Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 17, No.

2 Oxford University Press 2004; all rights reserved

Smuggling into Europe: Transit Migrants in Greece1

ASPASIA PAPADOPOULOU School of Geography, University of Oxford, UK The paper aims to contribute to our understanding of the overlapping elds of smuggling and asylum, and address the less studied condition of transit migration. Based on a case study of Kurds in Greece, the paper describes the organization of the journey and the process of temporary and permanent settlement. Greece is currently one of the main entry points to Europe for migrants coming from the Middle East. In the absence of legal entry paths, almost all migrants arrive in Greece illegally. Many see Greece as the passage to Western Europe, and therefore do not apply for asylum but remain undocumented in the country for a couple of years. Some eventually leave the country, while others end up staying permanently. The paper explores the reasons behind the phenomenon of transit migration and its consequences for the migrants, the country and the EU.

Introduction Boats loaded with Kurdish, Iraqi, Afghani or Pakistani migrants cross the Aegean on an almost routine basis. While few of these migrants apply for asylum in Greece, the majority remain temporarily undocumented, hoping to leave and settle in a Western European country in the near future. In reality, this condition of temporary settlement may last for a signicant amount of time. The paper argues that smuggling and transit migration are a result of the poverty of domestic reception infrastructure and the deciencies in domestic and EU asylum policy. Following an outline of the Greek reception policy structures in the rst part, the second part of the paper describes the journey from Iran, Iraq and Turkey to Greece and the role and type of smuggling used to cross the borders. The third part analyses the condition of transit migration and permanent settlement of Kurdish refugees. The shift to permanent settlement depends on the opportunities for asylum and the degree of engagement in socio-economic activities in the host society during the rst couple of years. The nal part discusses the consequences of transit migration for the migrants, the country and the EU. One of the main aims of this paper is to argue for the importance of politics and policy dimensions in determining migration trends (Hammar 1992). To a large extent, the institutional framework of migration and asylum in the EU member states is one of control and restriction. This framework affects migration ows, by leading to an increase of irregular and asylum migration. In turn, the fear of

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irregular migration raises security concerns that direct the development of ever stricter policies known as the securitization of migration. Since the 1999 European Council meeting in Tampere (1999), which set out the elements for a common European immigration and asylum policy, intergovernmental cooperation has not managed to reduce, but only to divert the number of asylum seekers and irregular migrants elsewhere in the European Union. In other words, member states have been able to obstruct but not to control migration (Geddes 2001: 35). Irregular migration encompasses various types of irregular entry, residence and employment. Incomplete documentation is not just a matter of preference, but also often a result of institutional deciencies in the countries of origin and settlement, and unrealistic government policies that require documents people sometimes cannot obtain (Ghosh 1998: 67). This is particularly the case for forced migrants, who generally are not able to obtain documents from the country they are forced to ee. There is also another connection between irregular migrants and refugees: refugees will take the irregular path when the asylum application has been rejected and they cannot return home; about 80 per cent of those rejected stay in Europe because they cannot be sent back home due to insufcient or missing identication (Nadig 2002: 5). Refugees also become irregular when they take up irregular employment while the asylum application is processed; or when they do not apply in the country of rst asylum, hoping to obtain asylum elsewhere. The term transit migration is used for the phenomenon where migrants come to a country of destination with the intention of going and staying in another country (Icduygu 1995: 127). The intentionthat is, the decision to stay temporarily in one country in order to move onis not always clear at the beginning of the journey, but is affected by the structural context of the rst country of reception (Chatelard 2002b: 24). It is equally affected by the dynamic and potential of transnational social networks in asylum migration. Migrants usually stay temporarily in the buffer zone awaiting developments both in the homelands, such as the possibility of return, and in the transit countries, such as obtaining visas or waiting for the outcome of business ventures they have begun in these places (Wallace et al. 1996: 269). In other words, transit migration can develop into further emigration or permanent settlement. In a way, temporary residence in the rst host country is a mechanism of negotiation with the structures of exclusion in Europe. It is a way to overcome restrictive policies by residing in more than one countrysometimes illegallyand by gaining time and money until the opportunities allow migration to another, more promising destination country. In this context, transit and irregular migration need to be seen not as factual migration types, but as different phases in the migration process. A number of structural factors also account for this phenomenon. The geographical position, the exclusive asylum policies and lack of experience in combating illegal migration have transformed Central and Eastern European countries into a perfect waiting room for migrants (Okolski 2000). Similarly, Greece, being a new immigration country sharing the features described above,

