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Accounting OrganizationsandSociety, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 17-35, 1992.

Printed in Great Britain

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DYSFUNCTIONAL BEHAVIOR AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF MARKETING MANAGERS*

BERNARD J. JAWORSKI

Graduate School o f Business, University o f Arizona


and S. MARK YOUNG

Graduate School of Business, University of Colorado, Boulder

Abstract

This paper reports the results of a study that developed and tested a causal model of dysfunctional behavior among a large sample of marketing managers. The results indicate that three contextual variables (goal congruence, perceived peer dysfunctional behavior and information asymmetry between superiors and subordinates) predict, in varying degrees, the extent of person-role conflict and job tension experienced by the manager. In turn, role conflict increases job tension and job tension increases the extent of dysfunctional behavior. However, no effects for the person-role conflict/dysfunctional behavior link were found. The behavioral l i t e r a t u r e o n m a n a g e m e n t a c c o u n t i n g a n d c o n t r o l is r e p l e t e w i t h r e p o r t s of s u b o r d i n a t e s w h o game p e r f o r m a n c e indicators, strategically m a n i p u l a t e i n f o r m a t i o n flows a n d falsify i n f o r m a t i o n (see Lawler & Rhode, 1976; B i m b e r g et al., 1983, for reviews). While behavioral theories such as dissonance, goal setting a n d p o w e r t h e o r i e s (see H o p w o o d , 1976; Lawler & Rhode, 1976, for r e v i e w s ) have b e e n used to e x p l a i n d y s f u n c t i o n a l behavior, it has b e e n difficult to d r a w clear c o n c l u s i o n s r e g a r d i n g w h y such b e h a v i o r o c c u r s as m a n y of the findings are taken from a n e c d o t e s (Dalton, 1959; Kerr, 1 9 7 5 ) or small sample studies (e.g. Roy, 1955; Whyte, 1955; Lupton, 1963; Burawoy, 1979, o n the shop-floor; H o p w o o d , 1972; Otley, 1978; Lukka, 1988, at the managerial level). O u r p u r p o s e in this p a p e r is to e x t e n d p r e v i o u s behavioral r e s e a r c h b y d e v e l o p i n g and testing a m o d e l that posits that three c o n t e x t u a l variables (goal c o n g r u e n c e , p e r c e i v e d p e e r d y s f u n c t i o n a l b e h a v i o r and i n f o r m a t i o n asymm e t r y b e t w e e n superiors and s u b o r d i n a t e s ) affect the e x t e n t of role conflict and job t e n s i o n e x p e r i e n c e d b y the s u b o r d i n a t e . As role conflict and j o b t e n s i o n increase, the m o d e l p r e d i c t s that d y s f u n c t i o n a l b e h a v i o r ( t h e violation of c o n t r o l system rules and p r o c e d u r e s ) o n the part of the s u b o r d i n a t e will increase. T h e study has several advantages c o m p a r e d w i t h p r e v i o u s research. Firstly, a modified v e r s i o n of Dillman's Total Design Method ( 1 9 7 8 ) is used to elicit responses. This techn i q u e has p r o v e d c o n s i s t e n t l y to b e o n e of the m o s t effective t e c h n i q u e s for m a x i m i z i n g survey r e s p o n s e rates (see Dillman, 1983, for a d i s c u s s i o n of the empirical support). Secondly, careful a t t e n t i o n has b e e n paid to scale develo p m e n t ( N u n n a l l y , 1978). Thirdly, w h i l e o t h e r

We would like to thank Chris Argyris, Dave Larcker, Barry Lewis, Mike Shields, Katherine Schipper and the reviewers for their comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. We also appreciate the helpful comments provided by participants at the Harvard Control Seminar and the Accounting Workshop at the University of Connecticut. 17

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BERNARDJ. JAWORSKI and S. MARKYOUNG In o r d e r to b u i l d the model, the l i t e r a t u r e o n d y s f u n c t i o n a l b e h a v i o r will b e r e v i e w e d first. Each c o n t e x t u a l variable in t h e m o d e l is t h e n p r e s e n t e d along w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n of its effects o n b o t h role conflict a n d job tension. F o l l o w i n g this, w e argue that b o t h role conflict and job t e n s i o n will lead s u b o r d i n a t e s to engage in d y s f u n c t i o n a l behavior.

studies have relied e x c l u s i v e l y o n simple correlational analysis to test hypotheses, w e have u s e d s t r u c t u r a l e q u a t i o n m o d e l i n g (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1979, 1986; H u g h e s & K w o n , 1 9 9 0 ) to analyze the r e l a t i o n s h i p s a m o n g variables. This a p p r o a c h allows us to gain insight into p o t e n t i a l causal relations a m o n g variables, w h i l e controlling for m e a s u r e m e n t error. Finally, n o behavioral studies of w h i c h w e are aware have a t t e m p t e d to systematically address the problem of d y s f u n c t i o n a l b e h a v i o r a m o n g m i d d l e managers. I n the n e x t section, a literature r e v i e w will b e u s e d to d e v e l o p the causal m o d e l from w h i c h n i n e h y p o t h e s e s will b e g e n e r a t e d . This is f o l l o w e d b y a d i s c u s s i o n of the r e s e a r c h m e t h o d , the results a n d their implications.

Dysfunctional behavior
D y s f u n c t i o n a l b e h a v i o r has b e e n discussed a great deal in the b e h a v i o r a l literature. Typically, the t e r m " d y s f u n c t i o n a l " has b e e n u s e d to d e s c r i b e actions in w h i c h a s u b o r d i n a t e att e m p t s to m a n i p u l a t e e l e m e n t s of an established c o n t r o l system for his o w n purposes. It has n o t b e e n d e m o n s t r a t e d in the literature wheh e r this b e h a v i o r u l t i m a t e l y results in b e t t e r or w o r s e p e r f o r m a n c e of the s u b o r d i n a t e , or w h e t h e r the firm is necessarily b e t t e r or w o r s e off. 2 Rather t h a n a t t e m p t i n g to d e t e r m i n e h o w such b e h a v i o r affects i n d i v i d u a l or firm performance, o u r goal is to d e v e l o p an e x p l a n a t o r y m o d e l a n d c o l l e c t empirical e v i d e n c e r e g a r d i n g the i n c i d e n c e of d y s f u n c t i o n a l behavior. Since d y s f u n c t i o n a l b e h a v i o r has b e e n defined in the l i t e r a t u r e in various ways, w e will use the following definition. A s u b o r d i n a t e ' s b e h a v i o r is d y s f u n c t i o n a l if he knowingly violates established c o n t r o l system rules a n d p r o c e d ures. W i t h this definition, the l i t e r a t u r e is o r g a n i z e d u n d e r t w o m a j o r headings: ( 1 ) g a m i n g p e r f o r m a n c e i n d i c a t o r s a n d ( 2 ) strategic i n f o r m a t i o n m a n i p u l a t i o n .

LITERATURE REVIEW As stated earlier, the p r o p o s e d m o d e l links t h r e e c o n t e x t u a l variables (goal c o n g r u e n c e , p e r c e i v e d p e e r d y s f u n c t i o n a l behavior, a n d i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y ) to the e x t e n t of role conflict a n d j o b t e n s i o n e x p e r i e n c e d b y the s u b o r d i n a t e . In turn, as the s u b o r d i n a t e ' s role conflict a n d j o b t e n s i o n increase, w e e x p e c t h i l l l I to violate c o n t r o l system rules a n d p r o c e d u r e s in o r d e r to c o p e w i t h the i n c r e a s i n g stresses a n d role c o n t r a d i c t i o n s ( s e e Fig. 1). This m o d e l b u i l d s u p o n p r e v i o u s w o r k w h i c h has suggested that the effects of c o n t e x t u a l variables o n s u b o r d i n a t e d y s f u n c t i o n a l behavior will b e m e d i a t e d b y role conflict (e.g. H o u s e & Rizzo, 1972; Kahn et al., 1964; Miles & Perrault, 1976; P a r a s u r a m a n & Alutto, 1 9 8 1 ) a n d j o b t e n s i o n (Lazarus et al., 1952; Janis & Leventhal, 1968; M o t o w i l d o et al., 1986).

G a m i n g performance indicators W h e n a s u b o r d i n a t e games a p e r f o r m a n c e i n d i c a t o r (Ridgway, 1956; B i r n b e r g et al..,


1 9 8 3 ) h e c h o o s e s an a c t i o n w h i c h will achieve

tBecause of the lack of epicene personal pronouns and personal adjectives, words such as "he" or "him" should also be taken to mean "she" or "her". 2 A reviewer has pointed out that in some instances allowing subordinates to engage in dysfunctional behavior may be "optimal" in the sense that controlling such b.ehavior can be costly. In addition, dysfunctional behavior cannot be eliminated totally from any organization. Allowinghigh levels of dysfunctional activities might even lead to higher levels of job tension which, in turn, could lead to greater performance.

