CARPIO VS. M AGLALANG [196 SCRA 41; G.R. NO.

78162; 19 APR 1991] Facts: On January 8, 1987, information for the murder of Mayor Jose Payumo of Dinalupihan Bataan was filed against Escao and ten other unindentified persons by the provincial fiscal in the RTC of Bataan at Balanga. Four days later, the Acting Executive Judge of said court issued an order of arrest against Escao recommending no bail for his provisional liberty. Pat. Cesar Diego who acted on the warrant returned to the court with a certification issued by NBI agent Gonzales, stating therein that accused was still under investigation. Through counsel Rolando T. Cainoy, Escao filed in court an urgent ex-parte motion for his commitment at the provincial jail of Bataan on the ground that he wanted to be where his family and counsel could have easy access to him. He alleged therein that his detention at the NBI headquarters in Manila was irregular and in defiance of the warrant of arrest issued by the court. This was granted. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Director Carpio stating that the NBI needed physical custody of Escao for the identification of the other accused in the case who were still the objects of a manhunt by NBI agents; that in view of the finding of NBI agents that the other accused and suspects in the case were subversive elements or members of the New People's Army, it was for the best interest of Escao that he be detained at the NBI lock-up cell where security measures were adequate; and that the NBI would produce the person of Escao before the court whenever required and every time that there would be a hearing on the case. However another motion was executed by Escao stating that he now wants to be detained in the NBI, alleging that he did not authorize his counsel to execute the first motion. Also, Escao's counsel Rolando T. Cainoy filed an application for bail stating that Escao was arrested by NBI agents on December 7, 1986 without a warrant having been presented to him and that since then he had been detained in the lockup cell of the NBI; that said agents, also without a warrant, searched his house when he was arrested; that he was subjected to inhuman torture and forced to admit participation in the killing of Mayor Payumo and to implicate other persons, and that during the custodial investigation, he was not represented by counsel. In opposing said application, the public prosecutor averred that the accused was charged with a capital offense for which no bail may be availed of, that the reasons advanced in said application would be overcome by strong and sufficient evidence; and that during the custodial investigation, he was represented by counsel. The court granted the application for bail fixing the same at P30,000, having found no sufficient evidence against accused. Director Carpio was ordered to justify his actions and so as not to be considered in contempt. Issue: Whether or Not the order granting right to bail was proper. Held: No. The order granting bail had been rendered moot not only by the fact that he had been released from NBI custody, but also because Escao jumped bail and did not appear on the date set for his arraignment. Notwithstanding, the Court resolved the issue of the legality of the order granting bail to Escao. Although the right to bail is principally for the benefit of the accused, in the judicial determination of the availability of said right, the prosecution should be afforded procedural due process. Thus, in the summary proceeding on a motion praying for admission to bail, the prosecution should be given the opportunity to present evidence and, thereafter, the court should spell out at least a resume of the evidence on which its order granting or denying bail is based. Otherwise, the order is defective and voidable. In the case at bar the RTC erred in not summarizing the factual basis of its order granting bail, the court merely stated the number of prosecution witnesses but not their respective testimonies, and concluded that the evidence presented by the prosecution was not "sufficiently strong" to deny bail to Escao. The facts, however, that Mayor Payumo was killed on August 20, 1986 when the 1973 Constitution allowing the death penalty was still in force and that the application for bail was made on March 5, 1987 during the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution which abolished the death penalty, should not have gotten in the way of resolving the application for bail in accordance with the Constitution and procedural rules. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides that "(a)ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law." As the phrase "capital offenses" has been replaced by the phrase "offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, 25 crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua instead of those punishable by the death penalty, when evidence of guilt is strong, are the exceptions to the rule that the right to bail should be made available to all accused. As the court itself acknowledged in its order of April 2, 1987 that "capital punishment" in Section 4, Rule 114 has been amended to reclusion

