Coming of Age in the Urban Kampung:

Gang Demographics and Territories in Select Jakarta Neighborhoods- Preliminary Findings Bobby Anderson and Justin Snyder1 A paper prepared for The City and Illegality: Territorial Control in Indonesian Cities, Panel No. 71, 7th Annual European Association for South East Asian Studies Conference, School of Social and Political Sciences, Technical University of Lisboa (ISCSP/UTL), Lisbon, Portugal, 02-05 July 2013. Introduction: Though the understanding of Jakartas larger and well-established criminal (preman) groups such as Forum Komunikasi Anak Betawi (Betawi Peoples Communication Forum or FORKABI), Forum Betawi Rumpug (Betawi Brotherhood Forum or FBR), Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth), and Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front or FPI) continues to be expanded by scholars such as Ian Wilson, smaller groups remain a relatively underdeveloped area of research in the realm of criminology, conflict, and security in Indonesia. Difficulties in forming relationships with credible sources, the inherent distrust of outsiders, and connections to members of the police and military make research on these groups difficult. Explicit territorial analysis of these larger groups has also often proven difficult to conduct as, with the exception of explicit home territories (such as the FPIs Tanah Abang), these groups do not control static and specific areas in the same way more conventional street gangs might, with explicitly demarcated areas of influence, control and operation inside their home turf. The franchising operations these groups engage in, especially FBR and Forkabi, give them a visible presence much greater than their physical presence. In this, sub-gangs lease the name of a given group (and its reputation): an exchange relationship of gang and sub-gang then allows for franchise sub-gangs to call on the larger entities for support in conflicts with non-affiliates. In several interviews, community leaders have painted a picture of Jakartas preman groups as utilizing violence on-demand, mobilizing members from across the Greater Jakarta area, including the suburbs of Tanggerang, Depok and Bekasi. As soon as extra muscle is no longer needed, members disburse and return to their respective areas. Given the challenges outlined above, the authors began research on more territorially-bound and lesser-known groups in four specific kelurahan-level neighborhoods of Central and Southern Jakartas Menteng and Setiabudi Districts primarily Pasar Manggis, with supplementary research in Menteng, Manggarai, and Pegangsaan. In pursuance of this we established a partnership with the Center for Inter-Group Relations and Conflict Resolution (CERIC) at the Faculty of Sociology and Political Science, Universitas Indonesia (http://www.cericfisip.ui.ac.id/). CERICs Imam Prasodjo and his NGO, Nurai Dunia, were especially beneficial: the group has worked with 50+ gangs over the last 10 years in Setiabudi and Menteng, reforming some members into community activists who now volunteer for Nurai Dunia, working with youth
This research was funded by a Nokia Global University grant. The authors wish to thank Josfish Kaye, formerly of Nokia, and now at Yahoo. The authors also wish to thank Tico Ballagas, Mari Mutila and Seppo Pienemaa. At the Center For Inter-Group Relations and Conflict Resolution at UI, the authors wish to thank Ibu Amalia, Pak Jufri, Imam Prasodjo & Nurai Dunia, and a special thanks to Adit Andikaputra, Abe, Ferry, and Jehoshaphat, as well as Praditya A. Putra, Syukira Ferry, Iham Abrar, Yosafat, Nurul Y. Aziz, Pandu, Adriana, Andhika Aji Baksoro, Arinal, Budi, Janu, and Zuhdi Pamudi.
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in after-school drop-in centers that offer remedial educational opportunities and music classes, and more generally, places to hang out other than gang shelters or convenience store parking lots. Nurai Dunia utilized their contacts with gangs in the pursuance of the survey, and CERIC helped in the development of the questionnaires and in data collection through house-to-house surveys. Survey Details and Rationale: The research team sought to understand the demographics of local gang members, the territory they control, the activities they conduct, the income they earn, why they joined, their future aspirations, and their perception among neighborhood residents, among other questions. A subset of this profiling of gang members was the economic and other profiling of non-gang members. This study also sought to measure, indirectly and within discrete territories, who controls what. The reason for the solicitation and analysis of this data is to understand motivations for joining and remaining in these smaller gangs, to determine the connection of these gangs with the larger entrepreneurs of violence who dominate the Jakarta gang scene, and to determine the embeddedness of the gang within the host community. The survey conducted interviews with gang members, family members and neighbors of gang members, and community members in gang areas: shopkeepers, taxi and ojek drivers, civil servants, business owners, teachers, and so on. The survey also recorded age, relationship status, number of children, number of dependents, criminal history (if any), educational level (secular), educational level (pesantren/ religious), literacy, vocational skill-sets, family sizes, education levels of parents, yearly income levels, drug and alcohol use, and so on. The gangs targeted in this exercise existed at a sub-level to better-known entities such as FBR, Forkabi, FPI, and others, although a few of the larger sub-gangs claimed informal affiliations with these larger entities. The survey also attempted to measure what legal and extralegal services these gangs provide in their areas of operation, especially public areas they assert control over, as well as their relationships with the coercive elements of the state- local police or military. Information & Communication Technology (ICT) Usage: ICT penetration and usage among gang members and gang neighborhood residents was also surveyed. The survey evaluated spontaneous usage of ICT and social media in the neighborhoods in order to identify current usage and seek to understand the potential for ICT in such areas, among gangs and residents. Technology preferences, social media utilizations, and the purposes of use were measured. ICT and social media platforms remain poorly understood in such contexts and it was assumed that the inclusion of this within the survey would provide useful data. But the ICT usage identified was often surprising and not in line with the research teams assumptions (please refer to the preliminary findings below). ICT was also utilized over the course of the survey: UI volunteers and ex-gang members used mobile phones in order to conduct the surveys (with all data then uploaded to https://nokiadatagathering.net/), demarcate territories (highlighting areas of exclusive, contested or cooperative gang control or the absence of a dominant group), and spatially map their neighborhoods. This mapping process is ongoing, but initial maps of discrete territories, Pos Kamling/hang out areas, and concurrent police presence, are found below. A Brief History of Jakartas Gangs:

Indonesias, and Jakartas, rich gang tapestry has been explored thoroughly in the writings of Joshua Barker, Robert Cribb, Loren Ryter, Ian Wilson and others. However, some background is necessary to frame this small study within broader gang and state contexts. The rule of law is fluidly defined in Indonesia: overlapping and often contradictory criminal codes dating back to the Dutch colonial era, and systemic corruption among coercive state elements and the courts, mean that the degree of ones obsciescence to the law is relative to ones power vis-a-vis the law; the state often has different legal codes to choose from, depending on who is caught within its laws. And while Indonesia has, since 1998, slowly emerged from backto-back dictatorships (1959 to 1965 under Sukarnos Guided Democracy, and 1966-1998 under Suhartos New Order), the state has always, to a certain extent, depended on gangs in order to control communities. This reciprocal relationship, between the state and the gangs it co-opted whereby gangs were allowed income-generating extralegal activities in exchange for their state-friendly control of said areas and, often as not, election coercion (especially for Golkar), did not begin under Soekarno or Suharto. Such relationships began under the Dutch, who pragmatically recognized the territories that were beyond their control, especially in the Ommelanden (Van Till 2011) beyond the walls of Batavia, and appointed the local strong men of those Kampungs as Kapitans, to keep order. This relationship, between elements of the state and gangs, began in earnest over the course of the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI), when gangs were utilized to round up and often kill suspected communists. The relationship was strengthened when gangs were utilized to intimidate citizens into voting for Golkar, the political party shaped to serve as a vehicle for Suharto, beginning in the early 1970s. Over the course of this interaction, certain state-sanctioned gangs emerged, foremost among them Pemuda Pancasila, with groups such as Pemuda Pancamarga also protected by the state in exchange for doing its bidding. Numerous other gangs, less recognized, maintained relationships with the state as well. However, after the 1982 elections, certain elements of the state security services turned upon these gangs, perhaps because they were seen to be assuming too great a level of power at the grassroots, and so the Penembakan Misterius (PETRUS) campaign began, first in Yogyakarta, and later, across Java: roughly 10,000 gang members, petty criminals, or just people unfortunate enough to have visible tattoos, were killed by persons unknown but of military bearing, with the bodies often left in grotesque public displays. The brutality of many of the killings had to do with the spiritually protected status of many of the victims, who were thought to have achieved some level of invulnerability to knives and bullets (Barker 1998). The murders, then, were marked by overkill. Accompanying PETRUS was constant media coverage of rising crime (Siegel 1998). Post-PETRUS, Pemuda Pancasila and others continued to serve the state until its demise in 1998: lording over petty fiefdoms whilst occasionally organizing intimidating rallies or assaulting, vandalizing, etc., on behalf of their patrons. In areas of Indonesias periphery, especially those hosting insurgencies, militias were formed by state elements, but these were simply criminal gangs with more overt support, training: the antiseparatist East Timorese militias2 and the PETA militias in the Aceh highlands3, to name but two.
At least 13 large militias were created by Indonesian security actors: the most infamous was led by a gangster named Eurico Guterres who is now a politician with Partai Amanat Nasional in West Timor. East Timor-born Jakarta gangster Hercules Rozario Marcal also worked for the Indonesian military in the then-province in the 1980s and 90s under then-KOPASSUS commander Prabowo Subianto before returning to tend to his organized criminal activities in Tanah Abang- the future turf of Front Pembela Islam. Hercules was recently arrested for vandalism- an indication that his star is waning, despite his affiliation with Prabowoone of the front-runners for the 2014 presidency. 3 The PETA militias were formed by Indonesian security actors as a counterweight to Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (the Free Aceh Movement or GAM) in the multi-ethnic highlands of Aceh. They were generally recruited from pre-existing gangs led by local elites dominant in the contracting and coffee business. A PETA affiliate, incidentally, runs the main
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The end of the New Order marked the decline of state-sponsored gangs such as Pemuda Pancasila, and the rise of others, including many with religious or ethnic affiliations. Indonesias foremost religious gang, the Front Pembela Islam, emerged from the Pamswakarsa mob formed by then-General and current perennial presidential candidate Wiranto in late 1998 in order to protect the DPR from student protesters opposed to the Habibie government. In eastern Indonesia, communal violence resulting from post-New Order local political struggles quickly degenerated into ethnic and religious violence based on markers of identity, and with this violence emerged the state-sponsored Laskar Jihad, which fought in the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi. In Papua, the Barisan Merah Putih and other groups were formed to defend state interests. The new era of democracy was also marked by the emergence of numerous political parties who all also felt the need to form their own party militias of Satuan Tugas (Satgas): for example, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) hosted four militias, although only one was official (Wilson 2005). Concurrent to this was the emergence of ethnically based gangs, especially those who claim to speak for Jakartas indigenous Betawi community: Forum Betawi Rumpug (FBR) and Forum Komunikasi Anak Betawi (FORKABI). Both of these groups, besides having a core gang, operate as franchises and have spread across Jakarta accordingly, with FBR being the most powerful. Other ethnically based gangs representing Timorese, Ambonese, Kei Islanders, and others, have emerged, with infamous leaders such as Hercules and John Kei. Meanwhile, Pemuda Pancasila, Pancamarga and others have lost power but still exist: the former remains strong in Medan and Bandung, the latter, less so. Wilson (2005) notes that in the New Order, gangs needed patrons, but now, the relationships power structure is no longer so skewed in favor of the state. Entrepreneurs of violence maintain more reciprocal relationships. And as Tilly explored in his groundbreaking War Making and State Making as Organized Crime (1985), such reciprocity between self-seeking entrepreneurs is reflective of the kinship of inlaws and outlaws. These new emerging gangs, and their still-surviving precursors, earn through the provision of security personnel for bars and nightclubs across Jakarta; through rent-a-mob activities, debt collection, and extralegal taxation on businesses within their territories; and though control of parking areas, markets and transportation hubs. Gangs in control of such assets are not only engaging in racketeering activities: a gang crackdown in several Jakarta bus stations in 2008 resulted in chaos. Crime increased: the gangsters taxing bus stations also enforced queues of buses entering and leaving stations in an orderly fashion and policed the stations to ensure garbage was disposed of and petty crime was controlled, among other services. They were providing a service that the state transportation authorities were not. These kinds of statenonstate organizational relationships are obvious, not just in Jakarta, but across Indonesia: for example, the largest markets in Maluku are run by gangs, as is every bus station in Aceh. Smaller and sub-Franchise Gangs: These large and flamboyant entities dominate Jakartas gang scene. However, under these larger entities exist hundreds of other, smaller, territorially based gangs, in neighborhoods across the city. Some of them participate in larger gang franchises; some of them have members with affiliations with larger gangs: but they are rooted in entirely local settings and their membership is constituted by territoriality rather than ethnicity. The history of these gangs is similar to gangs the world over: boys and teenagers banding together both to show solidarity with one another and
highlands bus station, and a gang fight between them and ex-GAM over that asset resulted in the massacre of 5 exGAM in early 2008.