DYSFUNCTIONAL BEHAVIOR AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL Context Mediators

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Behavior

Goal Congruence

Person-Role Conflict

PerceivedPeer DysfunctionalBehavior

Dysfunctional BehaviorAmong Managers

InformationAsymmetry Between Superior and Subordinate

Job Tension
I V

Fig. 1. Information asymmetry, goal congruence and dysfunctional behavior. the most favorable personal outcome regardless of the action that the superior prefers. 3 One f o r m o f g a m i n g is r i g i d b u r e a u c r a t i c b e h a v i o r (Lawler & Rhode, 1976). This behavior occurs when subordinates attempt to maximize their performance on an indicator, even though they k n o w t h a t t h e i n d i c a t o r is n o t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h what the firm desires (Babchuk & Goode, 1951; Blau, 1 9 5 5 ; K e r r , 1 9 7 5 ) . S u b o r d i n a t e s r e b e l since the control system measures performance only on a limited number of the subordinate's r e q u i r e d tasks, o r m e a s u r e s p e r f o r m a n c e o n t h e w r o n g t a s k s ( K e r r , 1 9 7 5 ; P o r t e r et al., 1 9 7 5 ) . F o r e x a m p l e , if s a l e s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a r e e v a l u ated only by sales volume, then their attention is f o c u s e d o n i n c r e a s i n g sales. H o w e v e r , t h i s effort may lead to lower profitability or even jeopardize long-term customer relations ( W e i t z , 1 9 8 1 ).

Strategic information manipulation


Strategic information manipulation occurs when subordinates alter the natural flow of information, report only those aspects of an i n f o r m a t i o n s e t t h a t is i n t h e i r b e s t i n t e r e s t , o r i n t h e e x t r e m e , falsify d a t a a n d c o m p a n y records. Probably the best-known example of s t r a t e g i c i n f o r m a t i o n m a n i p u l a t i o n is smoothing ( R o n e n & S a d a n , 1 9 8 1 ). S m o o t h i n g o c c u r s when a subordinate utilizes the information system to his benefit by altering the natural or preplanned flow of data without altering the

3 In the literature review, we discuss only those dimensions of dysfunctional behavior that are assessed in our study. One area of gaming that we do not review relates to the creation of budgetary slack by a subordinate (Schiff & Lewin, 1970; Onsi, 1973; Young, 1985; Lukka, 1988). When an employee builds slack into a budget, he is choosing a more easily attainable standard. The subordinate engages in this behavior in the hope that the standard or budget, under which his performance will be evaluated, will be more easily achieved. Subordinates also build slack into budgets in order to protect themselves from uncertainties in the environment (Cyert & March, 1963). In some instances, superiors even encourage slack building behavior by subordinates to increase budget commitment and to reduce incentives to engage in potentially dysfunctional practices to meet the budget (see Merchant & Manzoni, 1989; Merchant, 1989). Thus, when a superior encourages slack creation the behavior may not be dysfunctional by our definition.

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BERNARDJ. JAWORSKIand S. MARKYOUNG and that the divisions he studied w e r e independent, not interrelated. Building on the w o r k of H o p w o o d and Otley, Hirst ( 1 9 8 3 ) a d o p t e d a situational approach and studied the effects of reliance on accounting p e r f o r m a n c e measures and task uncertainty on job tension ( w h i c h he surrogated for dysfunctional b e h a v i o r ) and social withdrawal. Hirst administered a questionnaire to students and asked t h e m to imagine themselves as managers and to fill out the questionnaire accordingly. Hirst's results show that w h e n task uncertainty was high there was an increase in job tension as reliance on accounting performance measures increased, but w h e n task uncertainty was low, and as reliance on a c c o u n t i n g p e r f o r m a n c e measures decreased, there was an increase in job tension. These results are difficult to evaluate as the research m e t h o d used was significantly different from that of either H o p w o o d or Otley and, further, the correlations on the task uncertainty subscales w e r e very low. In summary, the behavioral literature to date has suggested a n u m b e r of reasons regarding w h y dysfunctional behavior may o c c u r among subordinates.

actual activities of the organization. The most c o m m o n form of s m o o t h i n g results from transferring revenues and e x p e n s e s from one p e r i o d to another (Schiff, 1966; Ronen & Sadan, 1981). Filtering information o c c u r s w h e n subordinates r e p o r t only the m o r e desirable e l e m e n t s of a set, usually those that favorably reflect on themselves (Birnberg et al., 1983). In a laboratory e x p e r i m e n t , Read ( 1 9 6 2 ) found that if a subordinate was upwardly mobile and perceived that the s u p e r i o r had influence that could hinder his aspirations then the subordinate w o u l d exhibit a strong t e n d e n c y to w i t h h o l d information c o n c e r n i n g his performance. Further, even ff subordinates trusted the superior, those with aspirations of high mobility refrained from sending up potentially threatening information. O'Reilly & Roberts ( 1 9 7 4 ) essentially r e p l i c a t e d Read's study and found consistent results. Falsification of information is an e x t r e m e form of strategic manipulation. It involves any fraudulent act w h e r e existing information is intentionally altered or fed into an information system (Argyris, 1971). Many examples of white-collar crimes and c o n t r o l system violations involving the falsification of information have been d o c u m e n t e d (e.g. Mars, 1982; Vaughn, 1983; Simon & Eitzen, 1986). Gaming p e r f o r m a n c e indicators and strategic manipulation of information may be the result of the way in which superiors use information in p e r f o r m a n c e evaluation. H o p w o o d ' s ( 1 9 7 2 ) field study s h o w e d that superiors w h o used a profit-conscious style of evaluation ( m e d i u m reliance on accounting p e r f o r m a n c e m e a s u r e s ) i n d u c e d only minimal dysfunctional behavior among subordinates. However, Otley's ( 1 9 7 8 ) attempt to replicate H o p w o o d u n c o v e r e d significant differences, noting that in some cases the amount of invalid r e p o r t i n g on the part of subordinates was l o w e r w h e n subordinates thought that their superiors used a budgetconstrained style (high reliance on a c c o u n t i n g measures). Otley a t t e m p t e d to r e c o n c i l e these findings by stating that the accounting performance measures he o b s e r v e d w e r e m o r e c o m p r e hensive measures of subordinate p e r f o r m a n c e

Consequences o f goal congruence


Organizational c o m m i t m e n t has b e e n defined as a partisan, affective a t t a c h m e n t to the goals and values of the organization, to one's role in relation to goals and values, and to the organization for its o w n sake, apart from its p u r e l y instrumental w o r t h (Buchanan, 1974, p. 333). One subscale of organization commitment, t e r m e d organizational identification, refers to the adoption of the values, goals and objectives of the organization as one's own goals (Buchanan, 1974). Thus, the c o n c e p t of organizational identification is very similar, if not identical to the notion of "goal congruence" b e t w e e n the individual and the organization ( P o r t e r et al., 1975) and the terms are used interchangeably in this paper. There has b e e n a great deal of evidence to suggest that goal c o n g r u e n c e and role conflict are negatively c o r r e l a t e d (Alutto, 1969; Bruning & Synder, 1983; DeCotiis & Summers,

DYSFUNCTIONALBEHAVIORAND MANAGEMENTCONTROL 1987; Dougherty & Pritchard, 1985; see also Fisher & Gitelson, 1983; Van Sell et al., 1981; Welsch & LeVan, 1981, for reviews). Role conflict refers to the degree of incongruence or incompatibility of role expectations from the perspective of the role occupant (Miles & Perrault, 1976). Historically, researchers have examined the concept unidimensionally (see Kahn et al., 1964). However, due to recent criticisms (Miles & Perrault, 1976; Tracy & Johnson, 1984, among others) attention has shifted to specific dimensions of role conflict. One subscale of particular interest in the present research is "person-role conflict" (Miles & Perrault, 1976), which has been defined as the extent to which role expectations are incongruent with the orientations or values of the role occupant. Thus, indicators of person-role conflict would include the extent to which ( 1 ) a manager believes his job should be accomplished one way while his superiors insist on an alternative method and/or (2) a manager believes he works on unnecessary tasks. Based on this research, we posit that in situations where the individual does not internalize the goals of the organization (i.e. low goal congruence), he is more likely to believe that his method of accomplishing role or job activities is superior to those proposed by management (i.e. experiences p e r s o n - r o l e conflict) because he has better information. Conversely, if the individual has internalized the values of the organization, he is less likely to experience conflicts between his methods of work attainment and management's suggested procedures. This reasoning leads to our first hypothesis:

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(Williams & Hazer, 1986) and propensity to leave the organization (Kemery et aL, 1984; Brief & Aldag, 1976; Williams & Hazer, 1986; Porter et aL, 1974). While no study that we are aware of has examined the relation between goal congruence and job tension, we posit that lower goal congruence will be associated with increased job tension.

