplan8ton
of lBcunhappy 8l810. o 80Iou8 work on the history of Punjab is
indeed possible 8o long as lhc80 Ch0u1c8 and problem8 remain
unsolved. owcver, this niay Bul Dc the uU088Dl0I 8p0ng

out these in depth or cV0W irnmcrically. Only .on .ch>.n>blem

need 00 m0nlon0C W lh0 pI080nl context, sincc(tba truly
,
has
served as the chief fctor fr the plannng o lhc prese'ht cqec
tion, and, in |0!, also happen8 to con8tI lute the basic tu1nbli11g
oK stalmating ti! research work on the h\8lo1] of lh land of
five Rivers and its Q0oy0 ~ lh0 QIOb0m8n0 the stumbling block
being the paucity of uui60 miitell which \$ !B0 sine-qua-11011
of
al hbtory of all peoples.
}i story@ most certainly, is .nor merely the enumeration of
events. Wi thout critical appreciation of evets no writing of any
modern' history is possible, or even desirable. History which does
not present a living and meaningful account of He Jife and deeds
of a people would not desere to be termed history. But before
any appraisal or appreciatiotl of things is tan in hand, there
oufht to be the things on ha11d to. be appraised amf appreciated.
F(r any such work on the history ofthe Punjab_ what is, therc
fre, needed first is the availability of so.urce material I the
preset situation, no political social or economical di scussion or
any period of the history of the .unjab is possible- since no
basic information on that particular period or any perid of our
.istory exists for historians to study and appreciate.
As pointed out aboveg reprints of quite a number of English
works of doubtful import, left by interested writers, ofcial di arists
and political agents 0f Flreign Establishmcnl in Lhis parl of the
world, have lately started coming out of the press, almost in a
stream, and happen to be these days much on display in the
bookshops of Lahore and other cities of the Pun.jab. Whatever be
the significance of these target- ori'nted 'reportings' fr purposes
of research into the British peri od of the history of our land, that
too, most definitely, is of secondary value. Material of primary
value even fom these sources remains hidden from our view, and
comes into light very rarely. It is of utmost importance that .this
material of primary value is uncovered aid made available fr the
research scholar to probe iHto the imperialistic policies and ac
tions of our late rulers _
Countless number of papers are believed to be lying buried
under files of records of the British Establishment, which could,
011 one hand throw light on the political and soioeconoiic
situation of the Pan1jb of that period, and provide teJltale
details, on the other hand as to how cold-bloodedly the foreign
rulers exploited that situation to their advantage. lt is essential
that tQj record or the British Rule is uptured and thoroughly
cxaiind before this period of the Punjab histoly is discussed
and properly appraised4
We have put together in this small pubication for the benefit
of our scholars f(Ul Such papers, which saw the light Of the day
for the first time in the April 1968 andOctober@ 1971 issues gf the
bianual journal Punjab -Past and Present, of the Punja bi
(niversity, Patiala, edited by three renowned schol ars of East
Punjab - Dr. Ganda Singh, Dr. Fauja Singh and Professor
Gurcharan Singh.
It is our hope that this publication will succeed in demolishiilg
ntany
.
a commonly held notion regiCiug British conquest of the
Punjab and their subsequent administratfon of the land, and will
stimulate mo:e incisi ve a11d objective thinking regarding this
almost contemporaneous period of our history. It is unfortunate
that, to-date, even when the conquest has since long been vacated,
we have continued to look upon and assess this period of our
slavery with half-hearted indiferene and only ambivalently. Thi s_
at one time, was natural too - since the attitude of the ruled
towards their rulers cannot be any other.
Today, however, we are an independendent state and free
people. Our approach to history in general and our own history in
particular ought to be maturer, more responsible and self-reliant
than has been the case so fr.
January, 1977
AHMED SALEEM
Jamshoro, Sind
Th Political Relations between the . British Government
anJ the-Panjab.States anJ Chiefs as they stood in 1843
by
Loodianah
Aloo [walia]
ANDREW D'CRUZ
Sirdar Nihal Singh
Thisdomain, Iiketherest oft!icSeikh protected States, is he!d
underourguarantee and protectIon,but the Chief is conideresdin-
Vide Appendix dependentwithn bis own ]urisdiction. Iutteh SIngh,
No. 84
the Cbiefwhorst came under our protection, having
ed fromthe Pun]ab n I826,bis trans-Sut!e] possessions were seized
bythe!atc Mahara] ah Run]eetSingh, who, however, ve years the
afterwardsgranted same in ]agheerto Iutteh SIngh's second son,
by qme Amur Singh.
IuttehSInghdied on 2Ist ofOctober I886, andwas succeeded by
hiseIdestson,thepresont Chief, Niha! Singh.

The possessionsof this chieftain are interspersed among the

protected States, and comprise ten distinct ho!dngs,the principa!
twoofwbich border on the river Sut!e] ., InI832the AIoo omain
contained 452 and haIf vI!Iages, 'and yie!ded a revenue ofKupes
8,62,O0O. In I842 the incomewas estImated at four !akhsof Rupees,
and a!!owing one Sowar to revenue of Kupees5OO [ aca!cuIation by
which the Ru!er of Lahore !evies his quotaofhorse), t his State is
capab!eof fu:ishing,on emergencies, a forceof 8OOhrses.
.
Culled from The Political Relations E#isting bala1n the Bfitish Govemmenl
and Native States and Chiefs, subjecl to the Govemment of the N. W. Pfovinees, as
.hey stood in 1840, Revised and Continued to 1843, with an Appendix compiled
from Ofcial Documents, by Andrew D'Cruz, Assistant Secretary to the Govern
ment of India, Home Department, and published by Authority of Government,
printed by J.L. Kingham at the Foreign Department Press, 7, Council House
Street, Calcutta, IB62.
.`
13 I
1 4
/
,Ferozepore
Tbis is one oftbo protected Seikh States, wbicb, on faiIure of
beirs, Iapsed to tbe BritisI Covernment. Coorbuksb Singb wos tbe
founder of !erozepore, and on bis deatbwas succeedcd,bybis son,
bunna Singb, wbo again wos succeeded by his widow, Sirgurnee
Lucbmun Koour, wbowostbe Iast boIder of tbe Cbieftainsbip.
Ierozepore, from its situation on tbe Ieft bonk of tbe SutIe],
oers anadvantageouspositionfor a frontier MiIitary post, and owing
toour Iate operationsin tbe Nortb West, bas eme;ged from a viIIage
town, to popuIous pIace.
BugboiISingL, ond aIterbim, bis sons, Cbunda SingJand]bunda
Singb, advanced cIaims to his Estate, but HugbaiI Singb's fatber,
oonab Singb, tbe uterine-brotber ofbunna Singb, badpossessions
on tbe nortbern bak of tbe Sutlej assigned to bim bybis fatber,
Goorbuksb Singb, wbo mode over Ierozepore and its Ionds as a
separate ootment and distinct tenure to bis second son, bunna
Singb, tbus constituting, occordIng totbe Hindoo Iaw and Seikh cus-
toms, two separate anddistinct Iami|ies.
Accordingly, on unna 5ingh's deatb, tbis separated potion
ofCoorbuksb Singb's acguisition came Intotbe possession of bis wite,
Lucbmun Koour, and5m ber deceaseIapsed to our Covernment . Tbe
nepbews of bunna Singb bad cIearIy no rigbt to tbis separated
prperty of tbeir unc|e, and tbeir claim was accordingIy disaIIowed.
I
.
.
,
Loodfanah
.
'
.
. 1
Tbis Pergunnob formed part of tbe possession of tbe ]beend
Rajab. It was acquired by tbe descendants of Cujput Singb prior
to our treaty witb tbe ruIer of tbe Pun]ab in I8O9, andassucb,
!apsedto tbe Brtisb Covernment on tbe deatb of Rajab Sungut Sinb.
Fensions, aggregating Rupees I,3781O-8 per annum, are payab! e
from tbe revenues of tbis Pergunnab tocertainIakeers, Sadbs, &c. ,
towbomtbeybad beengrantedforIifebytbe]beend Cbieftains.
Simla
We obtained tbis territory by

excbange from tbe Rajab of

PateeaIa ad tbe Rana of KeyontbuI. It now forms a!most entire!y
tbe Iocations o! Eqropean visitors t o

tbe biIIs. Tbe net reven

e

der|ved !rom tbis Pcrgunnab in I836 was Rupees 6O7.

15.
, Sikh Protected States
I
Tbe Cis-SutIej Sikb States came qnder thc BrItish Protection by
otr Treaty witb the RuIer of the Pun]ab, datod the25th ApriI I8O9.
Vid. e Appendix We made no dIstinctIon betwen the Chiefs whose
N
o. 4
5
-4
6 ancestor
s were tbe orIgnaI cuItivators or zameendars of
the country,
andthose
descendedfrom Invadersfromthe north ot the
SutIej.
BothcIassescame under the BrItishprotectionunderprecIseIy
tbesame

circumstances, at the same time, and on the same footing.

AlI

were
promisedtol
held except fromthepayment of tribute, and
theBrtIsb rghttopecuniarybenehtfromItsconnexion with tbemis
Iimited

to tbe revenues of the Iand wbicb may escheat to it a

the Supreme Power. "
Tbe principIe of the proceedings of our Covemment was to pIace
these territories in the same condition withrespecttoactuaI ocu-
pation as that which existed at the period of the Iate Mahara]ah
Run]eet SIngh's Iast invasion,withoutenteringinto aninvestigation
of anterior rights andonthIsprincipaI, the dIstricts of Buraich and
Udaweh were restored to Bhunga Singh, fromwhomth eyhadbeen
wrestedbythe CbIefofLahore and made oVetto Saheb Singh.
Tbe

prIncipaI ChIeftainsbips amongst the Sikh Protected States

are, PatceaIa, ]beend, KythuI a

d Nabah. Tbe Chiefs with the

' A
g
ra Proceedin
gs
, oxception tothat of KythuI,who was a Bbaeekeean,
8
th
F
ebrua
r
y
183
7 are of

the PhooIkeean tribe. and mthrespect to

Nos
.
5 and
6
. tbese States the ruIe of succession hasbeen deter-
minedbythe Suprome Covernment as foI!ows:
'TheEstateto devoIve entIre tothe nearest maIe heIr, according
to theHindoo Law and to tbe excIusIon of femaIes." That tbis
excIusion of femaIes is accordIng to the usagesoftheBbaeekeean
and FhooIkeean tribes, may be gathered from a written dec!atation
oftheIateBbaee LaI Singb oIXythu! , deIIvered to SirDavid Ochter-
Ioney in I8I I , as aIso from a communIcation onthe sub] ect from the
Ite Kajah Bhag Sin
g
h of ]heend toCaptainBirch,datedthe25th
]une1818.
In theabsence qf heirsma!e of tbebody of these fourprincipaI
Chieftains, the actuaI possessions of tbe founderof eachChieftancy
aretodecend tothenext of kin.
The territories acquired by the decendants of the original
founder, prior t o the year I80, nre to Iapse to the British Gv- -
16
errrment and the possessIons granted to the ChieI by the RuIcr oI
the Pun] ab,subsequently to theTreaty oI1809, areto revertto HIs
Hghness.
Succession to ChieItainshIps by adoptionhasneverbeen practised
by the Sikhs. Hence in 1826 Ind Kunwar was not permIt!ed t
adopthergrandson, the son oI theRajahoI Ladwah, asher heirin
Rudhour, which, on her demIseIntheIoIIowIng year, lapsed to the
Britisb Covernment. In like mannerthepoposal oI tbe SIrdarneeoI
Umbala to adopt an heir wasre]ected,andherterItiory escheated
to the British Covernment.
.
CaptainMurray, Iormerly Superintendent oI the HIll Territories,
intreatingor the rulesandcustomsoI tbe Sikhs, remarked that '!he
rulesoIsuccessIon tlandedpropertyin the SIkh Statesare arbitrary,
andarevariouslymodihed inaccordance to the usages, the intorests,
andpre]udices oI dmernt IamIlies, nor is it practicabIe to rcduce
the anomalous system to axedand Ieading prInciple.
The truth oI the above observation hasbeen substantiuted by
subsequent experience,

and it has been determined, that, with exce-

ptIon tothe Iour prIncipaI CheItainshIps noticed above, the rule oI
successIon in all other SikhCbieItainshipsorEstateswillbe to ascertain
the custom oI tbe IamIly in each instance by the best evidence,
procurable and to be guIdedin our decision tbeteby.

IemalesuccessIon is valid amongst some oI thesetribes, andsois

te ceremony oI Kuraiwaor 'ChadurUndazee. ' This Iormof marriage
is heId legaInot onlywith sIster-in-law, but with stranqeIemales, and
the ospring oI such connexIon is Iegitimatelyentitled to succeed to
the parents'patrimony.
!n sevoraI casesonsuccessionoI brothers,it hasbeen Iound that
successors marriedtheIrsIsters-In-law,the widows oI thelastpossessors,
but. can by no means be in!erred that the successions would not
havetaken place witbout such ceremony, still less thatthe widows
ould have succeeded to thepre]udiceoI the male heirs, had they
continuedina stateofidowhood.
The Sikh and Hill Protected territory, sub] ect to the Umbala
Political Agency, was stated, in183?, to compromise 6, 9I1] vilIages,
yieIdinga revenue oI Rupees55,22,49 and to be capable oIfurnish!ng
10,447horse, caulated at the rato oI one horse to a revenue oI
rupees 500.

17
eseStatespay no tribute, andwedonotinterferewth their
ntemaIaairs,though interference for generaIIy bene5ciaI purposes
wouId be justihabIe. We as the Paramount and ControIIing.Fower,
benet by escheats. TbeIapses up to the c!ose of !247 Ius!ee, !839-4O
A.D ._ yie!ded a reven

e ofRupees 2, I5, 3I6-I4-3 asfoIIows .

I, Be!aspore
. . s I3, 739 0 O
2. ]ugadree . u e 26,248 5 3
3. Khadwa Booreah l, I58 O O
4. Ma]rah I I ,984 4 O
5. Morudah
35,32O 4 O
6. Rudhour 43,9OI 8 O
7. UmbaIa
62,965 9 O
Rupees 2,I5,3I6 I4 3
, I
.
Besides the above, the

smaI! estate of Tehree, comp:smg 7

viIIages, and estimated in I$32 to yieId a revenue of Rupees 5,6OO,
escheated to tbe BritishCovernment in I838, on the death of Maee
Dhurmo, widowofSirdar_umyut Singh,without ma|e heirs. We aIso
possess two-tbirds of Thanessur, whicb Iapsed to us in 183O, on the
death oftheIastma!e heir of tbe originaI proprietor, Bhag $ingh.
Thisescheatwases_ timatedi nI832to yie!dRupees 34,00O.
The Pergunnah of LudhianahIapsetothe british Covernment in
I836,onthedeathofRa]ah SungutSinghof ]heend, and the cstate
ofMuIIick, formerIya dependency

of the BeIaspore domain, and esti-

matedtoyieIda revenueof Rupees 7,OOO a year, became Iikewise an
escheat on tbe deathof Sirdar Ram $ingIi In184O, and i n 1843 tbe
State ofKytbuI, yieIding a revenue of nearIy7 Iakhs of Rupees per
annum, escheated toourCovernment.
TheRvers Chortee, OonbaIa, Chuzzur, Tangree, andMurkhutde,
intersect the Sikh Protec|edState.
Possessions of Maharaja Tbe Iate Mahara]ah Runjit Singb of Lahore and
Ranjit Singh South o
f bis depndents heId certain Cis-SutIo] posses-
the Sultedge
sions, wbich by the Treatyof18O9, were secured
to tbem but tbe RuIer of the Pun]ab was resricted from maintaining

more troops than were necessary for the internaI duties of his
territory, situated ontheIeft bankof theRiverSutIe] , andheengaged
nottocommitor suer any encroachmentson thepossessions orrights
of Ihe ChIefsints vicInity. Tbe annuaI revenue ofthe Cs-SutIej
Lahore territory was estimated In I812 at seventeen Iakbs of
Rupees.
Umbi1a
The estate of UmbaIa Iapsed touson the death of Sirdarnee Dia

Koonwur, on theJ3th of ]anuary I821. She was the wIdow of Coor-

buks Singh, wbo, and hIs brothr, .a!Singh, came from Manjba, a
country south-west of UmrItsarand Lahore, and acquired by conquest
thepresent Sikh Frotected TerrItory from Zyne Khan, the Covernorof
Sirbind, InA.D. I763.

fbe acquIsitIon was parce!Ied into hve divIsions: Ist, UmbaIa

;
2nd, Thuma Fun]hokrah, 1th,BubbeaI; and5th, Boh; and dIstrIbuted
amongst tbe bretbren and foIIowqrs of the conquerors, aII owing
obedIencetoUmba!a, which became the seat ofCoorbuksh SIngh and
La!SIngh.
On the death of the brothers, DIa Koonwur, the widow ofthe
eIder, was acknowIedged as the bead of the confederacy; but sex,
age, and secIusIon, rendered her mere!ynominaIIy so, and misruIeof
necessIty foIIowed nevertheIess sbe heId her posItIon for no Iess a
period than 38 years.

Sirdar Hurnam SIngh was a Futteedar of tbe UmbaIa domaIn,

hIsportion [BubbeaI) !apsed to the BrItish Covernment on hIsdeath
which took p!ace on the IIIh of March I838, wben hIs wIdow,
MussumatKIsen Koonwur, was provIdedforbya pecunIaryaI!owance
of Rupees2, 1OO per annum, and a ]ointure of Rupecs 6O0 was granted
to Hurnam SIngh'smother.
UmbaIawasseIected as the headquarters of our FoIitica! Agent,
because ofIts centrIcaI situatIon wIth respect to the SIkh States,
whichcameunder our protectIon, wbe
n
, by the Treaty of the 25th
of Apri! I8O9, we restricted the RuIerof the Fun] ab to the right bank
of the RiverSut!e,
This Fo!itica! Agency has aIsounder ItscontroIa fewHiII States,
whIch we conquered from tho Coorkhas in I8I1-I5, such as the
territories of Nahun or Shmoor, KuhIoor orBeIaspore, Hindoor or
NaIagrh, andHaneeHajra.
19
Jheend
Raja Surroop Sing,Ba
h
adoor
On tbe deatb of the last CbieI, Ra]ab Sungut Singb, we took,
possession of tbis territory as a lapse, but subseguently madeover
Order dated 11t
h tbe greater portion to acollateral beir, tbe present
February 1837
CbieI, Raab Suroop Singb.
OurreIinquIsbment nfavouroISuroop Singb comprised tbetracts
ofcountrygenerally wbicb belngd to bisreat grandfatber, Cu]put
Singb, tbe founderof this Chieftainsbip. AIl possessionsgrantedby
Mabara]abKunjeet Singb, subseguently to

the Treatyof18O9,were
restored to Hs Higbnezs. Loodianab and all tbe other possession
acguIredby tbedescendantsof Cu]put Singh, sebsegitently to tbe
death of tbat Chief, and before tbeyear I809, lapsedto tbe BritIs]
Covernment .
Tbewidow, and SookbaSingb,a cousIn of Suroop SIngb, advanced
tbeir cIaim totbe Cbieftainsbip, but it wasnegatived.
Tbe ]beend revene was estimated in 1832 at Rupees 2,2+,80O
and tbe territory was stated to contain 281 villages, but in I842 tbe
Revenue was estimated at 3 lakhs. Tbe possessIons a:e sItuated i n
four dIe:ent parts of tbe P:otectedSIkb Te:ritories, t be principal
portion aud capitalare bounded by Karnaul, Paneeput , Kytbul, and
Ibe Bhuttee istricts, with exception to a small portIon to |be
nortb-west, wbicb is bounded by tbelandsof tbe Pateeala State.
Kythul
Lapsed to the British Government in 1843
Tbe Bbaees of KytIuI were descended from emig:ants from
]ysuImeer, wbo some centuries ago l ike tbe Pboolkeean family
ofSikhs,setteled as a pastoral people n tbe ]ungIe country
t
and
Bhoocboukee was tbeir hrst establisbed residence. Tbey are
descendedfrom tbesame stouk as the P:olkeeans, i . e. , tbe famIl ies
of ateeala, ]beend, Nabha,

and tbe Nabra]keean Sikhs. They

subseguently became Zemee:Idars and Cbowdrees, paying rev

enue to
Ibe Mabomadan Covernment, unti!one of them, attendingon tbe SIkb
Cooroo in tbe Pun] ab, rec

ivedfrom bi mthe familiar appellation of

20
Bhaee, which the famiIy has retained eversince as its distinguuf
titIe, andhas hence been heId n a certaindegreeofreverence.
Bhaee Coorbuksh Singh, the common ancestorofthe KythuI and
the ArnouIee house, and the founder of the Chieftainship, was a
principaI Ieaderanong the Sikhs

when they fought their great battIe

with theMahomedans at Sthind in I763, and sacked thatcity. He
diedin I766, and was scceededby

his son Bh aee eisooSingh, who

possessed himsIf of KythuIfrom the Mahomedans about fty years
ago, andmade ithIs chief pIoce ofresIdenc. Hedied in I782, and
wassucceeded by Bhaee LaISingh, whocame under Brtishprotection
in!8O9. Hedied in!8!9, ond wos succeeded by Bhaee Oodey Singh
whowasporoIytc, and died on t!e I5th of March I843, Ieaving no
issue.
ThisChieftainship comp:Ised the foIIowingPergunnahs:

No. I Habree OriginaI possessions of

Bhaee Coorbuxsb
Bhoochoukee Singh, the foundevof the Chieftainship,
BeIkan yieIding an estimated annuaI revcnue of
KhoodaI one Iakh of Rupees.
Kurrah
hannausoo
No. 2 KythuI
Iuttehpore Poondree
Pehowa
Acquired by the descendants of
G

oorbuksh Singhprior.!o the year

I8O9,estimated to yieId a revenue
of fourIakhs of Rupees per annum.
Ameer
SooIhur,od]oining
UmbaIa
Chuka
Soorsur
Barna
KukriaIa
KooIaran
MaIIau Chahdau
Buda Luda
Iutta ]oiner
No. 3 Coo]urwaI Cranted to the Chef of KythuI by tIe
RuIerofthePun] ab subsequentIy to I8O9.
Con!ormabIy with theruIe o succession Iaid down fo; the four
principaI SIkh Chieftainships of the Bhaeekeean and PhooIkeoan
tribes,the possessions marked No. I were adjudged to CooIab Singh,
theBhaeeof ArnouIee, who is the eIdest surviving son of Bhaee
BusawaSingh,who wastheyoungestson of BhaeeSookhaSingh, who
wasaIsothe youngest son of theoriginaIfounderoftheCheftainship,
Bhaee Goorbuksh Sinh. GooIab Singh has a younger brother

by
name Sun]eet Singh.
The Fergunnahs marked No. 2 have escheated to the British
Government, nd Fergunnah Coo]urwaI [No. 3) has reverted to the ,
RuIerof the Pun] ab. Theescheat tothe British Covernment was not
peaceabIy reIinquished. The KythuI Ministry, acting under

he
professedorders of Maee Sahib Koonwur, mother of the deceased
Chieftain,Bhaee Oodey Bingh, and of Maee Sooru] Koonwur, his
widow, causedaninsurrection, attacked and defeated theescortthat
had accompaniedtheBritish Omcer who was deputedtotake pos-
session of the Iapsed Pergunnahs, and it was not unti! we had

recourse to arms that the fort of KythuI was evacuated and the
Maeesed. Bytheir conducttheseMaeeshnve forfeitedaIIcIaims to
considerationand supportfrom the British Covernment. !ur ruIe
hasnowbeenintroducedinto tbe !apsedterritory,anda UritisbQmcer
is stationedat KythuI for its revenuemanagement.
Tbe principaI Chieftainsofthe PhooIkeean tribe, viz., those of
FateeaIa, Nabha, and ]heend, were suspected of having secret!y
abettedto produce thecontumacyof the KythuI Ranees and Ministcr,
wit!;the view ofmaintainingthe Chieftanship entire in their tribe;
but onthebreakingoutof theinsurrection, and on a warning that
theirintentionswereknown, they aordedgood aid in queIIing it, and
inappreh<nding theringIeaders, who werepunished.
The income of the KythuIterritory was estimatedin I813-41 at
Rupees 6,9O,OOO, and the charges at Rupees 2,5O,OOO, Ieaving a
surpIus revenue of Rupees 1,4O,OOO, but tI:e charges in this newIy
acguiredterritory arenot yet susceptib|e of proper controI,and our
Covernment may caIcuIate on a reduction wheneverit is enabIed to
sub]ect the expenditure to a rigid check.
Nabha
ThisChief is aIso of the PhooIkeean tribe. Ra]ah ]uswunt Singh
died on the 22nd of May I81O, and was succeeded by his son,
Deipree Singh, 18 yea)s of age. Nabha was stated in I832to
cmprIse 3!3 vIIIages, and tbe revenue was estImaIed in !812atour
!akhsof Rupees.
Interference between thIs Chief and bis feudatories bas been
excercIsed. The Iands of thIs terrItory are scattered tbrougb the
Protected States, and are In no !ess tban e!even distInctho!dings.
ThechIefportIon borders on Pateea!a.
Patee ala
Mahara] ahheera] Ra]eshur, Mabara]ab Ra]gan KurrumSingb
Mohender Babadoor.
ThIs Is tbe !argest of tbe SIkh ProtectedStates, andtbeCbief
IsIookeduptobyhIsneIghbours asthehead of the Pboo!kecan trIbe.
Vide Appendix Fateea!a proper comprIses 2, 15O vI!!ages, and tbe
No. 51.
revenue was estImated In !812 at twenty-two !akhs
oIRupees. The ChIef bad added t o bIs orIgInaI prIncIpa!Ity by
purchase. Three-fourtbs of theHI!!-StateofBughat were dismembered
by us after tbe expu!sIon of the Coorkbas, and so!d to Mabara]ah
Kurrum SIngh mr a !akh and tbIrty tbousand Rupees. We a!so
disposed of to this Chieftain nine Pergunnahs formerly belonging to
tbe HI!! State o] Keyontbu!,for one !akb and hfty tbousand Rupees.
Tbese two !ots were estImatod In !832 to yIe!d a revenue of Rupees
35,OOO. Fateea!a bordersontbeBhuttee IstrIcts.
In!83O,we obtaInedfrom tbIs CbIeftbe HII!TerrItory of SIm!a,
In excbange ofthreevI!!agesIn Fergunnab Burrow!ee, wbIch he had
retaInedwIthSubathoo.
Kurrum SIngh has Issue, hIs brotberA]eet SIngh, who had !ong
contended fora sbareIn tbeprIncIpa!Ity, has now guIet!y sett!eddown
asa pensIoner.
ThIsChIefmaIntaInsa respctab!e force.
Protected Sikh States
Chichrowlee
Sirdar Sabha Singh Kulseea
ThIs ChIef of tbe Kerora trIbe. His terrItory comprIses I33
vII!ages, andIsestImatedto yIe!d a revenueof Rupees !,O6,7OO.
Chooleean Sikhs
ThIs trIbe or fraternIty from not havIng a ChIef were IncessantIy
quarre!Ing and f!hting. Tbeir possessonswere dIvIded Int ve
23
shares or puttees, and tbey bad voIuntariIy pIaced tbem

elvs I

sub]ection to tbe Ra]ab of Pateea!a. Tbey aterwards became

dIssatIshed wItb tbIs arrangement, and, In !836, were emancIpated
from tbe superInte

dence oftbe Ra]abof PateeaIa, and transferred to

the controI oI tbe PoIItica! Agent at UmbaIa. Eacb puttee now
appoInts headmen for tbe atbItratIon

oI Its dIsputes, and

tbe Covernment bas not been troubIed bytbesepeopIe durngIate
ycars.
Indree
N
uwb Gbolam Mohee-ood-Deen Khan Bahadoor and Sirdars
N
ehal Singh,
' `
+
Soodh Singh and J owahir Singh
TbIs Is now a SIkb town, butwasorIgInaIIy acquIred by tbe Koon]-
poora famiIy.
On tbe IrruptIon of tbe SIkbs tbey were concI!Iated by tbe
payment

of "Cbout' IIteraIIyone-Iourtb revenue. TbIs 'bIack maII'

was graduaIIydoub!edtIII at Iast the SIkbs cameto be regarded as
co-sharers.
.
Indree bas sIx dependent viIIages, and Is estImated to yeId
Tupees 1,8OO.
L
CooIsbere Kban,former CbIef of Koon]poora,gIvetbIsestatetobIs
secondson,CboIamMobee-ood-deen Kban and bIseIdestson, Rabmut
Kban, tbetben CbIef_ cI Koon]poora, ]oIned Iord Iake durIngtbe
MabarattaCampaIgn o!8O1, bIs famIly possessIonsmaybeconsIdered

to bave come under our protectIon from tbat perIod.

A!ter tbe deatb ofCooIsbere KbanCbo!am Mobee-ood-deen Khan
dIsputed tbe successIonof bseIder brotber, RabmutKban, totbe un-
dIvIded PrIncIpaIity of Koon]poora and tbe dierences between tbe

brotbersweread]ustedbytbetransIerIn!8!ItoMobee-ood-deen of one
tbIrd of Koon]pooca, yIeIdIng anestImated reve:;,:eof Rupees !4,OOO.
WItb tbe vIew oI preventIng as mucb as possIbIetbe evIsoI
dIvIded autborIty, tbe IoIIowIng arrangement was sanctIoned bytbe
Covernment ontbe25tboI]uIy!833.
.
Ist. Tbe powers oI Covernment In Indree and its dependent
Iands, Inc!udIng tbe rIgt oI admInIsterIng )ustIce and ofcoIIectIng

tbe Iand and customrevenue, were vested excIusveIy In Mobee-ood-

' .
deenYan.
' 24 :
2ndIy. An Omcer on the part of the Sikhs was toattendon

a
occasions, when arrangementswere being made for the setIementand
coIIectionoftherevenue derived trom thetown Iands, and to take
copiesof aII papers
connected with the sub]ect One-haIf

of the
revenueof the town Iands was made payabIe to the Sikh sharehoIdcrs,
andthe other haIf was to be retained by ChoIam Mohee-ood-deen
Khan.
3rdIy. An Omcer on the part of the

Sikhs was to remain

n attendance at the Chubootera, and to take copies o! aI! pagers

reIating tothe coIIection of the cutoms revenue, one-half ofwhich

was adjudgedto

the Sikh sharehoIders and the other haIftoMohee-

ood-deen Khan.
I
.
4th!y. The Sikh- sharehoIders, their reIatonsand immediate
dependents, are independent ofMohee-ood-deen's

authority,whohas
no power to imprison or nethem, or to meddIe wi!h the bonade
property they possess in 1ndree, inhouses, gardens,goods,&c. In
case they misbehave themseIves, pIication must be madetotheir
Chiefs for punshment

andredress, or the PoIiticaIAgent atUmbaIa

maybeappeaIedto.
5thIy. The Sikhs and the peopIe oI thetownhavethe right of
appeaI to the PoIiticaI Agent at Umba!a against actsof in]ustice
or oppresson on thepartofChoIam Mohee-ood-deen Khan.
6thIy. In case ChoIam Moheeood-deen Khan, by misconduct
in the management o| the trust thusreposed i nhim, showshimseIf
unworthyof its!urther continuance, some other arrangement is to be
adopted forthe Covetnmentof the town.
In !835 Sirdar NehaI SinghcompIained against ChoIam Mohee-
ood-deen Khan of maIadminstration, and was directedtosubstantiate
A
g
ra Proceeding
s
, 27th his charges before thePoIiticaIAgent atUmbaIa.
Au
g
ust 183
6
,
No. 1 On that occasion the Supreme Covernment
remarked, that 'if itbe demed unadvisable that we shouId exercise
any direct ]urisdiction over the aairs of Indree, it nevertheIess
behoves us to see that the partywhom we have excJuded from ashare
in its administration shouIdreceiveisIuIIrightsin aIIotherrespects,
andfaiIing this, that we shouId restore him to his proper sharein
the.administration, not-withstanding theeviIsofa divided amm
tration.''
25
As during a periodof nearIy four years notbing more bas been

beajd, it isvcry probabIe tbat tbe disputes between tbe parties bave
been amicabIy ad]usted.

Ladwa
Rajah Ajeet Singh
Tbis Cbiefisoftbc uIIebwaIIebtribe be is connectedwitb tbe
IateRuIeroftbe Pun]ab. He was created Ra]ab by tbe EarI of
AuckIaud (Iate Governor GeneraIj,during bisLorsbip's so]ourn on tbe
biIIsin 839. Ladwawasstated in I832 to comprise I78 viIIages,
and tbe revenue was estimatedin I842 at Rupees 2,47,OOO.
Tbe Ra]abboIdsfrom usinfarmtbe viIIages ofhurur, RunduI,
and Rumbba, in tbe immediateneigbbourbood of tbe KamaI Canton-
ments,undera grant dated22nd ]une I8I7. Ye athrst retaindtbe
PoIice adminis

ratio

of tbese viI!ages, wbic as since been

.
mae
over totbe Ra]ab wttb a reservaton of our gb to re-assume tt,.-m
tbeevent

ofbis inabiIity torestraintberiots, wbo arenoted for turbu-

Iency.
Maharajkeean Sikhs
Tbe Rajahs

of PatiaIa,

Nabha, and ]beend, bave aII cIaimed
supremacyovertbeSikbs, tbougbeguauydevoid of any titIe to it .
Tbe Mabara]keeans are an independent community ; but

i n tbe
internaI dissensions by wbicb tbey bad Ion had been distracted,
dierent parties badattimescaIIedintbeaid

nd mediation of tbe
above-named Ra] abs, between wbom and tbis tribe tbere exists a
connection founded on consanguinty.
.
Tbese peopIe are now governed bytbeir beadmen, or representa-
tiveseIected from tbe severaIputtees ordivisious, and the PoIiticaI
Agent atUmbaIapossessestbeappeIIate]urisdiction.
Mustufabad
Sirdar Ruttun Singh

Tbis Cbief is oftbeDuIIebwaIIabtribe. Tbe estate comprises 3I

viIIages,andisestimatedtoyieId a revenuo ofKupees 24,8OO.
Ruttu Singb obtained tbe estate from us in I837. t was origi-
naypossessedbybis fatherMahtab Singb, wbo died in I797, ad
wassucceeded bybise!dest son, ]odb Singb, who vs kiI!ed

sbort!y
afterwards,leavingbisbrotber, tbe

present Cbief, Ruttun Singb, a

minor.
MabtabSingbbad twowidows, viz., Su!aknee and Gowran , tbese
dividedtbeirbusband'spossessonbetweentbemse!ves,andMustufabad
fe!Io tbe sbare oftbe!attcr.
Su!akt:ee andberson, RuttunSingb, residedon a portion of tbe
territoryofMabtabSingbontbe Sut!e] , wbicbbad fa!!ento tbe !ot of
tbeformer. Subseguent!y anarcbyandconfusion drove Go

ran from
Mustufabad, andob!iged ber to seek refuge witb Su!aknee. Tbe

estate,
howev
,
er, wasdefendedby herbrotber, Goordut

Singb,andber au tbo-
ritywasaferwardsreestab!isbedinMustafabad .
, Tbi
g
g

ereintbis statewbenBritisb protectiowasextended to

tbese Sikbterritories. In I8I2 after tbe estab!isbment of our supre-
macy, Ruttun Singb c!aimed tbis estate but was to!d by Sir David
Ocbter!ony, tbat Gowran was in possession, and tbat, as we bad
guaranteedexistingrigbts, bis pretensions cou!d not beentortained.
OnCowran's deatb tbe Estate was hrst considered to bave escbeated
totbeBritisbGovemment, but RuttunSingbbavingafterwardsrevised
his c!aim, tbere were no grounds wbicb cou!d ]ustify its re]ection, and
Mustufabadwasmade overto Ruttun Singb, togetber witbtbe coI!ec-
tions made byus, !ess tbe expense of management.
Ramguh
Meean Debee Singh.- Nat
_
ain Dass
This domain is be!d by a Ra]poot fami!y. !t comprises3O
viI!ages, and is supposed to yie!d a revenue of Rupees I6,OOO per
I annum.
,
Ou ou assumption of tbe protection of tbe Sikb States, Ramgurb
was be!d by two brotbers, Ma!deo and NarainDass, tbey disagreed a
sbort
.
time afterwards and divided tbe Estate, but tbe dispensiug of
]ustice witb tbe knowledge and concurrence of Narain Dass was
vestedin Ma!deo.
Ma!deodied,!eavingtwo sons, Debeo Singb and Du!eep Singh,
tbe formerwas recognisedas tbe bead of tbe fami!y, ad tbe !atter
bad!ands assignedbimyie!dingRupees 2,0OOper annum.
- t
The customs oftbis fami!y sanctionivision of territory, inste
_
d
of tbesuccession oftheeIdestson,witb'a provisen totbe younger. 1 - .
ol7
.1u|eep Singb Iivesinsub]ection to his brotber ebee Sngb, wbo
bas been recognised as Cbief.
Sontee and Ladhar
Tis Estate is possessed by a fraternity of Sikhs of the
Phoo!keean tribe the

possession comprises 64] viI!ages, witb an

estima

d revenueofRupees5I ,6OO.
Thi fraternity were

origina!Iy independent they afterwards

vo!untari!y submitted tothtvassaIage of the Ra]ab of Nabba, wbich
they subsequent!y endeavoured to tbrow ofbut it

wasdecidedthat
theyshou!d render feudaI service to the NabhaChief,to!he extent
of sening to Nabha a certaIn number of mounted foI!owers, on
eccasionssucb asthefo!!owing:
Birth of a son toNabba,
Narriageof a sonor daughter ofNabha
Ieathoftbereignng Ra]ah;

and
War.
Thanessur.
Two.ffths Iritish Government-Three-ffths Sirdarnee Chand Koonwur
and Roop Koonwur
Tbanessur, in the be!ief of the Hindoos, isoneof the most hoIy
p!aces, and was origina!Iy conquered andpossessed by MeiI.Singb,
wbosetwo nephews named BhungaSingh andBhagSingb, partiUoned
|e territory between tbemse!ves, in the proportionofthree-fths to
the fcrmer, andtwohftbs to the !atter.
Bhunga Singh, the possessorof three-hfths, was succeededby bis
only son, Iutteh Singh, who died without issue in I8I9, whenbis
motherMaee]ianassumedchargeofthe state, n capacityof Regent,
and on beba!f of her

daughters-in-!aw [Chand Koonwar andRoop

Koonwar) , who were at thetime undor age, andto whom sbetraus-
ferredber cbarge in I83O, andwho are at presentin possession.
Maee ]ian died on the IOth of ]une I836, andit has beenru!ed
tbat, on the death of ChandKoonwur and Roop Koonwur, this portion

of tbe territoryisto Iapse to us as the Paramount Power. It cmprses

99g
^
i!Iages, andis estimatedto yiId Kupees79,6OO.
`
Wben1be Sikb Stztes cameunder ourprotection,we found CboIab
S)ngb [second son of Bbag Singb) in possession of two-hftbs of
Tbanessur, wbicb bad not descended in a direct Iine; and by tbe
demise wi t houtissue, in 1830, of ]umyut Singb theIast oftbemaIe
beirs of tbe orginaI proprietor, Bbag Singb, tbis protiqn oI tbe
territoryIapsed

to us. Itcomprises 12] vIJages, and was estimated

in I82 toyieId a revenueofRupoes 34,OOO, buta number ofviIIages,
yieIding tbe greater portion of tbe revenue, bus been from time to
timeassigned away tofemaIesoIthefamiIy for

their Iivcs, and tbe

amount coming tousis compartveIy smaII
TI:e River Surressutte runs beIow Tbanessur, and
.

tbe Ladwa
Cbiefproposed in I839 to throw abridge acrossit.
Tbe popu!ationi s mostIy Hindoo,andtbe|oIIowersoftbe MosIem
faitb, as migbt be expected in sucbcases, areundersonie restraint
in1bat part oftheEstate whicb is beId by thewidowsofFuttebSingb.
Our Covernment does not inter!ere with tbe administration o|

the
Koonwurs.
Notes on the state of our relations with the Punjab. ant thJ
best mode of thir settlement
by
LT. Cot S:s C. M. WADE, C. B. , *
Friortoou::utu:ewththe SIkhs, thcir autbority extended, on
the West Ieyond the natu:aI IimIts usualIy assigned to the Punj ab)
across!he fduc to Ieshawr and the e:aj at, a|ong its :igbt bank to
Rojhan, in the M:i te:rItory, contguous to tbat of Shi!arpore. On
he No:tb and East yond the IoIty chain oItbe HIma|aya, and the
mass of mountains Iying between the Indus

and tbe SutIedge),to

Casbmere, ond the etty states of Iska:do and Ladakh i n IittIe
Tibet, andSoutb [beyond t he SutIedge on the Britisb side), wh
Ihe exception ofteetIy dstricts of Ferozeo:e, Iodiana, and Roe:,
o an extensive tract of count:y stretching aIong tbe rive: I:om
BeIaso:e, East, to Rana Wattoo on Lhe BabawIpore frontie:, Wcst .