in opposition to others. In poorer communities, these smaller gangs seem to be a common way station for many youths to pass through on their path to adulthood. Despite their origins in solidarity and opposition, many of these smaller groups soon engage in extralegal economic activities within their defined territory, and like larger entities, compete with other gangs over lucrative areas. In the surveyed neighborhoods, these smaller gangs function as coercive bodies to keep order, with the collusion of local law enforcement. Organization and control functions are especially obvious in markets, parking areas, and public transport hubs. Like their older brothers, the smaller gangs also provide attendees for political rallies and protests: some of them are petty drug dealers. The territories and memberships of these small gangs are fluid: they are a historically continuous presence in Jakarta, although the names change. Joshua Barker (1998) lists some of the 39 gangs known by police to exist in 1970: Girl gangs: The Fu Man Chu, The Single Girl, The Pretty Doll, Monalisa, The Hunter Boys, Amigos. Regional gangs: Banten Boy, Batak Boy, AMS (Ambon-Maluku-Seram). ABRI (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) gangs: Gang Siliwangi, Gang Beerland, Gang Panser. Mixed gangs: Santana, The Trouble, SBC (Santa Barisan Setan), MBC (Manggarai Boy's Club), Sarlala (Sarang Laba Laba), Kasko (Kami Selalu Kompak), Kobel, Tjablak, Scarlet BCD, Motor Scarlet, Flamboyant, Devil Kids, The Casanova SK 700, Provost, Chabreek, 9 AK, Mr. Lonely Heart, The Bat Boy MDC, The Flaming Cos, Leo Patra, The Legos. In Bandung: Mexis, AMX, BBC (Buah Batu Boy's Club), Melos (Menak Lodaya Sadis), Megas (Menak Galunggung Sadis), Amek (Anak Muda Emong Karapitan), Hippies Dago, Dollar, Patorados, Bexis, TXC.4 Siegel, in A New Criminal Type in Jakarta (1998), noted a similar menagerie of gangs at the time of Petrus. And Cribb, in Gangsters and Revolutionaries, discusses a similar topography of gangs, albeit with an older membership - a historical extension of the same gangs discussed by Margaret Van Till (2011). Manggarai, Menteng, Pasar Manggis and Pegangsaan: Jakartas Manggarai, Menteng, Pasar Manggis, and Pegangsaan neighborhoods represent a contiguous, densely populated area of the citys south and center. They are the kampung areas Jakarta is distinguished by large buildings and shopping malls rising out of traditional neighborhoods, and these are the latter and have been bypassed by the steel and glass and wide asphalt of the areas that surround them. With roughly 30,000 residents packed into just under one square kilometer, Pasar Manggis has a population density nearly six times that of Tokyo, and on par with Mumbai, India or Dhaka, Bangladesh. Flanked by the Epicentrum property development a garish office and retail complex built by New Order business tycoon and perennial presidential candidate Aburizal Bakrie and the offices of the prominent Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) on the east, the neighborhood of Pasar Manggis is abutted by the Manggarai flood gate, which pulls some 160 cubic meters of trash out of the rancid Ciliwung River every day5, and the bustling Manggarai train and bus depots.
4 Barker references the 1970 BA thesis of a Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu Kepolisian student, Soenarjo: "Suatu Analisa Tentang Tumbuhnya Gang Anak-Anak/ Pemuda di Djakarta" (An analysis of the groth of youth gangs in Jakarta), pp. 59-63. 5 http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/jokowi-praises-clean-up-of-manggarai-flood-gate/554041, accessed 19 June 2013.