Hypothesis lB. As goal congruence decreases, job tension increases. Consequences o f p e e r d y s f u n c t i o n a l behavior If the individual believes that his peers are beginning to game the system, we expect the individual to question whether he should continue to follow organizational rules, procedures and guidelines. In this situation, the individual may believe that if he does not follow his peers then his performance evaluation may suffer. This questioning of organizational rules, combined with observing that one's peers are not following them, will lead to increasing stress and role conflict. Similarly, with one's peers exhibiting dysfunctional behavior, a subordinate may begin to w o n d e r whether he too must commit such acts in order to attain competitive performance evaluations. If he does not, and continues to act in accordance with established rules and procedures, he may be ostracized from the group (Dalton, 1959; Hopwood, 1976; Vaughn, 1983; Mars, 1982). Hence, the subordinate's observations of the group's behavior will lead to increased p e r s o n role conflict and job tension, particularly as it relates to performance evaluations. In addition to the psychological and role effects, field research in industrial sociology has d o c u m e n t e d h o w group norms influence individual behavior (e.g. Dalton, 1971; Roy, 1955; Whyte, 1955). Experimental research on the effects of group cohesion on individual conformity illustrates the stronger social pressures that individuals feel (Festinger et al., 1953). Janis' ( 1972) work on groupthink highlights the p o w e r that groups can exert on individual behavior. In summary, we expect the following effects to emerge:

Hypothesis 1A. As goal congruence increases, person-role conflict decreases.


Lack of goal congruence or identification has also been tied to a number of dysfunctional psychological and behavioral consequences. For example, low organizational identification among white collar employees has been tied to absenteeism (Steers, 1977), low satisfaction

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BERNARD J. JAWORSK1 and S. MARK YOUNG

Hypothesis 2A. As perceived peer dysfunctional behavior increases, person-role conflict increases. Hypothesis 2B. As perceived peer dysfunctional behavior increases, job tension increases. Hypothesis 2C. As perceived peer dysfunctional behavior increases, manager's dysfunctional behavior increases.

cau se t h e firm's m o n i t o r i n g s y s t e m d o e s n o t k n o w w h a t to m o n i t o r .
However, relationship tion and experiment ferences found ior was that not other being (presence the between enough Rather, variables having to may mediate results. Young of In the an difbetween able private informa-

affect

that manipulated mere to

informational

or absence),

(1985) private

Consequences of information asymmetries


The behavioral literature pertaining to management control has long discussed the role of information as a power resource (French & Raven, 1959; Pettigrew, 1972; Pfeffer, 1981; Mintzberg, 1983; Markus & Pfeffer, 1983). 4 Individuals in organizations attempt to use all information at their disposal to affect results, especially if those results are used in their performance evaluations (Lawler & Rhode, 1976; Hopwood, 1976; O'Reilly & Roberts, 1974). In cases in which individuals have private information more opportunities to engage in dysfunctional activities may arise be-

existence cause subjects when (and

information behaviors. information misrepresent dard slack). sent was

a subordinate when

and superhad private to in was a stan-

dysfunctional

they felt little "social pressure" themselves selecting thereby not build

of performance However, relatively we suggest asymmetry complex

when high, that

information and the thus link

symmetrical, was created. Thus, vior

social pressure

to misrepreless slack between behadirect

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and dysfunctional than a simple

is m o r e

4 Asymmetric information is central to many economic models of control although its purpose in these models is different from ours, as the specific type of asymmetry affects the nature of optimal contracting b e t w e e n a superior and a subordinate (Baiman, 1982; Milgrom & Roberts, 1988). In this paper, we use a behavioral operationalization of the concept of information asymmetry ( o r simply informational differences) in order to develop a m o r e enriched behavioral model. It should be noted that we are not attempting to test any aspect of the e c o n o m i c models of behavior. Since parallels do exist in the e c o n o m i c s literature to behavioral notions of information asymmetry and dysfunctional behavior, we briefly review the e c o n o m i c concepts below. There are two e c o n o m i c models that are based on the central assumption of the existence of an informational asymmetry b e t w e e n parties. The first and most widely k n o w n is the agency model (see Baiman, 1982, 1988; Arrow, 1985; Hart & Holmstrom, 1987; Levinthal, 1987, for reviews), while the second, "influence" theory, is a m o r e recent development (Milgrom, 1988; Milgrom & Roberts, 1988). Such informational differences give rise to two types of problems in agency theory - - the adverse selection problem (or asymmetric information regarding an agent's "type") and the moral hazard problem (or asymmetric information pertaining to an agent's action choice). Moral hazard problems arise after contracting and relate to the unobservableness of action or effort choices that the agent m a y take. Agency models specify an agent's preferences for maximizing wealth and minimizing effort (or shirking). While moral hazard is modeled in this fashion, some agency theorists provide colloquial examples that are consistent with our view of dysfunctional behavior. For instance, in his review of the agency literature, Levinthal (1988, p. 156) states that "It is possible for m a n a g e m e n t to exploit the fact that shareholders do not observe m a n a g e m e n t ' s daily behavior. This may take the form of short work days, luxurious offices, or, in the extreme, redirection of corporate cash flows to their o w n pocket. More generally, this is a manifestation of the moral hazard problem." In the influence model, an employee can use his private information ( o r "credentials") about his productivity to influence another's decisions. In m a n y cases, the subordinate has an incentive to misrepresent this information. Milgrom & Roberts ( 1988, p. S156) state: "The basis of our explanation is an a r g u m e n t involving informational asymmetries. We take it as given that s o m e of the information that is important for the organization to make good decisions is not directly available to those charged with making the decisions . . . . In such situations, the m e m b e r s of the organization may have an incentive to try to manipulate the information they develop and provide in order to influence decisions to their benefits. Such manipulation can take m a n y forms, ranging from conscious lies c o n c e r n i n g facts, through suppression of unfavorable information, to simply presenting information in a way that accentuates the points supporting the interested party's preferred decision and then insisting on these points at every opportunity."

DYSFUNCTIONALBEHAVIORAND MANAGEMENTCONTROL effect. Similarly to Young (1985), we propose that other variables (i.e. role conflict and job tension) mediate the relationship between asymmetries and dysfunctional management activities. The model presented in Fig. 1 predicts that role conflict is a function of the extent to which the individual possesses private information or knowledge concerning the tasks or activities to be performed. In some instances, as managers learn more about their jobs and gain private information, they may feel less comfortable with standard operating procedures or rules mandated by the firm. These feelings may also arise because the manager cannot use private information due to organizational constraints. Hence, increasing levels of private knowledge are expected to increase the likelihood that a manager believes his methods are superior to the firm's. This belief is an attitudinal manifestation of p e r s o n - r o l e conflict. Indirect support for this hypothesis can be found in related management literature. For example, research has suggested that increased communication between superiors and subordinates should decrease role conflict (Kahn et aL, 1964; Parasuraman & Alutto, 1981; Walker et al., 1977). Further, increased subordinate autonomy has been shown to be correlated with role conflict (Roger & Molnar, 1976). Presumably, increased communication decreases the informational discrepancies that may exist between a superior and subordinate. Positive working relationships with superiors, as evidenced by strong leadership, teamwork and structure have also been shown to produce less role conflict (House & Rizzo, 1972; Rizzo et al., 1970). We expect that increased disclosure on the part of the subordinate will enhance the superior's understanding of the subordinate's job (Morris et aL, 1979; Jackson, 1983) reducing person-role conflict. Moreover, communication is expected to lead both parties to a more informed and balanced view concerning existing procedures, rules and work methods. Thus, a reduction in information asymmetry should lessen the degree of role conflict. Stated conversely:

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Hypothesis 3A. The greater the information asymmetry, the greater the person-role conflict. In contrast to the negative effects of information asymmetry on role conflict, we expect information asymmetry to reduce the extent of job tension. Organ's ( 1 9 7 1 ) laboratory study showed that persons occupying roles that required a great deal of interaction with stakeholders outside the official boundaries of the organization experienced greater job tension if they believed their behaviors were visible by their peers inside the organization. Hence, private information concerning the job, in this instance, appeared to buffer the employees from internal evaluations in much the same way that budget slack would serve as a buffer for production managers. This relationship is also supported by studies which have shown job autonomy to be negatively related to job tension (Brief & Aldag, 1976). Private information allows the subordinates to exercise more discretion and control over job activities and outcomes which, in turn, leads to less tension and anxiety. Hypothesis 3B. The greater the information asymmetry, the less job tension. C o n s e q u e n c e s o f role conflict As noted earlier, role conflict has been tied directly to various dysfunctional psychological and behavioral responses of employees. However, it should be stressed that dysfunctional behavior in these studies typically refers to such responses as propensity to leave the organization, low satisfaction, absenteeism and low job involvement (see Van Sell et al., 1981; Fisher & Gitelson, 1983, for reviews). In the present investigation we extend this general line of reasoning to include behaviors such as gaming, smoothing and filtering (see Birnberg et al., 1983; Lawler & Rhode, 1976, for reviews). As the subordinate begins to feel that his judgment, opinion and decision-making is superior to the firm's, we expect the individual to engage in behaviors which are favorable for him

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BERNARDJ. JAWORSKIand S. MARKYOUNG RESEARCH METHOD

in the s h o r t - t e r m b u t are n o t necessarily in the best interests of the firm in the long-run. For example, i n c r e a s i n g p e r s o n - r o l e conflict may lead the i n d i v i d u a l to feel that the system has n o t a l l o w e d h i m the n e c e s s a r y d i s c r e t i o n to carry o u t job activities. Hence, in a retaliatory fashion, the i n d i v i d u a l b e g i n s to i m p e r s o n a l i z e the job, l o w e r w o r k c o m m i t m e n t a n d take less r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for w o r k p r o d u c e d . I n c l u d e d in this overall b e h a v i o r a l r e s p o n s e is the d e c i s i o n to simply " p r o v i d e the firm w i t h w h a t it m e a s u r e s " r a t h e r t h a n "what it desires". This r e a s o n i n g leads to the following hypothesis:

Data collection
Because of the dismal r e s p o n s e rates typically e n c o u n t e r e d in s u r v e y research, w e f o l l o w e d a p r o c e d u r e to i n s u r e that the p r e s e n t r e s p o n s e rates w o u l d m e e t r e a s o n a b l e standards of a c c e p t a n c e ( s e e Sudman's, 1976, d i s c u s s i o n of r e s p o n s e rate evaluation). Specifically, w e i m p l e m e n t e d a modified v e r s i o n of Dillman's Total Design M e t h o d ( 1 9 7 8 , 1983). This survey p r o c e d u r e details specific p r i n c i p l e s or methods to e n h a n c e r e s p o n s e rates (i.e. it i n c l u d e s such details as w h e n to mail, h o w to type the labels a n d w h e r e to place the stamp). T h e Total Design M e t h o d consists of t w o parts: q u e s t i o n naire c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d s u r v e y i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . Each aspect of these parts consists of a n u m b e r of p r e c i s e steps, the details of w h i c h have b e e n p u b l i s h e d (Dillman, 1978). Briefly, the steps i n c l u d e ( 1 ) p r e s e n t i n g the s u r v e y b o o k l e t o n slightly lighter t h a n n o r m a l paper, ( 2 ) an i n t e r e s t i n g e y e - c a t c h i n g c o v e r page, ( 3 ) a b l a n k back page, ( 4 ) special a t t e n t i o n g i v e n to the first q u e s t i o n , a n d so on. By 1983, 28 studies u s i n g the m e t h o d had a c h i e v e d an average r e s p o n s e rate of 77% (Dillman, 1983), a rate m u c h higher t h a n the typical 4 0 - 5 0 % ( H e r b l i n & B a u m g a r t n e r , 1978). Based u p o n these i m p r e s s i v e results, w e i m p l e m e n t e d a modified v e r s i o n of this procedure. T h e d e c i s i o n to modify the p r o c e d u r e was b a s e d u p o n r e s o u r c e l i m i t a t i o n s (i.e. in the final stage D i l l m a n r e c o m m e n d s r e g i s t e r e d letters to all n o n r e s p o n d e n t s ) a n d s o m e interesting p r e t e s t results (i.e. the p r e t e s t suggested that m o n e t a r y i n c e n t i v e s w o u l d w o r k a n d that a m o r e personal, less formal letter w o u l d b e m o r e appropriate). 5 After c o n s t r u c t i n g the survey, w e c o n s t r u c ted t w o pretests. T h e first p r e t e s t i n v o l v e d

Hypothesis 4. The greater the person-role conflict, the


greater the dysfunctional behavior.

Consequences o f j o b tension
W h i l e job t e n s i o n has b e e n linked to decreased job p e r f o r m a n c e ( M o t o w i l d o et al., 1 9 8 6 ) the e v i d e n c e is m i x e d ( P a r a s u r a m a n & Alutto, 1981 ). C o n c e p t u a l l y , j o b t e n s i o n or a n x i e t y has also b e e n r e l a t e d to d e c r e a s e d satisfaction a n d a v o i d a n c e b e h a v i o r ( P a r k e r & DeCotiis, 1 9 8 3 ) as well as lack of c o n c e r n for the organization, low job i n v o l v e m e n t and loss of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y (Schuler, 1980). In the p r e s e n t investigation, w e anticipate that i n c r e a s e d levels of t e n s i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y as it relates to p e r f o r m a n c e evaluations, will increase the likelihood that the i n d i v i d u a l will b e g i n to e n g a g e in b e h a v i o r s that m a x i m i z e i n d i c a t o r s used b y the firm to assess performance. Hence, if the firm uses sales v o l u m e to assess the m a n a g e r ' s p e r f o r m a n c e , w e e x p e c t the i n d i v i d u a l to focus a t t e n t i o n o n sales v o l u m e , as a n x i e t y r e l a t e d to p e r f o r m a n c e e v a l u a t i o n s intensifies. This r e a s o n i n g leads to o u r final hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5. As job tension increases, dysfunctional


behavior increases.

The effect of the monetary incentive is quite interesting. Our pretest results with a total ofN 90 executives (N45 received the dollar, N 45 did not) showed that the monetary incentive does work as the reponse rate for those who did not receive the dollar was 49%, compared to 79% who received the dollar. This finding is very consistent with work on response rates and monetary incentives (see Herblin & Baumgartner, 1978; Kanuk & Berenson, 1975). In short, in the main study we included a dollar for all respondents.

DYSFUNCTIONALBEHAVIORAND MANAGEMENTCONTROL c o n t a c t i n g m a r k e t i n g m a n a g e r s a n d asking t h e m to fill o u t t h e s u r v e y in t h e p r e s e n c e o f o n e o f t h e r e s e a r c h e r s . T h e y w e r e i n s t r u c t e d to fill o u t t h e survey, ask q u e s t i o n s as a m b i g u i t i e s arose, and p r o v i d e any o t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n that m i g h t aid in t h e data c o l l e c t i o n effort. After e a c h "on-site" i n t e r v i e w , t h e s u r v e y was m o d i fied and a n e w m a n a g e r w a s c o n t a c t e d in a different firm. This p r o c e d u r e w a s r e p e a t e d until o n l y a v e r y l i m i t e d n u m b e r o f m i n o r r e v i s i o n s was b e i n g m a d e in t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e ( n = 10 m a n a g e r s i n t e r v i e w e d ) . At this point, w e i m p l e m e n t e d a s e c o n d , m o r e formal p r e t e s t ( n = 9 0 ) in a large e a s t e r n city to assess t h e p s y c h o m e t r i c p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e scales, assess o u r m o n e t a r y i n c e n t i v e s (i.e. 45 r e c e i v e d a dollar, 45 d i d n o t ) a n d o b t a i n a p r e l i m i n a r y a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e results. F o l l o w i n g t h e p r e t e s t results, w e o b t a i n e d a national s a m p l e o f m a r k e t i n g e x e c u t i v e s f r o m a p u b l i c l y available list, w h i c h is d i s c u s s e d b e l o w . A p p r o x i m a t i n g Dillman's a p p r o a c h , w e c o n t a c t e d t h e r e s p o n d e n t s o n t h r e e occasions. T h e first c o n t a c t i n c l u d e d ( 1 ) a p e r s o n a l i z e d l e t t e r o n University l e t t e r h e a d s i g n e d b y hand, ( 2 e a h a n d - w r i t t e n " t h a n k y o u " w r i t t e n in b l u e ink o n the b o t t o m of each o f t h e 500 letters, ( 3 ) a n e w o n e d o l l a r bill, ( 4 ) a b u s i n e s s r e p l y e n v e l o p e with the researcher's address type-set on the e n v e l o p e a n d ( 5 ) a p r o f e s s i o n a l l y drafted, s e v e n - p a g e s u r v e y b o o k l e t (8-1/2" 7", m e d i u m b o n d ) . T h e d o l l a r bill was i n c l u d e d as Kanuk & B e r e n s o n ' s ( 1 9 7 5 ) r e v i e w o f t h e s u r v e y l i t e r a t u r e i n d i c a t e d that m o n e t a r y i n c e n t i v e s e n h a n c e r e s p o n s e rates ( s e e also H e b e r l i n & B a u m g a r t n e r , 1978). T h e s e c o n d c o n t a c t was a p o s t c a r d f o l l o w - u p w i t h a h a n d w r i t t e n note. T h e final c o n t a c t was similar to t h e first c o n t a c t e x c e p t t h e d o l l a r i n c e n t i v e was n o t i n c l u d e d . O f t h e 500 m a i l e d r e s p o n s e s , 379 u s a b l e r e s p o n s e s w e r e o b t a i n e d (21 r e t u r n to s e n d e r o r n o l o n g e r at a d d r e s s w e r e also r e c e i v e d ) . This r e s u l t e d in a r e s p o n s e rate o f 79.1%. H o w e v e r , in t h e c u r r e n t analysis w e only used subjects who had complete data on all 23 s u r v e y items. This r e d u c e d t h e size o f t h e s a m p l e that w e a n a l y z e d to 348.