perpetua, the court should have proceeded accordingly: i.e., resolved the application for bail pursuant to Section 13, Article III of the Constitution. It did not have to invoke the abolition of the death penalty and the lack of legislative enactment restoring it in justifying the grant of bail. All it had to do was to determine whether evidence of guilt is strong in the light of the provision of Section 13, Article III. The RTC has the discretion in the consideration of the strength of the evidence at hand. However, in the exercise of said discretion, the court is controlled by the following: first, the applicable provisions of the Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules which this Court may promulgate; and third, by those principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be part of the laws of the land. 27 The lower court not only failed to properly apply the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the Rules but it also disregarded equity and justice by its failure to take into account the factual milieu surrounding the detention of Escao PEOPLE VS. FORTES [223 SCRA 619; G.R. NO. 90643; 25 JUN 1993] Facts: Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said municipality to report a rape committed against the latter by the accused. Following this, the accused was apprehended and charged. A bond of P25000 was granted for accuseds provisional release. The MCTC found him guilty. An appeal to RTC was filed, the request for the fixing of bond was denied. Now accused assails denial of bail on the ground that the same amounted to an undue denial of his constitutional right to bail. Issue: Whether or Not the accuseds right to bail violated. Held: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA [200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO. 93177; 2 AUG 1991] Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process. In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail. The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release. Issue: Whether or Not there was a denial of due process. Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail. Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counteraffidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of G/SCM) It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-

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martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto. The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup. Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs. MANOTOC VS. COURT OF APPEALS [142 SCRA 149; G.R. NO. L-62100; 30 MAY 1986] Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel. Issue: Whether or Not the right to bail a matter of right. Held: The right to bail is a matter of right if the charge is not a capital offense or punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [159 SCRA 70; G.R. NOS. L-72335-39; 21 MAR 1988]

recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused. Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. GALMAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [144 SCRA 43; G.R. NO.72670; 12 SEP 1986] Facts: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom. The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them. Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer. Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution. But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them). Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process.

Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the

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Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused. Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause. Held: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process. Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacaang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'. The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twentysix respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office. More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded. The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice." Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no

reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process. The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and honor. PEOPLE VS. DRAMAYO [42 SCRA 60; G.R. L-21325; 29 OCT 1971] Facts: Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the robbery case where he is an accused. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The others were to station themselves nearby. Only Dramayo and Ecubin were convicted in the RTC for murder. Hence the appeal Issue: Whether or not the accuseds criminal liability proved beyond reasonable doubt. Held: Yes. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of innocence. So it must be, according to the Constitution. That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt be shown beyond reasonable doubt. What is required then is moral certainty. "By reasonable doubt is meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certain of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any carnal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof regular to constitute the offense." The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the two appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution. The principal contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time, there had been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party or parties, responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainty having arisen as to their capability. PEOPLE VS. ALCANTARA [240 SCRA 122; G.R. NO. 91283; 17 JAN 1995] Facts: On July 19, 1988, Venancio Patricio, accompanied by Larry Salvador, drove a ten-wheeler truck a Coca-Cola plant in Antipolo to load cases of softdrinks. They were about to leave the plant at 10:00pm when several men approached them to hitch for a ride. Ascertaining that Salvador knew

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appellant, Venancio accommodated appellant's request. Appellant had four companions. At Ortigas Ave., one of them poked a gun at Venancio and grabbed the steering wheel. At the North Diversion Road, Venancio and Salvador(helper) were brought down from the vehicle and tied to the fence of the expressway, thereafter they were stabbed and left bleeding to death. Venancio survived but Salvador did not.Appellant was arrested in the vicinity of Otis Street in Pandacan, Manila. A few days later, he was turned over to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group. Sgt. Alberto Awanan brought the appellant to the MCU hospital and was presented to Venancio for identification. Appellant was brought to the Headquarters at Camp Crame where he confessed. Appelants Defense: Denial and alibi. He said that he was just applying to be a driver and stayed there even if he was told that no work was available, to confirm with the truck drivers. While he was applying for CONCEPCION TRUCKING located across Otis street from the Coca-cola plant. He was arrested. He denied any knowledge of the "hit" on the Coca-cola delivery truck. He remained in the custody of the police for two days and two nights. On the third day of his detention, he was turned over to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group. Appellant was the brought to the MCU hospital. He was made to confront Venancio whom he saw for the first time. CHPG Sgt. Awanan asked Venancio twice if appellant was among those who hijacked the truck he was driving. On both times, Venancio did not respond. Undaunted, Sgt. Awanan, called to a photographer present, forced appellant to stand about a foot from Venancio, and told the latter to just point at the suspect. "Basta ituro mo lang," Sgt. Awanan directed. Venancio obeyed, and pictures of him pointing to the suspect were taken. From the hospital, appellant was brought to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group headquarters at Camp Crame. Without being apprised of his rights nor provided with counsel, he was interrogated and urged to confess his guilt. He balked. At ten o'clock that night, hours after questioning began, appellant's interrogators started boxing him and kicking him. He was also hit on the back with a chair, and electrocuted. Still, he refused to admit to the crime. In the midst of his ordeal, appellant heard someone say, "Tubigan na iyan." He was then blindfolded and brought to another room where he was made to lie down. Water was slowly and continuously poured on his face, over his mouth. Appellant could no longer bear the pain caused by the water treatment. Finally, he confessed to being one of the hijackers. He was led to another room, where he was handcuffed and left until the following day. Later, he was made to sign prepared statements containing his full confession. Alcantara was arraigned under an information charging him and four others (at large) with the crime of robbery with Homicide and Frustrated Homicide. The trial court convicted the accused despite the following inconsistency between Venancios affidavit and testimony: Affidavit Testimony 1. mentioned 5 assailants was identified 2. stabbing was preceded by a assailants had a 3. conference by all assailants 4. claimed to have allowed assailants identify Alcantara 5. to hitch a ride because Alcantara and in open 6. was familiar to them to another person)