Overview of Survey Areas

The areas surveyed have historically continuous populations: they provide a rich tapestry of historical youth gang activity. Significant conflicts occurred between gangs in these neighborhoods, with ritual clashes occurring each year during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan. While gang violence has declined since 2008, when clashes severely damaged a TransJakarta bus station and left dozens injured6, plenty of smaller conflicts remain in border areas or on contested territory. A spate of high school brawls in the summer of 2012 left one student dead in the neighboring area of Manggarai, a few hundred meters over the official kelurahan boundary line. Nurai Dunias research on inter school conflict revealed more ritual sophistication in the weaponry of youth gangs in richer areas: students in South Jakartas Blok-M area, for example, fight with everything from sickles and sharpened motorcycle sprockets to stingray barbs. Within Menteng and Pasar Manggis, individuals predominantly begin these conflicts, and the core catalysts are women and perceived slights or a lack of respect. These individual conflicts then degenerate into gang fights, with much ridicule and taunting preceding the fights. Due to the sheer density of the population, and particularly of the number of gangs rooted in these populations, our partners at CERIC advised us to revise our initial plans and focus on the contiguous neighborhoods of Menteng and Pasar Manggis. The focus on these two areas also complimented Nurai Dunias efforts to design positive programming for area youth. While this
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/09/13/violent-brawl-damages-busway-station-manggarai.html, accessed 19 June 2013.
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limited scope restricts the city-wide applicability of the survey results, the results we realized show a surprising density of distinct organizations and sub territories, warranting further in-depth study. The Pasar Manggis neighborhood (lurahan) is divided by its predominant gangs into two territories. Zone A lies to the west of the Pasar Rumput (grass market) area, while Zone B is to the east. The dominant gang in Zone A is Rowlink, while Kadang Kuda controls the eastern Zone B. Rowlinkwhose name derives from the thick rolling door that used to guard their headquarters has a fearsome reputation. It is among the more established groups in the area, having been in existence for several decades. One key to its longevity and survival in a highly competitive gang environment, according to interviewees, is that the only individual in the city who knows how to produce a weapon called a dorlop a lethal homemade cannon loaded with nails and other shrapnel that is capable of cutting down dozens of adversaries in a single blast is a dedicated member of Rowlink. Numerous smaller gangs exist in Zone A, including Patok (stakes), Garcil, Kebon, Bonsai, Gaplek (Cassava), Boap, Pasipur, Ciput, Kincir (windmill), Jalan Putri (Jalput), Bogor Lama, AtTaqwa, and Anggala. The membership of these gangs is fluid, with some members having multiple affiliations (including some also being members of the franchise gangs). Members of one gang will socialize with plenty of other members of other gangs, so long as they are resident in the same territory or are not disputing one anothers territory. These gang members share a common sense of identity and a broader sense of membership that applies not only to their gang, but to their neighborhood: "Lo Songong Kayak Anak Menteng Aja" (were all children of Menteng) is a common expression. The composition of these gangs is nearly all male: young men transitioning into adulthood. The gang affiliations often carry into adulthood, which is generally marked by marriage and children. Underemployment is common. Territories are marked by where these gangs hang out - areas that are not constantly marked by hanging out are assumed to be contested. In the interests of facilitating hangouts, wooden structures (Basekamp or Pos) are constructed. In Pasar Manggiss Zone A, the following gangs have the following territories: Bogor Lama controls the front of the Zone A Alfamart7, and derives income from its parking lot, working as attendants. They often create problems for the storeowners and the front of the store has hosted fights between Bogor Lama and opposing gangs. The control of the parking lot is relatively profitable for young men, and is thus contested. Pasipur has no fixed territory, and is comprised of junior high (SMP) and high school (SMA) kids who start fights when an opportunity presents itself. These fights often consist of posturing more than actual violence, with much rock-throwing and stick-waving. Boap also has no fixed territory and an SMP-SMA membership. Boap are also known for drugs - they are petty dealers and consumers. At-Taqwa, which derives its name from an area mosque, is also violent, and has a reputation for seeking out conflict rather than using violence in the more calculated and restrained manner of its more mature counterparts. Members of Gaplek have a reputation for dealing drugs. Jalput, lacking a clearly defined territory, is also known for its violent disposition.
7 Alfamart is an Indonesian convenience store chain, equivalent to Circle-K, 7-11, CVS, Londes, etc. It is a franchise operation, and its spread (along with a sister company, Indomaret) across neighborhoods in cities and towns across Indonesia is not appreciated by many locals, especially small businesspeople.