25

Sample characteristics
The national sample (n = 500) was comprised of marketing executives (i.e. vice-presidents, d i r e c t o r s o f marketing, m a r k e t i n g m a n a g e r s ) r a n d o m l y s e l e c t e d f r o m t h e 1986 National R o s t e r o f t h e A m e r i c a n M a r k e t i n g Association w h o s e total m e m b e r s h i p n u m b e r e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y 25,000. M a r k e t i n g e x e c u t i v e s w e r e s e l e c t e d for t h r e e reasons. Firstly, m a r k e t i n g m a n a g e r s r e l y o n a c c o u n t ing i n f o r m a t i o n a g r e a t d e a l w h e n m a k i n g d e c i s i o n s ( K o t l e r , 1988). Secondly, s u c h inf o r m a t i o n is o f t e n u s e d to d e r i v e t h e kinds and quantities o f p r o d u c t s to m a n u f a c t u r e ( C h u r c h i l l et al., 1984). Thirdly, m a r k e t i n g m a n a g e r s p l a y a b o u n d a r y s p a n n i n g r o l e in o r g a n i z a t i o n s and t h e y i n t e r a c t w i t h c u s t o m e r s , competitors and other stakeholders outside t h e official b o u n d a r i e s o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n (Lysonski, 1985). The sample was comprised of vice-presidents o f m a r k e t i n g a n d / o r sales ( 1 6 . 2 % ) , d i r e c t o r s of marketing (20.0%), marketing managers ( 4 5 . 1 % ) , b r a n d / p r o d u c t m a n a g e r s ( 8 . 4 % ) and other marketing professionals (10.3%). While this d i s t r i b u t i o n m i g h t a p p e a r diverse, Hass & W o r t r u b a ( 1 9 8 3 ) s t u d i e d j o b d e s c r i p t i o n s and c o n t e n d e d that v i c e - p r e s i d e n t s , d i r e c t o r s a n d m a r k e t i n g m a n a g e r s essentially h o l d t h e s a m e p o s i t i o n a n d p e r f o r m similar tasks. O n average, the respondents had eight years of experience w i t h t h e firm (R = 7.7, s -- 6 . 8 ) a n d h a d an average s p a n o f c o n t r o l o f c l o s e to s e v e n s u b o r d i n a t e s ( ~ = 6.75, s = 9.7). T h e m a r k e t ing d e p a r t m e n t s s a m p l e d v a r i e d c o n s i d e r a b l y in t e r m s o f size, f r o m o n e i n d i v i d u a l to several h u n d r e d , a l t h o u g h t h e m e d i a n w a s 7.2 e m p l o y e e s . M e d i a n sales for t h e 500 divisions s a m p l e d w e r e 53 million. Most o f t h e s a m p l e classified t h e i r divisions as industrial ( 5 0 . 7 % ) , followed by consumer (28.3%) and both c o n s u m e r a n d industrial ( 2 1 . 0 5 % ) .

Measures
T h e scales u s e d in t h e s t u d y are s h o w n in t h e A p p e n d i x . Similarly to e a r l i e r sections, w e use Fig. 1 to g u i d e t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e section. It

26

BERNARDJ. JAWORSKIand S. MARKYOUNG a n d t h e task is e a s i e r than a c o m p a r a t i v e surv e y item. A similar p r o c e d u r e w a s u s e d for t h e r e m a i n i n g six i t e m s ( s e e A p p e n d i x ) . C r o n b a c h ' s a l p h a for this scale w a s ct = 0.90.

is i m p o r t a n t to stress that s i n c e single organizational informants w e r e used, the data c o l l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t individual p e r c e p t i o n s o f the organizational c o n t e x t (e.g. p e r c e i v e d p e e r d y s f u n c t i o n al b e h a v i o r ) . This focus o n p e r c e p t i o n s is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h e s t a b l i s h e d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l analysis ( L a w r e n c e & Lorsch, 1967; W e i c k , 1969, among others) and some recent accounting r e s e a r c h (e.g. M e r c h a n t , 1981; C h e n h a l l & Morris, 1986).

Goal congruence. Goal c o n g r u e n c e refers to t h e a d o p t i o n o f values, goals and o b j e c t i v e s o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n as o n e ' s o w n goals ( B u c h a n a n , 1974). T h e scale is c o m p r i s e d o f t w o i t e m s ( s e e A p p e n d i x ) . C r o n b a c h ' s a l p h a for t h e i t e m s is ct = 0.87. C r o n b a c h ' s a l p h a is a s t a n d a r d m e a s u r e u s e d for assessing scale r e l i a b i l i t y ( N u n n a l l y , 1978). Perceived peer dysfunctional behavior. P e e r d y s f u n c t i o n a l b e h a v i o r is a t h r e e - i t e m scale d e s i g n e d to m e a s u r e t h e p e r c e i v e d i n c i d e n c e o f dysfunctional behavior by peers within the organization. P e r c e i v e d p e e r d y s f u n c t i o n a l beh a v i o r m a y b e d e f i n e d as t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s p e r c e p t i o n that his p e e r s k n o w i n g l y v i o l a t e e s t a b l i s h e d c o n t r o l s y s t e m rules and p r o c e dures. T h e t h r e e i t e m s s h o w n in t h e A p p e n d i x h a v e an a l p h a (0t) o f 0.66. Information asymmetries. The i n f o r m a t i o n
a s y m m e t r i e s scale w a s b a s e d u p o n t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s j u d g m e n t o f his j o b k n o w l e d g e a n d p e r c e p t i o n o f his s u p e r i o r ' s k n o w l e d g e o f t h e s a m e j o b activities. T h e r e s p o n d e n t r a t e d s e v e n i t e m s for b o t h h i m s e l f a n d his s u p e r i o r . T h e s e i t e m s a p p e a r e d in s e p a r a t e s e c t i o n s in t h e questionnaire. The corresponding items were t h e n s u b t r a c t e d f r o m o n e a n o t h e r to f o r m s e v e n d i f f e r e n c e scores. F o r e x a m p l e , t h e i t e m "My m a n a g e r k n o w s e x a c t l y h o w to a c c o m p l i s h the work I normally encounter" was subtracted f r o m "I k n o w e x a c t l y h o w to a c c o m p l i s h t h e w o r k I n o r m a l l y e n c o u n t e r " to form a single d i f f e r e n c e item. This p r o c e d u r e has t h e advantage o f r e d u c i n g t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f r e s p o n s e bias (i.e. I always k n o w m o r e t h a n m y s u p e r i o r )

Person-role conflict. P e r s o n - r o l e conflict refers to t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h r o l e e x p e c t a t i o n s d e f i n e d b y m a n a g e m e n t are i n c o n g r u e n t w i t h the role orientation of the subordinate (Miles & Perrault, 1976). A t h r e e - i t e m scale w a s develo p e d b a s e d u p o n t h e c o n c e p t u a l w o r k o f Miles & P e r r a u l t ( 1 9 7 6 ) . T h e scale p r o v e d to b e a d e q u a t e (ct = 0.59). Job tension. A t h r e e - i t e m scale w a s u s e d to assess j o b t e n s i o n and a n x i e t y - - p a r t i c u l a r l y as it r e l a t e d to p e r f o r m a n c e e v a l u a t i o n s (z = 0.60). W h i l e this m e a s u r e is similar in spirit to H o u s e & Rizzo ( 1 9 7 2 ) , it w a s d e s i g n e d to b e more consistent with management control system research. Dysfunctional behavior. O u r scale for this c o n s t r u c t was d e r i v e d f r o m t h e e a r l i e r literat u r e r e v i e w . This scale is d e t a i l e d in t h e A p p e n d i x . T h e five-item scale ( s e e A p p e n d i x ) h a d an z equal to 0.72.
RESULTS

LISREL modeling
A LISREL causal m o d e l i n g a p p r o a c h was u s e d to analyze t h e s u r v e y d a t a ( J o r e s k o g & S o r b o m , 1979, 1986). T h e p r i n c i p a l a d v a n t a g e o f t h e LISREL a p p r o a c h is that it allows t h e r e s e a r c h e r to e s t i m a t e b o t h t h e m e a s u r e m e n t a n d structural p r o p e r t i e s o f a g i v e n s y s t e m o f s t r u c t u r a l equations. In t h e r e c e n t past, o n e t y p i c a l l y e s t i m a t e d p r i n c i p a l c o m p o n e n t analyzes, cons t r u c t e d f a c t o r - b a s e d scales, and t h e n e s t i m a t e d a series o f r e g r e s s i o n equations. H o w e v e r , this a p p r o a c h is l i m i t e d in that it ( 1 ) fails to a c c o u n t for m e a s u r e m e n t e r r o r , ( 2 ) d o e s n o t a l l o w for simultaneous estimates of measurement and structural parameters and hence (3) does not p r o v i d e d i a g n o s t i c s t a t i s t i c s / i n f o r m a t i o n for t h e m o d e l as a w h o l e . In contrast, t h e LISREL m o d e l g o e s b e y o n d c o n v e n t i o n a l g e n e r a l linear m o d e l s to a d d r e s s e a c h o f t h e s e limitations.

DYSFUNCTIONAL BEHAVIOR AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL

27

81 ,&

62 1,

V1DQ
Yll

YI2 831 83--.~ 64 .._~ 4


c7

85 _.~
Y21
Y22

x~ U
B32 ~3
1 ~~ I D ~ - - -

---- *10
ell

~3

Y23
n2 ~ ~2

mm'lSE E_ mm r ~ r r f r r
66 67 68 69 610 611 612 4 c5 c6

Fig. 2. Operationalization of causal model (correlations between constructs are not included to simplify the diagram): b = constrained parameter, specific value obtained from m e a s u r e m e n t model esimates; ~ = goal congruence; ~2 = perceived peer dysfunctional behavior; ~3 = information asymmetry; lq; = p e r s o n - r o l e conflict; q2 = job tension; ~3 = dysfunctional behavior.