Transit Migrants in Greece 169 is indirectly encouraging migrants to settle temporarily. At the same time, being in Schengenland (the countries of the European Union which allow free movement across their internal borders), Greece appeals as a potential entry and place of settlement in Europe. The paper is based on eldwork conducted in the Greater Athens Area in 20012002. This involved 50 interviews with Kurdish asylum seekers and undocumented migrants living in refugee camps, halls of residence and houses and who had been in Greece between two months and twelve years. The 35 men and 15 women were mostly aged between 2535, and originated from Iraq and Turkey, but also Iran (two) and Syria (one). The sample also included twelve migrants actively engaged in Kurdish political parties (all from Turkey), and fteen more who had been party members in Greece or in their homeland in the past (from Turkey, Iraq and Iran). The interviews were in-depth and semistructured and covered the whole migration experience, from the homeland and the reasons of ight, to the journey, arrival and settlement in Athens. They were rst recorded as personal accounts, and subsequently coded and analysed in themes. Fieldwork also involved 17 structured interviews with government and NGO ofcials on migration/asylum policy and reception in Greece, and analysis of secondary data such as parliamentary proceedings, NGO reports and briengs, and media information on migration issues. The different sources were correlated and horizontally analysed in themes relating to the asylum cycle. Migration to Greece in the 1990s and the Asylum Policy Framework Migration to Greece belongs to a broader set of contemporary migration phenomena in Southern Europe in the last twenty years. Greece shares the following characteristics, known as the South European model of migration: a multiplicity and heterogeneity of nationalities; a gender asymmetry in certain ows; an increasing participation of urban educated persons among legal and illegal migrants; and a high degree of illegality, due both to the restrictive character of EU migration policy, but also to the size and strength of informal economies that can host and sustain large numbers of illegal migrants (King and Black 1997; King 2000; Pugliese 1993; Baldwin-Edwards and Arango 1999). Today, the total number of foreigners, including regularized labour migrants (about 600,000 in 2001), irregular migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union is estimated to be close to one million (Cavounidis 2002). The signicant majority are Albanians and Eastern European nationalities. Greece has now more immigrants than any Southern European country in proportion to its population: between 9 and 11 per cent of the registered Greek labour force of 4.4 million and 25 per cent of wage and salary earners are foreigners (Fakiolas 2000: 59). Refugee movements to Greece came in ebbs and ows, with peak times the early 1990s, the years 19961997, and from 2000 onwards. Regarding nationality, roughly 50 per cent of asylum seekers and refugees during the last decade have originated from Iraq, Turkey and Iran (UNHCR 2000, 2002). The majority

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are said to be Kurds, who came to Greece in three main waves: in 19911992, after the use of chemical weapons in Halabja, Iraq and the Gulf War; in 19941995 after the escalation of violence in Southeastern Turkey; and in 19961998 due to the ongoing conict between Kurdish parties in Northern Iraq. A small number of Kurdish refugees from Turkey had already arrived in Greece in the late 1970s to early 1980s. Kurdish migration from Iraq has continued unabated up to the present, as a result of the social and political instability and economic deprivation in Northern Iraq. The number of Kurds in Greece is hard to estimate, because of the constant mobility in and out of the country, but also the absence of statistics for this particular group: applicants are recorded on the basis of citizenship (Iraq, Iran, Turkey), while ethnicity (Kurds) is mentioned in the hearing process only. In general, estimations have ranged from 7,000 to 24,000 in 19971998, and around 10,00012,000 in 2001.2 The relatively small annual number of refugees and asylum seekers gives the impression that the issue in Greece is minor. In 2002, for example, the country had a refugee population of 18,852, out of which two thirds were new applicants and people whose application was still pending.3 These numbers do not, however, reect the actual size of the refugee population, a large part of which remains undocumented, sometimes reluctant to apply; nor do they include the rejected asylum seekers, who often end up staying in the country. To state the obvious, no reliable data exists on illegal entries. Estimations are usually based on apprehensions at the moment of border crossing. The number of migrants arrested for illegal entry in 2001 was 6,800 people (Migration News Sheet, February 2002, vol. 9, 2). This does not, however, include the cases of successful entries; instead, the numbers of migrants arrested inside the country for the same year was 210,000 (Ta Nea, 25 October 2001). Another 114,181 were arrested between 1 June 2001 and 31 March 2002 (Eleftherotypia, 31 April 2002). Located at Europes southeastern border, Greece faces a major external and internal policy challenge to control irregular migration ows to the EU. Migration management has focused on the one hand on a series of regularization programmes for resident labour migrants, and on the other on the prevention of irregular migration through reinforced border protection (recruitment of additional border guards, intensication of sea patrols, penalties for smugglers).4 One of the most important aspects for Greece in the area of migration management is cooperation with Turkey, given Turkeys key geographical position in the map of SouthNorth migration movements. In November 2001, the two countries signed a Protocol for the readmission of illegal migrants.5 Its implementation, however, has not been considered successful up to nowat least from the Greek side. In practice, only very few migrants have been readmitted to Turkey. According to the Ministry of Public Order, out of 5,600 applications to Turkey for readmission in 2002, only 100 were accepted in the rst instance, and 34 after further negotiation (interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April 2003). The readmission protocol has also been criticized for not guaranteeing access to asylum for persons in need of international protection.6