laws strictly ordain their protection following the Magsaysay desideratum that those who have less in life should have more in law. CORPUZ VS. REPUBLIC [194 SCRA 73; G.R. NO. 74259; 14 FEB 1991] Facts: Generoso Corpuz is the Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Viscaya. He was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said office. In this capacity, he received collections, disbursed funds and made bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to government accounts. On April 13, 1981 his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated and a transfer of accountabilities was effected between him and his successor. The Certificate of turnover revealed a shortage of P72,823.00. He was able to pay only P10,159.50. After a final demand letter for the total of P50,596.07 which was not met, a case of malversation was filed against him. Corpuz did not deny such facts but he insists that the shortage was malversed by other persons. He alleged that Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through 1 of 4 separate checks (PNB) issued and encashed such checks while he was of leave. Also, Acting Deputy Provincial Treasurer Bernardo Aluning made to post the amount on his cashbook although he had not received the said amount. He was convicted in Sandiganbayan. Issue: Whether or Not Corpuz is guilty of malversation. Held: It is a subtle way of camouflaging the embezzlement of the money equivalent when 1 of the 4 checks issued and encashed in the same day was entered in the accuseds cash book 3 months after such encashments. Also, Corpuz claim that he was absent when Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through 1 of 4 separate checks (PNB) issued and encashed such checks, was not proven. Post-Audit is not a preliminary requirement to filing a malversation case. The failure of the public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by an authorized officer shall be a prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to personal use. The equipoise rule(balancing test) which is the presumption of innocence is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly balance, in which case the scale of justice should be tilt in favor of the accused. There is no such balance in the case at bar. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his claims. The presumed innocence must yield to the positive finding that he is guilty of malversation. Wherefore his petition is denied. He is guilty as principal of Malversation of Public Funds. PEOPLE VS. HOLGADO [85 PHIL 752; G.R.L-2809; 22 MAR 1950]

- only Alcantara Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information, only 3 being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for - conference about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal failed to liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was presented to indict the - at the hospital latter. Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the - court (pointed trial court. Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have Issue: Whether or not the rights of the accused was violated. attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of Held: YES. The peoples evidence failed to meet the quantum required to attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A overcome the presumption. The second identification which correctly pointed reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. This was violated. to accused by Venancio should not be credited. There is no reason for him to Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be held to err as they know each other for 3 years. It was also incorrect to give too answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all much weight to Police Sgt. Awanans testimony as to the previous accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal identification at the hospital. The testimony of Sgt. Awanan was not cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the corroborated by Venancio. opportunity to be heard by counsel. The identification procedure was irregular. Due process demands that the The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of identification procedure of criminal suspects must be free from impermissible accused. The record does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. suggestions as the influence of improper suggestion probably accounts for Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor. Conviction must be offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by based on the strength of the prosecution and not the weakness of the the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no defense. There was blatant violation of the constitutional rights of appellant way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or as an accused. Appellant belongs to the economically deprived in our may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became society. He is nearly illiterate(third grade education). Our Constitution and our satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the