In brief, the LISREL m o d e l consists o f t w o parts: the m e a s u r e m e n t m o d e l and the structural equation model. The m e a s u r e m e n t m o d e l specifies h o w the unobserved, hypothetical constructs relate to the o b s e r v e d indicators. In addition, the m e a s u r e m e n t m o d e l is used to

describe the m e a s u r e m e n t properties of the o b s e r v e d variables (e.g. factor loadings, measu r e m e n t error). The m e a s u r e m e n t m o d e l m a y be c o n s i d e r e d the confirmatory factor analysis c o m p o n e n t o f the LISREL model. The structural equation m o d e l specifies the

28

BERNARD J. JAWORSKI and S. MARK YOUNG TABLE 1: C o n t i n u e d Parameter qbl ; qb22 ~33 qb2~ LISREL estimate a 0.790 1.096 0.582 -0.296 --0.212 O.188 0.260 0.207 0.706 0.538 0.509 0.538 0.681 0.502 0.438 0.447 0.399 0.372 0.694 0.666 0.626 0.700 0.713 0.631 0.710 0.617 0.650 0,671 0.637 0,289 0.222 0.313 0.172 0.064 0.124 0.225 0.234 Standard error O. 103 0.238 0.087 0.073 0.047 0.060 0.066 0.069 0.063 0.062 0.064 0.048 0.057 0.046 0.095 0.045 0.043 0.045 0.066 0.065 0.065 0.071 (I.O71 0.073 0.064 0.061 0.062 0.067 0.O61 0.042 0.038 0.042 0.037 0.036 0.044 0.042 0,042 t value 7.667 4.608 6.685 3.050 --4.522 3.150 3.942 2.988 11.279 8.740 7.906 11.105 12.002 10.813 9.831 9.933 7.806 8.300 10.619 10.186 9.584 9.871 10.079 8.655 11.159 10.118 10.481 10.957 10.365 6.860 5.836 7.421 4.704 1.805 2.843 5,341 5,517 Standardized value 1.000 1.000 1.000 -0.318 --0.312 0.235 0.260 0.207 0.706 0.538 0.509 0.538 0.681 0.502 0.438 0.447 0.339 0.372 0.694 0.666 0.626 0.700 0.713 0.631 0.710 0.617 0.650 0.671 0.637 0.289 0.222 0.313 0.172 0.064 0.124 0.225 0.234

TABLE 1: E s t i m a t e d p a r a m e t e r s for causal m o d e P 'bx'd'~ Parameter [~21 [~31 ~32 Ytl Y~2 Yl.s ]'2~ ~22 723 T32 LISREL estimate a 0.508 --0.041 0.331 --.385 0.465 0.161 0.138 0.202 --0.494 0.288 O.968 a 1.002 0.506 a 0.655 0.697 0.891 ~ 0.740 0.926 0.983 0.975 1.066 1.039 0.504 ~ 0.530 0.561 0.494 a 0.483 0.548 0.463 a 0.528 0.514 0.475 0.514 Standard error 0.162 0.118 0.107 0.099 0.103 0.104 0.15 0.24 0.129 0.121 -0.093 -0.083 0.088 -0.058 0.061 0.083 0.083 0.088 0.087 -0.078 0.080 -0.081 0.089 -0.071 0.68 0.065 0.070 t value 3.140 --0.347 3.(182 -- 3.904 4.499 1.55 1.194 1.627 -- 3.839 2.389 -10.719 -7.896 7.928 -12.715 15.262 11.845 11.761 12.163 11.900 -6.835 7.006 -5.937 6.140 -7.449 7.512 7.272 7.352 Standardized value 0.499 --0.038 0.313 --0.315 0.447 0.113 0.110 0.91 --0.340 0.257 0.860 0.891 0.530 0.686 0.729 0.680 0.565 0.706 0.750 0.744 0.813 0.792 0.549 0.578 O.611 0.547 0.535 0.608 0.543 0.619 0.603 0.557 0.603

(~31 ~32
5t 82 53 54 5s 5o 57 88 59 5m 51 ; 5~2 ~ g2 ~ ~;-i ~ go I;7 Cu ~9 gm el t 57 56 88 86 58 5v 81o 59 512 511 ~7 53 89 5,~ glo 5~

k4 k6 k7 k8 ~9

IO

~L I X2 X3 ~-4 ~-s ~6 Xv ~L8 X9 ~qo ~tl

q/ll ~/22 q*33

0.656 0.809 1.097

0.171 0.220 0.242

3.843 3.684 4.539

0.554 0.659 0.798

a: P a r a m e t e r e s t i m a t e c o n s t r a i n e d . E s t i m a t e o b t a i n e d from e a r l i e r m e a s u r e m e n t models.

b: The m a t r i c e s h a v e b e e n r e c o n s t r u c t e d to r e p r e s e n t e n d o g e n o u s and e x o g e n o u s estimates. Since t h e m o d e l r e q u i r e d c o r r e l a t e d e r r o r s across e n d o g e n o u s and e x o g e n o u s c o n s t r u c t s , o n l y e n d o g e n o u s m a t r i c e s w e r e used. This a l l o w e d o n e to o b t a i n all the t h e o r e t i c a l l y d e r i v e d p a r a m e t e r s . c: Z2 = 294.34, 209 d.f.; GFI = 0.934; AGFI = 0.913; RMSR = .054. d: R 2 = 0.446 for p e r s o n ~ r o l e conflict equation; R 2 = 0.341 for job tension equation; R 2 = 0.202 for dysfunctional behavior equation. ~: N o t e s o n p a r a m e t e r s : ( 1 ) ~s and ys are " s t r u c t u r a l " p a r a m e t e r s . They are a n a l o g o u s to p a t h coefficients in r e g r e s s i o n analysis. ( 2 ) The ys are factor loadings. T h e y r a n g e from 0 - 1 . 0 w i t h h i g h e r s c o r e s r e p r e s e n t i n g b e t t e r loadings. ( 3 ) ~ is the variance/covariance m a t r i x of residuals of the u n o b s e r v e d d e p e n d e n t variables. In the above estimates, they r e p r e s e n t the variances of the residuals. ( 4 ) qb is the variance/covariance of u n o b s e r v e d i n d e p e n d e n t variables. Hence, the off-diagonal estimates can be interpreted as "correlations" between the independent variables. ( 5 ) The T and 8 represent measurement error.

DYSFUNCTIONALBEHAVIORAND MANAGEMENTCONTROL r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n t h e u n o b s e r v e d constructs. Similar to a set o f r e g r e s s i o n equations, t h e m o d e l is u s e d to d e s c r i b e t h e causal links b e t w e e n c o n s t r u c t s . H o w e v e r , in c o n t r a s t to r e g r e s s i o n m o d e l s , t h e LISREL m o d e l links unobserved, hypothetical constructs rather than c o n c r e t e , e m p i r i c a l indicators. Figure 2 s h o w s t h e causal m o d e l d e r i v e d from t h e n i n e basic h y p o t h e s e s . F o l l o w i n g J o r e s k o g & S o r b o m ( 1 9 7 9 ) and Bagozzi ( 1 9 8 0 ) , in Fig. 2, l o w e r case G r e e k l e t t e r s d e p i c t p a r a m e t e r s to b e e s t i m a t e d , ovals denote hypothetical constructs, boxes denote e m p i r i c a l indicators, a r r o w s linking c i r c l e s i n d i c a t e h y p o t h e s i z e d causal paths, a r r o w s f r o m ovals to b o x e s reflect m e a s u r e m e n t relations, and a r r o w s from t h e b o x e s s h o w m e a s u r e m e n t e r r o r terms. In Fig. 2, w e f o l l o w e d t h e c o n v e n tion o f e a r l i e r r e s e a r c h e r s (e.g. Bagozzi, 1 9 8 0 ) b y "fixing" t h e first ~. p a r a m e t e r o f e a c h latent c o n s t r u c t . In o r d e r to m o r e fully c o m p r e h e n d Fig. 2, c o n s i d e r t h e " s t r u c t u r a l " p a t h s b e t w e e n t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t s . T h e focus h e r e is o n l y o n t h e ~s a n d ys w h i c h link t h e various c o n s t r u c t s . F o r e x a m p l e , y~] r e p r e s e n t s t h e p a t h coefficient linking goal c o n g r u e n c e and p e r s o n - r o l e conflict. Referring to Table 1, w e can s e e that this coefficient is significant ( t = - 3.904). Similarly, t h e p a t h coefficient relating p e r s o n - r o l e conflict and j o b t e n s i o n is r e p r e s e n t e d b y t h e ~21 coefficient. In Table 1, w e can s e e that this p a t h coefficient is also significant ( t -- 3.140). For r e a d e r s unfamiliar w i t h this t e c h n i q u e , t h e first n i n e coefficients ( t h e ~s a n d y s ) r e p o r t e d in Table 1 r e p r e s e n t t h e c o r n e r s t o n e o f t h e h y p o t h e s i s testing. T h e r e m a i n i n g coefficients m o r e fully reflect t h e fit o f t h e m o d e l w i t h t h e data. For t h o s e m o r e familiar w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l p a t h m o d e l s ( s e e Duncan, 1975, for r e v i e w ) , t h e ovals in Fig. 2 can b e i n t e r p r e t e d as variables, w h i l e t h e ~s a n d ys can b e i n t e r p r e t e d as p a t h coefficients.