Transit Migrants in Greece 171 Several recent cases of mass arrivals have shown the difculty of controlling irregular migration ows, and the ambivalent attitude of the state towards the nature of these ows. State ofcials and the public generally share the impression that most newcomers are labour migrants abusing the asylum system. As a result, state policy has been an oxymoron of providing humanitarian assistance and temporary reception facilities to newcomers, but with the aim of deporting them so as to prevent permanent settlements. Asylum policy is very much based on a rationale of restriction, as evident in the limited opportunities for gaining refugee status and the poverty of reception infrastructure. The asylum examination process is quite long, between 18 months and two years including appeals, and the recognition rate very low: while in 2000/2001 it ranged between 79 per cent, in 2002 it dropped to 0.3 per cent (1.1 per cent including humanitarian status), the lowest in the last 20 years. In the rest of the EU the rate for the same year was 21.1 per cent.7 In general, the rationale is to grant asylum to those that strictly full the 1951 Convention criteria and provide irrefutable evidence. Due to the circumstances of ight, but also the diversity of reasons for ight, it is usually very difcult for Kurds to build a case with such evidence. In addition, and despite waves of refugee arrivals since 1996 (mainly Kurds, Iraqis, Afghanis), the reception infrastructure remains very poor. With a handful of refugee camps and reception halls and the allocation of services to the international and local NGOs, the existing facilities and resources are unable to cover the housing and welfare needs of the refugee population. Asylum seekers do not receive a subsidy; however, they are given the right to employment during the time their case is being examined. In addition, and judging from interviews, access to asylum is not always easy, as migrants are not well informed about their procedures and rights. Last but not least, informal deportations of persons, including torture victims, and detention of asylum seekers have often been reported by human rights groups (NCHR 2001: 6, 2002: Introduction). These factors discourage migrants from applying in the country. As a result, they tend to remain undocumented in Greece in order to maintain the right to apply for asylum in another European country (since the 1991 Dublin Convention provides that the country of rst asylum in Europe is the one responsible for the asylum determination process). Others do register with the authorities in Greece, in order to gain protection from deportation and the right to employment, and then apply again in the second host country. They play on the chances of their case being presented later to Greece from that country; 680 such Dublin Convention requests were addressed to Greece in 2001 and 818 in 2002 (ECRE 2001, 2002). In general, the Greek framework has been criticized for lacking an effective administrative infrastructure and a coherent state plan for integrated refugee protection (Sitaropoulos 2000). In addition, it is guided by a rationale of ad hoc, temporary solutions rather than comprehensive planning for refugee reception. In the policy context described above, the opportunities for legal entry and stay in Greece are very limited. As a result, the majority of forced migrants follow the illegal path.

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Smuggling into Greece The paper is based on the assumption that the migration of the particular ethnic group is forced, and a result of a broad set of factors, including political instability, social unrest and economic deprivation in the countries of origin. The Kurds reasons for ight are not further analysed here; taking the decision to emigrate is mainly induced by a pressing need to escape. The approach taken is close to Richmonds (1993) proposition that there is a continuum from reactive to proactive migration. As will be explained further below, the selection of destination country is affected by a number of factors. For many, the crucial issue is the way out from Iraq, Turkey or Iran; the question of destination is raised at a later stage. It is almost an established practice for migrants from the Middle East to use smugglers for the exit and entry into Greece. In this case study, smuggling is a small-scale organization of movement, where smugglers and drivers (kac akc i in Turkish) are not necessarily familiar with each other and often change as circumstances demand (Icduygu and Toktas 2002). They may be individually engaged in a casual business, or be part of a local network of individuals organizing the border crossings. The Ministry of Public Order reports that 190 such networks involving Greece have been identied in the last two years (Eleftherotypia, 5 January 2003). According to interviews, the smugglers facilitating the trip from Iraq or Iran to Turkey are usually Turks, Kurds, Iraqis and Turkmens, whereas those working for the trip from Turkey to Greece are Turks, Kurds, Greeks and other Balkan nationalities. The business is quite widespread: 1,100 smugglers were arrested in Turkey in 2001 and another 843 in Greece between 2001 and 2003 (Turkish Daily News, 1 December 2001; Eleftherotypia, 5 January 2003). Migrants may also participate in the smuggling business for some additional cash. According to the UN Protocol against the smuggling of migrants,
Smuggling of migrants shall mean the procurement in order to obtain directly or indirectly, a nancial or a material benet, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or personal resident (Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000, Article 3(1), p.2).