In Pasar Manggiss Zone B, the following gangs have the following territories: Pasar Manggiss Zone B is more densely populated than Zone A. The gangs there are larger, more stable, and with a seemingly older membership than the mishmash of youth gangs characterizing Zone A. The dominant gang is Kandang Kuda (Horse Stables, colloquially amalgamated as KanKud), which controls the large Pasar Rumput parking area, charging cars and motorcycles to park. They do, however, provide a service: organizing the parking and securing the cars from thieves. In addition to KanKud, smaller gangs exist: Gang Bocor (the Leak Gang) and others, comprised of junior high and high school kids who agitate and start/look for fights (mancing-mancing). This gang fractured due to ideological differences, with dissenting members of Bocor forming Pariaman. Pariaman itself is divided into two factions, Pariaman Depan (front) and Pariaman Dalam (inside). Other gangs include Pintu Air (sluice) and Menteng Wadas. Members of KanKud congregate every Saturday night in Menteng Park, where they are often joined by allies and friends from Bekasi. Interestingly, KanKud and Gang Bocor are both affiliated to a larger group: Bigshow. Pariamans two factions are both allies with another gang, Bagol. Menteng is home to groups such as the All-Stars, Ancemon, Glorados and Irega, but lacks the larger, more dominant groups found in Pasar Manggis. The gang territories are similarly fluid, but there is a rather pronounced division between them and groups from Pasar Manggis. Though Menteng has roughly half the population density of Pasar Manggis, it is still densely populated. Certain parts of Menteng are elite areas, with old Dutch colonial mansions, broad streets, and parks: numerous embassies and staff residences are found there. However, many other parts of Menteng are run-down, crowded neighborhoods, with populations of Betawis and Chinese predominating. The state of disrepair is understandably more pronounced in the areas closest to the commuter rail line and the heavily polluted Ciliwung River. Preliminary Findings: The UI volunteer researchers who surveyed the gang members in these areas had to maintain fluid schedules: members tended to be resistant to the idea of appointments. Therefore, most of the meetings were appropriately informal and often held late at night. The initial resistance to outside researchers was overcome with the help of former gang members, facilitated by Nurai Dunia, and through the generous provision of coffee, Red Bull, and occasionally, beer, although interestingly, none of the gang members proved to be especially heavy imbibers (see below). The survey was conducted in the first six months of 2013. 61 gang members and 206 residents in Pasar Manggis and Menteng were interviewed. The gang members interviewed hailed from the All Stars (9), Ancemon (8), At-Taqwa (1), Gang Bocor (7), Garcil (3), Glorados (7), Irega (7), Kandang Kuda (8), Kebon (2), Patox (3), Rowlink (3), and a breakaway faction, Rowlink Bawah (3). The gang members ranged in age from 15 to 30. The following profile emerges: the average gang member in these areas is male, 21 years old, Muslim, and Betawi, although considerations of race do not feature heavily in identity formation. He is unmarried, has no children, lives with his parents, and has an education falling between the Junior High School (Sekolah Menengah Pertama or SMP) and High School (Sekolah Menengah

Atas or SMA) level. He owns a mobile phone and his primary form of distance communication is SMS. He does not do drugs, drinks infrequently, and fights often. Gang embeddedness: The 61 gang members were specifically targeted based on their membership and introductions from Nurai Dunia. The 206 residents were selected according to random sampling methods, but interestingly, the resident pool revealed significant gang involvement as well. Of the 201 who chose to answer questions on affiliations, 32 of the residents were active gang members; 2 were active gang members with siblings in gangs; 37 were ex-gang members; 25 were not gang members but had siblings in gangs. The other 105 had no gang affiliation in their families. And so from 201 randomly sampled residents who agreed to interviews, we find a direct or indirect gang affiliation rate of 46.82% a high level of affiliation that shows how embedded such gangs are within their communities.

Community Survey Responses vs. Gang Location

Of the 61 gang members interviewed, only 2 were women. However, a large number of women are associated with these gangs, and are often the catalyst for fights between gangs: a very quick way to start a conflict with another gang member is to seek the attention of his girl. Gang Demographics: The average duration of membership across all gangs is 5.26 years8. Not all gang members are sure of the sizes of their particular gangs. Members of Rowlink, for example, cited between 100 and 700 members. Members of Rowlink Bawah, however, were uniform in their answers: 20 core members. We assume that the consistency of figures reported by members

Excluding 17 responses that were either blank, or beyond belief, including claims of membership starting at the age of 3 years old.

shows a certain continuity of membership. Average gang sizes, as reported by respondents, are as follows: Gang All Stars Ancemon At Taqwa Gang Bocor Garcil Glorados Irega Kandang Kuda Kebon Patox Rowlink Rowlink Bawah Total Members Interviewed 9 8 1 7 3 7 7 8 2 3 3 3 61 Gang size average 49 39 21 17 40 31 28 60 8 25 500 20 838 Reporting Range 45-55 25-50 21 15-20 40 25-35 20-36 40-80 8 25 100-700 20 Long-term members interviewed (>2 years) 8 6 0 3 1 7 6 n/a9 0 1 1 1 34

Territory: All interviewed gang members resided within what they perceived to be the areas of their gangs control. Thirteen gang members reported that their gangs area was not under their gangs exclusive control, while 47 gang members reported that their gang exclusively controlled its territory. Every gang member but one reported cooperative relationships with other gangs. Rowlink seems to have the most alliances with other gangs, followed by Kandang Kuda; Gang Bocor (the former two are also the gangs with the most enemies- see below); Patox; and Irega.