By the P:ocIamatIons of the Covernor Cene:aI, tbe possessions

heIonging to Iaho:e, on the Ie!t bank oI

tbe Su1Iedge, bavebeen

seguest:ated, and t hose situated between that :iver and tbe Biah
caI|ed the 'oaba of Bist', or oIten times 'Bist ]ahIendra', f:om
Ie name oI the capitaI town) decIared to be annexed to the B:iIsh
Covernment, p:eIimina:y to tbe negotIations Io: peace, whicbhad
been commenced wben tbelastadvIces IeIt India, viz. , after the battIe
of Sob:aon.
To what extent tbe limItz 0 thegovernmentof Lahore may be
cIrcumscribedir othe: directionsisnot known, butehave procIaimed
our wish to maintain a separate gove:nment of the Sikhs

in te
*Lt. Col. Sir. Claude M. Wade was British Political Agent at Ludhiana and
was employed in missions to the court of Lahore from 1823 to 1840.
These Notes were written by him in November 1848 when the so'-called second
Anglo-Sikh War was being fought and were issued m pamphlet form from Ryde_
Ille of Wight, on November 5, 1848-printed by G. Butler, Colonnade R
y
de -
Gancfa Singh
30
Fun]ab, in one of tbe supposed descendants of Ran]eet Singb, inas
far asmaybecompatib!ewitbourownfuture securIy.
.
_
In wisbing to preserve sucb a government, Sir H. [now Lord)
Hardinge basinmy opinion sbewn awise discretion, eguaI!y sanction-

ed bypo!cyand justice, bytbe former, because tbe entire copguesI

of tbe country wou!dbave at once invo!ved usin a seriesofprotracted
warfare, and wben eected, in tbe extcnsion of our frontier Io tbe
Indus, arneasurewbic,insteado|strengtbening,
.
wouId bave expand-
edandweakened

ourIine ofde|cnce on tbatside of Idia andbytbe

!atter, because the perseverence and consistency

witb wicb, for a

period of tbirty-hve years [one of unprecedented

!engtb in our
connection witb that country) , Ran]eet Singb andbissuccessors, in
timesofgreattemptationand tria|, maintainedtbeira!!ancewitbus~
manifsted a good faitb on tbeir partwbicb entit!es tbem Io be Ireated
witb moderation, tbe eect of wbicb wi!! noI on!ytendin time Io
reconci|e tbe Sikhs totbeir newre!ationswitb ourgovemment more
tban any otber measure, but sbew tbe peop!e of India aI!argetbat
sticbexamp!esof hde!ity receive tbe reward due totbem.
Tbeob]ectoftbese Notcs is notIo investigate tbe cIrcumstances
wbicbprecededtbe !ate outbreak buI

to ascerIain in whaI manner

the prncip|e of the po!icy desired to bepursu

dforpreserving tbe
independenceof tbe SIkbs, in the Fun]ab, may best be carried out,
witbout eventua!!yendangering tbat safeIyto ourse!ves wbicb we bave
now

acquired a rigbt to secure, or exposing

tbemto tbe !oss of tbaI

degreeofinuence and power which is necessary to tbeir existe

ce as
'omcient a!|ies", wbetherasregardstbe autboriIyoftbeirCbiefover

bemse!ves ortbenumeroustribeswbicb bave bitberto acknow!cdged

tbeir dominion.
Notbing can be more opposie to tbe sub]ect, or more c!ear!y
exbibiI tbe system onwbicb tbe truepoIicy ofour government ougbI
tobe based in India, tban tbe fo!Iowing obervaIionsof tbe Marquis
of Lansdowne, in bisp!acein FarIiament, ontbe 6tb instant [Apri! 6,
816), wben asking forpapers connectedwitb tbe !ateoperationson
tbe Sut!edge.
'Convinced that tbe safety ofour govemment in India depcnds
onIbe satisfacIion andprotecIionwe are enabIedo give totbenatives
of tbaIcountry, andtbe prosperiIy we canimparI JoIbeircommcrce
and socia!

exisIence, I am persuaded tbaI next to tbese standstbe
ImpIance of 1eIting it be fe!Iby a!! tbe nations ofIndiaIbat w
1 31
are notdesirous ofconguest
,
for any purpose but tbat ofseourity,and
1bat Iet tbeir government be wbat it may, perfect or impcrfecO
Mabomedan cr Hindoo, pIaced inone race or ves

ted in anotber, our

onIydesire is to organise tbem as a!|ies with wbom w can
meet on
egueI terms,iftbey

are prepared to ma|utan tbe reIationsof peace

andconcord.
,
o
Tbese sentimeuts from

a remarkabIe exception to tbe siIent

neg|ectwitb
.
wbicb tbe interests of tbat vastportion of our epire are
muaIIy treated

in our IegisIative assembIies, of\i

cb we may weI|
be proud; andbappy s|iould I beto Iea tbat they hadreached tho
ears of tbose whose destinies bave heen pIaced in our bands, and
whose rigbts and cIaims totbenatmnaI protection have been so nobIy
andso empbutmaIIy urged, by a statesman ofbisLordship'sintmacy
witb thesystemof ourIndlangvernu:nt and its resuIts.
No attempt to Ioave tbe Si khs indepenJent is worthy o! our
serious attention, or can be successfuI, whicbdoes notboIdout tbe
means of securing our own safety, as far as human foresight can
devise,andwitbit tbe 1ulImentoftbe obIigatonswbicb devoIve on
us, as tbesupreme power.
=
Tbe task appears a dimcuIt one, and, doubtIess, regures a nice
knowIedge

and discrmnation o! the Sikbs, andthe natureoftber

authority, throughout the region governed by them, but I donot
regard it as specuIative asit may at hrst seem, and, in venturingto
oer my opinions as to the best courseto be pursuod,with tbeview
of eocting the desired ob]ect, I trust tbat my Iong and intimate
experienceof their ahairs,andpersonaI intrcourse with aImost every
Chief and Proprietor of the country,wi| I b

e considered as a sumcient
excusefortheCondence with which I have come forward to decIare
them.
It sbouId be premised, that tbe Sikbs have hitherto been a
cong:ering power, and tbat tey owe tbeir greatness and miIitary
renown to the ambitIon oRanjeet Singh, wbich knewno rest whiIe
he cou|d nd an opportunityof induIging itinthe weakness, the

foIIy
orthe arrogance of his hcIpIess neighbours.
Thus far had I written, when the arrvaIof thenext maiIfrom
Indi+ announced the concIusion of a Treatywtb the Sikh, on a basis
which appeared to me to be but ot a temporary nature, asweIIas
ve,ry dierent from tbe settIement wbich I was about tq propose; and,
. as I bad no| becn askedfor my opinions, nor consuIted in anyway,
duringthecrisis wbich had occurred, I thpught it useIess tocontinue
tbeseobservations in tbeir present from. Infurtber expIanationof
my intentions, I may state that I hadbeen induced tonote them down
for tbo purposo of submitting them to the Court ofirectors andthe
President of tbe Board ofControI, and sucb members of H. M. 'sIate
andpresent govcrnment as havebeenorare connected with, or have
taken an interest in, tbe aairs of India. At the same time, as
opporunites oered, I did not faiI to dec|are mymistrust in the
permanenceof thearrangementmade,toseveraIParties, ndtostateto
them thepIan which I won|d have adopted. Recentsuccesses, however,
ai is too often the case, hadgiveu an ecIat to the measures of the
Covemor

CcneraI, and those who were at the time concerned intheir

execution,which precIudedthe possibiIity of deserved attention being
paid to the opinions of others

who were competent to aid tbe

deIiberationsofgovernment onsuch anoccasion.
The Treaty in question had scarceIy beensignedbefore itwas
discovered, both by our own omcers and the Sikhs, that theeIements
offorming a governm

ent by the Iatterwere so compIetey ` paraIysed,

ifnot destroyed, in the hrstpIace, bytheIr interna| dissensions and
massacres, andin the second, by the overthrow of theirarmies on the
SutIedge, thatthe expectation ofdoing so, bytheirown means, during
tbeprobationaryoccupaton of their capitaI, byour troops, washope-
Iess, and that no

sooner wou|d our garrisons be withdrawn than the

countrywouIdrevert to a state of anarchy worse thanfrom whichwe
wIshedtorecIaimt. AccordingIy, those among the Sikhs who bore a
prominent part inthenegotiationof the Treaty [among whou, with
onereaI exception onIy, viz. , ewan inanath, there was neithera
Chief nor Yinisterof State possessed of the Ieast inuence or
reputationin thecountry, Tej Singh himseIf being a foreigner-a meie
soIdier of fortune, In command of a ivision of the Sikh army-not
onIyofwhoseabiIity, but even courage, Ran]eet SingL had a Iow
opinion), appIiedtothe Covernor CeneraI forthe continuance of our
!roops, during the minority of the youth, huIeep Singh, and fr the
administrationof the Covernment by a CounciI of Regency, presided
overby ourResident and composed of the appIying parties. Sucha
course waspIain,dehnite,and praiseworthy in the abstract, as regard-
ed theopenexerciseofour responsibiIity, in restoring that which the
prevIousanarchy of the Sikhs, and the hostiIities t which it ;ed
33
between ourseIvesandtbem, badcontributed todestroy.
Moreover,takenina generaIpoint of view, tbere was apparentIy
mucb of merit and causo of congratuI ation to us in an appIication of
tbekind, as it wentto] ustify our direct interference in the internaI
management o| tbe country; but, in contempIating tbe presentsuccess
andprobabiIityoffu|urebnehtsfrom suchameasure,inaordngtime
for tbe consoIidation ofthe young Ra]a'sgovernment, we overIooked
tbe fact that these parties were not representing the nation, no

r
actuated in their conduct so mucb by a spirit ofIoyaIty andpatriotism
asbytbe desire of securingtberown safety, andthe station towbicb
we bad raised them, in seeking our protection and support. The
ma]orityof tbepeopIe, especiaIIy

the miIitarycIass wbo were neces-

sariIy tbe greatest suerers, and had been

tbe mosthumbIed

by our
victeries, had, it is weII known, taunted andreviIed

Te] Singh, and

others associatedwitb hm, as tbe betrayers of their cmntry, by tbe
deceitfuI andbackward behaviour

which tbey evinced towards tbeir

countrymeninthe battIeson theSutIedge, and tbere can be no doubt
tbat tbese ready instruments ofourpoIIcy aIreadyowed their security
from retaIiation to our presence at Labore aIone. It was too much,
therefore, toexpectthat the Sikh popuIaton generaIIy wouId easiIy
become reconciIedto their Iossof power, or to the ntroduction of a
change in our, hrst engagements, wbcb rendered more remote than
ever theirreIeasefrom the yokewhicb we bad imposed upon tbem,
with the apparent sanction oftheirown autborit
7
.
Anotberdefect and eventuaI sourceof

dissatisfaction intbe scbeme

adopted shouId aIso be borne in mind, that the Mabomedan and other
warIike tribes inhabiting the country beyond tbe ndus and tbe
]ebIem, wbohad, totho Iast, obstinateIy resisted tbe

Sikbautbority
and submitted to it onIy in the hope, as I know tobe the case, tbat
a day migbt arrive in the probabIe course of events when tbeir
emancipation wouId be eected by tbe triumphant progress ofour
own dominion, were, aswas naturaI to parties so stuated, grievousIy
disappointed, when that time did arrive, tohnd themseIves handed
overto tbe tyranny of Ra] a CoIabSingb thenotoriouscrueItyand
oppression ofwhose ruIe many of them had a!readyexperienced, or
conhrmedir tbeir sub]ection to the Sikhs

by theoperationsof that
power,vIz., tb British, in whose sense of ]ustice andbenevoIence
*In commutation of a pecuniar
.
} obligation of the treaty oh their pa(t.
34
th bad Ong bn d tO cOnbdc, frOm thc ObscrVaton O Our QOlc
n Otbt gart8 Of Inda.
tb rght Of cOaguc8t w wr at bcrt tO dsQO8c Of thc wh0c
c0untr a8 wc ga8cd, and as th OQQrtunt was faVOurab fOr
gratfng 1h bOQcs Of thcsc subjugatd trb8, and an ntcrst shOwn
b thc rt8h OVcrnmcnt Or thr dcVcrancc On that Occa8On,
wOuld haVc cxaltcd ts fam fOr gnrO8t amOng thc surrOundng
st0tcs, Qartcularl thc Alghans, whOs cOncla1on, b tbc mcans
whch wcrc `nOw at Our dssal, had bccOmc both cas and natUral,
m Obcct wOuld haVc bccn, nOt tO O8c sght of thcsc mQOrtant cnds,
n tb attcmgt to cOnsOldatc aa ndcQcndcnt bkh OVcrnmcnt, sum-
ccnt strOng tO bc an usul al, tO kccQ thc trbcs 0n thcr lrOntcr

n chcck, and to gVc tbct 8tandn

army [whch was bxcd On a Vct
lbral sca b LOrd Hardngc} as much rcsQcct and cOnsdcratOn,
_wth rcfcrcncc tO thc mltar charactcr Of
.
thc Dn, as consstcd
wth Our Qacc and sccurty as Wcl as thcr<wn.
.
M Qlan .was tO haVc rcstOrcd back tO thc )usulzcs, thc arakZcs
Of eshawr, th Kbuttucks and thc Othcr MahOmcdan trbcs, ntcrmxcd
wth thc clOcbcs n tb craj at, abOVc and bc!Ow balabagh, On thc
ndus, a thc gOssssOns wrcstcd lrOm thcm acrOss that rVct, lrOm
unta1, North, to Ojh0n, the conterminous boundry, South, of the
bkh8, wth.bndh, hcsc cOnccssOns wOu!d haVc ncludcd thc trbcs
whOsc gratbcaton wa8 HOt Onl a mcasurc Ol gOOd QOlc, but a
rccOmgcnsc tO whch thc wcrc wcll cUtt!cd rom thc srVccs thc
had QcrfOrmcd lOr us, durug Our cxQcdtOn thrOugh lhc 1unjab tO
Aghanstan [to whch I can msclf drcctl attcst} , and thc hdclt
wth whch tbc aQQcar t0 haVc sncc cOnductcd thcmclVcs, n jOnng
MajOr )dwardcs agansl thc nsurgcnts bcOrc MOOtan, and, uQ tO thc
!atst accOunts, n and arOund 1cshawr, alo . i n thcr adhcrcncc tO MajOr
Lawrcncc, but whch QrOOls O attaOh -nent, th0rc s tOO much tsOD
tO lcar, W nOt haVc cOntnucd, sBould the dccctOn Ol Shcr bngh,
bc fOllOwcd b that Ol thc bKh arrs0n at rcshawr, whcn thc asQcct
Of Our aar8 wOuld s0cm tO Our ltcuds to haVc bccOmc sO crtcal as
1O cOmQrOm8c thcr Own salct, l Ihcy rcmaIncd faithfu

I tO us an
!Ongcr.
hc lbctatOn of 1hcse trbcs from thc dOm|nOn Ol th0 Stkhs,
wOu!d nOt, as 8Om mght suQQOsc, h8Vc cxpOscd thcm tO an
such has
J
roved to be the result.
35
imminent danger, from tbe rapacity orambitionoftheir neibours
on tbesideof Afgbanistan, of wbom tbey bad remained Independent,
and wbose aggressions tbey are as capable ofressting now, as tbey
werebeforet

beywerecongueredbytbe Sikb. TbeywouIdbave accepted

sucbadisinterestedcxertionof ourpowerintbeirfavourwitbgratitudo.
Tbe SIkbswouIdbavebad norigbttocompIain of tbe use wemadoof
ourcongest,toconrm tbe attacbment oltbesefriendIytribes toour
Covernment;whi!e tbe Chiefs of Afgbanistan ingeneraI, wouIdbave
secnin itan ad

itionaI proof of tbat IiberaI poIicy towbicbwe are

principaIIyindebted!ortbeswayo tbat opinionof ourpowerin Inda,
towbichweowe success, andwouIdthemseIves

bave becomezeaIous
of deservigourfriendsbip. In short,frommyknowIedgeoftbesenti-
ment of tbese peopIe, I do notbcsitate t say tbat wesbouId bave
converted tbose wbose condence webad!ost,andwhoregardus, at
present,witb any tbingbutgoodwII,intofriends and aIIies.
Ontbe side ofCasbmere, I wouId bave foIIowed tbesame!ine of
poIicy, asregardedte Cbiefso!Iskardoand Laakb,wbosetorritories,
it wiIIbe remembered, badbeenwantonIyseizedduringtbe Iateryears
of Ran]eet Singb's rcign by Ra]a GoIab Singb without even tbe
autborityof hisaster.
Witb respect to Casbmere, IwouId bavekept tbatprovnce as a
dependency of tbe Sikhs, as beretofore, investingGoIab Singb witb
tbe Covernment of it, and boIding biu\ immediateIy accountabIe for
its administration to

tbe Court of Lahore, wbiIe, in return forbis

auicabIe conduct to us, during tbewaron tbe Su!Iedge, I conrmed
tbe Ra]a himseIf, inbisoIdpossessions around]ummooandtbeprinci-
paIities of Kisbtwar, Bhadarwar, &c. wbicb bad IormerIy been
confered on bim and dierent m'embers of bis famiIyby Ran]eet
Singh; but witb respect to tbe petty states of Pooncb, Ra]our, and
Mozuerabad, I wouId bave recommended tbeir restorationt

tbeir
oIdCbiefs,not mereIy from simiIar motivesofpoIiticaIexpediency to
that which I bave aIready advocated, but tomark oursenseofte
crueIandoppressive manner i nwbicb tbey, praticuIarIytbeCbief of
Poonch, bad been deprived of tbeir territoryby Ra] aCoIabSingb.
Bytbetermsof tbeir engagementswitbRan]eet Singb,tbeyhad been
madetributary to Labore, andIwouIdbavekept tbemso, andthereby
bave secured frIends, witbout compIicating our reIations in a quater
remote.from tbeexercise ofourinuence, andwhere,fromtbe dimcuIt
nture of tbe country and tbe passes Ieadinginto Casbmere, tbe
36
utIisbment of a friendIyinterest in tbe weIfare of ouroverment
mil. t some day bave proved a vaIuabIeacquisition.
.,
- ---
3be next sub] ect !or consid

ration is tbepoIcy wbicb we oughtto

haveadopted for our own excIusive advantage. Here two points cIaim
ourattention,viz.,tbeimmediate and:emote benehts to be deried
fromourconquests. Ifwe Iookcd cbieytothe former an addition to
ourhnanciaIresources readiIypresentcd itseIfin tbeanneation of tbe
]abIendaroab, undou

tedIy tbe ricbest, tbe most fertiIe, and tbe

most prosperous part of tbePun] ab, but wben we consider tbe compIi
cated and expensive macbinerywbicbwe are obIiged to empIoy, tbe
innovationsofour system andIts tendencyto disturb tbe estabIisbed
institutonsof tbe country, and raise suspicions in the minds of tbe
peopIein tbeintegrity
,
of ourpurpose, asbas, I beIieve, been tbe case
inthepresent instance, by a desire to covet and aIienate tenures,
wbicbmay bave been Iong beId in ]agbir or otberwise by tbeir
proprietors, I tbinkwesbouIdnotIook so mucbto present asto pros-
pective advantages.
I have aIreadystated that IiberaIityin. tbe use of ourconquestsis
tbebest poI icy, andinno countryis it more requisite than in India.
It isour

uty to IookratbertouItimate and permanent resuItstban to

tbeattainmentoJany temporary beneht. Inconqueringa. country, our
hrstob] ect, especIaIly asforeigners, ougbt to be toreconciIe itspeopIe
totbeirnewcondition, by consuIting tbeiriterests and usages . as far
asit may not bedetrimentaI toour own weIfare.
Instead, tbrefore, of taking tbe ]ahIendar oab, I wouIdbave
,sbewnfbepeopIe, byouracts as was done by us in our settIements
witb tbe Mabrattas, tbe Ra]poots and tbe NepaIese, tbat [astbe
MarquiseofLansdownebasobserved) we are notdesirous of conquest
loranyob]ect, but tbat of securitj and mutuaI benehts. I wouId bave
contended myseIIby tbeoccupation of a commanding position in tbe
country, whi migbtbavc been advautageous tousbotb in a miIitary
andpoIiticaIpointofview. I wouId bave bad a Iargegarrison of our
Troops, somewbere intbe vicinityof MooItan [as I remarked at tbe
!ime), andfortbatpurpose, Futebpore, ]aIaIpore, or Shu]abad wouId
bavesuppIiedagreat bIankin ourIine of defence between Ierozpore
andSind, and!rom its centraI ituation, given us actuaI means of
support

ngour posts on eitberside. Second|y, as it would bave served

as a check over the Sikhs andtheiranks, without hringing ourse!ves
intoimmediate contact with them as wehave done by occupying tbe
]ahIendar oab, and surrounding their capita!, by our own troops.
Tbepresence of ourforce, instrength, atFerozpore and Lodiana, South
and Hurrkee, North, of the SutIedge, wouId, in my opinion,

have
sumcedfor every desirabIe object to contro! the Sikhs at

Lahore,
Amritsarandthe oab. ThirdIy a strong miIitary position in :he
quprter I have suggestedwouIdhave increasedour inueuce towards
Afganistan, withoutadecided interference with that country andwouId
haVe onabIed

us to comand a highway ofcommerce, bywhicha grcat

tradeisconductedbetween Indiaand Centra!Asia.
s
Tomeet the expenseof maintaining our forcenear MooItan, i n-
steadofterritory, I wouId have takena certain amount of tribute, say
25!akhs ofrupees per annum, which according to my

recoI|ection,
wouIdhave been about the net revenue of the ]ahIendar oab, i f
properIy managed. I nRanjeetSingh's time its gtoss amount

was 35
!akhs, excIusive of ]aghirdars.
ByfoIIowingsucba coursewe shou|d bave Ieft the Sikhs indepen-
dent witbout tbe power, or any uHcienf excuse , to oppose our
authority, andhaveshewn them, at once,fhatwe\vere not covetous of
territory. Onthecontrary, thatwewerecarrying out ouravowedwish
ofsti!I seeingthem 'a happy and prosperous nation,'wheras, in the
settIement made, wehave !eftthe Sikhs groundsofdiscontentwhich, I
am satished,that nothingbut some p|an ana!ogous to that which I
haverecommendedwi|I over remove. We shouId reco!Ioct, that we

haveannihiIated their army, whichgave congeniaI emp!oyment toa

Iargeportin of their countrymen, both high and Iow
.
thatwe have
aIso destroyed the demand for the manufactures of their country,
which !he supportof a !arge armyand rich and powerfuI ]agirdars,
with their numerous estabIishments and contingents of troops, with
the maintenance of a gorgeous court, neceesariIy created.