While it is obviously a case of exploitation of people for the sake of prot, a main condition in this operation, and the one distinguishing it from human trafcking, is that of choice versus coercion (Morrison and Crosland 2001; Salt and Hoggarth 2000). In this sense, according to interviews, the Kurds who had paid a kac akc i for the crossing did choose this practice as the only professional way to be transported from the one country to the other. They are doing their job. We would not be here otherwise was the answer of one of my informants. In fact, using the smuggling service is mostly a short-term, commercial relationship between the individual offering the service and the migrant

Transit Migrants in Greece 173 client paying for it, and is terminated after the crossing. According to interviews, the kac akc i are numerous and well advertised in the local communities in Iraq, Iran and Turkey. In Greece, they are known in the refugee camps and within the migrant population, and are easily contacted by mobile phone. Turkey is the rst stop on the way from the Middle East to Europe. Migrants usually concentrate in the border cities of Van, Agri and Hakkari, and from there to Istanbul, a nodal point in the migration route. They stay in safe houses or in friends places and work in day jobs in the area, to nance the second part of the trip. My informants spent from a couple of weeks to one year in Turkey before coming to Greece. Kurds from Turkey immigrating to Europe join in the same routes. There are two main ways to Greece, by land across the GreekTurkish border and by sea, to the islands of the Eastern Aegean. According to interviews, the fee to Greece is about $1,0001,500. More than 5,000 are estimated to have crossed the border just between May and July 2002 (Avgi, 10 August 2002). Crossing the Evros River at the border is quite a perilous route and many have reportedly drowned in the river. Another danger is the border mineeld that is badly signposted and has cost the lives of 64 migrants during the last decade (Kathimerini, 29 August 2002). The kac akc i usually leads migrants up to the border and gives instructions for the paths to follow (like the pateros in the case of Mexican migration to the US, in Spener 2001: 134136), or accompanies them to the other side. Some have a specic contact for a safe house in Greece, others hide in trucks going to Athens. However, not all migrants can afford a smuggler; a quarter of my informants crossed the river on their own. The second option is the sea passage. Almost half of my informants came from Turkey to Greece by boat. Smuggling arrangements are made in Istanbul and the Turkish coastal cities. For migrants who cannot afford the extra $1,000 for the trip, there is the option of hiring a small inatable or motorboat, or even stowing away in cargo ships. The sea route is no less dangerous: it is estimated that 109 people have drowned in the Aegean between 19922001 (Metrorama, 30 January 2003). Migrants leaving Greece for Western Europe also use the smuggling service by plane (using fake passports), by road (hiding in trucks) through Albania, or by boat, hiding in the ferries going from Patras to Italy. The widespread use of smugglers by migrants seeking asylum in Europe lies at the core of the asylumirregular migration entanglement. The main problem is the fact that the state seems to be holding the type of entry (illegal) as the criterion for the categorization of migrants, at least in its conception and policy rationale. Thus, the fact that many among the stowaways and those irregularly crossing the border are in need of international protection is overshadowed by the suspicion about their illegal action. In fact, it is a vicious circle where intensication of border controls leads refugees to resort to illegal alternatives, which in turn leads to the securitization of migration. As Crisp (1999) suggests, therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between means and motivation to prevent a persons claim to refugee status from being reduced because of illegal entry. This point does not dismiss the fact that smuggling is a crime; it is a form of severe economic

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exploitation for the migrants and their families, both in the homeland and in the new destination countries, as well as a threat to human security. The receiving country is also a victim of smuggling because of the challenge to the states sovereign right to control its borders (Nadig 2002). This argument is more a suggestion to consider that, unfortunately, smuggling has become for most migrants the only way out of political and nancial desperation in their homelands and, at the same time, the only way in, in the absence of other legal entry paths into Europe. The restrictive entry criteria and the extreme difculties of the asylum process in Europe have driven people to the smuggled entry route (Koser 2001). With regard to the countries of destination, the UK, Sweden, Germany and France were the most popular among the Kurds I interviewed, followed by Canada, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Australia. A shared impression among the Kurds was that these countries, particularly the UK, Sweden and Germany, are more generous in granting asylum and social benets to refugees. This perception is based on rumours and information from smugglers and other migrants resident there. For half of my sample, the choice of destination was based on this kind of information. In other words, the main criterion for settlement is the type of asylum policies offered (Koser 1997: 600601). Some migrants had more than one choice, depending on the smuggling opportunities, and a few others did not have a particular country in mind. In fact, for many migrants the destination was Europe, understood as a broad space of safety, protection and opportunities. Return was rarely seen as an option, due to the current political and socio-economic situation in the countries of origin. As observed in migration studies, social networks assist in the migration process by providing information and resources to potential migrants and newcomers (Massey et al. 1987; Crisp 1999; Koser 1997; Boyd 1989). Indeed, Kurds with ties in Greece or other countries had been well informed before emigration about reception facilities, the asylum process, welfare provisions and meeting points in Athens. In fact, one fth of the sample came because of existing family or social ties in Greece. Yet, more informants had no social or family ties in Greece and arrived completely unprepared. In addition, ve chose Greece randomly, without any prior information or planning. Still, the choice of destination is based as much on the location of networks as it is on asylum policy criteria. Transit Migration The majority of my informants came to Greece because of its geographical proximity to the Middle East. For some people, especially victims of violence and persecution, the main question is personal security and protection. Thus, the fact that Greece is a European, democratic and safe country is a sufcient criterion for settlement, despite the asylum policy problems they face after arrival. For others, Greece is seen as the waiting room, the place to stay for a couple of years in order to pay off the debt to the smugglers and nance the second trip. This is also the dominant impression in the public and policy