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court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court. PEOPLE VS. MAGSI [124 SCRA 64; G.R. NO.L-32888; 12 AUG 1983] Facts: Soon after appellant was apprehended on August 20, 1970, his arraignment was scheduled before the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La Union. The case was actually set and rescheduled for six (6) times, first of which was on August 1, 1970. On that date, despite appointment by the court of Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing was re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion of Atty. Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it because of accused desire to be represented by a de parte counsel. Prior to the next hearing, Atty. Rivera moved to withdraw as de officio counsel and it was favorably acted on by the court on September 7, 1970. At the second hearing on September 8, 1970, for failure of the de officio and de parte counsels to appear, despite a second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for the next day and the court appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On the third hearing date, neither the de parte nor the de officio counsel was in Court, so Atty. Rivera was reappointed that day as de officio counsel for arraignment purposes only. The accused del Rosario entered a plea of guilty but qualified it with the allegation that he committed the crime out of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the other coaccused. Appellant was found guilty of murder and made to suffer the death penalty. Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the rights of the accused Held: YES. The desire to speed up the disposition of cases should not be effected at the sacrifice of the basic rights of the accused. Citing People vs. Domingo (55 SCRA 243-244): the trial courts should exercise solicitous care before sentencing the accused on a plea of guilty especially in capital offenses by first insuring that the accused fully understands the gravity of the offense, the severity of the consequences attached thereto as well as the meaning and significance of his plea of guilty; and that the prudent and proper thing to do in capital cases is to take testimony, to assure the court that the accused has not misunderstood the nature and effect of his plea of guilty. Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused, resetting of hearing by the court for alleged reception of evidence when in fact none was conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to the accused whether he understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient compliance. BORJA VS. MENDOZA [77 SCRA 422; G.R. NO.L-45667; 20 JUN 1977]

fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. Being arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. Also, respondent Judge Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an arraignment. With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel being thus manifest, it is correct that the Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being null. The absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial. Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment of petitioner. RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE TV OF TRIAL OF JOSEPH ESTRADA [360 SCRA 248; A.M. NO 01-4-03-SC; 29 JUN 2001] Facts: The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting the Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. Issue: Whether or Not live media coverage of the trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be permitted by the court. Held: The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred to win. Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted about its individual settings nor made an object of publics attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only be evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial, it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public. Nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions. PEOPLE VS. SALAS [143 SCRA 163; G.R. NO. L-66469; 29 JUL 1986] Facts: At about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1992, a 60 year old woman, identified as Virginia Talens was found lying dead in a canal at Bo. San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga; she was last seen alive at about 3:00 o'clock early morning of March 6, 1992 by Orlando Pangan and Richard Pangan who were with her going home coming from the wake of one Leonardo Flores; both Orlando and Richard Pangan testified that accused was with them in going home at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1992; Orlando and Richard Pangan reached first their house and left the two on the way and that was the last time Virginia was seen alive; just a few minutes after reaching his house and while inside his house, Orlando Pangan heard a

Facts: Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. However, he was not arraigned. That not withstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The case was appealed to the Court o First Instance in Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It was alleged that the failure to arraign him is a violation of his constitutional rights. It was also alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered The Solicitor General commented that the decision should be annulled because there was no arraignment. Issue: Whether or Not petitioners constitutional right was violated when he was not arraigned. Held: Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. It is also not just due process that requires an arraignment. It is required in the Rules that an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made