The resuIt is ve:y dierent from that which the Sikhs and the
othor c|asses of the pecpIe expcted. Theyhave becomealarmed the
aspect of aairs is now
compIeteIy changed,

and it rests with the

BritishCovernment to decide afteritshaI!haveasserted its supre-
macy, in conseguence of the Iate insurrectionsj whether it

wiI! be
advisabIeto persist in a !ine of poIicy which has produced tnese
troubIes, oradopt onesImIIarto that which I wou!d have fo!Iowed in
thehrstinstance, andhich, I amconhdent istheonIy safecourse fo
R
u8tO Qur8uc, wc wOuld savc Our8clvcs lrOm thc ndchntc cOntngcn-
ccs, whch m8t arsc lrOm thc cntrc subjUgatOn Ol thc unab, and
a cOmQlcatOn Ol lOrcgn rclatOns

n whch ts ancxatOn tO our rulc

and authOrt wl ncvtabl nvOlvc us wth thOsc natOn8 and trbc8
bcOnd thc 1ndus, rOm an mmcdatc cOntac| wth wh1ch wc ma rcst
assurcd, that wc shall nOt ncrcasc tbc stablt Ol Our dccnsvc
QO8tOn. hc lOwcr cOur8c O thc

10dus, cOnncctcd wlh thc butlcdg8
and thc ttact O dc8crt Qarallcl tOt, wth thc ntcrvcntOn O a QcOQlc
lkc thc khs bctwccn Oursclvcs and thc Alghans, aOrd8 a sccurt
tO u8, whch thc urthcr cXtcn8On Ol Our lrOntcr wll Dcvcr cld.
An0thcr mQrtant QOnt rcmans tO bc cOnsdcrd, vZ., hOw lar
Our Vcsdcnt 8 to ntcrcrc n thc ntcrnal admnstratOn O tDc
cOuntr, lOr On thc dcbntOu Ol that Ont, and hs Own Q0r8Onal
cxQcrcncc and udgmcnt, chcB dccnds thc succ0ss O Our QOlc,
and thc rOscHt O

thc stat8 wc wsh tO Qrcscrvc. 1 wOuld nOt

cxcrcsc an ntcrcrcncc n dctals, but lcavc thcm tO thc managcmcnt
O thcr Own unctOnar
.
8s, at th8 samc tmc that 1 wOud

nOt allOw
8n mattcr8 O mQttancc f transQrc Or bc carrcd Out
.
wthOut
thc knOwlcdgc and, rcgustc, thc advcc and cOncn1 O thc Vcsqcnt.
1 wOld al8O avOd, a8 ar a8 QOssblc, thc agnc O Our )urOQean
Omccrs n thc admnstratOn Ol thc cOuntQ. hcy arc gcncrall sclcctcd
lOr thcsc dclcatc omcc8 rOm thc Oung and ncxQcrcnccd, whO, rOm
thcr wnt 0 lOl knOWcdgc and `smQath wth thc QcOplc, mOrc
Olcn al thau 8uccccd n 8ccurng thc chcl Ob[cct Ol Out QOlc, vZ. ,
thcr rccOnclg tO thc changc ,' bcsdcs whch, thc cmQOmcnt O
Our Own Omccrs thrOw Out thc natvc lrOm thcr ]ust clams tO cr-
Orm thc s0rvcc O thcr Own statc . a crcumstancc whcb, dO what wc
ma tO QrcVcnt, gvcs rsc tO ]UalOuscs and ll-wll tOwards us, hghl
njurOu8 tO Our
.
Own crcdt and wcllarc, wthOut an bcncht ctbcr tO
Oursclvcs Or tO thc stat0, thc ntcrcsts Ol whch wc QrOlcss tO QrOtcct
and sccurc.
l
.
.

n rccOrdng thc8c OQnOns, t s rght lOr mc tO Obscrvc, that,
althOugh haVc cn`tcrtancd thcm lrOm thc bcgnnng, and saw thc
ncccst O thcr adOQtOn thcn as much as 1 dO nOw yct, n thc ragd
cOur8c O cvcnts, thc OQpOrtunt O suggcstng thcm dd nOt Qrc8cnt
tscll. A. crss ha8 nOw arrvcd n whch, rOm a cOnbdcncc n thc
truth O m cOnvctOns whch m lOng conncctOn wth tBat cOuntr
ma 8rl cnttlc mc tO cIam, and a 8cn8c O m dut tO thc Ovcrn-
mcnt Ol m own, I cOnsdcr mscll b0und tO statc m vcw8

and
39
gnOns, lOr thc nlOrmat0n Ol thOsc whOm hVc namcd, hOwcVcr
8tartng sOmc O thcm ma aQQcar tO bc tO thOsc whO 0On8dct thc
anncxatOn O thc 1unj ab as 0t Only atctnatve.
-.
Vdc, sc Ol Wght,
Nov. 5, 1848
C. M. Wadc
WHAT ARE WE TO DO WI TH THE PANJAB
[ 1819]
by
MAJOR GENERAL ]oHN BRIGGs
Tbe news from India

up to tbe 3rd February, and from theseat

ofWarto the9tb]anuary,havenaturaIIyoxcitedthegreatestinterest,
and created some aIarm as

to the state of aairs in

thatquater.

PeviousIy, bowever, to the receipt of tbese ccounts, opnions had

appeared, eitber before 1be pubIic or tbrough extens|ve privatc
circuIation, from individuaIs of b|gb authority, as to the poIicy of
annexing tbe Pun]ab to tbe Britisb dominions, after it

had been
eectuaIIy subdued. Astbeseparties bave advocateddiherent views
ontbis sub] ect, and as I do not entireIy concurwitb eiIher, I conceIve
nobar
.
mwi!Ibedone by reviewngtbe severaI opinions put forth, and
endeavouring, as far as myviews Iead :ne, to reconciIe, more or Iess,
thedierences whicb exist.
Of tbese

authors, Lieutenat:t-GeneraI Sir CharIes ]ames Naier,

lateIy appointed

Commander-in-Cbief of 1be Indian Army, is one.

Sir CharIesisknownto tbo pubIic asa soIdieroI the verybrst quaIity,
andn bis organization of tbe civiI administration of tbe

Province he
subdued, and the conduct of itsgovernment, bas shewn himse!f endow-
cd with powers equaI to tbe mostdimcuItandcompIicated emergences.
Butas a statesman,todecide a question Iike tbat oftbebest Iioe of
defenceforIndia, with referenceto its nances, present and

prospec-
tive, it tnay fairIy be doubted hetber be possesses a competent
knowIedge of Indianbistory,poIitics, or evenitsgeography, to render
bm as competent assome otbersto form a cooI and correct] udgment .
Oneof tbeindhiduaIs very far superior tohim i n tbi s knowIedge,
bas aIsoput forth bis opinions on this momentous guestion, tbis isSir '
CIaudeMartin Wade, Baronet, wbo has circuIated among frionds au
tbe pubIic autborities, a smaII pampbIet, dated tbe5tb November,
J Mad.dew, Leadenhal St. London, March, 1 849.
40
41
I818, connedtoa singIe sbeetof print, intbe modest sbapeof Notes
'Ontbe State of our ReIations witb tbe Punj ab, and tbe best Mode
of tbeirSettIement', and witbin tbe I ast fortnIgbt an autbor, signing
bimse!f 'Civis', wbo wrote some years since in tbe Times, on tbe
sub]ect of the Indian frontier andtbe Af gbanWar, basre-appeared
twIceintbe samepopuIar]ournaI, in two Ietters, duringtbis montb.
If I am not mistaken, Civis be!d, for many years, tbe omce of
KesIdent

or Ambassador, at one of tbe p;incipaI Courtsin Indi abas

fortIe!astfortybeen fami!iar with every poIItica! questiontbat has
cmebeforetbe Covernmentduring that period-andisan accompisb-
ed schoIar, botb in European and Asiatic !iterature andbistory.
.
I
.
Had tbe sentimentes of these bigb!y gifted and experienced
individua!s at a!! coincided, it mgbt bedeemed presumptuousinme
todiscusstbem but as we are to!d tbatin tm midst ofcounse!!ors
tbere is wisdom, and as we know tbemeasures arenot to be decided
on by tbese individua!s, but by tbe Covernment , de!egatedby tbe
Crown toru!e ourIndian Empire, I sba!I venture,witboutconceaIing
my name, to add tbeportionofinformation possessed byonewbobas
madetbebistory and po!itics of India, from tbe ear!iest ages, bis
particu!ar study. A sing!e gIance at tbe map ofJndia must convincc
anyonewbo regards it witbattention, tbat nature bas protccted its
frontierinevery direction, witbsingu!arcare. As tbe eyepassesover
it from tbe moutbs of tbe Bramapooter and tbe Ganges towards tbe
nortb-west, tbe broad and !ofty ranges of tbo Hima!aya are seen
biddingdehanceto tbeapproacb of anyfoefrom beyondtbem. Irom
tbe district of Sarbind, toucbing tbese mountains on tbe east, from
wbenceowstbe Sut!ej, a beItof deep sandy desert extends westward
and soutbward, a!ong tbe !eft banks of tbat river, and oftbe Indus,
ti!! the !atter enterstbe ocean. Tbis desert, varying in breadtb from
5O to 2OOmi!es, isfor1bemost part tbin!y dotted witb sma!I vi!!ages,
ifso tbey can be ca!!ed, at severaI miIes distance from eacb otber,
bavingafewdeepwel!sofbrackisbwater aroundwbicbtbeInbabitants
congregate,and areoccupied inbreedingcame!sforsa!etotbecountries
on tbeirborders. Wben pressed by an euemy, tbey y to tbe nearest
!argetown [say hfty mi!es o), and concea! tbeir we!!s by cover
,
ing
tbem witbboards,and!ayingsandover tbem.
Havingtracedtbe desert to tbe moutbsof tbeIndus,tbe Ocean
embraces30OOmi!es of SeaCoast, protected byourmaritimepower,
and tbe !ine of circumva!!ation terminates, wbere it began at tbe
42
embouchuresoI the two mIghty streams, whIch dIsembogue Into the
Bay oI BengaI , at itsnorthernmost poInt .
Irom fe earIIest tImes, the peopIe oI IndIahave regarded these
as theIr naturaI lImIts, and aII the great battIes whIch have been
Iought Ior the deIence oI that EmpIre have taken pIace on the pIaIn,
cIoseon the north oI eIhI, in the provInce oI SarhInd, a name gIven
to IndIcate the head or boundary entrance into the regIon oI IndIa.
There shouId, thereIore, be shown strong reasons as CIvIs bas
] udIcIous|y InsIsted on) for changIng the IrontIer so deIended by
natute. Si CharIes NapIer has stated that theIIneoItheSutIe] Is
more dImcuIt todeIendthantheIIne oI the Indus, beIng 6OO mIIes In
extent, and capabIe oI beIng crossed aImost everywhere at certaIn
seasons oI theyear. I am prepared to admIt thet neIther the SutIe] ,
nor the Indus, nor any otherrIverIn the worId, Is worth a straw as a
natura I boundary. MountaIns IIke the HImaIaya, and oceans, and
desertsIIke that oI IndI a, andthoseoI AfrIcaandArabIa, are stron
naturalboundarIes, but as CIvIsIasweI|observed, t errItorIaIboundar-
`
Ies are vaIueIess wIthout physIcaI aId. The ProvInce oI SarhInd
presentsthe onIy vulnerabIe poInt Ior an enemy to enter IndIa, and
contend, agaInst such anarmy aswecan present toopposehIm, with
the |eastprospect oIsuccess. Cur securIty Is neItheron the rapI dity
norbreadth nor depth oI theSutIe] or the Indus, butIs tobeIound
In the desert, aIong the IeIt bank oI each oI these streams, commenc-
Ing nearLodhIana, and exhIbItIng a breadth, north andsouth, Irom
thence toCanoond,oIabout I8O mIIes, extcndIng,ashasbeen stated,
to thevery coast, at the mouth oI the Iatter rIver. Cnthe exIreme
east oI the ProvinceoI SarhIndthere are severaI SIkh chIeItaIns, who
In I8O9, cIaImed and obtaed our protectIon andwho have, Ior the
IastIortyyears, en]oyedIt, wIthout evIncIng any desIretounIte wIth
theIr t:Ibes In the Pun]ab. TheI r weakness and theIr IntestIne
] eaIousIes renderthem equaIIy contemptIbIe and InemcIentto aid us
or our enemIes. TheIrterrItorIes are graduaIIy IapsIngtothe BrItIsh
Government, oIwhIch Ierozepoor aords one Instance. The desert
hason Itsouthern IImIttheterrItorIesoI ]yepoor, BhIckaneer, ]esseI-
mere, and _Jowdpoor InhabIted by the hardest and bravest oI the
HIndu race, whose countrIes beIng guaranteed Iy us lrom IoreIgn
InvasIon onayIng a very InconsIderabIe trIbute, IeeI secure In theIr
domInIon, and areamongthe most IaIthIuI andattached aIIi esoIthe
BrItIsLCovernment. The same may be saId oI themountaIn chIeIs
43
:f:he ArrIva|i , Iying to the eastof tbe desert on theIcft bank 6f the
Indus, empbatIcaIIy caIIed by those peopIe, from the danger of
|raversIng It, tbe Matustha|Ior the Region of eath.
SIrCharIesNapiei' sreasonsfor transferrIng our boundarIesto tbo
IndusfromAttockto thesea, are-hrst, that rIverIs easi erdefended
than theSutIej, but I repeat, that neIther riverIs any defence. Wbat
wehaveto decide Is, whether we shaII preferthe deserton the Ieft
bank ofthebothrIvers, wIth a|I Its advantages to the Su|Imavee, Ihe
Braheo, and the Be|och MountaInsstretcbIng from Peshawur to the
sea,throughoneofthesean InvadIng atmy must come, the defence of
IndIa Is on the Indus, sInce there Isn,o Porus In the Pun] ab. To
temaIn, therefore, stationary ontbe SutIej , is a thingimpossib|e. '

Aga1n . ~'In short our posItIon in defending the Ieft bankofthe

Sut|e],and theIeftbank ofthe Indus, are as dierent as possIbIe. The
ntstisscarceIy possibIe, theIastIscomparatIveIy easy. ThehrstwiII
requIreaIarge armyat a vast ' unmItigated expense, the Iast a smaII
army at comparativeIyIIttIe expense. '
'Therevenue ofSind wouIdhavepaId the army, were I tnot that
a Iarge one was required to watch Ihe SIkhs. When thePun]abi s
ours, SIndwIII more tban cover its expenses.'
In this IIne of atgument, SIr CharIes Naper seemstohaveover-
looked the fact, that wben weInvaded Afghanstan, we did not cross
lbese mountains [extendi ng for six hundred mIIes)by onIy one of
lhese passes, eItberIn enterIng or retirIng from tIocampaign, and he
admits, tbere are tweIve through whIch anenemy can march. Now
let usImagIne severaldivisions

of a hostII army, with aIIits resource

in Its near, simuItaneousIy crossIng this mountaIn frontIer, wbat must
be the amount of an army to oppose them

aI| at the same moment.

If we are to possess the whoIe country from northto soutb-from
Peshawur to the sea~we must be prepared at everypoint, and no
smaII army wiI| be sumcIent. But an attentive perusa|oIhIstory,
Itom theearIiestperiod down to the present tIme, sbewsusthat no
atmyeverdId, andno armyever couId,wIth tbeequipmentofmodern
tImesespeciaIIy, Invade IndIa proper but by oneand thesame route
bywhIchtheyhaveaIIapproached It. On a greatquestionIi ke this,
I

shaII
,
be forgIven, perhaps, for shewIng what is thenature oI thIs
desert, and \hat has been the chracter o| tbe attacks which have
been sustaIned and repuIsed by tbe armIes of our predecessors In
IndIa.
< -
44
In I8O9, Mr. EIpbinstone, accompanied by about 5OO individuaIs,
taking tbe most favourabIo route from eIbi toBabawaIpoor and
keeping asfarsoutb aspossibIe to avoid tbeworst part of tbe desert,
required6OOcameIs tocarry baggage, food, and water fromp|ace to
pIace. At Bickaneer, a considerabIe tow on tbe soutbern border,
tbe Chief made
,
over one o[tbeweIIsto tbe party. Tbese, Mr. EIyhin-
stoneeIsewberedescribestobe 34O feetdeep, andnot more tban tbree
feet in diameter. Inspeaking of tbem generaIIy,besays, 'tbewater
is aIways brackisb andunwhoIesome,andso scanty tbattwo buIIocks
workng for a nigbt easiIy emptied a weII. 5ome diercnce occurring
between Mr. EIpoinstone andtheCbief,wbo wantedbim1o reIinquisb
bisomce as envoyto tbe Afghan Court, to assist bim in repeIIingan
attack ofone of bis enemies, deprivedtbe former, foroneday onIy,
of Ibeuseoftbe weII,wbicb conv|nced hImbowcompIeteIybewas i n
theCbief'spower. uring bi s stay at tbis pIacefor a week, sucb
were tbeeects of tbe badwater, and tbe fatigueoccasionedbymarcb-
ing tbrougb tbe beavy sand, tbat tbirty men out ofbis escort, wbicb
consisted of 2OO infantry, were taken iIIin one day, and fortypersons
of tbe embassy died during tbat sbort week. Tbe wboIe route to
BabawaIpoor on tbe SutIe], tbrough 28O mi|es ofdesert, Iay tbrougb
sand-biIIs, varying from twentytoone hundredfeetin beigbt. As Iong
as tbetraveIIers kept tbe beaten patb tbey got on weII. But tbe sand
rendereditnecessaryto maketbe infantryride aIternateIy on cameIs,
eacb carryingtwo men. Whenever tbeydeviated fromtbebeatentrack,
tbe animaIssunk into the sandup to theirknees asifin snow, so tbat
tbe Iineof marcb extendedor two miIesinIengtb. Ou reacbing apIace
caIIed Poogoor, IOO miIes due south of BabawaIpoor, bebadtocross
tbe desert to tbe river. Witb tbe exceptionof

two weIIs at onepIace

hfteen m|Ies soutb of BabawaIpoor, tbere were putinreguisition to
carryskinsof water, and IargecoppervesseIs, wbicb badbeen provid-
edonhrst entering tbe sea of sand. Up totbis period, tbe routebad
been aIong its soutbern border, wbere towns and viIIages are occasion-
aIIy met witb, but tbe routenow waswboIIydevod of sucb resources.
Tbeembassy marcbedaImostaIwaysbynigbt, at tbe rateof hfteenor
twenty miIes eacbstage,to avaiI itseIfof suppIies. On tbe road from
Poogoor toBabawa!poor, tbeCbiefoftbeIatterpIace,ontwooccasions,
sent out severaIbundred skins ofwater and coppervesseIssucb as Mr.
EIpbinstone bad witb bim, to meet tbe embassy, to suppIy any
dehciency. 5cb is tbemodeofpassingtbe desertI Commerce,bowever,
45
does _contrivetomake i ts way from eIhii ntbesamemanner; and a
1ramc of opium from western Ra]putana to Sind was once carried on
by1he same means.

Without entering into detai Is, I wiII ]ust advert to two other
marcbes recorded in bistory. The one is that of tbe Emperor
Hoomayoon in A. . I2, on the occasion of bis igbt from
Ajmeer by AmerKoteto the Indus, a distance oftwo bundred mi!es.
Tbescene of bis disastrous escape tbrougb this desert, abandoned
by aII but bis own fami!y and about seventy fo!Iowers,isfee!ing!y
describedby
,
Ierishta. Tbe want ofwaterdrove themen andborses
mad, and aI! oftbepartyperisbedbuttwenty, Again,the Emperor
Mahmood of Ghiznee (A. . !O21) , after remaining in Guzerat
near!y tbree years, and baving destroyed tbe tempIe of Somnath,
attemptedwitb bis army [consisting entireIyof cava!ry) toreacb tbe
Indus from NebrwaIa Pattan. He started witb aI! the resources be
couId command, but tbe greater part ofbis army, men andborses,
died raving mad in the desert. The contemporary Mahomedan
autbors bave said IittIe more of tbis retreat tban tbat
tbearmy was mis!ed for tbree days andtbrcenigbtsin tbe desert
wbere many of tbem perished, and MahmoodreachedGhizneewitb
a very sma!! portionof tbosetbatoriginaI!y accompainedbim. Tbe
Hindu autbors, bowever, describe tberetreat asIittIe Iessdisastrous
tban tbat of tbe Eng!isharmyfromCabuI, ortbeIrenchfrom Moscow.
Wbat are tbe dimcu!ties of tbe Indus, or the Sut!ej, compared witb
tboseofsucbadesertasbas been described ? That it is not wbo!!y
impassabIe by smaII bands mounted on cameIs, I am fu!Iy aware,

from inroads made into it fromtherivers by detacbments oftroops

from tbearmies ofMahmood of Gbiznee,andTimoor, downtothetimes
ofSirCbarIes Napier himseIf

But tbe best proof, if any other were

wanting, ofits impracticabi!ity for !arge armies istbefact tbt tbe
Britishgovernment witb aIIitspowerand witb aI!itsresources,cannot
sendreinforcementst Sindor MooItan but bytbemoutbsof theIndus
ontbe soutb, or throughAmba!aeastwardofthedesert,on tbc nortb,
and tben up or down tbe rivers. A!I tbe battIes, ofwhich bistory
aords us anyaccountfortbedefenceofIndia,bavebeenfought witbin
fotyor hfty mi!esnortb o|e!hi, after the enemy bave turned the
desert, and bave crossed tbe SutIe] between Lodhiana and the
Hima!aya.Tbe distance between them isunder fortymiIes, and from
the Sut!e] to eIbi, we have divisions of tbe armybeIow Lodhiana,
46
supportIng each other at AmbaIIa, Kurnal, Meerut andDe!hi. On this
narrow IIne offrontier we may concentrate a force, even supposing
the Pun]ab in the hands ofan enemy, supported inits rear by exha-
ust!ess resourcesofmen and supp|iesourse!ves possessing a!! the ad-
vantages of IocaI Information, wIth wh ch noenemy can be so we!!
furnished. But our troopshave passed this boundary, and are now
hghtIngthe Sikhsin the Punj ab. What then i A mutinousarmy, having
exhausted

the tunds of a distracted government, fo the

supermacy of whIch a!l its generaIs were contendIng, invaded our
terrItory withoutanyadequatecause. t took advantageofthefa!se
posItIon of our new frontier st atIons, separated at a dIstance of
eIghtymiIesfrom each other, and one of them [Firozepoor), within
the IIne of the desert, though on the bank of theSut!ej . The SIkhs
marched to that rIver 40,000 strong, witha heavy parkofartIIlery,
crossed1t equIdistant. between both posts, andthreatened each at
the same time. It was cIear, however, that Firozepoor, the more
I;:suIated as to reinforcements and supp!ies, oered the most
vuInerab!e poInt , so that they sat down before and !aid
sJege to It. Had IIrozepoor been abandoned when the
Afghan war termInated, and Its

garrIson added to Lodhiana,

the same hurrIed operatIons on our part need not have taken
pIace as did occur,on the occassion aIIuded to. Thereinforcements
from the southwouIdhave at once arrestedthe furtheradvance of
theenemy, for wIth I 0, 000 men evcn inItsrear at LodIanah, wouId
any SIIh or other aimy, wIIh guns, venture to advance towards
Delhi. The BritishCovernment were not prepared for the conict
whIch ensued, though the information had been supp!iedtoit. t
cannotbe doubted that It disregarded theintention andcharacterof
the enemy. t was not aware that he had madesuch

progress n
the miIitary art. Thecommandersknew notof theexce!!entintemal
economy of his regu!ar forces, traned byskI!fuIEuropean omcers,
accustomedfo1 thIrtyyearsto constant warfare, andwhchhad never
encountered defeat . ThIsknowIedge was dear!yboughtin the batt!es
of Moodkee, ofFirozeshahand Sobraon. But Iodhiana on the Sut!ej
ought, after aII, tbea mere outpost of our frontier. Tmagine what
wouIdhave been the fateof that enemy, if Ithadvonturedtoadvance
to KurnaI,with an army hang|ng on Itsank and onits rear asdid
the IndIan armiesof oId. At one perIod ofhistory,whi!e the Tartar
hordes of Chengiz Khan, durIng the !atter haIf of the thIrteenth
47
Iorty years ago, when I was an aItache to the embassyIn PersIa, that
century, overran RussIa, PersIa and AsIa MInor, and ended by
subvertIng the Eastern EmpIre of Kome and founded the
Ottoman domInIon at ConstantInopIe, the same
, Impetuous
ood, for a successIon of forty years, poured