29

Tests o f hypotheses The causal model. In b u i l d i n g t h e p r o p o s e d


s y s t e m o f relationships, w e b e g a n t h e analysis by examining only the measurement properties o f t h e m o d e l . Thus, o u r initial m o d e l was a six-

factor c o n f i r m a t o r y analysis w i t h n o s t r u c t u r a l p a t h s specified. All ~Ls w e r e e s t i m a t e d a n d t h e diagonal o f t h e qb m a t r i x w a s c o n s t r a i n e d to 1. This initial m o d e l d i d n o t satisfactorily fit t h e data. Specifically, t h e g o o d n e s s o f fit index, GFI -- 0.86, t h e a d j u s t e d g o o d n e s s o f fit i n d e x , AGFI = 0.82, t h e r o o t m e a n square, RMSR = 0.07 and t h e B e n t l e r - B o n n e t t i n c r e m e n t fit i n d e x ( ( 3 2 1 3 - 5 9 9 ) / 3 2 1 3 = 0 . 8 1 ) w e r e inadequate. A l t h o u g h t h e r e are n o s t a n d a r d s o f a g r e e m e n t , it is t y p i c a l l y r e c o m m e n d e d that t h e GFI and AGFI e x c e e d 0.90, t h e RMSR b e n e a r 0.05 o r less, a n d t h e B e n t l e r - B o n n e t t e x c e e d 0.90. In addition, t h e n o r m a l i z e d r e s i d u a l m a t r i x and Qp l o t s s u g g e s t e d that m o d i f i c a t i o n s c o u l d b e made. It is i m p o r t a n t to stress that a d j u s t m e n t s to the model should be guided by theory rather than e m p i r i c a l results (Fornell, 1983). H e n c e , w e e x a m i n e d t h e initial p a r a m e t e r e s t i m a t e s from the standpoint of theory-guided model adjustments. U p o n c l o s e e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y m e a s u r e , it b e c a m e a p p a r e n t that s y s t e m a t i c e r r o r v a r i a n c e c o u l d b e d e t e c t e d . Specifically, t h e first t h r e e i t e m s o f the construct tap cause-effect asymmetries, the n e x t t w o i t e m s tap m e a s u r e m e n t / e v a l u a t i o n a s y m m e t r i e s , a n d t h e final t w o tap t h e range o f activities p e r f o r m e d . To take into a c c o u n t t h e s e i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n s , t h e e r r o r t e r m s for t h e s e items w e r e i n t e r c o r r e l a t e d to c r e a t e t h r e e " s u b c o n s t r u c t s " . Estimating t h e s e five additional p a r a m e t e r s r e q u i r e d five d e g r e e s o f f r e e d o m . T h e r e s u l t i n g AZ 2 ( ( Z 2 = 599.05, 215 d.f. - Z 2 -- 371.21, 210 d.f.) = 227.83 w i t h 5 d.f.) was h i g h l y significant, suggesting a m u c h i m p r o v e d m o d e l (i.e. p < 0.0001). Overall, h o w e v e r , t h e m o d e l still d i d n o t p r o v i d e an a d e q u a t e fit (e.g. AGFI -----0.891 ). T h e n e x t m o d e l a d j u s t m e n t was m o t i v a t e d b y a m e a s u r e m e n t issue. Specifically, it a p p e a r e d that t h e i t e m s p e r t a i n i n g to p e e r d y s f u n c t i o n a l b e h a v i o r a n d i n d i v i d u a l dysfunctional b e h a v i o r w e r e c o r r e l a t e d w h e n t h e i t e m w o r d i n g w a s similar. F o r e x a m p l e , i t e m 1 in t h e p e e r d y s f u n c t i o n a l scale was h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d with item 1 of the individual dysfunctional scale. A similar c o r r e l a t i o n w a s a p p a r e n t for t h e

30

BERNARDJ. JAWORSKIand S. MARKYOUNG p e e r d y s f u n c t i o n a l b e h a v i o r w o u l d lead to an increase in m a n a g e r ' s d y s f u n c t i o n a l behavior. T h e results s u p p o r t this c o n t e n t i o n (T32 = 0.288, t = 2.389, p < 0.05).

n e x t t w o items. To deal w i t h this shared m e a s u r e m e n t variance, w e a l l o w e d the errors for similarly w o r d e d items to b e correlated. This e s t i m a t i o n thus r e q u i r e d t h r e e additional degrees of freedom. T h e r e s u l t i n g ;(2 was highly significant ((;(2 = 371.21, 210 d.f. - ;(2 = 2 8 8 . 1 1 , 2 0 7 d.f.) = ;(2 = 83.10 w i t h 3 d.f.). In a d d i t i o n to the i n c r e m e n t a l i m p r o v e m e n t to fit, the overall m o d e l fits the data (GFI = 0.936, AGFI --- 0.914, RMSR = 0.052). At this phase of the m o d e l e s t i m a t i o n w e w e r e satisfied w i t h the m e a s u r e m e n t fit, a n d w e t u r n e d o u r a t t e n t i o n to the s t r u c t u r a l parameters. Using a c o r r e l a t i o n m a t r i x as input, the initial s t r u c t u r a l m o d e l r e s u l t e d in a very g o o d m o d e l fit (GFI = 0.934, AGFI = 0.913, RMSR = 0.054, B e n t l e r - B o n n e t t i n d e x --- 0.91, less than 0.05% of the n o r m a l i z e d residuals w e r e > 2.0). T h e estimates are s h o w n in T a b l e 1. W e s h o u l d n o t e that in o r d e r to m o d e l the c o r r e l a t e d errors across e x o g e n o u s a n d e n d o g e n o u s m a t r i c e s it was n e c e s s a r y to estimate the series of equations using only the e n d o g e n o u s LISREL matrices.

Consequences of information asymmetry.


Hypothesis 3A p r o p o s e d that greater information a s y m m e t r y w o u l d lead to i n c r e a s e d role conflict. T h e results did n o t s u p p o r t this p r o p o s i t i o n . Hypothesis 3B, w h i c h suggested that i n c r e a s e d i n f o r m a t i o n a s y m m e t r y w o u l d lead to d e c r e a s e d job t e n s i o n , was s u p p o r t e d (3'23 = - 0.494, t = - 3.839, p < 0.05).

Consequences of role conflict. H y p o t h e s i s 4 stated that an i n c r e a s e in role conflict w o u l d lead to i n c r e a s e d d y s f u n c t i o n a l behavior. This h y p o t h e s i s was n o t s u p p o r t e d (~31 = - 0.041, t -- - 0.347, n o t significant). H o w e v e r , w h i l e w e did n o t formally state the hypothesis, i n c r e a s e d role conflict did lead to an i n c r e a s e in the a m o u n t of job t e n s i o n (~21 = 0 . 5 0 8 , t = 3.140, p < 0.01). Consequences of job tension. T h e final h y p o t h e s i s ( H y p o t h e s i s 5 ) stated that as job t e n s i o n increased, o n e w o u l d e x p e c t a conc o m i t a n t rise in the i n c i d e n t of d y s f u n c t i o n a l behavior. The causal path linking these t w o c o n s t r u c t s s u p p o r t s this h y p o t h e s i s (~332 = O.331, t = 3.082, p < 0.01).

Results of tests of hypotheses Consequences of goal congruence.

The

causal p a t h l i n k i n g goal c o n g r u e n c e a n d p e r s o n - r o l e conflict is s t r o n g a n d in the exp e c t e d d i r e c t i o n (T11 = - 0.385, t = - 3.904, p < 0.05). Thus, H y p o t h e s i s 1A w h i c h stated that as goal c o n g r u e n c e i n c r e a s e d role conflict w o u l d d e c r e a s e is s t r o n g l y s u p p o r t e d . T h e s t r u c t u r a l path l i n k i n g goal c o n g r u e n c e and job t e n s i o n ( H y p o t h e s i s 1B) was n o t supported.