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shout; another woman, one Serafia Gutierrez, testified that she likewise was awakened by a shout at about 3:00 in the morning; Dr. Aguda who autopsied the victim found hematoma on the head and chest, an abrasion on the left chin and stabwound on the neck which stabwound, the doctor claims, was the cause of death of the victim; Police Investigator Gonzales who immediately responded upon report, recovered at the scene a pin, the victim's wristwatch, earring, a ring and P135.00 money; he likewise found on March 9, 1992 when he continued his investigation bloodstain on the front door of the house of the accused which bloodstain when submitted for examination was found to be of human blood; one Resultay was with Virginia Talens at about 5:00 afternoon of March 5, 1992 in going to the wake, who claims that Virginia had money on a purse as while they were on the way Virginia bet on a jueteng she saw Virginia got money from her purse a P500.00 bill but as she had no change she instead took P8.00 from her other pocket; one Ramil Talens, a son of the victim corroborated the claim of Resultay that Virginia had with her at that time money worth P2,000.00 as in the morning of March 5, 1992 he gave her mother for safekeeping the sum of P1,500.00 which he claims his mother placed in her purse and claims further that at the wake, he asked and was given P50.00 by his mother as he also participated in the gambling thereat, however, the purse of Virginia containing about P2,000.00 was no longer to be found when she was found dead; Orlando Pangan saw the accused gambled in the wake; Virginia likewise gambled at the wake; accused had been working for three days before March 6 at Sta. Ana, Pampanga and up to March 5, 1992, but the following day, he did not anymore report for work at Sta. Ana, Pampanga, was no longer to be found and was last seen at about 3:00 morning together with Virginia Talens on their way home coming from the wake; the parents of [the] accused were informed by Investigator Gonzales that their son was the suspect and adviced them to surrender him, but since March 6, 1992 when accused left Mexico, Pampanga, he returned only on September 19, 1992 at Arayat, Pampanga, not at Mexico, Pampanga where he was ultimately apprehended by the Mexico Police on September 22, 1992 after chancing on a radio message by the police of Arayat to their Provincial commander that a vehicular incident occurred at Arayat, Pampanga where one Elmer Salas was the victim and was hospitalized at the district hospital at Arayat, Pampanga where he used the name of Rommel Salas and not Elmer Salas. The trial court rendered convicting Salas for Robbery with Homicide

authorities. Appellant was apprehended only a full six months after the date of the crime, following his confinement in a hospital in Arayat, Pampanga because he was sideswiped by a Victory Liner bus in Arayat. When hospitalized, appellant used the alias Rommel Salas, instead of his true name Elmer Salas. These circumstances denote flight, which when unexplained, has always been considered by the courts as indicative of guilt. Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake they attended. The victim was, in fact, enjoying a winning streak when her son, Ramil Talens, came to fetch her but which he failed to do because his mother was winning, and she refused to leave. The purse of Talens containing cash was gone when her corpse was found in the canal with a stab wound and bruises. What was left was a safety pin which victim used to fasten the missing purse to her clothes. Denial is an inherently weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Denial is negative and selfserving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimonies of credible witnesses who positively testified that appellant was at the locus criminis and was the last person seen with the victim alive. The absence of evidence showing any improper motive on the part of the principal witness for the prosecution to falsely testify against the appellant strongly tends to buttress the conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that the testimony of said witnesses deserve full faith and credit. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wants to save the State the trouble of having to effect his arrest. Spontaneity and intent to give one's self up are absent where the accused went into hiding for six months after the incident and had to resort to an alias when he was involved in an accident being investigated by the police authorities.