Its vast torrent

through the passes It Is now proposed we shaI! have for our
boundary, and nv

ded the Pun] ab. Here they encountered severaI

defeaIes, but eventuaIIy sweeping over it, he marched Into IndIa.
Thesetroopswere unencumbered with guns or the heavy munItions
of war of modern tImes. Theywere thehnest cavaIaryIn theworId,
but they hadto pass In the vicinityoI LodhIana. In the year I292,
ten tomans, or IOO,OOO men were repuIsednear eIhI, and compeIIed
to retreat. In I296, a sImIIar arm
{
Ieft I,2OO men ontheheIdof
battIe, and aIso fought theIr way back through the Pun] ab. In the
I297, an equa||y Iarge force crossed tbe SutIe] , but did not venture
onwards, and retreatedwIthout sustaInInga generaI actIon. In I298,
twentytomans or dIvIsionsof IO,OOOeach, vIz.,2,OO,OOOmen,advanced
to eIhI, but were repuIsed with fearfuI sIaughIer. In I3O3 they
mereIy ravaged the country and retIred but they returned In the
foIIowIng year wIth 4O,O0O, and Iost I6,OOO men. TheIast attempt
madewasby57,OOOmen in theyear I3O5, whohavIng reachede|hI,
metwIthasIgnaI defeat, andhnding theroutebyLodhIana occupIed
by the IndIan troops, they ventured to throw themseIves Into the
desertontheIrretu

n, where thewhoIearmy perIshedby thIrst and

fatIgue, or feII vIctims to the fury of the Ra] poot chIefs who are
descrIbed asoccupyIng Ihe southern IImIt

of the desert. SInce that

tIme TamerIane, B
_
ber, Hoomayoon, Akbar, and In modern tImes
NadIr Shah,In I 74O, and Ahmed AbdaIII so Iate as I76O, haveforced
the Pun] ab, but have been arrestedIn theneIghbourhoodof elhI,
CIvIs, who Is evIdentIy wel| readIn the historyof IndIa, says, 'We
had nobusInessever to cross the SutIe] . I know IthasbeensaId by
hIgh authorIty that the SutIe] Is not a secure frontIer. In ages
unto!dthe SutIe] had served as the frontIer of IndIa,but Idonot say
itmustcontInue so. I wI|!ask,why[beforeyouwentout of your way
to makeboththe SIkhs andthe Aghansyour enemies) It might not
asweIIhave contInuedsoinyour hands as In the hands of those who
havepreceded you
OurhousewasquIteIargeenoughas It was. Someday orother,
thest:ucture wI|!become sobIg astofaII byits own weight, or the
48
folks down stairs tbe sub]ugated poepleof India) wi!l become too
unruly to be ccntrolledand even in the mean time, without a great
cbangefortbe better, we sha!lbe ina dilemma wbicb wiI! !eave us
notbingto Iookback upon,butwar without success, and nothing to
lookforwardtobutpeacewithout security."
It istimeweshouldweighwe!l tbese prophetic words of an old
and distinguished statesman,hehas longwitbdrawn from the scene,
butbaskeptbismindwel! suppliedwithinformation ofevents asthey
bavehappened. Hehasoccasional!y given us warning, which, in the
case ofAfgbanistan,proved too true, and his voice shouldnot now be
disregarded.

Somucb fortbeIndian frontier lettbose who desire to carry it

on to tbe Soohmanee mountains, make themse!ves atleast masters of

tbewboIe sub] ect.
Let us now!ook at tbe question in anotber point of view~the
past and present po!icy for tbe defence ofIndia.
EngIand hastoomuchat stake f treat

ligbt!y1he risk of !osing

tbat country. When Zeman Shab, the elder brotber of the !ate unfor-
tunate Shah Sbu]a, attbeinstigation of Tippoo, invaded tbe Punjab,
and reacbed Lahore on his route to elbi in I799, the Marquis
Wel!es!y, better acquainted with Asiatic bistory than the ru!ersof
modern times, recollectedtbat tbe ancestorsof tbat Prince bad, some
fty yearsbefore, taken advantageof tbe dissensions in Persia, on the
deatb of Nadir Shah, and prevailed on tbe Agbans to throwo their
al!egianceto tbeShah and to estab!isb a separate dominion. The
sagacity oftheMarquisWellesly !edbimtodepute tbe late Sir ]ohn
Malcom thenonlyCaptain Malco!m),aseuvoyto theCourtof Persia,
in order toinduce that sovereign totbreatenthewestern provinces of
Aghanistan, eithertoreconquer tbem, or at !east to demand tribute
and a recognition of their dependency. Tbis measure perfect!y
succeeded, and!he frequent visit since of the Persian army to Herat,
torepeat tbese demands, repdered it who!ly out of tbe power of
the Aghans to direct their attention to conquests in ndia.
Tbis it was that favoured thegrowth oftbe Sikhpower, wbicb, under
Ranjeet Singh, wrested 1om the AghansMooltan and a!l tbe terri-
tory to tbe east of the Khyber Pass.

t is clear, then, tbat a close

alliancewith Fersia, and strengthening thatpower, wou!deectua!ly
protect us from any approach of an army tbrough Aghanistan.
49
was the avowedpo!icy oftbe Britisb government. On that occasion,I
reco!!ectsevera! guns, which we brought witb us from India, were
presented to the king, acd tbe Madras Native Horse artiIIerymeu wbo
accompaniedtbemremainedfor some time withtbeir gaIIantcaptan,
tbe presentMa]or-Cenera!SirHenryBethune,Bart. Hehasdono good
service for Persia, andwearsthe honourswhicbbehas gained inwar
intbat quarter. Some of the omcers attacbed to the escort aIso
remainedin tbeserviceofPersia, andinayearortwo a weII-discipIin-
ed forceof IO,OOOinfantry was formed, wbicb, on more tban one
occasionmeasuredits strengtb with the Russians. Tbis force formed
tbenuc!eusofan army, which [had ourgoIcynot cbanged) wouId at
aII timesbave been readytofaII on the rear of any enemy advancing
towards ndia.
Theyear I827was tbat inwbcb tIe viewsof EngIisI statesmen
witbregardtoPersiaa!tered. A!In tIreprecedingevents since I8OO
were of no avaiI and tbe interestsof Creat Britainwere compromised,
whenbythepayment of a sum of moneywe got ridof tbat articIe of
the treatyofTehran of I8Il, whicbbound berina defensive aIIiance
wtbPersiatoprotecther fromher enemies, eitherbynegotiation, by
money, or bytroops and munitons of war. From that hour Persia
graduaI!yfeIIundertbe dominion ofRussia,wbosepower andinuence
haveincreaseddaiIy. nstead ofbeing cherished as a vaIued aIIy, she
hasbeenunder the guidance of Russian counciIs and has ever since
beenviowedby uswitb distrust and apprebension. In I839, it was
thougbtdesirab!e, insteadof empIoying her as tbe protector of our
Indian dominions by assai!ingthe Agbans on tbe west,to empIoy
tbe resorcesof Aghanistan against her, to preve:ther,in connection
witb Russia invadingIndia. Hence the orgin of the Agban war.
Tbe authori ties here had aIso taken it into tbeir beads, tbat a
vast tramc migbtbe carriedon a!ong the Indus witb the Pun]ab and
the countries!yingbetween it and PersIa and the Caspian Sea. To
eect this it became necessa:y to expIore theIndus and toqo so, it
wasresoIvedto send some horses as a prescnt to Ran]eet Singh, the
ru!er oftheFunjab, and to obtain permission of tbe Amirs of Sind to
a!Iowtbemtobeconveyed up tbe river to bis country. Tbe Amirs
didnotob]ectandthe !ateSirA!exander Burnes [tben a Iieutenant
inthe Bombay army), took cbarge of tbese catt!e an was thebearer
ofa!etterfromLordEI!enborougbto the Sikb cbief. On tbeI5tb Apri!,
I83O, whiIethepartywere on tbe river,Burneswrites: 'Aswe ascend-
50
ded the river, the inhabitants came from miIes around to see us.
A Syud [aMahomedan Sant) stoodonthe water'sedge and gazed
with astonishment. He turned to his companion aswepassed, and,
in the bearing of one o! our party, said, 'AIas I Sind isnow gone,
since theEngIishbaveseentheriver,whichistheroad toits conquest. '
How truIy tbs hoIy man foresaw the inev,itabIe consequence of
permittng us to conveythese Trojan horses totheun]aI has been
but too fataIIy reaIisedforhis country.
Burues' report of tbe river and of the peopIe, and of those he
afterwards visited in his enterprising traveIs during the foIIowing
threeyearsthroughout Aghanistan,Bokhara,and Persia, waspubIish-
ed in 1834, and conhrmedthe beIief |hat thepossession of thenaviga-
ton of the Indus and of the country of Sind, was aIonewantingto
Iead to a commerciaI deveIopment unparaIIeIedin any other quarter
of the gIobe.
Thisidea, and thenewpoIicy towards Persa, Ied to theinvasion
of AghanIstan, which wouId, in tbe Ianguage of another President of
tbe Board of ControI, ahord deveIopment to fesources and tothe
achievement of deeds which the most romantic funcywouId faiI in
depctng. Here weare in 1849, hfteen years after tbe Syud, andten
afterthatoftheCabinetMinster, and I Ieave myreadersto] udgeto
whom the true gift of divination beIonged, whether to the

the MosIem orto the Cbristian. Iorthe Iasthve years Sind has been
in ourpossession, but where are the Amirs who granteduspermission
not onIy to see the Indus, but asssted us in furtheringthe fancifuI
viewsofthosewhodreamt of greatonquests and commerciaI advan-
tages ? They not onIy did this, but at aIater period, they aidedus
in returningthrough their country, and in saving our re|reating army
from destruction. Tbese bave been burIed from theirseats, deprived
oftheir weaIth and power, and sent into exiIe~whiIe !he gay youth,
Burnes, whowas tbe main instrument in brngng about these events,
was cut oin the prime ofIife; and a British Indian

army, tberst
that had sustained a defeat since the Ume ofBayIey (10. 9. 1780] in
1783, annihiIated, and the prestige of our name mter|aIIyin]ured.
These events arestiIIfresh in the
,
recoIIection ofthe nationsamong
whomthey occurred, andtheyhave inspred both SikhsandAghans
with an idea of our miIitary prowess very dierent from that which
prevaiIedwhenwe

engagedin the Aghan war.

5 1
Letus now turn t o the impression made,in,a politicaI poin!of
view, by thiswar, we engaged in a tripleaIliance with Shah Shu] a
andRan]eetSinghtoplace the former on the throne from whencobe
hadbeen expe!Ied thrty years before, and which he hadfai!edin
regaining i n a subsequent war. This object was to he e'|ected by
expeI!ing the reigning king who was the choce of thepeopIe,and
recognised as one of t he most popuIar rulers ofthat region. Tbe
ob]ectwaseected histroopsweredefeated,andShah ShujahrepIaced
on the throne. The expeIIed king gave himselfup toourgenerosity,
and was sent a prisoner into India. A proc!amation was issued, that
our ob]ect being gained, we shouId quit the country,Ieavingitto be
governed by Shah Shu]ah. id we do so ? Not at aII, we not only
remained in it and reguIated its aairs, but broke faith with1he
ChiIzies and other mountain chiefs, who had, on certain conditions,
favoured the advance ofone division of army. The result is too recent
to require detailing.

We restoredost Mahommed Khan tothe arms

of his faithfulsub] ects, and he has been revenged by reconquering
Peshawur, taken from him by the Sikhs j ust for|y years ago. We
migbt have then retired with credit but the same President ofthe
BoardofContro!wasnow Covernor-CeneraI of India. Hisinfatuation

regarding the commercal advantages to be derivedfrom the naviga-

tion o|the Indus, wasnot removed by theabundant knowIedge gained
fortheprevioustenyears, oftheimpossibiIityto tradewithnationsof
barbarianpaupers, inhabiting countries yieIdingnodesirabIe produce.
Buthewas resolved either toru!e Sind as a British Province, orto
make itone. He did so, and thispresent totheCrownhas costi t,
and will stiI! cost it mi!Iions of money. It is not onIy a mi!Istone
roundourneck, but ithas!edtothcwarinwhichwe are nowengaged.
SirChat!es Napiersays . 'It has becn necessarytohave a Iarge army
in Sind, for fearofthe Sikhs. " Had the Sikhs no reason to fear Sir
CharIes Napier as Covernor of Sind, after what they had !ateIy
witnessed, but more especiaIly from the we!I-known fact that the
annexation of the Punjab had been a favourite pro] ect
propagated in Sind, and spoken of and toasted at the mess-
tab!es throughout the army ? I do not pretend to ]ustify the attack
of the $ikh army on our post at Iirozepoor, during a period of
profoundpeace. But what was the state ofthecountry? Iortwo
years anarchy had prevaIed. Each ofthe miIitary chiefs, strugg!ing
for supremacy at Court and having obtained a!l that tbe pubIiccoers
52
couId yIeId, resoIvcd to antIcipate tbe timewhen tbe EngIIsb sbouId
be ca!Ied Into settIe tbeir aairs, and eventua!Iy to annex tbeIr
courtry. IntbeIrrasbness, tbey bave promoted, instead of postpon-
ing an event, wbicb, if we are to retain SInd, must sooner orIater
occur. Let us examinewbatis tbe cbaracteroftbisarmy. Burnes,
]acquemont, HugeI, Lwrence, and otbers, bave a!! spoken ofit, and
of tbe court and resources of Ran]eetSIngb, but from aI! tbesewe onIy
gatberImperfect notIons oftbe truemIIItaryresources of tbe Pun] ab.
In

tbyear 1840, SIrC!aude Wade dIrectedbIs particu!ar attentIon to

thIs ob]ect, and bis PersIan Secret ary andAssistant, MIrSbaba:nat
A!I, now In London, was emp!oyed In obtaIning It. In tbeworkof
MIr Sbabamat A!I pubIIsbed In 1846, be gives tbe !ol !owIng hgures .~
40 RegImentsofdIscip!InedInfantry equIpped
!Ike European soIdIers# e a a e e e a a a 4 a 4 e e e e e a a e & a e e e a e e a e e e 4 a 4 a 40,000
14 RegIments of cavalry. . a e . e . e . e e . e a a e . a e e e . 4 4 . e . e . . a . e e a 10,000
ArtIIlery. a . e a e e # e e . . e . a e . e # 4 a e e e e a e . e a : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,880 '
ReguIar troops 52,880
Irregu!ar cava!ry~Yeoman of tbe countrybringing
tbeIr own borses and paId bIgbIy. e e a e e e e . . e e a e a 4 . # e . e e 30,000
IrreguIar matcb!gck Infantry, for IIgbt duties. . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1,800
Crand TotaI 94,680
TbIsdoes not inc!ude troops In grIsonswbIcb arefortbe most part
locaIandstationary. Tbe heId and batterIng traIn consists of 188
pieces ofcannon baIf of wbIcb are borse artIIIery, and tbe remaInder
drawn by oxen.
Tbereare arsenaIs at AmrItsar and Labore for casting cannon
and sbot, makIng powder and muskets. Tbere are aIso In every
dIstrict oneor more commIssariat depots ofraIn, hIledannua!Iybytbe
revenue, takeninkInd and deaIt out to tbe mi!lItary commissarIes.
Tbe army consists for the
,
most part, of trueSIkbs, tbougb tbereare
some regIments termed Na] ibs, wbIcb consIst of Ra]poots from
HIndustan. Among tbe SIkb corps,1hemenare, I understand, dIvIded
into messes. Eacb regIment bas Its

commIssary, and

tbere are
company messmen, termed Rooswayee, wbo prepare tbe bread and
potage for tbe men. Tbeycarry !Itt!e ornobaggage, are accustomedto
53
makeIong marches, and, IIke aIIthe AsiatIcsoutside IndIa areused
toentrench themseIves, an art in whichthey areveryexpert. The
practiceprevaiIs equaIIy among the Arabs, the NepiuIese, Burmese,
andChinese natIons. The soIdIers of the front and rear rank dig a
hoIe as they stand, throwin upthe earth before them, tiII theycan
justre over the bank, eachhole Isthen connectedwiththatonthe
right and Ieft, and thus a reguIar trench

isformed. ThIsmode of
entrenchmentisvery rapIIy per!ormed, and serves asabreastwork
but ItoersIittIeobstacIe

toan advancing foe, andIsonIy avaiIabIe

ascoverfor defence. Once turned, the troops Iose

conhdence, and
wiII aIways give way before attackIng coIumns. To attack them in
front is to give them

every advantage of position, which, if on

eminences, canonIybe earried at agreat sacrIhceofIife.
TheSikhshave shewn themseIvesformIdabIewhiIe so posted, but
theywIIIIosetheirconhdencewhencompeIIed to meet us onthe open
Iain, and to manoeuvre. I havemyseIf witnessed this ef|ectinArabia
and in India, among men as brave and hardy as the Sikhs. The
campaIgnsagaInsttheNepauIese, the Burmese, andamongthepasses
oftheAghan moun|ains, have eorded our Indian army abundant
opportunities of knowIng how to deaI with these tactics, and there
must bepIenty ofomcersof IocaIexperience onthe spot, whose service
mightbemade avaiIabIe withevery advantage. The moment we meet
wIth dIhcuItIesthat appear greater at a dIstance than they are in rea-
Iity, we immedIateIy think It requisitoto scnd out addItionaI EngIIsh
regImentsandomcersneitheraccustomedtothe cIImatenor tothewar-
fare, instead of merelysuppIyingthe oId regiments on the spct with
ready driIIed men, who might be easIIy had, whenever wanted, as
voIunteersorevenasrecruits.TheaccIimatedandexperiencedEuropean
veteran Is InvaIuabIe. But thisheavyexpenseo| additionaI European
soIdIeryappearstomeveryunneccessary.Our Sepoys, weakIy omcercd
asthey are,haveaIwaysdonetheIrdutyaIongside of our own country-
,
meninamannerthat must astonIsheverybody. Theyare in no respect
indivIduahy inferIor to anyenemy they can be opposed to, but the
Sikharmyhasa vastadvan|ageoveroursinthenumberofits omcers,
derIved from the gentry of the country, to whom the men are

accustomedto Iook up. ThIs defect has often been Iamented, and
sooneror IaterweshaIIbecompeIIedto remedyitby a new constitu-
tionofthe native armyofndIa.
ThegaIIant Chiefwhois now proceedIng thither has experIence
54
and cendence intbat army, andno one knows better tban he does,
bow much it suers for want of proper regimenta! omcers. He does
not reguire tobe to!dbow to deaIwitb tbe Sikb strategy. But I do
notpartakeofhis apprebension that our rst marcb towards c!bi
wiIIbe

therst towards Ca!outta, nor tbat we sbaI!be driven into tbe

sea, neitberdo feartbeimpetuous torrentoftbe Nepaulese on our
anks, nortbe1we!ve mi!!ionsof tbesubyctsof tbeNizam. Wbave
beatentbe Nepau!ese in tbeir mountain fastnesses, witb every disad-
vantageof!oca!knowIedge, and sbaI|, if tbey venture on tbe pIain,
makea signa!exampIeoftbemfortheirtemerity. Astotbesub] ects of
theNizam, theybavegroanedtooIong underbis ma|-administration to
riseatbissuggestion to subvert our power on tbe contrary, tbose
verypeop!e are, I be!ieve, ready at any moment, to transfer tbem-
seIves toour ru|e. Aairs intbe Panj ab must be placed in otbers
bandsthantbeyare but as to ndia,our powerstands on too hrm
groundstobesbakenby a revoIutioni na remotecornerofit, and tbat
ina countrywbicbdoes noteven beIong to us. Sir CbarIes Napier
says, 'TbeSikhsbate tbe EngIi sb-nopermanent peacecan be made
witbtbem. 'Tbis is not tbelanguage becoming a statesman. Tbey bate
us as tbeIrench andwe bave hated eacbotber~becausewe are next
door, and do not fee!v,erycomfortabIe witbsucbpowerfuI neigbbours.
TbeSikbs,

fortbeIasttbirtyyears, bave carried on war continuaIIy

witb tbe Mabomedans, tbeir otber neigbbours. Tbe !atter were once
mastersanddrovetbeformerintotbe bi||s, wbere tbey kettbem for
years, andpersecutedtbem inordertomake converts oftbem. Tbese
bate eacbotbermoreinte

se tban tbe Sikbsbateus, and can never

bereconci!ed. Tbe Iatter I|ave watcbedourproceeding in ndia, tbey
know notbing of tbe causes oftbat bave Iedto our graduaI absorption
ofaII tbe native states nordotbeyknowanytbingof ourforebearance
in many instanceswberewemigbt have taken more territorytban we
bave done. They dreadour eucroacbmentsand tbeir own extinction,
and tbeymistrust usj but ifit suitsour convenience to permit tbem to
governtbemse!ves, ratbertbanbe attbe troubIe and expense and

risk
ofruIing tbem, I see no reason wby wesbou|dnot do so butwe must
take caretbattbere isnomistakeas to our powertodo as weIike.
SirCIaudeWadeconsiders tbat when Lord Hardinge wascontent
witbtakingtbe ]aIIinduroab, thattbeSikbpowerwasnotsumciently
broken be wouId have restored to tbe wboIe of tbe Mabomedan
tribcs, from whom tbey were taken, aII tbe Sikb conquests of
55
!can]eet Singb. Tbese concessions wouIdbave incIudedalI trIbeswhose
grati hcation was not onIy a measureof good poIicybut a recompense
towbicbtbeywereweII entitIed fromtbe services tbey bad rendered
to us