Approximated gang locations, based on survey responses

The responses from Kadang Kuda members conflicted with their stated ages, resulting in responses that would have placed them as members in the group since early primary school; they are excluded from this table.
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Gang recruitment: Of the 36 gang members who reported on the individual who recruited them into their gang, 26 reported that they were recruited by friends, 3 by a senior; 2 by siblings; and 5 joined on their own. Competitors and Enemies: Because the relationships between a larger group such as Rowlink or Kadang Kuda, and the smaller crews that operate within their territory is not strictly hierarchical, the survey data shows a rich variety of perceived competitors for control over their respective areas. And while smaller gangs consider themselves the younger siblings of a larger group, the fact that there was a mutual perception of contestation between large and small groups points to a certain degree of independence and independent organizational ambition. However, while every respondent identified at least one group as a potential competitor, only 22 respondents went so far as to consider other groups as their primary enemies. These characterizations of enemy groups largely followed territorial lines, pitting groups rooted in Pasar Manggis against groups from Menteng. This survey data largely confirms the patterns of clashes between the two neighborhoods as alluded to earlier in the paper. Members of Kadang Kuda displayed a near universal animosity toward groups from Menteng, though they avoided mentioning gangs such as the All-Stars, Glorados and Irega by name. And while Rowlink (and Rowlink Bawah) members also viewed Menteng gangs as enemies, two respondents included Kadang Kuda and Bogor Lama as their most hated adversaries. Conversely, while groups such as the All-Stars, Ancemon, Glorados and Irega tended to avoid the question of who they viewed as their enemies, the three members who did answer the question generally referred to Pasar Manggis-based gangs only as such, rather than naming specific groups. Within Pasar Manggis, although overall neighborhood cohesion against outside groups was high, hostility among smaller groups was also present. Two of the three Garcil members surveyed, as well as two out of three Patox members, identified Jalput as an enemy. Active Conflict with other gangs: Only 10 gang members reported no conflict with other gangs: however, this was their own personal involvement in conflict with other gangs, not their gangs conflict with other gangs. Fifty-one respondents reported conflicts with others; of these, 22 gang members reported involvement in 117 incidences of violent gang conflict over the past year, ranging from one conflict per year to 18. Of the gang members reporting conflict, the following reasons are cited by 29 gang members: bothered by another gang (1); dont know (1); continuation of an earlier fight (2); football (1); assisting friends in fighting another gang (1); lost a bet (2); responding to an attack by another gang on an individual member (1); misunderstandings (5); no real reason (1); respect and football (1); revenge (1); ridicule (4); ridicule, football, and women (1); ridicule and women (1); a trivial matter (1); women and football (1). 24% of these conflicts indirectly or directly involve fights over women (Cehweh); 24% involve misunderstandings, trivial matters, or nothing; all involve notions of respect. Of the 30 gang members who cited their conflict resolution methods in such instances, 21 gang members report that the way they address these conflicts is to directly attack the other, either gang-upon-gang or individual-upon-individual; 9 others, however33% reported that they first attempt to resolve such conflict through negotiations with the other gang. Motivation for joining gangs: Motivations varied across members, but two things never cited were crime or profit. Generally, feelings of security, togetherness, and solidarity were expressed.

Of the 61 respondents, motivations generally fit into the following categories, in order of frequency: Hanging out/ place to hang out (17); togetherness (16); find friends (7); help and security (5); gain knowledge (4); solidarity with other youth (3); find entertainment (3); forget things (2); find friends for football (1); the negative and positive things membership offers (1); strength (1); experience (1); no response (1). Criminal Records: 53 of the gang members interviewed have never been convicted of a crime; eight have been found guilty of crimes, including carrying a weapon; not having an identity card (KTP); fighting/ brawling/ brawling with supporters of an opposing football team; and drug possession. Of these 8, 3 spent time in jail; the gang member caught with a weapon spent 16 months in jail, while two brawlers spent less than a month in jail. Anecdotally, gang members revealed that the police represented only a minor nuisance in their operations: they could be easily outrun or bribed if need be. With only one police precinct (polsubsek) to cover the population of 30,000, and given the high levels of embeddedness reported, this is easy to understand. However, a much deeper fear and respect was held for the military police stationed in the area. Future aspirations of gang members, and what they believe they require to realize those aspirations: Of the 60 gang members who answered this question, the following categories of aspiration emerge, in order of frequency: Find work (16); find something better (6); get married (6); be successful (5); advance within the gang (4); professional athlete (4); higher education (3); dont know (3); make parents happy (2); be in a famous band (2); nothing (2); build a house (1); have children (1); provide a good education for their children (1); become a motorcycle racer (1); work in an office or as a secretary (1); open a dress-making business (1); open a silk-screening business (1); still planning (1). As for what these gang members to achieve these aspirations, the members generally reported that they needed connections, money, hard work, and more school. The aspiring motorcycle racer only reported that he needed a motorcycle. And one member who wishes to stay in the gang simply reported that he needed a better place to hang out. Gang members perceptions of how their communities regard them: when asked what they believed other community members thought of their gang and its activities, the following responses were offered: Very negative (1); generally negative (4); slightly negative (2); indifferent (19); slightly positive (5); generally positive (24); very positive (5); no answer (1). And so roughly 12% of surveyed gang members believe that their community regards them negatively; roughly 57% believe that the community views them positively; and roughly 32% believe that the community doesnt care either way. Community perceptions of gangs and gang activity in their neighborhoods: when 205 community members were asked about the gangs in their neighborhoods, and their activities, the following responses were offered:

Very negative (1); generally negative (14); slightly negative (12); Indifferent (43); slightly positive (25); generally positive (69); very positive (21); no answer (20). And so roughly 13% of surveyed community members regard the gangs in their presence negatively; roughly 56% regard them positively, and roughly 21% are indifferent. Gang member belief that communities view them positively correlates closely with the actual regard of communities toward these gangs- 56% and 57%. This is unsurprising given that nearly half of community respondents had their own gang linksrecall that in the gang embeddedness section above, 46.82% were ex-members, active members, had relatives that were members or other connections. Again, a high level of affiliation demonstrates that there is little division between community and gang. When asked what gang members did within the community, two of the more popular answers were that they hang out or that the community member doesnt know. When asked what services gangs offered, the following answers were given: that gangs protect kiosks; that they provide security; they provide help when theres trouble or insecurity; that they organize the parking; that they help with funerals; they patrol; and so on. A surprising number of community respondents cited the help that gang members provided their communities during the last Jakarta floods in 2013. As for the negative respondents, none of them stated anything specifically negative about the gangs: as for activities they did in the neighborhood, dont know was the universal answer from negative respondents. Community regard of the police: when asked what they would do if they had a problem with a gang in their neighborhood, out of 206 respondents, only 12 said they would go to the police. The vast majority said they would handle the problem through the gang leader or other local figures (Tokoh Masyarakat). When asked why they would not involve the police, some of the more common answers were: that they want to solve the problem quickly; that they fear the police; that its simply better to go to the controllers of the source of the problem. Gang member household economies, straight job incomes, and incomes from gang activity: 22 gang members have full-time non-gang jobs; 13 have part-time non-gang jobs; 21% are unemployed (7 are unemployed and actively seeking work, 6 are unemployed and are not seeking work), and 13 are still in school. Straight jobs earn working gang member households an average of IDR 1,336,705 per month. Across 61 gang members, the lowest straight income reported is 200,000, and the highest is 7,000,000 (from one respondent- the next highest was IDR 3,000,000). Only 20 gang members out of 61 report income from gang activity, ranging from IDR 75,000 to IDR 1,500,000. Only 16 gang members reported incomes from gang activities that were equivalent to salaries within the band of averages found in those gang members that were engaged in non-gang employment: of these 16, 15 reported gang income in addition to their regular income. The average income from gang activity was IDR 827,191 per earning member: the average income of the 15 who earned combined straight and gang incomes was IDR 2,832,333 per member. The average income of the 41 gang members not earning money from gang activities averages IDR 1,234,146, or 44% of the earnings of gang members with combined income streams. The one gang member who reported that he earned income solely from gang activities earned IDR 750,000 per month. And the highest earning from gang activities for any individual only amounted to IDR 1,500,000 per month.

What gang members did exactly to earn their money outside of normal work proved to be too sensitive a question. Anecdotally, members referred to parking and other fees collected, and given certain groups reputations as small-time drug dealers it can be assumed that this forms at least some portion of their income. However, the question was generally avoided, and the UI students exercised discretion in deciding whether such questions were safe to ask. Resident household employment and incomes: 8 of the respondents were housewives; 61 were part-time, casual workers; 104 were full-time employees; 19 were unemployed; 12 were pensioners. The average household income across 205 community respondents was IDR 3,185,268 per household. However, eliminating the extremes of either end by discounting the ten highest and lowest earners results in a more accurate average of IDR 1,788,559 per month: significantly higher than gang members with normal employment not earning incomes from their gang activities, but significantly lower than gang members with both gang and legitimate revenue streams. ICT Usage among gangs: Only five gang members do not have mobile phones. Of the five, only two have land line telephone access. Of the 57 who do own mobiles, all of them primarily use SMSs, while 23 also report accessing the Internet via their mobiles. Eight gang members own computers, 24 do not own or use computers, while 29 use computers but do not own them. All computer users are also Internet users: the perception seems to be that computers have little value or use without Internet. All computer users primarily download music; many of them access online games. The all use Facebook as well as Twitter though none of them mentioned Friendster (once the most popular social network in Indonesia) or MySpace. As many as 18 respondents also read the news online. The average Internet use among gang members was 8.56 hours per week. The most interesting usage of ICT emerged anecdotally: gang members utilize Twitter and Facebook in order to taunt and ridicule other gangs, to arrange pre-fight logistics, to organize meetings, and so on. These social networks have become normal modes of interaction, positive and negative, and represent the extension of gang territory into virtual realms. Drug Use: Although reporting biases may result in significant underreporting, 72%, or 44 gang members, do not regularly use drugs; only one reports no drug use ever. 16%, or 10 gang members, report using drugs, including riklona/reklona, alpazolam, kamlet/ chamlet, dexa/ dextro, metadon (methadone), and ramadol. Only two gang members report regular drug use; the rest only use drugs infrequently. Interestingly, the 10 respondents who reported even occasional drug use come from smaller, less-established groups, which lends some credibility to anecdotal evidence that the larger groups view drug use as a threat to their members health, and by extension, their organizational strength. This perspective, however, requires further study to yield conclusive findings. Alcohol: 62%, or 38 of the 61 surveyed gang members, consume alcohol; 36%, or 22 gang members, do not. 4 drink everyday; 6 drink many times per week; 2 drink a few times per week; 26 drink infrequently. Education: only one interviewed gang member had never attended school. Four only finished primary school, 23 only finished junior high school (SMP), and 33- 53%- finished high school (SMA).