Transit Migrants in Greece 175 discourse and has become a standard argument against the need to develop a reception infrastructure. In fact, this is a Janus-faced situation: it is exactly because of the absence of reception infrastructure that the migrants in Greece remain in transit. Most of them would actually consider staying in Greece, should the chances for asylum and settlement become more promising. Nevertheless, and while the term transit country is used as a justication for shifting the question of reception to the destination countries, an increasing number of migrants end up staying in Greece for more than a couple of years. It is important to explain the condition of being in transit before addressing its consequences for the migrants, the country and the region. Once in Greece, refugees nd shelter in refugee camps and halls and friends places. In the case of the Kurds, Athens and Patras, Greeces western port, are the main points of concentration: Athens, for the presence of NGOs, authorities and refugee camps, and Patras for the opportunity to stow away in ferries connecting Greece to Italy. The rst couple of months can be very difcult, as refugees have to rely on their own efforts to contact the authorities and NGOs, nd accommodation, work and assistance. The asylum seekers I interviewed stayed in refugee camps and reception halls, or in shared ats, warehouses and empty lots in downgraded city areas, together with undocumented migrants. Most men in my sample worked in day jobs in the informal economy. Women, on the other hand, did not work and usually stayed at home. Being in transit is a period of vulnerability, insecurity and socio-economic marginalization. Accommodation and employment are uncertain and subject to constant changes, while socialization is restricted to the refugee camp environment or friends in shared houses. Undocumented migrants live with the constant threat of deportation, and registered asylum seekers with the constant anxiety about the outcome of the asylum application. This transitional period can be quite prolonged, stressful, and frustrating, especially for the unemployed. In reality, this is an invisible population living on the margins, with no obligations and no rights. Survival depends on individual efforts and informal networking with the local population and NGOs. Permanent settlement or further emigration are subject to the following conditions: the progress of the asylum application, the type of employment, the prospects for proper housing in the near future and the degree of socialization during these two to three years of waiting. In fact, the length of stay is not a determinant factor. While some of my informants stayed in Greece contrary to their initial plans, others, who had hoped to settle in Greece, decided to leave after two or more years time. Other informants felt that, since they had started a life in Greece, they were not willing to move to another country. In other words, the period of being in transit is a process rather than a status, where the question of protection and the degree of engaging socially and economically in the host country will determine the decision for settlement. During this period of time, social and family networks provide signicant assistance. In fact, refugees seemed more engaged in ties with the homeland and other destination countries, than with the place where they were staying. Many of my informants in the camps were not interested in socializing with other

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camp residents, and even less with locals and migrants outside the camp, and knew very little about the city and Greek society. They also had no interest in learning the language, even though they worked in the local market. Instead, they kept regular phone contact with their friends in Germany, Sweden and England. It is a situation of living neither here nor there and engaging in transnational elds and practices. A similar situation of permanent temporariness has been observed in the case of Salvadoran migrants in the US (Bailey et al. 2002). Are transit migrants then transnational? Al-Ali et al. (2001) argue that forced migrants, especially newcomers, cannot be described as transmigrants, because they are not continuously engaged in the life of their homeland. The insecurity about their legal status and survival in the host country prevents them from doing anything that would jeopardize this status. Moreover, travelling and return, a prerequisite for the development of transnational communities, is impeded by the situation in the homelands. Forced migration, however, often leads to forced transnationalism, as refugees continue catering for the nancial and material needs of family members in the homeland (Al-Ali et al. 2001: 582591). Transnational networking becomes for asylum seekers and irregular migrants a question of survival: these connections help to overcome economic difculties for the journey and settlement, and create a sphere of communication with fellows in other countries (Chatelard 2002a). And smuggling networks are also engaged in these transnational practices. In the case of the Kurds, these activities have a bridging function between numerous locations, through regular exchange of information, resources and travelling: they may not return to their homeland, but they visit friends in other destination countries, and often stay there for a signicant amount of time. Family, relatives and friends at home give their savings and sell their property to assist with the travel fees. Migrants in Western Europe send money to those waiting at home or in the transit country. In turn, those in Greece take up part-time jobs to pay off their relatives or friends; the capital, instead of being invested in one country, circulates between homeland, transit and destination country. What Faist (2000) describes as the bridging effects of transnational linkages are here active in the transit period and continuation of the journeya case also observed among Iraqi transit migrants in Jordan (Chatelard 2002a). What this networking signies is not living in two places simultaneouslyas transnationalism is usually explainedbut living in a state of limbo. Whereas Al-Ali (2002) claims these to be emerging transnational practices, I would rather describe them as emerging transborder practices that expand beyond the bipolar homelanddestination country relation: the countries of origin, the transit country and other destination countries. Whether these practices will crystallize in stronger engagement in the homeland and the host society remains to be seen. On the other hand, the Kurds that are actively engaged in Kurdish political parties do participate in a sphere of transnational actitivities that operate in both the homeland and the host society. Participation in Diaspora politics is for them the reason and the means for migrating: the journey, arrival, accommodation and daily life have been arranged through political ties. Even more, membership in homeland