duringour expedition tbrougb tbe Punjab toAgbanistan, and

tbedeIitywitbwbIcbtbey appeartobavesince conductedtbemseIves
in joining Major dwardes against tbe insurgents before MooItan.
Tbe Mabomedans wouId bave accepted sucb a disinterested act in
tbeir favour witb gratitude. !n sbort, from bis knowIedge of tbe
sentiments oftbese peopIe, Sir C. Wade does not besitate to say tbat
we sbouId bave converted tbose wboso conhdence we bad Iost, and
wbo regard us at presentwitb anything but goodwi!I, into frinds
and aIIies. Cn tbe side of Casbmere be wouId bave foIIowed tbe same
Iine ofpoIicy as regarded tbe Cbiefs of Iskardo and Laddak, wbose
territories bad been wantonIyseized during tbe Iater years ofRanjeet
Singh's reign, by Ra] a CooIab Singq witbout eventbe autbority of
bis master. Cn Ra]ab CooIab Singh migbtbavebeen conferred, asbas
been, Casbmeer andbisoIdossessions around ]ammo,Bbarawar, &c.
To tbe severaI otber Cbiefs wbose territories CooIab Singb bad
violentIy appropriated to bimselI, tbeir dominionssbould bavebeen
respectiveIy restored. Under tbese Iimitatons, tbe integrity of tbe
Sikb dominionmigbt bave remained in s ubordinateco-operationwitb
us, insteadof taking tbe ]aIindur Doab, andintroducing our ruIes
witb regard to I1nded tenures wbicb arewboIIy inappIicabIe to tbe
existing state oftbings, andwbicb bas kept us in botwater up totbe
present moment,andcausedourruIe and graspingrevenue-systemtobe
tbe obects of borror and disgust. Instead of taking territory, be
woul d

have suggested tbe expediency of requiring a payment of

2,5OO,OOO Ks. , about tbe amount of tbe net revenues of tbe
province, in orderto pay tbe expenses ot a forceto be stationedin
tbe vicinty of MooItan, wbicb wbiIe it wouId bave increased our
inuence in Aghanistanwitbout aninter!erence witb it, wouId bave
been an extension of tb communication between Iirozepoor and
Sind. Tbe Resident at tbe court of Labore, be conceives, witb
tbe power and rigbt of interference, ougbt not to bave exercised
it, excepting in matters of great importance and incommunication
witb tbe government. In India, aseIsewbere,on tbe cbaracter oftbe
Resident manIy depends tbervputation of tbe state by wbicb be is
deputed Civis, on tbeotberband, witbouturging tbe rostoration of
tbe conqueststo tbe Mabomedans, proposes tbat tbe FunjabsbouI

be
56
dividedinto separateprincipalties, and calculates

on the improbability
of their everunitingfor any great object of foreign conquest, and
considers tbat theywould then have a strong motive for opposing an
enemy coming from the West, andthus protecting our territoriesin
India. The timehas unfortunatelypast for restoring, as an act of
grace,theterritory conquered by the Sikhsfromthe Mahommedans.
Ourlastaccountsshowthat theyhavetakenadvantageof thewareast
of the Indus toheI p themselves but it wiIlnow be a question, whether
afterhavingsubdued the Sikhs, we shouldbe content with the river
boundaryinstead of the mountain boundary, andsit down quietly
underthedisgrace ofnothavingbeenabIeto maintain for the Ra]ah
bisownterritory. Ifthe Fun]ab question were entirely isolated,we
mightwith inhniteadvantage toourselves withdraw from the scene
aftercripplingthe miIitarypower ofthe Sikhs, andfrom treaties, both
withthem and theAghans, notto permit anyencroachment beyond
tbeIndusbyeither party, and Ieave thom in the en]oyment each of
hisown. An agent atLahoreandanother at Cabul would a|ways keep
usinformedofwhat wasgoingon, andweshou|dsecure safety to our-
selves by the proximity oftwoneighbours, each ]ealous of the other,
butbound bymotivesof self-defence toprotect his ownland, andby
thismeansguard our frontier at noexpense to us. But the occupation
of Sind hasbecome "unfait accompli. " do not

see how we can retrace

ourstepsinthatquarter. havenosuchopinion of thepeople as to
beIievethattheSikhs aretobe keptdown by a handfulof men. We
cannothave a Napier there for ever and inIegisIationwe must appIy
ruIesfor ordinary men. Sir CharIes Napieriscondent that the reve-
nues of tbe Pun]ab wiII, when annexed with Sind, more than cover
their expenses. Butwe must recoIIect webave a very dierent descrip-
tion of enemy to deaI with than undisciplined Belochees ghting
without their Ieaders. Howeverbravely they may have con1ested the
beId againstourreguIartroops,weshouldcalltomindthattbeMahom-
medan armies from Aghanistan~both in the timeof Ma' t mood, in the
eIeventh, and Babur, i the sixteenth century~made hve or six
invasions, with aIl their power from Aghanistan, and all their
resourcesathand, erethey gained a footing in the Fun]ab. have
reason !othink the Sikh popuIation much more extensive, now we
know the real numericaI strength of their army, than has been
supposed andthatitisnot a small band of Mamlukes we have to
combH andto annihiIatebut a large portionofthe popuIaion of the
57
Punjab. Sir CbarIesNepierpropsesto make tbem feeI hrst tbatwe
are tbeir mastcrs, and tbat wetake fewer taxes tban tbeiroIdmasters.
TbisisaII verywelIfor anabsoIuteCovernor to sayand to carry out,
butis tbistbewaygovernmentsact ?
I bave accomplisbedwbat I proposed to myseIf~to Iay before tbe
public[and I bopeinan intelIigibIe sbape) aII tbe causes tbat bave
Ied to tbe present war. Tbey are connected witb tbat _uixoti c
expeditionintoAghanistan, wbicb, badIt notbeen fortberetirIng of
tbeFersianarmy before Herat, would, no doubt, bave bad to oppose
tbe united forcesofFersia and Russia, at tbe distance of 1500 mIes
from ourresources. I repeat, as faras a frontierisconcerned, tbeoId
one oftbedesert, andnottbe Iineof tbe Indus, is tbe best. I bave
sbewnbowtbeinfatuation oftbe Cannon Rowinsisted on commanding
tbenavigationoftbe Indusandbow tbe induIgence of tbat fancy bas
Iedusinto tbese sangninary andunprohtable wars. I beIieve wemigbt
}osnotbing,eitber inreputationorpwer,ingivingupbotb Sind and
tbeFunjabto begoverned by tbe people tbemselves; buti fwe are to
retaintbeonewemusttake tbe otber andit IsquiteessentiaI, tbatas
intbecaseof Sind,tbeciviland miIitary power sbouId be united in
oneperson, and tbat it sbould form a separate government baving
witbin itselfaIltbe appIiancesand meansof seIf-defencewitboutwait-
ingeigbt montbs for a battering train,

and reinforcements from a

distance, andif Sir CbarIes Napier could IIve for ever, be wouId be tbe
manmosthttobeat tbebeadofit. In conclusion, I beg torepeat tbe
wordsoftbeMarquessof Lansdowne, quotedby Sir CIaude Wade in
bisNotes asto tbe Folicy to be loIIowed towards tbeSikbs, and otber
nationsin IndIa.

He remarks, 'Convinced tbat tbe safety of our

Covernmentfo Indiadependsn tbesatisfactionandprotectIonwe are
enab!edto givetotbenativesoftbat country, and tbeprosperty we
can impartto tbeir commerce andsocial existence, I am persuaded,
tbatnext to tbese, stands tbe i mportanceofIetting it be feIt by aIl tbe
nationsofIndia,tbatwe arenotdesirousof couquest foranypurpose
but tbat ofsecurity, and tbat, Iet theirgovernmentbe wbat it may,
perfector imperfect, Mobammedan or Hindu, placed in on race, or
vestedin anotber, ouronly desirei s toorganise tbem as aIIIps, witb
wbom we can meetonequalterms, if tbey are prepared to maintain
tbe reIationsofpeaceand concord. "
Onewordmore, and I bavedone. Forall tbese blunders, tbis
bIoodsbed,andtbisexpendIture of treasure, sincetbe 1ast Cbarterin
/ 58
IS3S, we are indebted wboIIy and so!eIy to the autboritiesin Downing
5treet and CannonRow. TbCourt oI Directors, as a body, wouId,
couIdthey bave doneso, bave preventedit. Tbe ma]ority bave dis-
approvdof aII tbe measures wbicb induced us to depart from our
naturaI Iimits, tbe desert, and forewarned tbe government

of tbe

resuItoftbe[gbanwar. Le| the saddIe tben be put on tbe rIgbt

borse.
s
IIAT ]USTITIA RUAT COELUH"
London, MarcbI819
]obnBriggs,
HajorCeneraI, . I.C. S.
-- i
How To Rule India Two Documents On The I.C.S.
and The Politics of Administration
N. GERALD BARRIER
Maitaining the British raj in ldia required the gQvemment to
come to terms with the changing social and political milieu in which it
had to operate. Without sensitivity to vents around them, dvil servants
stood in danger of being trappd by subrdinate opinion and fulty
intel_li

ence which coul

_
d lead i turn t
?
serious mistakes. Te task j
of fnding out what was_ happenmg, of bmg aware and respnsive to
chaiges and attitudes, . remained a frmidable one. Two little-known
documents particularly illustrate this process. The frst, a memoran- 1
dum written by John Malcolm in 1 821 , contains instructions to his
staf in the Delhi residency on proper modes of intercourse between
European ofcials and . Indians. . The secon.d consists "f a detailed
commentary on social and political rel ations between .L. b. ofcers
and Punjabis, written in 1922 to acquaint young administrators with
the "broad rules ad principles" of contact btween rulers and ruled.
The documents, particularly .
.
the recent Punjab version, aford
insight into the nature of British administration. First, a consider
able amount of the self-image of the civil service had ben perpetuated
between 1 821 and 1 922 The same themes keep appearing
.
in the
i.nstructions : the key roles of izza, '.ce,' and infuence in successful
rule, the notion of the raj as both paternal and "personal" government,
and the need for patience when dealing with a subject, "native"
I
people. At the same time, however, a century ot experience had
helped alter old themes. Early assumptions abut being a ruling race
had become douded wi th ambivalence. Respect fr indigenous
institutions had been amended to include attention to use of words
and symbls, and gestures such as ofering chairs to the emergent
western educlted elite.
Both documents were printed by the Punjab Government and circulated
confdentially to ofcers "fr ofcial use only." Grants fom the Americn
Institute of Indian Studies and the Research Council, Unive:sity of Missouri,
made1pol8ible l ocation and editirg_of te Memoranda.
59
60
y 1922 the ritish were more aware, or at Ieast more verbaI,
about bow to gather nformaton and remain at the top oI the pohticaI
system. lormer re|ance on contact with the peop|e through tours
and re|axed horseback rides had gven way to a search mr a routnzed
method ot communicaton wth Punjabs. Tme must be set asde
fr n:ervews and specaI conversatons. These perods of contact
were not ntended on|y to p|acate the teeIings ot those desiring redress
or the honour resu|tng trom persona| contact wth tbe hazur, the
omcer, they had come to be viewed as a necessary method mr cu|tivat-
ng po|itca| support and acquring inmrmaton. To survive as the
accepted ru|er meant a|so to understand and m+nipulate a varety of
interests. The 1 922 memorandum carelIy dherentates Punabis
into various c|asses-chieh, peasants, urban or educated, so|diers,
emp|oyeeswth appropriate treatment a||oted to each groupng.
Keiterating the sgnihcance ot dherent cIasses was not a new feature,
as were not the use of durbars and patronage as means of poIticaI
con|ro|, but the wording and organizaton ot the memorandum re-
hects a sense of urgency in keepng wi th the rapd poIticaIizaton
ot the Punjab.
5uch themes, and many others n the m||owing documents, under-
|ne the admnistratve pattern often Iost in constitutiona| studies or
tbe remnscences of distrct omcers. The ritish were not free
agents, but a cog In a compIex set ot re|atonships stretchng from the
vi||age through the |egsIatve counc|. aIancing detached judgement
and decson-makng wth responsiveness to changes and keIngs
among ndians remaned the dua| and sometmes conHictng task f
governmnt. To taI n ether tuncton cou|d mean a breakdown
of admnstraton
.
Memorandum on the Subject of Social and Ofcial
lnttrcourse between European Ofcers in the
Punjab and Indians
1 . The ob]ect of the Memorandum s to give hints to members
of tbe ndan CvI 5ervue and other branches ot the Cv| adminstra-
ton in the Punjab, when they rst come out to oin their appntments,
as to the broad ruIes and prncp|es whch govern socaI and ,mcal
ntercourse with ndans of a|| c|asses.

Lvery such omcer shou|d careluI|y study 5ir J. MaIcom's Minte
-61
whchis appndcd to ths mcmorandum. hswaswrttcnncarly a
ccnturyago znd was zddrcsscd t o omccrs n gutc anothcr part ot
nda, but all thc prncplcs and much ot thc advsc t mrth n t,
arc applcablc to thc unjzbat thc prcnt day.
2. tscsscntal that znomccr ncvl cmploymcntshould bc
ablcto convcrsc hccly n thcr own languagc wth thc classcsot
ndanswthwhomhc comcs ntocontact, as thswll add grcatlyto
thc ntcrcst othslifc ' n lnda,to hs cmccncy asa scrvan| otLovt
andto Ihc conhdcncc wth whch he s rcgardcd by thc pcoplc, cspc-
cally thosc otthc pcasant class, who mrmthc bulk otthc populaton
otthc provncc. Ncxt to a knowlcdgc otthc languagc, tact and sym
pathyarc thc most mportant gualhcatons mr a succcsslul carccr n
nda.
A sympathctc omccr, whowlllstcn toand can hmscltundcr-
stand thcpcoplc's rcprcscntatons an takcs a kndly ntcrcst n thcr
wcllarc, wll n acgurc an nhucncc that can ncvcr bc acgurcdby
anomccr whp, though morc capablc. cthcr cannot undctstand thc
pcoplc or wll not cxtcnd hs sympathy to thcm.

hcn tourng t s a good pan to hod nmrmal confcrcnccs at

haltng placcs and to lstcnto any vcrbal rcgucsts thcpoplc may havc
to makc. hcy are much lcss pronc to cxaggcratc thcrcomplantsznd
much morc lkcly to adhcrc to thc truth, whcn thcy arc spcakng n thc
prcscncc ota largcconcoursc otthcrncgbours, than whcn, tutOrcd by
a pctton-wrtcr, thcy appcar n a Lourt or omcc at thc hcadguartcrs
otthc Lstrct or bubLvson.
As a rulcthc truth rcgardng any mattcr otlocal ntcrcst can bc
vcry casly asccrtancd n such an arscmbly.
hc pcoplc thoroughly apprccatc thcsc "Larbars," as thcycall
thcm, as t gvcs thcm an opportunty otpcrsonal communcaton wth
thcomccr.
.
Atsuch Larbars an omccr, who has acgurcd thc conhdcncc otthc
pcoplc, wll ottcn bc ablc to chcct an amcable scttlcmcnt,through
t
local hcadmcn, otdsputcs whch would othcrwsc havc gonc to thc
Lorts and causcd thc run otonc, tnot bth, otthc partcs.-
o
t must bc bornc n mnd that thcrc arc many mattcrs whch

tbc
gcncralty otmdans do otvcw hom thc samc standpont zs Luro
pcans. hcr socal laws and thcr codc ot morals dhcr n many
rcspects homthosc nvoguc n thc brtsh slcs.
Anomccrmust otcoursc admnstcr thc laws as theystznd, and
62 -
hesho`ud not aow oce customs and oca deas tocause hm to
devate nthesghtestdegree om.the hgh standardoljustce w

h
s the manstay otbrtsh rue n nda. ^tthe same tm, heshoud
a

guanthmsetwth thecustoms otthe peope, n order thathemay

bcabe to judge theractons reasonaby and nterpret ther motvcs
ntegenty.

^ harsh overbearng manner s hta to thesuccesslu management

otahars n an ndandstrct. tanomcers sympathetcan
g
.reaso-
naby patent the peopI e ,as a rue, w accept hs decson wth sats-
lacton and carry out hs orders cheertuy.
3. bpecacare s reguted na reatons that young cvans
mayhave wth ndanLhets. ^ Lhet shoud be treated wth dele-
rence, and care shoud be taken on a occasons when a Lhel cals
upon an omcer he shoud notbeket watng or otherwse nconven
enced but shoud be treated as a genteman ot good my wth a
cam to dehrence andspeca courtesy. ^ chetw usuay notca
wthout sendng prevous ntmaton, and a youngomcer maywe
ookupthe hstoryot the Lhets hmyn Lepel Lrmn's "Lhels
and ames ol !ote n the unjab" n the nterva bemre
recevng theLhel. Lmcers payng a prvate vst to a Natve btate
shoudatonce ascertanat whattme tw be convenent mr them
to ca on the Kung Lhet. hendrvngwth a bung Lhel care
shoud betaken to pace hm onthe rght.
4. bpecacares aso regured n deaIngwth educated ndans.
^n easy andhendy atttude shoud be cutvated and any appearance
olhauteurshoud b specy shunned. Lood humours amostinds-
pensabe. he respect whch an Lngshman can aways wn n nda
s notto beattaned by "comngt" over an ndanor presumngon
thecthatone s a member otthe rung race. he days whenths
menta atttude was acguesced n by ndans have passed
and a Lovernment servant w do the best mr mpera nterests lhe
estabIshes a cam mr ahecton nthe hearts oths ndan ends.
1tmust not be rgotten that ndans are at once emotona and sens-
tve. Lrdnary speakng the educated ndan, or the ndanolgood
hmy, has extraordnary good manners. t w not be amss there
mreto evenexeggeratethc habtol courtesy n deangwth

ndans.
Lngshmen areheguenty rough.ready andohhand wth each other.
mos ndans w not apprecatesuch a demeanor, though doul
wnen a persona) hendshp between an ndan and ngshmen har

rpened, .any excessve degree olcourtesy may be relaxed.

-
-
6
3
-
S.
-
nmanydstrcts there are pensoned solders n almost every
vllage.
hese mrm a loyal and desewng class and should be treated wth
kndness. An old solder, whether an omcer, or a sepoy or reservst,
has always been accustomed to have speca!ly lree access to brtsh
omccrs and s genunely gIad tosee a "bahb" agan. A hwguestons
abouthsregmet and hsservce, or an nspectono1hs medalswll
gladden theold man'sheart.
t sgeperalIy advsab|e tocultvat e ther acguzntance. regu-
ently`they can gve trurtworthy nmrmaton end sometmes valuable
assstane n the admnstraton.
.
bome subordnate cVl omcals try to preventcvl omcers makng
ends wtholdsolde[s. hss probab!y merelydue to jealousy, and
any tendency n ths drectonsould be watched and checked. bpecal
care should b taken to treat ndan commssonedomcers wth proper
rcspect, thats, Kssaldar-majors, bubedar-majors, bubedars, Kesa- '
darsand]emadars.
Any Natvecommssonedomcer, whether on leave or pensoned,
should alwzysbe gven an ntervew lhedesres t. n hs regment,
hes a personolconseguence, trusted and conhded n by hs brtsh

omcers, so he can rcasonably expect a cvl omcer ol the dstrct n

whchhs home s stuated, bysparnga lew mnutes olhs tme, to
mark hs apprecaton olhsservces to Lovernment.
A natve omcer, orcavalry mznol any rank, who s n unmrm
and wearng a sword wll present the hlt ol t. hs should be
touched wth the rght hand, as an acceptance ol the devoton olthe
wearer olthe sword tothe Lovernment whose servant he s.
6. n nda, asclsewhere, repeated loss ol temper nvolves loss
ol respect. n all dealngs wth
ndans t s a golden rule
nevcr t gve way to tempr.