Robbery with Homicide is a special complex crime against property. Homicide is incidental to the robbery which is the main purpose of the criminal. In charging Robbery with Homicide, the onus probandi is to establish: "(a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized with animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is used in the generic sense, was committed." Although there was no witness as to the actual robbing of the victim, there is testimony that the victim had more or Issue: Whether or Not there is evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction of the less P2,000.00; and wore gold earrings valued at P750.00. These were never recovered. appellant of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Whether or Not the appellants crime homicide or robbery with homicide. While there is indeed no direct proof that Virginia Talens was robbed at the time she was killed, we may conclude from four circumstances that the robbery occasioned her killing: (1) Both appellant and victim gambled at the Held: wake. (2) The appellant knew that victim was winning. (3) The victim was last There was no eyewitness or direct evidence; either to the robbery or to the seen alive with appellant. (4) The victim's purse containing her money and homicide and none of the things allegedly stolen were ever recovered. earrings were missing from her body when found. However, direct evidence is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its findings and conclusion of culpability. Resort to circumstantial The decision of the regional trial court is affirmed. Costs against appellant. So evidence is essential when to insist on direct testimony would result in setting ordered. felons free. US VS. TAN TENG [23 PHIL 145; G.R. NO. 7081; 7 SEP 1912] For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the theory that the accused is guilty of the offense charged, and at the same time Facts: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the victim and it was alleged that possible, rational hypothesis excepting that of guilt. All the circumstances he entered her home and threw the victim on the floor and place his private established must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one and fair parts over hers. Several days later, Pacomio was suffering from a disease and reasonable conclusion pointing solely to the accused, to the exclusion of called gonorrhea. Pacomio told her sister about what had happened and all other persons, as the author of the crime. The facts and circumstances reported it to the police. consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified can constitute evidence which, in weight and probative value, may be him. He was then stripped of his clothing and was examined by a policeman. He was found to have the same symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took deemed to surpass even direct evidence in its effect on the court. The fatal stabbing of Virginia Talens occurred at around 3:00 a.m. of March a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned 6, 1992. Appellant hastily abandoned his house in Barrio San Nicolas, it over to the Bureau of Science. The results showed that the defendant was Mexico, Pampanga, his residence since childhood, on that very date. suffering from gonorrhea. Appellant was nowhere when his co-worker and barrio mate, Eduardo The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim had Bagtas, came to appellant's house to fetch him for work at around 6:30 to acquired came from the defendant herein. Such disease was transferred by 7:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant also abandoned his job as a painter in the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter. The defendant alleged that Sta. Ana, Pampanga, on March 6, 1992, the date of the crime, leaving behind the said evidence should be inadmissible because it was taken in violation of an unfinished painting project. He was not seen again from said date. Police his right against self-incrimination. investigators found human bloodstains on the front door of appellant's house, on his clothing, and on his yellow slippers after the victim was killed. Despite Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a violation of efforts of the police to find appellant as the principal suspect, a fact known to the defendants rights against self-incrimination. appellant's family and neighbors, appellant did not present himself to the

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Held: The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a violation of the said right. He was neither compelled to make any admissions or to answer any questions. The substance was taken from his body without his objection and was examined by competent medical authority. The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. It would be the same as if the offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him may be used as evidence against him. VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS [41 PHIL 62; G.R. NO. 16444; 8 SEP 1920] Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the petitioner to subject herself into physical examination to test whether or not she was pregnant to prove the determine the crime of adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to such physical examination interposing the defense that such examination was a violation of her constitutional rights against self-incrimination. Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioners constitutional rights against self-incrimination. Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. BELTRAN VS. SAMSON [53 PHIL 570; G.R. NO. 32025; 23 SEPT 1929] Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself. Issue: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination. Held: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons. PASCUAL VS. BME [28 SCRA 345; G.R. NO. 25018; 26 MAY 1969] Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave

abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against selfincrimination. The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing. Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board. Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the Self-Incrimination Clause. Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will." The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. PEOPLE VS. COURT OF SILAY [74 SCRA 248; G.R. NO. L-43790; 9 DEC 1976] Facts: That sometime on January 4,1974, accused Pacifico Sensio, Romeo Millan and Wilfredo Jochico who were then scalers at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane cars No.1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with sugar canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight report cards), Apparently, it was proven and shown that there was padding of the weight of the sugar canes and that the information on the tarjetas were to be false making it appear to be heavier than its actual weight. The three accused then were charged with Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified document. After the prosecution had presented, the respondent moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidences presented were not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on the motion, respondent court issued its order dismissing the case on the ground that the acts committed by the accused do not constituted the crime of falsification as strictly enumerated in the revised penal code defining the crime of falsification which was charged earlier and that their case be dismissed. People asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable even if the case at bar was dismissed because according to them, it was done with the consent of the accused therefore waiving there defense of double jeopardy. The accused on the other hand, reiterated the fact that the dismissal was due to lack of merits of the prosecution which would have the same effect as an acquittal which will bar the prosecution from prosecuting the accused for it will be unjust and unconstitutional for the accused due to double jeopardy rule thus the appeal of the plaintiff. Issue: Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court would place the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico in double jeopardy Held: Yes the revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been dismissed earlier due to lack of merits. It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on a motion of the accused however this was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for the evidence beyond reasonable ground which the prosecution had not been able to do which would be tantamount to acquittal therefore will bar the prosecution of another case. As it was stated on the requirements of a valid defense of double jeopardy it says: That there should be a valid complaint, second would be that such complaint be filed before a competent court and to which the accused has pleaded and that defendant was previously acquitted, convicted or dismissed or otherwise