Transit Migrants in Greece 177 parties is often the purpose for settlement in Greece. In other words, political ties create a transnational sphere in the sense that practices feed in and are part of both locations. Settlement and Integration Still, some undocumented migrants and asylum seekers do settle permanently in Greece. From an institutional perspective, Greek reception structures do not seem to encourage permanent settlement at the moment, for they do not provide an infrastructure for integration from its initial phase. Migrant participation is left to depend on employment, knowledge of the language, and informal networking with Greek NGOs and locals. The structure of the Greek labour marketgrowth of the tertiary sector, seasonality and a well-established informal economyactually displays an increasing demand for exible, low-cost and unskilled labour. In addition, there is a labour shortage because of the concentration of natives in smallscale manufacturing (usually family businesses), self-employment and the public sector (Fakiolas 2000). As in the rest of Southern Europe, migrants in Greece are recruited in sectors such as agriculture, tourism, construction and domestic and other services with a high degree of informality. Asylum seekers, recognized refugees, undocumented migrants and registered labour migrants are all recruited in the same niches and with the same degree of irregularity. My informants also worked in day jobs in construction, or short-term jobs in restaurants and small manufacturing enterprises. Two Kurds, who had been in Greece for almost a decade, owned a shop. In reality, employment seems to be the key to integration in Greece, since migrant participation is understood as participation in the labour market. In relation to Soysals renowned typology of migrant membership regimes, the Greek case is closer to the liberal type of membership, where migrants are incorporated in the receiving country as workers (Soysal 1994).8 The liberal perception was also evident in the latest regularization processes (1998 and 2001) that attached the migrants right to stay (residence permit) to the work permit. In the same context of informality, relations with the host population can sometimes become a promising source of social capital. Among the Kurds interviewed, it was those who had ties with Greeks who had more stable jobs and were feeling more integrated in Greeceeven if migrant participation still ts into class boundaries of a Greek/dominant versus a migrant/marginal social stratum. In addition, judging from three cases, Kurdish men married to Greek women managed to overcome even nationality-based class boundaries. Almost all Kurds interviewed, who had spent more than a year in Greece, stated that they felt a sense of afnity with the culture, the mentality, the strength of family ties and the character of socio-economic structures in Greece. A comparison with North European receiving countries reveals a striking contrast; in Finland, Middle Eastern migrants found social interaction with locals hard to attain (Valtonen 1998). In England, Kurds found themselves withdrawing into a cultural enclave