An omcer who, when necessary,

s quetly and determnedly severe s lar more leared and respected
than the most volent blusterer, and an omcer who cannot control
hmsell acgures very quckly a unenv

ble reputaton,

loses the
condence and respect l the people, and thus reduces hs own
emcency as a servant oltheLovernment.
7. nLrdu the word "Ap'_ should be used whcn conversng
1h 1ndan gentlemen orocals olany standng.

he7nd person plural shou!d b used to ordnaryzmndars and

64
pctty omcals whlc thc 7nd pcrson sngular shouI d, t uscd ztzl,
b rcscrvcd trmcnal scrvants.
hcprovncal dalccts, howcvcr do not lcnd thcmsclves tosuch
poltcncss and thc 7nd pcrson plurzl, or cvcn somctmcs thc 7nd
pcrson snguIar, is gcncrzllyuscd n ordnary onvcrsaton.
nbnglsh convcrsaton thc applcatonto

1ndans otthc tcrm

"Natvc" snow frcgucntly rcscntcd d shoud bc avodcd.
x
8. t sonc otthc most mportant dutcs ot al! Lovcrnment
omccrs and partculzrly ot Lstrct Lmccrs to bc hccly acccssblc to
all whodcsrc to scc thcm cthcr on busncss or, as ts gcncrally
phrascd, mr thc purposcot 'payng thcr rcspccts.' owcvcr cmccnt
zn omccr may bcon papcr or n hs Lurt, hc s a urc thc s not
pcrsonallyknownto thc pcoplc oths dstrctor dvson. Al orcnta
pcoplhavc a strong prcdlccton tr pcrsonal Lovcrnmcnt, znd arc
much morc amcnzblc to ordcr and control whcn thcy rccognscthc
pcrsonal sourcc ol such control than whcnt appcars to thcm n thc
lght ot a mcrc mcchancaI cmznaton not lrom a man but from an
omcc. Aso thcrc s nothng whch thc ndan apprccatcs morc than
thc prvIegc ot pcrsonal zcccss to hs rulcr znd thc opportunty ol
rcprcscntng at cngth and oraly hs grcvancc or hs pont of
vcw. Lvcn whcn t s a mrcgonc concluson thzt thc rcpIy ota
rcprcscntaton must bc n thc ncgatvc, t s z mstakc on thataccount
to dcclnc to Istcn to argumcnt wthn rcasonzblclmtsortotcrmnatc
curtly a dscusson. A rclusal or an unpalatablc ordcr s acccptcd
wth much grcatcr rcsgnation whcn thc omccr, who has to gvc t,
haslstcncdto alI that s to bcszd on thc othcr sdc. ts wcll, thcrc-
mrc, cvcn at thc cost otsomc wastc ot tmc, to aIlow vstors or
pconcrs ordcputatons to tzlk tl Ithcy hzvcsad al that thcy can
say. NlIagcrs n a crowd wll gcncrzlly try to taIk a at oncc, butthcy
hzvc noob|ton to bcng told t
o
sclcct a spokcsman, and thsshouI
bcdonc. morcovcr, whcn thc spokcsman hzs had hs say, t s wc
lurthcr to nvtc ndvdual cldcrs to say what thcy wantto.
9. hcn ts ncccssary to hnd ault wth an nd:an otz respon
sblc poston, cthcr an omczl orz non-omcal, thc rcbukc shouId bc
dclvcrcd n prvatc , unlcss thc ohcncc s so hcnous that z pubtc
dsgracc sconsdcrcd ncccssary.
t must bc rcmcmbcrcd that thc nhucncc and conscgucntly thc
utlity ota rcsponsblc omczl or locaI magnatc, who has bccnso ds-

greccd, s matcrallylcsscncd. hcbystandcrs wlccrtanly pttbsh

65
tr and wdc.
hc mantcnancc ot thc nhucncc ot such pcrsons s a matter ot
the grcatcst mportancc to Lovcrnmcnt, as t s practcally mpossble
t admnstcr a dstrct wthout t. "
hus a sverc warnng, couchcd n plan words but admnsteredn
prvatc, to a ahsldar, who s bclcvcd

to bccorrupt, orto a ]agrdar

who sbclcvcdtoopprcsshspcoplcorto bc gulty otothcr ob|ccton
ablc conduct, wll ottcn havc thc dcsrcd chcct, whcrcas thc hum-
laton ot a publc rcbukc causcs rcscntmcnt and scldom sccures
thcob|cct wth whch t s gvcn, namely, thc mprovcmcnt ot mture
conduct.
10. ntcrvcwng vstors s onc oIthc most mportant parts ota
cv l omgcr`s dutcs.
bomcomcers x certan daysotthewccktrthcreccpton otvsts
at thcr prvate rcsdcnccs when thcy are at head-guartcrs.
tanomccr lcts t bc known that hc prctcrs to rcccvc vstors
wthn ccrtan hourshcwll hnd that hs wshcs wll gcnerally be
obscrvcd.
Vstors otthe hgher casscs oltcnwrte and ask mr thc appont
mcntota tmc at whch they may call .
Al l vstors_kctobc rcccvcd atanomccr's prvatc rcsdcncc.
t must bc rcmcmbcrcd that a rc!usal to admt an ndan vstor
s a dstnct rcbuh, and that thcrcmrc an omccr should always make
an chort to scc all whocallon hm.
t, mr any rcason, anomccr s unablcto sccallthc pcoplc who
havc come to call on hm, hc should, t possblc, avod scndng out a
mcssagctoths chcct by a chapras, as thcrcby hc wIl ccrtanly causc
ohcncc, whcrcas, thc hmsclt gocs to thc watng-room or vcrandah,
n whch hs vstors arc sttng, and cxplans brchy that owng to
prcss ot work or an mportant cngagcmcnt he cannot grant thcm
ntcrvcws, no ohcncc wll bc causcd.
1 1 . Jhchrst dmculty whch a |unor omccr encountcrs wll b
that ldstngushng bctwccn thc varous classes olndans who vst
hmtohom to ocr a char, wth whomtoshakchands,ctc.
hcre are certan cIasses ot pcrsons who arcnttlcdto rcceve
'chars' whcn vstng uropean omccs, but thcre s no harm n
* Editor's note- : This is one of the clearest statements by the government that
it realized its rule rested upon an ongoing Political System --Ofcers. ruled only
on the top and relied on a broad-based system for order.
oer1ng z chzr toz respectzble vstorespeczly lhe seduczte
g
znd
s zccustomed to ustng chzrs, who s DC ncuded nthese clzssef.
Lrdtnary z chztr should beoered toeverypersons pzyng zn omczl
vtst to whom t would zppezr znordtnzry mztter otcourtesy to oer
one. Lovernmentservants drzwng 8s. SO or over zsszzry wll be
enttted to theszme prvege when pzyng zn omczlvst. A regzrds
shaktnghznds there s no hzrd zndlzst rule, but t s usuzl to shzke
hznds zt the termtnztton ol zn ntervew wth Lzzetted Lmcers,
Lommtsstoned Lmcers znd Lzrbzrts. besdes ths, on speczl occzstons
t tsz much vzuedsgn ol personzl regzrd or zpprecztton olgood
servce toshzke hznds wth persons olesser degree, especzy l ts
done tn pubtc.
zbtts znd customs zre chzngng rzpdly n the unjzb. mzny ol
the young ndtzn gentemenolthepresent generztonhzvebeengrezty
educzted tn Lnglznd. hs hzs resuted n z pzrttz lltng olthe
'vet|' to whtch br J, mzcom tehrs nhsmtnute. hus twoud b
unrezsonzbe tonegect to oer z chzr or to demur zbout shzkng
hzndswtth zn ndtzn gentlemzn whohzd resded tnLurope.
It must berememberd that ordinarily speaking an Indian visitor
oltheod schoo wtnotgo untt he s gven ezve to do so, theremre
thehosthtmselndtczte when heconsders t s tmeto termnztethe
ntervcw.
Uneduczted znd evensome educztcd ndzns hzve zn zggrzvztng
hzbtofnotmentontng the obect olthetr vst, unt they rse to go,
butomcers must pztenty bezr wth thsod estzblshed custom znd
hezr whzt the vtsttor hzs come to szy.
1 2. Lmcers shoud tzke pzns to sz1tsly themseves thzt ther
vtsttors zreproperly trezted by thechzprzsts.
bpectz czreshoud be tzken to see thztchzprzstsznd prvzte ser-
vznts zre not permtted to pester vstors mrvatls. buch vzts zre
entreytmproperznd zre more thzneverObjecttonzbewhen secure
them zmentzservznt keeps z respectzble gentemzn stzndng n the
sunordoes not provtde them z chzr when wzttng. n the unjzb
zdtstrtct omcers zre regured tosetzpzrtz properplzce zs z wztng
room mr vsttors znd Lovernment ether pzys therent mrthts or
meets the cost o! uldng t. n theczse oljunor omcers ths s
not `zwzys possbe, but z tzctml omcer czn zwzys mzkeproper
zrrzngements.
Lhztrs shoud zlwzysb provded 8t hrzdguzrters or if z rest-
67
house fr visitors of position while waiting fr an interview. When an
ofcer is under canvas, It is not always possible to do so, b
p
t no o-
;
i nee will be caused, as the visitors will real ize that the omission is -
' unavoidable.
1 3. It has long been the custom fr Indian visitors, especially of
the trading classes, to present a small ofering of fruit or vegetables
which ofcials were expected to accept civilly. As, however, the
acceptance cf such oferings is liable to be misunderstood and mis
interpreted as likely to infuence an ofcer in favour of the man who
presents it, and insinuations are made that the dali contains a good deal
more than appears to the eye, a circular (No. 1737 (Home-General),
dated the 22nd of January 1 91 8) has been issued to the efect that fr
the fture any dal or gift that is ofered by or on behalf of an Indian
to any Government ofcial should be refsed even at the risk of giving
ofence.
The prohibition is not, howeer, to be given an application beyond
its obvios meaning, or interpreted as placing any restriction on fiend
ly social intercourse between Indians and British ofcials.
14. Correspondence in English with Indian gentlemen should be
conducted in exactly the same frm as with Europeans of a similar or
corresponding class.
Professional Indian gentlemen prefr 'to be addressed by name as
Dear Mr.-/
To others it is usual to address them as Dear
Lala Sahib, Dear Khan Sahib, etc.
Letters of congratulation upon the receipt of an honour, the birth
of a son, or any auspicious event, and letters of condolence upon a
bereavement, should be exactly the same as if addressed to a European,
the degree of cordiality varying with the degree of intimacy.
15. An ofcer should be feely accessible to all his subordinates,
and should make a point of knowing personally as many as possible
of them. He should listen sympathetically anq patiently to all re
presentations and grievances. He should make no fvourites and should
let no one presume. A favourite or reputed fvourite is sure to make
capital out of his repute.
16. To all requests he should give a defnite answer, if possible;
If not possible, he should say that he will consider the request and
should do so. He must never shirk saying "No" and, if a negativ is
necessary, the more decided it is the better, provided the course it is
conveyed in courteous terms.
_ He should be shy of making promises but, if he makes -oe, he
should always perfrm it.
68
1 7. He must make it clear that patronage is in bis own hands
and that while on occasion he may seek advice or infrmation, the
fnal decision rests with him. With a _ new ofcer this is about the
frst point upon which his subordinates will seek to satisfy themselves.
It is even less harmful fr an ofcer to make a wrong selection of his
own motion than a good one under the infuence of a subordinate. The
frst mistake can b rectifed; the harm done by the second will endure
fr years. Absolute fairness, completely free from weakness, is the
ideal. At the sme time, obstinacy is not strength. It is often the
accompaniment of weakness. It is only a strong man who can afort
_ to acknowledge a mistake and to amend his own orders. The practice
of bringing menials and subordinates fom one pst to another is prohi
bited, and ofcers should be careful to observe the Rule with the
greatest strictness or otherwise their personal reputations fr honesty
and strength of character will inevitably sufer.
1 8. Junior ofcers should avoid giving written certifcates to any
subordinate: these are keenly sought after and are saved up fr years.
There are many ofcers who, after attaining years of greater discre
tion, have been embarrassed by the production of these relics of a
generous but indiscreet youth. Any remarks which an ofcer may
really wish to place on record can be entered in the character-book or
personal fle of the ofcial concerned.
19. An European ofcer should know something about the treat
ment he has a right to expect from Indians.
Indians as a race are most courteous. This applies to all, fom
the highest to the lowest. o.ut in the j ungles a yokel, who is showing
the way, will stop to break of a thorny branch which might cause
inconvenience and of his own accord will often ofer his 'chaddar' or
blanket to place on the ground should an ofcer desire to sit down.
Almost every case of apparent rudeness is uni ntentional and due
either to ignorance or difdence.
Instances of dliberate discourtesy are rare, and when they do
occur they are generally the act of some il l-conditioned upstart-but
this is the same all the world over.
An ofcer can and should insist on respectful treatment fom edu
cated Indians, especially ofcials.
When such persons appear befre him they should b suitably
dressed.
'
Cuntry shoes must always be left outside, but those who wear
69
shoes of European pattern are allowed to retain them. In frmer days
Indians used always to alight when passing a person of superior
position and, if carrying an umbrella open, would lower and fld it.
Matters have now changed, and though these marks of special courtesy
ar shown especially in country districts, no ofcer shoud attempt to
insist on this, and in ordinary circumstances no ofence or rudeness is
intended if al Indian does not fllow the frmer custom.
An ofcer only makes himself ridiculous who is constantly on the
look-out fr ofence and is too ready t take it. At the same time it is
quite easy to tell when a person is intentionally ofensive or unduly
f
a
miliar. If such a thing occurs at an interview, it may be terminated
aburptly with frmness and dignity and a subsequent interview may be
refsed.
Sometimes, however, the best punishment fr a rudeness is to
ignore it.
20. There is a further point which it is desired to bring to notice
with reference to the modern Indian pint of view regarding the
return of calls made by Indi
a
n ofcers to the Public Services at an
European ofcer's bungalow. An Indian Executive Engineer has
written as fllows:
"I can say so much that duiing my service of 18 years, only two
civil ofcers gave me the honour of return calls. I have invariably
made calls on civil ofcers when coming into a new station. In order
to create better social understanding between European and indian ,
ofcers, I think both should be frank and communicative. This will
not only bring about better understanding between the two classes of
ofcers, but will prove a great beneft to both. To start with a clean
slate, think fesh instruct1ons about social approchment between
European and Indian ofcers be issued, The European will obtain
real insight into matters Indian by free exchange of views with the
Indian ofcers better than he can ever get fom lengthy interviews
with zamindar and rais class. The latter generally go

to see ofcers as
a
matter of routine and probably with an idea of reward lurking in
their
minds. The position of an Indian ofcers is quite diferent from
that of a rais. He considers himself a part of the machinery called
Governme
nt and therefre has some sort of a halo of self-respect
created
around him. This phenomenon is less eident in subordinate
services of ofcers promoted fom such services, while amongst tbe
more
eduated peisona and those directly recruited this appeai;s toa
I
70
marked degree. The present day idea of extinction of the colour bar
and equality of treatment has made an Indian ofcer
.
more sensitive
to the question of his self-respect. I am writing this fom my experien .
ce of the Indian ofcers with whom I come in daily contact.
I can
only submit the fllowing few practical suggestions which, if acted
upon, would _go a good deal in the direction of removing cause of
several misunderstandings:
' ( I ) When an Indian ofcer calls on a European ofcer at his
residence, the orderly should at once report the arrival, i. e. ,
convey the card to the ofcer concerned, who should give
necessary instructions abut the visitor. It has happened
several times that the orderlies do not carry the card insice
saying they do so when Sahib comes to
o
fce room or suh
and such room. This is very annoying. The orderly is most
probably obeying his master's orders . . . but to leave us at
the mercy of orderlies is certainly impolite and discourteous.
(2) When an ofcer is busy and cannot immediately see an
Indian ofcer he should be shown into the drawing room
or ofce room and not made to wait in the verandah
o
f
visitors.
(3) As regard ofcial visits fr settlement of ofcial matters, I
would rather prefr them to be made by appointment, and
when the visit is settled it should b given preference over
other matters.
(4) The European ofcers should encourage Indian ofcers to
repeat social calls, and such calls should b reciprocated
so far as possible.
(5) The Indian ofcers have also to shake of lethargy and
shyness and should meet the Europeans more fequently, not
fr mere 'salaaming' but to improve social relations. Mutual
better understanding will result as soon as ofcers meet each
other on terms of equality in matters social .
Special attention should b paid to all fve suggestions in this
letter. As regards suggestion (4) where local Indian Heads of Depart
ments, such as Executive Engineers, Superintendents of Police, Civil ..
Surgeons and 10 frth make a call on an European ofcer, he should
retur the call at the indian ofcer
;
a house, ai he would do had the
call been paid by 'an Europan ofcer. It will generally b fund that
Indians have a
.
room or ''bithak" at their houles where they can

71
receive visitors without any infingement of the ' Pardah. ' The J(!_turn
o
f :mch calls may in cases where the Indian ofcial is not likely to
be expecting visitors, be fcilitated by a tictfl enquiry made befre
hand as

to the time at which it will be convenient fr the call to be
returned.
APPENDIX
Instructions regarding intercourse between Euopean ofcials and
Natives issued by Sir John Malcolm, Agent of the Governor-General,
in his Min\te, dated 28th June, 1 821 , to his A'sistants in Central
India.
Our success and moderation, contrasted with the misrule and
viclence to which a great part of the population of india have fr
more than a century been exposed, have at this moment raised the
reputation of the British nation so high, that men have frgotten, in the
contemplation of the security and prosperity they enjoy under strangers,
their feelings of patriotism, but these are feeling which that very know
ledge that it is our duty to impart must gradually revive and bring
into action. The people of India must, by a recurring sense of benefts,
'
have amends made them fr the degradation of continuing subject to
freign masters; and this can alone be done by t he combined efrts
of every individual employed in a station of trust and responsibility to
render popular a government . which, though not national, has its
foundations laid deep on the principles of toleration, justice, and
wisdom. Every agent of Government should study and understand the
above facts. He shoud not content himself with having acquired a
knowledge of the languages and of the customs of those with whom he
has intercourse. All his particular acts (even to the manner of them)
should be regulated by recurrence to the fundation of our rule and a
carefl observation of those principle8 by which i t has been
established and can alone be maintained. Of the i mportance of this I
cannot better state my opinion than by expressing my fll conviction
that, independent of the prescribed duties which every qualifed
ofcer perfrms, there is no person in a situation of any conseq uence
who does not, both in the substance and manner of his conduct, do
72
something every day ot his Iite which, as it operates upon the generaI
nterests ot the empire through the fe|ings ot the crcIe he controIs or
ru|es. has an unseen eect in strengthening or weaken|ng the Govern-
ment by which he is empIoyed. My be|iet that what have assumed is
correct, wi|| be my excuse mr going into some minuteness in my gene-
ra| instructions to those under my orders.
The hrst, and one ot the most important, point is the manner ot
European superiors towards the Natives. t wou|d be quite out ot
p|ace, in this p+per, to speak ot the necessity ot kindness and ot an
absence oI a|l v|oIence, this must be a matter ot course with those
to whom it is addressed . there is much more required !rom them
than that conciIiation wh|ch is a duty, but which, when it appears as
such, Ioses haIt its ehect. t must, to make an impression, be a habit
ot the mind, grounded on a tvourab|e consideration ot the qua|ities
and merits ot those to whom it extends, and this impression, am
satished, every person wi|| have, who, atter attaining a thorough know-
|edge ot the reaI character ot those witb whom he has intercourse, sha|I
I
'
udge !hem, without preudice or se|-conceit, by a standard which is
suited to their beIieh, their usages, their habits, tqeir occupations,
their rank in |ite, the ideas they have imbibed !rom int+ncy, and the
stage ot civi|ization to which the community, +s a whoIe, are advanced.
he does so with that know|edge and that temper ot mind which are
essentiaI to render him competent to mrm an opinion, he wi l | hnd
enough ot virtue, enough o doci|ity and disposition to improvement,
enough ot regard and observance ot a|I the best and most sacred ties
ot society, to create an esteem Ior individua|s, and an interest in fhe
community-which, when grounded on a sincere conviction ot its
being deserved. wiI| render his kindness natura| and conciIiating. A|I
human beings, down to the Iowest |inks oI the chain, inc|uslve of chi|d-
ren, are quick in tracing the source ot the manners ot others, and,
above aI|, ot their superiors-when that is regu|ated by the head, not
the heart, when it proceeds !rom reason, not from !eIing, it cannot
p|ease, tr it has in it, it at a|l artihc|a| , a show ot design which repe|s,
as it generates suspicion. Vhen this manner takes another shape,
when kindness and consideration appear as acts ot condescension, it
must be tcIt ohensive. Men may dread, but can never |ove or regard,
those who are continuaIIy humi|iating them by the parade oF superiority.
have recommended those tundations ot manner, towards the
Matives ot ndta, upon which tcel my own to be grounded. can
73
!

oIIect (and do t wtb shame) the perod when thought f was

very superor to those wth whom my duty made me associate, but
as my
knowIedge ot them, and ot myseIt, mproved, the dstance
beteen us gradaIIy Iessened. have seen and heard much ot our
boasted advantages over tbem, but cannot thnk that, t, alI tbe ranks
ot the diherent commuotes o Lurope and lnda are comparatively
vewed, there s ust ground fr any very arrogant eIng on the
part ot the nhabtants ot the frmer, nor can oin in that common-
pIace
opnon whch condemns n a sweeping way the Natves ot this
country as men, takng the best ot them, not only unworthy of trust,
and devod ot prncipIe, but ot too lmted

ntelIgeoce and reach o

thought, to aIIow ot Luropeans, wth Iarge and Iiberal minds and
education, having ratonaI or satstctory ntercourse with them. 5uch
mpressons, admtted, must prove vtaI as to the manner o treatng
the Natves ot ndia. shalI therefre say a tew words upon the
ustce ot the grounds upon whch they rest. The man who consders
them n tbs Ight can grant Ittle or no credt to the high characters
and the euIoges whch are gven to ndvduIs and great bodies ot
men n ther owo hstores, traditons and records. He must then
|udge them by hs own observatons and knowledge, and hs opnion
wiII, n al! probab!ity, b frmed not comparatveIy wth Luropeaos
ot ther own class ot Ite, but wth the public servants ot Government. a
cIass ot meo who are caretuIIy educated, whose ambton s stmuIated
by the hi ghest prospects ot prerment, and whose ntegrity s pre-
served by adequate saIares through every grade ot ther servce.
efre ths Iast prncipIe was ntroduced (whch s IttIe more than
tbrty years) the Luropean servants ot Government were in the habt
ot making money n modes not unsmIar to those we now reproach
the Natves o our empIoy wth dong, and t may here be asked, if
tbe same endeavou,rs have been made to aIter the habi ts ot the Iatter
as the mrmer. beleve tbe contrary to be the tact, and that the
system since ntroduced has not operated more to eIevate the !uro
pean, thn to snk and depress the Natve character, but th s is not
the pIace mr the dscusson ot ths large queston.
Many of the moraI de!cts ot the Natves ot nda are to b
e
re(rred to that msruIe and oppresson trom whch they are now n
great degree emancpated. do not know the example ot any great
popuIaton, n smIar crcumstances, preservng, through such a per od
Icbanes and tyranncaI ruIes, so much ot virtue and so many good
74
qualities as are to be fund in a great proportion of the inhabitants
of this country. This is to be accounted fr; in some degree, by the
institutions of the Hindu, particularly that of caste, which appears
to have raised them to their present rank in human society, at a very
remote period, but it has certainly tended to keep them stationary at
that point of civil order to which they were thus early advanced;
With a just admiration of the efects of many of their institutions,
particularly those parts of them which cause in vast classes not merely
an absence of .the common vices of theft, drunkenness, and violence,
but preserve all the virtuous ties of family and kindred relations, we
must all deplore some of their usages and weak superstitions,
but what individuals or what races of men are without great and
manifld errors and imperfections, and what mind that is not fortifed
with ignorance or pride can, and on such grounds, come to a severe
j udgment against a people like that of India '
I must here remark that I have invariably fund, unless in a fw
cases where knowledge had not overcome self-sufciency and arro
gance; that in proportion as European ofcers, Civil and Military,
advanced in thei r acquaintance with the language and customs of the
Natives of India, they became more sincerely kind to them, and, in
the contrary, ignorance always accompanied that selfsh pride and
want of consideration which held them light, or treated them with
harshness.
am quite satisfed' in my own mipd that if there is one ca1se
more than another, tht wi ll impede r progress to the general im
provement of India, it is a belief frmed by its population, from the
manner of their English superiors, that they are viewed by them as
an infrior and degraded race; but, on the contrary, if the persons
employed in every branch of the administration of this great country,
under the check of which they act, comport themselves towa"rds the
people whom it is their duty to make happy with that sincere humility
of heart which always belongs to real knowledge, and which attaches
while it elevates, they will contribute, by such a manner, more than
any measures of boasted wisdom ever can, to the strength and duration
of their Government.
It is of importance, before I conculde this part of the subject,
to state my opinion, that in our manner to the Natives,

though it is
I
our duty tG understand and to pay every proper deference to theit.
.
I . I
customs and usages, and to confrm to thes as fr as we can with
7
propriety, particularly on points where the religious prejudices or the
rank of those with. whom we have intercourse require it, yet we should
always preserve the European, fr to adopt their manners is a
departure fom he very prindple on which every impression of our
superiority that rests upon good fundation is grounded. We should
take a lesson o.n such points from what we see occur to Native Princes
and others, Who ape English habits and mods : they lose ground
with one class-to that which they belong-without gaining with the
other-that to which they wish to approximate. The fact is, they
ultimately lose with the latter, for even their attachment is useless,
when they ciase to have inf1ence with their own tribe. The Euro
pean ofcer who asumes Native m.anners and usages may please a few
individuals, who are fattered or profted by his depa{ture fom the
habits of pis country, but even with these, fmiliarity will not be
fund to increase respect, and the adoption of such a course will be
sure to sink him in the estimation of the mass of the communiy,
both European and Native, among whom he resides.
.
The intercourse to be maintained with the Natives within your
circle is of two kinds-private and ofcial. '