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terminated without express consent of the accused in which were all present in the case at bar. There was indeed a valid, legitimate complaint and concern against the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico which was filed at a competent court with jurisdiction on the said case. It was also mentioned that the accused pleaded not guilty and during the time of trial, it was proven that the case used against the accused were not sufficient to prove them guilty beyond reasonable doubt therefore dismissing the case which translates to acquittal. It explained further that there are two instances when we can conclude that there is jeopardy when first is that the ground for the dismissal of the case was due to insufficiency of evidence and second, when the proceedings have been reasonably prolonged as to violate the right of the accused to a speedy trial. In the 2 requisites given, it was the first on that is very much applicable to our case at bar where there was dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of evidence which will bar the approval of the petition in the case at bar for it will constitute double jeopardy on the part of the accused which the law despises PEOPLE VS. RELOVA [149 SCRA 292; G.R. NO.L-45129; 6 MAR 1987] FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with personnel of Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and examine the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city government and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. Said devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the plants electric meter. The case was dismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint was filed nine months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to discovery that the act being a light felony and prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage and prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscals claim is that it is not double jeopardy because the first offense charged against the accused was unauthorized installation of electrical devices without the approval and necessary authority from the City Government which was punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as opposed to the second offense which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint against Mr.Opulencia. Issue:

PEOPLE VS. DE LA TORRE [380 SCRA 586; G.R. NOS. 137953-58; 11 MAR 2002] Facts: Wilfredo dela Torre, appellee, has three children from a common-law relationship, the eldest of which is Mary Rose. When Mary Rose was 7 yearsold, her mother left them together with her youngest brother so she and her other brother were left to the care of her father. Mary Rose was the brightest in her class despite their poverty. However, in January 1997, a sudden change in Mary Roses behavior behavior was noticed. She was twelve years old at that time. She appeared sleepy, snobbish and she also urinated on her panty. When confronted by her head teacher, Mary Rose admitted that she was abused repeatedly by her father. Her father, however, denied vehemently the charges being imputed to him by her daughter. The RTC convicted appellee of two counts of acts of lasciviousness and four counts of murder. However, the RTC refused to impose the supreme penalty of death on appellee. It maintained that there were circumstances that mitigated the gravity of the offenses such as the absence of any actual physical violence or intimidation on the commission of the acts, that after the mother of Mary Rose left the conjugal home, for more than five years, Wilfredo, Mary Rose and her brother were living together as a family and Mary Rose was never molested by her father. The prosecution seeks to modify the RTC Decision by imposing the supreme penalty of death of the accused. It argues that it has proven that the victim is the daughter of the accused, and that she was below eighteen years old when the rapes took place. As a consequence, the trial court should have been imposed the penalty of death pursuant to Section 11 of R.A. 7659. . Issue: Whether or Not the Court erred in penalizing the appellee with reclusion perpetua in each of the four indictments of rape, instead of imposing the supreme penalty of death as mandated by R.A. 7659. Held: Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party may appeal from a judgment or final order unless the accused will be put in double jeopardy. In People vs. Leones, it declared that:

while it is true that this Court is the Court of last resort, there are allegations of error committed by a lower court which we ought not to look into to uphold the right of the accused. Such is the case in an appeal by the prosecution seeking to increase the penalty imposed upon the accused for this runs afoul of the right of the accused against double jeopardyWhen the accused after conviction by the trial court did not appeal his decision, an appeal by the government seeking to increase the penalty imposed by the trial court places the accused in double jeopardy and should Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as therefore be dismissed. defense to the second offense charged against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of electricity punishable by a statute against The ban on double jeopardy primarily prevents the State from using its the Revised Penal Code. criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused Held: by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves as a deterrent Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. offense because as tediously explained in the case of Yap vs Lutero, the bill And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the of rights give two instances or kinds of double jeopardy. The first would be defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. that No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense and the second sentence states that If an act is punishable by a law Being violative of the right against double jeopardy, the appeal of the or an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution prosecution cannot prosper. for the same act. In the case at bar, it was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of double jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. It further explains that even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second charge was a violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the two charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy. The fact that Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from the same identity as that of the 1 st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.

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