Marital Status: 53 members are unmarried, 1 is engaged, and 7 are married. Only four of the members have children. Residence: 52 out of 62 members live with their parents. Conclusion: Significant data remains to be correlated and analysed. However, what emerges from the data that has been analyzed thus far shows youth and young adult experiences in poorer urban settings that do not differ from peer experiences in similar contexts worldwide. These are kids, acting as kids act. To the authors, the most important data emerging from the survey so far regards the future aspirations of these young men, and two young women. Only four of the 61 sought a future in their gangs: discounting the aspiring sportsmen and racers, the rest sought school, work, and a better future, and marriage and children are also mentioned. They seek the same indicators of stability that social scientists would use to measure their group volatility. The profile that emerges is, on its surface, a volatile one: young, mostly male, un- or under-employed, and prone to violence. But the actual volatility of such young people is more determinate upon the opportunities they may or may not avail themselves to, and is less determinate upon their youth, employment status, and so on. In many an inequitable, unjust and partisan society, such young men and women make up the ranks of insurgent armies. The immediate opportunities young people may avail themselves to in many a poor neighborhood are found in gangs that offer acceptance, camaraderie, respect, violence and pocket money. The work that these young people express the desire for, and all it may entailmeaningful work with a living wage, perhaps supplemented with health insurance so that injury doesnt lead to bankruptcyis not as easy to come by as it sounds in an Indonesia where the gulf between the Kampung and the skyscraper continues to grow. The gang will recede as a colorful segment of ones youth for many, and will grow for others as, cut off from other opportunities, they join the ranks of the entrepreneurs of violence that burn like coals in the niches and fractures of Jakartas blighted urban landscape. The authors will continue to expand this study as well as create geospatial representations of the findings. Please check http://independent.academia.edu/BobbyAnderson for updated survey results. Author Backgrounds: Bobby Anderson (rubashov@yahoo.com) is a development, conflict, and social risk management specialist, with 12 years of project management and research experience in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indonesia. He has worked for Peace Brigades International, the International Rescue Committee, the International Organization for Migration, and International Relief and Development, among others: he currently works for the World Bank. Bobby holds an MA in International Politics and Security Studies from the University of Bradfords (UK) department of Peace Studies and a BA in Russian & Eastern European Area Studies from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; he also lectures on Ex-Combatant Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration at the Rotary Peace Center in Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok.

Justin Snyder (jsnyder83@gmail.com) works on USAIDs Indonesia-wide KINERJA project, which strengthens the governance of public service delivery related to health, education and the business climate at the district level. Prior to this, Justin worked for as a copy editor and occasional contributor at The Jakarta Post, Indonesias leading English-language news outlet. Justin is an expert on local governance and GIS, especially regarding local budget allocations and expenditures by district across Indonesia. He holds a degree in Political Science from the University of Nebraska Lincoln.

Bibliography and Further Reading: Aspinall, Edward, and Jerry Van Klinken (eds). The State and Illegality in Indonesia. KITLV Press: Leiden, 2010. Barker, Joshua. State of Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Suhartos New Order. Indonesia 66, Oct 1998. Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad (eds). Roots of violence in Indonesia: Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective. KITLV Press: Leiden, 2002 Cribb, Robert. Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta Peoples Militia and the Indonesian Revolution 1945-1949. University of Hawaii Press: Honolulu, 1991. Ryter, Loren. Pemuda Pancasila: The Last Loyalist Free Men of Suhartos Order? Indonesia 66, Oct 1998. Siegel, James T. A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter-Revolution Today. Duke University Press: Durham, 1998. Soenarjo. Suatu Analisa Tentang Tumbuhnya Gang Anak-Anak/ Pemuda di Djakarta. BA thesis, Perguruan Tinggi Ilrnu Kepolisian, 1970. Tilly, Charles. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, in Bringing the State Back In, edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Urdal, Henrik. The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict, 1950-2000. World Bank Social Development Paper No. 14, July 2004. Van Till, Margaret. Banditry in West Java, 1869-1942. NUS Press: Singapore, 2011. Wilson, Ian. As long as its Halal: Islamic preman in Jakarta, in Greg Fealy and Sally White, eds. Expressing Islam: Religious life and politics in Indonesia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008. --. The Biggest Cock: Territoriality, Invulnerability, and Honor amongst Jakartas Gangsters. The University of Sydney, Indonesian Studies Working Paper 13, Oct 2010. --. The Changing Contours of Organised Violence in Post New Order Indonesia. Murdoch University, Asia Research Centre Working Paper 118, Feb 2005.