The frst. should extend as muh as

polsible to all ranks and
classes, and be as fmiliar, as kind, and as fequent, as the diference of
habits and pursuits will admit.
There is a veil between the Natives of India and their European
-superiors, which leaves the latter ignorant, in an extraordinary
degree, of the real haracter of the former,, He can only judge his
own domestic by that he sees of their conduct in his presence, of the
manner in which they perfrm their other duties _in Jif e, he is, if not
ignorant, but imp.erfectly infrmed: so many minute obstacles, grounded
pn caste, usages and religion, oppose an approach to closer acquaint
ance, that it can never be generally attained : butjn private inter
course m!ch may b learnt that will fcilitate the perfrmance of
public duty, and give that knowledge of the usages and feelings of
the various classes of the Natives, which will enable its possessors
to touch every chord with efect. In joining with them in feld
sports, in an unceremonious interchange of visits with the most
respctable, and in seeking the society of the most learned, the
European public ofcer will not only gain infrmation, but impart
complete confdene. and lay the grounds of that personal . attachment
which will ever be fund of the greatest aid to his public laburs.
76
He WnI aIso obtain by such habits of prvate

ntercourse thc meaue

ot e|evating those he esteems by marks ot notice and regard; but T_
pursuing this course he must beware, Iest he Iose his object by taI|ing
nto the weakness or indu|gences ot the persons with whom he thus
associates t is in the prmrmance of this part ot his duty, when a|I the
pride ofstation is |aid aside, that he must most careu||y guard that
rea| superiority, which he derives trom better know|edge aod truer
princip|es ot moraIity and reI igion, tor it is trom the mpression made
by the possession, without t he ostentaton, ot those higher qua|ities
that he must expect the benehts have described as |ikeIy to resu|t
om a tamiIar and private nterccurse with the Natives under his
direction and controI.
In a| | omcial intercourse with the Natives, one of the hrst
points ot importance is that these, whatever oe ther rank, cIass, or
business sou|d, have compIete and easy access to personaI communi-
cation wih ther Luropean superor The necessit
\
ot this arises out
oI the character ol our ru|e and ot those over whom it is estabIished. t
is sumcienf|y ga|Iing tr the peop|e ot ndia to have mreign masters, the
impression this he|ing must contnua||y excite can onIy be mitigated or
removed by a recurring sense ot the advantages they derived om
the wisdm and ustice o ther European superiors, and this can on|y
be eected by direct communication with them. Though Native
servants must be emp|oyed and trusted, and though it is quite essen-
tia| to behave to a|| with kindness, and to raise the higher c|asses
ot them by a treatment which combnes consideration and respect, yet
they can never without hazard be used as exc|usive mediums ot com-
munication. they are a||owed requent approach to an European omcer
in the excrcise ol authority, gve them oppoxtunities ot abusing his
conbdence it they desire it, and men under our power wuI have, in
aggravation ot the tee|ing arising out ol subection to trign` ru|e,
that ofbeing to a certain extent at the mercy ot persons ot their
own nation wbom tbey neither trust nor respect. There is no remedy
tr such an evi| except beng compIete|y easy ot access, but ths,
however, much the superior may desire to, is not to be estab|ished
without dimcu|ty and perseverance. t aects the interest and con-
sequence ot every man in his employ trom the highest to the |owest,
but in proportion to their enorts to counteract it, so must his be to
carry this important point on which, more than a|I others, the integri-
ty ot his persona| adminisIration and the good o the couotry depend.
.
. `. .
77
NoNative servnt, hg orAow. must bc allowcd the privIege o(eitner
ntroducng or atoppng an appIicant, or a compIaintant. AII such must
come with cone
0
q

thc Europea superior, or to such Assistant
as he may spccb

hy
g
r

to teccvc or hear thm8 It requires much

temper and patience, Corttt acthfiy, and no sIight sacibce of perso-
naI comfort, to maintaiu an intecurse with the Natves upon this
Rotng, but unless it be done (I speak here rom the mlIcstexperience),
the government ot controInow cstab!shed in CentraI ndia cannot
be carried on mr any period,

and the changes which must ensue bom
reIaxation in this, particuIar wilbe brought bout in the manner most
unmvourabl to our character and reputation.
The next important point to be observed in omciaI ntercourse
with the Natives is 'PubIicity' . There can be oo occasion 1o expatiate
here upon the uti!ity ot this principIe. t s thc happy prvil ege ot
a 5tate, so constituted as that o the EngIish in ndia, to gan strength
in the ratio that it mcasurcs, and grounds on which they are adopted,
are made publc; and this is above 1 alI essentiaI in a quarter of nda
where we are as yct but mpcrhctIy understood. Thre are and can
be no secrets in our ordinary proceedings, and every agent wiII hnd
his means of doing god advacced, hs toiI Iessened, and the power
of the dcsgnng and corrupt to misrepresent his actions or
ntentions decreased, n the propoltion that he transacts aairs in
pubIic. He shouId avod, as much as he possibIy can, private conter-
ences wth those n hs empIoy or others. These wiII bc cagcrly sought
Rr, thcy give the individuaI thus admitted the appearances ot lavour
and nhucncc, and thcrc s no science in which the mor i artfI
among the Natives are greater adepts, than that of turning to account
the rcalor supposed conhdence of their surperors. know no mode
ot preventng the mischief wbich this mpression, it t becomes
generaI, gives men the power of chectng, but habtual pubIicty n
transactng business. t Tbis wII, n doubt, b murd to havc ncon
veniences, which wiII be purposeIy ncreased by those who have tber
game to pIay, and indeed others, mr Natives of rank and station, even
when they have no corrupt views, are from habit and scI t-mportancc
attachcd to a secret and mysterios way ot conducting both great and
smalI ahars.
he mrms of the omcaI intercourse between European agents
and Netivet ot rank were, bemre we obtancd paramount powcr, a
attert more moment, and one on which we couId less reIax thzn at
78
prsont, because Ur motives were at that period more liabIe tooe
mistaken. Though it s essential in our intercourse with natives who
are attached to and give vaIue to ceremonis, to understand such per-
6ctly, and to claim from all what is due to our station, that we may
not sink the rank ot the European superior n the estmation ot those
subject to his control, t is now the duty of the mrmer to be much
more attentive to the respect which he gves than what he receves,
particuIarly n hic intercourse with men ol high ra:k. Jhe Princes
and Chiets o nda may, n dierent degrees, be sad to be all de-
pendent on tbe rtish Government many have Iittle more than the
name ot that power they bemre enoyed, but they seem, as they lose
the substance, to cling to thz mrms ot station. The pride oF reason
may smile at such a felng, but it ex|sts, and it would be alike
opposite to the prncip|es ot humanity and polty to deny ts
gratibcation.
n ,omciaI ntercourse wth the lower classes, the latter should be
treated accordng to the usages ot the country, as practiced by 1he
most ndulgent of their native superiors. h wil| be tound that they
requre personal notce and consderaton n proportion as their state
removed trom that knowIedge which belongs to c|vilization, and it is
on ths ground that the heel must have more attention pad to him
than the ryot. t s more dmcult to give conbdence to hs |nd, and
to make him bel|eve n the sincerity and permanence ot the kindness
with whch he s treated, because he s in a conditon more remote
trom the party wth whom he communicates, and, bemte he can be
reclaimed he must be approx|mated.
There are few points on which more care s required than the
selection and empIoyment oI Natve servants mr the public service.
Jhere is no object|on to n omcer contnuing to keep in service a
person he has bought Irom a distant province, who has been long wth
him, and on whose hdelity and competence he can repose, but, gene-
rally speaking, i t s much better to entertain respectable Natives or
old resldents ot the country n which he is employed. Ther advantages
over mreigners are very numerous. Jhe prncpal are, ther acquain-
tance wth the petty nterests ot the country, and ther knowledge
ot a|l the prejudces and the eaIouses ot the dierent classes ot the
community to which they belong. n all these ponts the superior
should be mnutely nfrmed, `f, t he employs men not personally
accquanted wth the dispostion and condition of those under
hucharge or control, hs nmrmation on such subjects must me
79
througb muItplcd mcdums, whch s n tsc!l a scrous

cv!.
but,ndpcndcntoltbs, thc cmpIoymcnt othc Natvcs ot adstant
provncc s aIways unpopuIar, and thcy arc gcncra!!y vcwcd wth
ds!kc and suspcon by thc hghcr and m orc rcspcctab!c cIasscs ol
thc country nto whc thcy arc ntrouccd. hs cxctcs a hcIng
n thc mnds otthc mrmcrwhch cthcr makes thcm kccp alooltrom
a!Iconnccton wth thc nhabtants, or scck thc soccty and usc as
nstrumcnt1 mcn who arc dscontcntcd or ol ndhcrcnt charactcr. 't
sdmcuIt t say whch ot thcsc causcs has tbc worst edcct. hc onc
gvcs an mprcsson olprdc, tnot contcmpt, and the othcr odcsgn
and an ncInaton to ntrguc, and both opcratc unhvourab!y to th
!ocaI rcputaton olthc mastcr.
I havc. obscrvcd that thc Natvcs who arc !cast nmrmcd otthc
prncp!cs olour ruIc arc rcady to grant a rcspcct andconhdcncc to
an Lng!sh omccr, whch thcy rclusc to pcrsons ol thcr own trbc,
butthcyarc apt to mrm an unhvourabIc opnon ol hs dsposton
and charactcr trom any bad conduct ot hs dsposton and charactcr
Hom any bad conduct ol hs Nattvc scrvants l mrcgnc, onthc
contrary, whcn thc Ia_tlcr arz mcbrs ot thcr own commuty thc
cxposurc otthcr crrors or crmcs, wh!ct brngs shamc and convcys
a sa!utary Icsson to thc c!ass to whch thcy bc!ong
, s attcndcd wth
thc chcctotra sng, nstcad ol dcprcssng, thc Lurpcan supcrorn
thercstmaton.
\
hccmploymcntolthc !owcr c!asscs ol pubIc scrvants rcgurcs
much attcnton. hcsc shouId bc sc!cctcd on thc samc prncp!cs
that havc aIrcady bccn statcd, wth ,rc)rcncc tothc dutcs thcy arc to
permrmwhch ought a!ways to bc cxactly dchncd, and1hcrconduct
vgIantIy watchcd. t wI! ndccd b mund usclu! to rcndcr as
pub!c as possb!c thc naturc olthcrcmp!oymcnt,and to caII upon aII
!oca! authortcs to ad us n thc prcvcnton ol thosc unauthorzcd and
odous actsotnjustcc and opprcsson towards thc nhabtants othc
country whch ths c!ass wlI, n sptc ota!I our chorts hnd opportu-
ntcs ol commttng. spcak lrom thc lu!!cst cxpcrcncc whcn .
statc, that, though thc Natvcs ol nda may do mII justcc to thc
purty otour ntcntos and thc cxcc!!cnccot thc prncp!cs ol our
ruIc, thcy arc undsguscd n thcr scntmcnts rcgardng thosc parts
olour admnstraton n whch thc vcry drcgsotthcr own communty
are cmp!oycd. hcy cannot, ndccd, but scc wth hr!ngs odct. sta-
toa and rcscntmcnt a ma. rascd hom thc !owcst ot thmr own
80
HO_W. TO RULE INDIA : TWO DOCUMENTS ON THE t. c. s.
ranks, and decorated with an omciaI badge, become the very next
moment nsoIent to persons to whom he and hs tmiIy have been
lor ages submssve, or turn the extortoner ot money trom those
trbes among which he has bemre Iived as an humbIe ndviduaI.
he power of this cIass ot servants to nure our reputation is
everywhere great, but more so n the proporton that the N+tives ot
the country are gnorant ot our reaI charactr, and where ther dread
ot our power s excessive. t the mischet they have done, or rather
tred to do, n MaIwa can speak Irom a pertect know|edge. have
endeavoured wth unremitting soIictude to counteract ther impositions
and oppressons, by pubIshng procIamatons and gving high rewards
to aII who nmrmed against or sezed any ot my servants when
attempting the s!ghtest nterlcrence n the

ountry, or ahecting to
have any business beyond that ot carryng a Ietter, or some specib ed
or I|mited duty, but have, nevertheIess, been compeIled withn three
years to pubIicIy punish and dscharge one Moonshee, two Moot-
suddies or Vrters, three ]emadars, and upwards ot btty Hircarrahs,
and a|most an equaI number ot the same cIass, beIongng to other pubIic
omcers, have been taken and punshed, or banshed trom the country.
These exampIes wII show the danger ot being tempted, by any
convenence ot servce, or a desire to acceIerate the accompanment ot
our objects to empIoy such nstruments w|h any Iatitude of action.
I n d e x
Afghanistan 34, 3S, 37, 43, 48, 49, SO,
SS, S6.
Afghan (S) S7, 34, 38, 47, SO, S6,
Court 44, Mountains S3, War 46,
49, SO, S8
Africa 42
Ahmad Abdalli 47
Ajreer 4S
Akbar (Mughal Emperor) 47
Ararkot 4S
Amritsar 37, S2
Andrew D
'
Cruz 13
Anglo-Sikh War (Second) 29
Arabia 42, S3
Arabs S3
Asia Central 37
Asia Minor 47
Attock 43 See also Indus
Auckland, Earl of 2S
Bahar (Mughal Emperor) 47, S6
Bahawalpur 29, 44
Balochis See Belochies
Bart, Major General Sir Henry
Bethune 49
Bay of Bengal 42
Belaspore 17, 18, 29
Beloch 43
Belochies 34
Bhadarwar 3S, SS
Bheel 78
Bhickaneer 42, 44
Bi ah (Doabe of Bist) 29 See, also
Jahlendar
lirch, Captain 1 $
Bokhara SO
Braheo 43
Brahol See Braheo
Bramapooter 41
British 60, dominions ; 40, govern
ment 14-19 21 , 26, 29, 34, 37, 42, 4S,
46, 49, 78 ; Indian army SO ; Isles 61
nation 71 ; ofeials 67 ; protection
IS, 20, 26 ; rule 62
Burmese S3
Burnes, Sir Alexander 49, SO, 52
Cabul 4S, S6
Calcutta 13, S4
Cashmere 29, 3S, SS
Caspian Sea 49
Chengiz Khan 46
Chiefs and Families of note in the
Punjab 62
Chinese S3
Cis-Sutlej lS, 17
Constantinople 47
Derajat 29, 34
Dhuleep Singe (Maharaja Daleep
Sing) 32
Dost Mohammad Khan Sl
Edwards, Major 34, SS
Ellonborough, Lord 49
Elphinstone 44
En$lang 481 661 Sea a!o, British 62
82
English 49 army 45, regiments 53;
statesmen
Europe 66, 73
European (S) 67, 75, 78, 79, agents
77; ofcers 65, 68, 69, 74, 76
Eusufies 3
4
Ferishta 45
Ferozepore 29, 36, 37, 42, 4', 51, 55
Ferozeshah 46
French 54 army 45
Futehpore 36
Ghilzies 51
Ghiznee 45
Golab Singh, Raja 32, 35, 55
Goorkhas 1 8, 22
Great Britain 49
Grifn, Lepe! 62
Guzerat (Gujrat) 42
Hardinge, Lord 30, 34, 54
Herat 48, 57
Himalaya 29, 41 , 42, 45
Hindoo 31, 57 ; institutions of the
72;'.Law 1 5, population 28 ; race 42
Hindoor (Or Nalagarh) 1 8
Hindustan 52 See also India
Hoomayoon (Mughal Emperor) 45,
47
Hugel 52
India 29-32, 34-37, 40, 42, 43, 47-49,
51, 53-55, 57, 61, 63, 73, 74, army of
53 central 77, courts in 41 ; defence
of 45, 46 ; natives of 74, 75, 79 ;
people of 42. 48, 71 ; princes and
chiefs of 78; region of 42
Indian (S) 60, 62-64, 68, 69 army 40,
53 chiefs 62 ; civil service 60 ; com
missioned ofcers 63 [; dominions
49 ; Empire 41 ; frontier 41, 48;
government 31 ; ofcers 69 ; poi nt of
view 69
Indree (State) 23, 24
Indus (River) 29, 30, 32, 33, 38, 4 1 ,
42, 43, 35, 49, 50, 5 1 , 55, 57
Iskardo 29, 35, 55
Jacquemout 52
Jahlendar Doabe 36, 37, 54. 55, See
also Biah
Jalalpur 36
Jehelem (Jehlem) 33
Jesselmere (Jysulmeer) 19, 42
Jheend 1 4, 1 5, 17, 19, 2
1
Jowdpoor 42
Jammoo 35, 54
Jyepoor 42
Kalabagh 34
Karnaul 19, 25, 4 6
Khuttucks 34
Khyber Pass 48
Kishtwar 35
Kythul 1 5, 17, 19, 20, 21
Ladakh 29, 39, 55
Ladwah (State) 25, 28
Lahore 13, 14, 1 7, 18, 29, 33, 37, 48;
52, 56 ; court of 35, 55
La>e, Lord 23
Lansdowne, Marquis of 30, 36, 57
Lawrence, Major 34, 52
Little Tibet 29
London 52
Loodianah (Ludhiana) 13, 14, 17, 19,
29, 37
'
42, 45, 46, 47
Madras Native lorse Artillerymen
4?
Mahmood of Ghiznee (Ghazni ) 45,
56
Marhatts 36
Malcolm, Sir John 48, 60, 66, 71
Malwa 80
Maribekes 56
Meerut 46
Mohammadan (S) 20, 31, 33, 54, 55 ;
57 armies 56 ; conquests of the 55_;
govarnment 1 9 ; tribes 34
Moodkee 46
Mooltan 34, 36, 37, 45, 48, 55
Moscow45
Moslem Faith 28 See also Moham
madan (s)
Mozuferabad 35
Murray, Capsain 16
Mustufabad (State) 25, 26
Nabha 15, 19, 21
Nadir Seah 47, 48
Napier, . Si r Charles 40, 41 , 43, 45,
51. 54, 56, 57
Nehrwala Pattan 45
Nepalese 36, 53, 54
Ochterlony, Sir David 26
Ottoman Dominion 47
Paneeput 19
Pateeala 14, 15, 19, 21
Persia 47-50, 57 ; court of 48
Persian Army 48, 57
Peshawar 29, 34, 43, 51
Phoolkeean 1 5, 1 9, 20, 21 , 22, 27
Poonch 35
Porus 43
Punjab 13, 19, 29, 30, 34, 36, 38, 40,
42, 43, 46, 49, 50, 54, 57, 59, ' 61;
administr1tiou
in the 48i annexa-
83
tion of the 3 9, 40, 51, hill terri
tories invasion on .,47, 48 ; Poli
ticali zation of the 60 ; popula
tion of the 56, 57 ; ruler of the 14,
15, 1 6, 20, 21 , 25, 49
Punjabis 60
Rajour 35
Rajpoot 36, 52, chiefs 47 ; f1mily 26
Rajputana (Western) 45
Ramgurh (State) 26
Rana Wattoo 29
Ranjeet Singh, Maharaja 13, 15, 17,
1 9, 30-32, 35, 37, 48, 49, 51 , 52, 54
Rome 47
Ropar 29
Russia 47, 49, 57
Russian (s) 49 ; councils 49
Seikh (Sikh) 13, 16, 20, 23, 24, 27,
29, 35, 37, 38, 47 , 49-54 ; army 32,
46, 51 , 53 ; chieftainships 20 ;
conquests of the 54, 56 ; customs
14 ; dominion 55 ; garrison 34;
government 34; population 33, 56 ;
power 48, 54, 56; states 14, 15, 28 ;
strategy 36
Shahamat Ali, Mir 52
Shah Shuja 48, 51
Sher Singh 34
Shikarpore 29
Shujabad 36
Simla 14
Sindh 34, 36, 45, 50, 52, 56, 57
amirs of 49, 50 ; revenue of 43
Sirhind 18, 20, 41 , 42
Slrmoor (Or Nahun) 18
Sobran (Sabraon) 29, 46
Somnath (Temple) 45
S\rress1tte (Saraswati) 28
84
Sutlej (Sutledge) 13, 15, 17, 18, 26,
30, 33, 3
5,
37, 38, 41-47
Tamerlane (Temur) 47
Tehran 49
Thanessur 17, 27
Timoor 45
Tippoo 48
Trans-Sutlej 1 3
Umbala (Ambala) 16, 1 8, 23, 24, 25,
45, 46 ; political agency 16
Urdu 63
Wade, Si r Claude Martin 40, 52,
54, 55, 57
Wellesly, Marquies 48
Zeman Shah 48
Zyne Khan 18