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(Grifths 2002). The afnity that Kurds, and Middle Eastern migrants in general, feel with Greek society supports not only socialization with locals, but also access to the labour market. A similar case of easy relations with the locals and employment in the informal economy was observed among refugees from the Former Yugoslavia in Italy (Korac 2001). This factor was even mentioned as a motivation to stay in Greece, despite bureaucratic difculties and welfare deciencies. Needless to stress, informal relations may be a positive asset for the success of integration programmes, but cannot replace the need for institutional developments. Another factor contributing to the good relations between Greeks and Kurds is the Greek experience of refugeeness (Hirschon 1998) in the 1920s, with the arrival of ethnic Greek refugees from Asia Minor, and their successful integration in what turned out to be a remarkably ethnically homogeneous state (Kitromilides 1989). In a country with a refugee past, collective memory has nurtured feelings of sympathy and solidarity towards displaced persons (Voutira 2003). This is made evident in the considerable humanitarian support that local communities provide to shipwrecked migrants reaching Greek shores and the generosity of private donations in the refugee camps, conrmed by social workers I interviewed. And what is more, like many of todays Kurdish refugees, it was Turkey that the Greek populations of Asia minor were forced to ee from some eighty years ago. It is remarkable how the people of the Athenian neighbourhood of Nea Smyrni, now second and third generation of the 1920s refugees, have been supporting the undocumented Kurds in their area (Nea Smyrni Municipality 2002). In addition, Greeks have shared during the 1990s a sense of special solidarity with this ethnic group that went beyond the scope of humanitarian assistance to the tolerance of Kurdish political mobilization. Nevertheless, the receptive attitude towards refugees in general, and the Kurds in particular, has not prevented the rise of xenophobic trends, usually stemming from the discourse of security and border protection from irregular migration. At the time of my eldwork, the Kurdish families and singles I interviewed were settled in ats in various middle-class and downgraded Athenian boroughs with Greek or mixed population (mainly, Dafni, Nea Smyrni, Neos Kosmos, Egaleo, Zografou and Patissia). Black observed a similar distribution of the Kurds in Athens in 1991 (Black 1992: 16). Thus, one could argue that social networks have sustained a concentration of families in particular areas. Relations between Kurds were usually formed during the journey and at the place of arrival (i.e. reception camps), or based on locality ties (town/area of origin) and political afliations. As Wahlbeck also observed in the case of Kurds in England, interpersonal relations are the continuation of the types of social and political relations the Kurds had in their countries of origin (1998: 140141). In Greece, these ties offered psychological and material support, but they did not generate employment, which was assisted more by NGOs or relations with locals. Local migrant ties were not a strong resource for permanent settlement and integration for a number of additional reasons: the short history of Kurdish migration to Greece, the high mobility of this population in and out of the country, and the

Transit Migrants in Greece 179 maintenance of ethnic and political divisions among Kurds transferred to the host society. The main divisions were between Kurds from Turkey and the rest (from Iraq or Iran), between Kurds from the same country afliated with rival Kurdish parties, and more generally, between politicized and non-politicized Kurds. In fact, the negative environment of political divisions, the pressure exercised by the parties on individuals, and the absence of refugee issues from the parties agenda has discouraged migrants from engaging in homeland politics. For most Kurds, homeland politics are seen as an impediment to integration (Papadopoulou 2004). In a nutshell, the permanent settlement of Kurds in Greece is based on a high degree of informality in the types of employment and in development of social relations with the local population. Migrants that manage to engage in these types of socioeconomic structures develop avenues for survival that are nevertheless only partly assisted by the institutional structures (asylum and NGO provisions). As one informant put it:
. . . Its just a matter of how you feel here, how much you care that the state does not give you anything, that you will have to nd a job and a house and survive on your own. If you get used to that, you stay, if not, you go. Also, if you have started a life here, well, then you stay.

Transit Migration and its Consequences The integration of refugees in Greece is more an issue of domestic rather than European policy. Generally speaking, immigrants and refugees in Europe still meet nationally bounded education, employment, welfare and political systems (Joppke 1999: 279). The transit condition of undocumented migrants and asylum seekers in Greece, on the other hand, is a problematic issue with consequences for the migrants, the country and the EU. For the migrants, being in transit is a period of harsh living conditions, constant uncertainty and marginalization. This prolonged situation is counterproductive in the process of smooth social and economic integration. The rst couple of years are a precious time for establishing connections and access to resources, familiarizing oneself with the authorities and the local structures and nding ways to match peoples skills to the demands of the labour market. Instead this time is wasted, because, in the absence of a reception programme, migrants are not given the opportunity for access to resources, but are immediately pushed to the margins of social strata. In addition, since the majority of refugees use smugglers to come to Europe (Morrison and Crosland 2001), they are collectively treated as illegals and very often prevented from access to asylum. Needless to stress, the lack of protection and the dangers involved in irregular travelling pose a serious human security threat (Graham and Poku 2000). For the state, tolerating this situation raises moral and ethical issues about the provision of protection to displaced persons and the regulation of irregular migration ows. Even more, it poses an internal security threat, because the