DISCUSSION T h e p u r p o s e of this s t u d y was to e x a m i n e the factors that p r e d i c t d y s f u n c t i o n a l b e h a v i o r in organizations. It was p o s t u l a t e d at the o u t s e t that goal c o n g r u e n c e , p e r c e p t i o n s of p e r c e i v e d peer dysfunctional behavior and information asymmetries play an i m p o r t a n t role in determining i n d i v i d u a l behavior, b u t that the relationship is m o r e c o m p l e x t h a n p r e v i o u s research w o u l d suggest. In particular, w e p o s t u l a t e d that the effects of the t h r e e c o n t e x t variables w o u l d b e mediated by role conflict and job tension. Moreover, w e also incorporated the goal cong r u e n c e c o n s t r u c t since it had b e e n hypothesized

Consequences of peer dysfunctional behavior. Hypothesis 2A stated that as p e r c e i v e d


p e e r d y s f u n c t i o n a l b e h a v i o r increased, role conflict w o u l d increase. This h y p o t h e s i s was strongly s u p p o r t e d (T12 = 0.465, t = 4,499, p < 0.01). H y p o t h e s i s 2B p r o p o s e d that the p e r c e p t i o n s of d y s f u n c t i o n a l a c t i o n s o n the part of the p e e r s w o u l d i n c r e a s e the individual's job tension, T h e data do n o t c o n f i r m this expectat i o n (T22 = 0.202, t = 1.627, n o t significant). In Hypothesis 2C, w e e x p e c t e d that an increase in

DYSFUNCTIONALBEHAVIORAND MANAGEMENTCONTROL to be an i m p o r t a n t p r e d i c t o r of dysfunctional behavior (Ouchi, 1979). The results p r o v i d e m i x e d support for the model. Specifically, information asymmetry appears to lessen dysfunctional behavior, although the effect is indirect. Having private information appears to decrease job tension, which in turn lessens the d e g r e e of dysfunctional behavior. But the e x p e c t e d link b e t w e e n information asymmetries, role conflict and dysfunctional behavior did not result. The links relating to p e r c e i v e d p e e r dysfunctional behavior strongly s u p p o r t the model. Namely, the results suggest that p e e r dysfunctional behavior leads to increased feelings of role conflict and increased job tension. In turn, job tension is directly related to increased dysfunctional behavior. Finally, the direct link b e t w e e n p e r c e p t i o n s of p e e r dysfunctional behavior and the individual's dysfunctional behavior is significant. As the individual believes his peers are increasingly attempting to "game the system", he is m o r e likely to engage in dysfunctional behavior. The result that increased goal c o n g r u e n c e r e d u c e d the amount of p e r s o n - r o l e conflict is consistent with previous w o r k in organizational behavior (Ouchi, 1979). Our results indicate that as the individual internalizes the goals, values and beliefs of the organization, his actions are m o r e likely to c o r r e s p o n d with activities desired by the firm. In turn, as p e r s o n - r o l e conflict decreases, job tension decreases, with the final result being a reduction in dysfunctional behavior.

31

it could be that the theoretical u n d e r p i n n i n g of u n s u p p o r t e d hypotheses is incorrect. While we motivated each hypothesis using the extant literature, in some cases some of the hypotheses that we tested had not been tested previously. Secondly, o t h e r variables o m i t t e d from our model could account m o r e for the incidence of dysfunctional behavior than those that we included. While w e acknowledge this problem, our reading of the literature led us to d e v e l o p o u r m o d e l based on those variables that s e e m e d to account in various ways for dysfunctional behavior. Thirdly, there could be m e a s u r e m e n t problems relating to the scales used. For instance, m o r e w o r k needs to be done to refine the measures of information asymmetries and dysfunctional behavior. As Fornell ( 1 9 8 3 ) notes, multiple indicators with relatively low correlations will increase the relationship b e t w e e n o b s e r v e d constructs. Thus, the m o d e r a t e reliabilities of the role conflict and job-induced tension measures may have artificially raised the structural estimates. It w o u l d be interesting to examine the different dimensions of information asymmetries and dysfunctional behavior. For example, Lawler & Rhode ( 1 9 7 6 ) and Birnberg e t al. ( 1 9 8 3 ) identify focusing, smoothing, gaming and invalid r e p o r t i n g as different aspects of the c o n s t r u c t of dysfunctional behavior. In this study, the construct was examined as a single entity. However, even with all of these concerns, we believe that this study has p r o v i d e d interesting results and provides a foundation for additional w o r k regarding h o w these and other variables lead to dysfunctional behavior on the part of middlelevel managers. CONCLUSION Finally, as was m e n t i o n e d earlier, researchers Overall, information asymmetries, goal con- still do not understand the link b e t w e e n gruence and p e e r dysfunctional behavior af- dysfunctional behavior and individual and firm fect the i n c i d e n c e of dysfunctional behavior performance. In some instances, firms might through a variety of pathways. The relations c o n d o n e some violations of the control system among variables are quite c o m p l e x and are if subordinates can d e m o n s t r a t e that these mediated, in some cases, by p e r s o n - r o l e con- violations may actually i m p r o v e p e r f o r m a n c e flict and job tension. Certainly the results did over the long run. For instance, even if a not s u p p o r t all of our hypotheses. This could subordinate manager is told to eliminate all have o c c u r r e d for a n u m b e r of reasons. Firstly, slack from his b u d g e t he could argue that giving

32 him more license to create to as be some investing leading

BERNARD J. JAWORSKI and S. MARK YOUNG slack allows in in to new better him his pertechformance which certainly in the future. The conditions under is

freedom (such

adventuresome

firms would

approve

of such behavior

activities nology),

a topic for future research.

ultimately

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35

APPENDIX:

MEASUREMENT

OF CONSTRUCTS

A. Goal Congruence ( 5 - p o i n t scale. Strongly A g r e e - S t r o n g l y Disagree, ct = 0 . 8 7 )


1. I feel that m y v a l u e s and the division's values are v e r y similar. 2. My goals and the division's goals are v e r y consistent. B. Peer Dysfunctional Behavior ( 5 - p o i n t scale, N e v e r - A l w a y s , ~t = 0 . 6 6 ) 1. I t h i n k m y p e e r s in this division t e n d to i g n o r e certain job-related activities b e c a u s e t h e y are n o t monitored by management. 2. 1 t h i n k m y p e e r s adjust m a r k e t i n g data to m a k e t h e i r p e r f o r m a n c e a p p e a r m o r e in line w i t h division goals. 3. W h e n m y p e e r s p r e s e n t data to u p p e r m a n a g e m e n t . I t h i n k t h e y try to e m p h a s i z e data w h i c h reflects favorably u p o n them. C. Information Asymmetry ( 5 - p o i n t scale, Strongly A g r e e - S t r o n g l y Disagree, ct = 0 . 9 0 ) 1. I k n o w h o w to a c c o m p l i s h the w o r k I n o r m a l l y e n c o u n t e r . 2. I a m i n t i m a t e l y familiar w i t h the day-to-day d e c i s i o n s r e l a t e d to m y work. 3. I h a v e d e v e l o p e d an e x c e l l e n t w o r k i n g k n o w l e d g e of m y job. 4. I can q u a n t i t a t i v e l y assess m y p e r f o r m a n c e after I c o m p l e t e m y activities. 5. I am able to a d e q u a t e l y assess m y p e r f o r m a n c e after I c o m p l e t e m y activities. 6. I can specify the m o s t i m p o r t a n t variables to m o n i t o r in m y work. 7. I c o u l d specify p e r f o r m a n c e o b j e c t i v e s to c o v e r the r a n g e of a c t i v i t i e s I perform. The s e v e n i t e m s b e l o w are s u b t r a c t e d from the c o r r e s p o n d i n g i t e m s a b o v e to form s e v e n "difference s c o r e " items. 1. My m a n a g e r k n o w s e x a c t l y h o w to a c c o m p l i s h the w o r k I n o r m a l l y e n c o u n t e r . 2. My m a n a g e r is i n t i m a t e l y familiar w i t h the day-to-day d e c i s i o n s r e l a t e d to m y work. 3. My m a n a g e r has d e v e l o p e d an e x c e l l e n t w o r k i n g k n o w l e d g e of m y job. 4. My m a n a g e r can q u a n t i t a t i v e l y assess m y p e r f o r m a n c e s o o n after I c o m p l e t e m y activities. 5. My m a n a g e r is able to a d e q u a t e l y assess m y p e r f o r m a n c e after I c o m p l e t e m y activities. 6. My m a n a g e r c a n specify the m o s t i m p o r t a n t variables to m o n i t o r in m y work. 7. My m a n a g e r c a n specify p e r f o r m a n c e o b j e c t i v e s to c o v e r the r a n g e of activities I perform. D. Role Conflict ( 5 - p o i n t scale, N e v e r - A l w a y s , ct = 0 . 5 9 ) 1. I p e r f o r m tasks that I t h i n k s h o u l d b e d o n e differently. 2. I h a v e to b u c k r u l e s or p o l i c i e s in o r d e r to carry o u t assignments. 3. In my v i e w I w o r k o n u n n e c e s s a r y things. E. Job-Induced Tension ( 5-point scale, N e v e r - A l w a y s , ct ~ 0 . 6 0 ) 1. I e x p e r i e n c e t e n s i o n in m y job. 2. I e x p e r i e n c e job t e n s i o n d u r i n g p e r f o r m a n c e evaluations. 3. If I d o n ' t attain m y p e r f o r m a n c e goals, I feel tense. F. Dysfunctional Behaviors ( 5 - p o i n t scale, N e v e r - A l w a y s , ~t = 0.75 ) 1.1 t e n d to i g n o r e c e r t a i n job-related activities s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e y are n o t m o n i t o r e d by the division. 2. I have a d j u s t e d m a r k e t i n g data to m a k e m y p e r f o r m a n c e m o r e in line w i t h d i v i s i o n goals. 3. W h e n p r e s e n t i n g data to u p p e r m a n a g e m e n t , I try to e m p h a s i z e data w h i c h reflect favorably u p o n me. 4. W h e n p r e s e n t i n g data to u p p e r m a n a g e m e n t , I try to a v o i d b e i n g the b e a r e r of bad news. 5. Even if m y p r o d u c t i v i t y is inconsistent, l still try to nlake it a p p e a r consistent.