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presence of an irregular population reinforces intolerance and xenophobic trends towards migrants in the country in general. The existence of irregular and transit migration in the country is impeding the development of a comprehensive integration policy for the existing migrant populations. Besides, tolerating illegal entries becomes an issue of national security and can affect foreign relations with the neighbouring countries; irregular migration from Turkey over to Greece could, for example, burden bilateral relations in the future (Tsardanidis and Guerra 2000: 334). For the EU, the presence of transit migrants in one member state results in further irregular or asylum migration ows to other countries. Many among those that remain undocumented in Greece, and for that matter also in other countries of the EU periphery, become asylum seekers in Western Europe a few years later. The movement of migrants from one member state to another is usually based on differences in reception conditions. In other words, this situation is a result of the divergence among national asylum systems and the fact that member states have been working with the principle of the lowest common denominator, that of intergovernmental cooperation, to achieve harmonization of migration and asylum policy up to now. The known impediments are problems of coordination, and the role of national histories in moral and normative perceptions of migrant participation. However, immigration and asylum issues have now become de facto common European issues. In a way, the migrants who come to Europe see the European Union as an integrated space more than the member states do. Acknowledging the level of state interdependence and need for uniform policies should not be seen as a challenge to state sovereignty, but as a means to strengthen the border control and reception capacity of each member state separately. It would also enhance the credibility and the value of refugee protection by preventing asylum abuses by non-genuine refugee claimants. Conclusion The aim of this paper has been to contribute through empirical ndings to the understanding of the relation between asylum and irregularity in the process of entry through smuggling and residence in a European country. Using smugglers is a common practice for forced migrants coming from the Middle East to Europe. By no means does this explanation legitimize smuggling operations, or approve of those who make money out of peoples desperation to leave their country. Instead, the explanation suggests that the root of the problem of illegal crossing is not the illegal practice, but the absence of legal entry alternativesand this is where the focus of policy developments needs to be placed. The phenomenon of Kurds living in transit in Greece is explained as a result of the restrictive domestic policy framework and the absence of a uniform asylum system among member states that would prevent asylum shopping and the consequent situation of refugees in orbit. Discouraged by the poverty of reception provisions and the asylum system, Kurds remain in Greece in a condition of semi-protection and socio-economic marginalization, hoping to seek asylum in

Transit Migrants in Greece 181 another EU country in the near future. This period is characterized by intensied transnational networking with Kurds in the homeland and other destination countries. On the other hand, this period is crucial for determining the place of permanent residence. The shift from temporary to permanent settlement depends on the opportunities for asylum, employment, housing and development of social relations with the local population and NGOs. For those who stay in Greece, permanent settlement and integration are based on a high degree of informality in economic and social activities. The presence of transit migration in Greece is a good example of the degree of state interdependence in immigration and asylum issues: migrants are moving between member states according to the types of rights, protection and opportunities available. The transit condition of refugees is not a domestic, but a common European issue, given that migrants themselves seek asylum in Europe. Irregular and asylum migration, temporary and permanent settlement need to be seen as different phases in the migration process. EU states now face two major challenges: rst, to provide better protection to refugees on the basis of need rather than on the basis of which country it is easier to reach through smuggling. And second, to understand and incorporate responsibility sharing as the key to strengthen their own border protection and reception capacity.

Acknowledgements I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Greek State Scholarships Foundation and the Economic and Social Research Council, UK, for their generous nancial assistance during the writing of my DPhil thesis. My thanks also to Dr Ali Rogers and Constantin Kourkoulas for their valuable support and comments on this paper.
1. The present paper is based on the authors DPhil thesis: Asylum, Transit Migration and the Politics of Reception: the Case of Kurds in Greece (20002004). An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference on Poverty, International Migration and Asylum, UNU-WIDER, Helsinki, 2728 September 2002. 2. The rst gure mentioned in interviews and in Ta Nea 5 January 1998, the second by the then Minister of Public Order, G. Romeos, Parliamentary Proceedings, Session 109. (04/04/1997), pp. 54134. The third in Triandafyllidou, A. et al. (2001), p. 50, Table 3.1. 3. 7,000 Convention Refugees, 6,188 registered asylum seekers and 5,664 new applicants in 2002, UNHCR Branch Ofce, Athens, based on Ministry of Public Order (MPO) data, www.unhcr.gr/basics/o4.htm 4. Land border control bodies were created with PD 310/1998, amended by PD 112/ 1999. Article 55 (amended) of law 2910/2001 on the illegal transportation of migrants into Greece introduces stricter punishment for smugglers (imprisonment, high penalties and vessel conscation), and foresees the provision of temporary residence permits and protection from deportation to smuggled migrants.

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5. Protocol for the Implementation of Article 8 of the Agreement between the Government of the Hellenic Republic and the Government of the Republic of Turkey on Combating Crime, Especially Terrorism, Organized Crime, Trafcking and Illegal Migration signed on 07/11/2001, and voted on 20/06/2002 (Law 3030/2002). 6. UNHCR Comments on the Protocol, UNHCR Branch Ofce, Athens, November 2001,Amnesty International, GreekDelegation, PressConference, 26/11/2001,Athens and National Committee for Human Rights (NCHR) Annual Report 2002, pp. 9192. 7. UNHCR, Report on refugee recognition rates in the EU: Greece rockbottoms the ranks, Press Release 43/03, 12/09/2003. Due to the slow processing of applications, the calculation of recognition rates is problematic; refugee and humanitarian status are usually granted to applicants whose case is still in the backlog (from the previous year). 8. The membership regimes in Soysals typology are: the corporatist (migrants incorporated through strong welfare regimes), the liberal (labour market participation), the statist (civic participation/assimilation) and the fragmented (migrants incorporated as individuals and through primordial structures).
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